On the choice of a public good for agents with double-peaked preferences
Küçükbaş, Oğuz (2017) On the choice of a public good for agents with double-peaked preferences. [Thesis]
We study the problem of choosing the location of a public good on a finite interval when agents have double-peaked preferences. A preference relation is double-peaked when an agent has two most preferred spots and her location is his least preferred in between these two spots. We assume that the locations of the agents are observable and agents report only their most preferred spots. We characterize strategy-proof mechanisms, and show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for this problem. We also show that our results still hold when we replace the assumption of a finite interval with the continuity of the mechanism. Additionally, we discuss the consequences of dropping the assumption that the locations are observable, and the possibility of strategy-proof mechanisms that use the whole preference relations of the agents.
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