

THE OTTOMANS AND THE CRIMEAN WAR (1853-1856)

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is about the role of the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and the impact of the war on Ottoman state and society. The study is based mainly on archival material from the Ottoman archives in Istanbul. Chapter 1 reviews the existing literature on the subject in various languages with a more detailed coverage of the Ottoman/Turkish and Russian sources. Chapter 2 analyzes the diplomatic, economic and political origins of the war as well as the European and Ottoman public opinion before the war. Chapter 3 is about the battles of the war and diplomatic negotiations during the war, from the point of view of the Ottoman involvement in these battles. This chapter dwells on the Ottoman war effort and military practices. Chapter 4 is on the finances of the war. It attempts to assess the war expenses of the Ottoman Empire and how they were met, including the story of the first two Ottoman foreign loans as well. Chapter 5 is on the social impact of the war on the Ottoman state and society. This chapter includes subsections on the status of women, the Reform Edict of 1856 and the question of Muslim and Non-Muslim equality, slavery and the Black Sea slave trade, municipal affairs in Istanbul, law and order in the provinces, desertions and the *başıbozuk* troops as a source of disorder, Ottoman public opinion and patriotism. Finally this dissertation argues that the Crimean War had an important role in Ottoman modernization.

Key words: Crimean War, Ottoman Empire, Reform Edict of 1856, Paris Treaty of 1856

OSMANLILAR VE KIRIM SAVAŐI (1853-1856)

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ÖZET

Bu tez, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun 1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı'ndaki rolü ve savaşın Osmanlı devlet ve toplumu üzerindeki etkisi hakkındadır. Tez esas olarak Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi'nden belgelere dayanıyor. 1. Bölüm'de konu üzerine çeşitli dillerdeki mevcut literatür Osmanlı/Türk ve Rus kaynakları üzerinde daha çok durarak gözden geçiriliyor. 2. Bölüm savaşın diplomatik, iktisadi ve siyasal kökenleri ile savaş öncesindeki Avrupa ve Osmanlı kamuoyunu irdeliyor. 3. Bölüm savaşın muharebeleri ve savaş süresince meydana gelen diplomatik görüşmeleri Osmanlıların bu muharebelere ve görüşmelere katılımı açısından ele alıyor. Bu bölüm Osmanlı savaş çabaları ve askeri pratiklerini anlatıyor. 4. Bölüm savaşın finansmanı üzerine. Bu bölüm Osmanlı devletinin savaş giderlerini ve ilk iki Osmanlı dış borçlanması dahil olmak üzere bu giderlerin nasıl karşılandığını değerlendirmeye çalışıyor. 5. Bölüm savaşın Osmanlı toplum ve devleti üzerindeki toplumsal etkisi hakkında. Bu bölüm kadınların statüsü, Islahat Fermanı ve Müslüman-Gayrimüslim eşitliği sorunu, kölelik ve Kara Deniz beyaz köle ticareti, İstanbul'da belediyeçilik, taşrada kanun ve nizam, firarlar ve bir nizamsızlık kaynağı olarak başıbozuk askerleri, Osmanlı kamuoyu ve yurtseverlik altbaşlıklarını içeriyor. Sonuç olarak bu tez Kırım Savaşı'nın Osmanlı modernleşmesinde önemli bir rolü olduğunu savunuyor.

Anahtar sözcükler: Kırım Savaşı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Islahat Fermanı, 1856 Paris Antlaşması

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The staff of the BOA has been very helpful. I am especially grateful to Fuat Recep, Dilek Cansel and Ayten Ardel for their help in deciphering some difficult words in the documents. I have held conversations with Dr. Mustafa Budak, deputy general director of the BOA, whose doctoral dissertation was on the Caucasian front of the Crimean War. Dr. Budak has also kindly given me the copies of some documents which were at that time in use by the staff of the BOA for a collection of documents on the Crimean War. I must add that historians of my generation should be happy to work in much better technical conditions in this archive than, say, 10 years ago. Furthermore, the atmosphere in the BOA is such that everybody is ready to help others.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. AMD.	Sadâret Amedî Kalemi
A. DVN.	Divan-ı Hümâyun
A. MKT. MHM.	Sadâret Mektubî Mühimme
A. MKT. NZD.	Sadâret Mektubî Nezair ve Devair
A. MKT. UM.	Sadâret Mektubî Umum Vilâyat
AGKK	<i>Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs.</i> Ed. Winfried Baumgart.
AKAK	<i>Akty, Sobrannye Kavkazskoyu Arkheograficheskoyu Komissieyu.</i> Tiflis, 1863-87.
ATASE	Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih Arşivi, Ankara.
AVPRI	Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Moscow.
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul.
C. AS.	Cevdet Askeriye
CH	<i>Ceride-i Havadis.</i> Ottoman semi-official newspaper.
DMA	Deniz Müzesi Arşivi, Istanbul.
DŞA	<i>Dâr-ı Şûray-ı Askerî</i> (Military High Court)
FO	Foreign Office
GARF	Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow.
GPIB	Gosudarstvennaya Publichnaya Istoricheshkaya Biblioteka, Moscow.
HR. MKT.	Hariciye Nezâreti Mektubi Kalemi
HR. SFR (04)	Hariciye Nezâreti Paris Sefareti
HR. SYS.	Hariciye Nezâreti Siyasi Kısım
HR. TO.	Hariciye Nezâreti Tercüme Odası
ILN	<i>The Illustrated London News.</i>
İ. DH.	İrade Dahiliye
İ. HR.	İrade Hariciye
İ. MMS.	İrade Meclis-i Mahsus
İ. MSM.	İrade Mesail-i Mühimme
İ. MTZ.(05)	İrade Eyalat-i Mümtaze Mısır
İ. MVL.	İrade Meclis-i Vâlâ
MVL	Meclis-i Vâlâ-i Ahkâm-i Adliye, (Meclis-i Vâlâ in short) The Supreme Council for Judiciary Ordinances.

NYDT	<i>New York Daily Tribune</i> . Newspaper.
OBKS	<i>Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Savaşı 1853-1856</i> . Ankara: BOA Yayın Nu. 84, 2006.
PRMA	<i>Papers relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey and the Defence and Capitulation of Kars. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty</i> . London: Harrison and Sons, 1856.
RGIA	Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenny Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, St. Petersburg
RGVIA	Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenny Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, Moscow.
RGVMF	Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota, St. Petersburg
<i>Savaştan Barişa</i>	<i>Savaştan Barişa: 150. Yıldönümünde Kırım Savaşı ve Paris Antlaşması (1853-1856)</i> . 22-23 Mayıs 2006. <i>Bildiriler</i> . İstanbul: İ. Ü. Ed. Fak. Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, 2007.
TNA	The National Archives, London. (Formerly the Public Records Office, PRO)
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu
TV	<i>Takvim-i Vekayi</i> . Ottoman official newspaper.

LIST OF GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES

Turkish	Russian (in transcription)	English / French
Ahışha, Ahıska	Akhaltzykh	Akhaltzikh, Akhaltsik
Ahılkelek	Akhalkalaki	Akhalkelek
Akmescit	Simferopol	Simferopol
Akyar	Sevastopol	Sevastopol
Almalu, Elmalı	Alma	Alma
Anakra	Anakliya, Anakriya	Anakria
Başgedikler	Bashkadyklar	Bashgedikler
Boğdan	Moldava	Moldavia
Cizre	Djezire	Jezireh, Jezira-ben-Omer, Jazira
Çamçıra, Çamşıra	Ochamchire	Shemsherrai, Tchamshirah
Çatana	Chetati	Cetate, Citate

Turkish	Russian (in transcription)	English / French
Çürüksu	Churuk-Su, Kobulety	
Eflak	Valakhiya	Wallachia
Erzurum	Erzrum	Erzeroom
Gözleve	Yevpatoriya	Eupatoria
Gümrü	Aleksandropol	Alexandropol
Hocabey	Odessa	Odessa
Halep		Aleppo
İsakçı, İsakça	Isakchi	Isaktschi, Isacchea
Kancaçay	Kacha	Katscha
Kefe	Feodosiya	Feodosia, Kaffa
Kılburun	Kinburn	Kinburn
Megrelistan	Megreliya	Mingrelia
Oltaniçe	Ol'tenitsa	Oltenitza
Or Kapusu	Perekop	Perekop
Özi	Ochakov	Ochakof
Rahova	Rassova	Rassova
Rusçuk	Ruschuk	Ruse
Semirzağan	Samurzakan	Samursachan
Sohum, Sohumkale	Sukhumi	Souchoum, Sukhum, Soukoumkale
Süzebolu	Sizopol'	Sizepolis
Şekvetil, Şefketil	Svyaty Nikolai	St. Nicholas
Şumnu	Shumla	Shumla, Schumla
Trabzon	Trebizond	Trapezund
Tutrakan, Totrakan	Turtukai	Turtukai
Üsküdar	Skutari	Scutari
Yergöğü, Yerköy	Zhurzhev	Giurgevo
Ziştovi	Svishtov	Sistov
Zugdidi	Zugdidi	Sugdidi

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATES

All Ottoman-Turkish proper names have been given in their modern Turkish orthography. Thus, instead of Omar (or Omer) Pasha we have Ömer Pasha. Nevertheless, the final –d has been preserved. Thus, instead of Ahmet, Mehmet and Mahmut, I preferred Ahmed, Mehmed, Mahmud etc. Geographical proper names with a different Turkish version have also been given in the original Turkish version, with their European counterpart provided in the list of geographical names. Thus we have Gözleve instead of Eupatoria and Şekvetil instead of St. Nicholas.

Russian personal Christian names were not anglicized but their original orthography was maintained. Thus, instead of Nicholas I and Alexander II, we have emperors Nikolai I and Aleksandr II. Russian proper names were also transliterated in a phonetic way, closer to their pronunciation. Thus, instead of Evgeny (or Eugene) and Muraviev, I used Yevgeniy and Muravyov which correspond better both to the pronunciation and spelling of these names.

European proper names that appear in Ottoman texts are also duly given in their original spelling as far as possible.

Muslim (*Hicri*) and Julian (*Rumi*) dates were converted to the Western calendar by using the online calendar converter at the website of the TTK (www.ttk.gov.tr).

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE SOURCES

1.1. Introduction

The subject of this dissertation is the Ottoman involvement in the Crimean War of 1853-56. The necessity for such a study arises from the fact that while there is a huge literature in the European languages (including Russian) on the topic, there hardly exists any modern, up-to-date, comparative, scholarly monograph based on original research in Ottoman sources and focusing on the Ottoman state and society. The main concern of this study is to re-construct the narrative of the war as experienced by the Ottomans, setting the record right by an up-to-date, comparative study of factual data from primary sources. In so doing, I will also examine the political, economic, social and intellectual impact of the war on the Ottoman state and society. Language barriers, neglect and even ignorance of the Ottoman archival material have hitherto prevented Western and Russian historians to devote sufficient attention to the role of the Ottomans in the war.¹ The present study aims to fill this gap in the historiography of this all-European, proto-world war of the long 19th century. While a good deal of the Western historiography focused on the origins of the war and the role of diplomacy, the present study will rather be interested in the conduct of the war itself and its implications, results and impact upon the Ottoman state and society.

There are two big gaps related to the Ottoman Empire in the overall historiography of the Crimean War, despite the rich international literature on the subject. One of them is, as said above, that Western and Russian historians do not use Ottoman sources. The other is that the Ottoman and Turkish historians themselves have neglected this topic and their references also come from Western sources. Although recently there have been new studies and some dissertations written in Turkey, the

1 Prof. David Goldfrank adds “parochialism” to the list of causes. See his article “The Ottoman Empire and the Origin of the Crimean War: Sources and Strategies”, in *The Turks* 4, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002, p. 233.

general outlook of the Turkish historiography on the subject is not very bright. Existing general histories of the 19th century give scanty place to the war and the few monographs on the topic confine themselves to making a summary of Western sources, whereas Ottoman archives are open and the subject is waiting for its researchers.

The Crimean War is the only all-European war in the one hundred years between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. It is also the only war in the 19th century when the Ottomans held victory against Russia. Of the ten wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire from 1678 to 1917, only three ended with victory for the Ottomans. The Crimean War is also the only time when two European great powers, Britain and France fought against the Russians on the side of the Ottomans. The Crimean War indeed proved to be of utmost importance for the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. It officially introduced the Ottoman Empire into the European state system, the so-called *Concert of Europe*. The Crimean War is an exceptional example of Russian diplomatic isolation due to Russian Emperor Nikolai's personal miscalculations and successful alliance policies of the Porte. Ottoman statesmen, however, would soon find out the “practical” value of being included in the European system or becoming allied with European powers, when in 1877 their hopes of British or French help against Russia did not materialize. Even the promulgation of the 1876 Constitution did not help the Ottoman Empire to gain European favour. Nevertheless, the doctrine of Turkey's geopolitical strategic importance carried over into the 20th century.

One of the possible reasons of the relative oblivion concerning the war in Turkish historiography is that the war is seen as bringing too much trouble although the Ottoman Empire was on the victorious side at the end of it. In fact, the Treaty of Paris neutralized the Black Sea for both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Territorially the Ottoman Empire neither gained nor lost, but it was exhausted economically and morally. Soon after the war the idea that it was quite a useless and senseless war gained popularity in both European and Ottoman public opinion. Public opinion was indeed important during the war: We can argue that the Crimean War was the first war in world history where public opinion did matter. This was in part due to the wonderful effect of the telegraph and photography, bringing news from the front almost daily. In 1877 when Russia again attacked the Ottoman Empire, the British were still under the influence of this public opinion, however, this time Britain took Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire as a reward of its support without going into war. That Britain could gain its ends without going to war against Russia also contributed to the common (especially British) notion that the Crimean War was useless. Such a view is very misguided because it does not

pay attention to the tensions between Russia and Europe over the influence over the Ottoman Empire. Needless to say, these tensions were based on very material interests and not on some personal matters or religious quarrels.

From a wider perspective, the Crimean War divides the long 19th century (from 1789 to 1917) into two periods, ending the reign of peace in Europe after the Napoleonic wars. It starts the age of modern warfare and many military novelties. It gives us a prototype or foretaste of the long trench wars of the First World War. There has been a debate around how to call this war properly. Recently some new studies, especially those of Trevor Royle² and Winfried Baumgart³ also challenged the naming of this war. They have pointed to the inadequacy of the term Crimean to describe the war. On this point I feel sympathy with them. I think this war comes very close to the definition of a “Proto-World War” or an All-out European War. Some Turkish sources call it simply the 1853-56 Turco-Russian War, which is doubtlessly as narrow as the term Crimean. Not surprisingly, there is very little mention of the Baltic and White Sea fronts of the war in Turkish historiography.

We can ask a very legitimate question: what is a World War or a European War? How should we define it? Should we define it by the importance and number of belligerent states? That is, by whether all great powers participate in it? Alternatively, should we define it by the extent and proximity to Europe of the war areas? The Crimean War was fought on six fronts and not just in the Crimea: in the lower Danube, in the Black Sea, in the Baltic and White Seas, and in the Caucasus. All major powers either actively fought or came close to war, as in the case of Austria. Now the only missing party for this war to be called a world war seems to be the USA. Then, was the USA a great power in the middle of the 19th century? Did it have a say in world politics? I rather think it did not. Nevertheless, even the USA came close to breaking its isolationist stand in world politics during the war.

On the other hand, I was surprised when I first discovered that Russian sources also used the term *Vostochnaya Voyna* (eastern or oriental war). The term was first used in Europe (*guerre d'Orient*) and came to Russia later. Nevertheless, as in many other cases, this intellectual invention proved to be more permanent in Russia than in Europe. Russian historians used the term as if it was an originally Russian term. As for the

2 Trevor Royle. *Crimea. The Great Crimean War 1854-1856*. London: Little, Brown and Company, 1999. Second edition: London: Abacus, 2000. As is seen from the title, like many other Western narratives of the war, the book starts the war from 1854, when Britain and France joined the war, ignoring the battles of 1853 to a great extent.

3 Winfried Baumgart. *The Crimean War, 1853-1856*. London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Turkish historiography, naturally there is no mention of an “eastern” or “oriental” war. In some cases the war is called Turco-Russian war of 1853-56. I think the term *Vostochnaya Voina* is useful only in that it reminds us the so-called Eastern Question of the 19th century. Apart from that, it is of course rather Eurocentric. What is east of Europe may well be west of Asia. Geographically speaking, for instance, Trans-Caucasus (*Zakavkaz'e* in Russian), is the area *beyond* the Caucasian mountains for Russia, Ukraine and also for Europe, but for someone looking from Turkey, it is the area *before* the Caucasian mountains, or it is simply the Caucasus. Nevertheless, such kind of Euro-centrism or Orientalism is so powerful that that we find even some Ottoman and Turkish sources using the literal translation of Trans-Caucasus or *Zakavkaz'e* as *Mavera-i Kafkas* or *Kafkaslar Ötesi*.

One of the problems of the Ottoman-Turkish historiography was that it simply did not have recourse to Russian and did not use Russian sources. I would like to give a small example of the consequences of this. The name of the Russian extraordinary ambassador Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menshikov is usually misspelled in Ottoman and Turkish sources as *Mençikof* while the correct form in Turkish would be *Menşikov*. Only in the work of Akdes Nimet Kurat we encounter a correct spelling of his name. The confusion probably stems from using French sources instead of Russian or from the influence of the Italian, which was still a popular *lingua franca* between the Ottomans and the Europeans. In the Ottoman archive the name of the Russian extraordinary ambassador is mostly spelled as *Mençikof*, although there are instances of the more correct spelling of *Menşikov*. History textbooks of the 1930s use the almost correct form, *Menşikov*. From the 1950s onward we observe a return to the old incorrect form of *Mençikof*. Even recent publications still misspell his name as *Mençikof*. This seemingly insignificant spelling error in fact mirrors a lot about the perils of using secondary sources and not checking the orthography of proper names.

What’s more, in Turkey, Russian history and Turkish-Russian relations came to be written by émigré intellectuals who fled the Russian revolution and who were very fervently anti-Russian and anti-Soviet. These historians could not be objective in their studies due to personal affiliations and ideological-political engagements. One of them, Prof. Akdes Nimet Kurat, who comes from an *ulema* and *mirza* family, has written two voluminous books on Russian history and Russo-Turkish relations from such a perspective. In the period of cold war, it was hard to find unbiased approaches to the questions of Russo-Ottoman relations. Now the ice is broken, there are more and more Turkish researchers willing to learn Russian and study these relations in a more relaxed

and objectively detached way.

The method used here is comparative historical social analysis that aims to present a balanced view of all sides without any nationalist agenda to prove the “heroism” of one side and / or the “cowardice” of another. This requires a thorough critique of the nationalist, imperialist, state-worshipping and apologetic discourses in the Ottoman, Turkish, Russian and European historiographies.

1.2. Ottoman and Turkish Sources

Now let us begin our survey with the primary and secondary sources of the Ottoman-Turkish historiography on our subject.⁴ First a few words about the archives. In Turkey, the most important archive is of course the Prime Ministerial Ottoman archive in Istanbul (BOA). It contains the former archive of the Ottoman foreign ministry as well. The other related archives in Turkey are those of the Turkish Naval Museum in Istanbul (DMA) and of the General Staff in Ankara (ATASE). I applied to the DMA in January 2006 and only at the end of May 2006 I was told that my application was rejected without citing any reason. Therefore I did not apply to the ATASE. However, I do not think that I have lost much, because, as we will see later, there are two doctoral dissertations related to our subject that have used these two military archives and their results imply that these archives may not contain much significant information on our topic.

The Ottoman official chronicler (*vakâinvis*) Ahmet Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895), served in this office from 1855 to 1865 and he wrote his *Tarih-i Cevdet*, a history of the Ottoman Empire from 1774 to 1825. After that he continued to write historical notes or memoranda (*Tezâkir*) about current events of his time for his successor at the post of chronicler, Lütfî Efendi. Cevdet Pasha was a first-hand witness of many of the events he describes in his notes. Although he was a protégé of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1799-1857), he managed to survive under all cabinets, because he was also a bureaucrat of all times, capable of preserving his position amid changes in the government. Cevdet Pasha's observations are sharp and witty. Prof. Cavid Baysun first began publishing the whole

4 For an introduction to the Ottoman-Turkish historiography of the Crimean War, see Candan Badem, “The Treatment of the Crimean War in Turkish Historiography”, *Vostochnaya (Krymskaya) Voina 1853-1856 godov: Novye materialy i novoe osmyslenie*. Tom 1, Simferopol: Krymskiy Arkhiv, 2005, pp. 24-35.

of the *Tezâkir* only in 1953.⁵ Until then it was a manuscript. Another work of Cevdet Pasha that concerns us is the *Ma'rûzât*, which covers the period from 1839 to 1876.⁶ The work was written on the order of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909). It was also published lately in 1980. Although the subjects of the two works overlap, the *Tezâkir* is more reliable because it does not try to appeal to Sultan Abdulhamid II. In general, Cevdet Pasha is an influential source for our subject. Some mistakes in the secondary sources originate from his account of the war. But in any case Cevdet Pasha is a very valuable and indispensable source for understanding the attitudes of the Ottoman bureaucracy towards the war. He was the first Ottoman chronicler to attempt a reform in Ottoman historiography by introducing comparative analysis and social history into it. It is a pity that even those international historians who read Turkish have neglected him.

Ahmed Lütfi Efendi (1816-1907) was the Ottoman official chronicler after Cevdet Pasha. From 1866 until his death Lütfi was responsible for the chronicle of the period 1826-1876. Unfortunately, his work is very insipid, insignificant, scanty and without much analysis. In many cases he copies from the *Takvim-i Vekayi* and the *Tezâkir*. Lütfi wrote his chronicle when many participants and statesmen of the time of the Crimean War were still alive, yet in so many cases where he gives so little information, he simply makes the following comment: “only this much information has been given in the *Takvim-i Vekayi*”! Nevertheless, on the question of the actual losses of the Ottoman army during the Crimean War, he writes of his having applied to the war ministry and their inability to give an answer. The new edition of his chronicle by Münir Aktepe is unfortunately full of transliteration errors. For example, the French Admiral Bruat figures as “*amiral bir zat*”.⁷ On the same page, the name of the Russian schooner *Alupka* is transformed into “*Elvikali*”. In the same sentence, the date of the capture of the *Alupka* (*Kanun-ı Evvel* 1269) is converted into December 1852, while in reality it corresponds to December 1853. The French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys appears as “Verone (?) de Louis”, (question mark by Aktepe), etc.⁸ Admittedly, the Ottoman script can be very troublesome for some foreign words; in this case, however, the editor is not excusable, because it is easy to check out who the French foreign minister was at that time.

The scarcity of Ottoman primary sources may at times be disappointing for the

5 Cevdet Paşa. *Tezâkir*. Ed. Cavid Baysun. 4 vols. Ankara: TTK, 1991. First Edition 1953.

6 Cevdet Paşa. *Ma'rûzât*. Ed. Yusuf Halaçoğlu. Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınevi, 1980.

7 Lütfi Efendi. *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi. C. IX*. Yayınlayan Prof. Dr. Münir Aktepe. Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1984, p. 209.

8 Op. cit., p. 216.

historian of the Ottoman Empire. Although the BOA contains a great wealth of documents, they are by their very nature prosaic and official. The two newspapers in Turkish, the official *Takvim-i Vekayi* and the semi-official *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis* are also very dry and colourless. What is missing is personal narratives, memoirs. As it has been noted by James Reid, while many Russian and British officers have written their memoirs, Ottoman officers did not, with a few exceptions.⁹ Thus in the absence of Ottoman personal narratives, we have to make do with those of the foreign officers who were temporarily in Ottoman service such as the Hungarian György Kmety (Ismail Pasha), the Pole Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Pasha) and the British naval advisor Adolphus Slade (Mushaver Pasha), General William Fenwick Williams, Colonel Atwell Lake and Doctor Humphry Sandwith. (Their memoirs will be dealt with below in subchapter 1.4.). The Ottoman exceptions are those of Zarif Mustafa Pasha (1816-1862),¹⁰ governor of Erzurum in 1853 and commander of the Anatolian army from March to October 1854; Nafiz Efendi,¹¹ an artillery officer who wrote on the siege of Silistria of 1854, and Major Osman Bey (alias Frederick Millingen), step-son of Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha (1853-54 and 1859-61). During the war, Osman Bey was the adjutant (aide-de-camp) of Müşir Mustafa Pasha, the commander of the Batum army from August 1854 to August 1855. Osman Bey's article was also published in a Russian journal in 1877 and has not been translated into Turkish to the best of my knowledge.¹² In fact there are no references to this article in Turkish literature. Osman Bey went over to the Russians in 1874, converted to Orthodoxy, and became a major in the Russian army by 1877 when he wrote his article. Like his mother Melek Hanım, he is very hostile to Islam, but he is not biased against all Muslims; he even shows some sympathy to Muhammed Emin, the *naib* of Sheikh Shamil (1797-1871) in Circassia. He gives us interesting information about his stepfather's relations with Mustafa Pasha and others. Aşçıdede Halil İbrahim's memoirs are only very slightly tangential to the war: He was appointed *ruzmançeci* (daybook accountant) of the Anatolian army in March 1856 and when he arrived at Erzurum in April 1856, peace

9 James J. Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire. Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000, pp. 47-51.

10 Enver Ziya Karal (ed.). "Zarif Paşa'nın Hatıratı 1816-1862", *Bellekten* IV, Ankara, 1940, pp. 442-494. These memoirs had not been published anywhere until 1940.

11 Nafiz Efendi, "Krepost' Silistriya v 1854 godu", *Voenny Sbornik* 106(12), 1875, pp. 488-502. M. Bogdanovich writes that the article is the translation of part of a brochure published in 1874 in Ottoman Turkish. The editor of *Voenny Sbornik* remarks that the article is published as a rare example of "Turkish" military literature. I could not find the Ottoman original.

12 Mayor Osman Bey. "Vospominaniya o 1855 gode", *Kavkazskiy Sbornik*, vol. 2, 1877, pp. 143-214.

had already been declared.¹³

It would be very interesting to read the memoirs of Ömer Lütfi Pasha (1806-1871), the commander-in-chief, Müşir Selim Mehmed Pasha and Müşir Mustafa Pasha of the Batum Army, Abdi Pasha, Kerim Pasha and Vasıf Pasha of the Anatolian Army, Vice-Admiral Osman Pasha, commander of the Ottoman squadron at Sinop, etc, if such memoirs existed. Indeed the memoirs of any Ottoman officer or soldier or bureaucrat would be very valuable. We only have the statements (evidence) of some pashas during their trial at the MVL for their misdeeds in battles and in the administration of the army. Unfortunately for historians, Ottoman statesmen like Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuad Pasha (1814-1869) have left no memoirs either, except for the unauthenticated political testaments by Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha.¹⁴

On the other hand, there is a rich literature in Turkish, mostly poetry and theatre plays on the Crimean War. There are many military marches (*harbiyye*), epic poems (*destan*, *zafername*) and epic folk songs (*koçaklama*). Some of the *destans* are indeed good sources for information on the war. For example Salih Hayri's *Hayrabat* is such a work.¹⁵ The editor Necat Birinci informs us that Salih Hayri, also known as “*Türk Hayri*”, was a quarantine officer in Istanbul and a protégé of Âli Pasha. He must have talked to many people and listened to many high officials during the war because he gives much specific information about the war. Unfortunately, this modern Turkish edition of the *Hayrabat* by Necat Birinci is not free from transliteration errors of proper names. Thus Russian generals Muravyov and Brimmer become “Moradif” and “Barimov”, the title of the Georgian rulers, Dadyan, becomes “Tatya”, the British officer Teesdale (Mir Teesdale) becomes “*mir-i tez-dil*”, geographic name Çengel is turned into “Haykel”, Zugdidi into “Zükdit” and Poskhov into “Boskhov”, etc. Necat Birinci refers to Fahrettin Kırzioğlu's work, but seems not to have read it carefully, because if he had done so, at least some of his mistakes could have been prevented.¹⁶ Birinci has provided some useful biographical notes, however, these also include some errors, such as confusing the Hungarian-British refugee Hurşid Pasha (Richard Guyon) with another Hurşid Pasha, who was a slave of Yahya Pasha and confusing Abdi Pasha

13 Aşçıdede Halil İbrahim. *Hatıralar*. İstanbul: İstanbul Ansiklopedisi Kütüphanesi, 1960.

14 See Roderic Davison, *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1999, pp. 27-40, 47-64. Also see Engin Akarlı, *Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyyetnameleri*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1978.

15 Salih Hayri. *Kırım Zafernamesi - Hayrabat*. Hazırlayan Necat Birinci. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988. Written first as manuscript and published partially in 1883.

16 Cf. Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, *100. Yıldönümü Dolayısıyla 1855 Kars Zaferi*, İstanbul: Işıl Matbaası, 1955, pp. 210-213.

with a certain Circassian Abbas Pasha. In his biographical footnote for Sheikh Shamil, the editor even argues that Shamil was a “Turkish hero”.¹⁷ Shamil was, as is well known, ethnically an Avar from Dagestan. Though he accepted the authority of the Ottoman caliph, he never considered himself a “Turk”.

Another important *zafername* or *destan* is Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni's *Manzume-i Sivastopol* that was first printed in 1869.¹⁸ Ahmed Rıza was a trader from Trabzon who had business in the Crimea. He seems to have been in Gözleve, Sevastopol, Kerç and Sohum and talked to Ottoman officers during the war. He has depicted many battles of the war. While his account is not altogether reliable, especially for numbers, it is not entirely without interest either. Occasionally he gives an interesting piece of information or interpretation. Veysel Usta's recent edition is in general good, with some minor biographical errors in dates and persons, like confusing Kerim Pasha with Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha and giving a totally unrelated Hüseyin Pasha's biography for Riyale Bozcaadalı Hüseyin Pasha who died during the battle of Sinop, and a few transliteration errors. Usta's introduction also contains a few minor errors like bringing the French and British troops to the defence of Silistre.

Other known *destans* are Aşık Selimi's *Rus Destanı*, Eflâki's *Şuregel Destanı*, Karlı İbrahim Baba's *72 Kars Destanı*, Gülzârî's *Destan-ı Sivastopol*, Karlı Süleyman Şâdi's *Muzaffername*¹⁹ and Râzi's *Destan-ı Şeyh Şamil*.²⁰ Apart from these, Bezmi, Yusuf Halis Efendi, Hayali, Cemali, Ervahi, Muhsin and Safderi have also written or composed such epics.²¹ Among them Yusuf Halis Efendi, who was an Arabic translator in the Translation Bureau of the Sublime Porte, stands out as probably the first Ottoman-Turkish patriotic poet. He wrote many poems in the newspaper *Ceride-i Havadis* during the war and then these were published in October 1855 under the title of *Şehname-i Osmani*.²² These were epic and patriotic poems and marches in plain Turkish

17 Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 96.

18 Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni. *Manzume-i Sivastopol*. Hazırlayan Veysel Usta. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2000.

19 See Selahattin Tozlu. “Kırım Harbi'nde Kars'ı Anlatan Kayıp Bir Eser: Muzaffer-Name”, *Akademik Araştırmalar* 1(2), Erzurum, Güz 1996, pp. 123-144.

20 Ömer Faruk Akün. “Eski Bir Şeyh Şamil Destanı”, in *Atsız Armağanı*, Erol Güngör et al (eds.), İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1976, pp. 17-59.

21 See Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, “Yardıma Koşan Manevi Ordu ve Kırım Harbi (1853-56)”, *Kubbealtı Akademi Mecmuası* 16 (3), Temmuz 1987, pp. 25-41. By the same author, “1853-1856 Kırım Harbi'yle İlgili Destanlar”, *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi. Ankara: 22-26 Eylül 1986. Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, V. Cilt, Ankara: TTK, 1994, pp. 1977-2009. Also see Cahit Öztelli. *Uyan Padişahım*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976, pp. 344-371.

22 Yusuf Halis Efendi. *Şehname-i Osmani*. İstanbul: Ceride-i Havadis Matbaası, 1855. For some of these poems, see Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, ibid, pp. 53-55 and 214-215. Also see Cahit Öztelli, ibid, pp. 372-373.

that are probably the first of its kind. For example, he used the word *vatan* (*la patrie* or fatherland) in a very European and modern way. Before, the word simply meant one's place of birth or native area. His *Destan-ı Askeri* contains lines resembling the Marseillaise of the French (*Vatan oğulları gayret edelim*).

Namık Kemal, one of the first Turkish patriotic poets and by far the most famous of them in the 19th century, wrote the first patriotic Ottoman (and Turkish) theatre play *Vatan yahut Silistre* which took its theme from the siege of Silistria in 1854. Thus the word *vatan* was for the first time used in a theatre play. Indeed the literary legacy of the Crimean war in Turkish literature is interesting and could be a good topic of for a separate study. Nevertheless, such literature (with a few exceptions) is of little value for writing the history of the war. It is all the more surprising that despite the old tradition of Ottoman prose writing, we have few prosaic narratives of this war other than epic poems.

For periodicals, I had some luck. I must be thankful to Hakkı Yapıcı, who in his master's thesis has transliterated many articles about the war that appeared in the *Takvim-i Vekayi*. This has saved me much time, notwithstanding the fact that he has mistransliterated many foreign proper names, without bothering to find their original spellings. The result is such that the British ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe appears as “istirak fort dö rödklif”, the French ambassador Baraguey d'Hilliers as “Brake Diliye”, Generals Raglan as “Reğlan”, Canrobert as “Kanrober”, Pelissier as “Pilise”, Colonel Simmons as “Senmis”, Colonel Ballard as “Bilard”, Captain Dymock as “Katin Dimak”, British steamship Retribution as “Tirebiyaşün” and elsewhere “Deretere Büyüşün”, Yılanlı Tabya as “Bilanlı” Tabya, Ozurgeti as “Azerkit”, Zugdidi as “Zekdide”, Muravyov as “Morafbif”, General Williams as “Vilyamis”, Major Teesdale as “Tizvil”, Colonel Lake as “Lık”, etc. The thesis covers the period from 13 August 1853 to 30 June 1856.

Hüseyin Hüsnü's *Saika-i Zafer* (Lightning of Victory)²³ and Hayreddin Bey's *1270 Kırım Muharebesinin Tarih-i Siyasisi* (A Political History of the 1270 [1853] Battle of the Crimea)²⁴ are two monographs that do not offer much insight. The first is a summary account derived from foreign sources and the latter is mainly about the diplomatic history of the question of the “holy places”. Hayreddin Bey (later Hayrettin Göçen?) was a bureaucrat of the ministry of foreign affairs. Although he says that he

23 Hüseyin Hüsnü. *Saika-i Zafer*. Istanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1292 [1876].

24 Hayreddin Bey. *1270 Kırım Muharebesinin Tarih-i Siyasisi*. Istanbul: Ahmed İhsan Matbaası, 1326 [1910]. New simplified edition: *Kırım Harbi*. [Hazırlayan: Şemseddin Kutlu]. Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi 1001 Temel Eser, 1976.

has made a lot of research for the book, the result is not satisfactory, unfortunately. He was aware of the existence of Cevdet Pasha's *Tezâkir*, but he could not get hold of it. He also writes that he went to Paris, but he could not gain access to the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the end, one cannot help but feel sympathy to him because he has at least tried to do original research.

Ali Fuat Türkgeldi (1867-1935), who served as head secretary (*mabeyn başkatibi*) of the Sultan from 1912 to 1920, has written some important articles which were later published in a book that includes many documents which are not available elsewhere.²⁵ I have been unable to locate some of these documents in BOA; others must be either lost or still unclassified. Among these rare documents is an account of the proceedings of the war council in Istanbul in September 1853, narrated by Rifat Paşazade Rauf Bey (later Rauf Pasha). The three volume work was published only in 1960 by Bekir Sıtkı Baykal who has also written probably the first research based article on the question of the holy places. A deficiency of this work is its inattention to dates, mixing the Russian old style (Julian calendar) dates with the Gregorian (*Miladi*) calendar.

Ali Haydar Emir has published some documents about the naval battles of the war in the naval journal of *Risale-i Mevkute-i Bahriye* (Periodical Naval Pamphlet) in 1916 and 1918.²⁶ Another naval officer, Ali Rıza Seyfî has written a series of articles about the Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha and fall of Kars in 1855, drawing largely from Laurence Oliphant's book.²⁷ These articles were published in the *Donanma Mecmuası* (Journal of the Fleet) in 1912.²⁸

The first book from the republican era of Turkey belongs to Captain Fevzi (Kurtoğlu).²⁹ Kurtoğlu was a teacher at the Military Naval School (*Bahriye Mektebi*). He is also the author of many works on Turkish naval battles. This work is a military history of the war focusing on military-naval techniques and technology. However, he does not analyse Turkish defeats, devoting too little space to them. One exception is the Sinop naval battle of 30 November 1853, which is given in some detail. However, even

25 Ali Fuat Türkgeldi. *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye*. 3 vols. Yay. Haz. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1957-60. Second edition 1987.

26 Ali Haydar Emir [Alpagot]. “Kırım Harbinin Safahat-ı Bahriyesine Mütcellik Vesaik-ı Resmiye”, *Risale-i Mevkute-i Bahriye*, cilt 3, numero 2, İstanbul, Kanun-u Evvel 1332 [December 1916], pp. 49-62, 193-202, cilt 4, numero 11-12, Eylül - Teşrin-i Evvel 1334 [Sept. - Nov. 1918], pp. 481-502, 529-545.

27 Laurence Oliphant. *The Trans-Caucasian Campaign of the Turkish Army under Omer Pasha. A Personal Narrative*. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1856.

28 Ali Rıza Seyfî. “Serdar-ı Ekrem Ömer Paşa'nın Maverâ-i Kafkas Seferi ve Kars Niçün Sükut Eti?”, *Donanma Mecmuası*, İstanbul, 1327-1328 [1912], pp. 2017-2022, 139-142.

29 Yüzbaşı Fevzi [Kurtoğlu]. *1853-1855 Türk-Rus Harbi ve Kırım Seferi*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1927.

here he makes some factual mistakes. As captain of the *Fazlullah* frigate, (former Russian frigate *Rafail* captured by the Ottomans) he cites Kavaklı Mehmet Bey whereas in reality it is Ali Bey, who was taken prisoner by Russians and thanks to Russian painter Ivan Aivazovskiy, there is even a portrait of him published in Vasiliy Timm's *Russkiy Khudozhestvenny Listok* in 1854.³⁰

Another book from an officer belongs to Captain A. Tevfik Gürel, published in 1935.³¹ This is a rather superficial military history without serious research and with many factual and even grammatical errors. Besides, almost all foreign and many Turkish proper names have been misspelled, such as Menshikov being spelled as “Minçikof”, Bebutov as “Robodof”, Vasif as “Vasfi”, Muravyov as “Moravyef”, Vivian as “Viyoban”, Canrobert as “Kont Rober”, Sandwith as “Sandoviç”, Osten Saken as “Ostan Saksen”, Vrangell as “Varangel”, Gözleve as “Güzelova”, Simferopol as “Sahferpol”, Sasık Göl as “Sarık” Göl, Şekvetil as “Şevketil”, etc. The author also confuses Mustafa Zarif Pasha, commander of the Anatolian army, with Mustafa Pasha of Batum army and Müşir Mehmed Selim Pasha of the Batum army with Ferik Selim Pasha of the Bayezid army corps. He also does not realize that General Cannon and Behram Pasha are not two different persons but the latter is simply his new Muslim name. As James Reid has noted, Gürel also mistakenly states that Ahmed Pasha commanded at the battle of Kürekdere, without naming Zarif Pasha.³² One of the rare good parts of the book is those passages that are taken directly from the Russian General Andrey Nikolaevich Petrov's book. (Gürel acknowledges Petrov).

As we have said before, in 1940 Enver Ziya Karal published the memoirs of Zarif Pasha, who was the governor of Erzurum at the beginning of the war and the commander in chief (*müşir*) of the Anatolian army from February to the end of October 1854. These memoirs are very important because they are the only known memoirs of an Ottoman pasha about the Crimean War, except for the court evidences and interrogations of Abdi Pasha, Ahmet Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha as well about their participation in the war. In fact, part of Zarif Pasha's memoirs is also part of his testimony at the military court in Istanbul. I have found in the BOA another copy of the second part of Zarif Pasha's memoirs, related to his commandership of the Anatolian

30 Vasily Timm (Georg Wilhelm). *Russkiy Khudozhestvenny Listok*. St. Petersburg, 1854.

31 Kur. Yzb. A. Tevfik Gürel. *1853-55 Türk-Rus ve Müttefiklerin Kırım Savaşı*. Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1935.

32 Reid, op. cit., p. 238. Reid mentions some other shortcomings of Gürel's work as well. However, as we will see in Chapter 3, Reid is not fully right in his critique of Gürel's narrative of the behaviour of the Ottoman troops in the Battle of Balaklava on 25 October 1854. (Gürel's account in general is not correct either).

army from February to October 1854, among the documents related to his trial.³³ There are some slight differences between this document and the one published by Karal. Zarif Pasha (also called Mustafa Zarif or Zarif Mustafa Pasha) had written his memoirs in Istanbul towards the end of 1854 while he was under custody for charges of corruption, made by the British military commissioner Colonel Williams. Zarif Pasha had been dismissed after the defeat of the Ottoman army in the Battle of K rekdere (or G kdere or Kurudere) in August 1854 and after the reports of Williams. As Karal noted, Zarif Pasha’s memoirs covering the period from 1829 to 1854, do not give us any information on the great changes of his time beginning with the *Tanzimat*, focusing instead only in his petty affairs like how much money he accumulated, how he bought his wife, etc. These memoirs indeed may serve as an indication of the intellectual, cultural and military interests of a successful, careerist Ottoman officer of the pre-war years. Nevertheless, Zarif Pasha still makes some valuable observations. For example, he attributes his imprisonment to Stratford de Redcliffe’s personal grudge against him because of his handling of some affairs of the Christians in Jerusalem in 1847, when he was the governor (*mutasarrıf*) there. Karal transliterated and wrote an introduction to these memoirs. He has also noted the problem of the lack of memoirs of Ottoman statesmen. On the other hand, Karal has made some errors (for example, spelling Azğur (Atskhur) as “Azgor”, Norşin as “Nurşin”, Şüregel as “Şirk l” and, as Fahrettin Kırziođlu noted, *somar* as “*himar*” and Ahilkelek as “Ahleklik”) and omissions in transliteration (such as not transliterating the words “*ve konsullar*” but giving in Arabic letters). Karal’s biographical notes on the officers also contain many mistakes, such as mistaking the Polish refugee officers Arslan Pasha (Bystrzonowski) and Şahin Pasha (Breansky) for some other Ottoman pashas with the same names, mistaking the illiterate chief of staff of the Anatolian army Ahmed Pasha for the Nazır Ahmed Pasha of the Rumeli army, who was one of the first graduates of the *Mekteb-i Harbiye* (War Academy), mistaking the Prussian Ferhad Pasha (Stein) for another Ferhad Pasha, etc. Karal makes some useful editorial comments as well, however, he does not ask the most delicate question: Did Zarif Pasha commit embezzlement? The fact that Karal received the memoirs from a grandson of Zarif Pasha must have complicated matters.

In 1943, Ali Rıza Seyfi translated Adolphus Slade’s important book.³⁴ This is in general a good translation into Turkish with some minor mistakes and omissions and a

33 BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 10.

34 Rear-Admiral Sir Adolphus Slade (Mushaver Pasha). *Turkey and the Crimean War. A Narrative of Historical Events*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1867. Translation: *T rkiye ve Kırım Harbi*. Istanbul: Genelkurmay X. Ş., 1943.

few real blunders. The book is long out of print and I think a revised edition is much needed.

Karal has devoted 35 pages to the Crimean War and the Rescript of Reform in his *Osmanlı Tarihi*.³⁵ Karal's bibliography on the subject includes only four books and two articles. One of these books is Hayreddin Bey's above mentioned book. Karal is of the opinion that the British ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe was happy to see that war had began against Russia. Karal totally omits (or is unaware of) the White Sea and the Pacific fronts of the war and does not mention the battles of Başgedikler, Ahışa, Kürekdere etc and the Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha. He even argues that at the time of the fall of Sevastopol (September 1855), Ömer Pasha defeated the Russians in “Eupatoria”, while in reality the battle of Gözleve took place in February 1855 and Ömer Pasha had left the Crimea for Trabzon shortly before the fall of Sevastopol. In short, besides unfounded conclusions and interpretations, Karal’s account includes many omissions and material errors in dates, numbers, etc. For example, he gives the number of Ottoman troops landed in September 1854 in the Crimea as 60,000, which was in fact only about 6,000. (The number of Ottoman troops in the Crimea reached 55,000 to 60,000 only in 1855).

Fahrettin Kırzioğlu (1917-2005), a native of Kars, published in 1955 a book titled *1855 Kars Zaferi* (“1855 Kars Victory”) on the centennial anniversary of the Battle of Kars.³⁶ For him it was victory, despite the fact that one month after this victory the Kars garrison capitulated to the Russian army. In general, Kırzioğlu's work has a strong anti-Russian bias. The relative merits of his work are some good research in the BOA (considering the conditions of work in the archives at that time), use of at least one Russian source (*Blokada Karsa*, Tiflis 1856), although without giving its original title, and collection of some unknown Turkish local epic folk poetry on the war. He has also used the works of the English doctor Humphrey Sandwith (whose name he turns into “Sandoviç”) and Colonel Atwell Lake (whose name he spells as “Lik”). In 1994, in a symposium on “Kars and Eastern Anatolia in the Recent History of Turkey”, Kırzioğlu states the Russian casualties (dead and wounded) from the unsuccessful Russian attack on Kars fortification as more than 20,000, although in his 1955 book he had given a more reliable and accurate figure (around 7,000) depending on reports of the Ottoman commanders. He repeats Cevdet Pasha to the effect that “this battle was greater than the battle of Silistria” and “Kars victory was greater than Sevastopol victory”.

35 Enver Ziya Karal. *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. V. Ankara: TTK, 1995. First edition in 1947.

36 Fahrettin Kırzioğlu. *100. Yıldönümü Dolayısıyla 1855 Kars Zaferi*. Istanbul: Işıl Matbaası, 1955.

In 1957 Emin Ali Çavlı published a superficial treatise written for the occasion of the centennial anniversary of the Treaty of Paris.³⁷ Like Gürel, Çavlı changed Gözleve into Güzelova, which means “beautiful plain”; being unaware that Gözleve itself is a Turkic (Tatar) word, which means a hunters’ hut. He also uses the spelling of “Menchikov” for *Menşikov*. As James Reid has noted, Çavlı failed to consider even the basic issues of the war.³⁸

In 1959 Can Yücel translated Stanley Lane-Poole’s biography³⁹ of the British ambassador Lord Stratford de Redcliffe into Turkish.⁴⁰ Yücel’s father Hasan Ali Yücel wrote a long preface to the translation. Allegedly this was a summary translation of those parts of Poole’s book that related to “Turkey”. However, in reality, a whole chapter from the book, directly related to the Ottoman Empire, was omitted. This chapter (vol. II, ch. 18) is on the question of the punishment of the “Christian Renegades” (that is to say Ottoman apostates, those Christian subjects who after having converted to Islam returned back to Christianity) in the Ottoman Empire. Thus Yücel’s translation is a very partial translation or rather an arbitrary summary of those parts related to the Ottoman Empire. Many pages, paragraphs, sentences and words have been omitted. The translation contains many minor errors and some blunders as well. Some of these translation errors and some of the omissions are indeed deliberate distortions. For example, the expression “had murdered one of his Christian concubines” is translated as “*Hıristiyan olan karısını öldürmüştü*”, thus making the perpetrator (Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha) murder “his wife who was Christian”. It is impossible and not necessary to show all the translation errors here. Yücel has also turned *Menşikov*’s name into *Mençikov*, under the unhealthy influence of Turkish historiography. The book was reprinted in 1988 and in 1999 without any revision.

Akdes Nimet Kurat published a book on Russo-Turkish relations in 1970.⁴¹ Although his account is much biased against Russia, we must admit at least one merit of Kurat: he has spelled correctly Menshikov’s name, (*Menşikov* in Turkish) thanks to his ability to read Russian. Kurat seems to have read Temperley and Tarle (in fact he cites

37 Emin Ali Çavlı. *Kırım Harbi (Paris Muahedesi 1956)*. Istanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1957.

38 Reid, op. cit., p. 238.

39 Stanley Lane-Poole. *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning: Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*. Two volumes. London & New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888.

40 *Lord Stratford Canning’in Türkiye Anıları*. Çev. Can Yücel. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1959. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1988. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999.

41 Akdes Nimet Kurat. *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1798-1919)*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970.

only three sources on the Crimean War, including these two authors). He also seems to have visited the Ottoman, Austrian, British, French, German and even Swedish archives, but his account of the war is surprisingly very superficial and contains several blunders. First of all, he really confines the Crimean War to the battles in the Crimea and for him the war begins in 1854 (instead of 1853). In his narrative, Prince Menshikov's mission to Istanbul, then the Russian occupation of the Danubian principalities and the battle of Sinop all happen in 1854, whereas all three of these events happened in 1853. He does not mention the Danubian front at all and for the Caucasian front, he only mentions shortly at the end that Kars had been captured by the Russians. Kurat considers that the theatre of war was transferred from Wallachia and Moldavia to the Crimea, whereas the principalities were involved in the war only tangentially, most of the battles being fought along the Danube or south of it, as in the case of the siege of Silistria. Then he claims that the "Ottoman-Turkish" forces in the Crimea raided Russian positions (*Osmanlı-Türk kuvvetlerinin Rus mevzilerini basması*), while in fact it was the Russians who attacked the Ottoman forces in Gözleve. (The Russians were repulsed). He then argues that Nikolai I died of grief when he received the news of the defeat of the Russian army in Gözleve, which is rather an exaggeration. All of this gives the impression that he did not read Tarle carefully.

Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı's biography⁴² of Mehmed Namık Pasha gives some important information on the then Minister of Commerce and Public Works Mehmed Namık Pasha's (1804-1892) loan mission to Paris and London in 1853-54. Sinaplı, who claims to be a relative of Namık Pasha, gives some correspondence of Namık Pasha from the BOA. However, as in many other cases, this information is intertwined with misinformation and one has to be careful. Sinaplı shows the attitude which is so characteristic of so many traditional Turkish Ottomanists: an uncritical narrative of the events and simple juxtaposition of the documents. He unquestioningly accepts whatever Namık Pasha says. Finally his work is full of transliteration mistakes, such as reading the name of Kostaki Musurus, the Ottoman ambassador in London, as "mösyö Roz", "Mösyö Ruso" and also "Kostaki mösyö Roz". Other examples are "İrdin" and then "Alberti" for the British prime minister Aberdeen, "Golsmod" for the London banker Goldsmid, "Kalerond" and then "Kile Rondone" for Clarendon, the British foreign minister, "Lord Reklen" for Lord Raglan, the British commander in chief, "Derin Döives", "Dinin de Lhinyi" and then "Doroin Dolayı" for Drouyn de Lhuys, the French

42 Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı. *Şeyhül Vüzera Serasker Mehmet Namık Paşa*, İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1987.

foreign minister, “*mühimma imkan*” for *meh-ma-emken*, etc.

In the 1990’s and after, Besim Özcan wrote several articles on some aspects of the Crimean War. His doctoral dissertation is also about the Battle of Sinop (See subchapter 1.2.3.). He has also written a book on the financial situation and the war “policy” of the Ottoman subjects during the war.⁴³ There he published long lists of contributions to the so called “*iane-i harbiye*” (war assistance), which was in fact a war tax. In Özcan’s view, these were only voluntary donations showing the willingness of the population in their support of their government’s war against Russia. However, there are many documents in the BOA showing that the *iane-i harbiye* was for all practical purposes a tax, only euphemistically named so, the amount of which was strictly determined beforehand based on everyone’s material wealth. Moreover, if this were a donation and not a tax, then distant governors would not have paid exactly the same amounts.

Prof. Fahir Armaoğlu devoted more than 30 pages to the Crimean War and the *Islahat Fermanı* in his political history of the 19th century.⁴⁴ Armaoğlu’s account is based largely on Karal, Temperley, Kurat, A. Debidour and Edouard Driault. Therefore he repeats some of their mistakes. For example, he quotes from Karal that “60,000 Turkish troops” were landed on the Crimea on 20 September 1854.⁴⁵ This is, as we have seen above, incorrect. Armaoğlu gives at first three alternative spellings for Menshikov including the correct one (as Mençikof, Menchikov and Menshikov) but then sticks to the usual wrong one (*Mençikof*) throughout the text.

Fuat and Süphan Andıç’s recent book⁴⁶ is mainly a short diplomatic history, written from secondary sources in a popular style without bibliographical footnotes and marred by hero-worshipping in the person of the Grand Vizier Âli Pasha, whom the authors called “the last of the Ottoman grandees” in another book. The narrative has some minor factual, chronological and logical errors and gaps as well.

Necdet Sakaoğlu and Nuri Akbayar have written a large book on Sultan Abdülmecid and his reforms. The book was published in English as well.⁴⁷ This is a richly illustrated, popular and rather touristic edition without footnotes, being mainly a

43 Besim Özcan. *Kırım Savaşı'nda Mali Durum ve Teb'anın Harb Siyaseti (1853-1856)*. Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997.

44 Fahir Armaoğlu. *19. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi (1789-1914)*. Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 227-260.

45 Armaoğlu, op. cit., p. 244.

46 Fuat Andıç; Süphan Andıç. *Kırım Savaşı. Âli Paşa ve Paris Antlaşması*. İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002.

47 Necdet Sakaoğlu; Nuri Akbayar. *Avrupahlaşmanın Yol Haritası ve Sultan Abdülmecid*. İstanbul: Denizbank Yayınları (Creative Yayıncılık Ltd), December 2001. *Sultan Abdülmecid. A Milestone on Turkey's Path of Westernization*. İstanbul: Denizbank Publications (Creative Yayıncılık Ltd), January 2002.

social history of reforms under Sultan Abdülmecid. The authors have not bothered themselves to find the original quotations and seem to have had some passages from Can Yücel's inaccurate and abridged translation of Lane-Poole's biography of Lord Stratford translated back into English. They have also translated (or made others translate) passages from Adolphus Slade's and Melek Hanım's books' Turkish translations back into English.⁴⁸ Overall the book is not scholarly, but contains some interesting material.

Kezban Acar's small book is about the visual history of Russo-Ottoman wars.⁴⁹ It has a section on the Crimean War as well. Acar analyses Russian folk pictures (*lubki*) and caricatures on Russo-Ottoman wars. This study is in general good, but contains one blunder: Acar translates the Turkish expression “*üç tuğlu paşa*”, which literally means a pasha with three horse-tails (as the symbol of a vizier), from its Russian version “*trekh-bunchuzhnoi pasha*” back into Turkish as “*üç boncuk yüklü paşa*” (“pasha laden with three loads of beads”). Acar then even comments on it, arguing that beads might be precious things!

Şevket K. Akar and Hüseyin Al's thin monograph⁵⁰ on the Ottoman foreign loans and loan control commissions of 1854-1856 is the most up-to-date and factually most correct work in Turkish on the subject. Akar and Al have done quite a good job, with only a few minor errors. However, their work is too technical and lacks comparative analysis. The authors have not searched all the relevant correspondence of Namık Pasha available in the BOA, or even in the work of Ahmet Sinaplı, whom they do not mention at all. Furthermore they also subscribe to Olive Anderson's thesis of Namık Pasha's “amateurishness” as the reason of his failure to contract the loan. I have shown Chapter 4 that the causes were more complex and deeper.

Thanks to the happy coincidence of the round-number (150th) anniversary of the war, there have been conferences, symposia, exhibitions and publications in Turkey as well as in Russia, Ukraine (the Crimea), France and Italy from 2003 to 2006. The BOA has published a collection of documents⁵¹ for the 150th anniversary of the war and of the Treaty of Paris. Unfortunately this collection of documents was offered to sale in

48 Cf. for example, Sakaoğlu and Akbayar, op. cit., p. 99, “Lord Stratford Canning's ‘Memoirs of Turkey’ [sic]” with Stanley Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, “The Sultan's First Ball”, p. 444.

49 Kezban Acar. *Resimlerle Rusya, Savaşlar ve Türkler*. Ankara: Nobel, 2004. On the Crimean War, see pp. 11-30, 107-124.

50 Şevket K. Akar; Hüseyin Al. *Osmanlı Dış Borçları ve Gözetim Komisyonları 1854-1856*. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2003.

51 *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Savaşı 1853-1856*. Ankara: BOA Yayın Nu. 84, 2006. (Hereafter OBKS).

Istanbul only on 26 February 2007, when I had already finished most of my work and had already done most of the transcriptions of those Ottoman documents given in the appendices of this dissertation. I felt some relief in discovering that very few documents were in fact common between my transcriptions and those in the book, which includes a total of 126 documents under six headings: Diplomatic Relations, Reforms, Military Activities, War and Economy, Immigrants and Settlement, and Rewards and Promotions. To the best of my knowledge, only three of the 126 documents have been published before. As such, this is a useful collection of documents for researchers. However, its use is limited due to several reasons. First, while we must admit the difficulty of selecting 126 documents from among thousands of documents, the selection of documents nevertheless leaves much to be desired. Especially the section on reforms is rather weak. Other sections are also fragmentary. Secondly, there are almost no editorial notes, the documents are simply transliterated. This makes the selection useful for only historians and specialists of the period. For example, Document 56 is given as a document on the Ottoman loan, whereas it is only a fictitious (estimated) calculation of loan repayments over assumed rates. However, since there are no explanatory notes, the reader may think that these calculations refer to an actual, executed loan agreement.⁵² The collection also includes some errors in the transliteration of proper nouns, such as “Paul” instead of Buol, “Edgar Duplier” instead of Argiropulo, “Brock” instead of Brück, “Brany” instead of Pisani, “Chiffer” instead of Schefer, etc.

Istanbul University in collaboration with Marmara University organized its annual seminar on 22-23 May 2006 around the theme of the 150th anniversary of the Crimean War and of the Treaty of Paris. The papers presented in this symposium were published in May 2007. The collection includes many interesting papers.⁵³

Sadberk Hanım Museum in Büyükdere, Istanbul held an exhibition on the 150th Anniversary of the Crimean War from 9 December 2006 until 25 February 2007. The museum also published a fully-coloured, large-size catalog of the exhibition, including some articles.⁵⁴

52 See OBKS, pp. 209-211. For a review of the book, see my review article in *Toplumsal Tarih* 160, Istanbul, April 2007, pp. 92-94.

53 *Savaştan Barişa: 150. Yıldönümünde Kırım Savaşı ve Paris Antlaşması (1853-1856). 22-23 Mayıs 2006. Bildiriler*. Istanbul: İ. Ü. Ed. Fak. Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, 2007.

54 *Kırım Savaşı'nın 150nci Yılı / 150th Anniversary of the Crimean War*, Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfı Sadberk Hanım Müzesi, December 2006.

1.2.1. Turkish Official Military History

The Turkish General Staff has published a multi volume history of the Turkish Armed Forces and three monographs on the Crimean War. Retired Full Captain Saim Besbelli of the Turkish Navy has provided a naval history of the war.⁵⁵ The book is written in the form of a textbook from secondary sources (among which Adolphus Slade's book is prominent) without any references to archival documents and without any footnotes except a few for explanation. Besbelli argues that the Russian fleet was equal to the Allies in terms of battleships and guns and also that it was a mistake of the Russian command to sink its own fleet in order to blockade the entry of the Sivastopol harbour. We know that the Battle of Sinop was the first major international demonstration of the destructive power of explosive shells against wooden ships. Interestingly this point is not clearly understood and sufficiently explained by Turkish historians, even the military historians including the present one. Besbelli also argues that while the “Turkish” forces fought on the Danube, Caucasus, the Crimea and Anatolia, the allies fought only in the Crimea. He is simply unaware of the Baltic, North Sea and Pacific (Kamchatka) fronts of the war.

Part 5 of the volume III of the *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi* (History of the Turkish Armed Forces) published by the general staff in 1978 includes 17 pages devoted to the Crimean War.⁵⁶ In 1981 the general staff published another book with a long title including a section or an article on the Caucasian front of the Crimean War. The following quotation from the conclusion of this article is very characteristic of the perspective of the works of the Turkish general staff on the Crimean War:

During the time of the Crimean War Turkey had almost no real friends in the outside world. Those who seemed friendly were not real friends either... Turkey in this war lost its treasury. For the first time it became indebted to Europe. What is worse, by participating in this war with allies, thousands of foreign soldiers and civilians were allowed to see closely the most secret places and shortcomings of Turkey... Even some friendly opponents [sic, “*dost muhalifler*”] characterised as perfidy the indifferent attitude and foot-dragging of the allies for a long time in the participation in the war. Another negative impact of this war was that some semi-intellectual circles of Turkish society came to admire Western fashions and values, losing their identity. While Turkish people showed their traditional hospitality and opened their seashore villas to Allied commanders, their soldiers did not show respect to Turkish people and Turkish graves. Furthermore, they

55 Saim Besbelli [Retired Naval Colonel]. *1853–1856 Osmanlı-Rus ve Kırım Savaşı (Deniz Harekâtı)*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Yayınları, 1977.

56 Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi. III. Cilt. 5. Kısım. 1793-1908*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1978, pp. 450-466.

prevented Turkish troops from landing on the shores of the Caucasus for months because this was against their political aims and national interests. While the great city of Istanbul with its hospitals, schools and military buildings was laid at the discretion of the Allied commanders, they caused such historical army headquarters as Davut Pasha, Harbiye and Varna to catch fire due to their carelessness... While Turkish soldiers showed every sign of selflessness and shed their blood on the fronts, the Allies took all the honours of the war to themselves. Likewise some historians came under the influence of this propaganda and neglected the role of the Turks in this war, despite the fact that Turkish casualties in this war amounted to 120,000.⁵⁷ [My abridged translation]

The Caucasian front of the Crimean War was studied in another book by the general staff. The book *1853-1856 Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi* (1986) written by Retired Brigadier General (Air Commodore) Hikmet Süer is about the Caucasian (Anatolian) theatre of the war. Süer seems to have written the above article as well, because the conclusions of the article and of this book are very similar.⁵⁸

Many of Süer's arguments in his conclusion come from Slade's book. In fact many of his sentences are simply translations of Slade's sentences without, however, due references.⁵⁹ For example, the idea that the Ottomans should have better accepted the "Vienna Note" comes from Slade. By this, Slade argued and Süer repeated, the Porte would have avoided war and the Rumanian independence (meaning union of the Danubian principalities that later formed Rumania) would perhaps not take place and also Syria would not be occupied by the French.⁶⁰ Süer also argues that the Caucasian people fighting for the last 30 years against Russia for independence were Turkish or of the Turkish "race" ("*30 yıldır vatanları için savaştan 500,000 Kafkas Türkü*", "*Türk ırkından gelen yarım milyon Kafkasyalı halkı*", "*Acara ve Laz dediğimiz Türk türleri*", "*Avar Türkleri*").⁶¹ As for Georgians and Circassians, Süer does not go so far as to make them Turks as well, but still makes them originate from Central Asia.⁶² The fallacy of these arguments is too obvious to demand any refutation here.

Both military historians of the Turkish general staff (Süer and Besbelli) do not

57 Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı. *Selçuklular Döneminde Anadolu'ya Yapılan Akınlar - 1799-1802 Osmanlı-Fransız Harbinde Akka Kalesi Savunması - 1853-1856 Osmanlı - Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1981, pp. 84-86.

58 Cf. Hikmet Süer. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi. Osmanlı Devri. Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi Harekatı (1853-1856)*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1986, p. 170.

59 Cf. Slade, op. cit., p. 411 and the translation by Ali Rıza Seyfi (1943), p. 244-245 with Süer, ibid, p. 177.

60 Slade, op. cit., p. 109.

61 Süer, *ibid*, pp. 2, 30, 176. Obviously, the aim here is to turkify Sheikh Shamil who was an ethnic Avar.

62 Süer, op. cit., p. 30.

mention in any way Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's articles on the Crimean War, even those articles that are written from a military strategic point of view. As we shall see below, these articles were translated into Turkish and published in 1966, 1974 and 1977. Despite the manifest pro-Turkish stand of Marx and Engels, the military historians have simply ignored them, probably because of the cold war mentality or simply out of their ignorance.

1.2.2. Turkish History Textbooks for Schools

A survey of Turkish national historiography would be incomplete without an analysis of history textbooks for schools. Therefore I will also analyse critically the content of the Crimean War in Turkish history textbooks for schools. Let me first offer my periodization of the Ottoman – Turkish official historiography from 1853 up to the present. I divide this period into six distinct sub-periods: (1) The period from the war to the Balkan Wars (1912-13), (2) from then to the birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923, (3) the early Republican or Kemalist era until 1950, (4) from then on the liberal era of the Democrat Party until 1970s, (5) the new traditionalist-nationalist period of National Front governments (the so called Turkish-Islamic synthesis) and (6) finally the new period from 1990s onwards which is characterized by Turkey's efforts to join the EU. I will cover the first five periods here, because the last period is still in formation.

In the 1930s and 1940s history textbooks in Turkey were written by the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*). These textbooks were more critical of the Ottoman Empire and of European great powers in comparison with later books. As for Russia, the following statement was typical:

Nikolai did not like it when Ottomans tried to put an end to anarchy in their internal affairs and reform themselves. Europe's economic exploitation of the Ottoman lands and Britain's effective control of Ottoman affairs were not in the interests of Russia either. Tsar Nikolai wanted to seize the Bosphorus and Istanbul with a successful operation and put an end to the Ottoman Empire, giving shares to some of the European states as well... Using the quarrel of Catholic and Orthodox priests in Jerusalem as a pretext, Nikolai sent Prince Menshikov to Istanbul as an ambassador with extraordinary powers to force the Ottoman state to accept his demands from the Sublime Porte. This ambassador who came with much noise and ceremony wanted to intimidate the Sublime Porte into recognizing the tsar as protector of all Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire and thus give an exceptional status to Russia among other states. Relying upon Britain and France, the Sublime Porte rejected Menshikov's demands.⁶³ [My

63 TTK, *Tarih 3*, 1931, pp. 119-121 and 1933, pp. 244-247.

translation]

In most of the 1950s and some of the 1960s, Niyazi Akşit and Emin Oktay's history textbook⁶⁴ was read in Turkish secondary schools. Their narrative of the Crimean War is even faultier than the one before on many accounts. It begins by observing that the Ottoman Empire had started becoming a European state thanks to the reform movements of the *Tanzimat*. While France and Britain were glad with these efforts, Russia was not. Ottoman diplomats like Reşid Pasha, Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha had managed to secure the friendship of France and Britain. Then the authors mention the Hungarian refugee crisis, "Tsar" Nikolai's plans of partitioning the Ottoman Empire with Britain, the holy places dispute and Prince Menshikov's (the spelling is again turned into *Mençikof*) mission (in 1851!, while it was in 1853). The authors state that after the occupation of the Danubian principalities by Russia, a conference was held in Vienna with the participation of Britain, France, Austria and Prussia and despite long negotiations an agreement was not reached, upon which the war began. Obviously they confuse the Vienna conference of April 1855 with the pre-war negotiations and exchange of notes among embassies in Vienna in 1853.

Then, very interestingly, the authors argue that British and French fleets came to Istanbul contrary to the regulations of the London [Straits] Convention. Why should the fleets' arrival in Istanbul be contrary to the said convention if the Ottoman Empire was at war? In fact this argument could be and has only been expressed by Russian nationalists. Surprisingly and contradictorily for themselves, our authors seem on the one hand very anti-Russian and rightly accuse it of trying to partition the Ottoman Empire, yet on the other hand, they articulate a very fallacious pro-Russian argument. Then they argue that the Russians were defeated in the Danubian and the Anatolian fronts. As far as the Anatolian front is concerned, this is, as we will see in Chapter 3, very far from the truth. The authors also conclude that the new military organization after the removal of the Janissary troops had proved to be serious and regular. This is also only partially and relatively true, as we will see in the discussion of the Ottoman army and the battles. Other inaccuracies and errors of the authors include describing the Piedmontese army as 25,000-strong, whereas in fact it was only 15,000-strong, and the statement that both Prince Menshikov and "Tsar" Nikolai I died during the capture of Sevastopol (September 1855), whereas in reality the Russian emperor died earlier in March 1855 and Menshikov died much later. The authors also transform the name of

64 Niyazi Akşit, Emin Oktay. *Tarih 3*, 1953-1963, pp. 115-123.

the Ottoman ambassador in London Musurus into “Mazaros”. In conclusion, they argue that the inclusion of the Rescript of Reform of 1856 in the Treaty of Paris was harmful to the Ottoman Empire because some European states later interfered with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire depending on this article.

Let us now have a look at the 1970s. The textbook for this period is very laconic on the Crimean War. However, its novelty is that it gives a rather aggressive role to Reşid Pasha, much contrary to what we have heard from Cevdet Pasha. Since the section on the Crimean War is really short I can quote it here almost in full:

Reşid Pasha was of the opinion that Turkey could not breathe freely without dealing a heavy blow to Russia. In the 1850s it was not possible for Turkey alone to deliver this blow. Although Turkish land forces came third after France and Russia and the Turkish fleet also came third after Britain and France, an offensive war against Russia was beyond the power of the Turkish Empire. But in a defensive war Turkey was self confident. Reşid Pasha provokes Russia into war in a way that this state realizes this too late. He has already prepared the diplomatic scene. Russia’s demand for more privileges to the Orthodox confession over Catholicism in Jerusalem gives the opportunity to Reşid Pasha. The Sublime Porte rejects Russian demands and ultimatum. There begins a war with Russia (1853). This is the famous Crimean War. Ömer Pasha defeats the Russians several times in Romania. The Russians who want to take Silistria are defeated very heavily (1854). While the war goes on favourably for the Turks, Reşid Pasha signs treaties of alliance with France, Britain and even Sardinia that wanted to unite Italy and they all enter war against Russia. Because Britain and France are afraid of Russia defeating Turkey and going down to the Mediterranean Sea. The Allies land on the Crimea (1854). Russia waives the white flag after it suffers very heavy losses with the fall of the well fortified city of Sevastopol (1855). The Treaty of Paris (1856) puts an end to the war.⁶⁵ [My translation]

Clearly, there is no mention of either the Battle of Sinop or the fall of Kars. The author then goes on to say that by the Treaty of Paris Russia was obliged not to keep any arsenals on the Black Sea, forgetting to add that this rule applied to the Ottoman Empire as well. Apart from such obvious omissions this account of the 1970's is remarkable for using the term Turkish Empire for the Ottoman Empire, something which was not possible during the early Republican era, as in its founding phase, the Turkish republic had a visible tendency to distance itself from the Ottoman Empire.

1.2.3. Dissertations and Theses in Turkish

Finally, a review of the doctoral dissertations and master's theses in Turkish will not be out place here. I will make here only very short comments on some of their

65 Yılmaz Öztuna, *Tarih*, Lise 3, 1976-77.

strengths and weaknesses. I could locate five doctoral dissertations (plus one partially relevant PhD) and four master's theses on the subject, completed recently in the period from 1990 to 2003, from the archives of the Turkish Higher Education Council (YÖK).

Among these dissertations and theses, Mustafa Budak's doctoral dissertation about the Caucasian front of the war (*1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı'nda Kafkas Cephesi*, Istanbul University, 1993) stands out. Budak has made good use of the BOA, TNA and the ATASE. Nevertheless, the dissertation focuses on military history and covers only the Ottoman side, without use of the Russian sources, therefore it does not address the questions of how the Russians organized their efforts, how Georgians, Armenians and other Caucasian peoples reacted to the war. It has also little analysis over the causes of Ottoman defeats at battles and in the war in general. The question of the slave trade that was conducted by some Ottoman officers is omitted as well. We must add that this omission is general to all dissertations and theses.

The topic of Cezmi Karasu's doctoral dissertation is about the Ottoman diplomacy during the war: *Kırım Savaşı Sırasında Osmanlı Diplomasisi (1853-1856)* (Ankara University, 1998). It is a pity that the thesis could not benefit from the archive of the political section and translation bureau of the Ottoman foreign ministry (BOA. HR. SYS and HR. TO) because these sections were not open at that time. Karasu argues that the handling of this war was the biggest ever success of the Ottoman diplomacy in all its history. He uses the incorrect and abridged Turkish translation of Stanley Lane-Poole's biography of Stratford de Redcliffe. Like Besim Özcan, he also presents the *iane-i harbiye* as donations. Repeating Sait Açıba's mistake, who himself repeated A. du Velay's mistake, Karasu sends Lord Hobart instead of Edmund Hornby to Istanbul as the British commissioner for the Turkish loan in 1855. Like most Turkish historians, Karasu uses the incorrect spelling of the name of the Russian ambassador *Menşikov* as *Mençikof*.

We have already cited above Besim Özcan's doctoral dissertation. Its title is *Rus Donanmasının Sinop Baskını (30 Kasım 1853)* (Atatürk University, 1990). The dissertation is based upon serious archival research in the BOA (except for the HR SYS and HR MKT collections which were not included in the BOA at that time and was probably not open to researchers), DMA and ATASE, yet it is one sided, because it does not tell the Russian story. Özcan states that it was difficult to get Russians sources. He still refers to some secondary and general reference sources in Russian, but these are superficial sources and there are translation and even transcription mistakes in these references. For example, referring to Sergeyev-Tsenskiy's historical long story

(*Sinopskiy Boy*), he makes Admiral Nakhimov commander of the Russian Black Sea fleet and puts Admiral Kornilov under Nakhimov's command, which is incorrect and is not meant by Sergeyev-Tsenskiy at all. Özcan also refers to some articles in the *NYDT* but he fails to indicate Karl Marx as the author of those articles, for example for the leader (article) on 27 December 1853.⁶⁶ In one place, Özcan quotes approvingly an openly racist comment on the Russians from an unimportant article, stating that the Russians exhibited “the savagery that is characteristic of their race” (*ırklarına has vahşeti bir kere daha sergilediler*).⁶⁷ I think such expressions are not compatible with a scholarly study. I have given a more comprehensive, comparative, analytical and unbiased account of the Battle of Sinop in Chapter 3.3, using new archive material from the BOA as well as Russian and British sources.

