Filling position incentives in matching markets

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2013) Filling position incentives in matching markets. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

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One of the main problems in the hospital-doctor matching is the maldistribution of doctor assignments across hospitals. Namely, many hospitals in rural areas are matched with far fewer doctors than what they need. The so called "Rural Hospital Theorem" (Roth (1984)) reveals that it is unavoidable under stable assignments. On the other hand, the counterpart of the problem in the school choice context|low enrollments at schools| has important consequences for schools as well. In the current study, we approach the problem from a different point of view and investigate whether hospitals can increase their filled positions by misreporting their preferences under well-known Boston, Top Trading Cycles, and stable rules. It turns out that while it is impossible under Boston and stable mechanisms, Top Trading Cycles rule is manipulable in that sense.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:21783
Deposited By:Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Deposited On:27 Aug 2013 10:10
Last Modified:01 Aug 2019 10:53

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