Constructing a justice model based on Sen's capability approach

Official URL: http://192.168.1.20/record=b1266190 (Table of Contents)

The thesis provides a possible justice model based on Sen's capability approach. For this goal, we first analyze the general structure of a theory of justice, identifying the main variables and issues. Furthermore, based on Sen (2006) and Kolm (1998), we look at 'transcendental' and 'comparative' approaches to justice and concentrate on the sufficiency condition for the comparative approach. Then, taking Rawls' theory of justice as a starting point, we present how Sen's capability approach emerges as a justice model in light of its criticisms against Rawls. Analyzing the capability approach, we show that it satisfies the sufficiency condition of the comparative approach to a theory of justice. Building on the relation between freedom and equality as determined by the capability approach, and taking diversity in human condition as a key element, we construct a formal justice model. The justice model gives lexicographic priority to basic capabilities, existence of which are considered as a precondition for other potential functionings to develop. Then social states are ranked by lexicographically comparing their common and aggregate capability sets, where the first is defined as the intersection and the second as the union of the capability sets of the members of the society. We argue that giving priority to the common capability set captures the egalitarian aspect of the capability approach, while subsequently focusing on the aggregate capability set reflects its emphasis on freedom. Moreover, we adopt a cardinality method for ranking individual capability sets.