Mehmet Yıldız's doctoral dissertation has an interesting topic: *1856 Islahat Fermanının Tatbiki ve Tepkiler* (Istanbul University, 2003). Yıldız has made good use of the Ottoman archive (except for the political section of the foreign ministry (HR SYS) which could be used more fully). Some important documents are published for the first time, but there is almost no use of works in other languages than Turkish. This reliance on translations is dangerous as shown above in the case of the translation of Lane-Poole's biography of Stratford de Redcliffe. Yıldız argues that the ulema did not oppose the reform much. Except for this, the dissertation does not contain original arguments. He is also one sided in his conclusion on why the non-Muslims were not accepted into military service, with a pro-Muslim bias.

Hasan Şahin's doctoral dissertation carries the title *1855 Erzurum Harekati* (Atatürk University, 1995). Nevertheless, the title is a misnomer, for it was Kars, and not Erzurum, that was involved to a greater degree in all the operations of 1855 (or indeed in the whole war on the Caucasian front). Şahin has a definite anti-Russian bias, as if Russia was the only power that wanted to subdue the Ottoman Empire. The dissertation includes no references to sources in Russian; it includes some references to English sources like the works of Lake, Sandwith and Allen-Muratoff, but no reference to the PRMA. There is a lack of critical attitude towards sources such as Zarifi Mustafa Pasha's memoirs. No evaluation of the charges against him is made either. Moreover, Şahin misunderstands the “Turkish Contingent” as a “reform” in the Anatolian army, while in reality it had nothing to do with the Anatolian army or with reform. Şahin also confuses the identity of some persons, turning the Circassian Sefer Pasha into a

66 See Karl Marx. *The Eastern Question*, London: Frank Cass, 1969, pp. 180-182.

67 Özcan, op. cit., (1990), p. 119.

Georgian notable (*eşraf*), the Polish refugee officer Arslan Pasha (Bystrzonowski) into a brother of İzzet Bey of Göle, again Polish officer Şahin Pasha (Breanski) into a refugee from Dagestan. Like Budak, Şahin makes no mention of the question of slave trade. Problems of spelling include the classical case of *Menşikov* given as *Mençikof*, General Dannenberg as “Donneberg”, General Lüders as “Lüdens”, Şekvetil (Sv. Nikolai) as “Şevketil”, etc.

Şenol Kantarcı's MA thesis is about the building of the earthworks or bastions of Kars: *Kars Tabyalarının İnşası* (Atatürk University, 1997). Kantarcı made very little use of the BOA and shows a weak grasp of military terms. For example, explaining 36-pound cannons, he gives the definition of “*fund*” (pound) as “*bir top çeşiti*” (a type of cannon), whereas, as is well known, pound is a measure of weight. A 36-pound cannon (sometimes called a 36-pounder) is a cannon that projects balls of 36 pounds.

Elvira Kazas's MA thesis concerns immigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire during the ten year period beginning with the Crimean War: *1853-1863 Yıllarında Kırım'dan Osmanlı Topraklarına Yapılan Göçler* (Marmara University, 1994). Kazas uses Ottoman and Russian archive material. But she covers only the Crimean Tatars, leaving out Jews and others, despite the comprehensive title of her thesis. Kazas is openly anti-Russian and pro-Crimean Tatar. She calls the Crimean Tatars “the Crimean Turks” (*Kırım Türkleri*).

Sema Emel Göksel's doctoral dissertation, entitled *The Ailing Imperialists: The Ottoman Empire in British Travel Literature 1821-1876* (Boğaziçi University, 2003) has a section on the Crimean War. Göksel makes good analysis of the orientalist mentality with regard to the Ottomans in British travel books.

Caner Türk has written his MA thesis on the Ottoman-Iranian relations and secret Russo-Iranian treaty during the war: *1853-56 Kırım Harbi Sırasında Osmanlı-İran İlişkileri, Osmanlı Devletine Karşı Rus-İran Gizli Antlaşması* (Atatürk University, 2000). His supervisor is Hasan Şahin. Türk has also committed many transliteration, translation and spelling errors. Thus Dolgorukov, the Russian ambassador to Tehran, becomes first “Dolgorki” and then “Dolgorkof”, Russian foreign minister Nesselrode is transformed into “Neseldorf”, “Neseldrof” and “Neseldroft”, the word *ziyyar* (visitors) is read as *zevar*, “*evahir*” is translated as beginning instead of end (thus announcing the declaration of war at the beginning of the Muslim year 1269, while it was at the end of it). To the credit of Türk must be mentioned his reference to the AKAK.

Hakkı Yapıcı's MA thesis was already discussed above. I could not read the MA thesis of Ahmet Teoman Özkaya, entitled *Kırım Savaşı* (Erciyes University, 1991),

because the copy was too faded to be read. Finally, I have seen two master's theses partly related to the Crimean war. These are Veysel Şimşek's *Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit: 1826-1853*, (Bilkent University, 2005) and İbrahim Köremezli's *The Place of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Circassian War (1830-1864)*, (Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, 2004).

1.3. Sources in Russian

The international literature on our subject is very large and for the purposes of this dissertation the focus will be more on Ottoman and Russian sources rather than on British, French and other European sources, because the emphasis here is to fill the gaps in the narrative of the war by using the less used Ottoman and Russian sources. Although the literature in Russian is probably larger than that in other European languages, it is almost totally unknown in Turkey. The number of memoirs (books and articles) alone of the participants of the war is 242 according to a bibliography⁶⁸. Therefore it is not possible here to mention even all the major works. Indeed the Crimean War is one of the well-researched and well-discussed topics in Russian and Soviet historiography.⁶⁹ Here I will also try to introduce some of these sources into the English-reading community of historians. Attention will be given especially to those works that are more or less related to the involvement of the Ottomans in the war.

In Moscow, I visited the Russian Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA) and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Although some sections (*fonds*) of these archives were closed, they contain many relevant materials. Another important archive in Moscow is the archive of the foreign policy of Russian Empire (AVPRI). Unfortunately, I could not get permission into this archive while I was in Moscow from 29 May to 21 June 2006. Sadly, the permission came too late, after I returned from Moscow to Istanbul. This archive contains important consular reports. The two other important Russian archives for our research are located in St. Petersburg: The Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA) and the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGVMF).

68 Pyotr Andreyevich Zayonchkovskiy (ed.). *Istoriya Dorevolyutsionnoy Rossii v dnevnikakh i vospominaniyakh. T. 2. Ch. 1. 1801-1856*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Kniga", 1977. See section "Krymskaya (Vostochnaya) voina 1853-1856 gg.", pp. 307-347. This is a very well annotated bibliography of diaries and memoirs. The author is the son of the tsarist military historian Andrey Medardovich Zayonchkovskiy .

69 See my article "Rus ve Sovyet Tarih Yazımında Kırım Savaşı", *Toplumsal Tarih* 155, Istanbul, November 2006, pp. 16-23.

The second one is especially valuable for the papers of Prince Menshikov, commander in chief of the Russian forces in the Crimea for most of the campaign. Unfortunately for me, these two archives were closed during the year 2006 due to reorganization and transfer to new premises. As for libraries in Moscow, the State Historical Public Library (GPIB) is a very rich, specialized library for historians. It contains many rare books and periodicals of the 19th century. The former Lenin library (now Russian State Library) is also very helpful. Its manuscripts section includes some documents related to the Crimean War.

Imperial Russia published many documents related to the war. Among these the AKAK (Documents Collected by the Caucasian Archival Commission) is a very impressive mass of documents relating to many aspects of the Caucasian wars and affairs. Then there are many articles in the journals *Kavkazskiy Sbornik* (Caucasian Journal), *Russkaya Starina*, (Russian Antiquity), *Russkiy Arkhiv* (Russian Archive), *Russkiy Invalid* (Russian War Veteran) and *Voenny Sbornik* (Military Journal) as well as newspapers like *Kavkaz* (Caucasus). Nikolai Putilov has published 33 volumes of documents from 1854 to 1957.⁷⁰

In 1856 a diary of events during the siege of Kars was published in Tiflis: *Blokada Karsa* (Blockade of Kars).⁷¹ Although the title is about letters of witnesses of the campaign into Asiatic Turkey, all these “letters” seem to be written by an officer from the general staff of the commander in chief (General Muravyov) from the Çivilikaya camp near Kars, most probably after the war on the basis of notes or diaries, because the senders are not identified, the letters are too well informed to be written by ordinary soldiers, and finally their literary style is the same throughout. The unsuccessful attack on Kars and the defeat of the Russian army on 29 September 1855 is narrated very shortly, in an understatement of the Russian defeat, without citing exact details of the Russian and Ottoman losses, while in all other battles and skirmishes won by the Russians, losses are given in detail. The news of the fall of Sevastopol during the siege of Kars is not mentioned. Except for these two gaps, the narrative is interesting and seems to be realistic.

Many of the Russian generals who have taken part in the war have also written their memoirs. Although all these works were published under censure, they are full of details of events and comments. Expectedly, tsarist writers and historians in their

70 Nikolay Putilov (ed.). *Sbornik izvestiy, odnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchey voyny, izdavaemy s Vysochayshego soizvoleniya N. Putilovym*. 33 vols. St. Petersburg: Tip. E. Veymara, 1854-57.

71 *Blokada Karsa. Pis'ma ochevidtsev o pokhode 1855 goda v Aziatskuyu Turtsiyu*. Tiflis: Tipografiya kantselyarii namestnika Kavkazskago, 1856.

analyses tried to justify the policies of Nikolai I and Aleksandr II. Nevertheless, they have made important contributions to the historiography of the war. Thus, when General Nikolai Nikolayevich Muravyov-Karsskiy, conqueror of Kars, writes in his memoirs that “the Turks do not write anything”, he is very right in his complaint.⁷² It is the Russians and the British and the French who continued the discussion in writing, while the Turks wrote only patriotic theatre plays (Namik Kemal, the patriotic “Young Ottoman”) and verses about the war. Some of the other Russian officers who have written their memoirs are Pyotr Alabin, A. S. Korsakov, Colonel Mikhail Lihutin, General Yakov Baklanov, General Yegor Kovalevskiy, Prince Aleksandr Dondukov-Korsakov, General Nikolai Ushakov, etc.

Russian novelist, publicist and revolutionary democrat Nikolai Chernyshevskiy (1828-1889) has published in his journal *Sovremennik* in 1863 a partial translation of the British historian Alexander Kinglake's book *The Invasion of the Crimea* and wrote a preface to the translation.⁷³ Chernyshevskiy comments that although politically Kinglake is just a Tory (whom Chernyshevskiy does not like) he has fulfilled the duty of a historian conscientiously (*dobrosovestno*). Nevertheless, the great Russian revolutionary democrat was mistaken, because Kinglake has not, and could not have, written an unbiased history.

Typical tsarist military historians whose works on the Crimean War I have been able to consult are Modest Ivanovich Bogdanovich⁷⁴ and Andrey Medardovich Zayonchkovskiy (1862-1926).⁷⁵ The latter gives probably the most developed classical tsarist account of the war, rich in detail and amply documented. Staff Colonel Zayonchkovskiy was commissioned by the Russian general staff to write this history in 1900, with all archives opened to him. For this work he was paid 2000 roubles per year.⁷⁶ He had the opportunity to read Prince Aleksandr Sergeevich Menshikov's diary as well. (Nevertheless the diary is not published in the appendices of his work). The colonel finished his work in 1904 but the Russo-Japanese war delayed its publication

72 Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov. *Voina za Kavkazom v 1855 godu*. 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Tipografiya tovarishestva “Obschestvennaya pol'za”, 1877.

73 N. G. Chernyshevskiy. “Rasskaz o Krymskoi Voynе (po Kingleku)”, *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*, tom X, Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1951, pp. 193-440.

74 Modest Ivanovich Bogdanovich. *Vostochnaya Voina 1853-1856 godov*. St. Petersburg: Tip. M. Stasiulievicha, 1877.

75 Andrey Medardovich Zayonchkovskiy. *Vostochnaya Voina 1853-1856 gg v svyazi s sovremennoy ey politicheskoy obstanovkoy*. Tom I-II. St. Petersburg, 1908-1912. St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2002. 2 vols., vol II in two parts. Simferopol: Krymskiy Arkhiv, 2005. 2 vols.

76 RGVIA. Fond 481 “Voyna 1853-1856 gg”, opis’ 1, delo 65, list 240-280. Materialy o sostavlenii polkovnikom gen. shtaba Zayonchkovskim istorii voiny 1853-1856 gg .

until 1908. The two-volume book (bound in four), which amounted to more than three thousand pages, was dedicated to Emperor Nikolai II. Unfortunately for researchers, the new edition of 2002 has omitted many appendices (actually more than half) from volume one. Among these are many important documents like the instructions to Menshikov and Nikolai's letter to Sultan Abdülmecid (*prilozheniya* no. 105-112). I have had only a short time to see and read the first (1908-12) edition, and therefore I could not read all the appendices there and take notes accordingly.

General Staff Captain (later General) Pyotr Ivanovich Averyanov (1867–1937) was a Russian military agent who worked some time at the Russian consulate general in Erzurum. His book on the Kurds in Russian-Persian and Russian-Ottoman wars includes a chapter on the Crimean War and covers the revolt of Yezdan Şer at some length.⁷⁷ Depending on Russian sources, Averyanov gives important information on the relations of the Kurdish tribes with the Russian army. Nevertheless, he mistakes Yezdan Şer as brother of Bedirhan Bey, while in reality Yezdan Şer was the grandson of Bedirhan's uncle. The book has been translated into Turkish as well. I have not seen the 1926 translation, which is out of print now.⁷⁸ The new edition of 1995 is actually a transliteration into modern Turkish of an earlier translation from Russian into Ottoman Turkish.⁷⁹ Due in part to the inconveniency of Arabic letters, almost all Russian proper names, beginning with that of the author, have been mistransliterated. The author's name is given as Avyarov. There are translation errors as well. For example, the Ottoman word *kese*, which means a purse of 500 piastres or five Ottoman pounds, has been turned into *çuval* (sack). Thus we read 400 *çuvals* of money, which does not make sense. The anonymous Kurdish editor has provided some footnotes, correcting some mistakes and arguing with the author from a Kurdish nationalist position. Nevertheless, the editorial quality of this translation in general is very low, there is no information on the author, even his first name is not given.

A common characteristic of the tsarist apologist military historians was their inclination to neglect socio-economical processes in their explanations of the reasons for the war, to give too much emphasis to individuals and individual mistakes in their explanations of the defeat of Russia, and to try to put all the blame on the French and

77 P. I. Averyanov. *Kurdy v voynakh Rossii s Persiei i Turtsiei v techenie XIX stoletiya*. Tiflis : Tipografiya Shtaba Kavkazskago voennago okruga, 1900.

78 P. Averyanof. *Ondokuzuncu Asırda Rusya, Türkiye ve İran Muharebeleri. Türk, İran, Rus Kürtlerinin Vaziyet-i Hazıraları*. Rusçadan tercüme edenler: Teğmen Adil – Yüzbaşı Mustafa. Ankara: Hakimiyet-i Milliye Matbaası, 1926.

79 Avyarov [sic]. *Osmanlı-Rus ve İran Savaşları'nda Kürtler 1801-1900*. Osmanlıcadan tercüme eden: Muhammed (Hoko) Varlı (Xani). Ankara: Sipan Yayıncılık, 1995.

British cabinets. Since these historians could not criticise Nikolai's despotic regime and Russia's relative economic backwardness, they explained Russia's defeat by certain blunders of certain commanders and by the "tactical superiority" of the allies.

The Soviet era of the Russian historiography of the Crimean War begins even before the October revolution of 1917, with an article of the Bolshevik historian Mikhail Pokrovskiy, published in 1908. There he made an attempt to explain Russia's defeat in the war by its economic and political backwardness. His characterization of Nikolai I is brilliant. Thus he explains Nikolai's inability to understand the social-class essence of politics:

The Emperor (*Gosudar-Votchinnik*) believed naively that all around the world, politics were determined by the personal tastes and sympathies of those who led it. For this reason, it always remained an enigma for him why Wellington or Aberdeen, sincere and profound conservatives, who were personally well-disposed towards him, could not prevent Britain's involvement in various "revolutionary" conspiracies against Russia.⁸⁰ [My translation]

Pokrovskiy became very influential in the foundation of the Soviet historical school in the 1920's. Pokrovskiy's articles can be considered the first attempts of a Russian Marxist historian to give a Marxist account of the war. He was later criticised for being not so critical against the cabinets of Napoleon III and Palmerston as against tsarism and for exaggerating the victories of the allies, while not giving enough attention to the "heroic defense of the Russian people". He also came under criticism for his treatment of Sheikh Shamil's movement as an anti-colonial freedom struggle against tsarism, because the new trend in Soviet historiography on the eve of the World War II was rather nationalistically pro-Russian. After Pokrovskiy, we see a more moderate attitude in the Soviet historiography in the 1940's towards imperial Russian policies. Yet Pokrovskiy had also politicized history too much, even arguing that history is simply politics turned towards the past (*istoriya yest' politika, oprokinutaya v proshloe*).

On the eve of and during the World War II, interest towards the Crimean War among Soviet historians had risen considerably. Many new monographs began to appear. The naval battle of Sinop was the subject of several monographs. Two collections of documents about the admirals Nakhimov and Kornilov were also published during this period. Without doubt, the single most important monograph from this period is Yevgeniy Tarle's two-volume classical diplomatic history, the *Krymskaya Voyna*, which has since set the standard in the Soviet historiography of the Crimean

80 Mikhail N. Pokrovskiy, *Diplomatiya i Voyny Tsarskoy Rossii v XIX stoletii. Sbornik statey*, Moscow: Krasnaya Nov', 1923, p. 110. Reprinted in *Istoriya Rossii v XIX veke. Epokha Reform*. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001, p. 9.

War. Tarle in his work subjected all the warring states and their diplomacies to a thorough critique. He also criticised some tendencies of the Russian *intelligentsia*. He wrote that the contradiction of the Slavophiles consisted of the fact that they did not wish to admit for a long time that Nikolai Pavlovich was as concerned about the freedom of the Slavs as Palmerston and Napoleon were about the independence of “Turkey”.⁸¹

Tarle shows good command of the Russian archives and of the European sources, with only a deficiency in Ottoman / Turkish sources. Considering that the Ottoman archives were not open to all at that time and the published sources in Turkish were insignificant, this was not so important a gap at that time. However, Tarle in general gives too much role to Stratford and almost no role to individual Ottomans. His Ottoman terminology is also somewhat old fashioned, for example, he calls the Ottoman foreign minister *Reis Efendi*, a title which was already out of use at that time, replaced by *Hariciye Nazırı*.

Tarle also made an analysis of the economic relations among the warring states, trying to show the importance of the Ottoman markets for Britain. However, Tarle also warned against the vulgarised Marxist conception of history that might reduce the reasons of the war just to economic rivalry. Tarle is incorrect in the details of the Ottoman foreign loans. He writes that Namık Pasha contracted a loan in Paris and London in 1853, while in fact Namık Pasha had failed in contracting a loan and the task was accomplished by others in 1854.⁸² Tarle’s characterization of the Ottoman ministers is also somewhat simplistic and superficial, suffering from the wide-spread tendency among so many Western writers to create a permanent dichotomy between pacifist and warlike or between conservative and reformist Ottoman statesmen. Thus Tarle writes that there were two tendencies among the Ottoman ministers. Some of them, headed by Reşid Pasha and Grand Vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha (*Damad*, a brother-in-law of the Sultan) were trying to solve the dispute by diplomatic negotiations, while others headed by Ömer Pasha and Fuad Efendi firmly believed that it was time to revenge for the peace of Adrianople.⁸³ However, as we will see in Chapter 2, this view is erroneous, because the differences of policy among Ottoman ministers did not as a rule originate from ideas, they originated rather from personal rivalry. Those who had lost their office and were yet unemployed (*mazul*) simply tried to replace those in office. Differently

81 Yevgeny V. Tarle, *Krymskaya Voina*, vol. 1, Moscow: Eksmo, 2003, p. 17.

82 Tarle, op. cit., p. 61.

83 Tarle, op. cit., p. 165.

put, their policies depended upon whether they were in office or not. For example, our Mehmed Ali Pasha, after being dismissed or forced to resign from the office of grand vizier in May 1853 became much belligerent immediately. Finally we must note that Tarle's work, being written during the WWII, bears a certain tone of Russian nationalism, which seems quite un-Marxist.

In the 1940's and 1950's, there was an acute discussion among Soviet historians about the role of the movement of Sheikh Shamil in the 19th century. While the movement was until then seen as a progressive, anti-colonial independence movement, now the emphasis was on the reactionary side of the movement, the so called "muridism". E. Adamov and L. Kutakov's article in the *Voprosy Istorii*, the prestigious journal of the historical section of the Academy of Sciences contains fifteen documents from the AVPR, showing relations among British agents, Circassians and the Ottomans.⁸⁴ The article represents one of the turning points in Soviet historiography on the question of the historical role of Shamil and his movement. At that time, it was considered reactionary. Another collection of documents about Shamil's movement was published in Tiflis 1953: *Shamil' - Stavlenik Sultanskoy Turtsii i Angliyskikh Kolonizatorov. Sbornik dokumental'nykh materialov* (Shamil – Agent of the Sultan's Turkey and of British Colonizers. Collection of documentary materials). As the title clearly indicates, it was intended to prove that Shamil waged a reactionary war and not a national liberation war, and that he was an agent of the Turkish Sultan and British imperialism. This collection showed the anti-Shamil atmosphere of the Soviet post-WWII years.

After 1956 this policy was abandoned under Khrushchov, and once again Shamil became an anti-colonial freedom fighter. Shamil had indeed rendered invaluable service to the Ottoman army by distracting a large portion of the Russian Caucasus army. (See Chapter 3). Recently Khalat Omarov from the Dagestan branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences translated and edited a collection of one hundred letters of Shamil, written in Arabic.⁸⁵ These letters have also been translated into Turkish by Fikret Efe.⁸⁶ However, Omarov's name has not been mentioned at all. In this form the translation represents a case of plagiarism.

84 E. Adamov; L. Kutakov. "Iz istorii proiskov inostrannoy agentury vo vremya Kavkazskikh voyn", *Voprosy Istorii* 11, Moscow, November 1950, pp. 101-125.

85 Khalat A. Omarov (ed.). *100 pisem Shamilya*. Mahachkala: Dagestanskiy Nauchny Tsentr Rossiyskoi Akademii Nauk, 1997.

86 *Şeyh Şamil'in 100 Mektubu*. Mektuplar ve açıklama notları: DAM RBA [sic]. Çeviren: Dr. Fikret Efe. İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, Mayıs 2002. "DAM RBA" probably stands for Dagestan Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

After Tarle's work, Soviet historiography of the Crimean War was mainly engaged in filling the gaps in his work in one way or another. Igor Vasilyevich Bestuzhev concentrated on military technology in his book.⁸⁷ Three important contributions complemented the work of Tarle on the Caucasian front. These are the dissertations and books of the Georgian Yermolai Burchuladze, the Armenian A. M. Pogosyan and the Azerbaijani (of ethnic Circassian origins) Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli (1924-1999). Burchuladze and Pogosyan's contributions were on the Georgian and Armenian participation in the Crimean War respectively. But their books were published in their native languages only, thus reaching a limited public. (Burchuladze wrote two articles in Russian as well). On the other hand, Ibragimbeyli wrote two books on the contributions of the Caucasian peoples to the war effort of Russia, based on his doctoral dissertation.⁸⁸ He described Sheikh Shamil as the spiritual and military leader of the national liberation movement of the mountain peoples of Dagestan, Chechnya and the North Caucasus against tsarism. He made good use of Russian archives, in addition to European, Turkish and Iranian sources. However, Ibragimbeyli's work, ostensibly Marxist, does not give in fact a non-biased, non-nationalist, materialistic explanation of the Russian defeats and victories on the Caucasian front. His main concern is to stress the contribution of the Caucasian peoples in the war against "Turkish" aggressors. He explains Russian victories simply by the heroism and patriotism of the Russian army (including local militias), not bothering himself to try to understand what problems (political, social, strategical, tactical, logistics, etc) the other side had had. It would not be irrelevant or redundant here to note that Ibragimbeyli showed himself as an ardent anti-Communist and a Muslim Circassian nationalist politician and publicist after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In the 1970's Vitaliy Ivanovich Sheremet has written several articles on the Crimean War and the Ottoman Empire. One of them (co-author L. S. Semenov), is on the foreign economic ties of the Ottoman Empire in the era of the Crimean War.⁸⁹ Another article, written together with Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli, is a review or survey of the modern Turkish historiography of the Crimean War. The authors are in general highly objectively critical, except for the fact that they have omitted some historians and

87 Igor V. Bestuzhev. *Krymskaya Voina 1853-56*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956.

88 Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli. *Stranitsy Istorii Boevogo Sodruzhestva Russkogo i Kavkazskikh Narodov (1853-1856 gg)*. Baku: Azerbaidjanskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1970. *Kavkaz v Krymskoi Voine 1853-1856 gg. i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*. Moscow: Nauka, 1971.

89 V. I. Sheremet; L. S. Semenov. "Vneshneekonomicheskie svyazi Turtsii epokhi Krymskoi voiny", *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta* 14, vypusk 3, 1973, pp. 44-49.

most notoriously undervalued (or simply not understood) Cevdet Pasha's *Tezâkir*. This may probably stem from their inability to understand the text of the *Tezâkir* written in the rather bookish style of the Ottoman Turkish.⁹⁰ Sheremet also dealt with the question of the Crimean War and Ottoman-West European relations in his book published in 1986.

V. E. Bagdasaryan and S. G. Tolstoy have written a recent book on the historical lessons of the Crimean War.⁹¹ This is an anti-Western, anti-Soviet, anti-liberal, nationalist Russian historiographical account that tries to analyse the lessons of the Crimean War for today, arguing that the West is still a threat to Russia's security. The authors also make comparisons between Nikolai I and Stalin and between Nesselrode and Molotov.

1.4. Sources in Other Languages

A great work has already been done by Prof. Winfried Baumgart by publishing the Austrian, British, French and Prussian documents in a twelve-volume series called *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs* (AGKK).⁹² However, I could get access to only two volumes. These are well-edited, well-annotated, invaluable primary sources. They almost remove the need to go in person to these archives. With the help of Prof. Andrew Lambert, I was able to get some documents from the TNA (the former PRO) as well. The Rothschild archive in London has also sent me some documents on the Ottoman loan of 1855.

Besides the AGKK, an important source of published documents is the British parliamentary papers, the PRMA. These documents cover the correspondence among the British cabinet in London, ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe in Istanbul, Her Majesty's military commissioner Colonel (General) Williams in Kars and the British commander in chief Lord Raglan in Sevastopol in the period from 2 August 1854 to 18

90 "Sovremennaya Turetskaya Istoriografiya Vostochnoy (Krymskoi) Voyny", *Voprosy Istorii* 4, Moscow, April 1977, pp. 45-57.

91 V. E. Bagdasaryan; S. G. Tolstoy. *Russkaya Voina: Stoletniy istoricheskiy opyt osmysleniya Krymskoi kampanii*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGOU, 2002.

92 Winfried Baumgart (ed.). *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*. Serie 1. *Österreichische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*. München, Wien: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979-80. 3 vols. Serie 2. *Preussische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*. München, Wien: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1990-1991. 2 vols. Serie 3. *Englische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*. München, Wien: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988-2005. 4 vols. Serie 4. *Französische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkrieges*. München, Wien: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999-2003. 3 vols.

March 1856. Fortunately, they are now available online at www.victoriantimes.org under the heading of “the Crimean War”. I was also able to download many articles from the digital archive of *The Times* newspaper, which is searchable by keywords and dates. I was able to get some issues of the *Illustrated London News* of the period.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels contributed many articles to the newspaper *New York Daily Tribune* during the war. These articles sometimes appeared as anonymous leaders. Engels’s articles also appeared under the name of Marx. Marx and Engels saw tsarist Russia as the stronghold of monarchy and reaction against the forces of democracy and revolution. Therefore they had a clear anti-Russian and pro-Turkish attitude. Although they wrote from London and Manchester, they provided astonishingly sound analysis and good foresight into military affairs. Especially the anonymous articles of Engels were written with an expert knowledge of military strategy. These articles are among the best reportages of the war. They were published in a volume by Marx’s daughter and son in law in 1897.⁹³ There are two Turkish translations as well.⁹⁴ The latter of these is well-edited and contains other articles as well by Marx and Engels that were not included in the 1897 edition.

The *Times* correspondent William Howard Russell’s despatches from the Crimea and his book *The British Expedition to the Crimea* are among the important first-hand eyewitness narratives.⁹⁵ But eyewitnesses can be misleading. Russell’s despatches and book, together with Lord Raglan’s nephew and aide-de-camp Colonel Somerset Calthorpe’s book⁹⁶ formed the basis of the false reports on the “cowardice” of some Ottoman troops defending the redoubts on the hills of Balaklava on the day of the famous (for the British) battle of Balaklava on 25 October 1854. However, it was again some British historians and researchers who set the record right on this question and not Ottoman or Turkish historians, who have been quite disinterested in general and in the battles fought in the Crimea in particular. (See Chapter 3.8.).

Alexander W. Kinglake’s six-volume work is the first major history of the war in

93 Karl Marx. *The Eastern Question. A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-1856 Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War*. Edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling. London, 1897. New York: B. Franklin, 1968. London: Frank Cass, 1969.

94 *Türkiye Üzerine (Şark Meselesi)*. Çevirenler Selahattin Hilav, Atilla Tokatlı. Ankara: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1966. İkinci basım 1974. *Doğu Sorunu [Türkiye]*. Çeviren Yurdakul Fincancı. Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1977.

95 William Howard Russell. *The British Expedition to the Crimea*. Revised Edition. London: G. Routledge & Co., 1858. *Despatches from the Crimea 1854-1856*. London: Deutsch, 1966.

96 [Colonel Somerset Calthorpe]. *Letters from Head-Quarters, or the Realities of the War in the Crimea. By an Officer on the Staff*. Two vols. Vol. I. London: John Murray, 1856.

English, based chiefly on Lord Raglan's papers.⁹⁷ While the book is not altogether useless, Her Britannic Majesty's apologist is strongly anti-Napoleon III and anti-Stratford. Kinglake's study is interesting but it does not cover much material related to the Ottoman involvement.

There are also a number of memoirs of British officers, doctors and journalists who have served in the Anatolian front. Colonel Atwell Lake has written two books on the defence of Kars. The second book is with letters from General Williams (the British military commissioner at Kars), Captain Thompson and Major Teesdale.⁹⁸ Doctor Humphry Sandwith has also written his memoirs.⁹⁹ Lake and Sandwith are too pro-Williams, failing to point out any deficiencies on the part of their superior officer. Surprisingly, Sandwith even thinks that Williams arrived already with the rank of General, while in fact Williams had come to Istanbul as a lieutenant-colonel and in December 1854 the Sultan conferred upon him the Ottoman rank of *ferik* (division general) and after the battle of Kars on 29 September 1855, he was promoted to the rank of *müşir* (general of army). Nevertheless, these memoirs contain very valuable, lively observations especially on Ottoman rule in the province of Erzurum, on the influence of European consuls and the situation of Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

The *Morning Chronicle* correspondent Charles Duncan's two-volume memoirs of the Kars army give lively and interesting details of the Ottoman army and of the people of Kars.¹⁰⁰ While Duncan is not altogether unbiased, his account is very useful. Duncan gives a detailed description of the battle of Kürekdere (he even gives a wonderfully correct spelling of "Kürekdere", same as in modern Turkish). Interestingly, Duncan includes the despatch of General Bebutov on this battle as well. However, he does not tell where he got this despatch. In addition to the testimonies of Abdi Pasha, Ahmed Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha before the court, Duncan's narrative is a useful counterbalance to Russian eye-witness accounts of the battles around Kars in 1854.

The eccentric English journalist and writer Laurence Oliphant participated in the Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha during the fall of 1855 as correspondent of the *Times* newspaper and published his memoirs (see footnote 27). Oliphant is critical of both the British and the French governments for delaying the campaign. Like almost all

97 Alexander W. Kinglake. *The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress Down to the Death of Lord Raglan*. 6 vols. New York, London: Harper, 1863-87.

98 Colonel Henry Atwell Lake. *Kars and Our Captivity in Russia*. London: Richard Bentley, 1856. *A Narrative of the Defence of Kars*. London: Richard Bentley, 1857.

99 Humphry Sandwith. *A Narrative of the Siege of Kars*. London: John Murray, 1856.

100 Charles Duncan. *A Campaign with the Turks in Asia*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1855.

foreigners, he has a high opinion of the “gallantry” of the Ottoman (“Turkish”) soldiers and a very low opinion of the Ottoman officers, of whom, he argues, “the less said the better”. He has in general a low opinion of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, considering them “the two most barbarous nations in Europe”.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, he gives many details on the battle of Ingur and on the Circassians and Georgians.

Lady Emilia Bithynia Hornby, wife of Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby, arrived at Constantinople on 8 September 1855 together with his husband. Lady Hornby wrote her memoirs of their stay in Istanbul first under the title *In and Around Stamboul* (London, 1858), then an enlarged and illustrated version of the above book appeared in 1863.¹⁰² The book is in the form of letters sent by Lady Hornby from Constantinople to England from September 1855 to September 1856. They are generally superficial, but contain some insights into Turkish daily life. Especially valuable is the description of the balls at the British and French embassies in February 1856, when for the first time an Ottoman Sultan visited a ball at an embassy.

Lady Alicia Blackwood has written a book under the same title as that of Lady Hornby, but I could not get hold of this book.

Another lady who has written her memoirs of Istanbul after the Crimean War was Marie de Melfort, a relative of Edouard Thouvenel, the French ambassador to Istanbul. But the book was published much later in 1902 under the new marital name of the author, La Baronne Durand de Fontmagne.¹⁰³ These memoirs include some important episodes of Ottoman statesmen like Fuad Pasha and some details of social life like women wearing corset. The rest is the usual orientalist banalities that are characteristic of the European travel literature of the 19th century. The book has been translated into Turkish as well.¹⁰⁴

Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby (1825-1896) was appointed the British commissioner for the “Turkish Loan” of 1855. His duty was to control the spending of the loan money of more than five million pounds sterling strictly on the needs of the Ottoman army. In his *Autobiography*, written most probably after the “Bulgarian horrors” of 1870s, he argues against Britain’s fighting for “Turkey”, because of her misgovernment of the Christian subjects. He also argues that without the fear of the Russians, “the

101 Oliphant, op. cit., p. 48.

102 Lady Hornby [Emelia Bithynia Maceroni Hornby]. *Constantinople during the Crimean War*. London: Richard Bentley, 1863.

103 La Baronne Durand de Fontmagne. *Un séjour à l'ambassade de France à Constantinople sous le second empire*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1902.

104 Baronne Durand de Fontmagne. *Kırım Harbi Sonrasında İstanbul*. Istanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, 1977. Translated by Gülçiçek Soytürk.

Turks” did not consent to reforms in the long run. His words are indeed quite indicative of the mentality of many British gentlemen of the time. They are worth quoting here because of their unusual openness:

I have never been able to understand any adequate cause for the Crimean War, or why England took any prominent part in it. It began by a squabble between the European Powers about the “Holy Places”. We had absolutely nothing to do with that quarrel... the Treaty of Paris (1856) was a huge diplomatic blunder. It freed Turkey from the fear of Russia and left her to misgovern her Christian subjects as she pleased, which she forthwith proceeded to do. I know that although during the war, and immediately after it, neither Lord Stratford nor myself acting under his orders felt much difficulty in getting the Turks to consent to reforms, especially in their courts of law, in provincial administration, and in the management of their prisons; yet within eighteen months of the treaty it was impossible to do anything with them.¹⁰⁵

Another Englishman who took part in the war and has written his memoirs is Adolphus Slade (1804-1877) whom the Ottomans called Mushaver (Adviser) Pasha. Slade had come to the Ottoman Empire first in 1829-31 and written his reminiscences in 1833.¹⁰⁶ In 1847 he came again to Istanbul and was employed as an advisor in the Ottoman navy, his rank being promoted to Mirliva (Rear-Admiral). Together with Captain Borlase (Bahri Bey) his duty was mainly to train the Ottoman sailors. Slade’s account of the Crimean War is more interesting than those of other European observers, because he has more knowledge about the Ottoman bureaucracy and people in general, and because he was in a unique position of acting as intermediary between the Ottoman navy and the Allied navies. His attitude is also very pro-Ottoman and anti-Stratford. He also takes issue with General Williams. In many cases he speaks up for the Ottomans. Indeed he fills to a certain extent the void in the literature caused by the lack of Ottoman accounts about the war. The fact that Slade published his book in 1867, when he had retired from Ottoman service¹⁰⁷ and already returned to Britain, gives more credibility to his words because he was no longer an Ottoman official and in principle he could be more objective. Nevertheless, as for all sources, a critical attitude is necessary towards him as well. We must also admit that memoirs are more valuable when they are written not long after the events described in them.

105 Sir Edmund Hornby. *An Autobiography*. London: Constable and Co. Ltd, 1929, pp. 80-81.

106 Adolphus Slade. *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc. and of A Cruise in the Black Sea, with the Capitan Pasha, in the Years 1829, 1830, and 1831*. 2 vols. London: Saunders and Otley, 1833.

107 Mushaver Pasha retired from his office of *Istanbul Liman Memuru* (official of the port of Istanbul) at the rank of *ferik* (vice-admiral) in April 1861. His British rank was rear-admiral. See BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 329/63, dated 20 Zilkade 1281 (16 April 1861).

Another late remembrance is Dr. Thomas Buzzard's book.¹⁰⁸ Dr. Buzzard was a member of the British medical staff and he was for some time attached to the headquarters' staff of Ömer Pasha in the Crimea and the Caucasus.

Georges Kmety (Ismail Pasha) was a Hungarian revolutionary émigré officer who served in the Ottoman Anatolian army. He has also left a narrative of the defence of Kars, however, I have been unable to find this book.¹⁰⁹

The Polish refugee Michal Czajkowski (1804-1886), who accepted Islam and the Muslim name of Mehmed Sadık (Mehmed Sadyk in English and Polish) also left important memoirs for the year 1854.¹¹⁰ Sadık Pasha was the commander of the first Cossack regiment in the Balkans. His memoirs seem to contain important information and remarks about many Ottoman officers and statesmen. Although I received some help from native speakers in translating some passages from this book, I could not make full use of it. (My Russian was of little help in understanding Polish fully). I think this important book must be translated into Turkish, Russian and English. Fortunately, Czajkowski also left an autobiography which was translated into Russian and published in the journal *Russkaya Starina* with intervals from 1895 until 1904. It contains an important remark about Stratford de Redcliffe's attitude towards the issue of Christian or non-Muslim military service in the Ottoman army. (See Ch. 5.3.)

Stanley Lane-Poole's biography¹¹¹ of the British ambassador in Istanbul Stratford de Redcliffe is useful but the biographer exaggerates the role of his hero. This is not an objective biography but rather a eulogy of the "Great Elchi". Lane-Poole also exaggerates the role of the British military officers-advisers in the Ottoman army to such an extent that sometimes becomes ridiculous, as in the following passage:

Perhaps with merely Ottoman commanders the garrison might have surrendered; but it happened that two young English officers, Butler and Nasmyth, had thrown themselves into the beleaguered city and had inspired the defenders with a zeal and enthusiasm that no skill of Russian engineers could quench. Silistria was saved...¹¹²

Nevertheless, the author had the private and official papers and memoirs of Canning at his disposal and this gives some interest and value to his work.

108 Thomas Buzzard. *With the Turkish Army in the Crimea and Asia Minor. A Personal Narrative.* London, 1915.

109 [Georges Kmety (Ismail Pasha)]. *A Narrative of the Defence of Kars.* London, 1856.

110 Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadyk Pasza). *Moje Wspomnienia o Wojnie 1854 Roku.* Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1962.

111 Stanley Lane-Poole. *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning: Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.* London, 1888.

112 Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 367.

From 1932 to 1936, English historian Harold Temperley wrote four long articles and a book on the Crimean War. In his articles and his book he made good use of the British, Austrian, French, and remarkably of the Dutch archives. He has indeed shown that Stratford was not “the human agency which caused the Crimean War” and that he was not “animated throughout by personal feeling against Tsar Nicholas”. Nevertheless, despite his achievements in setting some points right in the record, Temperley basically followed a British imperialist, Orientalist and pro-Stratford view of the British policy in the Ottoman Empire. The following quotation provides ample proof of his Orientalist and hero-worshipping approach:

Stratford had set out to drive orientals along new roads, a task to baffle the most expert of drovers. There seem to be two ways of moving orientals in new directions. One way is to imitate them, to yield to them to pretend to be theirs. Then they follow you as a flock of sheep the bell-wether. That was Lawrence's way with the Arabs... There is another way, and one by which an Englishman may preserve his faith and yet instruct orientals in reality. It is 'to stand against them, to persuade himself of a mission, to batter and to twist into something which they, of their own accord, would not have done'. That is to drive, not to lead, and it was Stratford's way with the Turks.¹¹³

The American historian Vernon John Puryear, on the other hand, criticized this pro-Stratford view. In 1931 he published an article (“New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War”) and a book: *England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856*.¹¹⁴ This book was based on his doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1929. He was very critical of Stratford de Redcliffe. The book included a chapter on the “commercial preliminaries” of the war, where an interesting economic analysis of the importance of the Black Sea trade was made. In 1935 he published another book, where he developed his economic analysis in full. Puryear was probably the first Western historian who argued that “the causes of the Crimean War, although several in number, were in great part economic in nature”.¹¹⁵

Olive Anderson has written several articles on the Crimean War and the best article is in my opinion the one on the beginnings of Ottoman public debt.¹¹⁶ This is probably the only research based article (although based only on the British archives) in

113 Harold Temperley. *England and the Near East: The Crimea*. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1936. Reprinted: London: Frank Cass, 1964, pp. 242-43.

114 Vernon John Puryear. *England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856*. Berkeley: University of California Publications in History, 1931. Reprinted, Hamden: Archon Books, 1965.

115 Puryear. *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853*. Stanford University Press; London: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1935. Reprinted, Hamden: Archon Books, 1969.

116 Olive Anderson. “Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-55”, *The Historical Journal* 7(1), 1964, pp. 47-63.

English on the “Turkish” loans of 1854 and 1855. Nevertheless, the article includes several minor factual errors. Furthermore, its general attitude is pro-British, it puts the blame too easily on Namık Pasha for his unsuccessful efforts to contract a loan, taking Lord Clarendon’s¹¹⁷ words for granted that Namık Pasha abided by unrealistic instructions. We will see in the chapter on finances that this claim does not reflect the whole picture.

English scholar, Foreign Service officer, politician and businessman William Edward David Allen’s book, the *Caucasian Battlefields*, written together with Paul Muratoff and first published in 1953, includes two chapters (totally 45 pages) on the Caucasian battles of the Crimean War.¹¹⁸ The authors give a clear and understandable account of these battles, based upon English and Russian sources. Although they also refer to some works in Turkish, it is highly doubtful that they could read Turkish. The book includes a few minor errors like giving in one passage the commander of the Batum army as Ahmet Pasha (instead of Selim Pasha) and turning the Abkhazian prince Mikhail Sharvashidze’s name into Iskander Sharvashidze. The book was translated into Turkish and published by the Turkish general staff in 1966, but I could not find this translation.

Ann Pottinger Saab’s book is one of the first Western revisionist and pro-Ottoman accounts of the war, trying to understand the views of the Ottomans from their sources.¹¹⁹ Saab makes some use of Ottoman archive sources. However, very surprisingly, she makes no mention of Cevdet Pasha. This is all the more surprising because she acknowledges help from Stanford Shaw and other Ottomanist historians as well.

Robert Edgerton’s book was among the first to try to revise the Western notions of the role of the Ottoman soldiers and officers in this war.¹²⁰ The book has a chapter titled “Pride and Prejudice: the Turks at War”. There he shows that at the battle of Balaklava, 500 “ethnic Turks” in the first gun positions were attacked by 6,000 Russians with superior artillery and despite these “overwhelming odds” they did not leave their position for an hour while losing 170 men. Finally they broke and retreated

117 George William Frederick Villiers, fourth Earl of Clarendon (1800-1870). British secretary of state for foreign affairs 1853-1858. See www.wikipedia.org.

118 Allen, W. E. D.; Muratoff, Paul. *Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1999.

119 *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977.

120 Robert B. Edgerton. *Death or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

and from then on the British and the French troops held the “Turks” in contempt. Before Edgerton and later other authors, researchers and historians also tried to set the record right and thus the “Turks” at the battle of Balaklava were rehabilitated by many British historians.¹²¹

Prof. Winfried Baumgart’s book *The Crimean War 1853-1856*¹²² is up to date and shows good command of Russian and Western sources. It also covers the battles in the Danubian front remarkably better than any other Western study that I have seen. However, it contains little information on the Ottoman army, a fact admitted by the author himself.

James J. Reid published in 2000 a book with substantial coverage of the Crimean War.¹²³ He has also made a review of Ottoman and Turkish sources in his introduction, giving concise and correct evaluations. However, like Saab, he has very strangely omitted Ahmet Cevdet Pasha’s *Tezâkir* and *Ma’rûzât*. This is all the more surprising because Reid makes some marginal, trivial references to the *Tezâkir* elsewhere in his book, which means that he is at least aware of the existence of Cevdet Pasha’s work. Nevertheless, Reid is unaware of other Turkish works such as those of Yüzbaşı Fevzi Kurtoğlu and the military historians Hikmet Süer and Saim Besbelli, not to mention theses and dissertations in Turkish. Nevertheless, Reid’s study addresses some important issues and suggests some interesting explanations as well. It also attempts to introduce elements of psychohistorical inquiry and analysis of cultural mentality into the study of the Ottoman 19th century. I think one of the major contributions of Reid’s study is its ability to show the hazards of the Ottoman outmoded strategy of the “scattered” or “piecemeal” or “detached” or “dispersed” deployment of troops. As Reid stated,

Rather than concentrate armies to build greater force, Ottoman generals feared the loss of even a small territory to invasion or rebellion, and attempted to deploy forces everywhere to hold everything. Part of their problem was the factional strife in the officers corps and in the Ottoman government. Such factional conflicts made it difficult for a general staff to operate in unity and placed a

121 These are Michael Hargreave Mawson and Major Colin Robbins of the Crimean War Research Society, Dr Feroz Yasamee of the University of Manchester and the “Battlefield Detectives” of the Channel Five in the UK. See Mawson, *The True Heroes of Balaclava*, Kent, Bedford, London: Crimean War Research Society Publications, spiral-bound printout, 1996. Yasamee maintains that these troops were from Tunis. See David Wason, *Battlefield Detectives: What Really Happened on the World’s Most Famous Battlefields*, London: Granada Television Production, 2003, pp. 150-179.

122 Winfried Baumgart. *The Crimean War, 1853-1856*. London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

123 James Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire. Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000, pp. 236-306.

commanding officer in jeopardy for failing to defend any part of the empire from loss.¹²⁴

Therefore I will try to refer to some of its positive achievements as well as mistakes in Chapters 3 and 5. The basic problem with Reid's book is that it is almost exclusively based on Western sources, with few references to Russian and Ottoman / Turkish sources and with no reference to Ottoman archive material. Reid even makes a very strange statement on the Ottoman archives:

Ottoman documents relating to the period 1853 to 1862 exist outside the Ottoman archive in Istanbul. In addition to former Ottoman provinces [now independent states where one can find Ottoman archival remnants] the following archival sources exist.¹²⁵ [Brackets in the quotation are from the original].

Reid mentions the Walpole Papers, Fraser Papers and Ottoman *salnames* (almanacs) after this statement. The above statement is indeed vague at best: Does the author really mean that Ottoman documents relating to the period 1853 to 1862 exist in those former provinces? Alternatively, does he mean that there are some Ottoman documents outside the BOA *as well*? But then, what about the documents in the BOA? Has the author ever tried to do research in the BOA? In reality, these documents do exist in the BOA. There are tens of thousands of them (if not more) only for the period in question (the nature and scope of these documents is another matter). Reid's statement only betrays a complete ignorance of the contents of the BOA. Indeed, the statement comes especially surprising, because Reid claims that the place of his book in modern scholarship on the Crimean War is "to give a uniquely Ottoman perspective on the conduct of that war".¹²⁶ After such a claim, we have a right to expect from the author some serious research in the BOA. Furthermore, referring to some authors, Reid chooses not their relevant works but some other irrelevant works of them. For example, he does not mention at all Adolphus Slade's important book on the Crimean War (*Turkey and the Crimean War*). Instead he refers to another book by Slade, published in 1833, which is doubtless an important source on the Ottoman Empire, but (naturally) is not related to the Crimean War. I think that any study of the Ottoman involvement in the Crimean War without reference to Slade's book will suffer from a serious deficiency. Again, in the chapter on the Crimean War, Reid refers to the Turkish historian Fahrettin Kırzioğlu's book on the history of Kars (*Kars Tarihi*, vol. I), but not to that book of Kırzioğlu which is directly related to the Crimean War (*1855 Kars*

124 Reid, op. cit., p. 257.

125 Reid, op. cit., p. 38.

126 Ibid.

Zaferi).¹²⁷ These omissions also show that the author has not researched well the Turkish historiography of the Crimean War.

Referring to Helmut von Moltke, Reid spells the name of the Kurdish rebel chief Bedirhan Bey as “Vede Khân Bey”.¹²⁸ Then in the section on the insurrection of “Yazdân Shîr” (Yezdan Şer, a relative of Bedirhan and another Kurdish rebel chief), Reid mentions the Kurdish chief “Bedir Khân Bey”, this time referring to a contemporary Kurdish writer.¹²⁹ One can of course use different spellings, however, “Vede Khan” is simply wrong and Reid should have indicated its correct form(s). The problem here is that Reid does not realize that “Vede Khan” and Bedirhan are the same person. For this reason, Reid’s index too gives Vede Khan and Bedir Khan separately without any cross references.

While Reid’s critical attitude towards the efficiency of Ottoman reforms in general in the 19th century and military reforms in particular is welcome, it is not possible to say that he has provided an objective and balanced account throughout his analysis. In many cases he relies upon one Western source without referring to others. For example, in his interpretation of the conduct of the Ottoman troops in the Battle of Balaklava, Reid does not rise about the traditional cliché view of Russell and (to a lesser degree) Kinglake that has lately been challenged by new research. (See Chapter 3).

To sum up, Reid’s book has some aims and claims similar to those of this dissertation; however, the result is fragmentary. While he promises a separate book on the “Ottoman Crimean War”, it did not appear in print until now to the best of my knowledge. Reid has also written an interesting article based upon Dr Humphry Sandwith’s article on the roots of the Armenian question in the Crimean War.¹³⁰ In particular, Reid has been able to show the impact on the Armenian question of the disorders resulting from the abuse of the Ottoman irregular troops by Ottoman pashas.

Fikret Turan’s bibliography of monographs includes 657 entries (of which 53 are in Russian and 5 in Ottoman Turkish) with a thematic index.¹³¹ As the title itself suggests, it does not include document collections, reviews, articles, etc. In any case, the bibliography is far from being comprehensive even for monographs alone. Very

127 Reid, op. cit., p. 239.

128 Reid, op. cit., p. 79.

129 Reid, op. cit., p. 299.

130 Reid, “ 'How the Turks Rule Armenia' ”, in Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Armenian Karin / Erzerum*, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003, pp. 147-187.

131 Fikret Turan. *The Crimean War 1853-1856. A Bibliography of Monographs*. Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000.

surprisingly the author has not consulted the online catalogs of the British Library or the Bibliotheque de France, and (not surprisingly) the libraries or bibliographies from Russia in the compilation of this bibliography.

Tobias Heinzelmann's work¹³² on military conscription in the Ottoman Empire in 1826-1856 has some relevance for our study, though it has very few references to the Crimean War. Recently, Clive Ponting published a book with a provocative subtitle: *The Truth Behind the Myth*. Unfortunately, this book does not tell the Ottoman story either.¹³³

132 Tobias Heinzelmann. *Heiliger Kampf oder Landesverteidigung? Die Diskussion um die Einführung der allgemeinen Militärpflicht im Osmanischen Reich 1826-1856*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004.

133 Clive Ponting. *The Crimean War. The Truth Behind the Myth*. London: Chatto & Windus, 2004. London: Pimlico, 2005.

CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR

2.1. Overview of the Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the War

At the beginning of 1853, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a great power, despite contrary claims by Ottoman officialdom. Its very existence depended on the balance of power prevailing in Europe. Constant wars with Russia since 1768 and revolts in all the empire from Serbia, Greece, Egypt to Kurdistan had weakened the Ottoman state. By this time, however, the Ottoman Empire had become an important market for European great powers and had to be defended against its main adversary, Russia. The Ottoman Empire had not taken part in the post-Napoleonic Vienna conferences, it was not a member of the Concert of Europe and did not play a role in European politics as such. It had become the object of the so called “Eastern Question”. Its participation in the 1841 Straits Convention did not make it a member of the European state system either, but rather the empire became subordinate to the European system.¹³⁴ In fact, European diplomacy had long forgotten when the Ottoman Empire for the last time took any initiative in European politics. One notable exception was during the crisis of Hungarian refugees in 1849, when Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-1858), supported by Britain and France, refused to hand over Hungarian revolutionaries to Austria and Russia. This stand of the Ottoman Empire was to prove indeed very beneficial for its standing in the European public opinion, which gained considerable influence during the Crimean War thanks to war reporting and telegraph.

For many of his contemporaries, Sultan Abdülmeçid (r. 1839-1861) appeared as a weak and indecisive person, with a “melancholic” face. The weakness and indecision of Abdülmeçid meant that every reform movement was applied halfway and then compromised to the “Old Turkish” party, the enemies of reforms. In contrast, Butrus

134 This was clear from the form of address of the Padishah as “His Highness”, while European protocol demanded “His Majesty”. The Ottoman Sultan or Padishah became “His Majesty” in the Treaty of Paris of 1856, but still he was not an equal party to the system. See J. C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System”, *Middle East Journal* XV, 1961, p. 151.

Abu-Manneh portrays a different Abdülmecid:

Through his tutor on the one hand and his mother on the other, it is believed that Sultan Abdülmecid at a young age was exposed to Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi belief and that orthodox Islamic ideals formed the foundation of his convictions and socio-political outlook, which naturally after his rise and for some years to come continued to reflect itself in his actions.¹³⁵

However, such an orthodox Islamic outlook is not in easy conformity with his way of life, characterised by attraction to women and heavy drinking, and his benevolent attitude toward Western customs and methods.

On the other hand, it is not easy to establish a dichotomy of “old Turkish” and “reformist” parties within the bureaucracy. Because in most cases the real reasons of opposition or favour of the Ottoman elite to this and that reform or measure was not a matter of principle but rather a question of personal intrigues and petty interests. The same person who followed a policy of reforms could oppose those very reforms when out of office. The classic example is the best known reformer himself, that is, Reşid Pasha, whose jealousy of Âli Pasha, one of his protégés, made him oppose the recognition of equal political rights to the Christian subjects of the Empire.

Grand viziers, ministers and governors did not stay long in their office because the Sultan would yield to the influence of one party, then another, reshuffling the ministries and military positions all the time. These reshuffles were also due to the rival influences of the great powers. Abdülmecid knew some French and liked to talk about politics and life with ambassadors like the British ambassador Stratford Canning, who had great influence in Istanbul. Promoted to peerage as Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe in 1852, he was bound to play an important role before and during the war. However, his overbearing character turned many people against him, and in the 1850s he also began to lose faith in his main protégé in the Ottoman bureaucracy, Reşid Pasha, who had become less enthusiastic in reforms. Still Lord Stratford considered him the best man in the Ottoman Empire to carry out reforms.¹³⁶

Beginning from the 1830s, the office of the foreign ministry had become much prominent among all Ottoman institutions due to the need for the Ottoman Empire to

135 Butrus Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876)*, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001, p. 83. Abu-Manneh (op. cit., p. 84) has also argued that “when Sultan Abdülmecid rose to the Sultanate, both the Palace and the Porte appear to have been motivated by the ideals of Orthodox Islam, perhaps more than at any time before”.

136 “Among the ministers, whether in office or expectant, Reshid Pasha was the one who in sentiment and policy sympathized most with me. The Sultan seemed to be jealous of our intimacy”. See Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of Stratford Canning*, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1888, vol. II, p. 104.

balance out great powers against each other in order to survive. The *Tercüme Odası* (Translation Bureau) prepared many prominent statesmen, among whom Mustafa Reşid Pasha was the foremost. The Ottomans were now more dependant on diplomacy and the necessity to treat the Europeans as equals was becoming clear more and more. Mustafa Reşid Pasha tried to modernize diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire along European lines.¹³⁷ Reşid Pasha first became grand vizier (*sadrızam*) in 1845 and his office lasted until 1851 with two short intervals. In May 1853, during the final stage of the Menshikov crisis in Istanbul, he became foreign minister, actually controlling the Sublime Porte, and again *sadrızam* in 1854. Nevertheless, his office did not last to see the end of the war and to participate in the peace negotiations in Paris. His relations with his former protégés Âli and Fuad Pashas had already deteriorated in 1853 and after the *Islahat Fermanı* of 1856, Reşid Pasha's criticism of their policy increased.¹³⁸ (See Chapter 5.3.).

Reşid Pasha resigned in May 1855 when Sultan Abdülmecid forgave his brother-in-law (Damad) Mehmet Ali Pasha, whom he had recently exiled to Kastamonu due to charges of embezzlement. Mehmed Ali owed his return from exile to the quarrel and rivalry between Stratford de Redcliffe and his French colleague Edouard Thouvenel, who, in the absence of Lord Stratford in August 1855, managed to get his protégé Mehmed Ali back into government as marine minister. As the Ottoman statesman and chronicler Cevdet Pasha admitted, the state had lost its power and its ministers their honor and dignity, each one seeking protection from the embassy of this or that great power. Therefore interferences of the great powers into the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire were now conducted openly.¹³⁹ The Sublime State (*Devlet-i Aliyye*), as the Ottoman Empire called itself, was really in a pitiable situation.

Despite his much enthusiasm and efforts, Sultan Mahmud II had been only partially successful to set up a new modern army. The biggest problem was to find European officers of high reputation to drill and train the army. Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt was more successful and effective in bringing out a modern army on the European model. He was willing to pay 17,500 piastres monthly to his French instructor Colonel Joseph Sève (Süleyman or Soliman Pasha, 1788-1860) who trained his troops, while Mahmud II would not give more than 2,000 piastres in salary to any foreign

137 Cevdet Pasha even argues that Reşid Pasha instituted the method of diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire: "*Devlet-i aliyyede diplomasi usulünü vaz' ve te'sis eden Reşid Paşa'dır*". See Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 1-12*, Yayınlayan Cavid Baysun, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p. 7.

138 Op. cit., p. 16.

139 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 13-20*, p. 15.

advisor.¹⁴⁰ Sultan Mahmud II did not like foreign advisors much and he asked Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt to send him some Muslim advisors. In fact, Mehmed Ali had much more impact on Mahmud II than anyone else.

Although Abdülmecid was luckier with foreign military advisers, the army and the navy were still not professional in a modern European sense. As the Russian commander in chief of the Danube army General Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov¹⁴¹ (1793-1861) reported in his “Instructions for Battle against the Turks”, submitted to Emperor Nikolai I on 30 June 1853, the Ottomans had destroyed the old army, but they had not built a new regular army in a European sense.¹⁴² The Ottoman army was not professional in a strict sense, because high ranks as a rule were still distributed by favouritism and not by merit. There was also the rivalry and hatred between the uneducated “old Turks” and those officers who received some education in Europe. For example, in the Anatolian army the commander in chief (*müşir*) Abdi Pasha represented the latter, while his chief of staff Ahmet Pasha belonged to the former. There was mutual distrust between them. (More will be said on this question in Chapter 3). The Rumeli army under the command of Ömer Lütfi Pasha (1806-1871)¹⁴³ was better officered and better trained, yet still not a match for the Russian army, despite some successes in the battles. (This point will also be seen in Chapter 3). Lower ranks had few incentives to work hard for promotion because without links to the court elite or without some luck they had few chances of being promoted, while those with the right connections rose rapidly.¹⁴⁴

Recruitment for the Ottoman army was through levies among the Muslim male population at the age of 20 to 25 by draft (*kur'a*). Draftees could send a substitute for themselves. Military service in the Ottoman army lasted six years in active service and then seven years in reserve (*redif*). Non-Muslims did not serve in the army, paying a

140 See Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-39”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2, 1971, p. 24.

141 Not to be confused with Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister from 1856 to 1882.

142 “*Rukovodstvo dlya boya protiv turok, sostavlennoe knyazem Gorchakovym*”, quoted in Andrey M. Zayonchkovskiy, *Vostochnaya Voina 1853-1856*, vol. II, part two, St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2002, p. 560.

143 Ömer Pasha was born a Croat (his original name was Mihaylo Latas) and received military education at an Austrian school. Later he fled from Austria, came to Istanbul and converted to Islam. By luck and ability, he rose quickly in the Ottoman army.

144 Levy, *ibid*, pp. 21-39.

poll-tax (*cizye*, after 1855 called *iane-i askeriye*¹⁴⁵) instead. Nevertheless, patriotic feelings seem to have spread among Ottoman non-Muslims as well at the beginning of the war. 3,000 Bulgarians from notable families had also applied voluntarily for service in the Ottoman army, according to the *Berliner Zeitung* on 1 September 1853.¹⁴⁶ They were not accepted. Likewise, some patriotic Ottoman Armenians and Greeks from Saruhan and İzmir applied to the Porte to serve in the army, however, they were kindly rejected.¹⁴⁷ Thus the Ottoman Empire, with an estimated population of around 35 millions, that is, roughly half of Russia's population, had still fewer human resources to fill up the ranks of its armies, because of depending only on its Muslim subjects, while Russia could levy troops from a much larger (approximately four times larger) base of population.

Muslims could rise to high ranks in the Russian army, whereas non-Muslims were not accepted in the Ottoman army either as officers or NCOs or privates, except for the two Cossack regiments recruited from the Dobruca Cossacks, the Old Believers (*starovertsy*), especially the Nekrasovites (*Nekrasovtsy*) known as Ignat-Cossacks,¹⁴⁸ and Polish refugees under the command of the Polish officers Mehmed Sadık Pasha (Michał Czajkowski) and Count Władysław Zamoyski.¹⁴⁹ In November 1853, 799 Polish emigrants in France headed by General Wysocki signed a petition to Sultan Abdülmecid to form a “*Légion Polonaise*” in the Ottoman Empire. However, their request was not satisfied mainly due to the disapproval of the French government.¹⁵⁰ During the war, Adam Czartoryski, leader of the Polish emigrants in France, sent many Polish officers to the Porte.¹⁵¹ Czartoryski's son Witold also served as colonel in the second Cossack

145 *Mazbata of the Meclis-i Vâlâ-i Tanzimat*. BOA. İ. MMS. 132/5650, dated 16 November 1855. The fact that a regular tax was given the name of *iane-i askeriye* confirms my assertion that the *iane-i harbiye* was a tax and not a donation. See sub-chapter 4.7.

146 Mustafa Gencer, “Alman Basınında Kırım Savaşı”, in *Savaştan Barışa*, 2007, p. 168.

147 BOA. HR. SYS. 1346/52, 10 January 1854, OBKS, pp. 104-106.

148 From the name of Ignat Fyodorovich Nekrasov, the Cossack *ataman* who revolted against Peter the Great and fled with many Don Cossacks to Kuban in 1709. These Cossacks later moved to Köstence (Konstanza) and Manyas in the Ottoman Empire.

149 Fikret Adanır, “Der Krimkrieg von 1853-1856”, in *Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands, Band 2*, Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann Verlag, 2001, pp. 1196-1197. Also see Czajkowski, op. cit., (1962), pp. 11, 50-66, 80-100, 202-211, 232-255; and Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, “Michał Czajkowski's Cossack Project During the Crimean War: An Analysis of Ideas”, in P. L. Rudnytsky (ed.), *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987, pp. 173-186.

150 BOA. HR. SYS. 1194/1 and 1345/46.

151 Secrétaire du Comte Zamoyski à Son Altesse Mehmed Kepresli Pacha, Grand Vizir, 26 August 1854, BOA. HR. SYS. 1336/18.

regiment.¹⁵² However, the Porte was careful not to name these regiments as Polish regiments, preferring instead the name of Cossack regiments. It was also careful not to employ these Polish and Hungarian officers near the Austrian border, because it had given guarantees on this issue to Austria before.¹⁵³ Ottoman Greeks from Macedonia and other places were recruited for the navy and the naval arsenal (*Tersane-i Amire*) for some time but this practise was abandoned.¹⁵⁴

On the other hand, we must not forget that Russia had a longer border to defend and only a very small part of the Russian army did actually fight in the Crimea, Caucasus and other places, while the rest guarded the borders, awaiting attacks from hostile neighbours. For example, the Russians had to hold the larger part of the Caucasus army against Shamil and the Circassians and the smaller part had to fight against the Ottoman army. Russia also had to post large armies on the Swedish, Prussian, and Austrian borders.¹⁵⁵

Almost all Russian and European military observers of the time coincide in the opinion that the Ottoman soldiers were good fighters while the quality of the Ottoman officers was low. In terms of military art the Ottoman officer class as a whole lacked the ability of manoeuvring in the open field with a coordinated use of the cavalry, the infantry and the artillery. The once formidable Ottoman cavalry that had threatened all Europe was now the worst part of the Ottoman army, while artillery was the best arm of the Ottoman army.¹⁵⁶ However, the ability (or desire?) of these three groups to help each other in battle was again very limited. Cavalry and infantry had much reliance on the artillery, but if the enemy did not get confused in the face of bombardment, the cavalry and infantry did not show much discipline. In many cases, especially on the Caucasian front, some of the Ottoman officers left their troops unguided in the battlefield. The irregular cavalry, the so called *başbozuk* troops were more of a trouble than of help. They were also inclined towards plundering villages and their army quarters, when they did not receive their pay and rations. In fact, for some of them, hope of plunder was the ultimate reason for joining the war. (More will be said in Chapter 3).

152 Sultan's *irade*, dated 15 Şaban 1271 (3 May 1855). BOA. İ. HR. 120/5904 lef 5.

153 Grand vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha's *tezkire* to Sultan Abdülmeccid, dated 4 Safer 1271 (27 October 1854). BOA. İ. MMS. 2/88 lef 2.

154 Heinzelmann, op. cit., pp. 269-279, 305-310.

155 V. E. Bagdasaryan and S. G. Tolstoy, two academicians from Moscow, in a recent study argued that during the war only 15 per cent the Russian army was engaged in actual war. See *Russkaya Voina: Stoletniy istoricheskiy opyt osmysleniya Krymskoi kampanii*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGOU, 2002, preface.

156 This view is also shared by many 19th century military observers and contemporary historians. See, for example, James Reid, op. cit., (2000), pp. 81-83.

The upper ranks systematically robbed the poor soldiers of their rations, uniforms and pay (this will also be shown in Chapter 3). The differences of pay among upper and lower ranks were also much greater than those in European and Russian armies. For example, infantry privates in the Ottoman army received 20 piastres (*kuruş*) per month, corporals 30 piastres, captains 270 piastres, majors 900 to 1200 piastres, colonels 1,800 piastres, brigadier generals 7,500 piastres, division generals 15,000 piastres, while the full general or field marshal (*müşir*) earned 70,000 piastres.¹⁵⁷ Navy men and officers received the same amounts for corresponding ranks, while the cavalry earned slightly more. Indeed the salary of privates (20 piastres for infantry and 24 piastres for cavalry) had not changed since at least the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826, despite inflation.¹⁵⁸ It would be raised to 30 piastres only two years after the Crimean War, on 10 April 1858.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, while the privates and lower ranks received as rations barely enough amounts of food items, the upper ranks received again much bigger money and fodder allowances.

By comparison, the differences in pay among Russian officers were much smaller. For example, a Russian captain received about 36 silver roubles, equivalent of 6 pounds sterling or 750 piastres per month including salary (*zhalovanye*) and house rent money (*kvartirnye*) but excluding rations, while a full general received about 420 roubles or 70 pounds or 8,750 piastres (including pay, rent and *stolovye*). Thus a Russian general earned about 12 times as much as a Russian captain, while in the Ottoman army, as it can be calculated from the above numbers, a general (*ferik*) earned 55 times as much as a captain.¹⁶⁰ (If we equate the Russian full general to the Ottoman *müşir* and not to the *ferik*, and if we also take into account the rations, then the difference gets even bigger). Furthermore, we see that while the Ottoman captain earned only 270 piastres, his Russian colleague earned about 750 piastres in equivalent, thus 2.77 times as much! If we go higher in rank, then the situation differs in the opposite direction. The Ottoman

157 Russian military agent Count Osten Sacken's report to the Russian minister of war, June 1852. RGVA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 45. Also available at fond 846, opis 16, delo 5414, list 14. Also see *Troops in Turkey. Returns of the Pay and Allowances... War Department, London, April 1856*, Turkish Contingent, p. 11. Cf. Hikmet Süer, op. cit., p. 160. The pay of the men and officers of the "Turkish Contingent" was by treaty equal to those in the Ottoman army. On the other hand, Süer's table of salaries and rations, with less differences among ranks, seems rather more egalitarian (with smaller differences among ranks) than the British and Russian accounts given here. For example, Süer gives 30 piastres to the private, 400 piastres to the captain, 3,000 piastres to the colonel and 10,000 piastres to the *ferik*, without mentioning the *müşir*'s salary at all. However, Süer does not give any references for his table.

158 See Avigdor Levy, op. cit., (1982), pp. 496-497.

159 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 13-20*, p. 48.

160 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. I, p. 442.

ferik earns 1.7 times as much as the Russian full general and the *müšir* earns nearly 8 times as much as the Russian general! Nevertheless, we must note that the Ottoman pashas had to care for a large household of servants, slaves, wives and concubines.

When we compare the rank and file, then the situation is at first sight favourable to the Ottoman soldier: he earns 4 times as much as his Russian colleague, who receives only 2.7 roubles per year, that is, about 5 piastres per month, assuming food rations to be more or less equal. Thus the Ottoman soldier was in theory better paid than the Russian soldier, but in practise the Ottoman soldier did not receive his salary for months and years during the war, while the Russian soldier received even money rewards after victories. For example, after the battle of Başgedikler (1 December 1853), the rank and file received 2 roubles each.¹⁶¹

The well-known Russian diplomat, military agent, traveller, geographer, geologist, botanist, zoologist and palaeontologist, Pyotr Aleksandrovich Chikhachev (1808-1890), who had made many travels in the Asia Minor and published many works on the geography and palaeontology of the region, had also reported on the disproportion between the pay of higher and lower ranks in the Ottoman army while he worked at the Russian embassy in Istanbul in 1849.¹⁶² He even seems to have written these remarks in the first volume of his monumental 8-volume work *L'Asie Mineure*, which was published in France in 1853. Chikhachev wrote that the yearly cost of the Ottoman ("Turkish") infantry soldier consisted of 12.5 silver roubles (equivalent of 120 piastres) for salary and 6.25 roubles for rations and clothing, thus a total of 18.75 silver roubles, whereas the Russian infantry soldier cost 31.25 roubles, British infantry soldier 134 roubles, Austrian soldier 53 roubles, Prussian soldier 60 roubles and French soldier cost 85 roubles.¹⁶³ The Ottoman officer, however, received more than his European colleagues. In the case of the *müšir*, he wrote that only 25 per cent of his pay went to the expenses of his *konak*, and the rest to his pocket.

As recognized by many Russian and European observers, the Ottoman regular soldier in general, excluding the irregulars and the *redif*, fought bravely under so many deprivations. These poor soldiers could not even hope for any promotion or reward,

161 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part 1, p. 416.

162 "Donesenie kamer-yunkera Chikhacheva iz Konstantinopolya o sostoyanii turetskoi armii i Bosforskikh i Dardanellskikh ukrepleniy". 1849 g. RGVA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 33.

163 "Iz sochineniya l'Asie Mineure izvestnago russkago puteshestvennika P. A. Chikhacheva", *Kavkaz*, [Russian official newspaper of the viceroyalty of the Caucasus], No. 45, Tiflis, 20 June (2 July) 1853, Saturday.

except for bringing live prisoners.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, the Ottoman officer class had all the opportunities for promotion and rewards during the war, but few of them, especially among the high command, showed themselves worthy of praise. For these and other reasons the Ottoman army was not fit for an attack in the open field but was very firm in defending a fortified place.

It is necessary to note here that Emperor Nikolai I had well-founded information on the condition of the Ottoman army through the reports of the Russian military agents in Istanbul and other cities. Before and during the war, the military agent in Istanbul, Staff Colonel Count Osten-Sacken (not to be mixed with the other Osten-Sacken, governor of Odessa) regularly sent reports to the war minister General Prince Vasiliy Andreyevich Dolgorukov (1804-1868). On all these there is the note “His Majesty has read”. In his reports, Count Osten-Sacken tried to give every information on the Ottoman army and navy, in detail for all corps, from material to moral conditions. He also provided characteristics of all the leading commanders in the Ottoman army. For example, in his report on the “general review of the condition of the Turkish military forces in the year 1852”, he describes the Ottoman commander in chief Ömer Pasha as “more suitable for *small war*, than *command of an army*, although the Turkish government *expects much from him* in this latter respect” [My translation, italics underlined in the original]¹⁶⁵. Osten-Sacken gives only a handful of Ottoman commanders worthy of some military training or knowledge. Nikolai’s overconfidence might partly stem from these reports. While the Ottoman army included many foreign military advisers and émigré officers who had the knowledge of modern warfare, their effect was not very healthy due to jealousy and bickering among themselves. The Anatolian army at Kars for example had many foreign (Polish, Hungarian, French, British, etc) officers in all battles but they were divided among themselves as to what to do. Even if they offered sound advice, then its application by the lower ranks was a problem.

164 In a letter from the grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (25 February 1854), it was said that a reward of 100 piastres would be given to those who brought a live prisoner of war. BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 111/79. But this reward was abused as some soldiers caught civilians instead of soldiers.

165 RGVIA. Fond 846 (VUA), opis 16, delo 5414, list 19. “Obshchii obzor sostoyaniya turetskikh voennykh sil v 1852 godu”. This report is also available at RGVIA, fond 450 (Turtsiya), opis’ 1, delo 45.

