Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion
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Atasoy, Özgün (2007) Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion. [Thesis]
Official URL: http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b1167587 (Table of Contents)
This study presents an investor/entrepreneur model in which the entrepreneur has opportunities to manipulate the workings of the project via hidden arrangements. We provide the optimal contracts in the presence and absence of such hidden arrangements. The contracts specify the shareholding arrangement between investor and entrepreneur. Moreover, we render anexact condition necessary for the credit market to form.
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Shareholding. -- Collusion. -- Hidden-action problems. -- Ortaklık yapısı. -- Asil-vekil ilişkisi|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Deposited On:||13 May 2008 11:20|
|Last Modified:||25 Mar 2019 16:56|
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