## Optimal life-cycle capital taxation under self-control problemsPavoni, Nicola and Yazıcı, Hakkı (2017)
Full text not available from this repository. Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12323 ## AbstractWe study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self-control problems and the severity of these problems possibly depends on age. Focusing on quasi-hyperbolic discounting, we show that if agents' ability to self-control increases concavely with age, then savings should be subsidised and the subsidy should decrease with age. Quantitatively, we find that the optimal subsidies in our calibrated model with age-dependent self-control are much larger than those implied by models with constant self-control. Our optimal subsidies are of comparable magnitudes to those implied by the 401(k) plan, even though the latter prescribes subsidies increasing with age.
## Available Versions of this Item- Optimal life-cycle capital taxation under self-control problems. (deposited 22 Nov 2015 21:15)
- Optimal life-cycle capital taxation under self-control problems. (deposited 09 Sep 2017 20:14)
**[Currently Displayed]**
- Optimal life-cycle capital taxation under self-control problems. (deposited 09 Sep 2017 20:14)
Repository Staff Only: item control page |