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Non-cooperative games on dynamic claims problems

Aslan, Ercan (2010) Non-cooperative games on dynamic claims problems. [Thesis]

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Official URL: http://192.168.1.20/record=b1304405 (Table of Contents)

Abstract

In the present thesis, we analyze the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of two different non-cooperative games. These games involve dynamic bankruptcy situations where agents have linear preferences over the set of possible allocations. We first consider a case where there are two agents and two periods (2x2) and, then, N agents and T periods (NxT). For the first game (the Steel Game) we characterize the equilibria under the renowned CEA rule. For the second game (the Hospital Game), we consider a more general set of rules. Namely, we prove that a certain strategy profile is an equilibrium under the rules that satisfy bounded impact of transfers and weak (strong) claims monotonicity for 2x2 (NxT) model and the payoffs of all equilibria are unique and equal to those of this profile's.

Item Type:Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords:Dynamic claims problems. -- Bankruptcy rules. -- Non-cooperative claims game. -- Bounded impact of transfers. -- Weak (strong) claims monotonicity. -- Dinamik alacaklar problemleri. -- İfIas kuralları. -- İşbirlikçi olmayan alacak oyunları. -- Transferlerin sınırlı etkisi. -- Zayıf (güçlü) alacakların tekdüzeliği.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:18992
Deposited By:IC-Cataloging
Deposited On:19 Apr 2012 10:32
Last Modified:19 Apr 2012 10:32

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