Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules

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Kıbrıs, Özgür and Gürsel Tapkı, İpek (2010) Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules. Games and Economic Behavior, 68 (1). pp. 233-241. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity (Kalai, 1977) and scale invariance (Nash, 1950). We first show that a class of monotone path rules uniquely satisfy strong monotonicity, scale invariance, weak Pareto optimality, and “continuity”. We also show that dropping scale invariance from this list characterizes the whole class of monotone path rules. We then introduce a symmetric monotone path rule that we call the Cardinal Egalitarian rule and show that it is weakly Pareto optimal, strongly monotonic, scale invariant, symmetric and that it is the only rule to satisfy these properties on a class of two-agent problems.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Disagreement matrix; Axiomatic; Monotonicity; Monotone path rule; Cardinal Egalitarian rule
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Özgür Kıbrıs
Date Deposited: 07 Jun 2010 20:48
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 08:37
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/14011

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