Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Salman, Umutcan (2016) Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case. Economics Letters, 141 . pp. 95-97. ISSN 0165-1765 (Print) 1873-7374 (Online)

[thumbnail of Afacan_Salman(2016)_Affirmative_Boston.pdf] PDF
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (332kB) | Request a copy


We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quota-based affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Boston mechanism; Affirmative actions; Minority; Welfare
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2016 12:19
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 09:31

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item