Cache-timing attacks without a profiling phase

Warning The system is temporarily closed to updates for reporting purpose.

Atıcı, Ali Can and Yılmaz, Cemal and Savaş, Erkay (2018) Cache-timing attacks without a profiling phase. Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, 26 (4). pp. 1953-1966. ISSN 1300-0632 (Print) 1303-6203 (Online)

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]PDF - Repository staff only - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3906/elk-1711-359


Theoretically secure cryptographic algorithms can be vulnerable to attacks due to their implementation flaws. Bernstein's attack is a well-known cache-timing attack that uses execution times as the side-channel. The major drawback of this attack is that it needs an identical target machine to perform its profiling phase where the attacker models the cache timing-behavior of the target machine. This assumption makes the attack unrealistic in many circumstances. In this work, we present an effective method to eliminate the profiling phase. We propose a methodology to model the cache timing-behavior of the target machine by trying hypothetical cache behaviors exhaustively. Our implementation results show that the proposed nonprofiled Bernstein's attack has comparable (and better in some test instances) performance to the original attack with the profiling phase.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Cryptography; side-channel analysis; cache-timing attacks
Subjects:Q Science > Q Science (General)
ID Code:38244
Deposited By:Cemal Yılmaz
Deposited On:06 Aug 2019 23:24
Last Modified:06 Aug 2019 23:24

Available Versions of this Item

Repository Staff Only: item control page