On behavioral implementation

Yegane, Ece (2018) On behavioral implementation. [Thesis]

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This thesis studies implementation under complete information with boundedly rational agents. We introduce a notion called maximal choice set and define an associated maximal choice monotonicity condition on social choice rules. We show that this condition is necessary for Nash implementation when choice correspondences satisfy Sen’s property . Moreover, we prove that maximal choice monotonicity and no veto-power suffice for Nash implementation when agents have unique maximal choice sets. Our results, following Maskin (1999), provide some convenience when evaluating the Nash implementability of social choice correspondences without checking for the existence of the associated Moore and Repullo sets.
Item Type: Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords: Behavioral implementation. -- Nash implementation. -- Bounded rationality. -- Davranışsal uygulama. -- Nash uygulaması. -- Kısıtlı rasyonellik.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: IC-Cataloging
Date Deposited: 03 Dec 2018 11:13
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 10:27
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/36696

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