2.2. Relations with Britain

It has been long argued that the Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty of 1838 was an important turning point in the process of the commercialization of the Ottoman agriculture and the peripheralization or semi-colonization of the Ottoman Empire within the capitalist world system. Ever since the appearance of David Urquhart's book¹⁶⁶ in 1833, the importance of Ottoman markets for the British industry is well researched.¹⁶⁷ A brief look at the figures of foreign trade of Britain with the Ottoman Empire shows a big growth in exports and imports especially from 1845 on. These figures show clearly that the Ottoman Empire was an important exporter of raw materials such as madder root, raw silk, raisins, wool, wheat and valonia to Britain and an important importer of British manufactured goods such as cotton cloth, refined sugar, iron and steel, woollens, hardware and cutlery.¹⁶⁸ According to data published by the *The London Economist*, the British exports to the Ottoman Empire, including Egypt and the Danubian principalities, increased nearly three times from 1840 to 1851.¹⁶⁹

Recent studies have also shown that not all Ottoman industries became dead after the opening of the Ottoman markets to British goods and some sectors adapted themselves to new conditions.¹⁷⁰ But these are just slight modifications in the whole picture. The fact is still there that Britain dominated Ottoman imports and exports. Increasing competition from other European powers made Britain ever watchful for new markets for its fast growing manufactures. It is also well known to the students of 19th century Ottoman economic history that the Ottomans did not give any thought to maintaining the trade balance or a protective system of tariffs. The Ottomans levied 3 per cent customs duty on imports and 12 per cent on exports, doing exactly the opposite of other states that tried to protect their industries and domestic market. Thus it was

166 David Urquhart. *Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization, ... Prospects of English Commerce in the East, etc.* London, 1833.

167 See for example, Puryear, op. cit., (1935), Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Dünya Kapitalizmi (1820-1913)*. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1984. Revised edition: *Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme 1820-1913*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994.

168 See Frank Edgar Bailey, "The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-50", *The Journal of Modern History* XII/4, December 1940, pp. 462-476. Also see from the same author, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1942, chapters II and III.

169 Quoted by [Friedrich Engels], in Marx, op. cit., p. 16.

170 See Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Also see by the same author, "Manufacturing", in Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 888-933. Also see Pamuk, op. cit., (1994), p. 21.

very important for Britain to prevent the Ottoman Empire from falling into other, more efficient hands.

Before and during the war, when the Porte or its dominions (Wallachia or Egypt) tried to increase the export duty on grain or to prohibit the export of grain in order to secure enough grain for itself, the British ambassador strongly protested such practices as a breach of the treaty of 1838. For example, in June 1853, when Wallachia wanted to increase its export duty on grain, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe gave the following note to the Sublime Porte:

It being generally understood that the Government of Wallachia intended to increase the duty on grain destined for exportation to a degree which would contravene the Commercial Treaty of 1838, the Undersigned received Instructions from his Government to enter his Protest against any such departure from the engagements subsisting between the Two Governments.

In execution of those instructions the undersigned now protests in the customary form against this supposed infraction of Treaty, and holds the Porte responsible for any losses which may accrue therefrom to any subject or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.¹⁷¹

Even at a time of war, Britain did not want to restrict its foreign trade. Thus when in July 1854 the pasha of Egypt tried to restrict the export of grain, Stratford protested again:

Her Majesty's Government having received information from Egypt that the Pasha of that Province has of late allowed measures to be adopted by his officers calculated to impede the free trade in grain, I am instructed to inform the Porte that the system adopted by His Highness is clearly an infraction of the Treaty, and to request that proper communications may be addressed to him for his future guidance in that matter.

Her Majesty's Government attach much importance to a due compliance with their requisition, because as the supplies usually drawn from Russia, are now interrupted, it is extremely desirable that the trade should be unfettered in all other quarters and His Government are fully entitled to expect that in the dominions of the Sultan no unnecessary impediments shall be thrown in their way.¹⁷²

Two months later Stratford gave another note when the Porte tried to restrict the export of grain:

The British Embassy cannot assent to the Porte's memorandum of the 8th Zilhidje 1270 [sic, it must be 1270, 1 September 1854], with participating in what appears to be an unfounded and unnecessary measure. The Commercial Treaty stipulates for unrestricted liberty of commerce in articles of Turkish produce, as well for exportation as for internal trade. The occasional restrictions which have been submitted to with respect to grain were justified by urgent necessity. In the present instance no such necessity exists. There is an abundant harvest, and the

171 Stratford to the Ottoman foreign ministry, dated 4 June 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 11. See Appendix 1.

172 BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 36, dated 10 July 1854. See Appendix 52.

armies no longer look to Constantinople for their supplies. A continuance of restriction with partial exceptions can therefore be of no benefit except to speculators and those who encourage them. The plan is contrary to treaty and warranted by no necessity. On these grounds I rely upon the Porte's sense of justice and wisdom not to persevere in its original intention as stated in the memorandum.¹⁷³

In fact, freedom of trade was so important for Britain that even during the war its subjects were allowed to trade with Russia.

2.3. Russia between Expansionism and Legitimism

Emperor Nikolai I¹⁷⁴ had seen the revolt of the Decembrist (*Decabrist*) officers shortly after ascending the throne in December 1825. From then on he had vowed to suppress any revolutionary disorder in Russia and Europe and to be the defender of order. Russia, on the other hand, was the main antagonist of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. From his ascension until the Crimean War, Nikolai I had seen two major wars, one with Iran in 1826-1828 and the other with the Ottoman Empire in 1828-1829. In both cases Russia continued its expansion, gaining Nahçıvan and Erivan from Iran by the Treaty of Türkmençay in 1828 and Ahıska, Ahılkelek and the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea from the Ottomans by the Treaty of Edirne in 1829. Nikolai I ruthlessly suppressed the Polish insurrection during the upsurge of revolutions in Europe in 1830. Marshal Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich, conqueror of Warsaw and afterwards Prince of Warsaw, started to rule Poland in a military manner as Nikolai's viceroy. However, in 1833, Nikolai I helped Sultan Mahmud II against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. The Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, signed on 8 July 1833, made Russia and the Porte allies for a period of eight years. At the end of its term, this treaty was changed to the advantage of European great powers by the Straits Convention of 13 July 1841. In 1848 Nikolai I helped Austria to crush the revolt of the Hungarians. This earned him the title of the "gendarme of Europe". Nikolai's notion of legitimism did not allow any revolutionary disorders or nationalist insurrections against the "lawful" sovereign of a state. However, this principle had not deterred him from supporting the Greek War of Independence in 1827. In fact, Nikolai I

173 Lord Stratford's instruction to head dragoman Stephen (Etienne) Pisani on export restrictions, 7 September 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 31. See Appendix 57.

174 Interestingly, Nikolai calls himself "Nicolas Premier" in his own letters written in French, as if knowing for sure that there will be a second Nikolai. See for example BOA. İ. HR. 327/21182, Nikolai's letter dated 27 January 1853.

pursued a policy of autocratic rule and police control in internal matters and of reactionary conservatism in international matters. At home, all liberties were suppressed, the press and universities brought under strict supervision and a special third division of the imperial chancellery was organised as the secret police. Consequently, many talented officers, civil servants, artists were arrested, exiled or removed from their duties.¹⁷⁵

In 1853, Emperor Nikolai I was probably the most powerful person in the world. He commanded the biggest land army of Europe. The army was indeed Nikolai's favourite agency, yet he “stressed unthinking obedience and parade ground evolutions rather than combat training”.¹⁷⁶ He had surrounded himself with all military men, filling most of the ministries by generals. Thus by 1840, ten of the thirteen ministers were generals aide-de-camp.¹⁷⁷ His army was not up to date because of incapacity at the top, inflexibility, corruption¹⁷⁸ and technical backwardness. The soldiers were supplied with outdated weapons and had little training, if at all. Dmitriy Alekseevich Milyutin (1816-1912), War Minister from 1861 to 1881 under Nikolai's successor, Aleksandr II, writes the following in his notes:

Speaking frankly, like most of the contemporary young generation, I also had no sympathy for the then regime, at the basis of which lied administrative arbitrariness, police repression and strict formalism. In most of the state affairs, undertaken during the reign of Emperor Nikolai, a police point of view prevailed, that is to say, a concern about the maintenance of order and discipline. From here originated the suppression of personality and the extreme tightening of freedom in all spheres of life, in science, arts, speech, and press. Even in the military affairs, in which the Emperor took a passionate interest, the same concern about order and discipline prevailed; not the substantial well-being of the army, not the adaptation of it to military tasks were pursued, but only orderliness in appearance, bright outlooks in parades, pedantic observation of countless small formalities were sought after, blunting one's judgement and killing genuine military spirit.¹⁷⁹ [My translation]

175 George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, Yale: Yale University Press, 1969, pp. 212-213. Nicholas Riasanovsky has described the regime of Nikolai in similar terms, yet he has also insisted that Nikolai I “retained the earmarks of his basic belief in legitimism” in his attitude toward the Ottoman Empire. See Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 337. Seventh edition, with Mark Steinberg, vol. I, 2005, p. 314.

176 John Shelton Curtiss, “The Army of Nicholas I. Its Role and Character”, *The American Historical Review* 63(4), July 1958, pp. 886.

177 Albert Seaton, *The Crimean War. A Russian Chronicle*, London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1977, p. 22.

178 On corruption in the administration of the Russian army, see Curtiss, *The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965, pp. 212-232. British consul James Henry Skene also writes that the embezzlement of rations was an old and common practise in the Russian army. Marshall Diebich's army in 1829 drew rations and drugs for 2,400 men per regiment while their effective strength was 400. See Skene, *With Lord Stratford in the Crimean War*, London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1883, p. 261.

179 Yevgeniy Viktorovich Tarle, *Krymskaya Voyna*, vol. 1, Moscow: Eksmo, 2003, p. 69-70.

Friedrich Engels, in one of his anonymous leaders in the *NYDT* had also written in 1854 that Nikolai

limited promotion to mere parade martinets, whose principal merit consists in stolid obedience and ready servility, added to accuracy of eyesight in detecting a fault in the buttons and button-holes of the uniform – constantly preferring such sticks to men of real military ability and intellectual superiority.¹⁸⁰

The exception to the rule in Nikolai's armies was the Caucasus army that was waging an irregular war against the Caucasian mountaineers for many years. Many talented but politically unreliable officers had also been sent to the Caucasus as a punishment. But they in turn enhanced the capacity of the Caucasian army through constant war with the guerrilla forces of Caucasian mountaineers. Thus during the war, Russia would gain its great victories in the Caucasus front.

Russia's weak point was the navy, where Britain and France had the advantage. Russia had a strong naval base at Sevastopol but its Black Sea fleet was no match to the British or French fleet, let alone their combined power. In a one-to-one fight Nikolai I had no doubt of beating the Ottoman armies and navy, but he knew very well that the other powers would not let him gain control of the Turkish Straits or even control of the mouth of the Danube. Nevertheless, the fact that he occupied part of the Ottoman Empire without gaining the consent of the great powers is a clear indication that he had lost some sense of reality by this time. Before that Nikolai had already discussed with the British ambassador Seymour his plans on the partition of the "sick man of Europe". (See subchapter 2.6.)

Economically, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were rivals, both of them exporting wheat to Europe. Grain exports represented 35 per cent of the total value of Russian exports in 1855.¹⁸¹ Russia was also fostering its own industries. The Russian port of Odessa was in competition with the Danubian principalities that had been freed from the obligation to sell their grain only to Istanbul at fixed prices and given the right of export of their produce by the Treaty of Edirne of 1829 and confirmed by the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838. After 1830 Moldavia and Wallachia increased their wheat exports from the ports of Galatz and Brailov on Austrian and British commercial ships to customers that before bought wheat from Russia. Nevertheless, Russian exports continued to increase. For the period from 1832 to 1840, Russian grain

180 "The Russian Failure", Leader, *NYDT*, 11 July 1854, quoted in Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 397.

181 Riasanovsky and Steinberg, op. cit., (2005), p. 320.

trade increased by 56 per cent annually on average.¹⁸² Russian industry was weak and could not compete with that of Britain with its cheap prices and better quality. Thus an economic alliance of Russia and the Ottoman Empire was not possible.

On the other hand, Russia's trade with Britain in 1851 accounted for around one thirds of its total foreign trade.¹⁸³ But the relative importance of Russia for the British economy had fallen in comparison with the Ottoman Empire. As a customer of British goods Russia had fallen behind the Ottoman Empire. While in 1827 the British exports to Russia was three times more than the exports to the Ottoman Empire, this ratio had changed significantly by 1849, when the Ottoman Empire (including the Danubian principalities) bought much more British goods than Russia. Even the principalities alone imported from Britain more goods than Russia.¹⁸⁴ This was largely the effect of the 1838 Commercial Treaty. The Turkish Straits had become important channels for the trade of both the Euxine and the Indian trade, which now reached Trabzon via Iran. Caravans reached Trabzon from Turkistan, Mesopotamia and Persia. Thus the spices of India, the grain, wool and hides of Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, carpets of Iran, etc all flew through the Turkish Straits.

2.4. Dispute over the Holy Places

The Holy Places were the Church of Nativity and some other places of early Christianity in Jerusalem and its vicinity. Both Latin (Catholic) and Greek (Orthodox) churches endeavoured to gain supremacy in controlling these places. The dispute over holy places revolved around such seemingly trivial issues as to whether Latin or Greek clergy would possess the key to the Great Church of Bethlehem and which of them would have the priority of holding services in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. The Ottomans on their part were happy to check both churches but Ottoman bureaucracy, stressed from both sides, was hard pressed to satisfy both sides. France justified its demands on firmans from the time of Süleyman the Magnificent.

Russia on the other hand claimed the right of remonstrance on behalf of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte by a broad interpretation of the Treaty of Küçük

182 Vernon John Puryear, *England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856*. Berkeley: University of California Publications in History, 1931. Reprinted, Hamden: Archon Books, 1965, p. 88.

183 Tarle, op. cit., t. 1, p. 51.

184 Vernon J. Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853*. Hamden: Archon Books, 1969, p. 109.

Kaynarca of 1774, reaffirmed by the treaties of Bucharest in 1812, Akkerman in 1826, Edirne in 1829 and Hünkâr Iskelesi in 1833.¹⁸⁵ The Orthodox subjects of the Porte were by far more numerous than the Catholics, their number reached 13,5 millions, almost equal to the total Ottoman European population. In Jerusalem as well they were by far more numerous than the Catholics. In 1850, when the question was raised, the Catholic population of Jerusalem was less than six per cent and Catholic pilgrims constituted a negligible percentage of the total visitors of Jerusalem.¹⁸⁶

From a legal point of view, the position of France was more powerful since it was based upon capitulations, the last of which dated from 1740. Yet from then on the Latins had not fulfilled their responsibilities and the Greeks were given special firmans. Thus in practice the Greeks had more rights.¹⁸⁷ In this quarrel France took the initiative by officially demanding from the Porte the return of some places to the Latin Church. The Sultan became vexed in this meaningless Christian dispute and finally tried to solve the problem in February 1852 by two firmans, giving the keys to the Latins and assuring the Greeks that their rights would remain unchanged. Russia was not late in protest. Thus began a diplomatic war in Istanbul where the Ottomans were caught up between France and Russia, unable to find a solution acceptable to both. Commissions were set up and all documents examined, yet it was difficult to satisfy both sides.

At present most historians (except the new Russian Orthodox nationalists) accept that the question of the holy places was but a pretext for the Crimean War. That the issue of the holy places was but a pretext for the imperialist aims of tsarist Russia or that the defense of the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France was simply because of imperialist rivalry has always been a commonplace expression in contemporary Turkish historiography. While this is true, one has to be consistent and apply the same scepticism to the actions of the Ottoman Empire as well. Nevertheless, some Turkish historians like to perceive the Ottoman state just as a victim of great powers, without itself having any imperialist or expansionist aims or practices and in other cases even as the “last island of humanity”.¹⁸⁸

185 For more information see Roderic Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West*, London: Saqi Books, 1990, pp. 29-59.

186 Brison D. Gooch, “A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War”, *The American Historical Review* 62 (1), October 1956, p. 35.

187 For a detailed account, see Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, “Makamat-ı Mübareke Meselesi ve Babiali”, *Belleten* XXIII (90), Ankara, April 1959, pp. 240-266. In English, see David Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, London and NY: Longman, 1994, pp. 75-90.

188 Mustafa Armağan. *Osmanlı: İnsanlığın Son Adası*. Istanbul: Ufuk Kitapları, 2003.

2.5. Positions of France, Austria and Other States

In France Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte had been first elected president in 1849 and then through a coup d'état in 1852 proclaimed himself as Emperor of the French under the name of Napoleon III in a clear association with his great uncle. Looking for some cause to reassert the greatness of France, Napoleon III willingly took up the issue of the Holy Places against Russia. France being the protector of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, Napoleon III made strong representations at the Porte in defense of the Latin Church in Jerusalem. He owed also a lot to his Catholic followers for his coming to power. Thus contrary to most Turkish histories, it was Bonapartist France and not tsarist Russia that first initiated the question of the holy places. France had always been interested in the maintenance of the Nativity Church (*Kamame Kilisesi*) and other Christian holy places in Jerusalem. Reşid Pasha had held many negotiations on this issue with the French authorities in the 1840s as well.¹⁸⁹

Napoleon III had a personal grudge against Nikolai as well, because Nikolai had not addressed him as “my brother” in the usual form between monarchs, but as “good friend” (*bon ami*). Nikolai thought only those monarchs who like him came to rule “by the grace of God” were worthy of being addressed as a brother, whereas Napoleon had only been elected by the people.¹⁹⁰ Napoleon III could not help but feel slighted. Furthermore, at that time he found it necessary to attract the attention of the French people away from domestic problems to an international, religious problem. In European politics, ever since the 1815 restoration, France wanted to get rid of the policy of containment led by other great powers, especially by Britain against France. Although France was a member of the Concert of Europe, it had been excluded for a short time in 1840-1841. An alliance with Britain was essential for France to break its isolation.

Austria's position was troublesome during the war, torn between Russia and the Allies. Nikolai had saved the Austrian Empire by suppressing the Hungarian revolution in 1848. In the eyes of the absolutist Austrian aristocracy, he was a true monarch who ruled with an iron hand against all kinds of revolutionaries and democrats. In the recent dispute over Montenegro with the Porte, Austria had again depended on Russian support. Count Leiningen's mission to Istanbul on the Montenegrin question had ended

189 Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, Ankara: TTK, 1991, pp. 582-587.

190 Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovskiy, *Istoriya Rossii v XIX veke*, Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001, p. 18. (First published in 1908).

successfully a few days before or on the day of Menshikov's arrival, with the Porte succumbing to Austrian demands.¹⁹¹ While thus owing gratitude towards Russia, Austria's interests dictated otherwise.

Facing no longer any revolutionary threats, Austria did not want war, not could it allow Russia's control over the mouth of Danube or over Balkans in general. Austria's large Slavic population made it sensitive to any moves that would unite Balkan Slavs or show them an example of insurrection even against the Ottoman Empire, because, once began, an insurrection of Slavic peoples would certainly affect the Austrian Slavs (Serbs, for example) as well. Austria also could not afford to be on hostile terms with Napoleon III, because of the question of Venice and Lombardy, claimed by the Italians. While Nikolai could not help Austria against France in Italy, France could help and was willing to help Austria on the Danube. Thus the Austrian foreign minister Count Buol¹⁹² tried to strike out a compromise between the last Ottoman note and the Russian note. Yet he was unsuccessful, Reşid Pasha refused to compromise. Finally Austria's ultimatum to Russia at the end of December 1855 contributed much to the peace. Nevertheless, Austria was among the losers at the end of the war, for it had gained Russia's hate, yet without gaining France and Britain's sympathy.

Iran had a basically stable frontier with the Porte since the Treaty of Kasr-ı Şirin in 1639, despite occasional wars. Border violations of nomadic Kurdish tribes was an issue of controversy between Iran and the Porte. In 1847 a commission had re-adjusted the Ottoman-Iranian border. Nevertheless, the *nahiye* of Kotur in Van province was captured by Iran and the Porte demanded it back. The Tehran - Tabriz - Trabzon caravan road was an important outlet for Iran's foreign trade. Iran always had intentions on the Baghdad province due to the importance of the holy places (such as Kerbela) of this province for the Shiite sect. For this reason Iran and the Porte had never made an alliance even against such a Christian power as Russia that threatened both of them. Consequently, Russia had defeated Iran and the Porte one at a time from 1826 to 1829. The present war presented a good opportunity for Iran to capture Baghdad, but it was intimidated by Britain. During the war it signed a secret agreement with Russia on 29 September 1854. Iran promised not to give any assistance (including exports of military items) to the enemies of Russia and Russia promised to cancel Iran's remaining debt of

191 Goldfrank, op. cit., (1994), pp. 120-123. Cezmi Karasu, *Kırım Savaşı Strasında Osmanlı Diplomasisi (1853-1856)*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ankara University, 1998, pp. 44-50. Andıç & Andıç, op. cit., p. 18.

192 Karl Ferdinand Graf von Buol-Schauenstein (1797-1865), Foreign Minister of Austria from 1852 to 1859.

500,000 *tümens* at the end of the war.¹⁹³ Nevertheless, Iran also moved some troops towards the Ottoman border and its attitude remained as an uncertainty for the Porte and the allies.

The young state of Greece under King Otho was the most ready client for Nikolai's propaganda. At the beginning of the war, the Greek government secretly supported the Ottoman Greek insurgents in Thessaly and Epirus. Some Greek officers including Lieutenant-General Hatzi-Petros, an aide-de-camp of King Otho, crossed the border with some troops to join the insurgents.¹⁹⁴ However, the Porte suppressed the revolt and the allies blockaded Greece from the sea in May 1854. Austria and Prussia also did not want the Greek revolt spread into the Balkans. Therefore soon Greece had to give up its policy of support for insurgency.

2.6. The Sick Man of Europe

Emperor Nikolai I had first announced "Turkey" sick just two months after the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in September 1833 during his meetings in Münchengrätz with Prince Metternich of Austria. Metternich avoided discussion on this point according to his words.¹⁹⁵ In 1844, the Russian Emperor visited England and this time talked with the British ministers (at that time the foreign secretary was Lord Aberdeen) about the "Eastern Question". The fall of the Ottoman Empire was not, however, in the interests of British policy in the East. A weak Ottoman state best suited British interests. Therefore British ministers did not make any pledge to Nikolai. The two parties agreed to maintain the Ottoman Empire as long as possible, but in case of its dissolution they would come together for an understanding on its partitioning. The results of the negotiations were summarised by the Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode in a memorandum, which the British government accepted as accurate.¹⁹⁶ The British considered the memorandum as a secret exchange of opinions and not as a binding agreement, while Nikolai thought of it more seriously.

193 See İ. Caner Türk, *1853-56 Kırım Harbi Sırasında Osmanlı-İran İlişkileri, Osmanlı Devletine Karşı Rus-İran Gizli Antlaşması*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Atatürk University, Erzurum, 2000, pp. 43-44. Also see Mustafa Aydın, "Kırım Harbi Esnasında Osmanlı-İran İnan-Rus İlişkileri (1853-1855)", in *Savaşın Barışa*, pp. 131-150; İbragimbeyli, op. cit., pp. 232-244.

194 Clive Ponting, *The Crimean War. The Truth Behind the Myth*, London: Pimlico, 2005, p. 59.

195 Vitztum von Eckstaedt. *St.-Petersbourg and London in the Years 1852-1864*, London 1887, pp. 29-30, quoted by Tarle, op. cit., p. 89.

196 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, op. cit., (2000), p. 336; (2005), p. 313.

On 9 January 1853, Emperor Nikolai I once again approached the British ambassador Sir Hamilton Seymour (1797-1880) in St. Petersburg and repeated his famous words about the Ottoman Empire: “*Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade - un homme gravement malade*”. Nikolai added that “Turkey” seemed to be falling into pieces and it was important that England and Russia should come to an understanding as to what was to happen in the event of the sudden downfall of “Turkey”.¹⁹⁷ A few days later (on 14 January) Nikolai held a long conversation with Seymour, this time being more definite. He said he did not want to expand at the cost of “Turkey”, but there were several millions of Christians in the Ottoman Empire whose interest he was called upon to watch over, and he was making “moderate and sparing” use of his right of doing so. While he avowedly did not want the fall of the “sick man”, this “man” might suddenly fall upon their hands and in that case he would not allow any other power to occupy Istanbul; neither would he himself do so. Therefore he wanted to reach a preliminary agreement with Britain for such a case.

Nikolai supposed that the alliance of the strongest land power (Russia) with the strongest naval power (Britain) would be enough to decide the fate of the Ottoman Empire and he openly said that he did not care what others would think in case of such an alliance. Seymour on his part said that, in his opinion, “Her Majesty’s Government will be indisposed to make certain arrangements connected with the downfall of Turkey, but it is possible that they be ready to pledge themselves against certain arrangements which might, in that event, be attempted”. Then on the question of the holy places Nikolai seemed quite content with the Sultan’s firman of February 1852 and believed that his objects would be attained by negotiation. However, as Vernon Puryear has pointed out, Seymour was not shocked by these frank comments of Nikolai. Therefore, in his report to Lord John Russell, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he seems to endorse the plan:

A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilization of the nineteenth century if the void left by the extinction of Mohammedan rule in Europe could be filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal governments the most interested in the destinies of Turkey.¹⁹⁸

In reply to the report of Ambassador Seymour’s conversations with Emperor

197 See Bilal Şimşir, “Kırım Savaşı Arifesinde Mustafa Reşid Paşa’nın Yazışmaları (91 belge ile birlikte)”, *Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri. Bildiriler*. Ankara: TTK, 1987, Ek No. 1 [without page number]. Unfortunately some of the documents are barely readable because of the low quality of copy and print in this book.

198 Puryear, op. cit., p. 214.

Nikolai I, Lord John Russell reflected that Her Majesty's Government saw no actual crisis, "which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem". It was also uncertain when the event was going to happen. In twenty, fifty or a hundred years? "In these circumstances", it was said, "it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion".¹⁹⁹ Furthermore it was noted that such an agreement between England and Russia could not be kept secret and "European conflict would arise from the very means taken to prevent it". It is also worth noting here that Russell characterizes the attitude of the Ottoman Sultan and his government as "inert" and "supine". Nevertheless, it seemed from Russell's reply that these inert and supine Turks should be allowed to rule in Istanbul, simply because there was no better replacement without causing a European war.

Emperor Nikolai I and Sir Hamilton met again on 20 and 21 February 1853. Seymour read the above reply of Russell to Nikolai. Nikolai repeated that the catastrophe was "impending" on "Turkey" ("the bear is dying") and "it might be brought about at any moment, either by an external war, or by a feud between the "old Turkish party" and that of the "new superficial French reforms", or again, by an uprising of the Christians, already known to be very impatient of shaking off the Mussulman yoke ("*joug*")".²⁰⁰ Nikolai wanted a gentlemanly agreement with the British cabinet as to what not to do in the event of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Did he really believe that the end of the Ottoman Empire was so close? If so, on what grounds? These are interesting, yet not so easily answerable questions. In any case, he did not or could show any compelling evidence of the "sick man's" or the "bear's" dying, and failed to impress the British.

On the other hand, Nicholas Riasanovsky has argued that

Even his [Nikolai's] ultimate decision to partition the Turkish Empire can be construed as a result of the conviction that the Porte could not survive in the modern world, and that therefore the leading European states had to arrange for a proper redistribution of possessions and power in the Balkans and the Near East in order to avoid anarchy, revolution, and war.²⁰¹

199 Şimşir, *ibid*, ek no. 2. Also see M. S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923*, London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1970, pp. 73-74.

200 Şimşir, *ibid*, ek no. 4-5. We must add that these secret conversations did not remain so for long, being published in the Blue Books, i.e. the British parliamentary papers within one year. See Karl Marx, "The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence", *NYDT*, 11 April 1854, also available in *The Eastern Question* (London 1969), pp. 298-313.

201 Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-338. Seventh edition, 2005, p. 314.

2.7. The Mission of Prince Menshikov

In the meantime Emperor Nikolai I sent to Istanbul a mission headed by Prince Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menshikov (1787-1869) as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in order to press upon the Porte to arrange for a solution of the holy places and to receive formal guarantees for the future. Prince Menshikov, who bore the titles of Governor General of Finland, General-Adjutant, Admiral and Marine Minister was not a good choice for a diplomat. He was a rather sarcastic, self-conceited and vainglorious person. As such, he had a rather high opinion of his own abilities and had little respect for the opinions of others.²⁰²

Count Karl Robert Vasilyevich Nesselrode (1780-1862), the Russian foreign minister (1816-1856) had recommended instead of Menshikov, such experienced diplomats as General Prince Aleksey Fyodorovich Orlov (1786-1861), the Russian representative of the Treaty of Edirne (1829) and of Hünkâr İskelesi (1833), or Count Nikolai Dmitrievich Kiselev (1802-1869), the Russian ambassador in Paris, or his brother Pavel D. Kiselev. But either they had excused themselves for the mission because they did not believe in its success, or Nikolai did not accept them. In any case, Nikolai wanted not only a diplomat but also a military-naval commander who could take military decisions if need be. Furthermore, Menshikov possessed at least one virtue, which was rare among the ministers and officials of the emperor: He was rich and he did not steal from the state treasury. For this reason he was a favourite of Nikolai.²⁰³

Menshikov received oral instructions from Emperor Nikolai and a letter to Sultan Abdülmecid and some written (in French) instructions from Count Nesselrode, the foreign minister. These instructions described in detail how and what he should demand from the Porte, and if not accepted, how to leave Istanbul.²⁰⁴ Menshikov had also received the project of a treaty and a secret defense agreement with the Sublime Porte, where the Emperor offered military aid to Turkey in case of any attack. Nikolai also gave Menshikov a personal letter to Abdülmecid, dated 24 January 1853, where he

202 Zayonchkovskiy, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 349. Yevgeniy Tarle is of the same opinion. See Tarle, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

203 Tarle, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 161.

204 See Zayonchkovskiy, *op. cit.*, 1908 edition, *Prilozheniya* no. 105-109. The 2002 edition unfortunately (or perhaps deliberately) omits these important appendices. M. S. Anderson quotes (in translation) from Zayonchkovskiy one of Nesselrode's instructions dated 9 February 1853. See Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

wrote in friendly terms as if it was not he who discussed the partition of the Ottoman Empire with the British ambassador. Another letter dated 27 January 1853 simply informed of Prince Menshikov's being appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, citing all the titles of Nikolai and all the orders worn by Menshikov.²⁰⁵ The tsar also instructed Menshikov to threaten the “Turks”, if necessary, with recognition of the independence of the Danubian principalities.

Menshikov's (and his staff's) tasks included a military reconnaissance of the defences of the Bosphorus as well, because Nikolai's plans included a possible lightning attack on Istanbul and the Dardanelles as well. While talking to Seymour and signing letters to Abdülmecid, Nikolai had also signed a plan of attack on the Turkish Straits on 19 January 1853. For this purpose he detached the 13th division at Sevastopol and the 14th division at Odessa. On 28 March Menshikov would send a report on the weakness of the Ottoman fleet and the fortifications of the Straits, naming the most suitable places for landing Russian troops.²⁰⁶

On his route to Istanbul, Prince Menshikov made two conspicuous inspections, made for the effect of demonstration: he visited first the 5th army corps in Kishinev (capital of Bessarabia, north of Moldavia), and then the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. General Nepokoychitskiy, chief of staff of the fifth army corps and Vice-Admiral Vladimir Alekseyevich Kornilov (1806-1854), chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, joined his mission. Thus Menshikov with a large and impressive retinue arrived at Istanbul on board the steam frigate *Gromonosets*²⁰⁷ on 28 February 1853.²⁰⁸ The Russian military and naval officers had come to observe the defences of the straits and of Istanbul and the possibilities of a sudden attack on the city. They were also enjoined

205 BOA. İ.HR. 327/21182. The French translation of this second introductory letter and its Ottoman (Turkish) translation were submitted on 2 March 1853 to the grand vizier and through him to the Sultan. It is interesting to note that the Turkish translation renders “Votre Majesté” in various terms, among which “Hazret-i Hilafetpenahileri” is significant because the title Caliph seems to be seldom used in contexts related to the Crimean War. It must also be noted that Nikolai styles himself as “Nicolas Premier”.

206 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 67.

207 Which means *The Thunderer!* A significant name indeed. See Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., (2002 edition), vol. I, p. 354. Nicolae Jorga gives the name of this steamship as “Donnerer” only in German translation. See his *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* 5, Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005, p. 375. Fevzi Kurtoglu (op. cit., p. 14) has read it as Gromonec, also transliterated by Ali Fuat Örenç as “Giromonec”. See Örenç, “Kırım Harbi Deniz Savaşları”, in *Savaşın Barışa*, p. 27. Alan Palmer turns it into *Gromovnik*. See Alan Palmer, *1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı ve Modern Avrupa'nın Doğuşu*, Istanbul: Sabah Kitapçılık, 1999, p. 23. Trevor Royle (op. cit., p. 33) also calls it *Gromovnik*.

208 Dr. Dz. Kur. Kd. Albay Celalettin Yavuz, referring to Retired Admiral Afif Büyüktuğrul, writes that Menshikov arrived at Büyükdere on board “the biggest galleon of the Russian fleet” on “15 March” 1853. See *Osmanlı Bahriyesi'nde Yabancı Misyonlar*, Kasımpaşa, İstanbul: İst. Dz. İk. Grp. K.İği Basımevi Müdürlüğü, [200?], p. 71. This is not true.

to mobilize Russian land and naval forces in case of necessity. In Istanbul a crowd of Greeks, other orthodox subjects and Russians cheerfully welcomed the mission with applause.²⁰⁹

On 2 March, Menshikov, dressed in an overcoat instead of full uniform,²¹⁰ went to the Porte to visit the grand vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha, to whom he declared flatly that he does not trust Fuad Efendi the foreign minister, on the question under negotiation, and asked for someone else to be appointed for negotiations. Then, as he wrote in his diary,

My declaration disturbed the vizier, and on leaving him, wishing to confirm my words with actions and to show how little I value Fuad Efendi, I did not pay him the usual courtesy visit. This made a big impression and aroused the Porte's displeasure, and Fuad resigned.²¹¹ [My translation]

Fuad Efendi was not liked by the tsar for his conduct during the 1849 crisis of the Hungarian refugees and he was known as pro-French. Having heard of the concentration of the Russian fourth and fifth army corps in Bessarabia, the Sultan was frightened. Rifat Pasha was made the new foreign minister and he took his office on 6 March.²¹² Thus Menshikov had dealt his first blow to the pride of the Porte.

At that time the French and British ambassadors were on leave and the two great powers were represented at the level of chargé d'affaires. The British chargé d'affaires was Colonel Hugh Rose (1801-1885) and the French Vincent Benedetti (1817-1900). Rose recommended to the Porte to temporize until the return of Stratford de Redcliffe, who had resigned the ambassadorship in January 1853 but reappointed by the new Aberdeen²¹³ government in February. But Rose had become so alarmed at Menshikov's actions that he also ordered Vice-Admiral Sir James Whitley Deans Dundas (1785-1862), commanding the British Mediterranean squadron at Malta, to bring his fleet up to Urla near Izmir. However, Dundas refused to move without confirmation from the government. Colonel Rose was informed on 23 March that the British government did

209 See Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 354. Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 166. Zayonchkovskiy writes that Menshikov arrived at Büyükdere, while Tarle gives Tophane. Also see Fuat Andıç & Süphan Andıç, op. cit., p. 19. Türkgeldi (op. cit., vol. 1, p. 13) does not mention the applauding Greeks and others, but he writes that Menshikov arrived "with unprecedented pomp and splendour".

210 While Tarle and most European historians write that Menshikov did not wear an official uniform, Zayonchkovskiy argues that he had worn his overcoat over the uniform, and on entering the first cabinet he could not find time to take off his overcoat when he was met by the grand vizier. He also argues that European newspapers reflected this as if Menshikov appeared before the Sultan without uniform. See Zayonchkovskiy, *ibid*, tom I (2002), p. 392, footnote 18.

211 Zayonchkovskiy, *ibid*, p. 354. The author claims to have read Menshikov's diary and quotes from it from time to time, but the diary seems not to be deposited in an archive.

212 BOA. İ. DH. 17578.

213 George Hamilton Hamilton-Gordon, 4th Earl of Aberdeen (1784-1860) was a Scottish Tory / Peelite politician who headed a coalition ministry of Whigs and Peelites from 12 December 1852 until 30 January 1855. See www.wikipedia.org.

not approve of his order and the fleet remained at Malta.²¹⁴ On 19 March, however, Napoleon III had already ordered to send a squadron from Toulon to the island of Salamis (near Athens and Piraeus).²¹⁵

Menshikov was given the audience of the Sultan on 8 March only when he submitted Nikolai's letter to the Sultan (written in French, dated 24 January). Nikolai's letter contained both proposals of friendship and a threat. Nikolai put the blame on the “inexperienced and ill-advised” ministers of the Sultan, who had not informed him well of the consequences of the non-compliance with the firman already issued by the Sultan one year before. The tsar added that in the case of another state insisting on the Sultan not to fulfil his promises towards Russia, or threatening The Ottoman Empire, Russia was ready to come to help.²¹⁶ Menshikov submitted to the Sultan the project of the secret defense agreement as well. In short the tsar wanted to have an exclusive agreement with the Ottoman Empire, by adding an article to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, giving a formal guarantee of the rights and privileges of the Greek Church in The Ottoman Empire under the protectorate of Russia, in return for a military alliance, implicitly against France. The demands exceeded by far the question of the custody of some religious places.

The new foreign minister Rifat Pasha was authorized to negotiate with Menshikov. After the courtesy visits of Menshikov and Rifat Pasha, the first serious negotiation took place on 16 March 1853 at the pasha's house and lasted for six hours.²¹⁷ According to the minutes of the meeting, Menshikov did not follow a gradual opening of demands but opened all his demands and offers at once. He told that he was especially authorized to negotiate the question of revision of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and that unless Rifat also had the authority to negotiate the whole question,

214 Harold Temperley, “Stratford de Redcliffe and the Origins of the Crimean War”, Part I, *The English Historical Review* 48 (192), October 1933, p. 605.

215 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 93.

216 The original of this letter and two different translations of it are available in BOA. A. AMD. 50/56. One of the translations is done in the style of Ottoman official correspondence, while the other is marked as a literal (*lafzen bi-lafz*) translation. In the first instance, *Votre Majesté* is rendered, among other forms, “canib-i hilafetpenahileri” as well, (referring to caliphate), and the address “*très haut et très puissant Ami*” is not translated at all (for the caliph is too exalted to be a friend of a Christian monarch?) whereas in the latter, everything is translated literally. It is not a less curious fact that Menshikov appears as “Mençikof” in the first translation and as “Menşikof” in the second. This confusion of the spelling of Menshikov's name seems to have started right from the beginning and continues to this day. It is also an interesting question whether the second translator was ordered to make a literal translation or it was his decision to do so. Most probably he was ordered to; otherwise there should not be a second translation at all.

217 Cezmi Karasu, op. cit., p. 54.

there was no point in negotiations.²¹⁸

Rifat Pasha, by a skilful diplomatic tactic, separated the question of holy places from the question of protection of the Greek Church and said that they must first finish the first question. Menshikov threatened Rifat Pasha as well not to reveal the Russian proposals to the British embassy; otherwise he would cut off relations. Nevertheless, grand vizier Mehmet Ali Pasha told the essence of Russian intentions to Colonel Rose on 1 April. He added that “nothing whatever should be added to the Treaty of Kaynarji; that he would ask to retire from office rather than agree to either of the two propositions made by Prince Menshikov, which would be fatal to Turkey”.²¹⁹ As Lane-Poole pointed out, this shows that the Ottoman ministers were resolved to resist Menshikov's demands before Lord Stratford's arrival, which took place on 5 April 1853.²²⁰

Lord Stratford had an interview with the grand vizier and the foreign minister on the day after his arrival. He advised them “to keep the affair of the Holy Places separate from the ulterior proposals, whatever they may be, of Russia”.²²¹ He also advised them that the rights and privileges of Christians should be guaranteed by direct sovereign authority and not by any instrument addressed exclusively to Russia. For Protestant Britain a religious quarrel between Catholic France and Orthodox Russia was indeed not important in itself, it did not care whatever privileges these obtained within the religious sphere. However, any real increase of authority of one of them over the Ottoman Empire that could tilt the European balance of power was not to be tolerated. Yet what was clear to Stratford was also clear to the Ottoman ministers, the difficulty was that Menshikov would not accept anything less than a formally binding treaty or a *sened* (convention). The demands of Russia stipulated that all the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire would be under Russian protectorate, that the patriarchate would be life long and no patriarchs would be dismissed, that a new Russian church and hospital would be built in Jerusalem and put under the protection of the Russian consulate and that a new firman would point out clearly all the rights of the Orthodox in the holy places in Palestine. On the other hand, in his conversations with Lord Stratford and the French ambassador Edmond de la Cour, Menshikov told them that if the Porte did not agree with his proposals, this would at most result in a break-up of relations but

218 Ali Fuat Türkgeldi. *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye*. I. Cilt. Yay. Haz. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987, Zeyl 5, pp. 257-264. The author was the head secretary of Sultan Mehmed Reşad (r. 1909-1918).

219 Stanley Lane-Poole. *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning: Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*, vol. II, London & New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1888, p. 248.

220 Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 248.

221 Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 249.

not war. Yet these assurances would prove to be false. Lord Stratford pleased Menshikov by justifying his demands concerning the holy places, yet avoided any discussion of the broader question of Russian protectorate of the Greek Church.

On 19 April Menshikov gave another note to Rifat Pasha urging for a decision. The note included accusations and threats. The Ottoman extended council of ministers (*Meclis-i Mahsus*) convened on 23 April to discuss the demands of Menshikov. It found the demands on the holy places negotiable but the question of the privileges and rights of the Orthodox subjects was not to be negotiated.²²²

On 5 May Menshikov gave an ultimatum and duration of five days for an answer. This time he informed the Porte that if the *sened* was not signed, he would cut off diplomatic relations and leave Istanbul.²²³ At this stage of the play Lord Stratford entered the scene. On 8 May he pointed out to Menshikov that his demand “was an innovation altogether disproportionate to the question which is the chief cause of your Embassy, and as being little in accordance with the spirit of legality recorded by common consent in the Treaty of 1841”.²²⁴ From then on their intercourse practically ended.

On the next day Stratford visited the Sultan and found him full of “weakness and melancholy” and “ready to die”, because his mother had just died. The British ambassador informed Abdülmecid that in case of danger he “was instructed to request the commander of her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness”.²²⁵ Emboldened by this information, the Ottoman cabinet rejected Menshikov's demands at the end of the ultimatum, on 10 May. In his official reply, Rifat Pasha used a very careful and conciliatory language, stressing that the Porte would continue as always to respect the rights and privileges of the Greek Church, and maintain friendly relations with Russia, but such a convention with another state would harm its independence and would be against international law.²²⁶ Upon this Menshikov gave another ultimatum on 11 May, demanding an answer until 14 May. In this note Menshikov was still calling Emperor Nikolai I as an ally (*müttefik-i alileri*) of the

222 Karasu, op. cit., p. 57.

223 This note, together with other diplomatic correspondence, was published in the British Parliamentary Papers (known as the Blue Books) and quoted by the *Times*. See “The Turkish Blue-Books. The Menschikoff Note”, *The Times*, London, 4 February 1854.

224 Harold Temperley, op. cit., p. 609.

225 Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 266.

226 BOA. HR. SYS. 1188/7, dated 2 Şaban 1269 / 11 May 1853. The text is given by Türkgeldi, op. cit., p. 270-272. Türkgeldi, as usual, slightly errs on the date, which he gives as 10 May. He also gives Menshikov's name as *Mençikof*, although in this document it is written clearly as *Menşikof*, as one of the rare instances of correct spelling.

padishah.²²⁷ The Ottoman foreign ministry (Reşid Pasha), however, did not consider Russia an ally of the Porte, but talked of “friendly relations” (*münasebat-ı dostane*) between the two states.²²⁸

Meanwhile Stratford and Reşid Pasha probably agreed to act together and decided to send the patriarchal logothete and the representative of Wallachia (*Eflak kapı kethüdası*) the Greek Nicholas Aristarchi to Menshikov. Reşid told the logothete that the matter under negotiation was not to be exaggerated and could be solved.²²⁹ The logothete (*Logofet Bey*) told Menshikov that Reşid Pasha would better serve his ends. Menshikov thought he might have a chance if he gets Reşid Pasha appointed, so he applied to Abdülmecid to appoint Reşid as foreign minister. Abdülmecid should not have received him, but he received him, although according to Lane-Poole, referred him back to his ministers.²³⁰ On 13 May, the indignant grand vizier resigned and a reshuffle of ministers took place. Grand vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha became the new Seraskier, Mustafa Naili Pasha, president of the MVL, took the office of the grand vizier and Reşid Pasha replaced Rifat Pasha in the foreign ministry. The latter took the presidency of the MVL. Yet the prospects for Menshikov did not improve, for the new government was not pro-Russian at all. Menshikov had made a grave mistake by replacing a less skilful opponent with a more skilled one.

The new foreign minister had only one day left for answering Menshikov's ultimatum. He therefore asked Menshikov for five or six days more to prepare “an arrangement, conveying assurances satisfactory to both parties” on a matter of such delicacy as this of the religious privileges.²³¹ On that day he had received the dispatch of the Ottoman ambassador in London, Kostaki Musurus. Musurus wrote that in his interview with the British foreign minister Lord Clarendon, he received the assurances of Britain's guarantees for the independence and sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire.²³² This news of course made Reşid bolder. The Ottoman ambassador in Paris Veli Pasha had also reported the reactions to Menshikov's conduct from Paris.²³³ Berlin

227 For the text of Menshikov's ultimatum see Türkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 272-274. Türkgeldi however, gives the date of the note as 21 May, which must be a typing error, as understood from the contents of the note itself. Cf. Karasu, op. cit., p. 60.

228 Reşid Pasha to Menshikov. BOA. HR. SYS. 1188/8, dated 16 May 1853.

229 Faik Memduh Paşa, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*, p. 19-20, quoted by Cavit Baysun, “Mustafa Reşit Paşa”, in *Tanzimat 2*, Istanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1999, p. 741-42.

230 Lane-Poole, *ibid*, p. 267.

231 Reşid Pasha to Menshikov. BOA. HR. SYS. 1188/8, dated 16 May 1853. Cf. TNA. FO 424/8, no. 337/1, published by Şimşir, op. cit., document 15.

232 Musurus to Reşid Pasha, dated 13 May 1853. BOA. A. AMD. 44/81.

233 BOA. İ. HR. 327/21188, dated 29 Cemaziyelahir 1269 (9 April 1853).

charge d'affaires Ali Rıza Efendi reported that Prussian policy was not necessarily pro-Russian.²³⁴

On 15 May Menshikov received a note from the Porte and on the evening of the same day replied that he had cut off official relations with the Porte but would wait a few days more in Istanbul. Storms in the Black Sea were delaying his departure. Finally, on 21 May, Menshikov with his suit departed from Büyükdere towards Odessa on board his steamer. The Russian coat of arms was taken down from the palace of the embassy. On his departure, Menshikov wrote a non-official, personal letter to Reşid Pasha from the *Gromonosets* at the harbour of Büyükdere.²³⁵ He still attached a draft of an official note to his letter hoping for a last minute solution. He must have been disappointed by Reşid Pasha, whom he himself had suggested to the post of foreign minister. Now that the crisis reached a high point, Reşid Pasha decided to convene a general assembly (*Meclis-i Umumi*) of 46 persons from the bureaucracy, including former ministers and sadrazams, undersecretaries and the *ulema*. There Reşid's rival Mehmet Ali carried the day and a majority of 43 persons against 3 voted down the Russian demands.²³⁶

Menshikov had started demanding a treaty, then a *sened*, finally he was content with a ministerial note but the essence of his demands had not changed. He had not shown himself up to the skills of a great diplomat. On 26 May, the Russian charge d'affaires Ozerov also departed with the rest of the embassy personnel. Only a secretary and the head dragoman Argyropoulo remained in Istanbul. In the meantime, the French and British fleets had come to the Beşik Bay, which is at the entrance of the Dardanelles.

At this time Nikolai I had already set up his mind on what to do next if the Porte did not comply with his demands. In his instructions to Baron Peter von Meyendorff, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, dated 29 May 1853, he described four steps of action: 1) to demand from the Porte the signature of the demanded treaty, otherwise immediate occupation of the Danubian principalities, 2) If "Turkey" continues resistance, then a blockade of the Bosphorus and *the recognition of the independence of the principalities*, 3) If it is still obstinate, then *recognition of the independence of Serbia* and 4) Request from the Austrian emperor moral support.²³⁷ [Italics underlined]

234 BOA. A. AMD. 44/82.

235 Menshikov to Reshid Pasha, Büyükdere, "le 3/15 Mai 11 h. du soir". BOA. HR. TO. 286/12. Menshikov to Reshid Pasha from the *Gromonosets*, 6/18 May 1853. Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 291-293. Türkgeldi has misspelled the name of the steamship as "Gromonorets".

236 For the minutes and resolution (*mazbata*) of this meeting see Türkgeldi, op. cit., p. 274-291.

237 Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 243.

by Nikolai]. It seems that after his plans to reach an agreement with Britain on the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire failed, Nikolai began to approach Austria.

After Menshikov's departure and the interruption of diplomatic relations, Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode confirmed Menshikov's demands in a note dated 31 May and Reşid Pasha responded on 16 June.²³⁸ Reşid Pasha in his reply stressed that the rejection of the demanded *sened* on grounds of violation of the sovereignty of the state did not mean an insult to the tsar. He added that if it is approved by them an extraordinary envoy could be sent to St. Petersburg to renew negotiations. Reşid Pasha also informed the embassies of the four signatories of the 1841 Straits Convention (Great Britain, France, Austria and Prussia) in Istanbul with a note on 27 May 1853.²³⁹ Reşid Pasha informed them that while the question of holy places was solved in a way to please all sides, an agreement was not reached on the question of the rights and privileges of the Greek confession and the clergy. On the same day he also wrote to Lord Stratford explaining that Menshikov's demands were not acceptable for an independent government.²⁴⁰

Meanwhile the Porte was working on a new firman to please its Christian and even Jewish subjects and leave no excuses for Russia. On 7 June an imperial firman was issued to the Greek patriarchate, reassuring the Orthodox subjects of the Porte of their rights and privileges *ab antiquo*.²⁴¹ Similar firmans were addressed to other religious communities. Stratford in a letter to his wife claims that he “put two good sentences into them”.²⁴²

Towards the end of June, Nikolai ordered the two Russian armies in Bessarabia to occupy the Ottoman tribute-paying principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte on its part sent orders to the commander of the Rumeli army Ömer Pasha to strengthen fortifications along the Danube and be ready for defense. It also sent orders to the Ottoman dominions Egypt and Tunis to send troops.²⁴³ According to a report dated 24 June from the British consulate in Alexandria, 10,000 to 15,000 Egyptian troops had

238 For Nesselrode's note and Reşid's response, see *ibid*, pp. 297-301. Türkgeldi gives these dates as 19 May and 4 June respectively, which correspond to the Orthodox calendar. Cezmi Karasu's thesis reproduces this confusion, giving the latter date as 4 June. See Karasu, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

239 BOA. HR. SYS. 1188/9, dated 18 Şaban 1269. For the French translation of this note sent to the British embassy, see TNA. FO 424/8, no. 388/I published by Bilal Şimşir, *op. cit.*, document no. 22, where the date is set as 26 Mai, which is wrong.

240 For the French translation of this letter see Şimşir, *op. cit.*, document no. 23. I could not find the original of this letter in the BOA.

241 Şimşir, *op. cit.*, document 25.

242 Stanley Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 274.

243 BOA. A. AMD. 45/86 and İ. HR. 328/21222.

already received their salaries in arrears for the past 15 months and an advance of six months pay before sailing off to Istanbul.²⁴⁴ Salih Hayri in his *Hayrabad* writes that the governor of Egypt Abbas Pasha sent 17 battalions and the governor of Tunis Ahmed Pasha sent three regiments under Ferik Reşid Pasha.²⁴⁵ Süleyman Kızıltoprak gives the number of Egyptian and Tunisian troops in the Crimean War as 20,000-22,000 and 7,000-8,000 respectively.²⁴⁶

On 2 July the Russian armies commanded by General Gorchakov crossed the river Pruth, forming the border between Russia and Moldavia. The news reached the Porte on 7 July. This was an apparent *casus belli* for the Sultan, but he did not declare war. Nor did the tsar declare war, arguing that this action was just intended to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire to protect the rights of the Orthodox. The Russian consulate in Bucharest also warned the principalities to interrupt all relations with the Porte and not to send the tribute. The Porte requested then the Hospodar of Wallachia Prince Stirbey and the Hospodar of Moldavia Prince Ghyka to quit the principalities but they declined this request saying that they were needed by their people. The Serbian prince Aleksandr declared his loyalty to the Porte.²⁴⁷

On 15 July the Porte issued its official note of protest against the occupation of the principalities by Russia.²⁴⁸ It also reminded the four signatories of the 1841 Treaty of their obligations, and declared that it will not accept the occupation of a part of its territory and be prepared for war but did not intend to start it.²⁴⁹ Meanwhile, there had already begun a dense traffic of plans and projects of notes coming and going in all directions among the great powers. It seemed that none of them wanted war and strove for a peaceful solution. Several offers and plans were presented to Reşid Pasha from different powers. Vienna became the centre of diplomatic transmission between Russia and the Ottoman Empire thanks to Austria's neutral and interested position. Austria was both politically and geographically in the middle of Europe and was the natural candidate for an intermediary because it had good relations with both Russia and the allies. While it was grateful to Russia for the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in

244 BOA. İ. MTZ. (05) 16/548.

245 Salih Hayri, op. cit., pp. 32, 146, 284.

246 Süleyman Kızıltoprak, "Egyptian troops in the Crimean War (1853-1856)", *Vostochnaya (Krymskaya) Voina 1853-1856 godov: Novye materialy i novoe osmyslenie*. Tom 1, Simferopol: Krymskiy Arkhiv, 2005, p. 49.

247 Cezmi Karasu, op. cit., p. 68.

248 TNA. FO 424/10, no. 136/1 published by Şimşir, op. cit., document 34. The date of the document is shown as 8 Chevval 1269, which corresponds to 15 July 1853, but the translation bears the date of 2 (14) Juillet.

249 BOA. A. AMD. 46/100.

1848, it could not allow Russian possession or influence in the Principalities and around the mouth of the Danube. Several notes were sent from the Porte to Russia via Vienna. In fact there occurred a “revolution” in international diplomacy. Never before had been so much diplomatic efforts by so many parties to prevent war. Nevertheless, these efforts were complicated by the distances involved, so many of them became obsolete before reaching their destinations. Istanbul had not yet been connected to European centres by telegraph.

2.8. The Vienna Note and the “Turkish Ultimatum”

When Reşid Pasha’s note (known as the “Turkish Ultimatum”) reached Vienna, it was not seen as conciliatory enough and was not sent to St. Petersburg. The Austrians did not want to irritate Russia. Instead on 27 July, the Austrian foreign minister Count Buol, in collaboration with the British and French ministers, prepared another project of a note, which came to be known as the Vienna Note (in Turkish *Viyana Müsveddesi*²⁵⁰) and sent to both Istanbul and St. Petersburg. The note was close to Russian demands but differed in that it spread the guarantee to all the great powers. This time the tsar accepted the note but the Ottoman *Meclis-i Umumi* convened on 14 August 1853 did not approve of it as such and subjected to some modification.²⁵¹ The embassies of the four great powers in Istanbul tried in vain to persuade the Ottoman ministers. Reşid Pasha was now bitter at his European friends who first supported him against Russian demands and now seemed to force him into accepting those demands. “It would have been better for Turkey, he said, to have yielded at the first, than after so much support from the Powers to be now unseasonably abandoned”.²⁵² The questions of whether Lord Stratford did all in his power to support the Vienna Note or not, and whether he informally encouraged the Ottoman statesmen to resist or not, belong to the disputed areas of the diplomatic history of the Crimean War. However, we will not go into such details, because this is rather difficult to prove and remains a question of opinion.

Meanwhile Reşid Pasha talked with the French ambassador Edmond de la Cour but received no support from him. In any case the Ottoman council accepted the note

250 For a translation of this note into Ottoman Turkish see Türkgeldi, op. cit., p. 309.

251 Türkgeldi, op. cit., p. 25.

252 Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 293. Lane-Poole’s remark that Reşid Pasha “kissed the ambassador’s [Stratford’s] hand and implored him with tears” is highly improbable and does not coincide even with his own narrative where he also writes that the Turks were obstinate at that time.

only with modifications. These modifications stressed the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that the rights and privileges to the Orthodox were given by the will of the Ottoman Sultan and not by the enforcement of Russia or any treaty.²⁵³ However, on 7 September Russia totally rejected the Ottoman modifications.²⁵⁴ All the diplomatic efforts until then now seemed fruitless. War was impending. The question had now acquired all-European interest.

Meanwhile in the capital of the Ottoman Empire signs of warlike enthusiasm appeared on the part of the population or at least of the most conservative sections of society. *Medrese* (theological schools) students or *softas* demonstrated in favor of war against the “infidel”. A placard was posted on the walls of mosques, calling the Padishah to holy war. Its style and language leaves no doubt as to its being written by the *ulema* or the *softas*:

O Glorious Padishah! All your subjects are ready to sacrifice their lives, property and children for the sake of your majesty. You too have now incurred the duty of unsheathing the sword of Muhammad that you girded on the mosque of Eyyub-i Ansari like your grandfathers and predecessors. The hesitations of your ministers on this question stem from their addiction to the disease of vanity [*izzet-i nefis illeti*] and this situation has the possibility (God forbid) of leading us all into a great danger. Therefore your victorious soldiers and your praying servants want war for the defense of their clear rights, O My Padishah!²⁵⁵ [My translation]

Lord Stratford during this time still tried to gain time for a peaceful solution. It was now the cabinet that actually instructed him to bring the navy to Istanbul. On 3 October, Clarendon wrote privately to Stratford:

We should have been glad if the fleets were now in Constantinople... great care must be taken that they don't give too much encouragement to the Turks nor assume an aggressive position towards Russia, with whom, however much we may be displeased with her for her conduct to Turkey, we have as yet no quarrel.²⁵⁶

From the beginning of the dispute over the holy places, the Ottoman diplomacy was anxious to appease the tsar without impinging on the independence of the state. The tsar practically wanted to put the whole Ottoman Empire into the status of the Danubian principalities. No sovereign body would accept another state's protection over a significant part of its subjects. Indeed Bolshevik Soviet historian Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovskiy was probably the first Russian historian to express the absurdity of Nikolai's

253 Türkgeldi, op. cit, p. 311.

254 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 327.

255 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezakir* 1-12, p. 24.

256 Harold Temperley, “Stratford de Redcliffe and the Origins of the Crimean War”, Part II, *The English Historical Review* 49 (194), April 1934, p. 288.

demands:

In order to evaluate this demand correctly, it is enough to imagine the Kazan Tatars receiving the right to complain of the Russian Emperor to the Turkish Sultan, whose representations the Emperor would have to take into consideration and to satisfy them.²⁵⁷

Curiously, however, the Ottoman diplomacy did not use at all a card that could countermand the demands of Russia: the Sunni Muslims (Tatars, Kuban Nogays, Circassians and Dagestanis) of the Russian Empire. If Russia interfered on behalf of the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, then the Ottomans could also interfere on behalf of the Sunni Muslims of Russia. While there is no doubt that by the 19th century the Ottomans were not in a position to seek protectorate over the Muslims of Russia, it could nevertheless make an argument for the sake of diplomatic rhetoric. But why did not the Ottomans ever raise any questions about them vis-à-vis Russians? Were they simply scared to take up issue with Russia or did they think that they did not have anything to say? It is really difficult to find an answer. In fact it seems that the Ottomans did not have a plan even for the future of the Crimean Tatars even after the war was transferred to the Crimea. The Ottomans did not try to make use of the Gerays, descendants of the Crimean khans who lived around Şumnu and other parts of Bulgaria. One of them, Mesud Geray applied to French in Varna and went to Gözleve with them. The Porte on the other hand had no interest in him. The Porte formed a Tatar cavalry regiment in Gözleve, however, this was only by the request of Tatars and after the French had already accepted 150 Tatars into their cavalry.²⁵⁸

It is indeed one of the peculiarities of the Crimean War that diplomatic efforts never ceased during more than two years of war. War and diplomacy went in parallel. Numerous notes, conventions, declarations were prepared in Vienna, Paris, Istanbul, London and then sent in all directions. The Prussians also tried to make Berlin a participant and venue for the negotiations. Sweden and Denmark maintained a policy of active neutrality.²⁵⁹ Sardinia-Piedmont lately (early 1855) joined the war on the side of the Allies in the hope of gaining further support for Italian union. Iran vacillated between Russia and the Ottomans, and had it not been for the efforts of Britain and

257 Pokrovskiy, op. cit., p. 19.

258 Hakan Kırımlı, "The Crimean Tatar Units in the Ottoman Army during the Crimean War", unpublished symposium paper presented at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (IFEA) in Istanbul on 27 November 2004. Instead of Gözleve, Kırımlı uses the name Kezlev, which might be the local Tatar pronunciation of Gözleve.

259 For more information, see Emanuel Halicz, *Danish Neutrality during the Crimean War (1853-1856): Denmark between the Hammer and the Anvil*, Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 1977.

France, it could have joined the war on Russia's side. The war had the full potential of turning into an all-out European war. All powers of Europe in one way or another were involved in the war. Diplomacy in this war was almost as important as military action. There were so many times when it seemed that a solution to satisfy all parties was found yet these efforts were fruitless until the capture of Sevastopol by the Allies and Kars by the Russians towards the end of 1855. Yet this was an unfinished war, and the peace that ended this war would also prove to be unfinished.

Cevdet Pasha is an important Ottoman primary source for our subject, being a contemporary eyewitness and the official chronicler of the Porte. Although his chronicle did not cover the period, still he left many notes or memoranda (called *Tezâkir*) to his successor Lütü Efendi. His account in these *Tezâkir* seems sober and realistic:

At the beginning of this matter, naïve people of the time acted quite belligerent and ambitious with hopes in vain of going as far as Moscow and maybe Petersburg or at least conquering the Crimea. As for the Western-minded [*alafranga efkârda bulunan zevat*], they claimed that in case of war Russia would come as near as Edirne. Both parties had wrong opinions. That our forces are not equal to those of Russia is out of question. Nevertheless, it was also known to well-informed people that the regular and reserve forces mustered by our state could for a long time engage and stop the Russian forces. Events too have proved this fact. His Majesty Abdülmecid Han did not like shedding blood and Reşid Pasha too was trying to solve the matter by pen. Diplomats like Âli Pasha and Fuad Efendi who were raised in his school were also of the same opinion with him. The military people, on the other hand, especially Mehmed Ali Pasha, cunningly appeared as supporters of war. Even those of them who at heart were for the maintenance of peace, were dreaming of saying: 'Let the diplomats forbid war, then we will be able to say that we could do this and that, alas, this and that person prevented war'.²⁶⁰ [My translation]

The Ottoman Empire had become an arena of contest among the great powers. While these powers contested among themselves over the question of who is to have more influence over the Porte, Ottoman sovereignty suffered every time. The Ottoman Empire had to answer even for matters totally alien to it. A good example is the affair of the Hungarian revolutionary refugee Martin Koszta, who had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire and lived for a while in Kütahya. Koszta was then released and he went to America. After a while he came back to Izmir, where he was arrested by the Austrian consulate and imprisoned in an Austrian ship in the harbour. Since he was under American protection when he was arrested, an American corvette had forced the Austrian brig in Izmir harbour to return Koszta to the Americans. Some Italians had also attacked three officers of the Austrian ship in a café, killing one of them and injuring

260 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 23.

another. Yet the newly appointed Austrian envoy (the internuncio) in Istanbul, Baron Karl Ludwig von Brück protested and demanded the dismissal of the governor of Izmir Âli Pasha, (the former foreign minister) and the appointment of a new governor who would be capable of restoring the security of the Europeans in Izmir. This was in June 1853, when the crisis with Russia was ripe. The Porte did not want a quarrel with Austria as well (*Rusya ile zuhura gelen bürudet üzerine bir de Avusturya ile bozuşulmasını zihinler almayıp*) and it had to satisfy his demand. It was first decided that Âli Pasha and the governor of the province of *Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid* (Aegean islands) would be interchanged. However, Brück did not accept this solution and therefore Âli Pasha was simply removed from his office. Just as in many other cases, an Ottoman official had been forced to resign because of a dispute between rival great powers.²⁶¹

2.9. European and Ottoman Public Opinion before the War

In the summer of 1853, European public opinion was definitely pro-Ottoman, because Russia was seen as the aggressor and the Ottoman Empire as the victim. As mentioned by Winfried Baumgart, since the 1830s (especially after the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833) a strong Russophobia had developed in Britain. Russian southward expansion against the Porte and Iran had enlarged such fears. Among the chief representatives of Russophobia we can cite Lord Palmerston and David Urquhart. Russian suppression of the struggles of Poles (1831) and Hungarians (1849) had also made Russia the stronghold of autocracy and reaction in the eyes of the liberal and socialist European public opinion. An increase of Russian influence on the Ottoman Empire was not in the interests of the European bourgeoisie who controlled most of the newspapers. Almost all British and many French newspapers were full of pro-Ottoman and anti-Russian sentiments. Even the neutral Prussian newspapers noted that anti-Russian sentiments increased in the European public opinion.²⁶² There is no doubt that the Ottoman cabinet knew what was written in these newspapers. Especially the Ottoman ambassador in London Kostaki Musurus was sending home clippings of newspaper articles on the Russo-Ottoman conflict. Thus we have many of them in the

261 İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnâl gives the text of the *tezkiye-i maruza* of the grand vizier. But he does not tell the release of Koszta by the American ship. See his *Son Sadrazamlar*. 1. Cilt. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1981?, pp. 10-11.

262 See Gencer, op. cit., p. 161.

BOA. Let us see some of them.²⁶³ Upon the news of the passage of the river Pruth by 12,000 Russian troops and the occupation of Jassy, capital of Moldavia, British newspapers in general were much excited against this act of aggression. For example, the *Observer* wrote on 3 July 1853:

The present and late conduct of the Czar, in his insolent aggressions upon his weak Neighbour and Ally, and his contempt for the opinion of his best friends in Europe have left him without an apologist in England... And why should we not sustain our old and faithful Ally, whose conduct is so just under most unjust aggression – who has conceded all that was tolerant – who does nothing on the offensive, but who is prepared in his own defence, and strong in kind and generous offers and acts of support, from friends both near and far? ... She [Russia] must, most of all, have undervalued or not known the strength and the force of public opinion, which is irresistible, without in the least fanatical.²⁶⁴

The Sun on the other hand, reflecting the voice of the British bourgeoisie, declared on 4 July 1853, that Britain had nothing to lose from a loss of trade with Russia,

We have nothing to fear from Nicholas; and Russia is not so profitable a customer that we need care for the suspension of commercial intercourse. In 1851 our export trade to Russia amounted to less than 1,300,000*l.*, while we have admitted her raw produce, her hides and hemp, and tallow to an enormous account, on the most favourable terms. Her magnates will regret the loss of our custom far more than we shall theirs. There is nothing then to create apprehension, or to depress the public securities, even if Nicholas should carry his greatest threats into execution, a matter which we still believe to be very improbable.²⁶⁵

The Daily News, a Liberal paper, wrote on 4 July 1853: “It seems the die is cast, and Russia has at length resolved to put to proof the value of Europe's diplomatic declarations that the faith of treaties and the integrity of the weaker states must be maintained”. *The Standard* on 4 July 1853 also declared that “the conquest of Turkey by Russia would seriously damage the commerce of England, if it should not threaten her Eastern empire”. The Tory newspaper *The Morning Herald* argued that “the honour and safety of Europe both demand that the act of invasion cannot be passed over unnoticed” (4 July 1853). *The Morning Chronicle*, another Liberal, Peelite paper, played the same tune on 4 July 1853:

Russia wages war upon Turkey, not to redress any wrong, nor to avenge any affront, but to wring from a weaker Power an acknowledgement of the sovereign rights of the EMPEROR over a large portion of its subjects; and, so far as the Porte

263 For a detailed study of public opinion in Britain before the war, see Basil Kingsley Martin, *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston. A Study of Public Opinion in England before the Crimean War*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1924. London: Hutchinson, 1963.

264 The Ottoman ambassador in London Kostaki Musurus sent these newspaper clippings attached to his despatches to Istanbul. They are available in the BOA. I. HR. 329/21224.

265 Ibid.

is concerned, the attack is as wanton and unprovoked as if he believed that the moment had arrived when he might with impunity overrun and subdue what he probably regards as a falling empire...²⁶⁶

Tory newspaper *The Morning Advertiser* advised firm action against the tsar on 5 July 1853:

The Czar has carried his cunning to excess. He has overreached himself... He must be brought to his senses immediately... He must be forthwith and peremptorily called on to give satisfactory guarantees that he will not again menace and molest the Turk, nor groundlessly and recklessly inspire a general alarm for the peace of Europe.. By exacting these securities for the good behaviour of the Northern Bear, both the Sultan and the other Powers of Europe will have no reason to regret that Nicholas has indulged in those acts of absolute madness which have filled the world with amazement and alarm.²⁶⁷

Even the conservative *Times* could find no apologies for Russia on 4 July 1853:

The utter insufficiency of the alleged causes of resentment against Turkey, especially after satisfaction had been obtained on the only tangible grievances complained of, suggests that other and deeper motives must be at work... the concentration of armies on the frontier, the review at Odessa, the demeanour of the Envoy and his reception at Constantinople, awakened other suspicions. He seems to have been sent not so much to obtain a treaty as to pick a quarrel...²⁶⁸

After 7 July, when the manifesto of Nikolai was published and reached Britain, the newspapers increased their criticism. For example, the *Daily News*, on 6 July 1853 wrote that the Russian emperor had declared a new crusade:

The Manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas, which we this day publish with less surprise than regret, affects to proclaim against the Ottoman Empire a religious war... it is the summons to a new crusade. It is an appeal, direct and undisguised, to the fanaticism of a bigoted priesthood and an ignorant population...²⁶⁹

The next day the *Daily News*, proposed action against Russia:

France and England united can, if they will, not only save an ancient and peaceful ally from the robber lust of the Barbarian, but by a prompt and steadfast course they may secure for Turkey better guarantees for its future independence and security than it has enjoyed during the present century... It is tolerably evident that Austria is now bitterly conscious of the folly of her late proceedings with regard to Turkey. The mission of Count LEININGEN to Constantinople last winter served as a species of rehearsal for that of Prince MENCHIKOFF a few months later; and the overbearing and menacing line of conduct pursued by the Cabinet of Vienna, in the affair of Montenegro, and the unconcealed disposition treacherously to stimulate the fanaticism of the discontented subjects of the Porte, is now imitated on a more perilous scale by the reckless and rapacious adviser of

266 Ibid.

267 Ibid.

268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

the CZAR...²⁷⁰

The Morning Herald, went so far as to accuse some members of the British cabinet of being pro-Russian

There is no use in concealing the disastrous truth. There is a Russian party in the Cabinet – that is, Russian as far as their feeble blundering permits them to have any settled foreign policy at all. We care not by what foreign influence this party is backed; it is high time that England should know to what extent they have sacrificed – to what greater extent they are prepared to sacrifice – English honour and English interests. (7 July 1853)²⁷¹

The Morning Advertiser wrote on 6 July 1853:

By force of arms the Czar will endeavour to impose upon Turkish subjects a protection which they hold in such horror, that they will brave death to escape it ... the moment a Russian soldier has crossed the Pruth for hostile purposes, that moment Turkey is at war, and the Dardanelles are, by treaty, open, with permission of the Sultan, to the ships of war of all nations. The right, then, of the fleets to advance is undisputed.²⁷²

The Morning Advertiser on the next day wrote that “the Autocrat of all the Russias has thrown down the glove to public opinion and to Europe. The opinion he despises, the Europe he defies can never hesitate to take it up”. *The Globe* defended Reşid Pasha’s and the Sultan’s “temperate and dignified” stand on 5 July 1853:

The text of the note addressed by Redschid Pacha, in reply to the note of Count Nesselrode, is now before the public, and it will be found to support the temperate and dignified position of the Turkish Government... The Sultan has newly confirmed the privileges, rights and immunities of the Greek Church as they have existed *ab antiquo*...²⁷³

The Morning Herald, 28 July 1853, even threatened the British ministers:

Once it comes to this, that the Cabinet are avowedly ready to prostrate British honour and British faith before the ambition of Russia, we venture to promise that the British people will make very short work of the Ministers.²⁷⁴

Reading these newspapers, one gets the idea that especially the British public opinion was very strongly pro-Ottoman and belligerent. But this was all the more misleading for the Ottoman ministers, because they did not really understand that newspapers do not necessarily reflect the views of their governments. A more or less free press was not quite conceivable for them. Therefore they mistook the tone of the

270 Ibid.

271 Ibid.

272 Ibid.

273 Ibid.

274 Ibid.

newspapers as proof of real support of their respective governments in case of Ottoman war against Russia. Adolphus Slade argues that the “prime councillor” of the Porte (London Ambassador Kostaki Musurus?) contributed to its indecision about the inevitability of war by sending the minister for foreign affairs articles extracted from the Western press, eulogizing “Turkey”, depreciating Russia. Thus,

Unused to free discussion, their own newspapers being strictly censored, the Turkish ministers were unable to discriminate justly between the government and the press. Innately suspicious, they may readily have fancied collusion. The warlike articles of sundry English and French journals weakened the effect of foreign offices’ pacific despatches. They were decidedly more palatable. The latter alluded to social aberrations and rayas’ [*raya*, non-Muslims, CB] rights; whereas the former made no allusion in that day to such delicate topics.²⁷⁵

Lord Beaumont, in a letter to Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, published in the *Times*, defended the Ottoman case in the following way:

A great, albeit a gradual, revolution, has been taking place during more than 30 years in the more important portions of the empire; one by one, every law or custom which tended to oppress the rayah or keep up the barbarous privileges of feudalism has been abrogated or repealed... The Porte has, by its own exertions, placed itself in the rank of the great powers of Europe. It has an army and a fleet inferior only to those of the three or four greatest military states; its ministers of state have displayed a tact and ability which has thrown western diplomacy into the shade... So changed is now the relative position of the different powers in the east of Europe, that the Crescent means religious toleration, personal freedom, national independence, and social order; while the Cross (whether Greek or Roman) is misused as the banner of those who would establish religious intolerance, personal slavery, absolutism in governments, and a return to the middle ages in literature and society. The question at issue and the subject at stake are something far beyond a personal quarrel between the Czar and the Sultan. The contest is between civilisation and barbarism, right and wrong, progress and retrogression, liberty and tyranny. All this ought to be put in detail before the public; nor ought the difference between the commercial codes and tariffs of Turkey and other European states to be forgotten. Beyond all this, it is easily shown how necessary the Sultan's independence is to the peace of the world and the balance of power in Europe...²⁷⁶

At the beginning of September 1853, the anti-Russian spirit in Istanbul had reached a peak. The pacificity of the government was also much criticised. This was largely the result of the pressure of the Ottoman public opinion that favoured war

275 Slade, op. cit., p. 99. Ali Rıza Seyfi, the translator into Turkish of Slade’s book, has totally misunderstood this passage, rendering a very distorted meaning in Turkish, exactly opposite to the original, by translating the terms “foreign offices” and “the latter” as “Türkiye hariciye nezareti”, whereas what is meant is, of course, the European foreign ministries. Cf. Adolphus Slade, *Türkiye ve Kırım Harbi*, Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1943, p. 63.

