title   
  

A study of incentives in three layer hierarchies

Deniz, Emine (2010) A study of incentives in three layer hierarchies. [Thesis]

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Official URL: http://192.168.1.20/record=b1301350 (Table of Contents)

Abstract

The thesis studies the relationship between the fabrication of evidence and corruption decision of the Agent. To further study the effects of above mentioned fabrication of evidence event, the thesis also analyzes the effect of supervision and incentive scheme organization, within a three layer hierarchial system on corruption. We analyze both pure and mixed Nash Equlibrium strategies. The thesis analyze both non-cooperative and cooperative game structures. In cooperative games, we have also tackled the relationship between the ex-ante and ex-post collusion proof incentive schemes.

Item Type:Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords:Corruption. -- Corruption evidence. -- Fabrication. -- Supervision. -- Incentives. -- Collusion. -- Control methods. -- Yolsuzluk. -- Yolsuzluk kanıtı. -- Yeniden üretme. -- Denetim. -- Teşvik. -- Muvazaa. -- Denetim yöntemleri.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:18840
Deposited By:IC-Cataloging
Deposited On:03 Feb 2012 10:51
Last Modified:03 Feb 2012 10:56

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