Uncertainty and ratification failure

Kıbrıs, Arzu (2012) Uncertainty and ratification failure. Public Choice, 150 (3-4). pp. 439-467. ISSN 0048-5829 (Print) 1573-7101 (Online)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9710-x

Abstract

I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo. For their agreement to come into e¤ect, they need the approval of a third agent. The preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary ratication failures. I show that under certain assumptions, the informational deciency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences, and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Game theory - Bargaining - Signaling games - Linkage politics - International cooperation - Incomplete information
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
ID Code:	18823
Deposited By:	Arzu Kıbrıs
Deposited On:	24 Jan 2012 11:40
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2012 11:40

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Uncertainty and ratification failure. (deposited 18 Oct 2010 15:30)
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