Digital product piracy and competition

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Okçuoğlu, Dilan (2011) Digital product piracy and competition. [Thesis]

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This thesis studies the optimal copyright protection level for a single firm. We consider two market settings: monopoly and duopoly under Cournot competition. We also analyze the optimal level in Cournot setting in two subsections: with and without a cost of implementing protection. The optimal level for the monopolist without any potential competitors is full protection. Under competition, for sufficiently high fixed cost values, the monopolist firm chooses a level which is below the monopoly setting. We also show that with implementation costs, competition is stronger.
Item Type: Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords: Copyright protection. -- Digital product. -- Piracy. -- Cournot competition. -- Cournot model. -- Copyrights. -- Telif hakkı koruma. -- Dijital ürün. -- Korsan kullanımı. -- Cournot rekabet. -- Cournot modeli. -- Telif hakları.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: IC-Cataloging
Date Deposited: 01 Mar 2013 16:02
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 09:57

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