Repeated games with one-memory
Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme and Sabourian, Hamid (2009) Repeated games with one-memory. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (1). pp. 312-336. ISSN 0022-0531
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.003
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1-memory strategies. We establish the following in games with perfect (rich) action spaces: First, when the players are sufficiently patient, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds with 1-memory. Second, for arbitrary level of discounting, all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported with 1-memory if the number of players exceeds two. Furthermore, in this case all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε-equilibrium with 1-memory. In two-player games, the same set of results hold if an additional restriction is assumed: Players must have common punishments. Finally, to illustrate the role of our assumptions, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained with 1-memory. Thus, our results are the best that can be hoped for.
Available Versions of this Item
Repository Staff Only: item control page