On the informational content of wage offers
Baç, Mehmet (2002) On the informational content of wage offers. International economic review, 43 (1). pp. 173-193. ISSN 0020-6598
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00008
This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single-play matching model with two-sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high-quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low-quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high-quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham’s Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns.
Repository Staff Only: item control page