Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work

Baç, Mehmet (2006) Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work. (Accepted/In Press)

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Abstract

The intensity of supervision. Defined as the proportion of supervisors to bottom-rank productive workers, differs widely across organizations and nations. Analyzing three monitoring systems that differ in their supervision intensity, I show that the possibility of collective shirking arrangements can impose a system- dependent limit on the range of implementable performances. This brings about a tradeoff in the choice of the monitoring systems: the system that economizes on incentive costs may implement an inferior range of performances. Application of the model generate work-disutility-, ethics and job-characteristics-based explanations for variations in the intensity of supervision.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Monitoring hierarchy; collusion; implementation; incentives
Subjects:	K Law > K Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence
ID Code:	31
Deposited By:	Mehmet Baç
Deposited On:	30 Jan 2007 02:00
Last Modified:	23 Sep 2009 12:22

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Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work. (deposited 30 Jan 2007 02:00) [Currently Displayed]
- Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work. (deposited 23 Oct 2007 20:37)

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