Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2013) Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:10.5900/SU_FASS_WP.2012.20092

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We address the question of whether schools can manipulate the student-optimal stable mechanism by creating fictitious students in school choice problems. To this end, we introduce two different manipulation concepts, where one of them is stronger. We first demonstrate that the student-optimal stable mechanism is not even weakly fictitious student-proof under general priority structures. Then, we investigate the same question under acyclic priority structures. We prove that, while the student-optimal stable mechanism is not strongly fictitious student-proof even under the acyclicity condition, weak fictitious student-proofness is achieved under acyclicity. This paper, hence, shows a way to avoid the welfare detrimental fictitious students creation (in the weak sense) in terms of priority structures.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:matching, stability, mechanism, acyclicity, ctitious students
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
ID Code:20092
Deposited By:Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Deposited On:28 Nov 2012 21:33
Last Modified:31 Jul 2019 14:20

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