Stable schedule matching under revealed preference

Warning The system is temporarily closed to updates for reporting purpose.

Alkan, Ahmet and Gale, David (2003) Stable schedule matching under revealed preference. In: ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications, Qingdao, China

PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader


Baiou and Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., forthcoming) studied schedule matching where one determines the partnerships that form and how much time they spend together, under the assumption that each agent has a ranking on all potential partners. Here we study schedule matching under more general preferences that extend the substitutable preferences in Roth (Econometrica 52 (1984) 47) by an extension of the revealed preference approach in Alkan (Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 737). We give a generalization of the GaleShapley algorithm and show that some familiar properties of ordinary stable matchings continue to hold. Our main result is that, when preferences satisfy an additional property called size monotonicity, stable matchings are a lattice under the joint preferences of all agents on each side and have other interesting structural properties.

Item Type:Papers in Conference Proceedings
Uncontrolled Keywords:Stable matching; Two-sided market; Lattice; Revealed preference; Choice function.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:1117
Deposited By:Ahmet Alkan
Deposited On:02 Apr 2007 03:00
Last Modified:25 May 2011 14:23

Repository Staff Only: item control page