276 Lord Beaumont to Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart on the Eastern Question. *The Times* [date not seen on the clipping] BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 23, letter dated 9 October 1853.

against Russia. This public mood was mainly expressed by the professors and students of religious schools (*medreses*), the ulema and the *softas*. Some of the ministers like Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha and part of the military also backed them. They were organized easily in the mosques. Ann Pottinger Saab has asserted that the reactions of the ulema and the *softas* were based largely on their own deteriorating material conditions. The new secular schools had largely diminished their career prospects, opening the way instead to the graduates of the new schools. The expropriation of the *waqf* (pious foundations) property had also deprived them of some of their traditional revenues. Therefore as a social group they were discontented.²⁷⁷ Şerif Mardin has also argued that the destruction of the Ottoman industries had created new unemployment and increased the number of medrese students together with their disobedience.²⁷⁸ However, the *medrese* students were still numerically stronger than those attending the new Western style *rüşdiyye* schools. According to Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, at the beginning of the Crimean War there were only 60 *rüşdiyye* schools in the entire empire with 3,371 male students, whereas *medreses* in Istanbul alone had 16,752 students, all male. However, the numbers for *rüşdiyye* schools seem doubtful.²⁷⁹ Cevdet Pasha was of the opinion that Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha provoked the *softas* in order to secure the dismissal of Reşid Pasha.²⁸⁰

On 10 September 1853, some 36 or 35 members of the ulema submitted a petition (*arzuhal*) to the MVL, citing verses from the Koran and the prophet Muhammad's words (*hadis*) that the *imam* of the true believers must fulfil his duty of proclaiming jihad.²⁸¹ The *Times* newspaper in London gave the news as follows:

... The petition was principally composed of numerous quotations from the Koran, enjoining war on the enemies of Islam, and contained covert threats of disturbance were it not listened to and complied with. The tone of the petition is

277 See Ann Pottinger Saab, *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977, pp. 81-82 and 84. Referring to Kovalevsky, Saab gives the number of *softas* at around 45,000, which seems to be rather overestimated. According to a study by Mübahat Kütükoğlu, there were 5,769 students and instructors in the medreses of Istanbul in 1869. See Kütükoğlu, *XX. Asra Erişen İstanbul Medreseleri*, Ankara: TTK, 2000, pp. 345-352.

278 Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998, p. 189.

279 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 107. The authors refer to the *Salnâme-i Devlet-i Aliyye* of 1268 (1852-53). However, I could not locate this information in this *salnâme* and the others for the following five years. It seems doubtful that the number of *rüşdiyye* schools had reached 60, for the *salnâmes* of these years mention only a few of them in Istanbul. Necdet Sakaoğlu and Nuri Akbayar, on the other hand, write that in 1860 the number of high schools (meaning *rüşdiyye* schools) in all the Ottoman Empire had reached 60 with 3,920 students. The authors, however, do not cite any reference. See Sakaoğlu and Akbayar, op. cit., p. 301.

280 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 23.

281 BOA. İ. MVL. 26350 lef 1, 8 Zilhicce 1269 (12 September 1853). There are 35 seals on the petition and one place is left unsealed.

exceedingly bold, and bordering on the insolent. Some of the principal Ministers endeavoured to reason with those who presented it, but the answers they obtained were short and to the point. The spokesman observed – ‘Here are the words of the Koran: if you are Mussulmans you are bound to obey. You are now listening to foreign and infidel ambassadors who are the enemies of the Faith; we are the children of the Prophet; we have an army and that army cries out with us for war, to avenge the insults which the Giaours have heaped upon us.’ It is said that on each attempt to reason with these fanatics, the Ministers were met by the answer ‘These are the words of the Koran.’ The present Ministers are undoubtedly in a state of alarm, since they look upon the present circumstance (a very unusual event in Turkey) as but the commencement of a revolution, and fear to be forced at the present inopportune juncture into a war. It seems that three petitions have been presented by these softas, one to the Sultan, one to Mehemet Ali, the Seraskier or Commander-in-Chief, and one to the Council. The party of Redschid Pacha believe the affair to have been instigated by Mehemet Ali, who has been from the first openly and avowedly in favour of war... Should a popular movement urge the Ministry to declare war, the peaceful and reasonable policy of Redschid Pacha would of course be at an end, and so would his services, while Mehmet Ali would become practically the chief man in the Empire; whereas should these unhappy questions with Russia be settled by the acceptance by the Emperor of the note of Redschid Pacha, the latter would acquire thereby immense influence and consolidation of power, with the confusion of all his rivals... The Ministry is much puzzled in its endeavours to ascertain how far the body of the nation agrees with the sentiments expressed in the petition – whether, in short, public opinion supports the movement of these softas, or whether their bold address has originated entirely within the walls of their mosques and tékés.²⁸²

On the next day a special council of eleven ministers and high officials (*havass-i vükela-i fiham*) convened in the seaside mansion of the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha to discuss the petition. According to the protocol or minutes (*mazbata*) of the council, the reason for not proclaiming war against Russia until then was the insufficiency of the military preparations. To the questions on this issue, the commander of Rumeli army Ömer Pasha had replied that the Rumelian army needed 40,000 regular troops in addition to the present forces and several months for the preparation of bridges and fortifications. The Anatolian army was in a similar situation, as confirmed by the seraskier. While the Porte was trying to find a political solution, it was obvious that if a political solution was not found, then war was inevitable.²⁸³

The ministers further argued that since the decisions until then were taken by unanimity and since calling for the assistance of other states was approved by the *şeriat*, and since the *şeyhülislam* had not yet sanctioned proclamation of war, then the protest

282 “Turkey. (From Our Own Correspondent). Constantinople, Sept. 12”, *The Times*, Issue 21544, London, 27 September 1853, p. 7.

283 BOA. İ. MVL. 26350 lef 2, dated 7 Zilhicce 1269 (11 September 1853). The *mazbata* is sealed by Şevket Bey, Mehmed Arif Efendi, Mehmed ?, Mahmud Pasha, Rifat Pasha, Ali Fethi Pasha, Mehmed Ali Pasha, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Rauf Bey, Esseyyid Ahmed Arif Efendi and Mustafa Naili Pasha (the grand vizier). See Appendix 5.

of some *hoca efendis* was very improper and contrary to law. Therefore they should be reprimanded and punished. Then the ministers observed that “the real issue to be regretted here was the audacity and insolence of the common people to interfere with state affairs”. Such things had caused a lot of trouble in ancient times and had been unseen for a long time “by the will of God and thanks to his Imperial Majesty’s firm rule”. Therefore it was very urgent to prevent such insolence.²⁸⁴ Now we see a really interesting development here with regard to Ottoman public opinion. It seems that the Ottoman public by then had started to take an active interest in “state affairs”.

The *mazbata* added that according to the news from Vienna, the modifications of the Porte in the Vienna Note were not disapproved by the ambassadors in Vienna and sent to St. Petersburg. The answer from Petersburg was expected in eight to ten days. If the answer will be negative then the Porte would not yield. Finally the council decided to summon prominent members of the ulema and receive from them written approvals of the policy of the government. Thus the excitement and agitation of the people would also be diminished. In any case the petition was not signed by well-known *hoca efendis* but only by the lesser ones. Vidinli [Mustafa] Hoca Efendi was inclined to sign the petition but after a reprimand from the şeyhülislam he had abstained from putting his seal. It was also observed that while the petition was prepared and circulated for signature for days, the police had not duly informed the authorities and had not taken measures to prevent it. Such indifference by the police,²⁸⁵ in such a delicate time when it had to be more vigilant than ever was really regrettable. Therefore the *zabtiye müşiri* should be strongly admonished to be on the alert. On the next day, the grand vizier submitted the *mazbata* together with the *arzuhal* to the Sultan, who approved the decision of the ministers.²⁸⁶ On the other hand, the *Berliner Zeitung* wrote that the ulema and the medrese students had collected 60,000 signatures from Istanbul and its vicinity for war against Russia.²⁸⁷ This number seems exaggerated.

The disturbances caused by the softas worried some of the European diplomats for fear of a fanatical wave of Christian massacres. The French ambassador Edmond de La

284 “bunda asıl teessüf edilecek ve nazar-ı dikkati celb eyleyecek madde halkın mesalih-i devlete müdahaleye cüret ve cesareti olup böyle şeyler ezman-ı salifede dürlü vukuat-ı müdhişeyi müntic olduğu halde bi-tevfik-i teala saye-i kudretvaye-i cenab-ı mülukânede pek çok vakitlerden beri görülmemiş bir hareket olarak bunun önü alınması pek ehemm ve elzem görünmesiyle..”

285 Very interestingly the *mazbata* uses exactly the word *polis* for the police (*polis memurları*), while officially the police were called the *zabtiye*, their chief being the *zabtiye müşiri*. I have not come across the word *polis* elsewhere in those documents for this period that I have seen in the BOA.

286 BOA. İ. MVL. 26350 lef 3, submitted on 7 Zilhicce 1269 (11 September 1853) and approved on the next day.

287 Gencer, op. cit., p. 168.

Cour sent alarming news to his government and the French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys²⁸⁸ telegraphed the news to London as well. Lord Clarendon, without waiting for despatches from Stratford, instructed him “to send for the British fleet to Constantinople” on 23 September. Then the Russian ambassador in London, Baron Philipp Ivanovich Brunnov (1797-1875) declared that the call to the fleet was a violation of the Treaty of Straits of 1841, which banned the passage of battleships from the straits in peace time. To this protest, Clarendon’s reply was that the Porte “had ceased to be at peace from the moment when the first Russian soldier entered the Danubian Principalities”.²⁸⁹

Stratford, however, was not aroused so much. He simply ignored the order, as if the summons to the fleet was left to his discretion. But still he called for two or three steamers to Istanbul for emergencies. The French ambassador also called in some steamers. Stratford in his despatch wrote: “Fortunately there is no necessity whatever for calling up the squadron... I wished to save Her Majesty’s Government from any embarrassments likely to accrue from a premature passage of the Dardanelles”.²⁹⁰ Thus it seems that Stratford probably did not have belligerent aims, contrary to allegations of some historians, especially the Russian historians who consider him as a great enemy of Russia and one of the chief causes of the war. On the contrary, he seems here careful not to provoke Russia while defending British interests. Nevertheless, the question of the role of Stratford de Redcliffe is a complicated and still controversial point among historians. Some documents published by Prof. Baumgart in AGKK show that even such British statesmen as Lord Clarendon, Sir James Graham (1792–1861), First Lord of the Admiralty, and Baron Henry Cowley (1804-1884), British ambassador to France, saw Stratford as “bent on war”, “resolved to embroil matters at home and abroad in the hope of obtaining a triumph for his own morbid vanity and implacable antipathies”, his tendencies being “clearly more for war than for peace”.²⁹¹

On 26 and 27 September 1853, another grand council (*Meclis-i Umumi*) of 163 high-level official dignitaries was convened to discuss the question of war against Russia. The council consisted of the three distinct groups of the Ottoman bureaucracy: the *mülkiye*, that is, ministers, ex-ministers and other officials, the *seyfiye*, i.e. the

288 Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys (1805-1881). French minister of foreign affairs in 1848-49, 1851, 1852-55 and 1862-66.

289 Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 307.

290 Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 308.

291 See Winfried Baumgart, “Einleitung”, AGKK, Serie III, Band 1, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005, pp. 46-47.

military, and the *ulema*, i.e. the religious establishment. According to the testimony of Rauf Bey, who was present at the meeting, first the *hoca efendis* were asked to give their opinion. Hoca Yahya Efendi answered that the ministers (*vükela*) knew better and they should be asked. Finally Vidinli Mustafa Hoca Efendi asked why the war was not begun until then.²⁹²

At this point Reşid Pasha the foreign minister interfered and told the council that the state did not have enough military preparation at that time. He added that although the ambassadors of the great powers advised not to declare war until the European opinion was clarified, the Sublime State was free in its decision. Therefore it would either accept the advice or declare war. Everybody should speak up, he told. Then some of the ulema asked: “If we begin war, will the great powers be against us or how?”. To this question Reşid Pasha replied that they were not expected to be against but their fleets might go back, or may be they would not leave. It was up to the Porte to endeavour to keep them or not. Again some of the ulema told what use they would be of, referring to them as one nation of infidels (*el küfrü milletün vahide*). Then Reşid Pasha explained that although their religion was one, they also had conflicts among them like the one between Iran and the Ottoman Empire.

The ulema then turned to the seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha to learn whether the Ottoman Empire had enough military strength to fight against Russia. The seraskier pasha gave an account of the military strength of the empire but avoided giving a definite answer as to whether this power was sufficient for a war against Russia. Edhem Pasha told about the population and the military power of Russia and concluded that war against them was a difficult job, even such a great conqueror as Napoleon I had been unsuccessful against them.

Rauf Bey writes that at this point the majority of the ulema attacked these words and made “unbecoming” remarks about Edhem Pasha as if he were an infidel. Former grand vizier İzzet Pasha also read a paper, saying that war should not be started without proper preparations. Another former grand vizier Âli Pasha also recommended precaution. Former foreign minister Fuad Efendi told that “the Ottoman Empire cannot make another treaty like the Treaty of Edirne. The matter must be considered well. Furthermore, the question of war finances should also be taken into consideration”. Rauf Bey further remarks here that some *hoca efendis* said “we will seize the wealth of

292 Rauf Bey was son of Rıfat Pasha, the president of the MVL. For the text of his minutes of the meeting, see Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 315-320. However, we do not know when he wrote these minutes, immediately after or much later?

the enemy by the force of sword and recover our expenses”; therefore, the question of money, which was the essence of the matter, was not discussed but instead irrelevant, meaningless words were uttered (*ruh-i maslâhat olan akça maddesi yine söyleşilmeyib başka abes sözlere girişildi*).

Rıfat Pasha, the president of the MVL said that the real point to be looked after in this matter was the alliance of the naval powers with the Ottoman Empire and internally the unanimity of the officials of the state. After some negotiations, Rıfat Pasha asked the opinion of the high ranking ulema. Then the *mufti* of the MVL Arif Efendi (the future *şeyhülislam*) referred the question to the office of the *fetva*. To this the *fetva emini* from the office of the *şeyhülislam* replied that if the commander of the Muslim armies says that there are enough forces to go against the enemy then it is necessary to go to war. Arif Efendi also complained about the rumours about himself spread by the *softas* because he had participated in the negotiations of Rıfat Pasha with Menshikov. After that he referred to the seraskier to tell whether the state had enough force. The seraskier again stated the number of the imperial troops but said that he was not sure whether this amount was sufficient for a war against Russia. Rauf Bey remarks that the seraskier did not give a certain answer to the repeated question, because he did not want to be held responsible if the result of the war would turn out to be unfavourable. When some lieutenant-generals (*feriks*) from the DŞA were asked, they gave some vague answers. Then Reşid Pasha asked the Kapudan Pasha, the grand admiral. Mahmud Pasha told that “if the great powers do not send fleets to the Mediterranean and attack the Ottoman Empire, then the imperial fleet could certainly be a match to the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. But if later we will be called to responsibility for these words then I will not accept it”. These words surprised all and a total silence fell to the hall.

Reşid Pasha broke the silence and told that “It is better to die with arms in hand than to die with tied hands. God willing, we will be victorious and destroy the harmful treaties as well”. Reşid Pasha seems to have carried the day and determined the outcome.

Thus after two days of discussions, war was decided unanimously and the resolution was sent to the Sultan for approval. The resolution (*mazbata*) of the council was written by Mustafa Reşid Pasha immediately in the night of the second day of the negotiations.²⁹³ It was stated that Russia had not accepted the modification made by the

293 The text of this *mazbata* can be seen at Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 320-321. Türkgeldi or his editor Baykal gives the date of the *mazbata* as 23 Zilhicce 1269 (25 September 1853). 23 Zilhicce 1269, however, corresponds to 27 September 1853. A better transliteration is provided by OBKS, pp. 126-127.

Porte on the Vienna. While the four great powers had asked the Porte to accept the note without alterations and offered some guarantees (*teminat ve kefalet*) against the risks it contained, this was not sufficient from the point of view of honour (*mesele-i namusiyyece kâfi*²⁹⁴ *görülemeyip*) even if it had any legal benefit. Acceptance of the note without alterations would mean taking the “killing poison” (*semm-i kaatil*). Therefore it was decided unanimously to declare war. It was also warned that the war was declared on the Russian state and the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire should not in any way be offended, on the contrary, more care and protection than before should now be exercised with regard to them in order not to cause any hostility from other states because of their ill treatment. Sheikhulislam Arif Hikmet Bey Efendi issued a *fetva* sanctioning the declaration of a holy war (*cihad ve kıtal*) and on 30 September Sultan Abdülmecid approved the resolution.²⁹⁵

If we can rely on the accuracy of the account of Rauf Bey, then an interesting picture emerges. Seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha, whom some sources like to assign to the war party, seems to have kept a very low profile at the meeting. Reşid Pasha on the other hand, who is seen as proponent of a diplomatic solution, seems to have played the role of the hawkish party. It is also important to observe that the Western oriented Reşid Pasha was rather in tandem with the ulema, supporting the war effort. Therefore we cannot make all-sweeping generalizations on the basis of this account alone, however, it is certain that there are no clear cut dichotomies of reformers versus conservatives or pacifists versus belligerents among the Ottoman statesmen.

294 Türkgeldi gives this word as “*faidesi*”, which is not correct. Cf. OBKS, p. 126 for transcription and p. 377 for a copy of the original document.

295 See OBKS, pp. 126-128.

CHAPTER 3: BATTLES AND DIPLOMACY DURING THE WAR

3.1. The Declaration of War

In this chapter I will dwell on the battles of the war to the extent that Ottomans were involved in them, using Ottoman, Russian and European sources in a comparative and critical way. Because of space limitations, I will focus on those battles, events and aspects of the war that I see more important. One of the aims of this chapter is to see the extent of reforms in the Ottoman army, how the Ottoman armies fought, how they were led, organized and supplied. I will also analyse how the Porte led diplomacy in this period, the diplomatic efforts of the great powers and the Porte from the declaration of war in October 1853 until the Treaty of Paris at the end of March 1856.

On 1 Muharrem 1270 (4 October 1853), the Porte's declaration of war was published in the official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi*. On the same day official notes were sent to the embassies of the four great powers in Istanbul (France, Britain, Austria and Prussia).²⁹⁶ The next day a leaflet was published in French, bearing the title "*Manifeste de la Sublime Porte*".²⁹⁷

The declaration was still mild and conciliatory in style. It stated that the Sublime Porte was forced to declare war since Russia had occupied Ottoman territory and had not evacuated it despite various diplomatic efforts. It also announced that as a last sign of peaceful intentions of the Porte, the commander of the Rumeli army Ömer Pasha was instructed to give a term of 15 days to the Russian commander of the Danubian armies General Mikhail Gorchakov to evacuate the principalities. Ömer Pasha sent the ultimatum on 8 October 1853, stating that if he received a negative answer or no answer, then hostilities would begin. General Gorchakov replied on 10 October that he was not authorised to remove his armies. Thus from a legal point of view, war was fully

296 BOA. HR. SYS. 1189/4, dated 1 Muharrem 1270 (4 October 1853). Also see CH, nr. 648, 6 Muharrem 1270 (9 October 1853).

297 *Manifeste de la Sublime Porte*. Imprimerie du *Journal de Constantinople*. BOA. HR. SYS. 907/5, 5 October 1853.

declared on the day when General Gorchakov rejected the ultimatum of Ömer Pasha.²⁹⁸ This point is important because later Nikolai I and some Russian sources would claim that the Porte did not wait until its own ultimatum expired, when Ottoman artillery opened fire on Russian ships on the Danube on 21 October.

Meanwhile Reşid Pasha was afraid that a sudden Russian attack on Istanbul could take place before the end of the duration of the ultimatum. Therefore he requested the French and the British embassies on 8 October²⁹⁹ to bring some part of their fleets from the Dardanelles to Istanbul. He knew that the ambassadors were instructed and authorised by their governments to bring their fleets to Istanbul in case of necessity to protect the Sultan. Nevertheless, the ambassadors did not hasten to answer. Their notes came only on 16 October. The French note was positive and clear. It stated that Russia had violated Ottoman territorial integrity and the Porte was now by treaty entitled freedom of action concerning the Straits. It informed that the French fleet was ready to come as a sign of friendship.³⁰⁰ It also added that due to weather conditions, it was in any case desirable that the fleet entered the Straits. The British note was also positive, though not so enthusiastic as the French note.³⁰¹

On 1 November 1853 (20 October according to the Julian calendar), the “All-Russian³⁰² Emperor and Autocrat” Nikolai I issued his manifest, finally declaring war on the Porte.³⁰³ In his manifest Nikolai distorted the facts so much, as if his subjects did not know anything apart from his manifest. He argued that the Porte had declared war despite the peaceful efforts of Europe and his long endured patience, pretending that Europe was behind him. He added that the Porte had accepted insurgents of all countries into its army and started military operations on the Danube. Russia now had to defend

298 Mustafa Budak writes that the Russians rejected the proposal on 17 October, referring to an ATASE document, the contents of which he does not explain. See Mustafa Budak, *1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı'nda Kafkas Cephesi*, unpublished PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 1993, p. 41.

299 This date is given by Lane-Poole (op. cit., p. 309). I could not find Reşid Pasha's note in the BOA; therefore its date is not certain, although I found the replies of the two ambassadors to it.

300 Translation of the French note to the Ottoman foreign ministry. [Edmond] de la Cour to Reşid Pasha, dated 16 October 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 9. I could not find the original of this note. See Appendix 7.

301 Translation of the British note to the Ottoman foreign ministry. Stratford to Reşid, dated 16 October 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 8. I could not find the original of this note. See Appendix 6.

302 Nikolai's official Russian title, “*Imperator i Samoderzhets Vserossiyskiy*” is usually translated as “Emperor and Autocrat of All Russias”.

303 For the Russian original, see Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part two, p. 531. This manifest was translated into Bulgarian as well and distributed in Bulgaria. The *kocabaşı* of Rusçuk (Ruse) sent it to the governor of Silistria, who forwarded it to Ömer Pasha and to the Porte. The manifest in Bulgarian, its translation into Ottoman Turkish and the letter of the governor of Silistria Mehmed Said Pasha to the grand vizier, dated 18 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (18 March 1854) can be found at BOA. A. AMD. 51/1.

its sacred cause of protecting the Orthodox faith by arms, he declared. Yet he had lost his confidence and initiative. Now it was not he who guided events but events which started to direct him. He did not give definite orders to the Danubian army as to what to do against the Ottoman army, other than self-defence. Although war was declared by both sides, they remained yet on the defensive. There were still hopes of a diplomatic solution. Emperor Nikolai on his part was still assuring the European powers that his actions would be defensive. Meanwhile, Sultan Abdülmecid assumed the title of *Gazi* on 3 November 1853.³⁰⁴

On 30 October, General Louis-Achille Baraguey d'Hilliers (1795-1878) was appointed to replace Ambassador Edmond de la Cour at the French embassy in Istanbul. The general, who had distinguished himself in Algeria like so many other French generals, was chosen by Napoleon III to balance the influence of Stratford de Redcliffe on the Porte. The new French ambassador arrived at Istanbul in mid November.

3.2. The Danubian Front in 1853

Now that the war was declared, the Ottoman side was expected to initiate actual hostilities first, because it was Ottoman territory that was occupied. Thus actual hostilities between Russia and the Ottoman Empire broke out on the mouth of the Danube, near İsakçı on 21 October 1853.³⁰⁵ Ottoman shore batteries opened fire on two Russian steamships with eight barges going to Galatz. However, this was only a small skirmish and the sides were not yet ready for a great confrontation. In some works of the Russian literature, the Ottomans are accused of beginning the war without waiting for the end of their own ultimatum. However, this view is not confirmed by documents.

The Ottoman Rumeli army was commanded by Müşir Ömer Pasha. The conqueror of revolts in Bosnia, Kurdistan and Arabistan, he was at the height of his career and full of energy at the age of 52 in 1853. He spoke several European languages (with some accent) in addition to Turkish and was considered by both the British and

304 BOA. HR. MKT. 68/4, dated 5 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 / 6 December 1853. Also see Lütfi, op. cit., p. 91.

305 General Hikmet Süer gives this date as 23 October 1853. See Süer, *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi. Osmanlı devri. Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi Harekatı (1853-1856)*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1986, p. 193. Captain Fevzi writes “1853 Teşrin-i Evvel’in yirmi birinci ve Muharrem’in yirminci Pazar ertesi günü”, which is contradictory in itself, because 21 October 1853 corresponds to Friday, 18 Muharrem 1270. Likewise 20 Muharrem 1270 corresponds to Sunday, 23 October 1853. See [Kurtoğlu], *Yüzbaşı Fevzi. 1853-1855 Türk-Rus Harbi ve Kırım Seferi*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1927, p. 16.

the French as the most talented officer in the Ottoman army. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Russian military reports sent before the war about his capabilities were not so much laudatory. Marshal Saint-Arnaud, the French Commander-in-Chief, evaluated him as a good general but needing guidance. Saint-Arnaud also commented that the Ottoman army had a high command and soldiers, but “no officers and even fewer NCO’s”.³⁰⁶

Ömer Pasha’s chief of staff and later (from December 1854 on) deputy [*kaimmakam*] was Ferik Çerkez İsmail Pasha (1815?-1861)³⁰⁷ and another chief of staff was Nazır Ahmed Pasha (?-1860).³⁰⁸ It seems that they did not like each other. According to Hüseyin Avni Pasha, who was a staff officer in the Rumeli army during the war, Ömer Pasha saw İsmail Pasha as a rival and tried to undermine him, while Ahmed Pasha did not help İsmail Pasha in the battle of Çatana.³⁰⁹

There were also some Polish and Hungarian refugee officers on the staff of Ömer Pasha, veterans of the Polish uprising of 1831 and the Hungarian uprising of 1849. In November 1853, the Polish émigré Michal Czajkowski, who had converted to Islam and taken the name of Mehmed Sadık Efendi, was promoted to the rank of *mirmiran* and appointed to recruit and command a Cossack (*Kazak* or *Kozak*) regiment from Polish emigrants and the Ignat-Cossacks.³¹⁰ For the Russians, Czajkowski was a “renegade” like any Christian who converted to Islam. About one year later a second regiment was formed under the command of Count Wladislaw Zamoyski, as we have seen in Chapter 2.

The Rumeli army was the best Ottoman army in terms of discipline, training, and quality of officers, arms and provisions. Its supplies of arms and provisions were not

306 David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army*, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 62.

307 According to Mehmed Süreyya’s *Sicill-i Osmani* he was a Circassian slave of İzzet Mehmed Pasha. He became a mirliya in 1838 in Nizip. He was made a vizier in March 1854 after his success at the battle of Çatana. See Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1996, p. 830. Michal Czajkowski calls him Satan İsmail Pasha (“Szajtan Izmail Pasza”), which is rather a doubtful and informal nickname. See Czajkowski, *Moje Wspomnienia o Wojnie 1854 Roku*, Warsaw: Wydawnicstwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1962, p. 44 and the editorial note on p. 292. Veysel Usta gives İsmail Pasha’s birth year as 1805. See Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni, *Manzume-i Sivastopol*, (Hazırlayan Veysel Usta), Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2000, p. 95.

308 Ahmed Pasha was one of the first graduates of the war academy (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*). He became a *ferik* and the superintendent (*nazır*) of the *Mekteb-i Harbiye* in 1848. He was made a vizier in November 1854 and commander of the Ottoman forces in the Crimea in September 1855. See Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., pp. 216-217. Ahmed Pasha was sentenced to death by Fuad Pasha for his involvement in the massacres of Christians in Damascus in 1860. See Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 13-20*, p. 111.

309 See Cevdet Pasha, *ibid.*

310 Abdülmecid’s *irade*, dated 5 Safer 1270 (7 November 1853). BOA. İ. DH. 282/17740.

inferior to that of the Russian army. The number of troops under Ömer Pasha's command was about 145 to 178 thousand.³¹¹ These troops were stationed along the Danube, from Vidin to Varna, mainly in Şumnu, Vidin, Kalafat, Tutrakan, Rusçuk, Zıştovi, Silistria and Varna. The headquarters of Ömer Pasha was in Şumnu with about 40,000 troops.

Field Marshal Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich (1782-1856), the Count of Erivan, Prince of Warsaw, the conqueror of the Persians in 1826-28, of Erzurum in 1828-29, of Warsaw in 1831 and of the Hungarian insurrection in 1849, was at that time commanding three Russian armies in Europe from his headquarters in Warsaw. He still held much prestige and authority in the eyes of Emperor Nikolai I, who called him "father-commander" (*otets-komandir*). Yet Paskevich, at the age of 72, had lost initiative and deep in his heart he opposed the war, though he could not say so openly. According to Tarle, he did not use his influence on the emperor.³¹² His hesitations and contradictions would have a negative impact on the Russian war efforts along the Danube. Afraid of ruining his reputation by an unlucky defeat, he behaved with too much caution, although he did not think that the Ottoman army could fight well against the Russian army. In his report to Nikolai, dated 23 September 1853, he wrote that

As is known, the Turks are strong in fortresses, but they cannot hold out against our troops on the field. It is necessary to manoeuvre in such a way as to lure them out of their fortresses and smash them... I do not share the idea that the Turks could dream of causing us great damage from the Asian side. The Turkish cavalry, the Kurds, have always been beaten by our Muslims and line troops... As regards their regular troops, they are not frightening in Europe and even less in Asia.³¹³ [My translation]

However, on 6 October 1853, Paskevich recommended to Nikolai a defensive position without crossing the Danube.³¹⁴ Then, in contradiction to this defensive position, he added that they had a powerful weapon against the Ottoman Empire in their influence on the Ottoman Christians. Therefore Russia could take advantage of a Christian revolt against the "Mussulman yoke". Paskevich, knowing well Nikolai's dislike of any revolutionary movements against any "legitimate" monarch, added that

311 There are different numbers for the strength of the Rumeli army. While Tarle gives 145 thousand troops excluding the *başibozuk*, (op. cit., vol. I, p. 264), Captain Fevzi (Kurtoğlu) gives 178 thousand with 12 thousand *başibozuk* troops and thus 166 thousand without the *başibozuk*. See Yüzbaşı Fevzi Kurtoğlu, op. cit., p. 8.

312 Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 255.

313 Paskevich to Nikolai, 11 (23) September 1853, Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., (1912), vol. 2, Prilozhenie 40, pp. 105-107.

314 "Vsepoddanneyshaya zapiska knyazya Paskevicha", Warsaw, 24 September [6 October] 1853, *Russkaya Starina*, August 1876, pp. 698-702. Also see Tarle, *ibid*, p. 262-263.

this was not a “revolutionary” call to insubordination to a sovereign, but a rightful cause, because Russia could not remain indifferent to the suffering of orthodox Christians under the Ottoman rule. Thus, while the Russian armies would remain behind the Danube, the Ottoman Christians’ revolt against the Sultan was expected to happen somehow under the obvious hostility of Austria to such revolts. Did Paskevich really believe what he recommended to Nikolai? It seems doubtful. Paskevich might have simply wanted to please Nikolai I, who until then was not inclined towards Slavophiles at all, but now thought that the Slavs could be of use. Paskevich also did not want to move his second army corps in Poland neither to the Danube nor later to the Crimea, referring to the danger of Austria’s intervention. One month later, Paskevich developed his cautious attitude further and recommended to stay in defense in “Europe” and not to anger great powers. He argued that even if they were to take Edirne, the great powers would interfere and not let them to benefit from their conquests. The Russians would suffer many losses from diseases and not gain much even if they hold victory. According to him, time was on the side of Russia. It was necessary to wait. Thus he recommended a defensive position on the Danube, but an offensive one in the Caucasus. He argued that with 16 battalions now in the Russian Caucasus army, it was possible to act offensively, because there the great powers could not interfere and the Russian army could easily beat the Ottoman army when it was alone.³¹⁵

The Russian occupation army in the Danubian principalities numbered about 88,000 in October 1853. The headquarters of this army was in Bucharest. The Commander-in-Chief General Prince (Knyaz) Mihail Dmitrievich Gorchakov, having served twenty two years as Paskevich’s chief of staff in Warsaw, was used to receiving orders and was not noted for resolution and initiative. According to Tarle, from Gorchakov’s army only a small portion of about 10,000 men under the command of General Count Anrep was given the vanguard position to guard against the Ottoman forces until February 1854.³¹⁶

Taking the events of the 1828-29 Russo-Ottoman War into consideration, Ömer Pasha had concentrated a considerable force around Vidin, the westernmost fortress on the Danube. The importance of Vidin also came from its closeness to Serbia. However, Russia did not intend to arouse the suspicions of Austria by being too close to the Serbians. Therefore the Russians did not concentrate their troops there.

315 Paskevich to Nikolai, dated 24 September (6 November) 1853, Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., (1912), vol. 2, Prilozhenie 41, pp. 108-111.

316 Tarle, *ibid*, p. 274.

On 28 October, Ferik İsmail Pasha's forces crossed the Danube from Vidin and occupied the small town of Kalafat with a force of 12,000. The small Russian force in Kalafat retreated. On 30 October Ömer Pasha himself came to Tutrakan (Turtukai), in the middle of the Danube front. An Ottoman infantry battalion with six guns under the command of Kaimmakam Hüseyin Bey crossed the Danube on 2 November and occupied the quarantine house of Wallachia (*Eflak Karantinahanesi*) at the village of Oltenitsa (or Oltenitza, in Turkish Oltaniçe). These forces were reinforced by another battalion next day and they built some earthworks there.³¹⁷

On the Russian side, the characteristic indetermination had passed from Gorchakov to his generals commanding various positions on the Danube. Thus General Pyotr Dannenberg, commanding the forces in Little Wallachia, had given orders to his forces to the effect that if the "Turks" crossed the Danube, they should not be engaged in battle with them but should definitely not let them go farther. General Pavlov at Oltenitsa, on the left hand (north) side of the Danube was at a loss trying to understand this order. How would he not engage in war and at the same time not to let them pass? When the Ottomans started crossing the Danube at the beginning of November, Dannenberg at first did not believe that it was a serious affair but soon he was proven wrong.³¹⁸

On 4 November 1853 (3 *Safer* 1270)³¹⁹ Russian forces commanded by General Pavlov attacked the fortified Ottoman positions in Oltenitsa. The Russian forces were met with a powerful cannonade from the Ottoman positions. Russian and Ottoman sources give different numbers for the strength of both sides, each side arguing that the enemy troops were more numerous. Ömer Pasha's report after the battle and the official chronicler Lütfi Efendi maintain that a few Ottoman battalions fought against 20 infantry battalions and 4 cavalry regiments. Ömer Pasha's report states that at the quarantine house the Ottoman forces consisted of 3 companies of infantry, 2 companies of rifles or chasseurs (*şeşhaneci*), 150 cavalry men and 6 guns, while the Russians attacked with 20 battalions of infantry, 4 battalions of cavalry and 32 guns.³²⁰ On the

317 See Ömer Pasha's report in Lütfi, op. cit., p. 205. Also see Yüzbaşı Fevzi Kurtoğlu, op. cit., p. 17. Kurtoğlu gives the date as 1 November.

318 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 280.

319 According to the TV and Ömer Pasha, the battle took place on Friday, 3 *Safer* 1270, which, however, corresponds to Saturday, 5 November 1853. Either the authors or the calendar of TTK must be wrong. See TV, 14 *Safer* 1270 (16 November 1853), transliterated by Hakkı Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 13. For Ömer Pasha's report on the battle see Lütfi, op. cit., pp. 205-207. Kurtoğlu gives the date as 17 November. See Kurtoğlu, *ibid*.

320 See Lütfi, op. cit., p. 206. I could not find Ömer Pasha's report after the battle in the BOA, but I found the draft of the *tezkiye-i samiye* of the grand vizier, which refers to it and confirms the above

other hand, Russian generals Petrov and Kovalevskiy, participants of the Danubian campaign and the Soviet historian Tarle argue that only one Russian brigade (2 infantry regiments consisting of 4 battalions each and 9 cavalry squadrons) attacked the Ottoman forces, which in turn amounted to 8,000 men with 20 cannons.³²¹

In any case, on that day the Ottomans held their first serious victory on the Danube. The Russian force retreated. E. H. Nolan stated that the Cossacks “suffered considerably from the rifle carbine of the Turks, a weapon superior to any which their assailants used”.³²² However, the Ottoman army did not follow the enemy. Ömer Pasha was content with having won the battle. According to Ömer Pasha, Russian losses were more than 2,000, while the Ottomans lost 30 dead and 150 wounded.³²³ Ömer Pasha had remained in Tutrakan during the battle, together with some foreign officers including the Spanish General Prim.

According to General Yegor Petrovich Kovalevskiy (1809-1868), Russian losses amounted to 236 dead and 734 wounded.³²⁴ Russian sources in general argue that the defeat was due to the untimely or unnecessary order of retreat given by General Dannenberg to General Pavlov. However, General Gorchakov endorsed the decision of Dannenberg, for which he is also criticised.³²⁵ Although this battle was not an important battle from a military technical point of view, the European press exaggerated it as a great “Turkish” success. However small a battle it might be, Russian pride was certainly damaged and Ottoman confidence increased.

numbers. See BOA. A. AMD. 50/5, dated 9 Safer 1270 (11 November 1853). As for the Ottoman forces, Lütfi mentions a few battalions with some guns and adds that during the battle another Ottoman battalion was sent from Tutrakan. See Lütfi, op. cit., p. 89-90.

321 See Eg. Kowalewski. *Der Krieg Russlands mit der Türkei in den Jahren 1853 und 1854 und der Bruch mit den Westmächten*. Leipzig: Verlag von Bernard Schlicke, 1869, p. 74-79. This is the German translation of the original book in Russian. Tarle, op. cit., p. 281.

322 E. H. Nolan, *The Illustrated History of the War against Russia*, London, 1857, vol. I, p. 30, quoted by James Reid, op. cit., p. 244.

323 Lütfi, however, writes that the Russians lost about 1,000 dead and twice as much wounded, while the Ottomans (*İslamiyan*) lost 18 dead (*şehid*) and 83 wounded. Nevertheless, right after this Lütfi writes that this battle is called the battle of Çatana (Cetate). He probably mixes the battle of Oltenitsa with the battle of Cetate.

324 Kowalewski, op. cit., p. 79. Kowalewski is simply the German version of Kovalevskiy.

325 See General Andrey Nikolayevich Petrov. *Voina Rossii s Turtsiyei. Dunayskaya kampaniya 1853 i 1854 gg.* St. Petersburg, 1890, vol. I, pp. 142-144. Also see Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 283-284.

3.3. The Battle of Sinop and European Public Opinion

The event that started the war in earnest and turned the Russo-Ottoman war into a European one was the naval battle of Sinop on 30 November 1853. The battles on the Danube front until then were but skirmishes in comparison to it.

The Ottoman navy had never recovered its strength after its crushing defeat at the battle of Navarin on 20 October 1827. Not only the fleet but also a whole generation of best mariners was lost in that battle, when the combined fleet of Britain, France and Russia had destroyed the combined Ottoman and Egyptian fleet during the Greek war of independence. Mahmud II had appointed as *Kapudan-ı Derya* or the Kapudan Pasha (marine minister and grand admiral) in 1829 a certain Pabuççu Ahmed Pasha (?-1830), who was a shipyard sergeant (*tersane çavuşu*) during the revolt of the janissaries in 1826. From then until 1853 little progress had been achieved.³²⁶

In April 1851, Adolphus Slade reported to Lord Stratford on the condition of the Ottoman navy.³²⁷ According to Slade, the navy consisted of about 15,000 men and 68 vessels in more or less good conditions. The naval hospital was in good order. The biggest problem was the poverty of the naval chest. The budget of the navy was £400,000, while only the cost of coal for a year was £55,000. The navy was in debt like all the institutions of the Porte. It can be safely assumed that from 1851 to 1853 there did not occur any substantial improvement, because the financial crisis of the Porte was not solved (See Chapter 4).

Therefore in 1853, the Ottoman navy, although probably the fourth or fifth naval power in the world, was not a match for the Russian Black Sea fleet in terms of training and firepower.³²⁸ Most of the Ottoman sailors (the rank and file) were untrained novices. Since September 1852 Kapudan Pasha was Mahmud Pasha, who had no naval training or education. He was a protégé of Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha, who was promoted to the office of the grand vizier from the admiralty. The officers of the navy, like those of the army, were divided into the educated and the uneducated, with the

326 Besbelli, op. cit., pp. 18-25. Süer, op. cit., p. 40.

327 Bernard Lewis, "Slade on the Turkish Navy", *Journal of Turkish Studies / Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları* 11, Harvard University, 1987, pp. 6-7, also cited by Besim Özcan, *Rus Donanmasının Sinop Baskını (30 Kasım 1853)*, unpublished PhD thesis, Atatürk University 1990, p. 66.

328 For a recent comparison between Russian and Ottoman naval forces in 1853, based on the works of Kurtoğlu, Gürel, Besbelli, Slade and Özcan, see Ali Fuat Örenç, "Kırım Harbi Deniz Savaşları", in *Savaşın Barışa*, 2007, pp. 23-27. Örenç, however, has mistransliterated most of the names of the Russian ships and repeated some mistakes of Kurtoğlu, such as mistaking horse power for number of guns on board for some Russian war ships.

latter in higher positions. Both groups had their deficiencies in theory and practice. The system of promotion like everywhere else was not professional. The uniforms of the sailors had been changed but the mentalities required more time.³²⁹

After the declaration of war by the Porte on 4 October 1853, some necessary defensive measures were taken by the naval authorities as well. Russian commercial ships were not to be arrested but requested to quit Ottoman waters within 15 days or more in some specific cases. Orders were also given that commercial ships were not to be allowed to lay anchor near Ottoman men-of-war for fear of fire, explosion or sabotage.³³⁰ Indeed this measure should already have been taken immediately after the suspension of relations with Russia, because, as Slade points out, any commercial ship (i.e., a Greek ship) could transform itself into a fire-ship and then anchor among the wooden ships of the Ottoman fleet at Büyükdere. However, the Ottoman captains were helpless against foreign commercial ships, because the Ottoman captains were unable to apply the right of keeping clear water round them, exercised by all other navies, for fear of the representations of consulates and embassies. Even the allies did not respect this right of the Ottoman navy. Thus Slade observed that “notwithstanding repeated representations the co-operation of the European legations could not be obtained to make their respective merchant vessels anchor clear of the lines of the Turkish fleet”.³³¹

Meanwhile the French and British fleets had anchored at Beykoz on 23 October. The French fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Ferdinand Alphonse Hamelin consisted of three line-of-battle ships, seven two-deckers (*kapak*), three brigs and three steamers. The British fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Dundas included two line-of-battle ships, four two-deckers, one frigate and ten steamers.³³² Their combined power was more than necessary to keep the Russian navy at bay. Thus their presence in the Bosphorus gave the Porte much confidence that the Russian fleet would not dare leave its port into the Black Sea. Furthermore the Egyptian fleet consisting of two galleons, three frigates, one corvette, one brig and two steamers under Patrona Halil Pasha had also joined the Ottoman fleet.³³³ Egypt’s total contribution of troops during the war reached 23,931 men towards the end of 1855.³³⁴ Nevertheless, the troops were mainly

329 Slade, op. cit., p. 129.

330 Özcan, op. cit., pp. 49-52.

331 Rear-Admiral Sir Adolphus Slade, op. cit., (1867), p. 96.

332 Saim Besbelli, op. cit., p. 35.

333 Ibid.

334 Report of the Ottoman finance ministry to the loan control commission, *Le Moniteur Universelle*, Paris, 8 January 1856. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1355/3.

selected from among volunteers and veterans who had fought in the Greek war of independence and in the army of Ibrahim Pasha against the Porte in the 1830's.³³⁵

The Ottoman fleet was divided into four squadrons. The commander of the fleet *Bahriye Feriki* (Vice-Admiral) Kayserili Ahmed Pasha (1796-1878) was commanding the patrolling (*karakol*) ships charged with protecting the merchant ships of the Ottoman Empire, as well as allied and neutral ships. The Egyptian Mirliva Hasan Pasha's squadron was to carry troops to Varna and to patrol the shores of Rumelia. The Egyptian squadron landed the Egyptian troops in Varna and returned to Istanbul on 13 November 1853. A third group, composed of four paddle steamers (*Saik-i Şadi*, *Feyz-i Bari*, *Taif* and *Ereğli*)³³⁶ under the command of Ferik İngiliz³³⁷ Mustafa Pasha was tasked with patrolling the north-eastern coasts of Anatolia and those of Georgia and Çerkezistan (Circassia). He was bound to call on the harbours of Trabzon, Batum, Çürüksu, Sohum and Soğucak (Novorossiysk), gathering information, landing ammunition for the Circassian insurgents against Russia and communicating with Hassa Müşiri Haseki Selim Mehmed Pasha (?-1872), the commander of the Ottoman army in Batum. Mustafa Pasha's flotilla had on board Çerkes İsmail Bey, who carried letters to the emissary (*naib*) of Sheikh Shamil in Circassia.³³⁸

Sheikh Shamil (1797-1871), the Muslim leader of North Caucasus, had been waging a war of independence against the Russians in Chechnya and Dagestan since 1834. His *naib* in Circassia, Muhammed Emin was also active among the *Çerakise* (Circassians) trying to organize their resistance to the Russian army. Nevertheless, this was not an easy task, neither for Shamil nor for the Porte and its allies, as we shall see later.

The fourth group of ships was sent to cruise the shores of north-western Anatolia from Amasra to Sinop under Patrona (Vice-Admiral) Osman Pasha (1798-1860) and Riyale (or *Mirliva*, Rear-Admiral) Hüseyin Pasha on 5 November. In case of coming across Russian ships, their instruction was to engage in battle only if they were certain

335 Süleyman Kızıltoprak, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

336 BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 7, not dated, end of December 1853 or beginning of January 1854, cited by Özcan, op. cit., p. 90. To the four steamers in this squadron, Özcan adds the steamer *Mecidiye* and the frigate *Muhbir-i Sürur*. See Özcan, op. cit., p. 81. However, Mustafa Pasha does not mention these two ships in his own statement referred to above. Besbelli also includes the frigate *Muhbir-i Sürur*. See Besbelli, op. cit., Kuruluş 5, p. 44ff.

337 Because he had been to England and knew English.

338 Özcan, op. cit., p. 82. Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha to the grand vizier before his dismissal on 17 December 1853. BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 4, written between 4 and 17 December 1853. See Appendix 23. Özcan mentions this document elsewhere but he does not quote from it.

of winning (*kazanacağını aklınız kestiği ve gözünüze kestirdiğiniz halde*).³³⁹ However, this order seems at some variance with the order given to Slade, where he was instructed to abstain from firing first. These differences stemmed from the contradictory orders of the Porte, hesitating to engage fully in war, yet having declared it, unable to prevent being drifted into it. However, the Porte was also under the influence of the French and British embassies and the admirals, as far as naval affairs were concerned. The Porte also asked the French and the British embassies to bring the rest of their fleets from the Dardanelles to the Bosphorus.

At this time a Russian squadron of three line-of-battle ships, two frigates and a steamer was reported to be cruising the north western coasts of Anatolia, 120 miles away from Istanbul.³⁴⁰ Having heard this news, Mahmud Pasha gave orders to reinforce the light squadron of Osman Pasha, consisting of frigates and corvettes, with another frigate from the fleet at Büyükdere. Slade, alias the Mirliva Mushaver Pasha, reminded him of the superiority of the Russians in nominal force and the dangers of sending a squadron of unequal strength against the enemy. Mahmud Pasha said he could not discuss orders with the Porte but promised to send the second squadron intended to winter at Sinop to be made up of line-of-battle ships and frigates instead of frigates and corvettes. The Kapudan Pasha also gave a written order to abstain from firing first in case of meeting the enemy. “Are we not at war?” asked Mushaver Pasha. “We are, but such is the Porte’s order” replied the Ottoman grand admiral. When Mushaver Pasha excused himself on the grounds that the first broadside fire from a ship in position might be decisive, Mahmud Pasha was indifferent: “I have given you the order and that suffices me”.³⁴¹

The Porte decided to send line-of-battle ships to the Black Sea, but when the ships were ready to sail, the order was cancelled. The grand admiral said it was the desire of the British ambassador. It was indeed the desire of the British and French ambassadors, both of whom sent their dragomans to the Porte on 4 November, warning the Porte of the danger of sending the fleet into the Black Sea in the face of the superior Russian fleet, until their fleets fully gather in the Bosphorus and even after that. The French ambassador, in his written instructions to his dragoman, stated to Reşid Pasha his readiness to bring the rest of the French fleet to the Bosphorus. But the ambassador also

339 Kapudan Pasha’s instructions to Patrona Osman Pasha and Mirliva Hüseyin Pasha, dated 15 Safer 1270 (17 November 1853). BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 6. See Appendix 28. Cf. Özcan, op. cit, p. 74-75, 85.

340 A line-of-battle ship is a two or three-deck ship with minimum 70 guns.

341 Slade, *ibid*, p. 132.

expressed his surprise at the decision of the Porte to send the Ottoman fleet to the Black Sea. He wrote that this measure seemed untimely to him, because he expected the Kapudan Pasha to concert his activities with the admirals of the allied fleets, before taking action.³⁴²

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the same day, also expressed his readiness to bring the rest of the British fleet to the Bosphorus, as it was decided together with Mr de la Cour. He wrote that they were impressed by the “*courage et de l’esprit de patriotisme*” manifested by the Ottoman ministers by sending their fleet into the Black Sea, except for the three-deckers. However, he observed that the opinions of both the French and British experts were against this enterprise because of the advanced season and the big danger coming from the great Russian force in Sevastopol. It would be imprudent to risk such a big part of the Ottoman fleet and a failure at this moment would cause a lot of problems for the Porte. He argued that in any case it would be “*une folie*” to send the Ottoman fleet before the allied fleets arrived in full in the Bosphorus. He further commented that according to the opinion of the allied admirals, even after the arrival of the allied fleets, three or four big steamships should be sent instead of sail ships of the line. He concluded that if the Porte decided to send sail or steam ships to the Black Sea, it should wait until the appearance of the full moon that would diminish the danger of navigation in the Black Sea in November.³⁴³

On 5 November, the date of departure of the light squadron of Osman Pasha and Hüseyin Pasha, the French ambassador sent another warning to the Porte of the serious disadvantages of sending the fleet and advised the Porte to defer it.³⁴⁴ On the same day Lord Stratford de Redcliffe wrote to Lord Clarendon that he had “succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line-of-battle ships and frigates into the Black Sea at this moment”.³⁴⁵

Some time later, when the parliamentary papers (the Blue Books) were published,

342 Instructions of the French ambassador Edmond de la Cour to head dragoman Schefer, 4 November 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 17 (translation into Ottoman Turkish in lef 16). See Appendices 10 and 11.

343 Stratford de Redcliffe’s instructions to head dragoman Etienne Pisani, 4 November 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 15. See lef 14 for the official translation into Ottoman Turkish. This translation, however, has rendered the expression of “sail ships of the line” (in the original “*vaisseaux de ligne a voile*”) into “*birtakım bayağı kapaklar*”, which means “certain ordinary two-deckers”. It seems that either the concept of the line-of-battle ship was not used by the Ottomans at that time or simply the translator was unaware of it. See Appendices 12-13.

344 Edmond de la Cour to head dragoman Schefer, 5 November 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 19. See Appendix 14.

345 From Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Therapia, Nov. 5, 1853, quoted by Slade, op. cit., p. 136.

Slade asked the ambassador why he had prevented sending line-of-battle ships to Sinop. Stratford replied that he had depended on the advice of Admiral Hamelin of the French fleet and Admiral Dundas of the British fleet. Slade further asked why he had relied on the opinion of men unacquainted with the local conditions; he said that their rank and position given by their governments left him no choice. Lord Clarendon from London on 21 November also approved the decision of Admiral Dundas and his Excellency the ambassador, adding that the Porte would do better by relying on the authority of the British and French admirals.

Stratford de Redcliffe's motives are open to a double interpretation. Those who believe that he wanted to accelerate the war suggest that he deliberately left the Ottoman squadron to destruction in order to involve Britain in the war against Russia. Those who are of the opinion that he had most peaceful intentions can argue that he wanted to prevent a possible collision between the Ottoman and Russian fleets. As an alternative to these views, we can argue that he simply followed the advice of the admirals, without a hidden agenda. But in any case it is difficult to understand the logic of not sending line-of-battle ships here: If there was danger from the Russian fleet, then would it not be bigger for a light fleet consisting of only frigates and corvettes than for a fleet consisting of line-of-battle ships and frigates? Was it not logical to advise either not sending any ships at all or sending a strong squadron? Did Stratford and the admirals think that since the Porte was so determined and destruction was so imminent, then at least line-of-battle ships should be saved? It is hard to come up with an answer.

That the prevention of line-of-battle ships being sent to the Black Sea was the desire of the allied admirals is also confirmed by Mahmud Pasha in his evidence at his trial after the disaster of Sinop and his dismissal from his post.³⁴⁶

In mid-November, Bahriye Feriki Mustafa Pasha with his flotilla returned from Batum and saw the position of Patrona Osman Pasha and Riyale Hüseyin Pasha's flotilla at Sinop, which is closer to Sevastopol than to Istanbul. The Ottoman squadron in Sinop consisted of seven frigates (*Avnillah* (flagship, 50 guns), *Nizamiye* (second flag, commanded by Riyale (Mirliva) Hüseyin Pasha, 64 guns), *Nesim-i Zafer* (48 guns), *Fazlullah* (the former Russian frigate *Rafail*, captured in 1829, 48 guns), *Navek-i Bahri* (42 guns), *Dimyat* (42 guns) and *Kaid-i Zafer* (22 guns), three corvettes (*Necm-i Efşan*, *Fevz-i Mâbud* and *Gül-i Sefid*, 22 guns each) and two transports.³⁴⁷ They had encountered gales and lost each other. Then they had hardly reached the Sinop harbour.

346 BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 4, written between 4 and 18 December 1853.

347 Fevzi Kurtoğlu, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

Mustafa Pasha also saw the danger of this flotilla's being exposed to a Russian attack, but he did not take any measures to prevent it. He left the two steamers the *Taif* and the *Ereğli* at Sinop and on 24 November came to Istanbul, where he reported the vulnerable position of the squadron and the insufficiency of the shore batteries of Sinop. Adolphus Slade interprets his conduct as a result of caution and fear of reprobation from the authorities and enemies or rivals in Istanbul in case the Russians did not attack. It is true that every pasha had enemies in Istanbul, ready to insinuate against him at the first opportunity. While many of the Ottoman pashas in general at that time had more cunning than merit, it was also true that working under a weak government open to all kinds of influence was not an easy task either. This uncertainty prevented them from taking any initiatives.

On the Russian side, Prince Menshikov was still the Marine Minister and now also the Commander-in-Chief of all the land and naval forces in the Crimea. At the beginning of the war, the Russian Black Sea fleet was divided into two squadrons or divisions, commanded by two talented and prominent admirals, Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Vladimir Alekseyevich Kornilov (1806-1854) and Vice-Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nahimov (1802-1855), both of them pupils of Admiral Lazarev (1788-1851). Nahimov cruised the eastern part of the Black Sea from Sinop to Sohum and Kornilov cruised the western part of it. Nahimov's first duty was to transport the Russian 13th division (16,393 persons, 824 horses and their load) from Sevastopol to Fort Anakra,³⁴⁸ which he completed successfully in September 1853.³⁴⁹

Kornilov for his part came as close as the northern mouth of the Bosphorus at the beginning of November. Menshikov had given him instructions to engage in battle with any Ottoman warships. Kornilov cruised the western coasts of the Black Sea from Balchik, Varna, and Sizopol to Burgaz and he did not meet Ottoman battle ships. Finally he sent back most of his squadron to Sevastopol and himself remained on the steam frigate *Vladimir*. At that time the Ottoman-Egyptian steamer *Pervaz-ı Bahri* was sent to Ereğli for coal. On its way it fell in with the *Vladimir* on 17 November 1853. In the battle that followed, the *Vladimir* captured the *Pervaz-ı Bahri*, which lost 22 dead including the Egyptian captain Said Pasha and 18 wounded men and officers. The Russians lost two dead and two wounded, however, one of the dead was Lieutenant

348 Fort Anakra (Anakria, Anaklia) lies at the mouth of the river Ingur, on the border between Georgia and Abkhazia. See <http://www.fallingrain.com/world/GG/0/Anaklia.html>. (Retrieved in January 2007).

349 Yevgeny Viktorovich Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 294 and p. 371.

Zheleznov, Kornilov's aide-de-camp.³⁵⁰ The Russians returned to Sevastopol with their booty, which was renamed *Kornilov*. This small battle can be considered as the first battle in history between steamships.

From 23 November onwards Osman Pasha knew that a Russian squadron of three line-of-battle ships (three deckers), two brigs and one steamer was nearby. However, he did not choose to accept battle in the sea and remained instead in port. According to the report of Yahya Bey, the captain of the *Taif*, submitted after it escaped the enemy and came to Istanbul, the Patrona Pasha gave the following instructions to all the captains:

The enemy's ships are at sea and we cannot cope with them. If we put out to sea we will be lost; the best thing is to fight them, if they come, so long as we have a gun left. If there be any danger of their capturing you, slip your cable, run your ships on shore and let fire to them.³⁵¹

Osman Pasha could fight this not powerful squadron or at least made a running fight towards Istanbul. However, he only sent an alarming report on 24 November to Istanbul asking for immediate help. Meanwhile Admiral Nahimov sent for reinforcement from Sevastopol. Prince Menshikov sent from Sevastopol another squadron of three galleons and two frigates under the command of Rear-Admiral Fyodor Mihailovich Novosilskiy. Reşid Pasha in Istanbul informed the British and French embassies on 29 and 30 November, just before and on the day of the fateful battle, that a Russian squadron was cruising the waters of Sinop, Amasra and Bartın.³⁵² The ambassadors consulted their respective admirals in the Bosphorus and decided that it would not be recommendable to send their fleets into the Black Sea. In any case, they did not hurry for an answer. The Ottoman Admiralty had also sent some warnings to Osman Pasha just prior to the fateful battle. We shall see these letters after the battle, during the case against Mahmud Pasha.

On 27 November the squadron of Novosilskiy joined Nahimov's squadron. Now Nahimov's power was more than necessary to destroy the Ottoman squadron, which

350 Plavanie eskadry chernomorskago flota i podrobnosti o vzyatii parohoda "Pervas-Bakhri" (Iz doneseniya General-Adyutanta Kornilova), V. Timm, *Russkiy Khudozhestvenny Listok*, no. 3, 20 January (1 February) 1854. In an anonymous report written in Rumanian from Bucharest, dated 16 (28) November 1853, it is stated that Menshikov had reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the (Russian) imperial troops (Gorchakov?) that the *Vladimir* had returned to Sevastopol on 7 (19) November with two ships. One of them was a passenger ship loaded with iron, the other was the Egyptian 10-gun steamer *Pervaz-ı Bahri*, which was taken only after a "strong resistance". The report must be the work of Ottoman spies in Bucharest. See BOA. A. AMD. 51/1. I am indebted to Alexandru Balas for the translation of this document from Romanian.

351 "Deposition of the Captain & Officers of the Turkish Steamer "Tayf" [sic], concerning the action at Sinope on Wednesday the 30 November, Constantinople, Dec. 6. 1853. Translation". TNA. FO 195/309. See Appendix 17.

352 Official note of the Porte to the British and French embassies. BOA. HR. SYS. 1189/54, dated 28 Safer 1270 (30 November 1853). See Appendix 15.

was still lying at the bay of Sinop. In the morning of 30 November Nahimov gave the order of attack to his squadron consisting now of six battleships: *Imperatritsa Mariya* (flag ship, 84 guns), *Parizh*, (2nd flag, 120) *Tri Svyatitelya* (120), *Velikiy Knyaz Konstantin* (120), *Rostislav* (84), *Chesma* (84), two frigates *Kagul* and *Kulevchi* and three steamers (*Odessa*, *Krym* and *Khersones*). These ships had definitely more guns with bigger calibres than those which the Ottoman ships had.³⁵³ The Ottoman guns fired shots of maximum 24 pounds, while the Russians had 68-pounders. Furthermore the Russian ships had 38 Paixhans guns that used explosive shells.³⁵⁴ These shells penetrated deep inside the wooden planking of the Ottoman ships, exploding and igniting the hulls. Although Paixhans guns had been used before, hitherto they were clumsy and dangerous to use on board ships. The Russian navy had developed an advanced design with a far greater explosive capacity and destructive force than before, sinking almost all the ships in the bay of Sinop. Cannon fire had rarely sunk ships before, but now the results of the explosive shells surprised the entire world.

Although the Ottoman forces could make use of the shore batteries as well, the Ottoman squadron's position did not allow a full use of them because some of the batteries were covered by the squadron. In any case these batteries were of small calibre, firing shots of 14 to 19 pounds.³⁵⁵ It is also not clear why Osman Pasha did not use the guns on the other board of his ships as shore batteries. Zayonchkovskiy also argues that the Ottoman squadron could have shown better resistance if it had lied not along the city but to the south. Taking into consideration that Osman Pasha was an experienced sailor and a good admiral, Zayonchkovskiy can find no explanation for his incautiousness other than senility or the British hypnosis that the Russians could not attack fortified positions.³⁵⁶

Osman Pasha's squadron was lying in crescent form at the bay. The Russian

353 The exact number of guns of the two sides is difficult to establish. Zayonchkovskiy gives 344 to 237 guns on one board for Russian and Ottoman ships respectively (plus 26 Ottoman shore batteries), Tarle gives 358 to 236 (Saab quotes from him), Besbelli gives 327 to 199 guns, Özcan gives 337 to 196. Slade gives only the number of Ottoman guns as 215 on one board. In any case, if we consider the calibre of the guns as well, Russian firepower was three times bigger. Prof. Winfried Baumgart writes that the "Turks" had more guns (about 500 as against 359 guns) because there were a number of batteries on the shore, without however, reference to any source. See Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War, 1853-1856*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 97.

354 Lawrence Sondhaus, *Naval Warfare, 1815-1914*, London & NY: Routledge, 2001, p. 58. Sondhaus describes Ottoman guns at maximum 32 pounds. Besbelli and Özcan give 24 pounds. Cf. Besbelli, op. cit., p. 44, Özcan, op. cit., p. 110.

355 Besbelli, *ibid.*

356 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., p. 275. Osman Pasha, like Nahimov, had participated in the battle of Navarin of 1827. He had served 21 years in the Egyptian navy and the last ten years in the Ottoman navy.

squadron entered the bay in two columns and demanded the surrender of the Ottoman squadron. Osman Pasha did not surrender but also vacillated about firing first. The Russian ships anchored at some 900 meters from the Ottoman squadron. The signal of *Navek-i Bahri* for leave to fire was disregarded. Then the *Nizamiye* first opened fire and others followed it.³⁵⁷ There began a devastating combat or rather cannonade between unequal forces. At first the Ottoman guns inflicted severe damage on the Russian ships during their manoeuvring. However soon the Russian ships took position and after a while started to make good hits. Then the effects of the explosive shells from 68 pound guns showed themselves. The Ottoman ships were burnt and blown up in a few hours (estimations range from one to six hours).

Adolphus Slade, the Mushaver Pasha was on board the *Taif*. At the approach of the Russian ships, he took advantage of the high speed of this steamship and fled the battle scene. Nahimov had already ordered the *Kagul* and the *Kulevchi* to look after the *Taif*, but they could not take it over. The *Taif* made some shots and then turned towards Gerze to the east, then returned to the direction of Istanbul.

At this time Admiral Kornilov arrived with his reinforcement and seeing the escape of the *Taif*, he tried to capture it, but the *Taif* managed to get through thanks to its higher speed. Kornilov was late; Nahimov had already devastated the whole squadron except the *Taif*. However, Nahimov did not cease fire even after all the ships were burning. The Muslim quarters of the city were also set ablaze and since the governor and the Muslim population had run away, there was no one to extinguish the fires. For this conduct Nahimov was later criticised for hitting civilian targets and he defended himself that it was because of the Ottoman fleet's position. After the bombardment stopped, Nahimov sent an envoy to the city but the envoy found no authorities or consuls. The only resident consul, the Austrian consul, had also fled. The envoy gave to the consulate Nahimov's explanations that he did not intend to harm the city but had come to destroy the Ottoman squadron which carried ammunition to Circassian insurgents.

According to Slade, Ottoman losses were about 2,700 dead out of the 4,200 personnel of the squadron. However, this figure seems a bit exaggerated for the capacity of the eleven ships that were present. According to the written statement of naval commander (Miralay) Mehmed Bey, who was a secretary of the commander at that

357 Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni confirms that the first fire was from Hüseyin Pasha's frigate. "*Dedi Osman Paşa biraz duralım, Bakalım ne eder düşmen görelim. Şu denli geldi düşmen gördüler kim, Bunlara doğru bindirmek diler kim. Hüseyin Paşa dedi iş oldu gayrı, Bizi cümle esir etmek diler bu. Görünce bunu hep verdi kumanda, Cemî' ateş ettiler ser-â-pâ*". See Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 77.

time, given in a report in 1891 to the chronicler Lütü Efendi, the number of naval personnel in Sinop was 2,989 men and the dead included Bozcaadalı Riyale Hüseyin Pasha, together with 56 officers and more than 1,000 men, while Patrona Osman Pasha together with 4 officers and some men was taken prisoner.³⁵⁸ Out of this number (2,989), only 958 men and officers turned up in Istanbul after the battle.³⁵⁹ More sailors from the Egyptian frigates had survived, probably because they swam well, while those sailors recruited from Anatolia did not.³⁶⁰

According to the report of Patrona Osman Pasha, whom the Russians returned to the Porte towards October 1855 together with four other Ottoman officers from his squadron, 156 Ottoman prisoners of war (sailors) were still kept in a place near Sevastopol.³⁶¹ If we add this number to the number above, then we get 1,114 survivors or rather those survivors who turned up, without counting the deserters. Thus the total number of Ottoman losses becomes 1,875. Patrona Osman Pasha was wounded in foot and taken prisoner. Riyale Bozcaadalı Hüseyin Pasha was among the dead. Ali Bey, the commander of *Navek-i Bahri* had blasted his frigate together with himself. Apart from Osman Pasha, the commanders of two frigates, Miralay Ali Mahir Bey (1820-?), commander of the frigate *Fazlullah* and Kaimmakam Ethem Bey, commander of the frigate *Feyz-i Bari*, the commander of one of the three corvettes, Binbaşı Yalovalı Hasan Bey (1814-?) and Mülazım Halil Efendi, together with at least 156 sailors (as explained above) were taken prisoners.³⁶² The Russians lost one officer and 33 to 36

358 Miralay Mehmed Bey's *varaka*, dated 31 Temmuz 1307 (12 August 1891). Lütü, op. cit., p. 210.

359 BOA. İ. DH. 18095, dated 23 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (23 January 1854), quoted by Özcan, op. cit., p. 126. Özcan gives the number of Ottoman prisoners as 125. Zayonchkovskiy (op. cit., p. 287) gives the number of Ottoman prisoners of war as more than 200 and the Russian loss as one officer and 36 sailors. Tarle (op. cit., p. 379) argues that the "Turks" considered that about 3,000 were dead. Slade (op. cit., p. 144, 148) gives the Ottoman dead at 2700, with five officers and about 150 men prisoners and 110 wounded.

360 Captain Fevzi Kurtođlu (op. cit., p. 28, footnote 1), referring to some unidentified documents, writes that three *kaimmakams* (lieutenant-colonels or navy commanders), one *binbaşı* (navy commander), three *kol ağası*, 20 captains (*yüzbaşı*), four lieutenants and 186 men from the Egyptian frigate *Dimyat* had reached Istanbul. Cf. Slade, op. cit., p. 144; Özcan, op. cit., p. 116.

361 Kapudan Pasha to the Grand vizier. BOA. HR. SYS. 1354/6, dated 17 Safer 1272 (29 October 1855). These 156 sailors were from the following ships: 28 men from the *Avnillah*, 100 men from the *Nesim-i Zafer*, 22 men from the *Fazlullah* frigates and six men from the *Necm-feşan* corvette. In his petition the grand admiral asks these men to be exchanged with the 20 Russian POWs at the *Tersane-i Amire*.

362 See "Kontrol'naya kniga razmena russkikh i turetskikh voenno-plennykh", RGVIA, fond 481, opis 1, delo 695, 13 December 1856, Odessa. This register contains the names of 8,030 Ottoman prisoners of war, including Patrona Osman Pasha, Hasan Bey, Ali Bey and Ethem Bey from Sinop and Abdülkerim Pasha, Abdurrahman Pasha and Hafiz Pasha from Kars together with their ages, seals and signatures. The above Russian register shows Ali Bey as a colonel, whereas Özcan (op. cit., pp. 121, 166-167) describes him as a *kaimmakam* (lieutenant-colonel), referring to a document from the DMA. Ali Bey's title is *miralay* (colonel) in another document. BOA. A. DVN. 109/40,

sailors.

At this point a question arises naturally: Did Slade receive explicit orders from Osman Pasha “to get out to sea and carry to Constantinople the news of the imminent danger which menaced the Turkish squadron”?³⁶³ Alternatively, did he leave the battle scene at his own discretion? Slade himself is not clear on this question in his book.³⁶⁴ Saab argues that the *Taif* “had been ordered to leave the harbour before the fighting commenced”, but she does not rely on any authority.³⁶⁵ Ottoman and Turkish historians do not even ask this question. For them, it seems a very normal action. Enver Ziya Karal, for example, writes that the *Taif* was sent to Istanbul by Osman Pasha. But he does not give any reference on this point. He simply repeats the Western secondary literature on this question, as he has done throughout his narrative of the Crimean War.³⁶⁶

Russian historians, on the other hand, openly accuse Slade of abandoning his commander at the time of battle and running away. They suggest that had he chosen to do so, the *Taif* could have given great damage to the Russian squadron thanks to its high speed and greater capacity for manoeuvring. Tarle even argues that had Slade been a “Turk” instead of a British subject, he would certainly have been hung from a ship’s mast. Then he further insists that the other Ottoman steamer, the *Ereğli* could also get away, but it did not do so, because it was commanded by a “Turk”.³⁶⁷ However, Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni writes that the “other steamer” could not escape because its engine was not ready due to lack of steam.³⁶⁸ Considering the certainty of destruction in the face of a powerful enemy, the question of whether the *Taif* received orders from the commander or not or whether it should have remained and fought with the enemy might seem to be rather a technical detail for some, while others may insist that it should have remained and fought. These interesting questions are difficult to answer.

Nevertheless, the problem of punishment still exists. During the entire war, no

29 Safer 1272 (10 November 1855). Özcan does not cite Kaimmakam Ethem Bey among the prisoners, apparently because his documents from the DMA do not give his name.

363 “The State of the Continent. Russia and Turkey”, *The Times*, Issue 21616, London, 20 December 1853, pg. 9.

364 Slade, op. cit., p. 146.

365 Saab, op. cit., p. 116.

366 Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi V*, Ankara: TTK, 1995, p. 235.

367 See Tarle, op. cit., p. 377 and 379; Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., p. 277; R. N. Mordvinov, *Sinopskiy Boy*, Leningrad: Obshchestvo po rasprostraneniyu politicheskikh i nauchnykh znaniy, 1953, p. 17.

368 “*Mukaddem çün göründü fülki zahir, Ocağın yaktı vapur oldu hâzır. Öbür vapur dahi yakmış idi hem, Ve lâkin gelmedi islimi ol dem. Anınçün bulmadı kaçıp halâs, Büyük vapur bulup islimi hâs*”. See Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 87.

Ottoman high ranking (above the rank of colonel, to be precise) officer seems to have been punished seriously, whatever the charges may have been against him. The most he received was a temporary exile or a short dismissal, after which he was usually restored to his former office or to another office. As we will see, the commanders of the Anatolian army are good examples. In the case of Sinop, Yahya Bey, the captain of the *Taif*, was dismissed from service but apparently this was not because of his retreat from battle. He had argued in Trabzon at a heated discussion that the employees of the foreign merchant steamers were informing the Russians.³⁶⁹ The question of the discipline of the Ottoman army and navy is itself an important question, but we shall take up this issue later.

