Incompatibility between stability and consistency

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Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Dur, Umut Mert (2017) Incompatibility between stability and consistency. Economics Letters, 150 . pp. 135-137. ISSN 0165-1765 (Print) 1873-7374 (Online)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022


Stability is a main concern in the school choice problem. However, it does not come for free. The literature shows that stability is incompatible with Pareto efficiency. Nevertheless, it has been ranked over Pareto efficiency by many school districts, and thereof, they are using stable mechanisms. In this note, we reveal another important cost of stability: ‘‘consistency’’, which is a robustness property that requires from a mechanism that whenever some students leave the problem along with their assignments, the remaining students’ assignments do not change after running the mechanism in the smaller problem. Consequently, we show that no stable mechanism is consistent.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Matching theory; Market design; Consistency; Stability; Incompatibility; School choice
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
ID Code:32578
Deposited By:Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Deposited On:11 Aug 2017 12:17
Last Modified:22 May 2019 13:52

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