Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Salman, Umutcan (2016) Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case. Economics Letters, 141 . pp. 95-97. ISSN 0165-1765 (Print) 1873-7374 (Online)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.014


We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quota-based affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Boston mechanism; Affirmative actions; Minority; Welfare
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
ID Code:29369
Deposited By:Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Deposited On:14 Jun 2016 12:19
Last Modified:22 May 2019 13:38

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