Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

Kıbrıs, Özgür and Sertel, Murat R. (2007) Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. Social Choice and Welfare, 28 (3). pp. 421-437. ISSN 0176-1714 (Print) 1432-217X (Online)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z


We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued.

Item Type:Article
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
ID Code:15
Deposited By:Özgür Kıbrıs
Deposited On:19 Sep 2006 03:00
Last Modified:28 Apr 2020 13:51

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