title   
  

The interaction between potential criminals' and victims' demands for guns

Baç, Mehmet (2010) The interaction between potential criminals' and victims' demands for guns. Journal of Public Economics, 94 (5-6). pp. 337-343. ISSN 0047-2727

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF (working paper) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
10Mb
[img]
Preview
PDF (This is a RoMEO green publisher -- author can archive pre-print (ie pre-refereeing)) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
169Kb

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.01.004

Abstract

I develop a model with endogenous gun ownership and study the interaction between the demands for guns by heterogeneous potential offenders and victims. I show that the interaction depends on pervasiveness of guns, injury probabilities and, in particular, the impact of the gun on the probability of success against armed relative to unarmed adversaries. While the sanction on armed offense is maximal under plausible conditions, the sanction on unarmed offense balances direct deterrence benefits against marginal deterrence costs and corresponding net property losses. Optimal gun control policy disarms all offenders but allows the attractive potential victims to own guns. The paper also discusses the effects of enforcement and price controls on the demands for guns and welfare.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Demand for guns; Offender-victim interaction; Sanctions; Social costs
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
K Law > K Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence
ID Code:14004
Deposited By:Mehmet Baç
Deposited On:07 Jun 2010 15:25
Last Modified:25 May 2011 14:18

Available Versions of this Item

Repository Staff Only: item control page