Yönetişim (kurumsal yönetim) kalitesi açısından icra ve kontrol işlevlerinin ayrılığı ve Türkiye'deki geleneksel yapılanmaların şirket performansına muhtemel etkisi (Separation of execution and control functions for effective governance and the potential effect of structural regularities in Turkey on firm performance)

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This paper discusses the performance implications of idiosyncratic governance arrangements, where execution and control functions overlap, in Turkey and the reasoning behind the principle of separation of the head of the executive function (Chief Executive Officer) and Board Chairmanship roles. Using the lens of management and finance theories, and with reference to the law, the regulations and generally accepted principles of good governance, the discussion highlights the conflicts of interest stemming from such overlap underpinned partly by tradition and cultural norms. The purpose of the paper is to encourage empirical research on the performance effect of such arrangements and further observations and investigations in the field. The paper is organized as follows; we first summarize the theoretical arguments in favor of separation of execution and control functions in Section 1. Section 2 discusses how this matter is addressed by generally accepted corporate governance principles and how these principles are reflected in capital market laws and regulations. In Section 3, we critically discuss the organizational regularities and common practices against the spirit of the law and regulations on corporate governance in Turkey. Section 4 concludes.