Jobs in politicians' backyards: party leadership competition and patronage

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Abstract

What are the factors that lead to variation in the clientelistic use of state resources in electoral contexts? In this article I provide one answer to this question by focusing on the role of intra-party politics and analyzing the empirical case of patronage jobs in the Argentine provinces between 1984 and 2001. Patronage jobs in provincial administrations help governors build political support both in their own party and with the general public. However, when governors need their party (leader)'s support for their political careers and when the national party leadership position is open to competition, they reduce their clientelistic efforts not to lose the party's (or party leader's) support. The statistical analysis of public employment confirms this prediction that patronage is lower when the party's (or party leader's) support is important for politicians and when the leadership position within parties is open to competition.

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• Jobs in politicians' backyards: party leadership competition and patronage. (deposited 30 Sep 2011 10:49)
  • Jobs in politicians' backyards: party leadership competition and patronage. (deposited 18 Nov 2011 22:25) [Currently Displayed]