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Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Bo, Inacio and Turhan, Bertan (2018) Assignment maximization. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments.
We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities.
Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize
assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated – in terms of number
of assignments – in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and
assign weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide
comparisons with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those
show that the difference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms
and others in the literature is large and significant.
|Item Type:||Working Paper / Technical Report|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Deposited By:||Mustafa Oğuz Afacan|
|Deposited On:||31 Jul 2018 16:06|
|Last Modified:||22 May 2019 14:05|
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