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Graduate admission with financial support

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Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2020) Graduate admission with financial support. Journal of mathematical economics, 87 . pp. 114-127. ISSN 0304-4068

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.006

Abstract

We formulate a graduate admission problem, which features different financial support options, in a matching with contracts setting. We introduce an algorithm, called "Minimum-Need Adjusted Cumulative Offer Process" (MCOP). Under certain mild assumptions on students' preferences, MCOP is stable, fair, strategy-proof, and respects improvements. Moreover, it limitedly respects departments' minimum number of teaching and research assistant (TA/RA) needs in the sense that no other stable mechanism honors those needs more than MCOP. It is also efficient within the class of stable mechanisms that limitedly respect the TA/RA needs. Lastly, we offer an axiomatic characterization: A mechanism is stable and strategy-proof, and limitedly respects the TA/RA needs if and only if it is MCOP.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Matching; Graduate admission; Financial support; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Respecting improvement
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:40026
Deposited By:Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Deposited On:19 Jul 2020 09:54
Last Modified:19 Jul 2020 09:54

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