Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work

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Baç, Mehmet (2007) Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work. Canadian Journal of Economics, 40 (1). pp. 317-339. ISSN 0008-4085

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00410.x


The intensity of supervision, defined as the proportion of supervisors to bottom-rank productive workers, differs widely across organizations and nations. Analysing three monitoring systems that differ in their supervision intensity, I show that the possibility of collective shirking arrangements can impose a system-dependent limit on the range of implementable performances. This brings about a tradeoff in the choice of the monitoring system: the system that economizes on incentive costs may implement an inferior range of performances. Applications of the model generate work-disutility-, ethics- and job-characteristics-based explanations for variations in the intensity of supervision.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Monitoring hierarchy; collusion; implementation; incentives
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
K Law > K Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence
ID Code:5401
Deposited By:Mehmet Baç
Deposited On:23 Oct 2007 20:37
Last Modified:25 May 2011 14:22

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