Production economies with single peaked preferences: pareto optimal and strategy proof rules
Kıbrıs, Özgür and Tapkı, İpek Gürsel (2011) Production economies with single peaked preferences: pareto optimal and strategy proof rules. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2011/0004
We analyze production economies with a linear technology and single peaked preferences. We fi rst characterize the class of Pareto optimal (allocation) rules. We then characterize the subclass that additionally satis fies strategy proofness. Finally, we show that a uniform production rule uniquely satisfi es Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, and equal treatment of equals. A similar result is obtained if equal treatment of equals is replaced with stronger fairness properties such as no-envy or anonymity. Our results can be applied to the problem of allocating central government funds among regional development agencies.
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