Economics of collective refusals to supply

Atiyas, İzak and Doğanoğlu, Uğur Toker and İnceoğlu, Fırat (2011) Economics of collective refusals to supply. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2011/0002

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This paper examines situations where vertically integrated firms refuse to supply an input to an independent competitor in the downstream market. The treatment of such cases by competition or regulatory authorities is based on the assumption that such outcomes can only arise if there is collusion in the upstream markets. We argue that this is not always the case. In particular, we argue that proper antitrust or regulatory assessment of such cases requires analysis of the nature of competition, the shape and elasticity of the demand curve, the observability of upstream contracts, and even the number of potential downstream competitors.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:collective dominance, collective refusal to supply, tacit collusion, upstream competition
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD0041 Competition
ID Code:16407
Deposited By:Fırat İnceoğlu
Deposited On:17 Mar 2011 09:57
Last Modified:29 Jul 2019 14:58

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