Pairing games and markets

Alkan, Ahmet and Tuncay, Alparslan (2013) Pairing games and markets. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

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Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here.
Item Type: Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords: Stable Matching, Market Design, NTU Assignment Game, Roommate Problem, Coalition Formation, Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Muhammed Alparslan Tuncay
Date Deposited: 22 Jan 2013 10:25
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 10:50

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