title   
  

Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium

Alioğulları, Zeynel Harun and Barlo, Mehmet (2016) Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium. BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 16 (2). pp. 633-647. ISSN 1935-1704

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]PDF - Registered users only - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
216Kb

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0055

Abstract

We propose a complexity measure and an associated refinement based on the observation that best responses with more variations call for more precise anticipation. The variations around strategy profiles are measured by considering the cardinalities of players' pure strategy best responses when others' behavior is perturbed. After showing that the resulting selection method displays desirable properties, it is employed to deliver a refinement: the tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium. We prove that it exists; does not have containment relations with perfection, properness, persistence and other refinements; and possesses some desirable features.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:This paper is co-authored with my former Ph.D. student Zeynel Harun Alioğulları.
Uncontrolled Keywords:Anticipation; Complexity; Refinements of Nash Equilibrium; Perfect; Proper; Persistent
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:29979
Deposited By:Mehmet Barlo
Deposited On:10 Nov 2016 11:52
Last Modified:10 Nov 2016 11:52

Available Versions of this Item

Repository Staff Only: item control page