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State, security, and interest: limits of European integration

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İlhan, Bekir (2018) State, security, and interest: limits of European integration. [Thesis]

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Official URL: http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b1819779 (Table of Contents)

Abstract

Under what conditions do security seeker states more inclined to initiate cooperation? What determines negotiation outcomes? Standard realist explanations argue that security-seeker states rarely cooperate even if their interests converge. This study proposes an analytical framework which argues that international cooperation and negotiation can best be explained through two theories, arrayed in a multistage model, which takes its fundamental assumptions from theories of structural realism and rational bargaining. Basically, the framework requires, first, the application of structural realist theory to explain the conditions under which states initiate cooperation; and second, the application of a rationalist theory of bargaining in order to explain what determines negotiation outcomes. With respect to the emergence of international cooperation, the framework argues that power symmetry and a large number of actors, as structural factors, conjointly increase the likelihood of international cooperation. A large number of actors with evenly distributed power will be more likely to initiate cooperation because such actors will believe that relative gains and losses from cooperation will not shift the balance of power in favor of one actor. As for interstate negotiation, the framework argues that whether negotiating actors exchange concessions depends largely on the relative bargaining power of the actors rather than their military power. The study focuses empirically on the negotiations for the European Defense Community (EDC) between France and the Federal Republic of Germany and concludes that the limits of European integration lie in the changing relative bargaining power of the member states in a given policy area not the nature of that policy area.

Item Type:Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords:International cooperation. -- Interstate negotiation. -- Structural realism. -- Rational bargaining theory. -- Uluslararası işbirliği. -- Devletlerarası müzakere. -- Yapısal realizm. -- Rasyonel pazarlık teorisi.
Subjects:J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
ID Code:36764
Deposited By:IC-Cataloging
Deposited On:07 Dec 2018 23:49
Last Modified:22 May 2019 14:12

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