A contemporary critic, Friedrich Engels, in an anonymous leader published in the NYDT, argued that the battle of Sinop resulted from such an unparalleled series of blunders on the part of “the Turks, that the whole affair can only be explained by the mischievous interference of Western diplomacy or by the collusion with the Russians of some parties in Constantinople connected with the French and English embassies”. Engels then asked the obvious questions:

How it happened that a squadron of some three hundred guns, mostly of inferior calibre, was thus abandoned to the tender mercies of a fleet of three times its force and weight of metal, at that point of the Turkish shore which from its proximity to Sebastopol is most exposed to a Russian attack, while the main fleet was enjoying the tranquil ripple of the Bosphorus, we have yet to learn... How then it came to pass that the Turkish batteries were in such a bad trim, when a couple of days’ labour might have done a great deal towards their repair? How did it happen that the Turkish vessels were at anchor in places where they obstructed the fire of the batteries, and were not shifted to moorings more fit to meet the threatened danger? There was time enough for all this...³⁷⁰

However, Engels also argued that according to the report of the steamer *Taif*, “the Turks” were taken by surprise, which is not correct, as we have already seen that Osman Pasha knew the danger. Engels then like a naval expert suggested that

Considering the clumsiness of Russian naval manoeuvres, the bad position of the Turkish fleet in front, and in the line of fire, of their own batteries, and above all the *absolute certainty of destruction*, it would have perhaps been better if the whole Turkish squadron had got under weigh and borne down as far as the wind permitted upon the enemy. The ruin of some, which could by no means be

369 Ali Haydar Emir. “Kırım Harbinin Safahat-ı Bahriyesine Mütcellik Vesaik-ı Resmîye”, *Risale-i Mevkute-i Bahriye* 4 (11-12), Eylül - Teşrin-i Evvel 1334 [Sept. - Nov. 1918], p. 530. Despite this information, Besim Özcan, referring to the same article, argues (op. cit., p. 118) that Yahya Bey was dismissed because of not fighting in the battle.

370 “Progress of the Turkish War”, Leader, *NYDT*, January 9, 1854. See Karl Marx. *The Eastern Question. A reprint of letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the Crimean War*. London: Frank Cass, 1969, pp. 194-196.

avoided, might have saved at least a portion of the squadron. Of course the direction of the wind must have decided as to such a manoeuvre, but it seems doubtful whether Osman Pasha ever thought of such a step at all.³⁷¹ [Italics in the original]

Engels concluded that the victory of Sinop “has no glory for the Russians, while the Turks fought with almost unheard-of bravery, not a single ship having struck its flag during the whole action”. The defeat was entirely due to the “good offices” of Western diplomacy, “which prevented the Turkish fleet from standing out and protecting and fetching home the Sinope squadron”.³⁷²

From a military-technical point of view, the battle of Sinop was really no glory for the Russian fleet. A squadron consisting of line-of-battle ships with two to three times greater firepower against a squadron of frigates anchored in the bay was sure to win the battle. Had not the Ottoman squadron fired first, the Russian squadron could have been accused of breaching a naval point of honour that despised attacking frigates with first-raters. There were almost no naval manoeuvres during the battle, so it was more like a siege bombardment. The Ottoman shore batteries were few, small and inefficiently positioned. Yet the battle lasted about two hours during which the Ottoman squadron was still active and the Russian squadron also received serious damage. A more efficient fleet (for example the British fleet) in the place of the Russian fleet in such a situation could win the battle in much less a time.³⁷³ Many historians admit that the Paixhans naval guns and explosive shells used by the Russian ships were very effective against the shot fire of the Ottoman squadron. Nevertheless, with such a sheer superiority of firepower, the Russian squadron could easily win the battle even with shot fire instead of the explosive shells.³⁷⁴

The Ottoman squadron had fallen to a situation similar to that of the French fleet, which was destroyed by Admiral Nelson at the bay of Abukir on 1 August 1798. Napoleon III took special lessons from the battle of Sinop; he understood that the wooden ships were vulnerable against such shells and thus ordered armour-plated wooden floating batteries for the French fleet. These floating batteries would be used later in October 1855 in the seizure of Fort Kılburun (Kinburn), guarding the mouths of the rivers the Bug and the Dnieper in the Black Sea.

371 Marx, op. cit., p. 197.

372 Ibid.

373 I owe this comment to Prof. Andrew Lambert from a discussion with him.

374 Andrew Lambert. *The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1853-56*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 60.

Ivan Konstantinovich Aivazovskiy (Hovhannes Aivazian, 1817-1900), the famous Crimean Russian Armenian naval painter of the 19th century, went to Sevastopol to talk to the Ottoman POWs Osman Pasha and Ali Bey and made a pencil portrait of them as well. When Aivazovskiy asked Osman Pasha why he did not take line-of-battle ships to Sinop, Osman Pasha replied: “With our sailors it would be the same”.³⁷⁵ Poor Osman Pasha had enough cause to deplore his mariners, he was badly injured at his foot in the battle and he had been robbed by his own crew while lying unconscious. He might be justified not to depend on his sailors for open sea operations, because at the beginning of October his experienced crew was given to Bahriye Feriki Mustafa Pasha, while he got newly recruited peasant boys from Anatolia. They had become seasick at their first voyage.

The *Taif* reached Istanbul on 2 December³⁷⁶ and gave the gruesome news. Mahmud Pasha at once reproached the French and British governments for their delusive attitude. “They bade us arm”, he said, “resist Russia, and now in the hour of our need their fleets look calmly on!”³⁷⁷ It was necessary to go to Sinop and check out the situation there, but the naval pashas seemed unwilling for the mission. From the office of the Kapudan Pasha, Mushaver Pasha went to the French embassy where the two ambassadors were in conference with their admirals Dundas and Hamelin. The French ambassador Baraguey d’Hilliers saw the event as a normal war incident. Stratford de Redcliffe and the admirals professed their ignorance till within a few days of an Ottoman squadron’s presence out in the Black Sea. At this point Adolphus Slade bitterly observes that the squadron had sailed from Büyükdere in sight of Therapia and Beykoz, where Stratford and the admirals inhabited. The ambassadors objected to sending Ottoman steamers alone to Sinop for fear of further disaster, and they also objected to their accompanying the French and British steamers, because they thought that might compromise their governments. Nevertheless, they declared that two steamers, one British and one French, were ready to go to Sinop alone.³⁷⁸

The news of Sinop was received by Emperor Nikolai with joy. He wrote to Prince Menshikov that he was happy to see that the Çeşme naval victory (of 1770) was not

375 “Otryvok pis’ma iz Simferopolya, ot 24-go Dekabrya”, Vasiliy Timm, *Russkiy Khudozhestvenny Listok* 3, 20-go Yanvary 1854 goda.

376 Slade, op. cit., p. 146. The CH however gives the date as 4 December. See CH, no. 660, Istanbul, 9 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (10 December 1853).

377 Slade, *ibid.*, p. 146.

378 Baraguey d’Hilliers to Reşid Pasha, 3 December 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 13.

forgotten in the Russian navy.³⁷⁹

On 4 December Reşid Pasha again applied to the British and French embassies, giving the news and this time asking the allied fleets to join the Ottoman fleet to go into the Black Sea.³⁸⁰ Although unaware of the full consequences of the battle, he rightly guessed that the defeat might be severe. Reminding the ambassadors that the reason for the presence of their fleets in the Bosphorus was to protect the coasts of the Sublime State, he now called them to the task. It was indeed a challenge by Russia and a task for the naval great powers now. The war had now definitely gone beyond a collision between Russia and the Porte. On that day the British steamship *Retribution* and the French steamship *Mogador* departed for Sinop.

At Sinop they found disorder and confusion everywhere, with more than one hundred suffering wounded men scattered in cafes. Six days had passed without proper treatment for the wounded. The governor (*kaimmakam*) of Sinop and the population who had defected at the beginning of the battle had now returned to the city. There were 10 officers, 3 doctors and about 120 seamen in town.³⁸¹ Many officers and about 1000 men had gone into the interior of the country. The governor tried to excuse his defection but to no avail. The steamers took 110 wounded with them and returned to Istanbul. At Tophane they were required to delay the landing of the wounded until evening so that they might not be seen.

Summoned to the Porte next day to relate the details of the battle, Slade found the Ottoman ministers not affected at all from the incident:

Their cheerful cushioned apartment and sleek fur-robed persons deepened in imagination, by the force of contrast, the gloom of the dingy cafes of Sinope with their writhing occupants. They listened, apparently unconcerned, to the woful [sic] tale; they regarded composedly a panoramic view of the Bay of Sinope, taken a few days after the action by Lieutenant O'Reilly of the *Retribution*. A stranger, ignorant of the *nil admirari* of Ottomans, would have fancied them listening to an account and looking at a picture of a disaster in Chinese waters. The mention, however, of the flight of the Pasha of Sinope elicited a spark of the old Turkish spirit. Redshid Pasha, in whose household he had formerly served, attempted to excuse his conduct: 'He could not,' he naively remarked, 'be expected to remain in the way of cannon balls.' On which Kiridli Mustafa Pasha

379 Emperor Nikolai I to Prince A. S. Menshikov in Sevastopol, 29 November (11 December) 1853. RGVIA. Fond 481, opis 1, delo 8, list 7.

380 Note to the British and French embassies in Istanbul, dated 3 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (4 December 1853). BOA. HR. SYS. 1189/55 and BOA. A. AMD. 50/30. See Appendix 16.

381 Adolphus Slade to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe. H.M.S. *Retribution*. Bay of Sinope. 7th December 1853. TNA. FO 195/309. See Appendix 18.

gave him a scowl pregnant with meaning.³⁸²

On 11 December the grand vizier Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha submitted to Sultan Abdülmeçid the results of the investigations on the Sinop affair the remedies proposed.³⁸³ By this time he had received the reports of the Mushaver Pasha, the *kaimmakam* of Sinop and the *vali* of the province (*eyalet*) of Kastamonu with a *mazbata* from the *meclis* of the *eyalet*. The grand vizier informed the Sultan of the declaration of the Russian admiral given to the Austrian consulate in Sinop as explained above. However, he wrote, this was only a trick to appease France and Britain. Eventually this trick would not be valid for the European public opinion anyway. He observed that if the European states sent cash donations to the victims of fire who were left without shelter, this would have much harmful effects for the Sublime State (the Porte). Therefore the governor should immediately set out to determine the fire victims (*harikzedegan*) and to make appropriate payments to them. He should also take care of the wounded.

The grand vizier also stated that the Sublime State should be able to protect its shores without aid from others, while this could be done in the long run, for the time being it needed to strengthen its navy by purchasing two two-deckers (*kapak*) and three frigates from the Americans or other places and to pay up the debt of the steamship which was still under construction in London. He pointed out that in a few weeks Namık Pasha in London was expected to contract the loan and then the steamer's cost could be paid. The Sultan approved the petition (*tezkiye*) of the grand vizier after two days.

Meanwhile a struggle was going on between the Kapudan Pasha and his officers. The Kapudan Pasha accused Ahmed Pasha and Mustafa Pasha as well as other officers of not taking necessary measures and swerving from duty. The pashas for their part forgot their animosities temporarily and united against the Kapudan Pasha. As Slade remarked, the Kapudan Pasha seems to have made the mistake of uniting his enemies against himself. In the end, most of the officers sided with the feriks. Kapudan Mahmud Pasha was dismissed from the admiralty on 18 December 1853 and later exiled to Bolu.³⁸⁴ He was replaced first by the former seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha (1809-1877),

382 Slade, *ibid*, p. 152-153. Slade also writes that some weeks after this scornful glance, Reşid Pasha replaced Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha as grand vizier. However, his memory fails him utterly, for Giritli was replaced only in May 1854 by Kıbrıslı Mehmet Ali Pasha.

383 *Tezkire-i Senaveri*. BOA. İ. HR. 105/5133 lef 5, dated 10 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (11 December 1853).

384 Abdülmeçid. Beyaz üzerine hatt-ı hümayun. BOA. İ. DH. 17914, dated 17 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (18 December 1853). Slade (*op. cit.*, p. 158) has turned Bolu into "Borloz". Besim Özcan (*op. cit.*, p.

who would also be replaced by Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha (1813-1871) in February 1854. The *kaimmakam* of Sinop Hüseyin Pasha was also dismissed from office, but according to Slade, he was reappointed to a “more lucrative” place next year.³⁸⁵ Mahmud Pasha was also pardoned in 1857 and returned to Istanbul, where he died soon after.³⁸⁶

Although Mahmud Pasha was apparently not fit as marine minister, the fault did not entirely lie with him. He seems rather to be chosen as a scapegoat. In his testimony given to the MVL during his trial after his dismissal, he showed his instructions to Osman and Hüseyin Pashas dated 26 and 27 November, where he had ordered them to leave Sinop immediately with all the ships and come to the vicinity of the Bosphorus.³⁸⁷ At that time Mustafa Pasha had returned to Istanbul and reported the situation of the squadron of Osman Pasha in Sinop. Nevertheless, these orders probably never reached their destination. In any case the carelessness Osman Pasha and Hüseyin Pasha must bear the brunt of the accusations.

There are two documents written by Mahmud Pasha in his defence. One is a letter to the grand vizier some time before his dismissal on 18 December, the other is a report or formal statement (*layiha*) submitted to the *Meclis-i Mahsus*. However, both documents have been neglected even by those Turkish historians, who have done archival research on this topic and who must have seen them. Thus the voice of Mahmud Pasha, after being suppressed for more than 150 years, will echo here for the first time. Mahmud Pasha’s defence statements show the tensions and rivalries within the Ottoman navy. He accuses Ferik Ahmed Pasha and Ferik Mustafa Pasha of long having hostile intentions against him and the desire to replace him. He argues that the two feriks had before complained of each other many times but now they had united against him, temporarily forgetting old quarrels between themselves. This account is in line with Adolphus Slade’s observations.³⁸⁸

In his letter to the grand vizier, Mahmud Pasha writes that upon reports of Russian

153) gives the date of Mahmud Pasha’s exile to Bolu as 3 Rebiyülevvel 1271 (24 November 1853), referring to a document from the BOA. Most probably he misread the month of Rebiyülahir as Rebiyülevvel. Furthermore, he seems unaware of the obvious contradiction of sending Mahmud Pasha to exile before the disaster happened!

385 Özcan, op. cit., p. 154. Slade, op. cit., p.

386 Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 924.

387 Kapudan Pasha to Patrona Osman and Mirliva Hüseyin Pashas, dated 25 and 26 Safer 1270 (27 and 28 November 1853). BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 5, paragraph two and three.

388 “The naval captains, seeing him [Mahmud Pasha] the doomed scapegoat, sided with the admirals [Ahmed and Mustafa pashas]. Accordingly, the forms of inquiry having been complied with, Mahmud Pasha was dismissed..”. Slade, *ibid*.

ships being seen around Amasra, it was first decided to send the galleons to the Black Sea against the Russian ships. However, the French and British admirals prevented such ships from being sent, proposing instead sending the frigates. After that, Mahmud Pasha gathered his commanders on the galleon *Mahmudiye*, in their presence instructing Osman and Hüseyin Pashas to patrol the waters of Amasra and Ereğli in two separate squadrons but keeping close to each other. If they met Russian ships they would judge their chances of success and if they thought they could win, they should fight them. Otherwise they were to take care of themselves. They were authorised to return to the Bosphorus in case of bad weather or superior enemy.

Mahmud Pasha then writes on the task of Mustafa Pasha's squadron. Mustafa Pasha had not visited Sokhumi as planned, excusing himself on bad weather. However, Mahmud Pasha had learned from captains that the weather was good and Mustafa Pasha acted rather timidly, not venturing to go as far as Sokhumi. He had returned to Sinop but not taken any measures other than leaving two steamers there. When Mahmud Pasha criticised Mustafa Pasha on his return to Istanbul for leaving those ships open to danger in such an unprotected place, Mustafa Pasha replied that the place was not open to danger and anyway he had strongly recommended them to return to Istanbul.

Mahmud Pasha then directs his criticism to Ferik Ahmed Pasha, who allegedly swerved from going to Sinop with a squadron of five or six steamers to save the sail ships there from Russian attack. Ahmed Pasha reportedly replied to him: "You sent Mustafa Pasha and he returned without doing anything. Now you are sending me into danger". To this Mahmud Pasha retorts:

You will go on board the steamers. If you perceive such a danger any time then you can return. Why do you speak like this, are you not ashamed? If you cannot go, then give me an official answer and I will go to the Porte and report the situation. Then God willing I shall go myself tomorrow on board the imperial steamships.³⁸⁹

Ahmed Pasha, sensing that now things would go bad for him, stated that he did not object to going to Sinop absolutely, but the matter should be discussed with naval commanders (*ümera-i bahriye*) in the naval council (*Meclis-i Bahriye*). Mahmud Pasha, again according to his statement, criticised Ahmed Pasha for trying to evade the task. "Are you going to take instructions from the commanders? Did you always ask their instructions before going out on an expedition?" Nevertheless, Ahmed Pasha insisted on the meeting of the council and the next day the council was convened.

389 Mahmud Pasha to the Grand Vizier. BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 4, written between 4 and 17 December 1853. See Appendix 23.

At the council, Mahmud Pasha addressed all the officers as follows:

Hitherto there have been many conquests in Rumeli and Anatolia thanks to the prophet and the imperial majesty. But we as the navy have not achieved yet anything. I cannot go to visit any person and even if I go, I do not know what to do because of my embarrassment. Isn't this a disgrace [*ayıp*]? By imperial grace we received these ranks and orders but we did not do any job and whenever we want to send any of you on a mission, you present certain fallacies and demagogies [*birtakım mugalata gösteriyorsunuz*]. I officially state to you that if you won't be able to go and if you are afraid, then tell me, let me go to the Sublime Porte and express these circumstances. Tomorrow I will take from among you the reis pasha or another and go on board the imperial steamers.³⁹⁰

Then the officers expressed their apprehensions. They told that going out with steamers alone would not be adequate in force against the multiple enemy ships. The galleons on the other hand would prove difficult to navigate in winter conditions. They also told that the allied admirals were of the same opinion. Even those frigates that went out last time (the frigates of Osman Pasha and Hüseyin Pasha) met harsh weather and took shelter in the harbour of Sinop and they could not get out of there. Now it was difficult to go back to Istanbul after passing the waters off Amasra. True, the Russians were cruising along, but sailing from Sevastopol to Sinop and going back to Sevastopol or to Batum and Sohum was much easier than sailing from Istanbul to Sinop and coming back. Russian harbours were closer to those places. Nevertheless, the Russians could not bring their big ships near the Bosphorus. Because in the case of an adverse weather, they cannot go back and will be forced to enter the Bosphorus.

Mahmud Pasha then argued that these officers were not reliable and it was necessary to make them sign their instructions every time, because they would distort his words after a while. He also argued that they always tried to blame their superiors and also dreamed of receiving the post of *kapudan* pasha for themselves. They were now spreading rumours among common people and servants (*nas beyninde ve sair uşak makuleleri yanlarında*) that the event of Sinop was due to the Kapudan Pasha.³⁹¹

The other document is Mahmud Pasha's statement (*layiha*) submitted to the *Meclis-i Mahsus* after his dismissal from office. At the beginning of his statement, Mahmud Pasha writes that when he was appointed to the office of the Kapudan Pasha, both the Padishah and the ministers knew that he was not versed in the naval art (*deniz fennine malumat-ı acizanem bulunmadığını velinimetim efendimiz ve saniyen vükela-i*

390 Ibid.

391 Ibid.

azam bildikleri surette).³⁹² Thus by his own admission Mahmud Pasha confirms Abdülmecid's appointment of high officials without consideration of their capabilities. In this case Abdülmecid had been under the influence of his brother-in-law Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha or Mustafa Reşid Pasha.³⁹³

Mahmud Pasha further argues that since he was already dismissed, but the *feriks* remained at their posts, the officers of the navy and the shipyard (*Tersane-i Amire*) were intimidated to testify against the evidence of the *ferik* pashas. If these two pashas had also been removed from their posts, the officers might probably find the courage to tell the truth, he added. The ex-Kapudan Pasha then accuses Mustafa Pasha of not visiting all the places on the Circassian coast. Judging from the information he had gathered from the captains of the flotilla, Mahmud Pasha argues that although the weather was fine, Mustafa Pasha did not visit Sohum and did not capture a small Russian ship which he met. In fact, according to the *Kapudan-ı Derya*, the duty of Mustafa Pasha was to circumnavigate the whole Black Sea, patrolling the Crimean shores as well and returning to Istanbul from the Rumelian shores. Then Mustafa Pasha is accused of seeing the squadron of Osman Pasha undefended in Sinop and without taking any measures, slipping away to Istanbul. Mahmud Pasha asserts that he has not given any orders to lie at the bay of Sinop; instead he had given permission even to return to the Bosphorus in case of bad weather or superior enemy force.³⁹⁴

Against the accusations of Mahmud Pasha, Mustafa Pasha defended himself with a *layiha* that was sealed by six other naval officers as well.³⁹⁵ He argued that although it was known that Sinop was not a safe harbour, Mahmud Pasha had ordered Osman and Hüseyin Pashas to patrol the coasts of Amasra, Ereğli and Sinop on 4 November 1853. In case of bad weather or going short of drinking water, they were not to return to Istanbul, but to go to Sinop. When Mustafa Pasha together with Ahmed Pasha expressed their concerns for this trip and volunteered instead to go themselves, the Kapudan Pasha rejected this offer, saying that it was not necessary for them to go.

Five days later, Mustafa Pasha was ordered to deliver ammunition to the Circassians with four steamers (*Feyz-i Bari*, *Saik-i Şadi*, *Taif* and *Ereğli*). According to

392 BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 1, not dated. See Appendix 26. Mücteba İlgürel and Besim Özcan must have seen this lef and lef 4, because they have references to the same *gömlek* in the *İrade Hariciye* collection of the BOA. However, they do not make any references to them.

393 Lütü (op. cit., p. 113) writes that the reason for Mahmud Pasha's appointment to the post of kapudan pasha was that his elder brother was the kethüda of Mustafa Reşid Pasha.

394 BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 1.

395 BOA. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 17, not dated, around January 1854. Other seals are those of Mehmed Emin, İsmail, Ahmed (?), Mehmed Pir and two other unidentified officers. See Appendix 27.

Mustafa Pasha, his only duty was to deliver the ammunition and he was not authorised to give any commands to the squadrons of Osman Pasha and Hüseyin Pasha if he met them on his way. At Sinop, he took coal for his steamers and inspected the fortifications and shore batteries there. Having found them insufficient, he wrote to the Kapudan Pasha on their conditions and also informed him that he would send the *Ereğli* back to Istanbul from Trabzon with some news, because it was not in good order and might hamper his movement. Mustafa Pasha then refers to the secretary (*mektubi*) of the *Tersane-i Amire* as witness to the fact that his petition (*ariza*) had really reached Kapudan Pasha. After Sinop, he cruised the coasts of Trabzon, Batum and Çürüksu, and on his return to Sinop found Osman Pasha lying in the bay with five ships. He saw an order from the Kapudan Pasha to Osman Pasha to keep the *Ereğli* with himself on its return from Trabzon. He advised Osman Pasha to sail into open sea since the harbour was not safe. On his departure from Sinop, the squadron of Hüseyin Pasha also entered the bay. Hüseyin Pasha informed him that the Russian squadron had returned to Sevastopol due to bad weather. Mustafa Pasha advised him as well to keep away from Sinop harbour. Upon Hüseyin Pasha's request, he left the steamer *Taif* to him and returned to Istanbul, where he begged the kapudan pasha to call back the ships from Sinop. Mahmud Pasha, however, did not heed his precautions. Two days later, Mustafa Pasha repeated his request and this time Mahmud Pasha accepted his request.³⁹⁶ Nevertheless, at that time, the *Taif* brought the bad news about Sinop. Now it was too late.

Both Mahmud Pasha's and Mustafa Pasha's statements seem to contain some falsehoods and some calculated uncertainties. For example, since Hüseyin Pasha was dead and Osman Pasha a prisoner of the Russians, it was not possible to check what Mustafa Pasha really told them. It is not possible either to put the whole blame on one person. In any case, these documents give important information to us.

The Ottoman foreign minister Reşid Pasha in his notes to the French and British embassies dated 29 and 30 November and 4 December 1853 had expressed his hopes of assistance from their fleets lying in the Bosphorus. Lord Stratford in his reply to Reşid Pasha dated 11 December 1853 informs him that "with sentiments of deep affliction" he learnt "the full extent of loss sustained by the Porte's flotilla in its late unfortunate conflict with a Russian force of disproportioned magnitude". Stratford then argues that the destruction might, to all appearance, have been avoided, "if earlier attention had been paid either to the dangers of their position or to the means of protecting them by

396 Ibid.

effective batteries on shore”. However he recommends not sending the Ottoman fleet and the allied fleets into the Black Sea:

It can hardly be necessary either for me or for the French Ambassador to assure Your Highness that such measures will be taken by the respective Admirals as the season may permit, and as circumstances may require for giving effect to the instructions, under which they are called upon to act. Their principal object is the protection of the Turkish territory against any direct aggression, but in the performance of that defensive duty they can not be expected to lose sight of those considerations which are prescribed by the earnest desire of both Governments to render their operations as much as possible conducive to the restoration of peace as well as to the maintenance of the Sultan’s rights.³⁹⁷

It is remarkable that Stratford is still talking of “restoration of peace”. At that time the four great powers were preparing a note to Russia and the Porte for a ceasefire and peace.

The French ambassador General Baraguey d’Hilliers also replied to Reşid Pasha’s note officially on 12 December.³⁹⁸ General d’Hilliers expressed his regret over the incident but added that he would not accept any responsibility, as they had before warned of the dangers of sailing into the Black Sea with the Ottoman fleet in its material and military conditions. These dangers stemmed from the severity of weather and the possibility of meeting a numerically more powerful enemy squadron. The French ambassador then argued that apart from the political meaning of the presence of the allied fleets in Büyükdere, it also meant a moral assistance (*müzaheret-i maneviye*) in so far as hopes for a peaceful solution were not exhausted. Finally the ambassador stated that they would defend the Bosphorus in case of a Russian attack but did not specify how and when they can go into the Black Sea.

Kostaki Musurus, the Ottoman ambassador in London, wrote to Reşid Pasha that he found Lord Clarendon “*très affecté*”:

The news of the deplorable event of Sinope, received by a telegram from Vienna, produced here a most painful impression, a universal sadness and one can say an indignation against the inaction imposed on the fleets moored in the Bosphorus. This feeling of national self-esteem is shared by the Cabinet itself, whatever his efforts for the maintenance of peace. ...

I pointed out to him [to Clarendon] what he had said to me in time on the assistance that the two fleets would lend to the Sublime Porte, which would limit itself to help in the event of aggressive attacks on behalf of Russia, but by no means in an offensive war on our part. I remarked with His Highness that it was certainly in consequence of this promise of assistance that the Sublime Porte had

397 Stratford to Reşid. BOA. HR. SYS. 903/2 lef 55-57, dated 11 December 1853. See Appendix 20. Translation of the note into Turkish is in HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 24.

398 BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 25, dated 12 December 1853. This is the translation of the French note. I could not find the original. See Appendix 21.

not sent, or perhaps had been advised not to send all its fleet into the Black Sea, convinced that such a promise would not have been given without a preliminary engagement of Russia towards the Powers in this respect.³⁹⁹ [My translation]

Lord Stratford, in his despatch to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 17 December 1853, again put the blame on the Porte and its advisers. “They alone, or their professional advisers”, he wrote, “were cognizant of the miserable state of the land defences of Sinope”. They alone were answerable “for the obvious imprudence of leaving so long in helpless danger a squadron exposed to attacks from hostile ships of far superior force”.⁴⁰⁰ To these accusations, which certainly touched him as well, Slade replied with a Turkish proverb:

His Excellency did not think of his own glass-house while throwing those stones. The French and English fleets were more or less under the direction of their ambassadors at Constantinople; and it has not appeared that *previous* to the battle of Sinope a wish had been expressed by them for any French or English ships to enter the Black Sea. The state of the defences, not only at Sinope but in every part of the empire, ought to have been familiar to men who claimed the right to dictate to the Porte its war operations, deeming it superfluous to counsel preliminarily with any of its military or naval officers; and who, with consuls at outports and contingent service money, had ready means for obtaining special information. The Capitan Pasha, the Porte’s professional adviser, had recommended sending line-of-battle ships into the Black Sea, to obviate the exposure of a squadron of frigates and corvettes ‘to attacks from hostile ships of far superior force;’ and his recommendation, approved by the Porte, had been overruled.⁴⁰¹

The foreign office in London on the same date was instructing Lord Stratford to order the fleet into the Black Sea. However, there was a difference of opinion between the British and French admirals on the question of sailing to the Black Sea. They were quite reluctant to leave their picturesque anchorage at Beykoz.

On 17-18 Rebiyyülevvel (18-19 December) the Ottoman grand council convened again, this time to consider the conditions for peace offered by the great powers on the basis of a modified Vienna note. The council voted for peace based on the evacuation of the Danubian principalities, recognition of the sovereign rights of the Porte and a guarantee from the four powers.⁴⁰² Reşid Pasha however had some difficulty in persuading the *ulema*. The *softas* again demonstrated against peace. On 21 December they started a boycott of classes. “If you want peace now, why did you declare war two

399 Musurus à Son Altesse Rechid Pacha, le 15 Décembre 1853. BOA. İ. HR. 105/5151 lef 37. See Appendix 22.

400 Slade, op. cit., p. 159.

401 Slade, ibid.

402 *Mazbata* of the *Meclis-i Umumi*. BOA. İ. HR. 21334 lef 1, dated 20 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (21 December 1853). See Appendix 31.

months ago?” was their question. The government published a notification in the semi-official *Ceride-i Havadis* newspaper on 21 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (22 December 1853). Here is its translation published in the *Times*:

His powerful allies have made known to the Sublime Porte the pacific intentions which the Court of Russia never ceases to testify, and, also, in impelling the Imperial Government in that path, they have demanded what its intentions were on the subject. In consequence, on the 17th and 18th of the present month, the affair was submitted to the deliberations of the Grand Council, convoked immediately for that purpose, and composed of all the Ministers, Viziers, Ulemas, military Pashas of the army and navy, and other dignitaries of the empire. It unanimously decided on replying that, since the Sublime Porte has commenced hostilities to protect its rights and the integrity of its states [sic], it will not reject a peace calculated to guarantee them both for the present and the future. A *fetva* confirmative of this decision has just been drawn up by the Sheik-ul-Islam, and an Imperial order has been published to that effect. Communication of what precedes has been made to the representatives of the four Powers. The affair at this moment only rests on a simple question and answer. The question is not now of peace, and even an armistice has not been declared. The state of war continues, and despatches announcing what has just taken place have been sent to the Pashas, and to the Generals of the armies of Rumelia and Anatolia, in order that the course of the military movements may not be interfered with...

The above-mentioned decision having been come to unanimously, conformably to the glorious provisions of the *fetva*, emanating from the sacred law, any one who shall allow himself to speak against the foregoing shall be considered to have spoken against a decision come to unanimously, and be immediately subjected to the penalties which he will have incurred for this act.⁴⁰³

Meanwhile rumours of a massacre of the Christians were spread in Istanbul. A wave of fanaticism was expected and feared, causing some panic and confusion in the European quarters of the city, that is, Galata, Beyoğlu and Therapia. Lord Stratford invited all diplomats and their families to the British Palace. On behalf of the whole *corps diplomatique* Stratford wrote to Reşid Pasha to stand firm against the *softas*.⁴⁰⁴ The capital was menaced by *une insurrection immédiate* and Stratford believed that “the government will not hesitate, undoubtedly, to take the measures necessary to maintain order”. However, Reşid Pasha, who was not known for personal courage, had resigned and was hiding in his son’s house at Beşiktaş. Stratford could not reach him. On 22 December Stratford finally found Reşid, but Reşid Pasha did not promise firmness, even saying that the Sultan was indifferent.

Stratford then went to see Abdülmecid and insisted on firm measures. Abdülmecid accepted the proposal and some steamers were brought from Beykoz up in

403 “The State of the Continent”, *The Times*, 7 January 1854, Issue 21632, p. 7.

404 Stratford de Redcliffe à Son Altesse Reshid Pasha [sic]. Pera, le 21 Décembre 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1346/38. See Appendix 30.

the Bosphorus near the Porte. Then the Sultan told the grand vizier, Mehmed Ali Pasha and the *şeyhülislam* that he would hold a council meeting at the Porte. Mehmed Ali got alarmed and tried to calm down the softas. The government this time did stand firm and about 170 *softas* were arrested.⁴⁰⁵ When they were asked to go the battlefield if they were so warlike, they replied that their duty was to preach, not to fight. Then they were shipped to Crete. The resistance was thus broken. Two days after Stratford's letter, Reşid Pasha replied that the softas were exiled and order was restored in the capital.⁴⁰⁶

On 26 December the grand vizier submitted the *mazbata* of the Kastamonu *meclis* on the details of the material damages and human losses in the city, dated 14 December and the letter of the vali Hamdi Pasha, dated 16 December.⁴⁰⁷ From the civilians, five Muslims became martyrs (*şehid ve şehide*) and sixteen non-Muslims simply died (*reaya canibinden dahi on altı nefer fevt olmuş*). Seven *mescids*, two schools, 247 houses and 170 shops belonging to Muslims were destroyed and burnt, while the losses of the non-Muslims were 50 shops and 40 to 50 houses. The *mazbata* was signed by the two non-Muslim members (*kocabaşı*) of the *meclis* as well.

The Battle of Sinop disturbed the European balance of power. It was a crying denial of Nikolai's assurances of his non-aggressive intentions, despite war being declared on both sides. However, from a military point of view, it was a brilliant operation of the Russian navy against a military target. From a legal point of view, it was a legitimate act of war except for its excessive bombardment and the civilian losses. For Britain and France, the most objectionable aspect of the affair was that it was a direct defiance to their fleets anchored in the Bosphorus. The Russians had destroyed a Turkish flotilla lying at anchor almost under the eyes of the great naval powers. This was too much indeed. Thus Admiral Nahimov by his very victory at Sinop had prepared the ruin of the Russian Black Sea fleet, which would be sunk later by the Russians themselves to block the entrance of Sevastopol.

The repercussions of the battle of Sinop were different in Britain and France. While the British public opinion reacted to the event with much excitement, the French public opinion was in general calm. On the other hand, while Napoleon III was "determined to make an issue out of the incident", the British cabinet took it as a matter of course.⁴⁰⁸ British newspapers in general described the battle of Sinop as a

405 Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 333-335.

406 Reşid Pasha á Son Excellence Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated 23 December 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 70.

407 BOA. İ. DH. 17947, the irade is dated 26 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (27 December 1853).

408 Saab, op. cit., p. 126.

“massacre”. Especially the damage to the city and its civilian inhabitants caused anger. The number of the dead was given as 4,000. Even the conservative, cautious and pacifist *Times* now turned belligerent. On 13 December 1853 it described a new phase in the war:

The war, hitherto confined to the occupation of the Danubian Principalities and to a few partial encounters of the hostile armies, appears to have assumed on the Black Sea the character of direct aggression, and the Emperor of RUSSIA has thrown down the gauntlet to the maritime Powers precisely on that element on which they are best prepared to meet him. We have thought it our duty to uphold and defend the cause of peace, as long as peace was compatible with the honour and dignity of the country, and we feel no regret that to the very last we have adhered to a course of policy which a just concern for the best interests of England and of the civilized world prescribed. Bu we have never concealed our opinion that the events occurring in the East might ere long compel us to meet by more resolute measures a sterner alternative; and we have repeatedly urged upon the Governments of England and France the necessity of being prepared with a plan of operations adapted to such an emergency.

In many British cities and towns like London, Manchester, Derby, Hanley, Sheffield, Leicester, Paisley, Newcastle upon Tyne, Rochdale, Southampton and Stafford, meetings were held in the city halls in support of the Ottoman Empire. The well-known anti-Russian publicist David Urquhart participated in some of them. In Paisley he spoke two hours and a quarter and ended his words by declaring that “what the people of England have now to do is, to call on their Sovereign to require that either war shall be proclaimed against Russia, or the British squadron withdrawn from the Turkish waters”.⁴⁰⁹ Memorials likewise from many cities were being sent to the Queen, asking for a more active British policy. These memorials were usually published in the newspapers like the *Times* and Kostaki Musurus sent such articles with his despatches to the foreign ministry.⁴¹⁰

Napoleon III wanted to use the incident both to develop his alliance with Britain and to turn the attention of the French public towards foreign issues away from domestic problems. Therefore he proposed to the British that the two fleets enter the Black Sea and force the Russian navy back to its base. The French foreign minister even declared that if Britain did not enter, France would go alone. This declaration and the agitated British public opinion forced the British cabinet to agree to send the fleet into

409 See BOA. Ī. HR. 105/5151 lef 36 for the article of the *Times* (December 1853, date not visible) on the meeting in the town of Paisley.

410 See for example BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1, Ī. HR. 108/5293 lef 37, HR. SYS. 907/18 and Ī. HR. 105/5151 lef 39-40. The last is about a public meeting in Newcastle, published in *The Newcastle Guardian* on Saturday, December 17, 1853.

the Black Sea. The Home Secretary Lord Palmerston,⁴¹¹ the symbol of the anti-Russian spirit and known for his support of the “Turks”, resigned in December 1853, but soon returned to office. The British public opinion was further excited by rumours of Prince Albert’s being in league with the tsar. The allied fleets were ordered to enter the Black Sea towards the end of December 1853 but they could weigh anchor only on 4 January 1854. However, after a short cruise along the Black Sea coast the allied fleets returned to Büyükdere.

The coverage of the defeat of Sinop was, as could be expected, minimal in the official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi*. On 8 December 1853, it announced that a Russian squadron of two three-deckers, four two-deckers, three frigates, three steamers and one *navi* had entered the Sinop bay in a foggy weather and signalled the Ottoman squadron of seven frigates, three corvettes and two steamers for surrender. It was stated that, although the magnitude of the Russian squadron was in such a degree that resistance was not possible, the imperial navy did not surrender and accepted the battle by virtue of its religious patriotism (*hamiyyet-i diniyye*) and bravery. The *Takvim-i Vekayi* further argued that although the Ottoman ships were destroyed, the Russian squadron was also severely damaged and lost a lot of men. While there was no mention of the number of Ottoman losses, it was stated that 110 wounded were brought to Istanbul.

Müşir Selim Pasha, the commander of the Batum army, reported to the Seraskier (the War Minister) that for the needs of current politics (*politika-i cariye iktizası üzere*) they would spread the news that the Russian ships were repulsed in defeat from Sinop.⁴¹²

We must mention here that in the Ottoman official correspondence the disaster or defeat of Sinop is mentioned usually as the “regrettable” or “sorrowful” event of Sinop (*Sinop vaka-i müteellimesi* or *mükeddiresi*).⁴¹³ (The same adjectives were later used for the fall of Kars). But we do not see any equivalent of the expression of “the massacre of Sinop” which was much used in the European press, especially the British press. It seems that the Ottoman bureaucracy did not see it as a “massacre”, but something like a natural disaster or something regular that accompanied war.

411 Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865), prime minister of the United Kingdom from February 1855 to February 1858.

412 Selim Pasha to the Seraskier, dated 21 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 / 22 December 1853. BOA. İ. HR. 106/5181.

413 See for example BOA. A. AMD. 50/38, A. MKT. NZD. 110/78, İ. MMS. 3/93.

3.4. The Caucasian Front in 1853

The Ottoman Anatolian army was in a much neglected state in comparison with the Rumeli army. The Anatolian army was under the command of Müşir Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha (better known as Çırpanlı Abdi Pasha, 1807-1883) and this army was deployed in Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan and Bayezid. Abdi Pasha's chief of staff was Ferik Tacirli Ahmed Pasha (?-1883)⁴¹⁴ and their relations were not good.

There was one division in Ardahan under the command of infantry division commander Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha, and another division under the command of cavalry division commander Ferik Selim Pasha in Bayezid.⁴¹⁵ Another army under Müşir Haseki Mehmed Selim Pasha (who held the command of the *Hassa* army as well) was deployed in Batum. The usual dispersed deployment of troops and especially the separation of these two armies would prove to be detrimental to Ottoman war efforts. The headquarters of the Anatolian army was at first in Erzurum, and then it was moved to Kars.

The fortress of Kars was an important stronghold but in the previous war of 1829 the Russians had captured it (they had actually taken Erzurum as well). Therefore the memory of this was still fresh in the minds of both sides. For the Russians it meant confidence that they could conquer the area again. As for the Ottoman officers, their initial optimism was soon replaced by a lack of confidence, bordering on defeatism, after the first defeats. However, at the beginning of the war, greatest hopes were entertained of the Kars army, as expressed so well by the British doctor Humphrey

414 Necat Birinci in his biographical footnotes on Abdi Pasha and Ahmed Pasha in Salih Hayri's *Hayrabad* gives completely wrong information. He mistakes Abdi Pasha for a certain Abbas Pasha and Ahmed Pasha for the other (Nazır) Ahmed Pasha of the Rumeli army. Thus he writes that Ahmed Pasha was executed in 1860 (op. cit., p. 100). See Sinan Kunalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali (1839-1922)*, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1999, p. 39. Birinci also writes that Ahmed Pasha became a pasha after the victory of Çatana, which is illogical and impossible because Ahmed Pasha could not have been both in Kars and in Çatana (on the Danube) simultaneously. Apparently he mixes the two different Ahmed Pashas of the Anatolian and the Rumelian armies. But he is wrong even for the other, Nazır Ahmed Pasha, because that Ahmed Pasha became a müşir and not a pasha after the battle of Çatana. Mehmed Süreyya and S. Kunalp record Ahmed Pasha's death as in 1883. See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. 1, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1996, p. 203 and Kunalp, op. cit., p. 60.

415 Russian military agent in Istanbul, Colonel Count Osten Saken had described Ali Rıza Pasha and Selim Pasha in his report on 24 March (5 April) 1852 as follows: "Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha: Been to St. Petersburg with Ahmed Fethi Pasha. Served in the navy and then appointed at once lieutenant-general to the Anatolian army. Diligent but not talented. Ferik Selim Pasha: Originally an Armenian from Georgia, who converted to Islam. Islamist. Not talented, not remarkable. Passed all ranks in the Anatolian army from private to major-general. Promoted to lieutenant-general last year for his success in that year's recruitment". [My translation] See "Donesenie russkogo voennogo agenta v Konstantinopole polkovnika Osten-Sakena o sostave i kvartirnom raspolozhenii IV-go Anatoliys-kogo korpusa turetskoy armii." RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 44.

Sandwith, who served in Kars:

“Here”, it was said, “you have the Turks posted on their own soil in the midst of a Mussulman population. At the summons of the fiery crescent thousands of warlike tribes will rush to the standard of Islam. It will be a holy war, and the enthusiasm of religious zeal will rouse the whole population, and amply atone for any deficiencies in tactics or military science”.⁴¹⁶

Events, however, proved that “tactics or military science” was not to be overruled by any “religious zeal”.

The weakness of the Ottoman army was not expressed in numbers of men or weapons, at least at the beginning of the war. The Ottoman Anatolian army in 1853 and 1854 had a definite superiority in size against the Russian army located along the Russo-Ottoman border, because the Russians had to keep a large portion of their army against the forces of Sheikh Shamil. Thus at the beginning of the war the Russians could raise against the Ottoman army only 20,000 to 30,000 men.⁴¹⁷ The Anatolian army or the fourth army received reinforcements from other parts of the Ottoman Empire, from the Arabistan and Iraq armies. Although we do not have exact numbers, we can safely say that at the beginning of the war, there were at least about 30,000 men in Kars, 6,000 in Ardahan, 25,000 in Erzurum, 10,000 in Bayezid and 16,000 in Batum, altogether making 87,000 men.⁴¹⁸ Nevertheless, the officers’ corps, beginning right from the Commander-in-Chief, did not show themselves equal to the task, with a few exceptions. They did not have a war plan and neither were they supplied with one by the war ministry.

Furthermore, there was much animosity and jealousy between the educated and uneducated officers within the army. The Commander-in-Chief Müşir Abdi Pasha, who had received education in Vienna from 1835 to 1840, belonged to the former group, while his chief of staff (*reis-i erkan-ı harbiye*) Ferik Ahmed Pasha belonged to the latter. During his trial at the end of 1854 in Istanbul, Abdi Pasha would tell that he had to give oral instructions to Ahmed Pasha because Ahmed Pasha was illiterate (*çünkü kendilerinin okuyup yazmaları olmadığından*) and secret written messages would have

416 Humphrey Sandwith, *A Narrative of the Siege of Kars*, London: John Murray, 1856, p. 91. Sandwith had lived in Istanbul since 1849. During the war he served first on the Danube and in October 1854 was appointed to the staff of Colonel (General) Williams in Kars. He spoke Turkish as well.

417 Süer, op. cit., p. 42.

418 See Süer, op. cit., p. 38. However, having given these numbers, the author somehow makes a total of 95,000 troops, instead of the mathematically correct sum of 87,000. Cevdet Pasha, on the other hand, mentions the figure of 70,000 men for the Anatolian army, but it is not clear which year he has in mind. See Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 100.

to be read by others.⁴¹⁹ The illiteracy of Ahmed Pasha is confirmed by many other sources as well.⁴²⁰ Thus factional strife among officers started right from the top, to a much greater extent than in the Rumeli army. Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni also mentions this rivalry in his *destan*.⁴²¹ In any case, the fact that an illiterate pasha had become the chief of staff of the second biggest Ottoman army during war time tells much about the officer quality in the Ottoman high command.

There were many foreign officers in the service of the Padishah as well. In fact from the summer of 1853 many military adventurers had come to Istanbul to offer their services. The Seraskier Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha at first believed the testimonials of the applicants in good faith and bestowed commissions liberally. But when the new foreign officers began to apply for money for their preparations, he got alarmed. Hasan Rıza Pasha, who was considered as a French protégé, succeeded him in February 1854. While he was averse to the employment of foreign officers, much harm had already been done, because many worthless first-comer officers were employed and some really good late-comer officers were left unemployed.

Apart from these adventurers, the Porte had a more reliable source of foreign officers. Many of the Hungarian and Polish officers who had sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire after Russia crushed the Hungarian revolution of 1848 were now serving in the Anatolian army and to a lesser extent in the Rumeli army. The Hungarians and Poles as a rule were not appointed to the Rumeli army so as not to have problems with Austria.⁴²² There are a few exceptions such as the Polish officers Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Pasha) and Count Antoni Ilinski (Iskender Bey). In fact there could have been a Polish Legion, because 799 Polish emigrants living in France

419 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5, page 2.

420 General George Klapka describes Ahmed Pasha as “a rough and ignorant Kurd”. See Klapka, *The War in the East: From the Year 1853 till July 1855*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1855, p. 43. Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Pasha) describes (op. cit., p. 74) him as “Ahmed Kurd Pasza”. Mehmed Süreyya (op. cit., p. 203) records him as “illiterate, simple-minded, brave, fierce and harsh”. The Russian military agent in Istanbul, Colonel Count Osten Saken in his report on the Anatolian army in 1852 also described the chief of staff Ahmed Pasha as illiterate and having bad relations with the mushir [Gözlüklü] Reşid Pasha, the predecessor of Abdi Pasha, also well-educated and well-read. See RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 44, list 2.

421 Ahmed Rıza, op. cit., p. 61. “Umar idi o kim müşir olaydı, Bu işte nâm u şâmı o alaydı...Müşir dahi kılardı vehmi andan, Müşirliği alır deyu elinden”.

422 İlber Ortaylı writes that General Bem (Murat Pasha) was appointed commander of the forces on the right bank [south] of the Danube in 1849. See Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p. 245. Ortaylı repeats the same claim in an article in 2006 published in Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, Halil İnalcık (eds.), *Tanzimat*, Ankara: Phoenix, 2006, p. 295. In reality, Bem was not appointed and might not have been appointed anywhere near the Danube due to Austrian and Russian pressures. Accordingly, he was sent to Aleppo, where he died in 1850.

had signed a petition authorizing General Wysocki to act as their representative to the Sultan for the formation a “*Legion Polonaise*”.⁴²³ However, this project was not accepted.

Some of the foreign officers in the Ottoman armies were well-trained officers, but some of them were little or no training and some also engaged in intrigues. Few of them had accepted Islam, but in any case they were given Muslim names and the Ottoman soldiers were led to believe that these officers were Muslims. Nevertheless, these officers were not given command positions, but employed as staff officers. Among them were the Hungarian General György Kmety (İsmail Pasha, 1813-1865) and Colonel Kollman (Feyzi Bey), the Polish generals Feliks Klemens Breanski (Şahin Pasha, 1794-1884), Ludwik Bystrzonowski (Arslan Pasha, 1797-1878) and Polish colonels Gościmiński (Tufan Bey), Paczek (Yıldırım Bey), Zarzycki (Osman Bey), majors Grotowski (Sahil Bey), Jagmin, Antoni Wieruski (1804-1870), the Belgian Baron Schwarzenberg (Emir Bey). The Prussian General Maximilian Stein (Ferhad Pasha, 1811-1860) passed a few weeks in the Anatolian army, then we see him as Ömer Pasha’s chief of staff in his Caucasian campaign.⁴²⁴ There were even two American officers, Major Bonfanti (Nevris Bey) and Major Tevis. Although these officers were capable of giving good counsel, there were too many of them and they conflicted among themselves. At one time there were 23 staff officers in the Kars army. Therefore their total impact was not altogether healthy. More will be said later on this point.

The Russian viceroy or vicegerent of the Caucasus (*Namestnik na Kavkaze*, in Turkish *Tiflis Serdari*), General Prince Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov (1782-1856) was old and ill. He had already asked for his removal from his post at the beginning of 1853 because of his health conditions and also because he was worried that he had few forces against the Ottomans. He constantly demanded reinforcements and even after receiving the 13th division from the Crimea in September 1853, he was still worried. However, Nikolai I did not share his worries and at the beginning of October 1853 wrote to him that now he should take Kars and Ardahan.⁴²⁵ Vorontsov was a cunning viceroy, from 1844 onwards in his fight against Imam Shamil he had pursued a subtle

423 *Liste des Emigres Polonais qui ont donné, par leurs signatures ci-jointes, les pleins pouvoirs au Général Wysocki, de traiter avec le Gouvernement de S. M. I. Le Sultan à fin de obtenir la formation de la Légion Polonaise en Turquie.* See BOA. HR. SYS. 1194/1 lef 1, dated 5 November 1853.

424 Czajkowski, op. cit., pp. 30-32, 75-77. These and other foreign officers are also mentioned by General Williams (in the PRMA), Charles Duncan, Humphry Sandwith, Atwell Lake and Zarif Pasha in their memoirs.

425 Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 292-294.

policy of gaining the local feudal class, introducing Caucasian elites into tsarist service, paying attention to indigenous traditions, supporting the growth of education, literature, and journalism in the native languages.⁴²⁶ His deputy was General Nikolai Andreyevich Read (1792-1855). As we have seen in the previous chapter, there were very competent officers in the Russian Caucasian army. Thus we can say that both the Ottoman and the Russian commander-in-chief on the Caucasian front were cautious and did not have offensive plans. Events, however, would dismiss both of them soon from the front.

3.4.1. Relations with Imam Shamil and the Circassians in 1853

Imam Shamil or Shemuil⁴²⁷ (1797-1871), the third *imam* and leader of the anti-Russian resistance of Dagestan and Chechnia, had been waging a guerrilla war against the occupying Russian army since 1834. Since he did not have a chance to win the war without the help of the Ottoman Empire, he appealed to the caliph several times beginning from 1839. However, the conjuncture was not favourable for him. By the Treaty of Edirne of 1829, the Ottoman Empire had relinquished all its claims on Circassia and Georgia to Russia. Russia had supported the Porte against Mehmed Ali of Egypt in 1833 and by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi the two states had become allies, albeit a half-hearted one for the Porte. Therefore the Porte, now at peace with the court of St. Petersburg, did not want to irritate it by helping Shamil. Furthermore, Shamil's relations with Mehmed Ali of Egypt, with the Halidi sheikhs in Kurdistan and other local notables who were opponents of the *Tanzimat*, the activity of his messengers in the sensitive north-eastern frontier made Shamil susceptible in the eyes of the Sublime Porte.⁴²⁸ When Shamil sent his messenger Hasan Hasbi to the region of Acara (Muslim Georgia in the vicinity of Batumi and Çürüksu) to recruit volunteers in 1845, Russian

426 Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli writes that Vorontsov followed a "consistent policy of colonial Russification". See Ibragimbeyli, *Kavkaz v Krymskoi Voine 1853-1856 gg. i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, Moscow: Nauka, 1971, p. 120.

427 Shamil himself always wrote his name as Shemuil. His signature in his hand written letters and in his seal is clearly readable as Shemuil. In the official correspondence in the BOA both versions are used. See Halat Omarov, *100 pisem Shamilya*, Mahachkale: Dagestanskiy Nauchny Tsentr Rossiyskoi Akademii Nauk, 1997. A Turkish translation (without mentioning Omarov's name!) was published by Dr. Fikret Efe. *Şeyh Şamil'in 100 Mektubu*. İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, 2002. James Reid (op. cit., p. 140) has misread Shemuil, claiming that it is "spelled Shamvîl in documents".

428 See Moshe Gammer, "Shamil and the Ottomans: A Preliminary Overview", *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi. Tebliğler. İstanbul 21-25 Ağustos 1989*. Ankara: TTK, 1990, pp. 387-394. Gammer's article is a good introduction to the topic and it is well-documented except for Ottoman and Turkish sources.

embassy protested and the Porte exiled eight of the local notables, collaborators of Hasan Hasbi, to Salonica. Hasan Hasbi himself escaped.⁴²⁹

With the deterioration of relations with Russia in 1853, the Porte had to modify its view of Shamil. The war with Russia could be very helpful for Shamil as well, because he had been lately pressed by the Russian army. He now had an opportunity to receive help from the Ottomans. A joint operation against the Russian army in the Caucasus would obviously pose a real threat to Russian dominance in the Caucasus. Shamil had already written a letter to Sultan Abdülmecid (as the Caliph) in March 1853, asking for help and informing him that they were now producing “cannons, gun powder and Congreve rockets”.⁴³⁰ He must have corresponded with the Anatolian army in Erzurum and with the governor of Erzurum, although contacts between Shamil and the Porte were not steady and many messages were being intercepted by the Russians, like the above letter.

Zarif Mustafa Pasha (1816-1862), the governor of the province of Erzurum (which included Ardahan, Kars and Bayezid as well) sent a letter to the grand vizier on 12 June 1853, stating that imperial decorations (commissions) and orders should be sent to Sheikh Shamil for him to cooperate with the Ottoman army. However, the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, in his petition to Abdülmecid on 9 August 1853, did not approve of sending such orders to “such outside parties as that of Sheikh Shamil” (*Şeyh Şamil gibi haricde bulunan takımlar için*) due to some previously mentioned obstacles. We do not know these obstacles or drawbacks, but we can guess that they are the results of the hopes of a diplomatic solution to the problem with Russia. The grand vizier wrote that in the future it might be reconsidered in accordance with the situation. Abdülmecid, as usual, approved the decision of the grand vizier.⁴³¹

In a document from July 1853, it is reported that Shamil had mustered a lot of troops and come to a place called Çar Kalesi. Shamil had seized the Russian mail on 16 July 1853 on the road to Gence and confiscated a lot of money.⁴³²

429 See BOA. İ. MSM. 26/728, 729 and 739, dated 19 Şevval 1261 (21 October 1845), 29 Zilkade 1261 (29 November 1845) and 23 Şevval 1261 (27 August 1845) respectively.

430 See *Shamil' - Stavlenik Sultanskoy Turtsii i Angliyskikh Kolonizatorov. Sbornik dokumental'nykh materialov*. Pod redaktsiey Sh. V. Tsagareyshvili. Tbilisi: Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Gruzinskoi SSR, Gosizdat Gruzinskoi SSR, 1953, p. 367. Moshe Gammer quotes part of this letter, but he does not mention the production of cannons, etc. See Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan*, London: Frank Cass, 1994, p. 267.

431 These documents have been published by Mustafa Budak. See Budak, “1853-1856 Kırım Harbi Başlarında Doğu Anadolu-Kafkas Cephesi ve Şeyh Şamil”, *Kafkas Araştırmaları* 1, 1988, pp. 52-58, transcriptions pp. 132-137, document photocopies pp. 236-243.

432 BOA. A. DVN. 90/15, dated 16 Şevval 1269 / 23 July 1853. The signature is not readable.

On 5 September 1853, without waiting for a reply to his letter, Shamil appeared around Zakataly, close to Tiflis, with 10,000 men and 4 guns. However, he was too early, for the Ottomans had not yet declared war and therefore he did not hold too long, retreating to Dagestan. His deputy (*naib*) in Circassia Muhammed Emin also started to recruit volunteers from the Circassians and Abkhazians. Muhammed Emin made his intention to advance from Circassia in case of the beginning of war operations by the Ottomans known to the mutasarrıf of Lazistan, who reported to his superior governor of Trabzon. The governor of Trabzon then reported to the Porte on the situation, but the reply was that the army of Batum under the command of Müşir Selim Pasha did not yet have sufficient strength and it would be reinforced by two battalions.⁴³³ A complimenting letter was sent to Muhammed Emin.⁴³⁴

After the declaration of war by the Porte on 4 October 1853, the Porte at last decided to send a firman to Shamil. Abdülmecid called him to holy war for the defence of Islam, without however using the word *jihad*. The firman was conveyed through Halil and Ibrahim Beys, notables of Dagestan, Kolağası Hacı Hüseyin Bey and Mülazım Kasım. Russia's "obstinacy and persistence" (*inad u israrı*) in its demands was said to be "a kind of malevolence and insult" (*bir nevi sui-kasd ve hakaret*) to the *millet* of Islam. Shamil was instructed to subdue the *khans* and *ümera* of Şeki, Kuban, Şirvan, Karabağ, Derbend, Şemhal etc and to attack the Russian armies. He was also instructed to enter into correspondence and coordination with the commander of the Anatolian army Abdi Pasha. Shamil was also informed that all those who fought with good faith for the cause of Islam would be rewarded by the Sultan according to their rank and deeds.⁴³⁵

On 17 October 1853, James Brant, the British consul in Erzurum, reported to the British foreign minister that Shamil sent "messengers to assure the Turks that they may depend on his cooperation and that as soon as he learns (that) they are prepared to attack the Russians, he will fall upon them on his side".⁴³⁶ According to a news article in the *Journal de Constantinople*, Shamil had expressed to Abdi Pasha that he was ready with

433 See Masayuki Yamauchi, "Sheikh Shamil and the Ottoman Empire in the Period of the Crimean War. Enlightened by the ATASE Archives in Ankara", *Orient* XXII, Tokio, 1986, pp. 144-145.

434 BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 96/38, dated 21 Muharrem 1270 / 24 October 1853.

435 BOA. İ. DH. 17605 and C. HR. 5454, dated 6 Muharrem 1270 / 9 October 1853. See Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 132-133, for the text of the firman. Halil Bey seems to have been made a pasha, for in an undated document the "*müsteşar*" (*sadaret müsteşarı?*) addresses him as "*mir-i ümera Dağıstani Halil Paşa*". See BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 117/53, October ? 1853. In April 1854 he was definitely a pasha.

⁴³⁶ Gammer, op. cit., (1990), p. 390.

20,000 men to fight against the Russians.⁴³⁷

Meanwhile Sefer Bey Zanuko (or Zanoğlu or Zanzade, “Zan’s son”), a Circassian noble from Anapa who had fought in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828-29 and had been subject to living in Edirne after the Treaty of Edirne in 1829, was now recalled to Istanbul together with Abdullah Ağa from his retinue in September 1853. For many years Sefer Bey had been a source of reference for British diplomats and agents going to Circassia, like David Urquhart, Captain Lyon, Mr Longworth, Mr Bell and others.

In November, Sefer Bey and Behcet Efendi, also a Circassian from the Bureau of Translation, were given the rank of *mirmiran* with the title of pasha and appointed by the Porte to the task of organizing the Circassians and smuggling arms and ammunition to them. A certain Circassian İsmail Bey from former timariot officers was also given the rank of *istabl-ı amire müdiri* and included in the group. Ostensibly they would be appointed to the Rumeli, Anatolian and Batum armies but in reality they would have a special mission to Circassia.⁴³⁸ Sefer Pasha sent two of his agents, Mehmet Efendi and Ahmed Ağa to Trabzon to cross into Circassia. The governor of Trabzon and the commander of the Batum army Müşir Selim Pasha were given instructions to assist them.⁴³⁹

Shamil sent a letter to Abdi Pasha on 13 December 1853 apparently in reply to Abdi Pasha’s letter. He seems to be unaware of the battle of Başgedikler of 1 December, which had ended with defeat for the Ottomans. In his letter Shamil writes that he heard that the Ottoman⁴⁴⁰ army had besieged the fortresses of Gümrü, Erivan and Üç Kilise (Echmiadzin) of the infidel (*kefere-i mezbure*). He further informs Abdi Pasha that he had come to Georgia with his Dagestani army and entered the “country of the tsar” after a violent battle. Nevertheless, rain and snow fell on the mountains and he was forced to retreat to Dagestan. Then Shamil warns of the deception of the Russians, who might

437 *Journal de Constantinople*, nr. 476, 19 October 1853, cited by Ömer Faruk Akün, *Atsız Armağanı*, Erol Güngör et al (eds.), Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1976, p. 34.

438 Seraskier to the grand vizier and the grand vizier to the Sultan. BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/94, Sultan’s irade is dated 22 Safer 1270 (24 November 1853). Sefer and Behcet Pasha were also assigned a salary of 12,500 piastres each with the rations of a brigadier general and 50,000 piastres each for travel expenses. İsmail Bey would receive a salary of 5,000 piastres and the same rations.

439 Yamauchi, op. cit., pp. 146-148. However, Yamauchi gives the date of the letter of governor of Trabzon as 27 Muharrem (30 October). Either this date is wrong or Sefer Bey had already sent his agent before his official appointment. Also see Mustafa Budak, “1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Devleti ile Şeyh Şamil Arasındaki İlişkiler”, *Tarih Boyunca Balkanlardan Kafkaslara Türk Dünyası Semineri, 29-31 Mayıs 1995. Bildiriler*, Istanbul: İ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1996, p. 90.

440 Mustafa Budak writes (op. cit., 1988, p. 56) that the Russians had besieged these fortresses, as if they might besiege their own fortresses! The argument goes into his unpublished PhD thesis (op. cit., 1993) and into his symposium paper/article, published eight years later. See Mustafa Budak, op. cit., 1996, p. 85.

offer peace.⁴⁴¹

This letter from Shamil was sent to Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha only on 5 May 1854 by the new commander of the Anatolian army Mustafa Zarif Pasha, a protégé of the seraskier.⁴⁴² Probably it was lost somewhere and found by chance. The seraskier sent the letter to the grand vizier on 3 July 1854 and finally it was submitted to the sultan on 9 July 1854. This delay in correspondence is interesting in itself, but we do not know what caused it. What is more interesting is the fact that the commander of the Anatolian army, the seraskier and the grand vizier in their letters all pretend as if there were no unusual delays and they do not offer any explanations. This may also be result of their indifference to Shamil and to the Caucasus in general.

3.4.2. The Battle of Şekvetil

Selim Pasha, the *müşir* of the *Hassa* army (the imperial guards in Istanbul) and also the newly appointed commander of the Ottoman army in Batum, made a plan to capture the Russian fortress of Şekvetil⁴⁴³ that lied to the north of Batum. This small fortress was defended by a small Russian force.⁴⁴⁴ Selim Pasha's superior forces, three or five battalions including the *başıbozüks*, commanded by Çürüksulu Hasan and Ali Beys and Dede Ağa, natives of Çürüksu, captured the post after a pitched battle on 25 October 1853.⁴⁴⁵ According to Selim Pasha, more than one thousand Cossack cavalry men were killed and 80 men were taken prisoner in this battle.⁴⁴⁶ Ottoman losses were

441 The Imam of Dagestan, El Gazi Shemuil to Abdi Pasha, commander of the Anatolian army, dated 12 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (13 December 1853). BOA. İ. DH. 19277 lef 3. See Appendix 29.

442 Budak writes that it was sent by Abdi Pasha (op. cit., 1988, p. 56). However, at that time Abdi Pasha and his successor Ahmed Pasha had already been dismissed and Mustafa Zarif Pasha had become the new commander. See BOA. İ. DH. 19277 lef 2, Zarif Pasha to the seraskier, dated 7 Şaban 1270 (5 May 1854).

443 The fortress was also called Şefketil in Turkish. The original name in Georgian was Shekvetili, the Russians gave it the name of Svyaty Nikolai and hence the English name Fort St Nicholas. While Zarif Pasha calls it Şevketli in his memoirs, this may also be a mistranslation.

444 General Hikmer Süer (op. cit., p. 72) writes that Şekvetil was defended by a Russian force of two battalions of infantry, three companies of Cossack cavalry and one artillery battery. Tarle, (op. cit., vol. I, p. 294) on the other hand, argues that the Russian forces consisted only of two incomplete companies and two guns. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., 1999, p. 60, footnote 2) also write that the fort was held by two companies of infantry.

445 This Ali Bey must be a Georgian Christian apostate. Georgian Soviet historian Yermolay Yevseevich Burchuladze calls him “Ali Bey Kobuletskiy (Tavdgiridze)”. See Burchuladze, “Krushenie Anglo-Turetskikh Zakhvatnicheskikh Planov v Gruzii v 1855-1856 godakh”, *Voprosy Istorii* 4, Moscow, 1952, p. 14.

446 Müşir Selim Pasha to Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha in Ardahan, dated 24 Muharrem 1270 (27 October 1853) and the kaimmakam of Çıldır to the grand vizier, dated 2 Safer 1270 (4 November 1853).

32 dead and 59 wounded.⁴⁴⁷ It seems that Selim Pasha has rather exaggerated the number of the Russian dead in his letter to Ali Rıza Pasha in Ardahan. If we accept that, only two Russian cavalry companies and two or three guns were there, then their number cannot be more than one thousand. Prince Menshikov in his report to the tsar stated that the *başıbozuk* had committed grave atrocities, killing and torturing civilians, women and children.⁴⁴⁸ These *başıbozüks* and even some of the regular men and officers also took many boys and girls into slavery from the neighbouring Georgian villages. It was also alleged that even Selim Pasha did not consider it beneath his dignity to retain some of these slaves for himself, probably as bribes to be sent to Istanbul.⁴⁴⁹

These acts naturally turned the Georgian population against the Porte, including even those Muslim Georgians who were at first well disposed. When Selim Pasha summoned all the Georgian notables to submit to Ottoman power, only one of them came to his headquarters. This was Demetrius, who stated the true feelings of the Georgians. Selim Pasha however, charged him with treachery and had him put to death. While the Porte, around one year later, at the urge of the allies, tried to regain the sympathy of the Georgians by returning the enslaved boys and girls, it was too late.⁴⁵⁰ The Georgians had become staunch allies of Russia. We will dwell more on this topic in the sub-chapter on the Black Sea slave trade. We must record here the fact that this issue has never been dealt with in the Turkish historiography of the Crimean War.

After the capture of Şekvetil by the Ottomans, the Russian forces in Ozurgeti tried to seize it back but they were defeated and forced back. Meanwhile Selim Pasha reinforced the fortress with the Tunisian contingent, consisting of 7,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 artillery men.⁴⁵¹ The marshy coast of Batum and Çürüksu was fit for many diseases and Salih Hayri writes that 4,200 Tunisian troops had died of disease in Batum.⁴⁵²

The Russians again attacked the fortress from the sea by four frigates on 18

BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/53. Reply of the grand vizier at BOA. A. MKT. UM. 1963/63. Tarle gives the date of the battle as 28 October.

447 Süer, op. cit., p. 73.

448 Yevgeny Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 294.

449 General George Klapka, op. cit., p. 50.

450 See sub-chapter 5.4. The Prohibition of the Black Sea White Slave Trade.

451 Slade, op. cit., p. 176. As we have seen, Kızıltoprak (op. cit., p. 49), writes that 7,000-8,000 troops came from Tunis. Salih Hayri (op. cit., p. 146) writes that Ahmed Pasha the governor of Tunis sent three regiments.

452 Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 146, p. 284.

November, but this attack was also repulsed like other attempts by the Russians. Thus the fortress became a formidable stronghold and remained in the hands of the Batum army until the end of the war. Nevertheless, the Ottomans could not make any efficient use of it to reach out to the Circassians. The Russians on their part started to evacuate the whole coast line from Şekvetil to Anapa.

3.4.3. The Battles of Ahışa, Bayındır and Başgedikler

After the capture of Şekvetil, the Ottoman forces in Kars and Ardahan decided to move toward Ahılkelek, Ahışa and Gümrü. Nevertheless, there was no harmony among the high officers and officials such as Müşir Abdi Pasha, the governor Zarif Pasha, Ferik Ahmed Pasha, Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha and the *müsteşar* (paymaster general) of the Anatolian army Rıza Efendi. From the accounts of Zarif Pasha's memoirs and other pashas' testimonies during their trials, it is understood that the *müsteşar efendi* was an influential figure and he interfered in military decisions and independently sent reports to the Porte on military affairs and his views on the pashas as well. While Abdi Pasha was cautious the others favored an engagement with the Russians. Hurşid Pasha and other European officers had not yet come to serve in the staff of the Anatolian army in the autumn of 1853.

The Ottoman forces in Ardahan included 8 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, 12 cannons and the *başbozüks* of Çıldır.⁴⁵³ Captain Fevzi gives this force as 10,000 *redif* and 2,000 *nizamiye* infantry with 13 cannons, one regiment of cavalry and about 6,000 *başbozüks*.⁴⁵⁴ There were two brigadier-generals under Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha: Mirliva Ali Pasha and Mirliva Mustafa Pasha. The fact that the majority of the forces in Ardahan were *redif* troops would prove fatal for the Ottoman forces. Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha would later complain that he had asked Abdi Pasha for more *nizamiye* troops but he was not given such troops. To this accusation Abdi Pasha would reply that those *redif* troops were the choice of the *redif* from Taşköprü and also that it was not possible to send more *nizamiye* troops to Ardahan because they were necessary elsewhere. Ali Rıza Pasha had also asked for an experienced, war-seen artillery major,

453 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80.

454 Kurtoğlu, op. cit., p. 100. Kurtoğlu calls the *redif* “*muavine askeri*” and gives the number of guns as 3. According to İbragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 193) there were 8,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry with 13 guns and 7,000 irregulars. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., p. 61) write that there were about 18,000 men in Ardahan, half of whom were Laz and other irregular formations.

but the müşir had not given him such an officer. To this complaint, Abdi Pasha replied that the military *meclis* in Erzurum had sent Captain Şakir Ağa, promoting him to majors. All other officers were stationed elsewhere.⁴⁵⁵

The Ottoman forces defeated the small Russian forces around Ahılkelek and Ahışa, capturing many villages of the region from 5 November to 25 November.⁴⁵⁶ The governor of Erzurum Zarif Pasha, who had come to Kars from Erzurum with 2,000 *başibozuks* went to Ardahan together with these *başibozuks* to encourage the troops and organize provisions.⁴⁵⁷ According to Abdi Pasha, Zarif Pasha and Müsteşar Rıza Efendi had urged the high ranking officers in Kars to attack the Russians. However, Abdi Pasha thought that winter had come and the war season was over, therefore no offensive operations could be made. Furthermore, the aim was to join forces with Sheikh Shamil and at this season this was impossible. Abdi Pasha also stressed in his statement to the military court that since he had received military education, he based all his actions on the military sciences (*fünun-ı harbiye*) of strategy and tactics (*istrateji ve taktik fenlerine*). Thereby he implied that his chief of staff Ahmed Pasha did not possess such education, mentioning at the same time Ahmed Pasha was illiterate.

The newly appointed *müsteşar* Rıza Efendi had interfered in military matters by giving instructions to Ferik Abdülkerim Pasha whom he met in Yeniköy (between Kars and Erzurum) while he was coming to Kars. He had asked Abdülkerim Pasha not to go to Erzurum but wait in Yeniköy because Rıza Efendi would have him summoned back to Kars. Arriving at Kars, the *müsteşar* started urging the officers for action, arguing that there had been successive victories in Rumeli and the Anatolian army was lagging behind (*hakikat-i hali anlamaksızın Rumeli tarafında fütuhât-ı mütevâliye vuku bulmakta ve Anadolu tarafında ağır davranılmakta olduğuna dair tefevvihat ile teşvikata başlayıp*). Abdi Pasha stressed that although the *müsteşar* was kind, honest and hardworking, he was like a foolish friend in military questions because he was unversed in the military science (*kendüleri fenn-i harbden bi-behre bulunmaları cihetle bu babda akılsız dost hükmünde olup*) and therefore the *müsteşar* interpreted Abdi Pasha's caution as cowardice. According to Ahmed Pasha, Zarif Pasha had reprimanded him (Ahmed Pasha) in front of other officers for not going to war, to which Ahmed Pasha answered that he had his superior commander, meaning the commander Abdi

455 Ali Rıza Pasha's statement at the military court in Istanbul. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4. See Appendix 79.

456 Budak, op. cit., pp. 51-53.

457 Zarif Pasha's memoirs, see Karal, op. cit., (1940), pp. 477-478. Cf. Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 53.

Pasha. Rıza Efendi had even told Abdi Pasha that if Abdi Pasha did not go against the enemy, he would summon the population by towncriers and go himself. Upon this declaration Abdi Pasha asked the *müsteşar*: “If things go bad, will your word save me?” Rıza Efendi replied yes, but Abdi Pasha was not satisfied. Abdi Pasha added that even those officers who thought that the war season was over could not say so openly for fear of being considered a coward. Later during the interrogation of the pashas in Istanbul by a military commission at the war ministry, Abdi Pasha complained that Rıza Efendi had “changed the minds of everybody” in favour of battle, while it became apparent from a letter of Rıza Efendi dated 27 November 1853 that Rıza Efendi had charged Abdi Pasha with “laxity and hesitancy” (*gevşeklik ve tereddüt*).⁴⁵⁸ Finally the warlike attitude affected the rank and file as well and Abdi Pasha was forced to take some action. Meanwhile the weather also improved a bit and Abdi Pasha decided to engage in what he called *petit guerre*, using the original French term.⁴⁵⁹

Ferik Veli Pasha was posted as *avant garde* in the Subatan village to the east of Kars with 5 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and a sufficient number of irregular cavalry. Abdi Pasha sent his chief of staff (*erkan-ı harb reisi*) Ferik Ahmed Pasha with 6 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and the remaining *asakir-i muvazzafa* together with the forces under Veli Pasha to Baş Şüregel (15 km from Gümrü), which was opposite the Bayındır (Bayandur) village (10 km from Gümrü). Mirliva Mustafa Pasha from the Arabistan army was sent to Baş Şüregel with 4 infantry battalions, 5 cavalry squadrons and 4 guns. *Başıbozuk* troops stationed in the villages of the *kazas* of Şüregel and Zarşat were also ordered to come to Baş Şüregel. According to Abdi Pasha, Ahmed Pasha’s task was to deploy the regular troops behind the hill there and to drive away the Russian irregular cavalry in Bayındır with his own irregular cavalry. Ahmed Pasha was allegedly instructed not to cross the river Arpaçay that formed the border with Russia. However, Ahmed Pasha stated that the instructions given him did not mention the hill or the ban on crossing the Arpaçay. According to him, Abdi Pasha had just instructed him to go to fight in order to shut up the mouth of the population who wanted war.⁴⁶⁰

Thus Ahmed Pasha came to Bayındır on 13 November and easily captured the village, driving away the Russian Karapapak irregular cavalry (more than 2,000 men)

458 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6. See Appendix 82.

