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Zero-determinant strategies in dynamic environmental policy

İmren, Sura (2016) Zero-determinant strategies in dynamic environmental policy. [Thesis]

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Official URL: http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b1648969 (Table of Contents)

Abstract

In this thesis, the regulation of carbon emissions between three players is modeled as an iterated game. We let the participants be two countries providing carbon emissions and an independent regulator responsible for controlling the carbon emission levels by imposing punishments on countries. In our setting, using a zero-determinant (ZD) strategy, the regulator gains a unilateral advantage to enforce a linear relation between the expected payoffs of countries. The regulator can also set his long-run payoff to a fixed value as a social planner. We continue our analysis by proposing a method to find the optimal ZD strategy for the regulator. Furthermore, we propose an intuitive and simple cost structure for the countries in order to enable the regulator to employ an uncomplicated ZD strategy and attain a maximal ZD payoff.

Item Type:Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords:Zero-determinant strategies. -- Carbon emissions. -- Iterated games. -- Sıfır-determinantlı stratejiler. -- Karbon salınımı. -- Tekrarlı oyunlar.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:34553
Deposited By:IC-Cataloging
Deposited On:26 Apr 2018 11:34
Last Modified:26 Apr 2018 11:34

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