Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme (2011) Strategic behavior in non-atomic games. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2006/0006
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Abstract
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player's belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.
Item Type: | Working Paper / Technical Report |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Nash equilibrium; Strategic equilibrium; Games with a continuum of players; Equilibrium distributions |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
Depositing User: | Mehmet Barlo |
Date Deposited: | 23 Jan 2012 10:16 |
Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2022 10:49 |
URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/18340 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Strategic Behavior in Non-Atomic Games. (deposited 26 Aug 2007 19:05)
- Strategic behavior in non-atomic games. (deposited 23 Jan 2012 10:16) [Currently Displayed]