Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2013) Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism. Mathematical Social Sciences, 66 (2). pp. 176-179. ISSN 0165-4896

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Abstract

Kojima and Ünver (2011) are the first to characterize the class of mechanisms coinciding with the Boston mechanism for some priority order. By mildly strengthening their central axiom, we are able to pin down the Boston mechanism outcome for every priority order. Our main result shows that a mechanism is outcome equivalent to the Boston mechanism at every priority if and only if it respects both preference rankings and priorities and satisfies individual rationality for schools. In environments where each student is acceptable to every school, respecting both preference rankings and priorities is enough to characterize the Boston mechanism.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Boston mechanism, characterization, respecting both preference rankings and priorities, individual rationality
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 27 Aug 2013 09:33
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:53
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/21780

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