Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme (2011) Strategic behavior in non-atomic games. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2006/0006

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In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player's belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Nash equilibrium; Strategic equilibrium; Games with a continuum of players; Equilibrium distributions
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:18340
Deposited By:Mehmet Barlo
Deposited On:23 Jan 2012 10:16
Last Modified:31 Jul 2019 09:30

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