Economics of collective refusals to supply

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Atiyas, İzak and Doğanoğlu, Toker and İnceoğlu, Fırat (2012) Economics of collective refusals to supply. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2011/0002

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This paper examines situations where vertically integrated firms refuse to supply an input to an independent competitor in the downstream market. The treatment of such cases by competition or regulatory authorities is often based on the assumption that such outcomes can only arise if there is collusion in the upstream markets. We argue that this is not always the case. In particular, we argue that proper antitrust or regulatory assessment of such cases must take into account the nature of competition, whether sales contracts are observable, the degree of contractual flexibility that is permitted, the substitutability of downstream products, and even the number of potential competitors in the downstream market.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:collective dominance, collective refusal to supply, tacit collusion, upstream competition
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD0041 Competition
ID Code:21337
Deposited By:İzak Atiyas
Deposited On:14 Jan 2013 11:45
Last Modified:31 Jul 2019 11:20

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