Career concerns and Bayesian overconfidence of managers

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Çitçi, Sadettin Haluk and İnci, Eren (2016) Career concerns and Bayesian overconfidence of managers. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 46 . pp. 137-159. ISSN 0167-7187 (Print) 1873-7986 (Online)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.005


We show that managerial overconfidence can be a rational response to the economic and institutional environment, rather than a personal trait. A manager, whose contract may not be renewed upon poor performance relative to his peers, chooses risky projects in the firm. This may result in more than half of the managers rationally estimating their abilities to be better than average. Although there can be underconfident managers in equilibrium, it is never the case that more than half of them estimate their abilities to be below average in any equilibrium.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bayesian rationality; Better than average; Career concerns; Overconfidence; Underconfidence
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:29495
Deposited By:Eren İnci
Deposited On:08 Aug 2016 15:06
Last Modified:22 May 2019 13:39

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