Uncertainty behind the veil of ignorance
Kurtulmuş, Ahmet Faik (2012) Uncertainty behind the veil of ignorance. Utilitas, 24 (1). pp. 41-62. ISSN 0953-8208
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820811000422
This paper argues that the decision problem in the original position should be characterized as a decision problem under uncertainty even when it is assumed that the denizens of the original position know that they have an equal chance of ending up in any given individual's place. It argues for this claim by arguing that (a) the continuity axiom of decision theory does not hold between all of the outcomes the denizens of the original position face and that (b) neither us nor the denizens of the original position can know the exact point where discontinuity sets in, because the language we employ in comparing different outcomes is ineradicably vague. It is also argued that the account underlying (b) can help proponents of superiority in value theory defend their view against arguments offered by Norcross and Griffin.
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