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Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: pure exchange and public good economies

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Kıbrıs, Özgür (2002) Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: pure exchange and public good economies. Games and Economic Behavior, 39 (1). pp. 91-110. ISSN 0899-8256

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0884

Abstract

In order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economies when the agents are not informed about their opponents' payoffs, we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation. In pure exchange (public good) economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption, the set of allocations obtained at the linear-strategies Nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of constrained Walrasian (Lindahl) allocations with respect to the agents' true utilities. Without this assumption, the result holds for two-agent pure-exchange economies and, under alternative assumptions, for public good economies.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:bargaining; Walrasian rule; Lindahl rule; distortion game; interiority
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
ID Code:293
Deposited By:Özgür Kıbrıs
Deposited On:07 May 2007 03:00
Last Modified:28 Apr 2020 13:51

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