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A non-cooperation result in a repeated discounted prisoners' dilemma with long and short run players

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2008) A non-cooperation result in a repeated discounted prisoners' dilemma with long and short run players. [Thesis]

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Official URL: http://192.168.1.20/record=b1266206 (Table of Contents)

Abstract

This study presents a modified version of the repeated discounted prisoners' dilemma with long and short-run players. In our setting a short-run player does not observe the history that has occurred before he was born, and survives into next phases of the game with a probability given by the current action profile in the stage game. Thus, even though it is improbable, a short-run player may live and interact with the long-run player for infinitely long amounts of time. In this model we prove that under a mild incentive condition on the stage game payoffs, the cooperative outcome path is not subgame perfect no matter how patient the players are. Moreover with an additional technical assumption aimed to provide a tractable analysis, we also show that payoffs arbitrarily close to that of the cooperative outcome path, cannot be obtained in equilibrium even with patient players.

Item Type:Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords:Repeated games. -- Discounting. -- Prisoners' dilemma. -- Short and long run players. -- Folk theorem. -- Tekrarlanan oyunlar. -- İskonto. -- Tutuklu açmazı. -- Kısa ve uzun dönem oyuncular. -- Folk teorem.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:14140
Deposited By:IC-Cataloging
Deposited On:15 Jul 2010 11:27
Last Modified:15 Jul 2010 11:27

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