459 Abdi Pasha’s statement and answers to questions together with Ahmed Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80.

460 Ibid.

under the command of Taştımur.⁴⁶¹ Although Ahmed Pasha also stated that his *başibozuks* chased the enemy until Gümrü and also defeated a Russian cavalry regiment there and forced them to enter the fortress of Gümrü, this seems doubtful. In the opinion of Abdi Pasha, removing a small Russian unit (*şirzime-i kalile*) had emboldened Ahmed Pasha. Some 1,000 *başibozuks* under the command of Meded Bey the *müdir* of the *kaza* of Şüregel were sent to the Russian village of Tuhaber (or Tukaber?) where some 300 Cossack cavalry was reported. These *başibozuks* brought 20 prisoners later.

Meanwhile the Russian Armenian commander in Gümrü, General-Lieutenant Prince Vasiliy Osipovich Bebutov (1791-1858) had sent a force of 7 battalions of infantry, 4 squadrons⁴⁶² of cavalry with 28 guns and more than 1,000 Muslim Azerbaijani (or Karapapak) irregular cavalry under the command of General-Major Prince Ilika (Ilya) Orbeliani towards Bayındır for reconnaissance and for the protection of Armenian villages from the Kurds and other *başibozuks*.⁴⁶³ Ahmed Pasha, however, argued that the enemy had 10 battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry with 40 guns and more than 2,000 Karapapak irregular cavalry on the battle field.⁴⁶⁴ Orbeliani's forces were met by a surprise fire from the Ottoman guns deployed on the heights of the village Bayındır on 14 November 1853.⁴⁶⁵ Orbeliani had fallen into a dangerous position: He could neither attack the strong Ottoman positions nor retreat without risk of being attacked by the Ottoman cavalry and the *başibozuks*. In this battle Orbeliani lost about 1,000 men but Ahmed Pasha did not show any further initiative. Ottoman losses included 23 dead, 47 wounded among the regular troops and about this amount from the *başibozuks*, according to Ahmed Pasha.

Towards evening Prince Bebutov came to help Orbeliani from Gümrü with the remains of the Russian army there (3 battalions of infantry, 6 squadrons of dragoons and 12 guns).⁴⁶⁶ Abdi Pasha had also come as far as Baş Şüregel with 6 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and 12 guns to help Ahmed Pasha. Although Abdi

461 Ahmed Pasha's statement, BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81. Budak (op. cit., pp. 56-57) has named this skirmish as the "Battle of Bayındır", and the battle next day as the "Battle of Gümrü". However, I agree with the Russian historians who accept only the next as the Battle of Bayındır.

462 Usually 6 squadrons make up a cavalry regiment.

463 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 390. Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 112) does not mention Orbeliani's guns and the 4 squadrons.

464 Ahmed Pasha's statement, BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81.

465 Zayonchkovskiy, ibid. Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 295. The *TV* of 7 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (8 December 1853) gives the date of the battle as 13 Safer 1270 (15 November 1853). Hikmet Süer (op. cit., p. 78) also gives the date as 13 Safer 1270 but erroneously converts it into 16 November.

466 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 390-391. Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 114.

Pasha argues that his forces went into battle, it is not certain to what extent they participated in this battle. Ahmed Pasha argues that Abdi Pasha did not immediately send help to him and did not encourage the troops by appearing in the battle field. Both sides retreated after the sunset. In any case, the Ottoman army as usual did not follow up the defeated enemy, being content with the initial success of the artillery only. In fact artillery was the only efficient Ottoman class of arms. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff justly observe that

Bebutov had been lucky in extricating the ineffectual Orbeliani from a very dangerous situation, and Abdi Pasha had missed the opportunity of destroying the principal Russian field force in Transcaucasia at one blow in the first week of the campaign. Never was the inadequacy of the Turkish high command at this period more dramatically demonstrated.⁴⁶⁷

Prince Vorontsov reported the battle of Bayındır as a victory to Nikolai I and the Russian emperor even conferred the order of Stanislav's first rank upon General Orbeliani.⁴⁶⁸

After the battle, Abdi Pasha did not retreat because he feared that the Russians, as a technically well-informed (*fen-aşina*) enemy might guess that his army had run out of ammunition and follow him up. Therefore he waited in Bayındır for 12 days by building fortifications and asked for ammunition from Kars. Meanwhile one battalion and 2 guns came from Subatan, 3 battalions of *redif* and one battalion of *nizamiye* under the command of Mirliva Hafız Pasha also joined the forces in Bayındır. On 21 November the *şeşhane* battalion of the Hassa army came to Bayındır. Thus according to Ahmed Pasha, their forces in Bayındır reached 22 infantry battalions, 2.5 regiments of cavalry, 800 artillery men with 38 guns and more than 3,000 irregular cavalry. Abdi Pasha also states that the Ottoman army in Bayındır (including his forces) consisted of 22 or 23 infantry battalions, 3 cavalry regiments and more than 30 guns.⁴⁶⁹ During the 12 days in Bayındır, Ahmed Pasha urged Abdi Pasha for three different options of actions against the Russians in Gümürü or Ahışa, but Abdi Pasha did not accept them. Abdi Pasha accepts this and even adds that more than three variants were discussed but in the end none of them seemed useful.⁴⁷⁰

Since the Russian army did not appear during these 12 days, Abdi Pasha decided

467 Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 63.

468 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 115.

469 Abdi Pasha, *ibid.* Zayonchkovskiy (op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 391) and Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 113) describe the strength of the Ottoman army in Bayındır as 30,000 men with 40 guns. However, Ibragimbeyli a few pages later (p. 115) gives the number as 40,000 men. This must be a typing mistake.

470 Ahmed Pasha's statement. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81.

to retreat towards Kars because in his opinion he did not have enough troops, provisions, ammunition and means of transport for an offensive. He moved to the village Başgedikler on 25 November while Veli Pasha with his forces was posted again to the village Subatan as *avant garde*.⁴⁷¹

Meanwhile the Ottoman forces were holding small victories against small Russian forces near Ahışa and Ahılkelek and took positions in the villages near Ahışa. Miralay (Colonel) Hasan Bey was sent as *avant garde* with two squadrons of regular cavalry and about 2,000 irregular cavalry (*asakir-i muvazzafa*). These başıbozüks had taken some prisoners and decapitated five to ten persons. Ali Rıza Pasha states that since the orders not to cut off heads and ears had not yet reached them, he sent the decapitated heads and ears together with the prisoners of war to the müşir.⁴⁷² While Ali Rıza Pasha does not state whether he rewarded these *başıbozüks* for the heads and ears brought to him, most probably he did so, because this was the custom.

Since Ali Rıza Pasha did not have siege artillery to attack the fortress of Ahışa, he asked for two battalions of infantry and some guns from Abdi Pasha but Abdi Pasha sent them very late. On 26 November 1853 the Russian forces of the Ahışa fortress received a reinforcement of 5 battalions of infantry, one squadron of cavalry and 7 guns⁴⁷³ from the 13th division in Ozurgeti under the command of Lieutenant-General Prince Ivan Malkhazovich Andronikov or Andronikashvili (1798-1868).⁴⁷⁴ General Andronikov attacked the forces of Mirliva Ali Pasha around the village Sufliš with a force of 7.5 battalions of infantry with 14 guns, 9 Cossack squadrons and about 2,000 Georgian and Ossetian irregular cavalry early in the morning on 27 November 1853.⁴⁷⁵ Mirliva Mustafa Pasha commanded the Ottoman right wing in the village Ab (or Abashi) including 3 infantry battalions with 5 guns and more than 1,000 *başıbozüks* and Mirliva Ali Pasha commanded the left wing in Sufliš, consisting of 3 infantry battalions with 7 guns and one cavalry regiment. 2 infantry battalions and about 2,000 *başıbozüks* were deployed in neighbouring villages around Sufliš at a distance of a quarter of hour.

471 Abdi Pasha's statement. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80.

472 Ali Rıza Pasha's testimony at the MVL in Istanbul. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4. See Appendix 79.

473 Ali Rıza Pasha, *ibid*.

474 Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 195) writes (like some other Soviet sources) that General Andronikashvili was an ethnic Georgian. An article in the *Times*, however, tells that the Greeks took pride in his being a Greek from Odessa, "who has changed the final "kos" of his name into "koff". See *The Times*, London, 19 August 1854, Issue 21824, p. 8. The Crimean Armenian historian V. E. Grigoryants, on the other hand, argues that Andronikov was of Armenian origins from a princely family at the court of the last Georgian king. See Grigoryants, "Vostochnaya (Krymskaya) voına i armyane", *Istoricheskoe Nasledie Kryma* 6-7, Simferopol, 2004, p. 136.

475 Ali Rıza Pasha, *ibid*. Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 195. Ibragimbeyli gives the date of the battle as 14 November, which corresponds to 26 November according to the Western calendar.

Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha remained behind in the village Yemak somewhere in the middle at the distance of one quarter hour. This traditional scattered deployment of troops contributed to the Ottoman defeat in this battle. The distance of a quarter of an hour among these villages seems to be an understatement even without any knowledge of the territory, because Ali Rıza Pasha tries to justify his deployment of troops and argues that it was not scattered. In fact, the military *meclis* in Erzurum in reply to Inspector Hayreddin Pasha's questions stated this distance as half an hour to three quarters.⁴⁷⁶ Furthermore, during his trial together with Ahmed Pasha, Zarif Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha at the MVL and the DŞA, Müşir Abdi Pasha also stated that Ali Rıza Pasha had dispersed his forces in villages contrary to the rules of warfare (*asakir-i muvazzafa kaide-i harbiyeye muğayir perakende olarak karyelere tefrik olunduğu anlaşılmış*).⁴⁷⁷ Abdi Pasha added that although Ali Rıza Pasha acted against his orders and against precautions of Zarif Pasha, he (Abdi Pasha) could not think of such a disaster because according to his intelligence the Russians had only 5 battalions there, while Ali Rıza Pasha had 8 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and the irregular cavalry of Çıldır and those with Zarif Pasha, so that it exceeded the Russian forces far beyond. To this comment Ali Rıza Pasha replied that although his forces were distributed to villages they all came together when the battle began. He also argued that he made all his moves with the approval of Abdi Pasha and he did not receive any help from Zarif Pasha.⁴⁷⁸

According to Ali Rıza Pasha's own statement, the Ottoman forces on the battlefield included 6 battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry with 7 guns. In addition, 2 battalions of infantry and 5 guns remained on the reserve. The cannonade of the two sides lasted four hours.⁴⁷⁹ Then the sides attacked each other. While the Russians shouted "Ura!" the Ottomans shouted "Padişahım çok yaşa!" (Long live the Padishah!). The *redif* battalions and the *başibozuks* in the army of Ali Rıza Pasha could not resist the massive attack of the Russian regular troops and the Ottoman artillery alone fought to the end. Ali Rıza Pasha also stated that he saw some of the *redif* troops from Harput retreating. He ordered to prevent their retreat but the officers were unable to stop the retreat. Then he ordered to beat the order to gather (*toplanma tranpetesini urdurdum*). Nevertheless, the officers were again unable to gather the troops. He shouted at those *redif* soldiers 100 steps away from him fleeing towards a mountain: "You have read the law. Why are you fleeing? Return and come back!". However, the

476 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, page 3. See Appendix 83.

477 Abdi Pasha's statement. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80.

478 Ibid.

479 Ali Rıza Pasha, *ibid.*

soldiers did not listen to him. Ali Rıza Pasha shouted at the *başıbozüks* as well: “You have come voluntarily and why do you flee now? You have also affected the (regular) troops, I will shoot you!”. He then fired a shot towards them and said: “If you do not return, I will let the artillery fire on you”. However, the *başıbozüks* did not listen to him either. Then he was informed that Mirliva Ali Pasha was wounded. Then Ali Rıza Pasha took Ali Pasha to the village Bamık (Yemak ?) in order to conceal him from the view of the troops and then returned to the battlefield.

However, by this statement alone, Ali Rıza Pasha puts himself under suspicion: Why should he himself go with the wounded Ali Pasha and leave the troops without command at the very high moment of the battle? Unfortunately, no such questions (which seem obvious) are recorded in the interrogations. Ali Rıza Pasha then states that he rejects the accusations from Hurşid Pasha that he fled at the beginning of the battle.⁴⁸⁰ However, there are other sources that accuse him of fleeing the battle field.

According to a report from the French consulate in Erzurum to the French embassy in Istanbul, Ferik Ali (Rıza) Pasha had retreated from the battle on 27 November with five battalions, instead of coming to the help of Hüseyin Bey who commanded three battalions of regular infantry and the *başıbozuk*. The French consul stated that Ali Rıza Pasha not only gave the order to retreat but he himself deserted, leaving the troops alone. When it was heard that the commander had gone, the soldiers retreated in panic and disorder.⁴⁸¹ The French consul added that although Mirliva Veli Pasha had fought bravely and tried to resist, he had been unable to control the troops and he was also forced to retreat. However, he seems to have mixed the battle of Başgedikler with the battle of Ahışa, because Veli Pasha was in Kars. The report also stated that the Ottoman troops had abandoned not only 14 guns, but also all provisions and other things in order to run away as fast as possible. Consequently, it was stated that the Russian force, consisting of 6 battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, had completely routed the Ottoman army corps of 15,000 men (regular and irregular together) within two hours. Ardahan and its villages were now left left to the mercy of the enemy. Furthermore, the report told of another deed of Ferik Ali Pasha. He had sent his servants together with the treasury of the army to the village Badele and joined them two hours before the defeat of the Ottoman troops. Some soldiers came to the said village and when he asked them why they had come, they answered that they hastened

480 Ibid.

481 Translation of a report from the French consulate in Erzurum to the French embassy in Istanbul, dated 10 Kanun-ı Evvel 1853 (10 or 22 December 1853), forwarded to the Ottoman foreign ministry on 30 December 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 14.

together with other troops to catch up with their ferik. Upon this answer, Ferik Ali Pasha took out his pistols and fired at them, killing two and severely wounding five of them. In another village near Badele, a *müdir* of a *kaza* came up to him and asked him to take measure to protect the Ottoman villages on the border from the Russians. Ali Pasha however answered that this was not possible and he should go to the army headquarters. The *müdir* then said that it was not appropriate to abandon one's religious brethren in Islam. This answer angered the pasha, who again took out his pistol and shot the *müdir* in the chest. The report then stated that Zarif Pasha had come to Erzurum on the date of the report with about 2,000 troops that he could collect in Ardahan. The sadness of the soldiers affected the people of Erzurum as well. The report also covered the battle of Başgedikler which we will see later.

In any case, the defeat of the Ottoman forces was so decisive that the event was called the "Ahışa rout" (*Ahışa bozgunu*).⁴⁸² Ottoman losses included 1,500 dead, 2,000 wounded and 120 prisoners with 11 guns and ammunition, while the Russians lost one officer and 51 men dead, 311 wounded.⁴⁸³

The anonymous military analyst of the *NYDT* (Friedrich Engels), wrote the following on the Russian victory in Ahışa in the same article where he discussed the battle of Sinop:

The Russians declare that with about 10,000 men they have routed 18,000 Turks. Of course we cannot rely upon such statements, but must confess that the great number of irregulars in the Turkish Anatolian army and the almost total absence of European officers, particularly in the higher commands and on the staff, must make them but a poor match for an equal number of Russians... [The Russians] confess they have made only 120 prisoners. This amounts to a confession that they have massacred almost all the wounded on the field of battle, they being necessarily left in their hands. Besides, they prove that their measures for pursuit and intercepting the retreat of at least part of the enemy, must have been wretchedly planned. They had plenty of cavalry; a bold charge in the midst of the fugitives would have cut off whole battalions...⁴⁸⁴

Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli refers to the same article of Engels, but he quotes only the last two sentences from the passage above. Although he is very critical of the tsarist policies in general and particularly in the Caucasus, he does not quote from Engels that which is not good for the reputation of the Russian army. This is a rather typical attitude

482 Kırzioğlu, op. cit., p. 70.

483 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 196. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., 1999, p. 62) give similar numbers. Mustafa Budak, who had access to the ATASE, also refers to Allen and Muratoff on this question in his PhD dissertation (p. 55). There are references to some detailed tables of Ottoman losses in the evidences of Abdi, Ahmed and Ali Rıza Pashas, however, I could not find these tables in the BOA.

484 Engels, article cited above. See also Marx, op. cit., p. 199.

of the Soviet historians after Pokrovskiy. We may assume that if the Russians massacred the wounded Ottoman soldiers, most likely it was the work of the Georgian *başibozuks*, the *militia* or the *druzhina*, who must have been particularly enraged by the acts of the Ottoman *başibozuks* in Şekvetil and their kidnappings of Georgian children into slavery from Georgian villages. As İbragimbeyli tells us, there were about 2,000 sabres of Georgian and Ossetian cavalry *druzhina* and 900 Cossacks in the army of General Andronikashvili.⁴⁸⁵

At Bayındır, towards the end of November, Abdi Pasha heard that the Russians were coming. He sent Miralay İsmail Bey for reconnaissance and the said colonel brought the information that a Russian army of 12 battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry and some irregular troops passed the Arpaçay and was coming closer. Abdi Paşa then states that the advent of Russians in such a composition was a rare opportunity for them (*Rusyalu'nun bu hal ile gelişi aranıp bulunamayacak bir keyfiyet olduğundan*) and he took preparations to meet them. Veli Pasha and Abdülkerim Pasha's forces were also summoned. However, the Russian forces did not appear. Meanwhile on 29 November, Abdi Pasha received the news of the defeat of Ali Rıza Pasha in Ahışa. He had also heard that Rıza Efendi had written to the Porte blaming his retreat from Bayındır for the disaster in Ahışa. According to Ahmed Pasha, Abdi Pasha told him:

We left Bayındır on Friday [25 November] and the defeat at Ahışa is reported to happen on Saturday. How could it be possible that the Russians in Ahışa learnt so quickly of our departure from Bayındır that the defeat might be attributed to it?⁴⁸⁶ [My translation]

At this point Abdi Pasha argues that Ahmed Pasha urged him to go to Kars because he was needed there and also assured him that he (Ahmed Pasha) would inform him immediately if anything happens. Therefore Abdi Pasha asserts that he went to Kars, instructing Ahmed Pasha to bring the army to Subatan in a few days after him. Ahmed Pasha, on the contrary, argues that he told Abdi Pasha that the enemy was there, it had not gone away and Abdi Pasha should not leave the army. Ahmed Pasha then produces some letters from *başibozuk* commanders (*sergerdes*) about the presence of the Russian army in the vicinity and a letter from Abdi Pasha on Tuesday instructing him to wait until Thursday. Abdi Pasha does not answer these arguments and it seems that Ahmed Pasha was right on this issue. In any case, Abdi Pasha decided to go to

485 İbragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 197.

486 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5.

Kars. Abdi Pasha in his statement also asserts that he had instructed Ahmed Pasha to send him news four times a day normally and immediately at an event. According to Abdi Pasha, Ahmed Pasha did not send him news when the Russians were seen coming, because Ahmed Pasha wanted to show himself and to gain a victory by himself alone.

As we saw above, the Ottoman army corps at Başgedikler and around it included 22 infantry battalions, two and a half cavalry regiments, 800 artillerymen with 38 guns and more than 3,000 irregular cavalry in neighbouring villages.⁴⁸⁷ However, not all of these troops and guns were actually used in the battle, because some of them were in the neighbouring villages. Most of the *başbozüks* had fled towards Kars even before the battle. Ahmed Pasha detached 3 infantry battalions with 6 guns under the command of Mirliva Hafız Pasha as reserve troops. Then he detached 5 infantry battalions (including 2 chasseurs companies), one regiment of cavalry, 6 guns and 500 irregular cavalry under the command of Veli Pasha to the neighbouring village on the left as the left wing. 5 battalions (including 6 companies of chasseurs) out of the remaining 13 battalions together with one regiment of cavalry with 8 guns and the irregular cavalry of Hasan Yazıcı were detached as the right wing under the command of Mirliva Hüseyin Pasha. Finally 5 battalions (including 6 companies of chasseurs) with 8 guns were commanded by Mirliva Mustafa Pasha somewhat to the right. Totally there were 32 guns in the battle field. Ahmed Pasha also states that since staff officers had gone to Kars and he could not receive help from them and deployed the guns in a hurry. To this statement Abdi Pasha commented that in any case there was only one staff officer in the army who was expert in this question (Faik Bey) and he did not know where Faik Bey was at that time. To this comment Ahmed Pasha replied that Faik Bey had gone to Kars.

In any case, however, the Ottoman army exceeded the Russian army in numbers, even though Abdi Pasha would later argue that he had only 17,000-18,000 troops, regular and irregular, when he was asked why he did not send two battalions and some guns to Ali Rıza Pasha in Ardahan.⁴⁸⁸ The irregulars were the *başbozüks* under the

487 Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., p. 63) give the total number as 36,000 men, including 20,000 regular infantry and one brigade of cavalry, the rest being “*başbozüks* and Kurds of doubtful value”. Cf. Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 58. General Bebutov reported after the battle to Prince Vorontsov that the Ottoman forces included 20,000 infantry, 4,000 regular cavalry with 42-46 guns and more than 12,000 Kurdish and other “militia”. See Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 297. İbragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 198) cites 27 battalions of regular infantry. Averyanov (op. cit., 1900, pp. 87-88; op. cit., 1995, p. 52) mentions 20,000 regular infantry, 3,000 regular cavalry with 46 guns and 14,000 irregulars, including 4,000 Kurds.

488 In the interrogation of Abdi Pasha, Ali Rıza Pasha and Ahmed Pasha, the *müşteşar* of the Anatolian army produces a document where the forces before Gümrü are described as more than 40,000 men including both regulars and irregulars. Abdi Pasha, however, argues that he had only 17,000 to 18,000 men and he even argues that the number of troops at that time around Gümrü can

command of Hasan Yazıcı of Damascus and the nomadic Kurds under the command of their tribal chiefs, who were more interested in pillaging Armenian villages than in the war. The number of these *başibozuks* seems to be exaggerated by Russian sources. Ahmed Pasha states that when he asked Hasan Yazıcı how many cavalry he had, Hasan Yazıcı answered he had 2,000 men. Upon a close view of them, however, Ahmed Pasha found out that there were only about 800 horsemen, of which more than half were youngsters and riff raff (*çoluk çocuk*).⁴⁸⁹ It is certain that these *sergerdes* as well as the pashas were engaged in the muster roll fraud, receiving pay and rations for more troops than was in reality. We will see more on this matter.

On the Russian side, upon the news of the success of Andronikov, Bebutov decided to attack the Ottoman army, even with a force of 10.5 battalions of infantry (7,000 bayonets), 10 squadrons of cavalry and 15 irregular cavalry hundreds (*sotnya*) (together 2,800 sabres) and 32 guns.⁴⁹⁰ Ahmed Pasha, however, during his trial in Istanbul, gave much exaggerated figures for the Russian army at Başgedikler: 24 battalions of infantry, 6 regiments of cavalry, about 3,000 irregular cavalry and 60 guns. Of these, he further argued, 6 battalions were behind near their wagons, the rest in front of the Ottoman army, with one regiment of cavalry and 4 guns against Veli Pasha. Abdi Pasha on the other hand stated that he heard the Russians had 12 battalions.⁴⁹¹

On 1 December 1853, when the Russians advanced from Şüregel towards Başgedikler, Ahmed Pasha also decided to attack them, relying upon his numerical superiority, notwithstanding his later understatement of his forces and overstatement of Russian forces. The problem was that an open field battle requiring high manoeuvre capacity and coordination of infantry, cavalry and artillery was apparently beyond the competence of the Ottoman army. Furthermore, Ahmed Pasha did not have a battle plan, therefore the officers under his command did not receive any orders as to how to begin the battle, what to do and where to retreat if the enemy proves stronger and a retreat becomes necessary.⁴⁹² The military *meclis* in Erzurum also stated that Ahmed

be found in the reports to the *seraskerlik*. I could not find such reports in the BOA and I do not have access to the ATASE archive. Budak seems to have used the ATASE archive extensively, but he does not mention any such reports or Abdi Pasha's claim. See BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6, dated 17 December 1854. Cf. Budak, *ibid*.

489 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81.

490 Zayonchkovskiy, (2002), vol. II, part I, p. 404. Tarle, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 297.

491 Ahmed Pasha's statement. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81.

492 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, page 3, answers to question [13]. See Appendix 83. Budak shortly mentions this document, but does not quote from it. Cf. Budak, *op. cit.*, (1993), p. 58. In fact, Budak has devoted, somewhat surprisingly, very meager space (1.5 pages) to this battle, in comparison with his coverage of other less important battles.

Pasha had hidden behind a rock during the battle and had not issued proper commands. Many soldiers were absent from the battalions, because they had been sent after barley, hay and tezek and for washing clothes. Thus even the 19 infantry battalions and 10 cavalry squadrons that actually participated in the battle were not complete and they were formed into one line without the second line and the reserve. Ahmed Pasha in fact confesses that he did not give specific instructions to his troops. He himself states that he had collected the pashas and told them: “Here is the enemy in front of you. It is high time to serve our religion and community. Let everybody act accordingly and take care of his own command!”⁴⁹³ Ahmed Pasha did not accept other charges and found it harmful to announce beforehand where to retreat in case of defeat because this would discourage the troops.

In this battle the Ottoman army was routed and turned into a disorderly retreat towards Kars, with heavy losses. Ahmed Pasha tells that at one point there were no Ottoman officers on the field above the captain. Hafız Pasha and his reserve battalions and guns also fled. Ottomans lost 24 guns and a total of 6,000 (8,000?) men, of whom about 1,500 men including 8 officers were killed and the rest were wounded or taken prisoner. Russian losses amounted to about 1,300 men, including 9 officers killed.⁴⁹⁴ General-Major Iliko Orbeliani died of his wounds soon after the battle.⁴⁹⁵ According to Ahmed Pasha, Ottoman losses included more than 500 dead, more than 700 wounded and 7 prisoners, while the Russians lost about 3,000 dead (of which 120 were officers from lieutenant to general), more than 4,000 wounded and 5 prisoners. Obviously these figures have nothing to do with reality: One can hardly believe that the Russians drove away the Ottoman army and captured 24 guns although they suffered about 6 times more losses! The Kurdish *başibozuks* plundered the Ottoman headquarters during their retreat and dispersed to their homes. On the relations of Kurds with the Russians, more will be said in Chapter 5.5.1 on the revolt of Yezdan Şer. The *başibozuks* of Hasan Yazıcı also did not participate in the battle.⁴⁹⁶

493 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, page 3, answers to question [13]. See Appendix 83.

494 Despite his research in the ATASE and the BOA, Budak (op. cit., p. 59) does not provide Ottoman figures for losses in this battle. Instead he quotes from John Curtiss. Thus he claims that Ottoman losses included 26 guns and 8,000 dead, while the Russian commander Bebutov reported Ottoman losses as 24 guns and more than 6,000 men. See Tarle, *ibid.* Although there is reference to certain detailed tables of losses in the interrogation of Abdi and Ahmed Pashas, I could not find them in the BOA. Zayonchkovskiy (op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 414) gives total Ottoman losses as 8,000 men, including more than 1,500 dead in the field, a certain Ibrahim Pasha, 2 regimental and 5 battalion commanders.

495 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., (1971), p. 200.

496 Salih Hayri, op. cit., pp. 102-103. Salih Hayri gives the Ottoman losses in this battle as 1,200 dead and wounded with 24 guns and provisions. He blames Ahmed Pasha for the defeat. Ahmed Rıza

According to the French consul in Erzurum, wounded soldiers from the battle of Başgedikler who had been brought to Erzurum told that there were about 1,200 wounded in the hospitals of Kars. It was also reported that the Russian army had captured 28 guns and 500 to 600 prisoners. It had occupied the villages between Kars and Arpaçay. The troops of the Anatolian army had been demoralized and they were deserting every day in groups. The consul added that Zarif Pasha had returned to Erzurum and asked him to request the French ambassador to help dismiss the current army commander and to find an able person for the job. Zarif Pasha even said that since it was difficult to save the Anatolian army without the help of the French, it was desirable that the French emperor appoint a general or at least a few high-ranking officers to the Anatolian army.⁴⁹⁷

On the next day after the destruction of the Ottoman squadron in Sinop, the Ottoman army now suffered a great defeat on land as well. These Russian victories more than compensated for early Ottoman victories on the Danubian and the Caucasian fronts. According to Russian military reports, the Ottoman army had shown progress in comparison with last time, especially the artillery was worthy of praise. Artillery officers and soldiers did their duty very well. The infantry also showed signs of being well trained in movements but in the open field it was not steady. The cavalry was the worst part of the Ottoman army.⁴⁹⁸

The news of Sinop, Ahışa and Başgedikler quickly changed the initial impressions on the capabilities of the Ottoman army. Now France and Britain were definitely convinced that the Porte needed help, otherwise it would be defeated. The Russians had now control of the Caucasian theatre of war. The Ottoman army had lost much confidence and had become demoralised. From then on, desertions from the army in Kars increased. The *müşir* and his *feriks* accused each other. Ahmed Pasha was indeed in a difficult situation, because he had disobeyed his commanding officer and had been defeated. However, Ahmed Pasha had enough money to bribe the authorities in Istanbul. He sent his agents to Istanbul with a lot of money and became the winner of this struggle.⁴⁹⁹ Abdi Pasha was recalled to Istanbul and Ahmed Pasha took his place,

Trabzonlu also blames the command of the army: “*Kumanda olmayınca n’etsin asker, Kumandasız ne yana gitsin asker.. Sabahtan geldi düşmen aldı gitti, Bizim paşa başını aldı yitti... Fenâ fikir ü fesâda erdi bunlar, Hiyânet ettiler başta olanlar*”. See Trabzonlu, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

497 BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 14.

498 See Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 415. One year later, the British Vice-Consul in Trabzon would also report of the inferiority of the Ottoman cavalry in his report on the Battle of Kürekdere. See Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Trebizond, August 12, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 2 in No. 7, p. 6.

499 Sandwith, op. cit., pp. 93-94. Mehmed Süreyya (op. cit., vol. 1, p. 202) in his biographic entry on Ahmed Pasha interestingly notes that he had become a *mirliva* (brigadier general) in a short time

with Ali Pasha as chief of staff.

Ahmed Pasha's command was probably the worst that the Anatolian army had ever seen during this war. He was also probably the most corrupt and venal of the pashas at that post. Doctor Sandwith has the following to say of him:

The fate of the miserable army under Ahmed Pasha is among the darkest records of war. His whole faculties were bent upon making money. He had in the first place to recover the sums he had already expended in bribes at Constantinople, and he had, besides, to make his fortune. I could not exaggerate the horrors the poor men suffered under his command, for no chief can plunder without allowing a considerable license to his subordinates, so that the poor soldier was fleeced by every officer higher than the Major.⁵⁰⁰

Ahmed Pasha's intrigues and corruption are confirmed by Russian sources as well. Ibragimbeyli, referring to some documents in the Georgian archives, writes that Ahmed Pasha made intrigues against Abdi Pasha in Istanbul to receive the command and that he robbed the army to such an extent that it was ruined by misery, hunger and mass diseases.⁵⁰¹ The British consul in Erzurum James Brant also reported to Stratford de Redcliffe on Ahmed Pasha's rule. Stratford forwarded this report to Lord Clarendon, who in turn wrote a strong worded letter to Lord Stratford, intended for the consumption of Reşid Pasha. Clarendon made it clear that the "rapacity, ignorance and neglect of Ahmed Pasha" were not to be tolerated, adding that

If the Turkish government has not the will or the the [sic] power to punish this man, and to make him refund the wealth which he has amassed by defrauding the soldiers, others will follow his criminal example, and the Allied Armies will look in vain for that support from the Turkish Troops that they have a right to expect while engaged in defending the Sultan's cause.⁵⁰²

Abdi Pasha's evidence in Istanbul also worked against Ahmed Pasha and in February 1854, Ahmed Pasha was also replaced in his post by Zarif Mustafa Pasha, the governor of Erzurum.⁵⁰³ Zarif Pasha arrived at Kars to take over the command of the army on 6 March 1854.⁵⁰⁴ Abdi Pasha and Ahmed Pasha's trials in Istanbul would start only at the end of 1854 upon pressure from Lord Stratford. Abdi Pasha was finally

and also earned a lot of money in Trablusgarb (Libya) before 1846. He does not specify how he earned so much money, but in any case it must be certain that he was rich. Doctor Sandwith (op. cit., p. 93) also writes that Ahmed Pasha had formerly enriched himself by plunder in the Kurdish campaign. This is very much likely, because Ahmed Pasha was appointed to the Anatolian army in 1846, at the time of the insurrection of the Kurdish Bedirhan Bey.

500 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 94.

501 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 202.

502 Clarendon to Statford de Redcliffe, dated 11 April 1854. BOA. HR. TO. 222/27.

503 Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 484.

504 Hayreddin Pasha to the Seraskier, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1270 / 8 March 1854. BOA. İ. DH. 18801.

acquitted in 1855. Ahmed Pasha was found guilty and first exiled to Cyprus in 1855. However, like so many other Ottoman pashas, he was pardoned after conviction and a period of unemployment. Thus we see that in December 1859, he was made the *mutasarrıf* of Adana with the rank of *mirmiran*. His last office is recorded as governorship of Yemen from 1867 to 1869.⁵⁰⁵

Karl Marx's article in the *NYDT*, published on 15 November 1853, had described the future prospects of the Anatolian army prophetically:

A short time ago it might have been believed that the Turks, if weaker in Europe, enjoyed a decided superiority in Asia. Abdi Pasha, who commands the Asiatic army, was said to have collected 60,000 or 80,000, nay 120,000 men, and swarms of Bedouins, Kurds, and other warlike irregulars were reported to flock daily to his standard. Arms and ammunitions were said to be in store for the Caucasian insurgents; and as soon as war was declared, an advance was to be made into the very heart of these centres of resistance to Russia. It may, however, be as well to observe that Abdi Pasha cannot possibly have more than about 30,000 regular troops, and that before the Caucasus is reached, with these, and with these alone, he will have to encounter the stubborn resistance of Russian battalions. His Bedouins and Kurdish horsemen may be capital for mountain warfare, for forcing the Russians to detach largely and to weaken their main body; they may do a great deal of damage to the Georgian and Colonist villages in the Russian Territory, and even open some sort of an underhand communication with the Caucasian mountaineers. But unless Abdi Pasha's regulars are capable of blocking up the road from Batum to Erzerum, and can defeat whatever nucleus of an active army the Russians may be enabled to bring together, the success of the irregulars will be of a very ephemeral nature... In 1829 the Russian forces in Asia amounted, before Erzerum, to 18,000 men only, and considering the improvements that have since then taken place in the Turkish army (although that of Asia has least participated in them), we should say the Russians would have a fair chance of success if they could unite 30,000 men in a body before the same place now.⁵⁰⁶

Indeed the Russian army would take Kars again when its number reached this figure. By then the Ottoman army would fall behind in numbers.

Thus the year 1853 ended on the Caucasian front with a Russian superiority. The Ottoman army had suffered a powerful blow to its self-confidence at the battles of Ahısha and Başgedikler. Disorganised and demoralised, its high command no longer thought of any attack or advance. The need for a remedy in the Anatolian army was obvious for the allies as well. The British embassy had been urging the Porte to send the Hungarian refugee general of British (Scottish or Irish) origin Richard Debaufre Guyon (1813-1856), who lived under his new Ottoman name Hurşid Pasha in Damascus. In fact, Hurşid Pasha himself had already applied to the Porte to serve in the Rumelian or

505 Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 202-203. Kunalalp, op. cit., p. 60.

506 "The Holy War", *NYDT*, Leader, November 15, 1853. See Karl Marx, op. cit., pp. 155-156.

Anatolian army even before the declaration of war and he was ordered to go to Erzurum soon after the declaration of war.⁵⁰⁷ (As was said before, the Porte did not want to send Hungarian refugee officers to the Danubian front due to Austrian pressure). The order of appointment of Hurşid Pasha to the Anatolian army did not, however, specify his position. From the wording of the *tezkire*, it seems that he was meant to serve on the staff of the army in Erzurum (*Erzurum ordusu maiyetine gönderilmesi*). But it is not clear on the basis of the above mentioned document whether he was just a staff officer or the chief of staff.

Hurşid Pasha arrived at Erzurum in early December. According to a British consular report from Erzurum, dated 23 December 1853, Hurşid Pasha had reportedly said to the *müşir* (the Commander-in-Chief or the governor?) and to the members of the *meclis* of the city, that he had an imperial order to take up matters in the Anatolian army and if his advices went unheeded, he would lose no time to return to Istanbul and tell the matters to the Porte. Thereupon the governor and the *meclis* assured him that his advices would be listened to. Again according to this report, he inspected the fortifications of the city and ordered new ones to be built. He also inspected the military hospitals, provisions and the troops. He found out that the salaries of the soldiers were twelve to eighteen months in arrears, while the pashas usually one month or in some cases three months in arrears of pay. Then he reproached the pashas for not caring for the men under their command while protecting their own comfort very well. He told them that they could have given up their salaries for one year instead of leaving the soldiers without salary and this would not be a great burden for them. Then he ordered the payment of two months' salaries to the soldiers. The consular report also states that Hurşid Pasha had thus gained much popularity (*makbuliyet*) among the soldiers and they pledged to him to go with him down to the last step.⁵⁰⁸ This is an interesting information, but unfortunately we do not have a confirmation from another source, preferably an Ottoman source. Moreover, this consular report is somewhat in contradiction with a letter from Hurşid Pasha from Kars, dated 9 December 1853. (See below). Nevertheless, if the contents of this report are true, then we can be safe to assume that the seeds of dissension between Hurşid Pasha and some pashas had already been sown by this act. Indeed, we will see later that Hurşid Pasha will not get along well

507 Sultan's *irade*, dated 10 Muharrem 1270 / 13 October 1853. See BOA. İ. DH. 17617. Also see instructions (*tezkire*) from the grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 13 Muharrem 1270 / 16 October 1853. BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 95 /82.

508 Translation of an extract from a report from the British consulate in Erzurum to the British embassy. BOA. HR. TO. 219/84, dated 23 December 1853. See Appendix 24.

with Zarif Pasha, the former governor and the new Commander-in-Chief of the Anatolian army beginning from March 1854.

According to Hurşid Pasha's own letter from Kars, dated 27 December 1853, he departed from Damascus and arrived at Kars on 9 December 1853. In this letter, he does not mention Erzurum at all. Hurşid Pasha writes that he could have arrived earlier had he not been kept two weeks for receiving his travel money (*harcırah*). He would be soon appointed chief of staff of the Anatolian army, but from his first letter from Kars it seems that he did not know his exact position in the army yet (*hizmet ve memuriyet-i bendeganemin ne olacağını katiyyen bilmekliği arzu etmekteyim*).⁵⁰⁹ The tone of this letter does not coincide with the consular report mentioned above, where he boldly states to all pashas and other officials in Erzurum that he holds an imperial order and his advices should be kept. Stratford de Redcliffe wanted him to practically command the army. Nevertheless, Hurşid Pasha would face the opposition of both the Ottoman and the Polish parties in the Anatolian army.

In his letter Hurşid Pasha stated his opinion on the causes of the defeats of the Anatolian army. First, he wrote that the artillery had ammunition enough for only 200 shots for each cannon whereas it was 400 shots before. Secondly, he argued, two corps had been detached from the Kars army to Ahışa and Bayezid, however, as these places were far away from Kars, they did not receive help from Kars and they were put into danger in vain. Thirdly, it was a mistake to march with 28,000 men upon such a well fortified fortress as Gümrü. The army should instead march upon Tiflis. Furthermore, he argued that, at the battle of Bayındır, the Russian army was half the size of the Ottoman army and thus it provided a good opportunity for the Ottoman army. Although the Russians suffered big losses, the battle consisted only of 4.5 hours of cannonade and neither the Ottoman cavalry nor the infantry were sent against the enemy, even the retreating way of the enemy towards the fortress (of Gümrü) was not cut off. Fourth, in the battle of Ahışa, the Russian forces were equal to Ottoman forces in number, however the Ottoman battalions were separated from each other, therefore the compact Russian forces were superior to the Ottoman battalions. Furthermore, the commander Ferik Ali Pasha had himself "retreated" from the battle scene, leaving the troops to

509 Translation of Ferik Hurşid Pasha's letter from Kars to the Ottoman foreign minister Reşid Pasha, dated 26 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (27 December 1853). BOA. HR. MKT. 68/42. See Appendix 25. Hurşid Pasha gives the date of his arrival at Kars as 9 *Kanun-ı Evvel*, which by the Julian calendar corresponds to 21 December. However, from other dates in his letter, it seems that by *Kanun-ı Evvel* he means the Western (Gregorian) month of December. Likewise he gives the date of the battle of Bayındır as 13 *Teşrin-i Sani* (13 November), again using this Julian month as a Gregorian month.

disorder and total defeat with the loss of 14 cannons. Fifth, in the battle of Başgedikler,⁵¹⁰ the *Reis* (Chief of Staff) Ahmed Pasha should have orderly retreated towards Kars, waiting for the 8 battalions of infantry, 18 cannons and 3 regiments of cavalry from the Arabistan army in Kars, then the Ottoman forces would have a definite superiority against the Russians. Hurşid Pasha asserted that the Ottoman losses in this battle were not only 26 cannons but also demoralisation of the army, which retreated disorderly, deserted and showed signs of distrust to its commanders. Hurşid Pasha suggested that by the next spring the number of the Anatolian army should be increased up to 50 to 60 thousand and the number of cannons up to 100 to 130. Then the army should leave a corps around Gümrü and march against Tiflis, trying to urge the Russian Muslims to insurgence and to meet with the forces of “Shamil Bey”, meaning Sheikh Shamil, the Imam of Dagestan. Hurşid Pasha also observed that the Anatolian army did not have any proper maps of the region. He suggested that the French ministry of war had a good map of the Caucasus in Paris, the grand vizier might ask the French for a copy. Finally Hurşid Pasha wanted more money allowance for the spies and better administration of the provisions.

3.5. The Danubian Front in 1854 and the Declaration of War by France and Britain

The year 1854 was opened with another Ottoman victory on the Danubian front. The commander of the Ottoman forces in Kalafat (across Vidin), Ferik Çerkes İsmail Pasha attacked the Russian forces near the village Çatana (Cetate or Citate) to the north of Kalafat on 31 December with a few thousand cavalry and infantry. The attack was repulsed, but on 6 January, on the day of the Orthodox Christmas day, a big Ottoman force of about 18,000 men attacked a smaller Russian force under the command of Colonel Aleksandr Baumgarten near Çatana. Another small Russian force was in a nearby village under the command of Brigadier General Belgard. Thus the total number of these two units (according to Tarle and other Russian sources) was about 7,000.⁵¹¹ On the other hand, according to the report of the Ottoman Commander-in-Chief Müşir Ömer Lütfi Pasha, the Ottoman force that took part in this battle consisted of 11 infantry battalions, 4 batteries (24 guns) and 3 cavalry regiments, while the Russian forces

510 Hurşid Pasha gives the names of “*Başgedi, Ortagedi and Kolveren (?)*” as the places of this battle. The words “*gedi*” here must be the distorted forms of “*gedik*” or “*gedikli*” or “*gedikler*”. See *ibid.*

511 Tarle, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 289.

included 15 infantry battalions, 24 guns and 3 cavalry regiments, that is to say, the Russians had 4 battalions more of infantry.⁵¹²

These Russian units were under the command of General Anrep, who stayed in Boloeshti, not far from Çatana. In this battle, the Russians lost about 2,300 men and officers, killed and wounded, according to Tarle.⁵¹³ According to Ömer Pasha, Ottoman losses were 300 dead and 700 wounded, while the Russians lost about 4,000 dead and many wounded. He also wrote that the Ottoman soldiers had bayoneted a lot of Russian prisoners of war because of their rage and anger, bringing only a few of them alive to Kalafat (*Rusyalu'dan hayy olarak hayli esir tutulmuş ise de asakir-i şahane kemal-i hiddet ü şiddetinden sağ bırakmayıp kaffesini süngüden geçirerek yalnız birkaç neferi hayyen Kalafat'a getirmiştir*).⁵¹⁴

Seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha, however, in his report to Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, wrote that, although it was stated that this bayoneting of live prisoners was a result of the soldiers' rage and although it was understood that they were reprimanded for this act, in fact this was not an act of spontaneous fury (*hemen oracıkda hasıl olmuş hiddet ü şiddetten olmayıp*) as stated by Ömer Pasha, but it was the result of the soldiers' awareness of Russian atrocities during the battle of Sinop, when the Russians had continued to fire shell and grapeshot even on those sailors who had jumped into the sea trying to reach the shore and fired about one thousand cannon shots on the corpses on the shore. Thus the seraskier continued that he had heard that the soldiers had intentionally killed the prisoners and the wounded. Nevertheless, he argues that this act is indeed illegitimate and in itself a harmful thing (*ancak bu hareket filhakika na-meşru ve hadd-i zatında muzırr şey olarak*), being also contrary to earlier directions, it was necessary to announce and to confirm once again that such actions were not to be repeated.⁵¹⁵

At the battle of Çatana, the Russians had captured two cannons from the Ottomans due to the desertion of some squadrons from the 4th cavalry regiment. For this reason, Kaimmakam (Lieutenant-Colonel) Sadık Bey and Binbaşı (Major) Ahmed Bey of the said 4th cavalry regiment were later found guilty of desertion and expelled from the

512 Ömer Pasha to the Seraskier, from Şumnu, 13 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (13 January 1854). BOA. İ. HR. 114/5554-09 lef 1. See Appendix 33.

513 Tarle, *ibid*.

514 Ömer Pasha, *ibid*.

515 Seraskier Pasha to the grand vizier, 22 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (22 January 1854). BOA. İ. DH. 18116. However, the grand vizier in his petition (*arz tezkiresi*) does not relate this event to the Sultan. The seraskier pasha mentions three attached letters from Ömer Pasha, dated 11, 15 and 17 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (January 1854). However, these letters are not found in this *gömlek*.

army by decision of the *Dâr-ı Şûra-yı Askerî* (military tribunal).⁵¹⁶ However, Ömer Pasha does not mention this fact in his first report above, neither does he seem to have reported in his three other reports during January 1854.⁵¹⁷ In any case, this is just another example showing that the regular cavalry was really the least efficient arm in the Ottoman army, just as the irregular cavalry.

On the Russian side, most Russian sources (both tsarist military historians and Soviet historians) accuse General Anrep of not coming to the help of his units, although the cannonade was heard in Boloeshti as well. They also argue that due to the incompetence of General Gorchakov, the small Russian forces in Little Walachia were sacrificed to the Ottoman army.⁵¹⁸

Thus the Ottomans closed the winter campaign on the Danube with victory. In his report dated 14 January 1854, Ömer Pasha informed the seraskier that Cetate would indeed remain as the biggest battle on the Danube front. However, the Ottomans did not follow the enemy and retreated to Kalafat. On both cases they had luck on their side, while the Russian command was inefficient. Overall, like so many battles of the Crimean War, this was an unfinished and indecisive battle.

The rest of January and February was quiet on the Danubian front. Sultan Abdülmecid conferred on Mushir Ömer Pasha the title of *Serdar-ı Ekrem* (Commander-in-Chief or generalissimo) on 15 February 1854. Ömer Pasha also retained his post of the commander of the Rumeli army.⁵¹⁹

While these battles took place, diplomatic missions continued their work. During this time, both Russian and Western diplomacy tried to gain Austria and Prussia to their side. Towards the end of January Nikolai sent Count Aleksey Orlov to the young Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph (1830-1916), whom he saw like a son and almost like a vassal. Orlov was one of the favourites of Nikolai and unlike Menshikov, had the reputation of a good diplomat. Although he was the brother of Mikhail Orlov, one of the leaders of the Decembrist (*Dekabrist*) revolt in 1825, his behaviour as the commander of cavalry regiment during the revolt had made him a favourite of the tsar. According to Tarle, Orlov did not believe that he could come to an agreement with Franz Joseph and

516 BOA. İ. DH. 21265, 17 Zilhicce 1271 (31 August 1855).

517 BOA. İ. DH. 18116.

518 For example, see Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 284-290. Also see Modest Ivanovich Bogdanovich, *Vostochnaya Voina 1853-1856 godov*. St. Petersburg: Tip. M. Stasiulievicha, 1877, Glava VII, available online at <http://history.scps.ru/crimea/bogdan07.htm> (Retrieved August 2006). Winfried Baumgart gives the Russian losses as 831 dead and 1,190 wounded. See Baumgart, op. cit., p. 96.

519 BOA. İ. DH. 18072. Also see Lütfi, op. cit., p. 211-212.

his foreign minister Count Ferdinand Buol.⁵²⁰ However, he could not object to Nikolai. So he went to Vienna. His task was to convince Franz Joseph to be neutral, but go into war on the side of Russia if France and Britain started war against Russia. In return he was promised Russian help against all enemies and internal revolutions, and Russia also promised not to decide anything on the fate of the Ottoman Empire without agreement with Austria. In Vienna however, the pro-Russian party had lost ground. Franz Joseph and Buol did not want to commit themselves to the policy of Nikolai. Thus the mission of Orlov was unsuccessful.⁵²¹

Towards the end of January 1854 Napoleon III wrote a letter to Nikolai I, which was published in the French official newspaper *Le Moniteur Universel* and the *St Peterburgskie Vedomosti* together with Nikolai's reply on 9 February. The French emperor stated that "*Notre attitude vis avis de la Turquie était protective mais passive*".⁵²² Napoleon proposed the withdrawal of the French and British fleets from the Black Sea and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldavia and Wallachia. Nikolai in return proposed that the Franco-British fleets should only prevent the Ottomans from carrying weapons and ammunition to Russian coasts and the Porte should send its representative to St Petersburg for negotiations on the basis of the his conditions. Diplomatic relations between Russia and France and Britain were severed in February 1854. The Russian ambassadors Count Kiselev in Paris and Brunnov in London left for Russia. The British and French ambassadors in St. Petersburg also returned home.⁵²³

Towards the end of February 1854, Britain and France gave an ultimatum to Emperor Nikolai to withdraw from the principalities. Nikolai did not give an official answer and unofficially told that he had no answer to such an ultimatum. Therefore Britain and France concluded an agreement of alliance with the Porte on 12 March 1854. On 27 March, France and Britain finally declared war on Russia. On 31 March the first French and then British troops landed in Gallipoli. By this time Lord Aberdeen dealt another blow to Nikolai: He approved of the publication of Sir Hamilton Seymour's conversations with Nikolai in January-February 1853. The publication of these conversations were especially harmful for Russo-Austrian relations, because Franz Joseph and Count Buol were indignant at Nikolai's disrespect towards Austria, by

520 Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 409.

521 The details of this mission are to be found in Tarle, "Missiya grafa Alekseya Orlova k Frantsu-Iosifu i pozitsiya Avstrii pered perekhodom russkikh voysk cherez Dunai", op. cit., vol. I, pp. 405-428.

522 A copy of this letter is at BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 82.

523 Paris Ambassador Veli Pasha to the Ottoman foreign ministry, 10 February 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 97.

learning that Nikolai had shown a disrespectful and patronizing attitude towards Austria in his talks with the British envoy, assuming that Austria needed not to be considered as an independent actor and taking Austrian consent for granted. The Russian government's objections were published in Russian newspapers, stating that Seymour had misunderstood Nikolai. "The Emperor has never thought of any partition, he directed attention to the future and not to the present, he had in mind only future possibilities", it was announced.⁵²⁴ But these excuses of course were not convincing for the European diplomacy and public opinion.

On the other hand, it would be interesting to know whether the Porte knew of the Nikolai - Seymour conversations before their publication. It seems that it did not. Kostaki Musurus's despatch dated 17 March 1854 mentions the intention of the British cabinet to disclose these conversations, but very interestingly he argues that the Petersburg cabinet itself had disclosed in a Petersburg newspaper the offers of Nikolai I to the Queen on the partition of Ottoman Empire with the purpose of setting France and Britain against each other.⁵²⁵

Thus the efforts of the Russian ambassador in Vienna Baron Peter von Meyendorff to gain Austria became fruitless. The French and British ambassadors in Vienna finally managed to sign a protocol of four points with Count Buol.⁵²⁶ This protocol became famous as the "four points" ("*mevadd-i erbaa*" or "*nikat-i erbaa*" in Ottoman diplomatic language). The first point stated that the Russian protectorate over Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia should be ended and these principalities should be placed under the guarantee of the great powers. Secondly, the mouths of the Danube should be free for navigation. The third and probably the most important but also the vaguest point stipulated that the Straits Treaty of 1841 should be revised "in the interest of the European balance of power". The fourth point was the only point related to the immediate cause of the war: Russia should abandon its claim to protect the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire and the Christians of the Ottoman Empire should be placed under the protection of the great powers, without violating sovereign rights of the Sultan. A secret fifth point, agreed between France and Britain only, specified the third point to some extent: Russia should give up its "preponderance" in the Black Sea,

524 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 494.

525 Translation of Kostaki Bey's despatch to Reşid Pasha, dated 17 March 1854. BOA. HR. TO. 52/59.

526 Gavin Henderson has called this event and the consequent alienation of Austria from Russia as a diplomatic revolution in the Concert of Europe. However, he claimed that the four points came into being in July 1854. See "The Diplomatic Revolution of 1854: I The Four Points", *The American Historical Review* 43(1), October 1937, p. 27.

by reducing its navy to four ships of war and by demolishing and not re-establishing the Sevastopol naval base.⁵²⁷

Meyendorff, who was a brother-in-law of Buol, tried to obtain the text of this protocol but he was rejected. He then almost threatened Count Buol: “Remember that Russia has a 700,000-strong army and it should not be approached as a second-rate state”.⁵²⁸ Nevertheless he had gained some unofficial and vague information about the protocol. According to what he heard, they were about maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, evacuation of the principalities by Russia and the improving the status of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire.⁵²⁹ It seems that he did not manage to learn the full contents of all the four points. He also observed that prices in the Vienna stock exchange had risen. The stock exchange thought that the more the enemies of Russia, the more chances for a peace. On 20 April, Austria also signed a “defensive and offensive” agreement with Prussia.⁵³⁰

Meanwhile the first clash between the allies and Russia happened at Odessa. On 9 April the British frigate *Furious* came to Odessa to take the British consul there. A sloop was detached from the frigate with a white flag. Then the authorities told the officer in the sloop that the consul had already left, and the sloop was returning to the *Furious*. At that time, or some time before, the Russian port battery fired a few shots which were not aimed at the sloop or the frigate. The Russian authorities later claimed it was a warning only. They argued that the frigate had come too close to the shore. In any case no damage was done. As Adolphus Slade remarked, a boat with truce flag should wait at a distance, until another boat meets it from the shore.⁵³¹ But the allied admirals took offence and sent a squadron of sail ships of the line and steamers to demand the release of neutral and surrender of all British, French and Russian ships at anchor in the port as reparation for the breach of international law. The governor of Odessa, Count Osten-Sacken released the neutral ships but refused to give the Russian ships. Then the allied fleet on 22 April bombarded the harbour and its facilities. Although they claimed that they did not aim at the city and the civilians, the city was also damaged. Slade is very critical of such acts, arguing that “war is never aided by needless severity or destruction of domestic property”.⁵³² Though this was a skirmish, the allied navies now

527 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 19.

528 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part one, p. 511.

529 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part one, p. 510-511.

530 Ibid.

531 Slade, op. cit., p. 215.

532 Slade, op. cit., p. 218.

sent a clear message that they were the masters in the Black Sea.

Austria continued its armed neutrality; mobilizing its army and practically becoming more and more anti-Russian. It even declared to Russia that if it crossed the Danube then Austria would send its armies. For fear of a Serbian uprising, that would upset its own Serbs, Austria concentrated troops on the Serbian frontier. Emperor Nikolai I was still undaunted, he thought he could still go on with his plans without Austria. The Greeks had revolted in Thessaly and Epirus. Nikolai now harboured the illusion that the Serbs and Bulgarians would also rise against the “Turkish yoke”. The Greek government secretly supported the insurgents, while the Greek newspapers openly called for an uprising. However, in April and May the Greek insurrection was suppressed by the Ottoman army under the command of Fuad Efendi with the help of the allied fleets threatening Athens and Piraeus.⁵³³

Nikolai’s plans for the spring campaign included crossing of the Danube from Vidin, Rusçuk and Silistria and the siege of these cities together with Galatz and Brailov in the north. Russian troops in accordance with this plan occupied the whole Dobruca region from 23 to 29 March. The Russian army across the Danube numbered 45,000 men under the command of General Aleksandr Lüders.⁵³⁴ For Nikolai, Silistria was to be the stronghold from which to attack the allied expeditionary force which he thought would be landed at Varna. Indeed his expectation would come true.

In Silistria there was an Ottoman force of 12,000 men under the command of Ferik Musa Hulusi Pasha (?-1854). There were also about six British officers in Silistria, among whom Captain James Butler and Lieutenant Charles Nasmyth are best remembered.⁵³⁵ In the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-29, the Ottoman army in Silistria had held out against Russians for six months. From then on the fortress was fortified by outer forts. Russian siege works began on 5 April. The commander of the siege forces was the aged General Karl Andreyevich Schilder (1785-1854), who had taken Silistria in 1829 by mining operations. One of his aides was military engineer Lieutenant-Colonel Eduard Ivanovich Totleben (1818-84) responsible for fortification and sapper works. Totleben would later undertake the fortification of Sevastopol. Meanwhile Field

533 See Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 40-Tetimme*, p. 67-68. Interestingly, Fuad Efendi signs a letter to Cevdet Pasha as “*Ceneral-i orduy-ı Yanya ve Narda*”. This is probably because he had become temporarily a general but not a pasha. Also see Besbelli, op. cit., p. 59, Reid, op. cit., pp. 248-253.

534 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 99.

535 Both had served in the East India Company army. Butler has left a “journal”. These six British officers received the Mecidiye order. See BOA. İ. DH. 19455, dated 14 August 1854. However, as we have seen in the introductory chapter, Lane-Poole has quite exaggerated their role, arguing that without them “the garrison might have surrendered”.

Marshal Paskevich came from Warsaw to Bucharest to take direct command of the occupation army. Paskevich arrived at Bucharest on 22 April. Ottoman reinforcements also began to arrive at Silistria. By May, the garrison muster-roll rose to 18,000 troops of all types.⁵³⁶

Paskevich had only grown more sceptic of the Danubian campaign. He was worried by the concentration of Austrian troops (said to reach 280,000 men) along the borders of Wallachia and Moldavia.⁵³⁷ They posed a real threat as Austria had already warned Russia not to cross the Danube. Paskevich now tried to convince Nikolai to evacuate the principalities. He said that the Bulgarians and the Serbians were not to be expected to rise. By evacuation of the principalities, Paskevich argued, Russia would gain time, which would work against the allies. Meanwhile Russia could reinforce its armies. But Nikolai did not heed his advice.⁵³⁸ It was indeed one of the biggest mistakes of Nikolai to continue with Paskevich, who simply did not believe in Nikolai's plans.

By May 1854, the Russian forces around Silistria had reached 90,000 men with 266 cannons.⁵³⁹ This was the biggest Russian siege force against an Ottoman fortress until then. It soon started siege works around the fortress and the Russian bombardment of Silistria began in the middle of May.⁵⁴⁰ But Paskevich hesitated to make a decisive assault on the fortifications while Ferik Musa Pasha energetically continued to improve fortifications. On 4 May, Paskevich wrote a second letter to Nikolai, this time more clearly proposing to retreat. He wrote that surrounded by the French and the "Turks" from the front, and by Austria from the rear, they did not have a chance. Upon receipt of this letter on 11 May, Nikolai felt offended and angry. After all their efforts, losses and expenses, now his Commander-in-Chief was suggesting to leave the principalities with shame! On the next day he wrote his reply, stating that he received his letter with "extreme grief and no less astonishment" and he would not accept his proposals because they were "shameful" for him. He emphasized that Austria could not enter the war

536 Reid, op. cit., p. 256.

537 Baumgart, *ibid.*

538 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 486-487.

539 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part 2, p. 272. Tarle gives 210 cannons. Cf. Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 500.

540 Nafiz Efendi, who was an Ottoman artillery sergeant-major at that time, gives the date of the beginning of the siege as 14 Şaban 1270 (12 May 1854). M. Bogdanovich (editor of the article), however, remarks that the bombardment began on the night of 17-18 May. See Nafiz Efendi, "Krepost' Silistriya v 1854 godu", *Voenny Sbornik* 106(12), 1875, p. 502. Captain Butler on the other hand, as quoted by Reid, wrote in his journal that the Russian bombardment began on 16 May. See Reid, op. cit., p. 256.

against Russia, that there was no reason to be afraid of the allies.⁵⁴¹

Meanwhile on 18 May, the allied commanders Marshal Saint Arnaud⁵⁴² and General Lord Raglan⁵⁴³ together with Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha came to Varna from Istanbul and on 19 May they held a war council with Ömer Pasha who had also come from Şumnu. Ömer Pasha was very worried about the Russian siege and offensive. His hope was in the allied troops. The allied commanders agreed with Ömer Pasha's request to bring their troops to Varna as soon as possible. St Arnaud promised to send 55,000 troops. However, these troops would not arrive at Varna before June and before they were ready for help, the Russians would raise the siege of Silistria.⁵⁴⁴

Ömer Pasha remained in Şumnu with 40,000 to 45,000 troops, but he hesitated to come to the rescue of Silistria or to make a diversion operation. In fact he did not want any open field encounter with a big Russian army. All he did was to send the Cossack regiment of Sadık Pasha and some other 5,000 irregulars from Razgrad to take positions at some distance around Russian forces. He also allowed Behram Pasha (General Cannon) to make a manoeuvre before the city with a brigade of infantry.⁵⁴⁵

On 28 May the Russians made an assault on the Arab Tabia in Silistria, but they were repulsed, losing 22 officers (dead and wounded) and 315 dead and 596 wounded rank and file.⁵⁴⁶ General Selvan was among the dead. Ottoman losses were about 68 dead, 121 wounded.⁵⁴⁷ On 2 June Musa Pasha was killed by a piece of shell while preparing for prayers. His heroic death further increased the spirit of the defenders.⁵⁴⁸

541 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 488-489.

542 Marshal Armand-Jacques Leroy de Saint Arnaud (1801-1854) had distinguished himself in Algeria. As minister of war, he led the military operations of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* of 2 December 1851. A year later he became a Marshal of France and a senator, remaining at the head of the war office till 1854, when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French *armée d'Orient*. He died shortly after the battle of Alma on 29 September 1854.

543 General Fitzroy James Henry Somerset, 1st Baron Raglan (1788-1855) was aide-de-camp and military secretary to the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo, where he lost his right arm. In 1819 he was appointed secretary to the Duke of Wellington as master-general of the ordnance, and from 1827 till the death of the duke in 1852 was military secretary to him as commander-in-chief. He was made Field Marshal after the battle of Balaklava on 25 October 1854. Lord Raglan died of dysentery on 18 June 1855.

544 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 109. Also see General Andrey N. Petrov, op. cit., as quoted by Kur. Yzb. A. Tefvik Gürel, *1853-55 Türk-Rus ve Müttefiklerin Kırım Savaşı*, Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1935, p. 56. Also see Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 502.

545 Gürel has taken General "Kannon" and "General Behram" for two different persons. See Gürel, op. cit., p. 66.

546 See Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 505.

547 Bogdanovich, op. cit., vol. II, glava XIII, footnote 17.

548 See Yüzbaşı Fevzi, op. cit., p. 43. Captain Fevzi Kurtoğlu writes that Musa Pasha was killed when he got out of his room to make ablution (*abdest*) before the noon prayers and while he was talking with an officer. However, Slade argues that Musa Pasha was killed while he was stepping on to his

Hüseyin Rıfat Pasha came from Şumnu to take the command of the defence. He also brought from Ömer Pasha the news that Silistria should not expect relief for about two weeks until the allies arrived.⁵⁴⁹ Meanwhile the provisions of the city were at their end. The Russians made a few further indecisive attacks without result. Paskevich in his reports to Nikolai stated that the Ottomans were defending the city with much energy and good strategical knowledge, assisted by foreign officers. However, he might as well be covering his own indecision and vacillation.⁵⁵⁰ The French General Pierre F. J. Bosquet also found it strange and wrote that he did not understand what paralysed the Russian army: “This is strange and I feel reluctant to explain it by the impotence of the Russians. There is another thing, like a demoralization, a concern, I do not know what, which paralyses this army”.⁵⁵¹

On 9 June Paskevich suffered a real or pretended contusion and left the command of operations again to Gorchakov, himself returning to Jassy. On 13 June General Schilder was severely wounded and died shortly afterwards. On 21 June the Russian army was to storm the main fortress. At this point, hours before the commencement of storming, Gorchakov received an order from Paskevich to raise the siege and retreat to the left of the Danube. Thus the Russian army retreated but the Ottoman army as usual did not follow.⁵⁵² The reason for Paskevich’s order of retreat was Austria’s menacing position and the concentration of allied forces in Varna. On 3 June Austria demanded Russia to evacuate the principalities otherwise it would join the allies to force Russia out.⁵⁵³

On 14 June, the Porte and Austria signed the convention of Boyacıköy, whereby Austria received the right to occupy the principalities temporarily.⁵⁵⁴ Thus Nikolai took alarm and decided to retreat. Nesselrode finally answered the Austrian summons to retreat on 29 June. The Russians began to evacuate Dobrudja. There were skirmishes between Russian and Ottoman forces at Yergögü (Giurgevo) on 5-7 July, but the Russians continued to retreat. In order to save face Russia called its retreat a strategic

seccade (small carpet) for the evening prayers. Slade also writes that the death of Musa Pasha sent “a fervid thrill through Islam”. See Slade, op. cit., p. 251.

549 Captain Butler’s journal, quoted by Reid, op. cit., p. 257.

550 Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

551 “*Ceci est étrange et je répugne à me l’expliquer par l’impuissance des russes. Il y a autre chose, comme une démoralisation, une préoccupation, je ne sais quoi, qui paralyse cette armée*”. Quoted by Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part 2, p. 290.

552 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 515-516.

553 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 101.

554 BOA. İ. HR. 111/5445.

withdrawal. On 1 August the Russian army left Bucharest. The Ottoman army entered Bucharest on 8 August under the command of Halim Pasha and on 22 August Ömer Pasha came to the city.⁵⁵⁵ The Austrians and the Ottomans started to occupy the principalities. The Austrians were cautious not to meet the retreating Russians. On 7 September the principalities were totally evacuated by the Russian army.

At the beginning of July the allies decided to embark their armies to the Crimea. They wanted to destroy the Russian navy at Sevastopol. According to Slade, Austria sent a military envoy to Varna to urge the allied generals for a joint campaign in Bessarabia, while Cevdet Pasha on the contrary argues that the allies later admitted their mistake and said that they were misled by the Austrians. Cevdet Pasha also writes that the proposal for a campaign in Bessarabia came from Ömer Pasha.⁵⁵⁶ In any case, France and Britain, too confident of their military might and not wanting to share their victory with anybody, even with the Ottoman Empire, started preparations for embarkation from Varna on 14 August. They counted on their steam frigates and screw-propelled line-of-battle ships for defying the distance, facilitating logistic support and destroying the Russian fleet. They had planned to finish the Crimean campaign by Christmas.

The allied fleets had come to Varna and anchored off Balçık. However they did not want the Ottoman fleet to have any active role in the Black Sea. They wanted it to protect the Bosphorus and cruise between Varna and Istanbul. While the Ottomans and the allies could not or did not want to conquer Bessarabia, a brave Russian war steamer called the *Bessarabia* left Sevastopol on 19 July and steamed among hostile steamers across the Black Sea up to the north-western coast of Anatolia, capturing two Ottoman merchant vessels, one off Kerempe, the other off Amasra, laden with maize and coal. The *Bessarabia* then took the coal for itself, burned the vessels, disembarked their crew at Ereğli, retaining only their captains and scribes as evidence and then returned to Sevastopol. When the *kaimmakam* of Ereğli reported the situation to Istanbul, it was met with suspicion. The Russian navy had once again showed contempt for the allied fleets.⁵⁵⁷

Varna had become a hot spot full with ships, troops, stores of provisions and ammunition. The best houses and private shops had been occupied by the allies without

555 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 104.

556 Slade, op. cit., p. 253. Cf. Cevdet Paşa, op. cit., p. 28.

557 Besbelli, op. cit., p. 66. Özcan (op. cit., 1990, p. 93) mentions only one merchant vessel, *Medar-ı Ticaret* and states that the steamer *Şehper* was attacked off Kerempe by Russian pirates but managed to come to the harbour of Sinop intact.

any payment to the owners. A year later these owners, Muslim and non-Muslim, were sending petitions to the Porte, complaining that they had not received any rent.⁵⁵⁸ Foreign residents alone were exempt from this free quartering. The inhabitants were also irritated by the drunkenness of the allied soldiers. One day French soldiers went to a Muslim café and demanded wine. When they were told wine was not sold there a quarrel ensued and consequently one person was killed and several wounded.⁵⁵⁹ On 10 August a fire broke out and lasted six hours burning many wooden houses, the bazaar and military stores. Slade then remarks: “As on other occasions when honour or loot was to be obtained, the Turkish soldiers and sailors were not invited to join: they neither robbed nor rioted”.⁵⁶⁰

The city *meclis* held a stormy meeting after the fire. Many notables were angry against the allies, even comparing the Russian siege of Varna in 1828 favourably with them. “The Muscovites”, they said,

came to Varna after the irritation of a double siege; they remained there two years, gave nobody reason to lament their conduct, and left the town better than they had found it. The Franks have scarcely been at Varna three months; they have taken our dwellings and store-houses compulsorily, have covered us with opprobrium, and now the place is ruined by their carelessness.⁵⁶¹

The governor of Varna and the military commandant said that they had warned the allies of fire. They also complained that the allied generals were like sultans, it was difficult to obtain an audience with them. They did not answer their letters either.⁵⁶²

Meanwhile cholera had started to ravage the allied troops and fleets from the beginning of July 1854. For this reason the embarkation was constantly being delayed. The French made an incursion into Dobruca in August, but they lost nearly 7,000 men from cholera, fever, drought and heat. The British also lost about 700 men from diseases. Furthermore 12,000 to 15,000 French and about 1,900 British troops were hospitalized.⁵⁶³ Sanitary and logistics problems now made themselves strongly felt and they did not cease to be felt during the war. At last the departure for the Crimea was set on 2 September, but it was again delayed until 7 September. The formidable armada

558 BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/12 lef 1-8, dated *Şevval-Zilkade* 1271 (June-July 1855). Osman Nuri Bey, head of the “Varna commission”, also reported to the Porte several times on this point. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1356/8, dated 12 Receb 1271 / 31 March 1855, HR. SYS. 1353/73, dated 22 Zilhicce 1271 (5 September 1855) and HR. SYS. 1354/46 lef 4, dated 24 Safer 1272 (5 November 1855).

559 Slade, op. cit., pp. 258-259.

560 Slade, op. cit., p. 261.

561 Slade, op. cit., p. 262. Tarle has also quoted this passage obviously with much pleasure. See Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 27.

562 Slade, *ibid.*

563 Calthorpe, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 122-123.

consisted of 350 ships carrying 30,000 (24,000?) French, 25,000 (27,000?) British and about 5,000 or 6,000 Ottoman troops (10 infantry battalions).⁵⁶⁴ Another 11,000 French troops were to follow later. Among the Ottoman troops, 8 battalions were selected from the *esnan*, that is, those who did not draw the lot but were liable to service during 13 years and the remaining two battalions from the *redif*, that is the reserve, those middle-aged soldiers with families to be worried about. The *esnan* had received only three months of drilling in Üsküdar. They had with them only three weeks of provisions, afterwards the Allies were to feed them. The Ottoman commander chosen for the expedition, Mirliva Süleyman Pasha, was not a distinguished officer either; he had spent the last 12 years of his life as the superintendent of Beykoz tannery. To encourage him for the mission, he had been promoted from colonel to the rank of mirliva. Other officers had shunned the mission for reasons of expected neglect from the Allies.⁵⁶⁵ Events proved that they were right to think so.

3.6. The Caucasian Front in 1854-1855

After the defeat of Başgedikler, the Porte sent the minister of the police (*Zaptiye Müşiri*) Mehmed Hayreddin Pasha (?-1869) in January 1854 to inspect the Anatolian and Batum armies and to enquire into the deeds of Abdi Pasha and Ahmed Pasha. Upon arrival at Erzurum and then at Kars, Hayreddin Pasha reported the guilt of both pashas in robbing the soldiers and they were recalled to Istanbul for trial.⁵⁶⁶

The Ottoman armies in Kars, Erzurum and Batum spent the winter of 1853-54 in very unhealthy conditions. They were fed and clothed scarcely and quartered in poorly heated, unventilated, filthy, crowded *khans* or houses with all conditions for the spread of contagious diseases like typhus. Therefore a total of 18,000 to 20,000 soldiers died from diseases and malnutrition.⁵⁶⁷ Zarif Pasha confirms this situation and states that when he took over the command of the Anatolian army in March 1854, there were

564 Calthorpe, op. cit., vol. I, p. 122. Calthorpe gives the number of Ottoman troops as 6,000. While Slade argues (op. cit., p. 273) that the Ottoman force consisted of 10 battalions of 800 men each more or less, totaling 8,000 men, Besbelli (op. cit., p. 71) gives the number as 5,000. The grand vizier had written to the seraskier that 10,000 regular troops should be given to Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan by 15 August 1854. See BOA. İ. MMS. 2/61, dated 3 August 1854.

