Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion

Atasoy, Özgün (2007) Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion. [Thesis]

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Official URL: http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b1167587 (Table of Contents)


This study presents an investor/entrepreneur model in which the entrepreneur has opportunities to manipulate the workings of the project via hidden arrangements. We provide the optimal contracts in the presence and absence of such hidden arrangements. The contracts specify the shareholding arrangement between investor and entrepreneur. Moreover, we render anexact condition necessary for the credit market to form.

Item Type:Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords:Shareholding. -- Collusion. -- Hidden-action problems. -- Ortaklık yapısı. -- Asil-vekil ilişkisi
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:8468
Deposited By:IC-Cataloging
Deposited On:13 May 2008 11:20
Last Modified:28 Dec 2008 12:43

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