The optimality of team contracts
Barlo, Mehmet and Özdoğan, Ayça (2013) The optimality of team contracts. Games, 4 (4). pp. 670-689. ISSN 2073-4336
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g4040670
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable side-contracts on effort levels and realized returns. Standard constraints, resulting in incentive contracts, fail to ensure implementability, and we examine centralized collusion-proof contracts and decentralized team contracts, as well. We prove that the principal may restrict attention to team contracts whenever returns from the project satisfy a mild monotonicity condition.
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