565 Slade, op. cit., p. 274.

566 Duncan, op. cit., vol. I, p. 111.

567 Clarendon to Redcliffe, 29 November 1854. PRMA, No. 54, p. 51.

17,000 troops in Kars, of which 11,000 were in hospitals.⁵⁶⁸ On the day of his arrival at Kars, 50 soldiers died of diseases. When he asked the doctors what was to be done, they wanted some of the troops to be sent to villages to leave more room to others, opening holes in the barracks for better ventilation and supplying the hospitals with clothing, beds and linen. The daily death-toll fell to half of this number afterwards, he writes. The Batum army was also reduced to a few thousands. However, reinforcements were begun to be sent as early as February 1854. Thus two steamers under the command of Bahriye Feriki Mustafa Pasha, escorted by an allied squadron, brought 5,000 troops to Trabzon (for the Anatolian army) on 10 February and 3,000 men to Batum on 11 February 1854.⁵⁶⁹ While the Russian fleet still cruised the coasts, it did not dare to meet the allied fleet.

Likewise, Doctor Humphrey Sandwith writes that during the winter of 1853-54, some 20,000 men had died of disease and hunger, being deprived of proper food and clothing, and “crowded into the dark, ill-ventilated hovels” of Kars. The great mortalities from diseases were not reported in the muster-rolls sent to Istanbul, “for the pay, food and appointments of dead men went to fill the coffers of the Pasha and his myrmidons”.⁵⁷⁰ Sandwith also writes that Abdi Pasha was a “poor and honest man”, but then he tells of a curious story related to Abdi Pasha’s journey from Kars to Istanbul, when he was removed from his post and called back to Istanbul. According to the story, on the road between Erzurum and Trabzon, one of the mules of Abdi Pasha’s large-train of heavily laden baggage-mules slipped and fell over a precipice, the load was smashed and a treasure of gold and silver rolled out, which was plundered by the muleteers and the peasantry.⁵⁷¹

At the beginning of 1854, Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha lost the office of the Seraskier and Hasan Rıza Pasha replaced him. The new seraskier did not like the existence of so many foreign officers in the Ottoman armies. He was effective in the appointment of the new commander of the Anatolian army. Thus with Hasan Pasha’s

568 See Zarif Pasha’s memoirs, Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 485. Also see Zarif Pasha’s answers to questions in the MVL. BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, paragraph 2 (See Appendix 85). The second part of Zarif Pasha’s memoirs, related to the period of his command of the Anatolian army is also available at BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 10. Zarif Pasha had submitted it as part of his evidence during his trial.

569 *Tezkire of Kapudan-ı Derya*, 21 February 1854, BOA. İ. DH. 18414 lef 1, quoted by Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 68. Budak writes that the *tezkire* belonged to Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha. However, Mahmud Pasha was at that time dismissed. Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha had become the grand admiral. See Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 40-Tetimme*, p. 67.

570 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 48.

571 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 47 and p. 49.

backing, the governor of Erzurum Mustafa Zarif Pasha was appointed the mushir of the Anatolian army in February 1854. But this would prove the second most unfortunate appointment after Ahmed Pasha. Although Zarif Pasha had been successful as the governor of Erzurum, he was unfit for the post of the Commander-in-Chief, because he had never commanded an army or even a regiment. As seen from his memoirs, his army life had been spent chiefly in the capacity of a regimental secretary. Actually Zarif Pasha had already sensed the possibility of this post being offered to him as early as December 1853, when he reported on the incompetence of Abdi Pasha.⁵⁷² In his letter to the grand vizier he had then asked to be saved from such responsibility, and then he was saved by the appointment of Ahmed Pasha. However this time he could not evade the appointment. He also writes in his memoirs that he had not wanted to be appointed mushir.

The post of the governor of Erzurum was given to the kaimmakam of Çıldır, Zaim Feyzullah Pasha. Lütfi Efendi, the official chronicler makes one of his rare criticisms in his chronicle on these three appointments. Of Ahmed Pasha he writes that he knows little, but he says that Ahmed is famous for his bravery. However, he argues, bravery alone is not enough for a commander. As for Zarif Pasha, he has no compliments and sees him as incompetent (*piyade ve racil*) while he cannot conceal his contempt for Feyzullah Pasha, (*koca Erzurum eyaletinin dahi ağavatdan bir şahsa ihalesi*) and altogether he considers their appointments in such a delicate time as belonging to strange affairs.⁵⁷³ But Lütfi could better tell us whether any prominent pashas were willing to take the governorship of Erzurum upon themselves. We must note that poor Feyzullah worked more energetically in his post than his predecessors.

Zarif Pasha is indeed a typical non-slave⁵⁷⁴ origin Ottoman pasha and governor of the mid-19th century. Since he has left his memoirs, albeit a very scanty one, we have

572 Governor of Erzurum Mustafa Zarif Pasha to the grand vizier, dated 10 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (11 December 1853). BOA. HR. MKT. 68/46.

573 Lütfi, op. cit., p. 93. While Lütfi calls Feyzullah an *ağa*, he is called a pasha in the documents. For example Zarif Pasha calls him pasha in his memoirs: See Enver Ziya Karal, “Zarif Paşa’nın Hatıratı”, *Bellekten* IV, 1940, pp. 480-481. The grand vizier in a letter dated 25 November 1853 to the seraskier also calls him a pasha. See BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 104/28. Feyzullah himself signs his letters as “*an mirmiran, kaimmakam-ı liva-i Çıldır*” and his seal reads as “Es Seyyid Feyzullah”. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/53.

574 Charles Duncan, the British war correspondent for the newspaper *Morning Chronicle* in the Kars army, argues that Zarif Pasha “passed in early youth through that imperial road to success in Turkey – the slave market”. Duncan seems to have taken a stereotype for granted. See *A Campaign with the Turks in Asia*, vol. I, London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1855, p. 180. He must have read Captain Charles White’s book *Three Years in Constantinople* (1846). Nevertheless, there were other pashas of slave origins, such as Vasif Pasha, who became the commander of the Anatolian army in 1855.

more information about him than about many of his contemporaries. Therefore we could dwell at some length on his memoirs to understand the mentality and world view of the pashas. Nevertheless, the problem arises exactly at this point: Zarif Pasha in his memoirs, written for his children and not for publication, does not comment on the political and social events of his time, which was indeed an interesting time of the *Tanzimat* reforms. Therefore these memoirs create a deep disappointment, as indeed pointed out by Enver Ziya Karal, their editor. Instead the memoirs are full of personal details, with a lot of information on how much money he earned and where he put his money. Thus, as the Turkish saying goes, he relates his speculation as if it was an accomplishment or bravery.⁵⁷⁵

Zarif Mustafa was given by his father to an accounting office in the ministry of finance as a scribe at the age of 12. Two years later, at 14, he became by chance a secretary to a regiment in lieu of the son of an accountant, Hamdi Bey, who was just promoted from a secretary to the rank of major in the army. From Zarif's account, it appears that this Hamdi Bey received his brevet rank just out of blue, without military training or education. Then Zarif himself becomes both a secretary and a lieutenant and even a deputy captain at the age of 16. He was also shown to Sultan Mahmud II. This is interesting because it shows both the degree of Mahmud II's interest in his new army, and also the degree of liberty in the distribution of military ranks. Afterwards Mustafa Zarif is appointed to many campaigns as regimental secretary and quickly grows in ranks. His narrative of his colonels reveals much ignorance and gambling on their part. However, some of them "give" a lot of money to our Zarif (for what?) and he mentions them with gratitude, while a certain Şerif Pasha still owes him forty to fifty thousand piastres.

Mustafa Zarif becomes a *ferik* (division general) in 1845 at the age of 29 without commanding any units in battle. He works first at the head of some military production then in the military tribunal. At all steps he records his salary and his side earnings. Thus we learn that as a *ferik*, he receives a salary of 25,000 piastres, which is more than the usual salary of a *ferik*. Then in 1847 he is appointed *mutasarrıf* of Jerusalem, with a salary of 27,500 piastres. A British doctor is beaten there for entering the great mosque by some Arabs. When the British authorities insist on the punishment of the culprits, Zarif Pasha temporizes with them, eventually returning to Istanbul under pressure. At that time Stratford Canning was again the British ambassador in Istanbul. (Thus when Zarif Pasha was arrested in 1854 for his misconduct of the Anatolian army, he would

575 Şecaat arzederken merd-i Kıpti sirkatin söyler.

see this as the work of the British ambassador). In 1852 Zarif Mustafa Pasha was appointed governor of Erzurum.

Mustafa Zarif Pasha in his memoirs tries to tell all his services as governor and as commander of the army. He claims that in the present war he spent 2,000 purses⁵⁷⁶ from his own pocket for the sake of the state. But then the question arises naturally: Where did he get this money from? (2,000 purses were equal to 40 months of a *ferik's* pay). During his interrogation at the MVL, Zarif Pasha again says that he gave more than 100,000 piastres (200 purses) as *bahşış* to soldiers who worked in the construction of fortifications.⁵⁷⁷ Salih Hayri in his *zafername* states that Zarif Pasha had “hoarded” much money for his own benefit.⁵⁷⁸ Likewise, Charles Duncan argues that Zarif Pasha had appropriated 15,000 purses when he was still a bey in the civil administration of an army.⁵⁷⁹ Thus, according to Charles Duncan, at that time Zarif Pasha had been removed from his post for this act. He had also repaid some portion of the embezzled money. However, the current seraskier Hazan Rıza Pasha protected him and soon he returned to state services.⁵⁸⁰ While we do not know the accuracy of this specific information, it is perfectly possible, because we know that many corrupt pashas, even those convicted ones returned to their posts after a while. Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha is the best known example of this.

While the new campaign season was nearing, the Porte tried to reinforce its armies, including the Anatolian army which had been greatly reduced during the winter by deaths from diseases and desertions of especially the *başibozuk* and the *redif*. New forces of recruits, redifs, and *başibozuks* were pouring from Arabistan and Anatolia to Erzurum. Provisions and ammunition were being sent from Istanbul to the port of Trabzon, but from then onwards it was a very difficult journey on mules and camels. The Russian army was also receiving reinforcements since the allied fleets had not yet blockaded the Black Sea.

576 See Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 472. 2,000 purses make 10,000 Ottoman pounds, equal to about 8,000 pounds sterling at that time, which is approximately 480,000 pounds sterling at current prices. The *Sicill-i Osmani* records Zarif Mustafa Pasha as “possessor of great wealth”. See Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 1706.

577 Zarif Mustafa Pasha’s answers to questions in the MVL. February 1855. BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9. See Appendix 85.

578 “*Kendi nef’in gözetip hem-vâre, İdhâr eyledi hayli pâre*”. Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 150. The editor has mistransliterated the word “iddihâr” as “idhâr”.

579 Duncan, op. cit., p. 182.

580 In April 1857 Zarif Pasha was entitled to a salary of unemployment (*mezuliyet maaşu*) of 15,000 piastres. See BOA. İ. HR. 375/24803, 21 April 1857 and BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 223/65, 3 May 1857. Then, in October 1857, he became president of the *Dâr-ı Şûra-yı Askerî*. See Mehmed Süreyya, *ibid*.

The allied fleets finally entered the eastern part of the Black Sea in April. The Russians had evacuated all the coast line from Anapa down to Redutkale,⁵⁸¹ because they had no chance against the combined allied fleets. Towards the end of May, the commander of the British fleet Admiral Dundas informed his Ottoman colleague Ahmed Pasha that “from Kertch to Batoum the only fortresses in the possession of Russia are Anapa and Soujak”.⁵⁸² Soon these two fortresses were also captured by the allies.

While the Porte wanted to attack Russia in the Caucasus, the allies were not interested as much. Both Britain and France had as a primary aim the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet and the naval base at Sevastopol. Any other targets were secondary for them. Nevertheless they had sent officers to Batum, Circassia, Trabzon, Erzurum and Kars. The prospects of a combined Ottoman-Circassian-Shamil offensive did not look bright to them. As we have seen above, the Ottoman armies had experienced a harsh winter and nearly half of the troops in Kars and Batum had died of diseases like typhus and malaria. The Circassians were divided among themselves and the *murids* of Shamil were easily kept at bay by the Russians. The Christian population of most of Georgia was united under the Russian command.⁵⁸³

3.6.1. Relations with Shamil and the Circassians in 1854-55

By the beginning of the 1854 campaign season, Shamil had accomplished the task given to him by the caliph, namely the task of uniting and subduing most of the khans and *ümera* of the Caucasus in the name of the Ottoman cause. According to the testimony of Mahmud Efendi, who had been sent to Shamil by the former seraskier Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha and returned to Istanbul in April 1854, Shamil stated that he had secured the loyalty of many Caucasian Muslim khans to the Porte. They were Major-General Cemedi (?) Khan, General Ebuselim Shemkhal Khan, General Ağalar Khan, General Yusuf Khan, General Hasay Khan and General Danyal Sultan. These khans, who were all given the rank of general by Russia, all stated their loyalty to the caliph and readiness for joint action against Russia. However, unless the Anatolian

581 The word *redut* is from redoubt and *kale* is a fortress.

582 Vice-Admiral Dundas to Vice-Admiral Ahmed Pasha, the *Britannia* off Baljik [Balçık], 25 May 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 1348/73 lef 1.

583 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 353-354. Tarle, op. cit., vol 1, p. 292. Budak (op. cit., 1993, p. 80) writes that not all Georgians were committed to the Ottoman state.

army attacked and took the fortress of Gümrü, they would not feel safe and would not openly declare their support for the Porte. Therefore they had not yet declared their support of the Porte and they were waiting the action of the Ottoman army. Otherwise they would be vulnerable in the face of Russian vengeance if the Ottoman army did not move against Gümrü and Tiflis.⁵⁸⁴

Meanwhile Halil Pasha of Dagestan had also returned from Dagestan. He suggested conferring some ranks to these khans of Dagestan. Consequently, a provisional council (*Meclis-i Muvakkat*) convened on 15 May 1854 and proposed to give the following ranks and titles: Sheikh Shemuil Efendi would receive the rank of vizier and the title of *Dağıstan Serdar-ı Ekremi* (Commander-in-Chief of Dagestan), his son Gazi Muhammed would be *Mirliva* (Brigadier-General), Ebu Selim Shemkhal Khan the rank of *Ferik* (Lieutenant-General), Cemed (?) Khan, Hasay (?) Khan, Danyal Sultan and İsmail Pasha would also become *Mirlivas*. These appointments would be kept secret for the time being. The grand vizier then submitted the decision to the Sultan on 24 May 1854 and the appointments were approved on the next day.⁵⁸⁵

Nevertheless, apart from distributing ranks and titles to Circassian and Dagestani notables, the Porte practically did little. Shamil's naib in Circassia, Muhammed Emin, in a letter written in Arabic, dated 21 May 1854, complained that six months passed after receiving some gunpowder but nothing came from the sea (that is, from the Porte).⁵⁸⁶ He had received orders from Shamil⁵⁸⁷ to march towards Georgia with the forces of the Abzeh tribe. Shamil informed him that he would also march in that direction and they would meet if possible. Muhammed Emin also complained of not receiving instructions from the Porte:

We need to know the aim of the Sublime State and also what to do and how to be here and what news to send to Sheikh Shemuil. However no orders have appeared from your grand vizirial Excellency except for only conferment of reward and favour and expressions of affection [*“taltif ve ibraz-ı muhabbet”*]. When I contemplate on the situation I wish the Sublime State had sent some troops here, more or less. Then I have thought in my inadequate mind that a great victory would have been gained. Because, although there is a distance of one month between Anapa and Temürkapu from the mountains, it is less by way of

584 See Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 56-57, transcription of the document is at p. 134. However, the transcription contains several errors, for example, reading *“taraf-ı mugayir”* instead of *“turuk ve meabir”*. The date of the document is also mistransliterated as 22 Cemaziyelevvel 1270, whereas it should be 22 Receb 1270, therefore it corresponds to 20 April 1854, and not to 20 February 1854.

585 BOA. İ. DH. 19040. Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 134-135.

586 BOA. İ. DH. 19234, dated 23 Şaban 1270 (21 May 1854). For the text of the translation of this letter, see Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 135-137. The date of the letter, however, is mistransliterated as 23 Ramazan 1270 (19 June 1854).

587 In the original Arabic letter, the name is Shemuil, but the translator has turned it into Shamil.

plains. Since the population of the mountains is from old times brave and warlike, if they had seen some regular imperial troops with us, then the population of the places under Russian rule would hasten to submit to our rule. Thanks to the majority of the Circassian population, the affairs of the mountains would have been completed and the Russians' road to Tiflis would be cut in the vicinity of the Abzeh tribe. Then the Russians would leave Tiflis by their own will, or it would be attacked from all sides by the mountain population down to children. They would not know what to do since they would have to deal with both the Danube and the mountains and then they could not have found enough troops to cope with all.⁵⁸⁸ [My simplified translation]

The allied fleets sent a steam squadron to the Circassian coasts in May 1854. The Ottoman fleet (including the Egyptian squadron) with Sefer and Behcet Pashas and many Circassian notables with their families as well as gifts from the Sultan for Circassian chiefs also wanted to join the allies off Sevastopol and go to Circassia. The fleet would make Sohum a base for its operations and embark 4,000 troops at Batum to transfer to the Circassian coast. The Kapudan Pasha had already informed the allied admirals by letter and by verbal message of the sailing of the Ottoman squadron to the same destination. The appearance of the Ottoman fleet and troops was intended to encourage the Circassians to rise against the Russians. The fleet was commanded by Ferik Kayserili Ahmed Pasha and it also included 12 European officers to instruct the Circassian militia, artillery officers, ammunition and small arms. Thus it was composed of 8 line-of-battle ships, 3 frigates, 4 corvettes and brigs, 5 steam frigates and 3 steam corvettes mounting 1,100 guns sailed from the Bosphorus on 6 May 1854.⁵⁸⁹

The Ottoman fleet went to Varna where it found a rather offensive letter from Vice-Admiral Dundas to Ahmed Pasha, in which Admiral Dundas informed Ahmed Pasha that he had received Kapudan Pasha's letter, but his and Admiral Hamelin's opinion was that the Ottoman fleet should "cruise along the coasts of Bulgaria and Roumelia, between the Danube and the Bosphorus, until the return of Rear-Admiral Lyons from the coast of Circassia and the arrival of the combined squadrons at Varna".⁵⁹⁰ Thus the British admiral slighted Kapudan Pasha and gave directions to the Ottoman fleet without even consulting him! Mushaver Pasha bitterly observed that, if Ahmed Pasha had any sense of dignity, he would have given an appropriate answer and steered for Batum without the company of the allied fleet. But Ahmed Pasha did not want to offend the allied admirals. He feared that the Porte would not support him in case of complaint on his part. We must note that he was right in his prediction. Thus he

588 BOA. İ. DH. 19234 lef 2. Cf. Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 135-137.

589 Slade, op. cit., p. 224.

590 Slade, op. cit., p. 225.

acted like a typical career-building Ottoman pasha. The Ottoman system promoted people like him, who thought of their selfish interests and career more than any concerns of dignity.

As a way out Ahmed Pasha requested Mushaver Pasha to go to Sevastopol to negotiate with the allied admirals. Mushaver Pasha found the allied fleet off Sevastopol on 11 May. He had noted down a memorandum for the admirals, explaining the importance of the mission. The memorandum read in part as follows:

With orders to proceed to the coast of Circassia, after consultation with the allied admirals, the Turkish fleet has left the Bosphorus. Sefer Pasha and Behchet Pasha with 300 of their countrymen, and several European officers to act as *talimgis* (instructors), are embarked in it. Those pashas bear the Sultan's firman, empowering them to act in his name, and are carrying *nishans* of merit and *berats* of rank to influential chieftains. In their opinion, unless the Caucasians operate timely in concert and with strategy, the Russian advance in Asia will be certain. There are embarked in the fleet a battery complete with artillery officers and 300 rounds for each gun, 500 barrels of gunpowder, 500 cases of musket cartridges, 400 cases of muskets, 2,000 pistols, 20 cases of cutlasses, 10,000 moulds of lead ... It is anticipated that with the aid of 4,000 regular troops, the marines of the fleet, European military instructors, field-pieces, and other named munitions of war, the Circassians will be able to act offensively on the enemy's territory.⁵⁹¹

Mushaver Pasha added that the Circassians were already expecting the Ottoman fleet as the signal for their gathering and if it did not soon appear off their coast, then doubts would arise in their minds of the Porte's sincerity. However, Admiral Dundas met this proposal very coldly. He was astonished that his directions to the Ottoman fleet had been disregarded because he said that fleet had been placed under his orders. Mushaver Pasha then visited Admiral Hamelin. Hamelin admitted the importance of the Circassian mission but he was worried that the Russian fleet might pursue the Ottoman fleet and another disaster might happen. Mushaver Pasha said that if the Russian fleet dared to move from Sevastopol then it would be all the worse for it and a good opportunity for the allied fleets. The Ottoman fleet was also in a much better position now. Yet Admiral Hamelin was of the opinion that if the Ottoman fleet went to Circassia then the allies should remain off Sevastopol, which was out of question. He also said that he had already been blamed for the Sinop disaster and now did not want to risk a repetition. Two days later, Admiral Dundas gave his and Admiral Hamelin's collective answer in a message to Ahmed Pasha, which was now even insulting. The admirals simply repeated their request laconically and added that future communications should be made in writing, "as verbal messages may lead to serious

591 Slade, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

inconveniences and mistakes”.⁵⁹² The allied admirals had treated the Ottoman Commander-in-Chief very lowly and described a mission entrusted by him to a flag officer as a verbal message. Furthermore, they themselves had given a verbal message for the Ottoman fleet to leave Balçık exclusively for the anchorage of the allied fleets.

When Mushaver Pasha brought the news to Varna the Circassian pashas were desperate. Ahmet Pasha however did not take much offence. After several days of counselling, he finally signed a letter to the allied admirals, where he tried to reemphasise the importance of the mission and the reasons for sending Mushaver Pasha to them.⁵⁹³ He also wrote that in compliance of their wish, he had anchored at Kavarna, leaving Balçık for the allies. The allied fleets came to Balçık after a week. As they passed Kavarna, the Ottoman fleet saluted them and showed all signs of respect. The admirals informed Ahmet Pasha that next time he should come to visit them without Mushaver Pasha, thus showing their anger with him. They even conspicuously did not invite Mushaver Pasha to an official dinner on 24 May in honour of the Queen’s birthday, while inviting all the pashas and one bey from the Ottoman fleet. Ironically, it was a British officer who defended Ottoman interests to the extent of inflicting the scorn of the allied admirals on himself, while the Ottoman commander complied obediently with all the wishes of the allies.

Meanwhile the French steamer *Mogador* brought the first news from the Circassian expedition of the Anglo-French squadron. The Russians had evacuated the coast from Anapa to Redutkale. Sohumkale was in the hands of Circassians. The allied squadron had embarked an Ottoman battalion from Batum to occupy Redutkale, which was then being evacuated by the Russians. The allied admirals then ordered the Ottoman pashas whom they had invited to dinner, to hastily transfer their passengers and ammunition intended for Circassia to an English screw line-of-battle ship (the *Sans Pareil*) and two Ottoman steam frigates to depart that very evening to Sohumkale and Redutkale. The Ottoman sail ships were to remain in Kavarna. The Ottomans proposed to take four steam frigates to tow four line-of-battle ships, but the admirals would not hear of it. Thus they wanted to turn the Ottoman expedition to Circassia into a consignment. Instead of an Ottoman squadron appearing at the Circassian coast with all pomp and ceremony, disembarking its envoys with dignity, the Ottoman Circassian

592 Slade, op. cit., p. 235.

593 The letter is given by Slade in its original French together with an English translation. Ahmed Pasha in his letter also mentions the *envoyé* of Shamil among the passengers. However, as we have seen from the above letter of Muhammed Emin dated 21 May 1854, this cannot be Muhammed Emin. See Slade, op. cit., pp. 446-448.

pashas with their retinue, families and goods would be cast into the coast of Circassia like ordinary passengers or adventurers from crowded transports. As Slade observes, this would not fail to diminish the importance of the Porte in the eyes of the Circassians. The allied admirals did not even accept a delay until next forenoon. Thus the Ottoman pashas returned to their ships without dinner. They had again obeyed an insulting order. Pashas, military instructors, traders, women, children, field-pieces, small arms, gunpowder, provisions etc were transferred in five hours from a dozen vessels into three steamers with much natural confusion and damage. The European instructors swore loudly at the admirals.⁵⁹⁴

Four days after the *Mogador*, the British Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons also arrived from the coast of Circassia. Sir Edmund reported that the Circassians were divided among themselves and requesting troops for action against the Russians.⁵⁹⁵ But he was opposed to the expedition of the Ottoman fleet to Circassian coasts. Upon this the allied admirals now totally disapproved of an Ottoman expedition. Then they asked Ahmed Pasha to write to the seraskier to request troops to be sent to Circassia. The Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha replied that they gave the fleet with orders to take 4,000 troops from Batum and the Allies' admirals had detained it at Kavarna. The reason for the allied admirals' desire to keep the Ottoman fleet idle nearby was, as Slade remarks, to prevent its activity in the Circassian coasts as compared to their inactivity at Balçık, thus being subject to the criticism of public opinion.

Then these "gallant admirals" spent all the summer lying at Balçık until September, from time to time sending a few steamers to inspect Sevastopol. While this was of course not an effective blockade, the renown of the British fleet was enough to keep the Russian fleet unmoved in the harbour of Sevastopol. If the Russians could have guessed this allied inactivity, they could have done much harm. But in this war such blunders and such lost opportunities on all sides were numerous. The allied fleets did not do much and did not allow the Ottomans do anything with regard to Circassia. They apparently did not want the Ottomans to be strong in Circassia.

About the middle of June, the Ottoman fleet was allowed to come to Balçık. When the Ottomans wanted to cruise the Anatolian coasts, the allies were again opposed, fearful of letting the Ottoman fleet out of their reach, for it might go to Circassia. When they ordered it to go and lie at Varna, the Ottoman admirals finally lost patience and gathered enough courage to ask kindly why they were being held idle at Varna. The

594 Slade, op. cit., p. 242.

595 Op. cit., p. 244. Besbelli, op. cit., p. 63.

allies replied that were waiting for an answer from their embassies. Finally the Porte decided to recall its fleet (except for two line-of-battle ships) to Istanbul, because there was no sense to keep it in Varna if it was not to do anything. The Ottoman fleet anchored in the Bosphorus on 3 July 1854.⁵⁹⁶

Thus the allied admirals had prevented the Ottoman expedition to Circassia. However, why did not the Ottoman admirals simply go to Circassia on their own? Wasn't it clear that the Russian fleet would not dare to get out of Sevastopol, when the allied fleets had shown themselves off Sevastopol? The only reasonable explanation seems to be in the lack of leadership together with the atmosphere of distrust in the Porte. Nobody wanted to take responsibility for anything, always passing the buck and always trying to depend on the authority of some other body.

Sefer Pasha, Behcet Pasha and other Circassians of rank landed in this way on the shore, without honours from an Ottoman fleet, did not of course produce a big impression on the Circassians. They had returned like refugees. Furthermore the presents remained in the hands of those who brought them. Behcet Pasha was involved in his personal affairs and Sefer Pasha could not regain his old influence. The military instructors were left unguided and unattended to. The Circassians felt betrayed by the Porte, because they had expected the Ottoman fleet to come with Ottoman troops.⁵⁹⁷

In mid-July 1854, Shamil made his second and last attack on the Russian positions in Georgia for the rest of the war, attempting to reach the Ottoman army. With a force of about 15,000 cavalry and infantry, he advanced towards Tiflis, coming as near as Shildi 60 kilometres north-east of Tiflis. While Shamil camped on Mount Pakhalis-Tavi, he sent a force of 10,000 infantry and cavalry into the Alazan valley under the command of his son Gazi Muhammed and Danyal Sultan (or Daniel Bek?). They were about to break the Russian line but the native Georgian population, the Kakhetians, resisted his forces with determination. After three days of fighting in the Alazan valley, Russian reinforcements under the command of Prince David Chavchavadze arrived and dispersed the *murid* force. Shamil retreated to Dagestan on 22 July.⁵⁹⁸ Meanwhile, a detachment commanded by his son Gazi Muhammed raided Prince Chavchavadze's summer house in Tsinondali and brought many prisoners and much booty. Among the

596 Besbelli, op. cit., p. 65.

597 Slade, op. cit., p. 243. Besbelli, op. cit., p. 63.

598 Major Prince Baratov, "Opisanie nashestviya skopisch' Shamilya na Kakhetiyyu v 1854 godu", Kavkavskiy Sbornik, tom I, Tiflis, 1876, pp. 237-267. Budak (op. cit., 1993, pp. 88-90) also gives Shamil's force as 15,000 men, referring to the newspaper CH and Gammer's unpublished dissertation of 1989. Gammer (op. cit., 1994, p. 270), however, gives Shamil's force as consisting of 7,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry. Cf. Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

prisoners were Princess Anna, the wife of Prince David Chavchavadze and Princess Varvara, the widow of Prince Iliko Orbeliani (granddaughters of the last Georgian king) with their children and their French governess Madame Anna Drancy. Shamil hoped to exchange them for his son Jemaleddin who was a captive in the court of St. Petersburg.⁵⁹⁹

However, the news of the capture of these women caused quite a sensation.⁶⁰⁰ The French embassy demanded an order to be given to Mustafa Pasha the commander of the Batum army to search in cooperation with the French consul in Batum Mr Steyert for Madame Drancy, daughter of French postal employee Mr Lemaire.⁶⁰¹ Accordingly an order was sent to Mustafa Pasha.⁶⁰² For Lord Stratford it was also an outrage, because the information he received was that two young ladies and their French governess were murdered. Therefore he urged the Porte to apply to the Sultan to write to Shamil or cause a letter to be written to him to release the surviving women and children and to condemn strongly the murdering and kidnapping of women and children. On 23 September 1854 Stratford gave instructions to his head dragoman to be conveyed to Resid Pasha:

I brought verbally under Reshid Pasha's notice some days ago an occurrence which has been stated in the public prints. It appears from the published statement, to which I allude, that an act of barbarous atrocity has been committed in Georgia by a party of soldiers, - it may be presumed, irregulars, detached from Sheik Shamil's army. These practical marauders are described as having attacked the country house of some person of wealth and official distinction in Georgia. The owner was absent. No resistance was made. Two young ladies and their French governess were, nevertheless, murdered by them in the house. The proprietor's wife, a lady of rank and education, was carried off to the mountains with several female friends, her guests at the time. I need not remark to you that these are circumstances which shock every feeling of humanity. They are not the acts of soldiers, but of assassins. Honorable war rejects them, and honorable men can have no sympathy with the perpetrators.⁶⁰³

Stratford stated that an officer from the Kars army together with a British officer should

599 For a romanticized story of their captivity, see Lesley Blanch. *The Sabres of Paradise*. NY: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1995.

600 See *Journal de Constantinople*, nr. 536, 29 Aout 1854, nr. 537, 4 Septembre 1854, *Ceride-i Havadis*, nr. 704, 9 Zilhicce 1270 (2 September 1854). Budak argues that one of the results of this event was that it caused Britain and France to seek connections with Shamil for the independence of Circassia, without mentioning any negative effects for Shamil (op. cit., 1993, p. 90).

601 BOA. HR. SYS. 907/16, dated 20 August 1854, but this date is not included in the text of the note, so it is probably a later date than the actual submission of the note.

602 BOA. HR. MKT. 91/14.

603 Stratford de Redcliffe's instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani, Therapia, 23 September 1854. BOA. HR. TO. 220/48. See Appendix 63. Translation into Ottoman Turkish is in BOA. İ. HR. 114/5577.

be detached to present the letter to Shamil and bring the ladies back. “No expense need be incurred by the Porte for the object of benevolence”, wrote Stratford, adding insult to injury. It is interesting that the wording of Stratford’s note is much more severe than the French note.

Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha applied to the Sultan on 12 October 1854, stating that some *başıbozüks* from the army of Shamil had perpetrated atrocities, killing two young ladies and their governess and kidnapping women of from a notable family.⁶⁰⁴ Thus the grand vizier repeated the wrong information concerning the murder of women. He asked for a letter of advice and warning to be sent to Shamil, advising him to punish the culprits and prevent the happening of such events in the future. The letter was to be sent with Dagestani Enis Efendi from the Bureau of Translation. He would be given verbal instructions as well. His travel allowance would also be given. The draft of the letter was attached. The Sultan approved it.

The letter to Shamil first began with praising him for his brave war for the cause of Islam. Then the news of the murder and kidnapping of women was related. It was stated that a groups of *başıbozüks* had attacked innocent children and women. Although it was certain that Shamil as a pious man would punish such an act contrary to the *shariat*, it was necessary to carry out the punishment of those responsible for this deplorable act because Shamil’s name could be defamed. Therefore Shamil was required to punish the culprits and to return the women to their families. Furthermore, Russian prisoners of war should be kept well according to international rules. In general the tone of the letter was not offensive, but certainly it would not please Shamil.⁶⁰⁵

Stratford had also written to the British military commissioner in the Anatolian army Colonel William Fenwick Williams (1800-1883) in Kars, requesting him to exercise his influence with Sheikh Shamil to get the women released. Williams wrote a letter to Shamil, but the letter seems to have reached Shamil rather late, after Shamil exchanged the ladies for his son Jemaleddin and 40,000 silver roubles on 22 March 1855.⁶⁰⁶ Shamil’s reply to Williams, dated 12 Receb 1271 (31 March 1855), written in Arabic and translated by Williams’ secretary for Ottoman, Henry Churchill, reads in part as follows:

We thank you for the notice you take of our dignity and honour, and for giving us a place amongst worthy men; and though we may not be that in truth and

604 Sadrazam’s petition and the Sultan’s *irade*. BOA. İ. HR. 114/5577 lef 5, submitted on 19 Muharrem 1271 (12 October 1854), approved by the Sultan on 20 Muharrem 1271.

605 Letter to Shamil. BOA. İ. HR. 114/5577 lef 2 and HR. SYS. 1354/60 lef 1. See Appendix 103.

606 Gammer, *op. cit.*, 1994, p. 272.

reality, God forbid that we should do anything which might be considered disgraceful by the Mohammedan laws or by the exalted government [the Sublime Porte?]. We had liberated the women before the arrival of your letter, and had you been acquainted with the true circumstances you would not have found fault with us; for everybody knows that we are always humane; that we expend our breath in reciting the holy words of the Lord of the Creation, and scorn the enmity of the infidels our foes.⁶⁰⁷

A Russian account from 1860, when Shamil was already in captivity in Kaluga, gives his narrative of this event:

At the very beginning of the war he [Shamil] received an offer to prepare to meet the allied forces at Imereti. Expressing his agreement Shamil immediately took steps to carry out his plan... In the spring of 1854 he marched towards the district of Chartalah... He intended to march on Tiflis, but in order to act more freely, he sent to inform the Ottoman commanders in Kars and in Abkhazeti of his intentions. Awaiting an answer, he sent his son with all the cavalry and some infantry into Kakheti, while he himself with the rest of his force camped near one of our forts... Soon he received an answer, the contents of which were extremely insulting. Instead of being grateful for his expressed readiness to cooperate with the plans of the allies and for the speed with which he had carried out his promise, he was reproached and told off as a common subject.⁶⁰⁸

After this event, Shamil remained on the defence. In any case he and his followers must have felt great disappointment from the Ottoman defeats by the Russians. Nevertheless he continued to seek the favour of the caliph and use this favour to enhance his political standing.

Shamil's naib in Circassia Muhammed Emin was made a pasha with the rank of *mirmiran* in May 1854.⁶⁰⁹ He came to Istanbul with seventy notables of Circassia in July 1854 for negotiations. In August Ferik Alyanak Mustafa Pasha (?-1884) from the Rumeli army, although unsuccessful against the Russians in the Babadağ region, was promoted the rank of *müşir* and sent to Batum to replace Mehmed Selim Pasha as the commander of the Batum army. Alyanak Mustafa Pasha was apparently chosen because of his Circassian origins. Ömer Pasha had also recommended him.⁶¹⁰ On the request of Mustafa Pasha, Muhammed Emin and his notables received monetary rewards (*atyye-i seniyye*) before leaving Istanbul.⁶¹¹ We do not know, however, what instructions he received.

607 See Colonel Atwell Lake, *Kars and Our Captivity in Russia*, London: Richard Bentley, 1856, pp. 340-341. The letter was addressed as "From the slave of God, Shemouil, to the illustrious and honourable Colonel Williams" and sealed "Shemouil" according to Mr Churchill.

608 Gammer, op. cit., p. 393.

609 Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 77.

610 BOA. İ. MMS. 2/40, 16 Ramazan 1270 (12 June 1854).

611 BOA. İ. MMS. 2/70, 21 Zilhicce 1270 (14 September 1853). Muhammed Emin Pasha received 10,000 piastres, others from 2,500 to 1,500 according to their ranks.

Müşir Alyanak Mustafa Pasha in Batum tried to gain the sympathy of the Circassian, Abkhazian and Georgian notables. He sent them gifts and letters inviting them to join the Ottoman side. Especially he tried to win the Abkhazian Prince Hamid (or Abdülhamid) Bey, whose Russian or Christian name was Mikhail Shervashidze.⁶¹² In his letter to Hamid Bey, dated 4 October 1854, Mustafa Pasha promised him on behalf of the Sultan all titles and ranks and rewards that Russia had given him. He argued that all states had now joined the Ottoman Empire and Russia was soon going to collapse (*yakın vakitte bütün bütün altı üstüne gelecektir*). Now by this war the Porte would no longer leave those territories and its population to Russia. Therefore Mustafa Pasha had now been appointed as the commander of the Batum army and *muhafız* of all Abkhazia and Circassia with a lot of troops and preparations. He continued his message as follows:

You have passed over to the Russian side since long and remained there, leaving your country, land and state. However since you belong to a great dynasty here and since you are an outstanding, intelligent bey, I don't believe that you would leave this place and prefer our enemies the Muscovites. I have even heard when I came to Sohum that you intended to join the Sublime State and serve it. Therefore I guess that the reason for your remaining there is that perhaps you are with us from inside and Russian only in appearance and your real intention and effort is to understand the conditions and weak side of the Russians? For nothing is impossible in the world.. Did some improper people come to you and stir your mind by some lies? Or did they do anything to offend you, hitherto being unable to tell you properly how kind and affectionate the Sublime State will be to such worthy beys as you? Your stay there is of course for one of these reasons. In any case, such things are possible.⁶¹³ [My translation]

Mustafa Pasha then invited him to the Ottoman side with all honours, addressing him as “fellow countryman” since Mustafa Pasha was from Anapa (*Ey hemşerim iştmişsinizdir ki ben dahi Anapa'dan çıkmış olduğumdan buralı demek olurum*).

Hamid Bey was now in a difficult situation. He had to choose between Russia and the Ottoman Empire with its allies. Yet the Porte did not impart much confidence and the allies were not clear in their intentions for Abkhazia and Circassia. Did they plan an independent Abkhazia and Circassia? Did they want to annex these countries to the Ottoman Empire? What protection did they offer against Russia after the war? Naturally, he was afraid of being left to Russian hands if he sided with the allies and if

612 Mikhail Georgievich Shervashidze (r. 1822-1864) was the last Prince (*Vladetel*) of Abkhazia. His title in Abkhazian was *Chachba*. He was given the rank of lieutenant-general by Nikolai I in 1848.

613 Müşir (Alyanak) Mustafa Pasha to Hamid Bey (Mikhail Shervashidze), 11 Muharrem 1271 (4 October 1854). BOA. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 14. This letter is written in astonishingly simple, clear, plain Turkish expressions, the kind of which is a rare sight in the Ottoman official parlance. See Appendix 69. See Appendix 70 for Mustafa Pasha's letter to some Circassian tribes. Also see Appendices 72-73.

the allies were not permanent in Circassia. So he chose a way between, trying to appease both sides. Meanwhile Mustafa Pasha had been authorized by the sultan to distribute salaries and ranks from lieutenant to ferik to influential and willing notables.⁶¹⁴

In 1855, the allies, instead of depending on the expertise of the Porte on relations with the Circassians, quite independently sent their agents to Circassia to organize the Circassian tribes.⁶¹⁵ The British sent Mr Longworth as “civil commissioner” and the French sent Mr Champoiseau as consul to Redutkale.⁶¹⁶ Lord Stratford asked the Porte to issue orders to Mustafa Pasha at Batum to assist these agents in every way.⁶¹⁷ There is no doubt that the orders were issued. These agents, however, would achieve very little. Furthermore the allies tried to check and supervise all operations of the Porte by attaching military commissioners to its armies.

The British former Secretary of State for War, the Duke of Newcastle⁶¹⁸ made a six weeks tour of Circassia and the northern part of Georgia in the autumn of 1855. There he saw Sefer Pasha and Muhammed Emin as well. His impressions and his opinions in his letter to the British foreign minister reflect the opinion of at least part of the British government:

I had most unusually good opportunities of seeing the two principal Mahometan Magnates of Circassia – Sefer Pacha and the Naib – indeed as regards the latter very remarkable man I doubt if anybody has seen so much. Sefer is an effete old rogue and robber – just the man whom you might expect to find as deriving his authority from the Sultan and of course thwarting every English view of policy. He must be recalled by the Porte but nobody ought to be sent in his stead - anybody she so sent will be just as bad and the Porte has no right to send anybody.

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- 614 Grand vizier’s petition and the Sultan’s *irade*, 20-21 Safer 1271 (12-13 November 1854). BOA. İ. MMS. 3/97 lef 3, cited by Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 88. See Appendix 75. Budak states that “Abdülhamid Bey” was given a salary of 2,000 piastres and the rank of *mirmiran*. However, the document mentions not him but a certain “Mağan Kasi” to be rewarded with this rank and salary. This person was an Abkhazian notable from Samurzakan, Katsi Marganiya, who held the rank of lieutenant-general in the Russian army. See K. Borozdin, *Omer Pasha v Mingrelii*, St Petersburg, 1873, p. 29.
- 615 Lord Redcliffe’s instructions to head dragoman Pisani, 27 May 1855. BOA. İ. MMS. 5/166, cited by Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 148. Budak gives the name of the French official as “Champassaur”.
- 616 John Augustus Longworth (?-1875) was one of David Urquhart’s agents to Circassia in the 1840s and British consul in Monastir in 1851-60. From April 1855 he was sent with special mission to Circassia. Charles François Noël Champoiseau (1830-1909) was French vice consul in Redutkale in 1855-1857. Müşir Mustafa Pasha wrote to the Porte on 20 May 1855 on Champoiseau’s mission to Redutkale. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/54. It seems that both of them were in Sohum at the time of Ömer Pasha’s campaign. Laurence Oliphant writes that “during my stay at Souhoum I was hospitably entertained by Mons. Champoiseau, the French consul”. This was in the first week of October 1855. Oliphant notes that Mr Longworth was also there. See Oliphant, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
- 617 Stratford’s instructions to Pisani, to be read to Fuad Pasha, 27 May 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/64.
- 618 Henry Pelham Pelham-Clinton, 5th Duke of Newcastle-under-Lyne, (1811-1864). Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 1852-1854, Secretary of State for War 1854 - 30 January 1855.

Turkey never had any real possession of the Country – her rights in Anapa were just like ours in Gibraltar and whatever rights she had she resigned by the treaty of Adrianople. She has not recovered them by conquest. English & French Arms have set free the littoral of Circassia, and it is monstrous to see the Turkish flag flying in every deserted Russian fort & to witness attempts to establish Turkish government in the Country. Omer Pacha quite concurs in this view and he has removed some of the scoundrels whom he found feathering their nests at Soukoum Kaleh, Bathum, and other places, - but even he can hardly make head against this system of complicated iniquity.⁶¹⁹

Newcastle added that Ömer Pasha was now aware of the dangers of sending a Muslim army into a Christian country. Newcastle also wrote that Ömer Pasha told him that an English or French army ought to be where he is and he ought to be on the Kuban. Newcastle reminded Clarendon that Britain ought to declare to the Circassians and the Georgians their future plans for their country and give guarantees for their liberty after they make peace with Russia. Finally Newcastle told Clarendon that his agent in Circassia Mr Longworth was unfit for the job.

The power struggle between Sefer Pasha and Muhammed Emin in Circassia finally resulted in an armed conflict between them. A letter from Muhammed Emin, dated 30 December 1855, informs the grand vizier that Sefer Pasha had attacked Muhammed Emin's men and himself while he was residing at the courthouse built with the approval of Serdar-ı Ekrem Ömer Pasha and Sefer Pasha in Şapsuğ region.⁶²⁰ Muhammed Emin writes that Sefer Pasha's attack was repulsed but again he gathered some regular troops with three guns and some bandits and attacked from Anapa into Abkhazia, plundering Muslim property. They again fought and Sefer Pasha retreated. The naib pasha adds that cavalry Brigadier-General (Mirliva) Ali Pasha has also organized conspiracies among the Circassians against him. Finally he expressed his concerns on the fate of Islam in the region.

There are basically two approaches in Ottoman and Turkish historiography to Shamil's role in the Crimean War. The first one is represented by Cevdet Pasha, who accused Shamil of remaining silent as if he had made an agreement with the Russians. His evaluation of the attitudes of Shamil and the Circassians to the war is interesting and worth quoting at some length here:

Unfortunately, Sheikh Shamil of Dagestan, having grappled with the Russians in Dagestan for so many years, did not show the action expected of him during the Crimean War. He retreated to an onlooker's position as if he had concluded an

619 Newcastle to Clarendon, Sinop, 3 November 1855. *AGKK, Englische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*, Band 4, Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988, p. 284.

620 Translation of an Arabic letter from Muhammed Emin to the grand vizier, dated 20 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (30 December 1855). BOA. HR. TO. 424/37 lef 2. See Appendix 105.

armistice with Russia and while the coasts from Batum to Anapa were captured by the allied states, the Abkhazian and Circassian tribes also remained like neutral. Actually the cold attitude of the Circassians was also caused by the errors of this [our] side. Because those sent by the Sublime State to summon these tribes were of slave origins. But the Circassians did not trust the slaves whom they had sold. They did not esteem at all the titles and addresses of pasha and bey which we had given. The British for their part, as soon as they approached those coasts, advised first the prohibition of the sale of male and female slaves. But if the Circassians were to abandon their old customs and habits, then for them there was no difference between the Russians and the English. In short, the reasons and means used by both the Sublime Porte and the Europeans to gain the tribes of the Caucasus caused their hate and therefore the desired aims were not attained.⁶²¹ [My translation]

The second approach is to accuse the Ottoman Empire for not having rendered enough assistance to the Caucasian peoples. The representatives of this approach are usually the Caucasian Ottomans or Turkish citizens of Caucasian origins.⁶²² I find this position closer to reality. Because the Circassians and Shamil, having no regular troops or gun power could not be expected to fight the Russians in their field without help from the Porte. It was the Ottoman Empire that should come to their help. By his presence alone and by his two raids towards Tiflis, Shamil had already rendered invaluable service to the Porte, because he had kept a significant number of Russian troops away from the Russo-Ottoman front. The Porte, however, weak and dependent upon the allies with different aims, could not give a strong assurance to the Circassians and the Dagestanis, because rumours of peace were always present during the war, and the Circassians were rightly afraid of Russia's vengeance in case of their commitment and the abandonment of the Porte and its allies.⁶²³

3.6.2. The Campaign of Summer 1854 and the Battle of Kürekdere

The campaign season of 1854 in the Caucasus opened somewhat late in June. The

621 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 90. Cf. Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800-1909*, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 106. Lütü Efendi also writes that the Circassians did not esteem people who are not noble and free by birth (*kişi-zâde ve hürri'l-asl*). See Lütü, op. cit., p. 91.

622 See for example İsmail Berkok, *Tarihte Kafkasya*, İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1958. Aytek Kundukh, *Kafkasya Müridizmi: Gazavat Tarihi*, Haz. Tarık Cemal Kutlu, İstanbul: Gözde Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1987.

623 Mustafa Budak argues that both positions are wrong. See Budak, "1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Devleti ile Şeyh Şamil Arasındaki İlişkiler", *Tarih Boyunca Balkanlardan Kafkaslara Türk Dünyası Semineri, 29-31 Mayıs 1995. Bildiriler*, İstanbul: İ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1996, pp. 79-92. He finds the policy of the Porte simply "cautious" (*ihtiyatlı*).

Russian army was now on the offensive. General Prince Andronikov's forces in Guria, around Kutaisi consisted of two infantry regiments, one Cossack regiment, two battalions and the Gurian and Imeretian *militia*, making up approximately 9,000 men and 10 guns. On 8 June, a Russian force under the command of Colonel Prince Eristov was attacked by the Laz *başibozuks* under the command of Hasan Bey. The Laz were repulsed and lost 200 men. On 15 June, General Andronikov attacked Selim Pasha's forces along the river Çolok between Ozurgeti and Çürüksu (Kobuleti or Kapulet). Selim Pasha lost 4,000 men and all his guns, and retired to Batum. The Russians lost 1,500 men.⁶²⁴

At the end of June 1854, Lieutenant-General Baron K. K. Vrangeli's forces consisting of 5,000 men with 12 guns advanced towards the Çengel pass near Karabulak village between Iğdır and Bayezid. The pass was occupied by Ferik Selim Pasha's forces consisting of 8,000 regular infantry with 8 guns and 7,000 to 10,000 *başibozuks*, half of which were Kurdish. In mid-July Vrangeli, reinforced with 5,000 more troops, attacked this force and dispersed it. The Ottomans lost about 2,000 men dead and wounded with 370 prisoners and 4 guns, while the Russian losses were 400.⁶²⁵ The Kurdish *başibozuks* fled to their villages.⁶²⁶ On 31 July Vrangeli occupied Bayezid without battle, where he captured a lot of provisions. Bayezid was on the commercial road from Tehran to Trabzon, thus the Russians were now in a position to control the caravan trade from Iran to Trabzon, which was as much important for Britain as for the Ottoman Empire. According to Colonel Mikhail Likhutin of the Erivan corps, Selim Pasha had accused his chief of staff, a Polish émigré and a "renegade", for the decision to accept battle with the Russians. Consequently, the chief of staff was recalled to Istanbul. But Ferik Selim Pasha was also recalled to Istanbul at the end of 1854.⁶²⁷

While these battles took place on the left and right flanks of the front, the decisive

624 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 516. Cf. Budak, op. cit., (1993), pp. 81-82. Budak, referring to *CH*, gives quite different numbers in favour of the Ottoman army, but adds that "although the Ottoman side claimed victory in this battle, General Andronikov brought his main forces to Ozurgeti on 15 June 1854".

625 Budak, op. cit., p. 96. Cf. Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 224) also gives the number of Ottoman forces around Bayezid as 18,000 men. According to Ibragimbeyli, Vrangeli's forces included about 1,000 Azerbaijanian, 150 Armenian and 150 Kurdish irregular cavalry.

626 Budak, quoting from Yüzbaşı Fevzi Kurtoğlu, argues that Selim Pasha of Batum had come to help. However, Müşir Selim Pasha did not and could not come to help from as far as Batum to Bayezid, while even those nearer Ottoman forces at Kars, Erzurum and Van did not come. Kurtoğlu is simply unaware of the second Müşir Selim Pasha other than the one at Batum, namely Ferik Selim Pasha at Bayezid.

627 See General-Major M. Likhutin, *Russkie v Aziatskoy Turtsii v 1854 i 1855 godakh*, St. Petersburg: Tipografiya tovarishestva "Obschestvennaya Pol'za", 1863, p. 188.

battle of the 1854 campaign would be in the middle of the front, between Kars and Gümrü, near a village called Kürekdere,⁶²⁸ where the main forces confronted each other in an open field battle. On the Ottoman side, Mustafa Zarif Pasha had reinforced his forces to cover the winter losses and now commanded 35,000 regular infantry, four cavalry regiments, 6,000 artillery men with 80 field pieces, and up to 14,000 mainly Kurdish *başıbozüks*. The best regiments were from the Arabistan army, but this had nothing intrinsic to do with Arabistan. It was simply the result of good command, namely able colonels, in whom the soldiers had confidence.⁶²⁹ But there was also a kind of embarrassment of riches in the Anatolian army. There were more than 20 Ottoman pashas and also more than 20 European staff officers, with Hurşid Pasha (General Guyon) as their chief, some of them being reputed generals of the Hungarian revolution of 1848, as we have seen above. Count de Melfray had recently joined them as first aide-de-camp to the mushir.⁶³⁰

However, relations between Guyon and the mushir and among these staff officers must have been restrained and full of intricacies. Mustafa Zarif Pasha did not like Hurşid Pasha and favoured instead Miralay Feyzi Bey (Colonel Kollman), who had converted to Islam and spoke Turkish well.⁶³¹ Zarif Pasha found him best in terms of military and engineering talents. He also praised the Polish generals Mirliva Arslan Pasha (Bystrzonowski) and Şahin Pasha (Breanski) and the Hungarian İsmail Pasha (General Kmety). At the beginning of June 1854, Zarif Pasha wrote to the seraskier that Hurşid Pasha was a short-tempered person (*tiz-meşrep, acul bir zat*), who did not respect other people's opinions and who did not possess enough knowledge of the area and of the military science.⁶³² In another letter of the same date, he recommended Feyzi Bey to be promoted to the rank of *mirliva* and appointed chief of staff. He also added

628 This place is also called and spelled as Kurudere, Kurukdere, Kuruckdereh, İncedere, Gökdere. In his book, published in 1855, Charles Duncan gives a wonderfully correct spelling, exactly the same as the modern Turkish one: "Kürekdere"! (See Duncan, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 189). Russian sources spell it as Kyuryuk-Dar or Kyuruk-Dar. This place was later called Mavrik Çay during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877.

629 These few Arabistan regiments were commanded by able colonels like Çerkes Hüseyin Bey, trusted by their troops. Thus the soldiers fully displayed their military capacity. See Duncan, op. cit., p. 188. Russian sources confirm the distinguished character of these Arabistan regiments and the *hassa* or Dersaadet regiments. See for example *Blokada Karsa. Pis'ma ochevidtsev o pokhode 1855 goda v Aziatskuyu Turtsiyu*. Tiflis: Tipografiya kantselyarii namestnika Kavkazskago, 1856, p. 113.

630 Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 486 and p. 491.

631 Budak writes that Hurşid Pasha and Zarif Pasha did not get along well, but he does not explain why. See Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. ???

632 Commander-in-chief of the Anatolian army Zarif Pasha to Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha, dated 6 Ramazan 1270 / 2 June 1854. BOA. İ. MMS. 2/52 lef 7.

that when Feyzi Bey was a colonel in the Hungarian army, Hurşid Pasha was at that time a major under him.⁶³³ Infantry Brigadier-General (Mirliva) Mustafa Raşid Pasha from his station at the village of Haciveli near Kars also reported to Zarif Pasha that Hurşid Pasha had said that Silistria was captured by the Russians, despite the official news to the contrary.⁶³⁴ It seems highly doubtful that Hurşid Pasha would spread such rumours when there was no need or basis for it. Why should he do so? In any case, Hurşid Pasha was of British origin and had the support of the British ambassador. Therefore the Porte did not want to disturb its relations Britain and Hurşid Pasha remained in his post until 1855 when he was called to Istanbul to stand trial together with Zarif Pasha.

Polish officers in general did not like Hurşid Pasha. While British sources in general praise Hurşid Pasha as a good officer, Sadık Pasha is highly critical of him, calling him an “emptier of bottles”. Since Sadık Pasha was in Rumeli, he must have gained his opinion of Hurşid Pasha from those Polish staff officers who served under Hurşid Pasha. Sadık Pasha describes Zarif Pasha as a “talented administrator and officer, although better as administrator, than commander”. This characterization also seems to come from the Polish officers whom Zarif Pasha favoured, as we have seen. Sadık Pasha is also very critical of Stratford de Redcliffe, whom he calls “Little Sultan” and argues that Stratford wanted Hurşid Pasha to command in practice and Zarif Pasha only nominally. Sadık Pasha writes that Hurşid Pasha gave “Lew” Pasha the task of reading newspapers and taking notes, appointed “Potop” Bey master of bakery and “Piorun” Bey master of trumpets as examples of his contempt for the Polish officers.⁶³⁵ Sadık Pasha argues that although “among Polish officers there was disorder, disagreement, jealousy, intrigues and gossip”, there were also such talented and brave officers among them as Breanski, Bystrzonowski, Zarzycki, Grotowski, Jagmin and Wieruski, who were “a hundred times better than the English and Italian officers”.⁶³⁶ This is in sharp contrast to the characterizations of the Polish officers in the memoirs of

633 Zarif Pasha to Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha, dated 6 Ramazan 1270 / 2 June 1854. BOA. İ. MMS. 2/52 lef 8.

634 BOA. İ. MMS. 2/52 lef 11, dated 16 June 1854.

635 Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadyk Pasza), *op. cit.*, 1962, p. 75. Interestingly, Czajkowski calls the Polish officers by the Polish equivalents of their Ottoman-Turkish names. Thus he writes Lew Pasha instead of Arslan Pasha, Potop Bey instead of Tufan Bey, Piorun Bey instead of Yıldırım Bey and Sokol Pasha instead of Şahin Pasha.

636 Czajkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 77. I am grateful to Joanna Błaszowska for help in translating these passages from Polish.

the British officers, doctors and journalists who have been with the Anatolian army.⁶³⁷

On the Russian side, Prince Bebutov had about 13,000 infantry, 3,000 regular cavalry and 4,000 irregular cavalry with 68 or 76 guns. According to Zarif Pasha, the Russians had 76 guns while the Ottomans had 84 guns. The Ottoman army was stronger numerically as well.⁶³⁸ The Russians, being numerically inferior, however, had a weighty counterbalance: the 8 grenadier battalions and 16 squadrons of the dragoon brigade were superior in quality than any of the Ottoman troops, perhaps even the best regiments from the Arabistan army or the rifles (*şeşhaneci*) battalions. This army included formations of irregular cavalry from Azerbaijan, Kabardia, Georgia, Karabakh, under the command of Colonel Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov, Colonel Andronikashvili and Lieutenant-Colonel Kundukhov. Both Ottoman and Russian commanders however had doubts for a battle and kept observing each other until August. At the beginning of August, Bebutov had taken a position between the Kürekdere and Paldırvan villages. After receiving the news of the Russian victory in Bayezid, Bebutov planned an attack on 5 August.⁶³⁹

The Anatolian army had taken a position near Hacı Veli Köy. By his own account, Zarif Pasha was not enthusiastic about an attack, referring to orders from the seraskeriat for defensive operations (*tahaffuzi hareket*). However, he maintained that Hurşid Pasha and the European staff officers all wanted war. The *başibozuks* had also started grumbling: why did we gather here if we are not going to fight? The regular soldiers and officers as well wanted war. In these conditions, Zarif Pasha writes that in order to deceive and appease them (*iğfal ve iskat*), he was suggesting all kinds of different operation plans and temporizing with them.⁶⁴⁰ When he received the news of the defeat of Bayezid on 3 August, Zarif Pasha wanted to send some troops there. But Hurşid Pasha opposed this plan and instead proposed to attack first Bebutov immediately at the dawn of 4 August, while he was relatively weak and then to attack Vrangeli's forces that were advancing towards Erzurum. Most of the officers supported this plan. As for the orders to be on the defensive, the war council decided that since they were operating on Ottoman territory and trying drive the enemy away from Ottoman territory, they should be considered acting on the defensive (*çünkü biz Rusya memaliki tarafına gitmeyip anı*

637 These are Atwell Lake, Humphrey Sandwith and Charles Duncan.

638 Zarif Pasha's evidence, BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, answer 5. See Appendix 85.

639 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 253.

640 See Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 492. Cf. Zarif Pasha's evidence, BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9. See Appendix 85.

memalik-i Osmaniye'den def' edeceğiz. Hareket-i tahaffüzi ve tedafüi bu demektir).⁶⁴¹ Hurşid Paşa's plan was accepted, but according to the *Times* corespondent, who was presnt at the battle, Zarif Pasha said that the fourth and fifth days were unlucky days so the attack was delayed until 6 August.⁶⁴² Meanwhile Bebutov learned of the attack from spies and accordingly he also gathered all his forces together for an attack.

According to Ferik Raşid Paşa's statement, although Hurşid Pasha's plan was accepted, Zarif Pasha did not execute it properly. When the army was to march early in the morning, Hurşid Pasha urged Zarif Pasha to go but Zarif Pasha replied him: "I am the commander of the army. I know when to set out".⁶⁴³ Thus they quarreled and the march began only after evening in the dark. Then the second division set out late and came to the battle field very late. Raşid Pasha added that due to lack of water on the battle field, the Ottoman troops suffered from thirst.

On 6 August⁶⁴⁴ 1854, the two armies met in Kürekdere. Hurşid Pasha had divided the Ottoman army into three parts. Ferik Abdülkerim Pasha (?-1863), better known as Kerim Pasha and called Baba Kerim, that is, "Father Kerim" by soldiers, commanded the right wing or the first division.⁶⁴⁵ Zarif Pasha with Hurşid Pasha was in the centre and Ferik Veli Pasha with General Kmety⁶⁴⁶ (İsmail Pasha) commanded the left wing. However, Hurşid Pasha's plan, though well prepared, required a well-trained army capable of skillful manoeuvring and coordination in order to execute it. The Ottoman army lacked such qualities. As Allen and Muratoff observed, the Ottoman army was divided into three widely sepatared groups, therefore, before one group came into action the other would face the whole Russian force.⁶⁴⁷ Then there was the problem of jealousy among the officers. Hurşid had his enemies as well, both European and Ottoman. In any case, he was only the chief of staff and did not command any units; thus at critical moments, commanders of divisions or regiments would be at liberty not to obey his orders without confirmation from the Commander-in-Chief, who was not to be found

641 Interrogation of Zarif Pasha. BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, paragraph (answer) 5. See Appendix 85.

642 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 101.

643 *Mazbata* of the MVL on the trial of Zarif Pasha and Hurşid Pasha, 23 Receb 1271 (11 April 1855). BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 2. See Appendix 96.

644 Russian sources in general give the day of this battle as 24 July (5 August). See for example Tarle, op. cit., vol. II, p. 517; Bestuzhev, op. cit., p. 75; Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 258.

645 Interrogation of Zarif Pasha. BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, answer 7. See Appendix 85.

646 Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., p. 76) call him Colonel Kmety, which is not correct. Kmety had the rank of *mirliva*, which corresponded to a brigadier-general. Budak (op. cit., 1993, p. 99) repeats this mistake by quoting from them. Furthermore, Allen and Muratoff do not mention Veli Pasha in this battle.

647 Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 77.

during the battle.⁶⁴⁸

The battle lasted four to seven hours. The Ottoman regular cavalry proved utterly useless. Artillery and part of the infantry fought well. The *başıbozüks* were also useless. However, the Ottoman army thanks to its size could still have won the battle had it not been for the lack of proper (or any) leadership or inefficiency of some of the officers. Thus the Ottoman army was defeated by an army half or a third of its size. Salih Hayri maintains that there were more than 50,000 Ottoman troops and the Russians were half that number. He also argues that the Ottoman army was defeated due to lack of command.⁶⁴⁹ According to Ibragimbeyli, Ottomans lost 2,820 dead, about 2,000 wounded and 86 officers and 1,932 soldiers taken prisoner.⁶⁵⁰ The *başıbozüks* dispersed to villages. The Russian loss included 21 officers and 568 soldiers dead, more than 2,000 wounded.⁶⁵¹ While the Ottoman army retreated disorderly towards Kars, the Russian army did not follow it.⁶⁵² Bebutov's caution played a role here. If he had followed the Ottoman army, the Ottoman losses would be much higher and Kars might have been captured.

The *Times* correspondent was a witness of the battle and wrote a lengthy article about it, blaming the Ottoman officers:

With a vivid impression of the whole engagement, from the first cannonshot to the last straggling discharges of musketry, I can use no language too strong to express my reprobation of the conduct of nearly four-fifths of the Turkish officers present. In accounting for the defeat of an army numbering nearly 40,000 men of all arms by a hostile force of less than one-half that number, it is not sufficient to say that the management of the whole battle on the side of the Turks was a series of blunders from first to last; strategical errors might have protracted the engagement, and have added to the cost of a victory, but downright cowardice alone – which no generalship could have redeemed – gave the day to the Russians. One arm, and one only, behaved well – the artillery – which with its commander, Tahir Pasha, acted worthily of any army in Europe. Of the whole 40 battalions of infantry two regiments – the 5th Anatolian and 4th Desardet⁶⁵³ – alone

648 “The War in Asia. (From Our Own Correspondent). Kars, Aug. 7”, *The Times*, Issue 21844, London, 12 September 1854, p. 9. Cf. Sandwith, op. cit., p. 105. Sandwith writes that the *Times* correspondent was an eye-witness of the battle.

649 Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 153. “*Bir kumandan olayıdı ol gün, Düşmeni eyler idi mahv u zebûn. Zâbit olmazsa ne yapsın neferât, Olamaz başsız ayakta harekât*”.

650 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 259.

651 Tarle writes that according to Bebutov's report, Russian dead and wounded numbered 3,054, which more or less coincides with the above account. See Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 517.

652 Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Erzeroom, August 10, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 4 in No. 7, p. 7. Tarle (op. cit., vol. 2, p. 517) writes that the Russian cavalry under the command of General Baggovut chased the Ottoman army almost to the walls of Kars, which is not confirmed by other sources.

653 The correct spelling is Dersaadet, that is, Istanbul army (the second army).

stood their ground and resisted cavalry. Three successive times did three squadrons of Russian dragoons bear down upon these exceptionally brave regiments with a force before which many better disciplined troops would have yielded... Than the conduct of the rest of the infantry, nothing could well be worse, except that of the entire cavalry, which would have disgraced the rawest Bashi-Bazouks. If such, however, was the conduct of the men, that, as I have said, of the great majority of the superior officers was still more infamous. An hour after the action began, there was hardly a Bunbashi (major) or Murallai⁶⁵⁴ (colonel) to be seen; almost to a man they had deserted their regiments, and fled back to the camp to secure their baggage and send it off to Kars.⁶⁵⁵

The *Times* correspondent further wrote that after the battle, Zarif Pasha collected his pashas and secured their seals to a petition to the seraskier that it was Hurşid Pasha's fault alone to have hazarded an engagement. He added that the returns represented the losses as 1,200 killed, 1,800 wounded and 8,000 missing (of which last 2,000 prisoners and the rest deserters, chiefly *redif*).

Although the mushir Zarif Pasha states that the attack was Hurşid Pasha's plan, he does not blame him for defeat in this battle but Mirliva Abdurrahman Pasha, who did not come to the help of his comrades, keeping 5 battalions and one battery (six guns) out of battle. Ferik Raşid Pasha confirms Zarif Pasha in this matter, stating that the said pasha with his 5 battalions, 6 guns and 3,000 başıbozüks did not come to help although Kerim Pasha, commander of the first division twice sent orders to him.⁶⁵⁶ Raşid Pasha, however, also maintains that the retreat was not in an orderly way as claimed by Zarif Pasha, since there was confusion and Zarif Pasha could not have counted enemy losses. Of the battle's result in general, Zarif Pasha gives quite a different account, as if he had not been defeated. He even argues that the result of the battle was useful for the Ottoman Empire and discouraging for the Russian army.⁶⁵⁷ This has, of course, nothing to do with the truth.

Hurşid Pasha, for his part, told the MVL that originally he was not a supporter of an offensive action. Instead he had suggested to strengthen fortifications in Kars and Hacı [Hacı Veli?] Köy. He had even experienced some tension for this with Zarif Pasha

654 The correct modern Turkish spellings are *Binbaşı* and *Miralay*.

655 "The War in Asia. (From Our Own Correspondent). Kars, Aug. 7", The *Times*, Issue 21844, London, 12 September 1854, p. 9. Cf. Sandwith, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

656 *Mazbata* of the MVL on the trial of Zarif Pasha and Hurşid Pasha, 23 Receb 1271 (11 April 1855). BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 2.

657 See Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 494: "İşbu muharebenin neticesi devleti aliyeye [sic] ne suretle faide vermiş olduğu ve Rusyaluya bilakis ne veçhile mazarrat ve askerine gayretsizlik ve dehşet verdiği gün gibi aşikardır". Cf. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 10: "İşbu muharebenin neticesi Devlet-i Aliyye'ye ne suretde faide vermiş ve Rusyalu'ya dahi bilakis ne veçhile mazarratı mucib olmuş olduğu gün gibi aşikardır".

and gone way for reconnaissance. When he returned the army was moving towards the village Vezin. When he asked Zarif Pasha the reasons for this move, Zarif Pasha gave him a peremptory answer: “I am the *müşir*”. However, at Subatan, Zarif Pasha asked his opinion on going to battle with the Russians. Although his original opinion was against such a move, taking into consideration the present deployment of troops and the intelligence on the numerical inferiority of the Russian army, he said if the intention is battle, then it was just the right time, therefore, immediate action was necessary before the Russians could receive reinforcement. However, Zarif Pasha did not think it was lucky time because the moon was in the sign of the scorpion.⁶⁵⁸ Thus Hurşid Pasha argued that many days passed there uselessly.

The British consuls in Erzurum and Trabzon sent reports to Istanbul about the battle of Kürekdere. Extracts from these reports were given by the British embassy to the Porte as well. These reports contained some details of the battle and even a “list of the well and ill-behaved officers at the battle of Kuruckdereh” and a list of “Ottoman officers accused of being addicted to drinking”. Another list included the above Abdurrahman Pasha of the Arabistan army, together with Vanlı Mehmed Pasha, as the officers “whose conduct is most reprehensible in refusing to charge when ordered”. It was also noted that Vanlı Mehmed Pasha “purchased his rank for 60,000 piastres from the Mushir”.⁶⁵⁹

By the battle of Kürekdere, the Russian army now demonstrated its ability to hold the Caucasus. Shamil and the Circassians were further disappointed by the Porte’s military inability. Thus the Caucasus front remained silent until the next campaign season.

3.6.3. The Siege and Fall of Kars and the Caucasian Campaign of Ömer Pasha in 1855

The British consul in Erzurum James Brant was reporting on the state of disorganization of the Anatolian army. The British cabinet wanted to send a military commissioner there to get information on the real state of affairs in the army. Three days before the battle of Kürekdere, Lieutenant-Colonel William Fenwick Williams of

658 Hurşid Pasha’s evidence is in harmony with the account of the *Times* correspondent. The only difference is that the *Times* correspondent gives the unlucky sign as the Ram or Crab. See Sandwith, op. cit., p. 101.

659 BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 73-76. These lists are anonymous and undated. Most probably they were written either by Colonel Williams or by another British officer at Kars.

the Royal Artillery was informed by Clarendon that he had been selected as the officer to attend, as Her Majesty's Commissioner, the head-quarters of the "Turkish" army in Asia, under the orders of Lord Raglan.⁶⁶⁰ Williams was chosen for his knowledge of Eastern Anatolia, where he had served as the British representative in the international border commission on the Ottoman-Iranian border from 1842 to 1852.⁶⁶¹ Williams arrived in Istanbul in August 1854 and after visiting Lord Stratford there and the Commander-in-Chief Lord Raglan in Varna, he departed to Trebizond on 31 August 1854, from there reaching Bayburt on 10 September and Erzurum on 14 September. He was received with high honours by the governor-general of the province, İsmail Pasha. After two days in Erzurum, Williams headed for Kars.⁶⁶²

Williams would be promoted to the rank of *ferik* (lieutenant-general, however, his British rank was brigadier-general) by the Porte upon the request of the British ambassador in December 1854 within three months of his arrival in Erzurum and Kars. From Governor İsmail Pasha's letter to the grand vizier we learn that the British consul in Erzurum James Brant had already informed İsmail Pasha that Williams held the rank of *ferik* even at the time of Williams' arrival at Erzurum. İsmail Pasha also states that he honoured Williams and allowed him to visit the army barracks and hospitals in accordance with the statement of the British consul although Williams did not produce an order from the grand vizier or the seraskier.⁶⁶³

Eventually General Williams played a role greater than any other officer in the Anatolian army, Ottoman or foreigner. This role however was not altogether positive and helpful for the Ottoman war effort. Because of his temperament, Williams mixed in his behaviour and reports the most justified complaints on frauds and on corruption with the most fanciful and vainglorious claims of alleged disrespect towards himself. Therefore one needs to distinguish in his reports the real and the imagined items. As noted by James Reid, "Victorian British commentators might have made harsh judgments about Ottoman corruption, but they addressed certain realities that impartial

660 The Earl of Clarendon to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams. Foreign Office, August 2, 1854. PRMA, No. 1, p. 1.

661 See Robert Curzon, *Armenia: A Year at Erzerum, and on the Frontiers of Russia, Turkey, and Persia*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1854, pp. VII-VIII. The author was at that time private secretary to the British ambassador Sir Stratford Canning and also served in this commission until 1847.

662 Colonel Williams to İsmail Pasha the Governor of Erzurum, 16 September 1854. BOA. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 6. Cf. PRMA, p. 21.

663 İsmail Pasha the Governor of Erzurum to the grand vizier, 3 Muharrem 1271 (26 September 1854). BOA. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 3. See Appendix 59.

observers cannot deny”.⁶⁶⁴ The fact that a certain European observer uses an Orientalistic discourse or shows some prejudices against the Ottomans does not necessarily mean that all his claims are based on fiction. This is especially true in the case of General Williams, who has made very detailed and concrete accusations and revelations of corruption and schemes of embezzlement, based upon rigorous investigations. We will see some of these.

After the Battle of Kurekdere, the Commander-in-Chief Zarif Pasha fell from grace and was dismissed from his post in September 1854. İsmail Pasha, the chief of staff of the Rumelian army was supposed to take the command of the Anatolian army at Kars in September 1854. Meanwhile, in the words of Clarendon, “a foreign general of distinction and said to possess great military talent” was on the spot and willing to take the command of Kars. His appointment was recommended by the allied commanders-in-chief, by the British ambassador and by all the Ottoman ministers except Reşid Pasha the Grand Vizier. The British foreign minister protested this “disregard of the Sultan's interests”, and the fact that “against all this weight of authority his [the Grand Vizier's] decision is allowed to prevail”. Clarendon further instructed Lord Stratford to request from Reşid Pasha to instruct the newly appointed İsmail Pasha “to defer to the advice of Colonel Williams, who is thoroughly acquainted with the people and the country, and who ought to have a high Turkish rank given to him in order to insure respect for his authority”.⁶⁶⁵ On 27 September, Clarendon wrote to Lord Stratford:

I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have little doubt that a deep rooted jealousy of foreigners is, as you suppose, the main cause of the neglect of the army in Asia; but the suicidal indulgence of that feeling ill becomes a Government whose very existence depends upon the support of foreigners.⁶⁶⁶

Clarendon also required Stratford to give a copy of his despatch to Reşid Pasha.

