Assignment maximization

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Bo, Inacio and Turhan, Bertan (2018) Assignment maximization. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

[thumbnail of AfacanBoTurhan(2018)_AMM.pdf] PDF

Download (328kB)


We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated – in terms of number of assignments – in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and assign weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide comparisons with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those show that the difference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms and others in the literature is large and significant.
Item Type: Working Paper / Technical Report
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2018 16:06
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 10:54

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item