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An experimental study of the investment implications of bankruptcy laws

Büyükboyacı, Mürüvvet İlknur and Gürdal, Mehmet Yiğit and Kıbrıs, Arzu and Kıbrıs, Özgür (2015) An experimental study of the investment implications of bankruptcy laws. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

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Abstract

We use an experimental design to analyze and compare actual investor behavior under two well-known allocation rules proposed by the theoretical literature on bankruptcy problems: Equal Losses Rule (EL) and Proportional Rule (PRO). More specically, we experimentally test the following hypotheses, forwarded by the theoretical work of Kibris and Kibris (2013): (i) total investment is higher under EL than under PRO; (ii) under both rules, a decrease in the rm's probability of bankruptcy (i.e. an increase in its success rate) serves to increase both individual and total investment levels; (iii) under both rules, more risk averse agents choose lower investment levels; (iv) under EL, agents with more risk averse partners invest more, (v) under PRO, an agent's investment choices are independent of his partner's risk attitude. Our findings support all hypotheses except (iv). We find that a switch from PRO to EL or an increase in the success rate induces higher investment choices and that more risk averse subjects invest less in general. We do not observe a signicant effect of partner's risk aversion on a subject's investment choices. Finally, we also find that the bankruptcy rule in play has a signicant effect on a subject's likelihood of choosing an extreme (that is, zero or full) investment level.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:bankruptcy, noncooperative investment game, proportional, equal losses, total investment, social welfare
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:27343
Deposited By:Özgür Kıbrıs
Deposited On:24 Nov 2015 12:44
Last Modified:24 Nov 2015 12:44

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