Security of distance-bounding: a survey

Avoine, Gildas and Bingöl, Muhammed Ali and Boureanu, Ioana and Capkun, Srdjan and Hancke, Gerhard and Kardaş, Süleyman and Kim, Chong Hee and Lauradoux, Cédric and Martin, Benjamin and Munilla, Jorge and Peinado, Alberto and Rasmussen, Kasper Bonne and Singelée, Dave and Tchamkerten, Aslan and Trujillo-Rasua, Rolando and Vaudenay, Serge (2019) Security of distance-bounding: a survey. ACM Computing Surveys, 51 (5). ISSN 0360-0300 (Print) 1557-7341 (Online)

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Abstract

Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Information security; cryptography; contactless; relay attacks; distance fraud; mafia fraud; terrorist fraud; distance-bounding; proximity check
Divisions: Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences > Academic programs > Computer Science & Eng.
Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences
Depositing User: Muhammed Ali Bingöl
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2019 12:52
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 10:02
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/36919

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