Bounded memory folk theorem
Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme and Sabourian, Hamid (2016) Bounded memory folk theorem. Journal of Economic Theory, 163 . pp. 728-774. ISSN 0022-0531 (Print) 1095-7235 (Online)
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.001
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded-memory strategies. Our result requires each player's payoff to be strictly above the minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor public randomization, nor communication. The type of strategies we employ to establish our result turn out to have new features that may be important in understanding repeated interactions.
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