In his first reports from Erzurum, Colonel Williams found the winter-quarters of the army satisfactory but needing repair, the military hospitals clean but the apothecary's department in need of surgical instruments and medicine. As we have already mentioned, he wrote that last winter 18,000 soldiers had died due to insufficient housing

664 Reid, op. cit., (2000), p. 89.

665 The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Foreign Office, September 22, 1854. PRMA, No. 11, p. 10. By the “foreign general of distinction”, Clarendon meant General George Klapka.

666 Clarendon to Stratford, 27 September 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 54, Turkish translation at lef 55. See Appendix 65. The PRMA (No. 13, p. 10) gives a smaller extract from this despatch.

and care.⁶⁶⁷ A week later, Williams would report from Kars that during last winter owing to the want of medicines, food, fuel, bedding and light, nearly 12,000 men perished in the hospitals of Kars.⁶⁶⁸ The troops in Erzurum were 15 to 19 months in arrears of pay. They had received only one month's pay before the last "Bairam". Although 10,000 purses (*kese*) were sent lately, nearly two-thirds of it was in paper. More money in specie was needed. Winter clothing had not been sent yet.⁶⁶⁹ In his reply to the representation of Lord Stratford, Reşid Pasha told that supplies were being sent to Erzurum. As regards the payment of the arrears, he said that this point could not be settled until the "financial" (loan) commission sits, and "the sooner they meet the better". Meanwhile 5,000 purses (2,500,000 piastres, about 20,000 pounds) in specie were being prepared for transmission to Erzurum for the pay of the soldiers. Reşid Pasha also asked Lord Stratford to give the name of the British commissioner in the financial commission for the purpose of setting the commission to work at once.⁶⁷⁰ However, even in the case of money in specie (gold and silver) being sent from Istanbul to the army, it is unlikely that it reached the soldiers because the müşir, pashas, the *müsteşar* (paymaster-general) and the *defterdar* (accountant-general) kept the specie to themselves and distributed paper money to the colonels, other officers and soldiers. The colonels in turn, receiving paper money which circulated only with a 20 per cent discount, were induced to swelling the returns of their regiments to get some extra rations. They would then resell these rations (food items, etc) to the army.⁶⁷¹ The soldiers, if they got paid at all, could change their money notes to buy tobacco and coffee for example only at the discount of 20 per cent.⁶⁷²

Meanwhile, as we have seen, the Russians had occupied the town of Bayezid which stood on the great commercial road between Persia and the Black Sea port of Trabzon. This was alarming news from a military and commercial point of view because this occupation also threatened the trade of the British manufacturers with Persia. Ferik Selim Pasha had fled at the approach of the Russian army. Some başıbozuk and redif troops from the Kars army fought the Russians but could not stop

667 Colonel Williams to İsmail Pasha Governor of Erzurum, 16 September 1854. BOA. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 6. The same letter is available at PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 20, p. 21.

668 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon, Camp near Kars, September 24, 1854. PRMA, No. 28, p. 26.

669 From Stratford's instruction to Pisani to be read to Reshid Pasha. Therapia, October 1, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 17, p. 13.

670 Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Pera, October 3, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 2 in No. 17, p. 14.

671 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 125.

672 PRMA, Inclosure in No. 48, September-October 1854, p. 46. Duncan, op. cit., vol. II, p. 11. Edouard Engelhardt, *Türkiye ve Tanzimat Hareketleri*, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976, p. 83.

them. The Russians, however, in order to strengthen the Erivan army, withdrew from Bayezid towards in November 1854, taking the Armenians with themselves. 600 Karapapaks of Şuregel (or Şüregel) and 300 Kurds under Kasım Ağa had also joined the Russians.⁶⁷³

In Kars, Colonel Williams was also received with military honours and attention by Zarif Mustafa Pasha. Together with his aide-de-camp Lieutenant Teesdale and Doctor Sandwith, Williams inspected the troops. Soldiers were in need of many things, like clothing and provisions, yet their healthy and soldier-like mien struck Williams. The great portion of the infantry was armed with flint firelocks, but three battalions of chasseurs (*şешaneci*) were armed with the Minié rifle (which the Russian army did not have) and seven battalions of infantry had detonating muskets.⁶⁷⁴ However, the sabres of the cavalry were too short. (After Williams's report, new sabres would be imported from Britain). Cavalry was indeed the worst part of the Ottoman army, while the artillery was the best.

All in all, the Ottoman army was not armed worse than the Russian army, which did not have Minié rifles at all. But the management of the Ottoman army was very corrupt and awfully abusive of the soldiers. Williams soon found out huge discrepancies between the actual counted number of troops and the muster-rolls, thus revealing the embezzlement of the mushir and his subordinates, who pocketed the pay and rations of the missing soldiers. The army at Kars that was supposed to be 40,000-strong, actually consisted of altogether 18,340 men including infantry, cavalry, artillery and some irregulars. The *başbozüks* were also stated as amounting to 10,000 in the muster-rolls, when in reality there were not more than 6,000 of them.⁶⁷⁵ Even after Williams's count of the troops, Zarif Mustafa Pasha was seen reporting to Istanbul the muster-roll with a

673 Lieutenant Teesdale to Colonel Williams. Kars, November 26, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 78, p. 73.

674 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, September 26, 1854. PRMA, No. 30, p. 29. The dictionary of Ferit Devellioğlu, under the second meaning of *meniyye* (first meaning "death" in Arabic) gives the information that the *meniyye* rifles were introduced into the Ottoman army under Sultan Abdülaziz. (*Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat*, Ankara, 2002, p. 615). However, Minié has nothing to do with *meniyye*, it is the surname of the French officer who invented these rifles and bullets before 1850. Secondly, as seen above, Minié rifles were already being used in the Ottoman armies during the Crimean War. See PRMA, pp. 102, 333, 335. Laurence Oliphant (op. cit., p. 100, 205) records their use by Ömer Pasha's army during his Caucasian campaign as well in the autumn of 1855, which is confirmed by Borozdin (op. cit., p. 29). Adolphus Slade also confirms the exclusive possession of Minié rifles by the allies. See Slade, op. cit., p. 99.

675 Report of the Military Board to the Seraskier on the Corps d'Armée of Kars in September and October, 1854. (Translation). PRMA, Inclosure 3 in No. 119, p. 116. Budak (op. cit., (1993), p. 105) gives these last numbers about the *başbozüks*, and other similar cases, referring to another British archival document.

total number of 27,538 effective of all arms, whereas in the opinion of Williams only 14,000 effective men were present.⁶⁷⁶ Williams also learnt from the “Vakeel” (*vekil*, deputy) of the *defterdar* that rations for 33,000 men were being issued daily.⁶⁷⁷

It is certain that this practise of muster-roll fraud was known and tolerated by the Porte, because it was the widespread and usual practise. An irrefutable proof for this is found in the words of the grand vizier himself. In November 1854 the army of Batum was weakened due to deaths from diseases and desertions and it needed reinforcements. It was decided to send the Tunis army and to levy 1,000 *asakir-i muvazzafa* from the sancak of Lazistan. The grand vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha in his *tezkire* to the sultan wrote that the Porte allowed the levy of the 1,000 men, however, he warned that this levy should not be done as it is done in most places by officers, that is, by registering for example 100 men but employing only 60 or 70 of them and then taking the pay and rations of the remaining men (*bu misillu asakir-i muvazzafanın ekser mahallerde tertibi faraza yüz nefer olduğu halde zabitleri altmış yetmiş nefer istihdam ederek küsurunun yalnız maaş ve tayinatlarını almakta olduğundan işbu celb olunacak neferat-ı muvazzafanın nüfusu adedine muvafik olmasına*).⁶⁷⁸ The grand vizier also warned the local authorities that measures must be taken to prevent these recruits from oppressing anyone. From these words and from the whole of the *tezkire*, it is certain that the grand vizier is trying to prevent a customary practise of fraud due to the necessities of the war.

Another irrefutable proof of the fact that the Porte knew and tolerated the muster-roll fraud is the non-existence of any concrete questions on this matter to the three successive commanders of the Anatolian army (Abdi, Ahmed and Zarif Pashas) during their trial in Istanbul from November 1854 to June 1855. Despite the many reports of Williams on concrete cases of fraud that were forwarded to the Porte by the British embassy, none of these pashas is asked directly about the muster-roll fraud or invited to prove that the numbers of troops were in confirmity with reality. The questions about corruption in the administration of the army are too general, as if corruption was just a rumour. It is also remarkable that while Abdi and Ahmed Pasha argue against each other and accuse each other on many military issues, they never accuse each other of

676 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, October 11, 1854. PRMA, No. 42, p. 39.

677 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, October 25, 1854. PRMA, No. 49, p. 47.

678 Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha to the Sultan, 21 Safer 1271 (12 November 1854). BOA. İ. MMS. 3/97 lef 3. See Appendix 75.

corruption. On the contrary, they firmly confirm each other in this question.⁶⁷⁹

According to the reports of Colonel Williams and the narratives of Doctor Sandwith, Colonel Lake and the *Morning Chronicle* correspondent Charles Duncan, apart from the muster-roll fraud, the governors, pashas and colonels used every opportunity for peculation and did many other evil things. They bought wheat and barley from producers and then sold it to the army at heightened prices, instead of allowing the producers to bring their produce to the army stores and get payment. Pashas took bribes from all kinds of purchases for the army, or simply embezzled the money without making any purchases at all. For example, they did not give the soldiers their ration of rice twice a week. This theft alone brought them £30,000. The pashas and colonels also dealt in *kaimes* (paper money). They collaborated with greedy contractors who sold low quality goods and provisions to the army at enormous profits. For example, a Greek baker named Kozma mixed the flour with hay, barley and other things and gave very coarse, hardly edible crumbs at the price of best quality loaves of wheat-flour. Kozma was protected by Ahmed Pasha.⁶⁸⁰ In another instance pashas and colonels bought old horses worth 3 to 6 pounds each for the cavalry and charged the government 10 to 12 pounds for each horse, thus pocketing the difference. They made the soldiers work for commercial purposes. In general, the pashas lived in luxury together with their large *harems* and did not care for the well-being of the soldiers at all. For example, some of the pashas appropriated houses with accommodation enough for 250 men, while the soldiers were packed tightly into overcrowded rooms. When soldiers were quartered in any place, the pashas took bribes from the rich not to use their houses while the poor were forced to evacuate their homes. Thus it was the poorest villages of Erzurum and Kars that were forced to billet soldiers in their houses. Many pashas added drunkenness to their vices.

Another problem was the hostility of the uneducated old officers towards young officers brought up the military schools of the Sultan or in Europe. Williams reported:

679 For the interrogation and statements of these pashas, see BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 and 5/170. See Appendices 79-83, 85, 96.

680 Duncan writes that the inspector Hayreddin Pasha had made “Kosmo” (Kozma) eat the “bread” of his bakery as a punishment at the beginning of 1854. However, it seems that Kozma continued with his practise with the consent of Müşir Ahmed Pasha, because Duncan also writes that the müşir [Zarif Mustafa Pasha] himself bastinadoed Kozma for the same guilt in May 1854. See Duncan, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 115 and vol. 2, p. 12. During his trial in Istanbul, Zarif Pasha was asked about Kozma as well and he admitted that he had beaten him (*rivayet olunan uygunsuzluğunun bazı eseri görülmekle darb ve tedip olunmuş idi*) or had him beaten (*döğdürdüğüm vakit*) and afterwards he started to serve better (*pek güzel hizmet etmeğe başladı*). However, Zarif Pasha also argued that other bakers could not provide bread at the same price as Kozma, who had great capital and experience in this business. BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, question 15. See Appendix 85.

Several months ago fourteen of these young men, after completing their studies at the Galata Serai, were sent to this army; they found themselves exposed to every description of insult and degradation; not one of them received a paid appointment in the Etat-Major, and several have, in consequence, disappeared altogether from this army; I believe only four remain, and those subsist on the bounty of such superior officers as may find it to their own interest to employ them: in short, the officers at present in command, as well as those in subordinate posts, will always endeavour to keep the young cadets out of employ in order that their own promotion may secure for them those illicit sources of peculation on which they at present fatten, at the expense of the unfed and badly-clothed soldier.⁶⁸¹

Sandwith is also of the opinion that especially against these young, educated “Turkish” officers, “a system of persecution” was pursued:

This mean and spiteful conduct towards these unfortunate young Turks was observable in all their superior officers, from the mushir downwards, and was shown in a variety of ways. No tents, pay or rations were given them, and they prowled about the camp in rags, fed by the charity of those who pitied their sad condition.⁶⁸²

The new mushir of the Anatolian army İsmail Pasha was in no hurry to proceed from Istanbul to Erzurum, because of his eye infection which threatened his sight. Whether this was a real problem or an excuse in order not to spend the winter in Erzurum is open to question. Meanwhile Kerim Pasha acted as his deputy for a short time but then Şükrü Paşa from the Rumeli army was appointed as the acting Commander-in-Chief. His chief of staff was Hüseyin Pasha. Şükrü Pasha arrived at Erzurum toward the end of October. Before Şükrü Pasha arrived at Kars on 12 November, General Williams had already received from the British consul Brant in Erzurum the information that at an evening meeting Zarif Pasha had excited Şükrü Pasha against Williams and Şükrü Pasha had said that Williams should not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of the army.⁶⁸³ Williams quickly reported the situation to Stratford de Redcliffe and to Lord Clarendon. Williams also reported happily that the new chief of staff Hüseyin Pasha had “taken the young staff-students under his special protection, provided them quarters, claimed their long arrears of pay”.⁶⁸⁴

Meanwhile Zarif Pasha was recalled to Istanbul in November 1854 and he was

681 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, October 23, 1854. PRMA, No. 46, p. 41.

682 Sandwith, *op. cit.*, p. 122, or p. 69 in the abridged edition of the book in the same year.

683 Consul Brant to Colonel Williams, Erzerum, November 2, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 2 in No. 56, p. 53. Cf. Budak, *op. cit.*, (1993), p. 106. Budak writes that the Porte dismissed Zarif Pasha and appointed instead Şükrü Paşa, omitting the appointment of İsmail Pasha.

684 Colonel Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Camp near Kars, November 4, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 56, p. 52.

soon arrested⁶⁸⁵ in December 1854 after strong demands from Lord Stratford, who gave an official note to the Ottoman foreign minister Âli Pasha on 28 November 1854, demanding the punishment of Zarif Pasha together with his two predecessors Müşir Ahmed Pasha, Müşir Ahmed Pasha and Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha.⁶⁸⁶ In fact even Abdi Pasha, the predecessor of Ahmed Pasha had not yet been tried. The trial of the three successive commanders of the Anatolian army, Abdi, Ahmed and Zarif Pashas, together with that of Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha, is, however, very important as an indicator of the attitude of the Ottoman elite toward charges of corruption against high officials, as in the case of Kapudan Mahmud Pasha. The difference is that in this case the allies, especially the British pressed for the punishment of Zarif Pasha and others.

There were two basic charges against Zarif Pasha. The first was strictly military in character: He was accused of taking an offensive action by the battle of Kürekdere (and thereby playing into the hand of the Russians) when his orders were to be on the defensive. The second charge was about corruption in the administration of the Anatolian army. On the first charge the DŞA decided that since the battle took place on Ottoman territory it should be seen as a defensive (*tahaffuzî* or *tedafüî*) operation.⁶⁸⁷ This decision was approved by the MVL and the Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükela*) as well. On the second charge, Zarif Pasha said that he was not informed and it must be asked from the *müsteşar*, the *defterdar* and other officials. He added that on the question of the exchange of coins for paper money he would pretend not to know. When he was asked to clarify, he said that it was perpetrated by the veznedar (teller) sent by the treasury and he had sent the veznedar to the former müsteşar Rıza Efendi. However, Rıza Efendi had only imprisoned the culprit for a short term. Raşid Paşa and Hurşid Paşa said that they had heard some acts like stealing from the cavalry fodder and buying grain at increased prices but they were not able to prove them. Then the MVL reached the conclusion that there had not been so much corruption in purchases and expenditures under Zarif Pasha as under his predecessors and that rations to the army had been allocated properly. While it was not denied that some local officials had committed embezzlement, it was not possible to investigate these cases from Istanbul, therefore, Vasıf Pasha and his defterdar Vehab Efendi should be asked.

685 Grand vizier's petition and the Sultan's *irade*, 26 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (17 December 1854). BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 7. The *irade* called for an acceleration of the trial of Abdi, Ahmed and Ferik Ali (Rıza) Pashas as well as Zarif Pasha.

686 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Aali Pasha, November 28, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure in No. 59, p. 56. For the official Ottoman translation of this official note see BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 1. Budak (ibid), refers to the same original document in English, however, he writes that Stratford wanted Kerim and Veli Pashas together with Zarif Pasha to be punished.

687 *Mazbata* of the DŞA, 19 Şaban 1271 (7 May 1855). BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 1.

Consequently, Zarif Pasha's arrest and unemployment did not last long, as was the rule among the Ottoman elite at that time. His trial lasted until June 1855, then he was finally acquitted and released in July 1855.⁶⁸⁸ Within two years, at the end of 1856, Hasan Rıza Pasha was again appointed seraskier and he again managed to take Zarif Pasha into state service, this time as president of the DŞA.⁶⁸⁹ As we have seen, only Ahmed Pasha from the Anatolian army was found guilty and exiled to Cyprus for 5 years.

On 8 December 1854, Colonel Williams complained to Lord Stratford that he had not received any correspondence from him since 23 September. He was disappointed at his demands being not complied with. Williams observed, among other things, that in such a case, he would fail to preserve the power which he had "seized" "unaided".⁶⁹⁰ Meanwhile, at the demand of the British cabinet, the Porte accepted to confer upon Colonel Williams the rank of *ferik* (division general or lieutenant-general) towards the end of December 1854. This was his "local" rank, for the British army, the new rank of Colonel Williams was Brigadier-General.

Lord Stratford in his despatch to Clarendon on the complaints of Colonel Williams remarked that Williams had decided in a hasty manner that he was neglected by the British ambassador. "Winter, distance, roads scarcely passable, want of funds, the extent of evil to be cured, the scarcity of trustworthy officers, the greater interest of operations elsewhere, the illness of Ismail Pasha" were to blame. He also blamed the "corruption, ignorance, prejudice, want of public spirit and the instincts of selfishness" of the "Turkish" ministers. But then he added remarkably:

Has England itself been always without a taint? Have we never heard of Bacon, or of Marlborough? Have we forgotten the Memoirs of Pepys, the profligacies of his day and the one claim of an exiled Sovereign to the gratitude of his country? Are not the denunciations Burke still ringing in our ears? Place, time, and circumstances vary altogether; but the disease differs only in degree. In Turkey it has reached the stage of extreme virulence; in Christendom, generally, it is in abeyance, or shows itself only under mild forms; in Russia it mingles with the system of administration, and would no doubt fulfil its mission there as elsewhere, if the power and energy of Government did not maintain a counteracting vitality.⁶⁹¹

688 Grand vizier's petition and the Sultan's *irade*, 15-16 Şevval 1271 (1-2 July 1855). BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 14.

689 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 13-20*, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p. 37. BOA. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 1.

690 Colonel Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Erzerroom, December 8, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure in No. 66, p. 65.

691 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon. Constantinople, December 28, 1854. PRMA, No. 83, p. 78.

Lord Stratford also wrote that he had learnt from a “Turkish” minister, on whom he could rely in this instance, that the real cause of the poverty of the Asian army last year was the jealousy of Mehmed Ali Pasha, grand vizier and then seraskier, towards Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha, then the mushir of the *hassa* army, who seemed to be his rival. Furthermore, the present Seraskier (Hasan Rıza Pasha) and Ömer Pasha had long been at variance with each other. While the Seraskier asserted that he had sent ample supplies to the army in Rumeli, the Generalissimo complained of being neglected.⁶⁹²

To those historical allusions concerning England, forwarded by Stratford to Williams as well, the response of Williams is also worth mentioning here:

although the crimes of Bacon, Pepys, and Marlborough were parallel and identical with those which now brand the characters of the greatest and least of the public men in Turkey, the circumstances which relate to the repression and punishment of them are by no means so; for, if we take the last and greatest of these guilty Englishmen above-mentioned, we find his glory and his avarice associated with the history and fortunes of the greatest nation upon earth. England was not then supported in the arms, as it were, of France and Turkey, and could not have been peremptorily called by great patrons and allies to put her house in order and repress corruption, as Turkey now is by France and England; and had this warning voice been heard, and responded to, we should have been spared this desperate struggle.⁶⁹³

Williams added that those “base” (implying Şükrü Pasha), “despicable” (referring to many of the commanding officers), “drunken” (openly accusing Liva Ahmed Pasha) Ottoman officers were still at the head of various departments and corps of the Anatolian army.

On the other hand, Stratford was pressing the Porte for the trial and punishment of Abdi, Ahmed and Ali Rıza Pashas from the Anatolian army for the corruption and other charges. In December 1854, an important change in office made things easier for Stratford: Reşid Pasha once again became grand vizier. Nevertheless, Reşid Pasha was no longer the champion of reform, and even if he were so, his office did not mean everything, the whims of the Sultan and the intrigues of the rivals had also to be taken into account. Lord Stratford was growing weary of the complaints of Williams and the constant pressure of Clarendon. Williams had sent the cover of a letter addressed to him by Şükrü Pasha as an instance of the disrespect shown him by the Ottoman authorities. Yet upon an exact translation of the superscription in question, Lord Stratford found that its terms, “far from being disrespectful, rather err on the side of compliment”. Lord

692 Ibid.

693 Brigadier-General Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Erzerroom, January 25, 1855. PRMA, No.137, p. 133.

Stratford observed that the “Queen's Ambassador and personal representative” had no more of the titles.⁶⁹⁴

Indeed this despatch of Lord Stratford to Lord Clarendon, dated 21 January 1855, revealed a very curious and important fact: Stratford admitted that there existed no record of his having applied in writing for a formal recognition of Colonel Williams as Her Majesty's Commissioner to the army of Kars. Stratford was “really at a loss to discover how it happened” that he omitted “so obvious a formality”. As he noted, “the very facilities” of his “position with respect to the Turkish ministers” had betrayed him into an inadvertency, but this was of so little practical importance since Williams's own correspondence had shown the honours and attentions with which he was received in Erzurum and Kars. Therefore, Stratford very rightly observed that, “surely there are no symptoms here of any disrespect to Her Majesty's Commissioner, who at that time in military rank was a simple Lieutenant-Colonel”. Then, very interestingly, it appears that the Ottoman pashas had in fact shown unduly respect to an unknown British lieutenant-colonel without proper documents testifying his appointment and they had even allowed him to search into almost all the details of the army.

In January 1855, Mehmed Vasıf Pasha (?-1865), the former commander of the Arabistan army, was appointed as the provisional commander-in-chief of the Anatolian army until İsmail Pasha could take over his responsibilities. İsmail Pasha himself was sent to the Danube to replace Ömer Pasha, who was now sent to the Crimea. Vasıf Pasha was known to be an honest commander; since he had an independent revenue, he was not engaged in peculation.⁶⁹⁵ Therefore he was chosen to command the Anatolian army. Vasıf Pasha was given instructions from the Seraskier Rıza Pasha and the Grand Vizier Reşid Pasha. The Seraskier instructed Vasıf Pasha to be on the defensive against the Russians, and in the case of a Russian attack he should consult with Ferik Williams Pasha and other commanders to repel the enemy. Reşid Pasha's instructions put more emphasis on the need to fight corruption and to follow the advice of Ferik Williams

694 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon. Constantinople, January 21, 1855. PRMA, No. 99, p. 91. The translation of this address read as follows: “To the most noble presence of the possessor of rank and nobility, his Excellency Williams Bey, a Military Chief Commander of the exalted Government of England, residing at Erzurum”. Ibid, Inclosure in No. 99, p. 93.

695 General Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov in his memoirs writes that Vasıf was a Georgian from the Guria region, village Chokhlati, surname Gudjabidze, and that he was sold as a slave at the age of 12 to the well-known Reşid Pasha in Istanbul. See Muravyov, *Voina za Kavkazom v 1855 godu*, vol. 1, St. Petersburg: Tipografiya tovarishestva “Obschestvennaya pol'za”, 1877, p. 41. Mehmed Süreyya also records his Georgian origin. He had become a *ferik* in 1830-31. He had also been governor of Niş, Salonica, Vidin and Trabzon.

Pasha.⁶⁹⁶ According to Sadık Pasha, Redcliffe told Vasif Pasha that he demanded “absolute obedience” to Colonel Williams and then Vasif could count on Redcliffe’s support. Sadık Pasha even claims that Vasif Pasha kissed the coat of Redcliffe, which no “Turk” had done before. He adds that Vasif Pasha was no “Turk”, but a Georgian of Slave origin.⁶⁹⁷

Meanwhile the *firman* conferring on Williams the rank of *ferik* was read in Erzurum on 25 January 1855 in the presence of military and civil authorities. This ceremony was a novelty in that probably for the first time such a high rank was bestowed upon a Christian, without changing his name into a Muslim name. As Williams noted, this innovation was calculated to do much good, “for, hitherto, the Turks have forced Europeans to take an Osmanli designation and the soldier was made to believe that the officer in question had embraced his religion also; and this inferred that no Christian was worthy of holding high rank in the armies of the Sultan”.⁶⁹⁸

By February 1855, Lord Stratford came into conflict with the demands of the Brigadier-General Williams, and this time he complained to the Earl of Clarendon. Even Stratford did not approve of Williams's tone towards the Ottoman command. Finally Lord Stratford asked the question which the Ottoman pashas in Erzurum and Kars should have asked from the beginning: What exactly are the position and powers of Williams? That he was assuming the powers of the Commander-in-Chief was clear from his demands and even Stratford was not prepared to press upon the Porte for all the demands of Williams. Therefore Stratford wrote that “he should be made acquainted with extent of his powers on the spot, with the degree to which he is independent of the Commander-in-chief”. He further remarked:

It appears that the Commissioner asserts in practise a right of being obeyed without hesitation, whether the object of his suggestion be the punishment or removal of an officer accused by him, the correction of an abuse, the introduction of an improvement, or the direction of a military operation. If such are his powers I know not in what he differs from a Commander-in-chief, except that he is not charged with taking the field in person, and directing the whole of the operations on his single responsibility. The Porte most certainly does not put this construction on the authority with which he is invested, nor have I so read my instructions as to ask for more on his behalf than a fair reliance on his judgement in matters affecting the administration of an army, a respectful attention to his advice and suggestions for the promotion of its efficiency, and that amount of

696 Instructions to be delivered to Vassif Pasha, dated January 28, 1855 (Translation). The Grand Vizier's addition to the Instructions to Vassif Pasha. (Translation). PRMA, Inclosure 1 and 2 in No. 119, p. 107-110.

697 Czajkowski, op. cit., p. 77.

698 Brigadier-General Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Erzeroom, January 26, 1855. PRMA, Inclosure in No. 138, p. 133-134.

confidence as to military movements and plans which ought to be inspired by the intimate relations subsisting between the respective Governments.

Observing in your Lordship's instruction to General Williams that he is directed to maintain the most friendly relations with the Turkish officers, I venture to ask whether the tone which he has assumed towards them, the abruptness of his charges, the violence of his threats, the dictatorial spirit which, according to his own account, has generally characterized his proceedings, can be said to correspond with that intention, or to favour those dispositions to reform which it is our object to produce no less at Kars than throughout the Turkish Empire.

We should be inconsistent with ourselves if we sought to trample down what remains of Turkish independence...⁶⁹⁹

Stratford then pointed out the inconsistency of Williams' pretensions to such a high position due to his "ignorance of the native languages, and of practical experience in the field".

Adolphus Slade is also critical of the conduct of General Williams, arguing that his unfavourable estimate of the Turks, formed while employed on the delimitation of the Ottoman-Iranian border, was

the inevitable consequence of his dependence on interpreters, drawn from classes prone from infancy to exaggerate in disfavour of the ruling class, and who when conflicting opinions respecting them are deducible, invariably deduce the least flattering. He had seen the Turks with their rayas' eyes, he had heard about them from their rayas' lips, and had passed judgement accordingly. As well might an Algerine's sketch of the French, or a Hindoo's colouring of the English, be accepted as genuine representation.

Thus impressed, the commissioner, face to face with proud susceptible men, unconsciously passed the faint line of demarcation between counsel and dictation... he fancied, in the professional jealousy excited by his visitorial character, disrespect for his position: - singular hallucination, in days when the humblest individual in French or English uniform was caressed!⁷⁰⁰

An author by the name of S. de Zaklitschine, who seems to be a French staff officer in the Kars army published a book in 1856 in response to the British "blue book" (the PRMA). There he wrote that

The reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams on the battle of İncedere testify, if not its credulity, at least of its provisions premeditated to blame all that had been done in Anatolia until his arrival. They do not speak in favour of his calm and cold judgement, neither of his view as a man of war nor of his impartiality as a critique.⁷⁰¹ [My translation]

Sadık Pasha in his turn, writes that Colonel Williams, "like most of the English officers who bought their ranks and did not deserve by service and merit, treated his

699 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon. Constantinople, February 19, 1855. PRMA, No. 135, pp. 129-130.

700 Slade, op. cit, p. 411.

701 S. de Zaklitschine, *Kars et le Général Williams. Réponse au Livre Bleu*, Malta, 1856, p. 19.

officers like Negroes”⁷⁰².

In February 1855, Vasıf Pasha became the mushir of the Anatolian army. He was given clear instructions to follow the advice of General Williams. Ferik Halim Pasha was also appointed to his staff. The chronicler Lütfi went to his house before his departure from Istanbul. Vasıf Pasha was sitting with Ferik Halim Pasha, who was complaining that having changed the old muskets with capsule rifles, what they were going to do if the French do not give them the capsules and if they did not have money for the capsules. Vasıf Pasha kept silent, smoking his *nargile* and pretending not to hear.⁷⁰³

Meanwhile General Nikolai Nikolayevich Muravyov (1794-1866), appointed at the end of 1854, came to Tiflis at the beginning of March as the new viceroy of the Caucasus. He was not known and he did not belong to the tsar’s circle of favourites, but he was an energetic and able officer. His appointment must have appeared as a surprise to generals like Bebutov, Baryatinskiy and Baklanov, who might have felt some jealousy towards him. Muravyov had been to Istanbul and Egypt in 1833 during the Russian help to the Porte against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. He spoke Russian, French, English, German and Turkish fluently.⁷⁰⁴

At the beginning of June 1855, Muravyov advanced towards the front with 21,200 infantry, 6,000 Cossack and Dragoon cavalry, 88 guns and some militia.⁷⁰⁵ His plan was to besiege Kars from all sides, cutting all ways of communication with Erzurum and other places and thus forcing the fortress to surrender. Vasıf and Williams Pashas on the other hand, knowing very well the hazards of an open field battle with the Russian army, gave all their energy to fortifying the city. Colonel Lake in Williams’s staff was an expert on fortification.

Cossack cavalry General Yakov Petrovich Baklanov (1808-1873) crossed the border at the end of May for reconnaissance. Towards end of June he recommended the storm of Kars to Muravyov, but Muravyov was hesitant. General Muravyov wrote to the Russian war minister that if he had some 15,000 troops more, he could have stormed the city.⁷⁰⁶ Instead he strengthened the blockade of Kars, taking away or destroying all sources of provisions for the army at Kars. Soon Kars was suffering from hunger. An Ottoman force under Ali Pasha sent from Erzurum was defeated by General Pyotr

702 Czajkowski, op cit., p. 78. I am grateful to Karolina Fursewicz for help in translating this passage.

703 Lütfi, op. cit., p. 108.

704 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 303. Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 212.

705 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 520.

706 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 523.

Petrovich Kovalevskiy (1808-1855) in Penek on 31 August. Ali Pasha himself was taken prisoner.

The peasants around Kars were now subjected to submit their tithe to the Russian army. Nevertheless, Muravyov in his memoirs writes that for living stock bought from the population, he ordered to pay them by money in gold, not by some doubtful promissory notes, as did the Ottoman army.⁷⁰⁷ Muravyov issued an appeal to the population of Kars on 28 June. The appeal proclaimed that now the Russian army was encamped near villages but “not one ear of their harvest” had been trodden by Russian horses, while Istanbul had showered them with taxes, violence and unpaid transport services. It is worth to quote more from this proclamation to see the arguments of Russian propaganda: (I am using here the word propaganda in a neutral sense)

When 22 years ago Mehmed Ali Pasha betrayed the Sultan and your present friends England and France sacrificed Istanbul to Mehmed Ali, while Turkey was being ruined and everybody watched cool heartedly, who gave you the hand of help? The late Emperor Nikolai, enemy of rebellion and malice. He ordered his army to cross the sea and defend Istanbul by breast. At that time our troops were in the Bosphorus and Nikolai could demand any reward from Turkey. But the Great Sovereign did not make a trade of his friendship. He saved his ally and withdrew his army after the danger was past. Did Turkey have a right not to trust Nikolai's word? But Sultan Mahmud died and around Sultan Abdülmecid there appeared men who valued more their personal interests than the peace of the nation. Now the English and the French give orders.. while the executors of these orders are Muslims... When a French captain appears beside a pasha at the head of his army, who gives the orders? The French captain! Foreigners have occupied your country, there are foreign troops even in the palace. Open your eyes and know well who is your real friend and who is your enemy!⁷⁰⁸ [My translation]

Meanwhile the situation in Kars had become unbearable for the soldiers and for the civilians. Müşir Vasıf Pasha was sending letter after letter to the Porte informing that the Russians were about to attack the city and asking for reinforcements. In his letter on 20 June 1855, he wrote that a Russian army of 40,000 to 50,000 men had come to the south of Kars preparing for an attack. Vasıf Pasha added that it would be difficult to oppose this Russian force because most of the troops in Kars were *redif* troops and they had been demoralized by earlier defeats (*burada olan kuvve-i mevcude birkaç kere muharebe görüp rabbim bir daha göstermesün vuku'a gelmiş olan halet-i müteellime cihetiyle askerın gözü yılmış ve ekserisi dahi redif bulunmuş olduğundan*).⁷⁰⁹ Every day

707 Muravyov, op. cit., vol. I, p. 210.

708 *Vozzvanie Gen. Muravyova k poddannym Turtsii, ot 16-go iyunya 1855 goda* (General Muravyov's appeal to the subjects of Turkey, 28 June 1855). AKAK, vol. XI, no. 65, p. 79.

709 Müşir Mehmed Vasıf Pasha to the Grand Vizier, 4 Şevval 1271 (20 June 1855). BOA. İ. MMS. 5/171 lef 3.

many soldiers were dying and many of them deserting. Some civilians helped these deserters and some civilians (both Muslim and Christian, namely Armenian) spied for the Russians. Vasıf and Williams had to resort to executions to stop the desertions and spies but even this measure did not stop the deserters and spies totally.⁷¹⁰

While Kars was thus under siege, the Porte and the allies were discussing on various methods of relief for the Kars army. While the allies' top priority was the conquest of Sevastopol, the Porte was naturally more interested in Kars. Brigadier-General Mansfield had come from Britain as Stratford's military advisor. There were in general two plans: landing an army at Trabzon and advancing towards Erzurum and Kars or landing the army at Redutkale and advancing towards Kutaisi and Tiflis.⁷¹¹ Both plans had their advantages and disadvantages but the Porte favoured the latter. Towards the end of June 1855 a meeting was held in Sadrazam Âli Pasha's *konak* on the Bosphorus with the participation of Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, Seraskier Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha (1811-1882), Lord Stratford, General W. R. Mansfield and Dragoman Stephen Pisani. We do not know why the French did not participate in this meeting. Were they uninvited or disinterested? The second alternative seems more likely.

After counselling with the seraskier, General Mansfield prepared a memorandum for landing at Redutkale. The command of the campaign was proposed to be given to Lieutenant-General R. J. H. Vivian, the commander of the "Turkish Contingent". Vivian's contingent (20,000 men, half of which was in Istanbul) was to be reinforced with forces from Batum and Rumelia, Egypt and Tunis, reaching a total of about 43,400 troops.⁷¹² Nevertheless, Vivian was not enthusiastic about the plan stating that the "Turkish Contingent" was not fit for the service, that he must have exact details, and then demanding a whole list of facilities of transport and supplies. The list included, among others, 170 transport ships and 15,000 horses for a proposed corps of 25,000 men.⁷¹³

The decision was of course to be taken by the British government and the Porte.

710 Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 138. Budak, however, mentions only Armenian spies. Cf. Tobias Heinzelmann, op. cit., p. 245.

711 Lord Stratford to the Earl of Clarendon, 30 June 1855. See PRMA, No. 245, p. 221. Stratford mentions "three possible modes of acting", but the third one is not clear. Probably it is a variant of the second plan.

712 PRMA, pp. 221-225. Cf. Budak, op. cit., pp. 150-153. Budak has translated the "Turkish Contingent" as "*Türk alayı*", that is, "Turkish regiment". However, General Mansfield's report (which Budak translates) tells that the "Turkish Contingent" would form "a division" of the force that would be sent to save Kars.

713 Vivian to Redcliffe, 2 July 1855. PRMA, Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 251, pp. 227-228.

Stratford immediately despatched the plan to Clarendon asking whether a diversion operation from Redutkale was approved by the government. On 14 July, Clarendon replied by telegraph that the plan is disapproved, adding that “Trebizond ought to be the base of operations”.⁷¹⁴ The British Secretary of State for War Lord Panmure⁷¹⁵ agreed with Lord Clarendon and warned General Vivian about undertaking “any expedition of a nature so wild and ill-digested as that contemplated by the Porte” and “risking the honour of the British name and your own reputation”.⁷¹⁶ Thus began a long series of discussions which delayed the proposed campaign and did much harm to its result. With the French generals and admirals hostile to the plan and the British hesitant, it was left to Ömer Pasha’s efforts.

Starting from 23 June Ömer Pasha was warning the allied commanders about the situation of the army of Kars and of the necessity of a diversion operation from Redutkale. On 7 July he sent a memorandum to the British and French generals and admirals in chief, wherein he stated that the Kars army “to the number of 10,000 men, blockaded in the entrenched camp of Kars by a superior Russian force”, might capitulate because of hunger if not from some other cause. The commander of the Kars army, finding that his communications with Erzurum were cut off, had required on 23 June reinforcements and a powerful diversion on the side of Redutkale. Then Ömer Pasha proposed:

The proposal which I wish to make is, that I should throw myself, with the part of my army which is here and at Kertch, 25,000 Infantry, 3,000 Cavalry from Eupatoria, and a proportion of Artillery, upon some point of the coast of Circassia, and by menacing from thence the communication of the Russians, oblige them to abandon the siege of Kars.⁷¹⁷

Ömer Pasha added that this force and that under Mustafa Pasha at Batum was enough for the operation and he only needed assistance in the transport of his troops. He then wanted a war council to assemble to decide upon the operation.

The conference of the generals and admirals took place on 14 July with the participation of the French Commander-in-Chief General Aimable Jean Jacques Pélissier (1794-1864), the British Commander-in-Chief General James Simpson (1792-1868), the Sardinian Commander-in-Chief General Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora (1804

714 The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, July 14, 1855. PRMA, no. 249, p. 226. Clarendon’s detailed dispatch was sent on 13 July. See PRMA, no. 248, p. 225.

715 Fox Maule-Ramsay (1801-1874), known as The Earl of Dalhousie after 1860. British Secretary of State for War from February 1855 until February 1858. See www.wikipedia.org.

716 Lord Panmure to Lieutenant-General Vivian. War Department, July 14, 1855. PRMA, Inclosure in no. 353, p. 234-235.

717 PRMA, translation of the Inclosure 3 in no. 270, p. 251.

-1878), the Commander of the French Fleet in the Black Sea Vice-Admiral Armand Joseph Bruat (1796-19 November 1855), the Commander of the British Fleet in the Black Sea Vice-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons and Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart (1791-1875). Ömer Pasha told the conference that a superior Russian force of 48,000 men of whom 10,000 were cavalry, advanced upon Kars, with other Russian forces taking Bayezid and Toprak Kale on the way to Erzurum. The generals said they could issue no opinion without information from their embassies. Upon this Ömer Pasha informed the conference that he would go to Istanbul for a few days to confer with his government and next day he left for Istanbul in the British steamer *Valorous*. On General Vivian's contingent, Ömer Pasha had informed the General Simpson that sending General Vivian's contingent would be risky, as the men were not yet acquainted with their officers, the officers did not speak their language, and the contingent is too small for this operation. He argued that he was well known in Asia where he had made several campaigns and possessed the confidence of the "Turks" and therefore was "more likely to gain the sympathies and assistance of the inhabitants in provisioning, in gaining information, etc".⁷¹⁸

Ömer Pasha arrived at Istanbul on 17 July 1855 and visited the seraskier and then Sultan Abdülmecid. He complained of the neglect of the allies, saying they were keeping the best Ottoman troops in the Crimea uselessly and did not care for Kars at all. This made him for a while the hero of Istanbul. All the resources were placed at his disposal. He chose his officers. The Sultan gave him an estate from the inheritance of Hüsvrev Pasha who had died last year at the age of 97. He was also invested with the Order of the Bath by the British ambassador.⁷¹⁹

Ömer Pasha was definitely in favour of a landing at Redutkale instead of Trabzon. According to Slade, he argued that

From Trebizond to Erzerum the movement would be of long duration, and difficult, from the distance and the mountainous nature of the country; which is only traversed by mule roads, rendering the passage of artillery a work of great labour and of slow process.⁷²⁰

Probably what gave more weight to Ömer Pasha's plan was a metaphor probably originating from Seraskier Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha, as the Ottomans liked to use figurative language. Thus he said that the operation was like striking the snake at its tail

718 Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lieutenant-General Simpson, camp near Kamara, July 12, 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 3 in no. 268, p. 247. Simmons was attached to the head-quarters of Ömer Pasha.

719 Slade argues that Ömer Pasha went from his ship immediately to the palace and accused the Porte to the Sultan of negligence and incapacity in regard of military matters. See Slade, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

720 Slade, *ibid.*

in order to turn its head to the rear. When Ömer Pasha's campaign ended in failure, Rifat Pasha the former president of the MVL would say "we have given Kars for the sake of a metaphor" (*Biz bir teşbih uğruna Kars'ı verdik*).⁷²¹

Colonel Simmons and Colonel Vico too had come to Istanbul with Ömer Pasha. The latter had brought General Simpson's letter to Lord Stratford. Simpson informed the ambassador that Ömer Pasha's arguments had failed to convince the members of the conference, "who all, without exception, entertain the strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea".⁷²² Therefore, Simpson begged Lord Stratford to use his "powerful influence" with the Porte to prevent Ömer Pasha's proposal's acceptance. On 19 July, Stratford was writing to Clarendon on the sudden arrival of Ömer Pasha and his proposal, having learnt everything from General Simpson and Colonel Simmons. Stratford wrote that through Pisani he had learnt that the arrival of the Generalissimo without orders from the government had created "some feelings of dissatisfaction" and that he had explained his conduct by referring to "the perilous nature of the emergency, and the inutility, as he thought, of his presence near Sebastopol under present circumstances".⁷²³

Stratford and Clarendon were not categorically against the plan. Their objection was rather to the use of the "Turkish Contingent". Meanwhile Ömer Pasha was received well by the Sultan. He was also on very good terms with the new seraskier Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha, unlike the former Hasan Rıza Pasha, with whom he had been at variance. On 2 August 1855, the Porte gave an official note to the British embassy, asserting that the best way to save Kars was to march with a 45,000-strong army from Redutkale toward Tiflis via Kutais. Since the British had objected to the use of the "Turkish Contingent" in this operation, the Porte proposed, as Ömer Pasha had said, to send the Contingent to the Crimea and to take instead 20,000 Ottoman troops from there. The remaining troops for the operation would be taken from Rumeli and Batum. The note also argued that a march from Trabzon to Erzurum with cannons and ammunition could take three to four months, by which time Kars would be gone; whereas the road from Redutkale to Tiflis via Kutais was plain and convenient for the transport of cannons.⁷²⁴ By this time, the French government also accepted the plan provided that the numbers

721 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 61.

722 General Simpson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, before Sevastopol, July 16, 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in no. 270, p. 249. As Simpson wrote, this letter was brought by Colonel Vico on the same ship with Ömer Pasha, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring his health.

723 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, Therapia, 19 July 1855. PRMA, No. 270, pp. 248-49.

724 OBKS, No. 49, pp. 161-165.

of Ottoman troops before Sevastopol are not diminished. The void could be filled by the “Turkish Contingent”. On 9 August, Clarendon informed Stratford by telegraph that General Vivian’s contingent was to go immediately to Gözleve and the Ottoman troops there, 10,000 or 12,000, to go with Ömer Pasha to Redutkale. The Ottoman troops at Balaklava and Kerç were also not to be diminished in number.⁷²⁵

Ömer Pasha spent too much time in Istanbul apparently for preparations but certainly having some leisure time and as in the words of Slade, “enjoying a long ovation”.⁷²⁶ He departed for Sevastopol only on the 1st or 2nd September 1855, calling shortly on Süzebolu on the Bulgarian coast.⁷²⁷ In Süzebolu he met Abdi Pasha the former commander of the Anatolian army and talked with him on the campaign.

Ömer Pasha together with Ferik Ahmed Pasha arrived on 4 September at the bay of Kamış, south of Sevastopol, where the French fleet lied. Ömer Pasha now had to struggle with the allied commanders to get his troops. The admirals said they had sent all the transport ships to France to bring troops and they could be given with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief when they arrived. However, Ömer Pasha noticed signs of despair (*asar-ı meyusiyet*) in the admirals. Next he visited General Pelissier and General Simpson and felt the same mood in them as well. On 6 September 1855 a meeting of the generals and admirals was held. The meeting rejected the idea of any troops leaving Sevastopol. Especially General Pelissier was opposed to Ömer Pasha’s plan, saying that Kars was not important at all and the campaign season had already passed.⁷²⁸ Meanwhile they were executing the sixth bombardment of the city that started on 5 September and they were planning an assault on the Malakoff bastion, which was the main bastion defending the city. Therefore they asked Ömer Pasha to participate in the assault. However, Ömer Pasha did not believe in the success of the assault and declined the honour by saying that he had an urgent duty. He left Sevastopol on board the steamer *Şehper* for Trabzon on 6 September, two days before the fall of the

725 The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 9 August 1855. PRMA, No. 278, p. 255.

726 Slade, op. cit., p. 426.

727 Ahmed Pasha to Seraskier Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha, Gözleve, 27 Zilhicce 1271 / 10 September 1855. BOA. İ. MMS. 6/196 lef 4. However, Ahmed Pasha gives the date of their departure from Istanbul as Saturday, 19 Zilhicce, which corresponds to Sunday. Slade gives the date of Ömer Pasha’s departure as 1 September (op. cit., p. 428). Budak assigns the Bulgarian port of Süzebolu (Sizepolis, according to Budak, “Sözebolu”) to the Crimea (op. cit., 1993, p. 167).

728 Ömer Pasha to Seraskier Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha, Trabzon, 28 Zilhicce 1271 / 11 September 1855. BOA. İ. MMS. 6/196 lef 3, quoted by Budak, op. cit., p. .

Malakoff.⁷²⁹ Ferik Ahmed Pasha and Osman Pasha remained in Sevastopol to organise the transfer of 10 Ottoman infantry battalions to the orders of the allies. According to Slade, however, Ömer Pasha forbade the Ottoman troops before Sevastopol to take part in the assault.⁷³⁰

In the end, however, after so many efforts, Ömer Pasha would neither participate in the conquest of Sevastopol nor succeed in his diversion operation against the Russian army at Kars. But at that time he still had some time to come to the relief of the Kars army. He arrived at Trabzon on 11 September after being delayed by a gale. From Trabzon he wrote to Seraskier Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha and explained the above. Next day he proceeded to Batum. After the fall of Sevastopol, General Pelissier softened his position and allowed 3 battalions of chasseurs with Minié rifles under the command of Colonel Archibald Ballard to go to Batum.⁷³¹ But still more troops were needed and these were sent finally by mid-October 1855.

Meanwhile Muravyov was restless before Kars. He had a very effective blockade around Kars and the city was about to capitulate in short time, but Sevastopol had fallen and Ömer Pasha was about to advance into Georgia. Russia needed an urgent gain to compensate for Sevastopol. Therefore Muravyov wanted to storm and take Kars before Ömer Pasha's forces made any advance. This time General Baklanov was against storming, however, Muravyov did not listen to him.⁷³² Thus on the morning of 29 September 1855 the Russian forces made an all-out attack on the bastions of Kars, mainly on the Tahmasb Tabya. The Ottoman army, although much emasculated by hunger and diseases, fought very well behind fortifications. General Kmety had sensed the Russian attack beforehand and therefore it was not a surprise attack. The Ottoman artillery was very effective. The Russian army lost about 7,500 to 8,000 men dead and wounded on this day, including General Pyotr Kovalevskiy among the dead.⁷³³ Ottoman losses were insignificant, less than 1,000, including about 100 to 150 civilians from

729 "The Turkish Army in the Crimea", *Camp of the Allied Armies on the Tchernaya*, Sept. 7, *The Times*, London, 21 September 1855, Issue 22165, p. 8. Also see Oliphant, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Budak, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

730 Budak, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-170. Cf. Slade, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

731 Budak, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

732 Tarle, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 525, 528.

733 According to the official report of General Muravyov after the battle, Russian losses (dead and wounded) totaled 252 officers and 7,274 men. See Bogdanovich, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, pp. 345-346. Tarle (*op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 528) also quoting from Muravyov, gives the same figure for officers but a slightly different figure for men: 7,226. The Ottoman semi-official newspaper CH had increased the Russian loss up to 15,000 men and 300 officers. See Budak, *op. cit.*, (1993), p. 131. Budak, however, also takes for granted the news from the CH, that Russian generals "Berimerof" (Brimmer) and "Baklonof" (Baklanov) were among the losses (p. 131). In reality, among Russian Generals only Kovalevskiy died of wounds from this battle. See Bogdanovich and Tarle, above.

Kars.⁷³⁴ The Ottomans army had no cavalry to follow up the retreating Russians.⁷³⁵

The news of the victory at Kars created great happiness in Istanbul. Ferik Williams Pasha and Ferik Kerim Pasha were promoted to the rank of müşir and decorated with the order of *Mecidiye*. A medal of Kars was struck and distributed. The population of Kars was exempted from taxes for three years.⁷³⁶

Muravyov had now suffered a terrible defeat. But he had still enough forces to continue with the blockade and he made a very correct decision after the ill-contemplated attack: He simply continued the siege without moving from his place, as many expected him to turn to Tiflis. Hunger reached such dimensions that many Ottoman soldiers deserted every day. These deserters were usually captured by Russian patrols all around the city. Vasif Pasha and Williams announced death penalty for deserters but even this did not stop them. The civilian population of Kars was also suffering from hunger. Women were bringing their children to General Williams's house and leaving there. Without horses, the army could not make a sortie either.⁷³⁷ In fact on the orders of Williams, the horses were secretly being slaughtered and their meat given to the hospital kitchen. The Russian troops were comfortably huddled and well supplied.⁷³⁸

The former commander of Batum army Hassa Müşiri Mehmed Selim Pasha had now become the commander of the forces in Erzurum. However, he did not advance beyond Köprüköy in the direction of Kars and soon it became clear that no help or diversion operation would come from his side. It should be mentioned here that the British consul in Erzurum James Brant had a very low opinion of Selim Pasha, accusing him of cowardice in his despatches to Lord Clarendon and Lord Stratford. (Tired of pressure and threats from the British consul and British officers, Selim Pasha would finally send his petition to the Porte in February 1856 to be removed from Erzurum to another place).⁷³⁹ Meanwhile the army in Kars was again under heavy siege and had no hope other than Ömer Pasha's advance. Yet Ömer Pasha was too slow.

Ömer Pasha changed his mind probably at Batum and instead of Redutkale, now

734 See Budak, op. cit., (1993), pp. 130-133. Budak gives various numbers related to losses from various sources.

735 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 284.

736 Kırzioğlu, op. cit., pp. 174-196. Budak, op. cit., p. 133.

737 Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 94.

738 Brigadier-General Williams to Consul Brant, Kars, November 19, 1855. PRMA, Inclosure in No. 364, p. 330.

739 Selim Pasha to the grand vizier, dated 5 Cemaziyelahir 1272 (12 February 1856). BOA. HR. SYS. 1355/28. See Appendix 108.

chose Sohum as the port of landing. However, since Sohum was to the north of Redutkale, this only further delayed the advance towards Kutaisi. It is indeed hard to explain why Ömer Pasha chose Sohum, if he had in mind the urgent liberation of Kars. Probably he thought that his incursion into Georgia would be enough to force Muravyov to release the siege of Kars and rush to the help of Tiflis. Another reason is suggested by Allen and Muratoff, who argue that Ömer Pasha had no cavalry except some (less than 1,000) Polish refugees and Ottoman Cossacks (*Nekrasovtsy*) and he hoped to find plenty of irregular cavalry among the Circassians. As Allen and Muratoff pointed out, his hopes proved to be unrealistic.⁷⁴⁰

Ömer Pasha also wrote to the Seraskier that the Circassians wanted an Ottoman officer in Circassia and therefore he would send them Mustafa Pasha the commander of Batum army. Grand vizier Âli Pasha, however, wrote to Seraskier Mehmed Pasha that the status of Circassia was under negotiation with the embassies of the allied states and for the time being Mustafa Pasha should not be sent.⁷⁴¹

Ömer Pasha started his march from Sohum in the middle of October 1855. His army numbered about 40,000, which included three well-trained rifles (*şeşhaneci*) battalions armed with Minié rifles (about 2,000 men) commanded by Colonel Ballard.⁷⁴² Ömer Pasha's chief of staff was Ferhad Pasha (Stein). Abdi Pasha (the former commander of the Anatolian army?) and a certain Osman Pasha also commanded infantry brigades. But half of the army was stationed at Sohum, Çamçıra and then at Zugdidi, leaving 20,000 for advance.⁷⁴³ Some Abkhazian and Circassian irregular cavalry accompanied Ömer Pasha's army. The territory was indeed marshy and densely forested. Laurence Oliphant, the British journalist who accompanied Ömer Pasha's army noted that "everything was paid for regularly, and the property of the country-people in Abkhasia was scrupulously respected by the Turkish army during its onward progress through the country".⁷⁴⁴

From Sohum, Ömer Pasha reached the river Ingur at the beginning of November in 16 days covering approximately 75 kilometers.⁷⁴⁵ On 6 November Ömer Pasha defeated the Russian forces and the local militia commanded by General Prince Ivane

740 Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

741 Grand Vizier Âli Pasha to Seraskier Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha, 25 Muharrem 1272 (7 October 1855). BOA. İ. DH. 21447, quoted by Budak, op. cit., 1993, p. 172.

742 Oliphant, op. cit., p. 83-84.

743 Bogdanovich, op. cit., vol. II, p. 346. Cf. Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 326.

744 Oliphant, op. cit., p. 83.

745 Burchuladze, op. cit., p. 16. Burchuladze gives the distance in versts. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., p. 97), however, argue that Ömer Pasha covered 50 miles (which is close to 75 km) in 20 days.

Konstantinovich Bagration-Mukhranskiy on the banks of the river Ingur.⁷⁴⁶ From the Ottoman side 16 battalions of infantry and 3 battalions of rifles took part in the battle. General Bagration-Mukhranskiy on the other hand had a total of 9,000 regular infantry, 700 Cossacks and about 10,000 irregular infantry and cavalry (*militiya*).⁷⁴⁷ Russian prisoners of war reported that 8 infantry battalions (about 5,000 men) with 8 guns, 3,000 Georgian militia and 7,000 volunteers had participated in the battle, but the volunteers had deserted just after the first fire. Oliphant gives the Russian losses as about 1,200 killed and wounded and the Ottoman losses as less than 400. He also writes that “it is impossible to speak too highly of the gallantry which the Turkish soldiers displayed throughout the action”.⁷⁴⁸ On losses, Burchuladze claims the opposite, that is, the Russians lost more than 500 but the Ottoman losses were “several times bigger”.⁷⁴⁹ Tarle gives the Russian losses as 450 men. Ibragimbeyli on the other hand describes the battle as if it ended undecidedly, claiming that the Russians “firmly resisted the onslaught of the numerically overwhelming enemy”, and not mentioning losses at all.⁷⁵⁰ After the battle of Ingur, the Russian forces retreated to the left bank of the river Tskhenis-tskhali (or Skeniskal, River “Horse”), leaving Mingrelia and Guria. On 9 November Ömer Pasha came to Zugdidi (capital of Mingrelia) and spent five days there. He behaved as if he had no hurry. According to Laurence Oliphant, the local population was in general in terror and hostile to the Ottoman army. Despite Ömer Pasha’s efforts to prevent pillage and to reassure the local people, principally the Abkhazian irregular cavalry (about 200 men) started pillaging villages and kidnapping children to sell as slaves.⁷⁵¹ Ömer Pasha then sent the Abkhazian militia back to their homes. Towards the end of November it started to rain heavily for days. Under such rains it had become extremely difficult to advance. On 8 December, after receiving the news of the fall of Kars on 27 November, Ömer Pasha gave the order to retreat. The retreat was however conducted disorderly. The Ottoman army was demoralized and the Georgian militia emboldened. Oliphant writes that Ömer Pasha said that

746 Op. cit., pp. 97-113.

747 Burchuladze, op. cit., p. 16. Ibragimbeyli’s numbers are almost identical (op. cit., p. 329). Tarle (op. cit., vol. II, p. 531) writes that the Russian forces numbered 18,500 men with 28 guns.

748 Oliphant, op. cit., p. 112-113.

749 Burchuladze, op. cit., p. 17.

750 Tarle, op. cit., vol. II, p. 531. Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., pp. 330-331. In his short passage on the battle of Ingur, Ibragimbeyli seems to have paraphrased Burchuladze and even used exactly the same expression “*razygralsya znamenity Ingurskiy boy*” (the famous battle of Ingur was fought) from Burchuladze without due references. Cf. Burchuladze, op. cit., p. 16 with Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 330.

751 Oliphant, op. cit., pp. 121-122, 125, 146. Cf. Burchuladze, op. cit., p. 19.

he had good reason to know that the country-people were assisting the enemy by every means in their power, and expressed his determination to deal with them accordingly. He seemed, not unnaturally, in low spirits at the unfortunate issue of the campaign, in which his usual luck seemed to have deserted him.⁷⁵²

Slade has very aptly expressed Ömer Pasha's failure: "Too often in the East, administration sacrifices a general: this time the general failed the administration".⁷⁵³

Tarle has also argued that Ömer Pasha, being an average general, had gained undeserved reputation on the Danube under favourable conditions and by self-advertisement and now, when he had a superior army, he did not use the results of this victory at the battle of Ingur and did not do anything to save Kars.⁷⁵⁴

On Ömer Pasha's far-fetched campaign, Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni makes an interesting point in his *destan*. Trabzoni writes that he went to Kerç and talked to some Ottoman officers. There Ahmed Rıza asked a major why Kars was left to starvation and why Ömer Pasha landed at Sohum, which is far away and full of marshes difficult to pass. The officer answered him that the intention was to give Kars to the Russians so as to make a peace! (*O Rus'a Kars'ı vermektir meramlar*). The fall of Kars would be an opportunity for peace (*Verilip Kars olacak sulha rağbet, Vesile olacak sulha bu elbet*).⁷⁵⁵ While we cannot of course take this information for granted, it does not seem to be altogether illogical. At least it means that there were such rumours among officers. Indeed, after the fall of Sevastopol, Russia badly needed to gain something, in order to save face and thus be willing to make peace.

While Ömer Pasha lost precious time in Mingrelia and Müşir Mehmed Selim Pasha did not move from Erzurum, Kars was forced to capitulate finally on 27 November 1855. With the approval of Müşir Vasıf Pasha, General Williams sent his aide-de-camp Major Teesdale to General Muravyov on 24 November to negotiate the terms of capitulation. Muravyov treated him well. Meanwhile General Kmety and General Kollman, having been formally sentenced to death by the Austrian government, did not expect mercy at the hands of the Russians. Therefore they applied to General Williams to accept their resignation. Williams accepted and they escaped the siege by night and reached Erzurum.

According to the terms of capitulation, agreed between Williams and Muravyov, the fortress of Kars would be delivered up intact. The Garrison of Kars would march out

752 Oliphant, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

753 Slade, op. cit., p. 439.

754 Tarle, op. cit., vol. II, p. 531.

755 Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 254-255.

and become prisoners. Muravyov appreciated the gallantry of the officers and allowed them to retain their swords. The *redif*, *başbozuk*, Laz soldiers and the non-combatants (doctors, secretaries etc) would be allowed to return to their homes. General Williams would give a list of certain Hungarian and European officers, who would also be allowed to return to their homes. Private property, public buildings and monuments would be respected. Thus about 5,000 to 8,000 regular (*nizam*) troops became prisoners while about 6,000 irregulars marched towards their homes.⁷⁵⁶

Immediately after the surrender, General Muravyov sent provisions to the city population. He talked with Vasif Pasha and reminded him that they had met in Istanbul in 1833, when Muravyov had come with the Russian military mission. At that time Vasif Pasha was a division general, Kerim Pasha was a lieutenant-colonel in the guards (Hassa?) cavalry regiment of Avni Bey and Ömer Pasha (the Generalissimo) was then appointed by the Seraskier as interpreter to Muravyov.⁷⁵⁷ Kerim Pasha is said to have told Russian officer Daniil Aryutinov that if Ömer Pasha was defeated, he deserved it because he contemplated manoeuvring instead of urgent help to Kars, and now they had to surrender because of him.⁷⁵⁸

3.7. The “Turkish Contingent”, the “Osmanli Irregular Cavalry” and the “Spahis d’Orient”

The so-called “Turkish Contingent” and the *başbozuk* formations under the command of the British and the French belong to the interesting and little known subjects of the Crimean War, especially in the Turkish historiography.⁷⁵⁹ The fact that

756 Trabzoni (op. cit., p. 256) gives the number as “five to six thousand”, while Salih Hayri (op. cit., p. 245) gives as small a number as four thousand. On the testimony of Captain Thomson’s Hungarian interpreter, who returned to Erzurum after the surrender, the *Times* correspondent in Erzurum gives the number of *nizam* soldiers at Kars taken prisoner by the Russians as 5,000. See “The Surrender of Kars. Erzeroum Dec. 11”, *The Times*, London, 3 January 1856, Issue 22254, p. 8. This might be true, but if we add up the number of deserters who had fallen into Russian hands, then the number is again about 8,000. *Blokada Karsa* (p. 114) gives the number of deserters as 3,000. At the end of the war there were about 7,900 prisoners of war from Kars in Russian hands. The list of Ottoman prisoners of war in Odessa, as of end of 1856, numbered 8030, with only about 200 from Sinop and other places and the rest from Kars. See “Kontrol’naya kniga razmena russkikh i turetskikh voenno-plennykh”, RGVIA, fond 481, opis 1, delo 695. This notebook contains the names of all the Ottoman prisoners of war.

757 *Blokada Karsa*, p. 113, 118.

758 *Blokada Karsa*, p. 109.

759 To the best of my knowledge, the only article in Turkish on this topic is by Cezmi Karasu, “Kırım Savaşı’nda Kontenjan Askeri”, *Yedinci Askeri Tarih Semineri Bildirileri I*, Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Yayınları, 2000, pp. 15-27. Nevertheless, this article is rather superficial and contains some major and many minor errors, beginning right from the first sentence, which states that the Crimean War happened in 1854-55!

they were left to oblivion is understandable because many Ottomans would not like to remember them. The “Turkish Contingent” was an army of 20,000 Ottoman soldiers hired by the British, to be paid, fed, clothed and officered by the British and returned to the Porte at the end of the war. In Turkish it was called *kontenjan (kontencan) askeri* or simply designated as troops given to the order of the British army. Although the Turkish general staff’s *History of the Turkish Armed Forces* calls it *Türk-İngiliz Mukavemet Ordusu*, that is, “Turco-English Resistance Army”,⁷⁶⁰ I have not come across this expression or anything remotely like it anywhere in the BOA. Whatever name we give it, it was indeed a breaking point in the entire history of the Ottoman Empire, for it provided Muslim soldiers to fight under Christian officers in the pay of a Christian state, even if it was an ally. This was probably an unprecedented event. One can hardly find a similar practise in military history. That is why we study it here in some detail, because, from a military point of view, it did not play any role in the outcome of the war (or rather did not have enough time to play any).

As usual in such cases, the need for the “Turkish Contingent” arose from necessity. The number of British soldiers in the Crimea was very small in comparison with the French army. At the beginning of 1855, the number of British troops in the Crimea was around 13,000, while the French had less than 70,000 troops. Because of this disparity between the two armies, British commanders could not take the initiative in matters of strategy and tactics in the Crimea. This could not help but be reflected in the influence over the Porte as well.

Lord Stratford was also anxious because his own influence with the Porte had deteriorated. Something had to be done by the British to sustain the balance. According to Stratford’s biographer,

It galled his national pride to see the French outnumbering the British troops in the proportion of at least four to one. Not only was the disparity injurious to the success of the siege, inasmuch as our men were numerically incapable of working and holding the wide extent of front which was allotted to them, without undue and consequently injurious physical strain; but the comparative insignificance of the British army brought the credit and prestige of England so low that her commanders found themselves compelled to give way to the superior influence of the French, even when there was no doubt that the latter were in the wrong.⁷⁶¹

Thus it was probably first in the mind of Stratford that the idea of forming a separate large regular army from hired Ottoman soldiers took place. Unable to feed its

760 See TC Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, III. Cilt, 5. Kısım*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1978, p. 463. The book gives no references to any source on this point.

761 Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 408.

own armies, the Porte too accepted the proposal. Stratford obtained the Sultan's approval in December 1854. The agreement was signed on 3 February 1855 in Istanbul.⁷⁶²

The agreement contained nine articles. The first article stated that Her Britannic Majesty engaged to take into her service a body of "Turkish" regular troops, to consist of twenty thousand men of all arms. Fifteen thousand of these men were to be detached from the regular troops serving in the armies of the Sultan and the remaining five thousand were to be taken from the *redifs*, either serving or in the reserve. All officers above the rank of sergeant were to be British, while the appointment of subaltern officers was left to the Ottoman government, with a few drill sergeants reserved for the nomination of the British commanders.⁷⁶³ Major-General Robert John Vivian,⁷⁶⁴ an East Indian Company officer, was selected to command the contingent.⁷⁶⁵

The troops designated for the contingent would be handed over with their arms and ammunition. The men and officers in the contingent would receive the same pay and rations as in the Ottoman army. However, this rule seems to have been violated and higher salaries were offered, as will be shown below. The troops were to be at liberty in performing their religious rites and ceremonies.

Adolphus Slade argues that the Porte at first thought that the troops to be furnished were intended for immediate active service and reluctantly accepted the demand. Then the Porte repented, but did not have the firmness to state its reasons. As Slade observed, raising an army after the Indian model was not easy in the Ottoman Empire. Slade argued that the officers chosen for the contingent from India were not fit for the service because "Indian officers, accustomed to rule haughtily a subject race, were not the men (with few exceptions) to act judiciously with a dominant race, imbued with traditions of military renown". Those selected came with exclusive ideas "fostered by brevet rank, high expectations and a double pay".⁷⁶⁶

As for the *başıbozuk* formations, they were inspired by the colonial army models of the British in India and of the French in Algeria. Both France and Britain used local

762 BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 2-8, dated 15 Cemaziyelevvel 1271 (3 February 1855). The agreement is in French, with English and Turkish translations. The original text in French uses the term "*un corps de troupes régulières turques*". See lef 3. The Ottoman Turkish text, however, does not use the word "Turkish".

763 Stratford's memorandum to the Porte, dated 3 February 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 9. See Appendix 86.

764 Karasu has written General Vivian's name as "Wivien". See Karasu, op. cit., (2000), p. 19, 22.

765 The ILN described him as "an able East Indian officer" and "the scion of an old military house". See "The Turkish Contingent", *ILN*, 23 June 1855, p. 630.

766 Slade, op. cit., p. 380.

irregular cavalry in their colonies. The French Commander-in Chief Marshal St. Arnaud gave the task of forming an Ottoman irregular cavalry corps to General Yusuf, who was renowned for his *spahis* (*sipahi*, the old Persian/Ottoman word for light horseman) in Algeria. While Lord Raglan did not like much such irregular troops, Lord Stratford supported the idea of Colonel William F. Beatson. Therefore, even before the Turkish Contingent, the first attempt of the British was to propose to form an irregular (*başıbozuk*) cavalry division under the command of Colonel Beatson.⁷⁶⁷ Like many officers of the “Turkish Contingent”, Colonel Beatson made his career in India, where he had formed a similar irregular cavalry unit (the Bundelkund Legion) from Indian natives.⁷⁶⁸ Beatson had offered his services to Lord Clarendon and he was accepted. Promoted to the rank of general and accordingly a pasha in the Ottoman army, Beatson was to form an irregular cavalry division of about 4,000 men in Bulgaria (called the “Osmanli irregular cavalry” or shortly “Beatson’s Horse”). The formation of this unit was accepted in 1854, but its execution coincided with that of the Turkish Contingent. The irregular cavalry was at first under the orders of the Foreign Office and Lord Stratford, that is not attached to Lord Raglan, however, in September 1855 it was attached to the “Turkish Contingent”. According to Captain Edward Money, who served in this irregular cavalry from July 1855 until July 1856, by August 1855, only about 1,500 of the proposed 5,000 men (8 regiments) had been recruited.⁷⁶⁹ These troops were stationed in Çanakkale (Dardanelles). We will see the problems created by them in Chapter 5.5.3.

On the date of the signing of the agreement on the “Turkish Contingent”, Lord Stratford gave another note demanding proper steps to be taken for raising the separate “Ottoman Irregular Cavalry” (in official translation *başıbozuk süvari askeri*) with necessary orders being issued to provincial authorities. Stratford warned that the orders should contain necessary information especially as regards the pay and rations of the soldiers:

The success of this important experiment depends so much upon the manner and spirit in which it is begun that the undersigned in addressing Aali Pasha on the subject cannot too strongly impress His Highness with the necessity of having the Vizirial letters, which he solicits, drawn up in the clearest and most stringent terms. It is, in particular, desirable that the men to be enrolled should know from the outset that in point of military service, pay, and rations they are to stand in

767 Translation of the note of the British embassy. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 1, 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854). See Appendix 74.

768 See [Calthorpe], op. cit., p. 47 and Reid, op. cit., p. 271.

769 Edward Money, *Twelve Months with the Bashi-Bazouks*, London: Chapman and Hall, 1857, p. 32.

direct connection with British officers and the Queen's Government. It is also essential that strict precautions should be taken to secure the peaceable inhabitants from any acts of plunder or violence in which the volunteers, if left entirely to themselves, might be tempted to indulge, while passing from their respective homes to the place of their destination.⁷⁷⁰

Accordingly, orders were sent to all Ottoman provinces from Vidin to Damascus. The commander of the Osmanli irregular cavalry General Beatson sent Colonel Frederick Walpole and Colonel Bruce to Syria to recruit troops in March 1855.⁷⁷¹ Other officers were also sent Anatolia and Rumelia. As Captain Money has noted, the recruits were offered pay and rations at a “most liberal rate”.⁷⁷² Captain Money gives the rates of pay for officers and troopers and these rates are indeed much higher than in the Ottoman regular and irregular troops. The *nefer* (private or trooper) received 24 piastres per month plus rations and forage in the regular cavalry, while the irregular cavalry men were paid 70 piastres per month *including* rations and forage. On the other hand, the British now paid the *nefers* 1 pound 13 shillings 4 pence per month (equal to about 200 piastres) *plus* rations of bread and forage to horses.⁷⁷³ Colonel Walpole came to Damascus in March 1855.⁷⁷⁴ However, these regular and irregular levies created in some places the same kind of atrocities and disorders as the *başıbozüks* of the Ottoman armies were creating. We will see some of them in Chapter 5.5.3.

The Porte's regret and unwillingness is confirmed by its slowness in the collection of troops for the Contingent. In the middle of April, General Vivian came to Istanbul and at once made inquiries to the Porte about the forces to be given to his command. However, there was very little preparation. Stratford de Redcliffe gave a note dated 19 April 1855 to Saffet Efendi the acting foreign minister. The British ambassador expressed his regret that “so very imperfect a preparation” was observed for that purpose at Constantinople, “notwithstanding the representations addressed repeatedly by him to the proper authorities, and the specific assurances received in reply”. Then he

770 Stratford's memorandum to the Porte, dated 3 February 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 10. See Appendix 87.

771 Reid, *op. cit.*, p. 275. However, Reid argues that these officers began their activities there in August 1855, which is refuted by the letters of Mehmed İzzet Pasha and İsmail Rahmi Pasha dated May 1855. See below.

772 Captain Money, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

773 Money, *op. cit.*, p. 31 and 49. Money claimed that the troops in the regular Ottoman army received 18 piastres or two shillings. However, this is not true, as we have seen, infantry troops received 20 piastres and cavalry 24 piastres. On the other hand, at the rate of pound sterling to piastres which was prevalent at that time, 18 piastres would make slightly less than 3 shillings.

774 Chief of staff of the Arabistan army Mehmed İzzet Pasha to the seraskier, Damascus, 29 Şaban 1271 (17 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/51. Colonel Walpole's actual rank in the British army was major. See James Henry Skene, *With Lord Stratford in the Crimean War*, London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1883, p. 59.

requested that

the Troops, which are to compose the Corps in question may be collected, and that such part of them as are at Constantinople, may be at once detached from the remainder of the Garrison, and reviewed in presence of the British General, to the amount of at least six thousand infantry, with two regiments of Cavalry and two or three batteries of Field Artillery. The season for operations in the field is rapidly coming on, and it is most desirable that the Turkish Corps in the Queen of England's pay should be prepared, with all practicable expedition and good effect, for taking part in them.

The Undersigned must remind the Ottoman Secretary of State that he is entitled to expect the number of troops agreed upon from the several places already designated by the Porte, namely, the Danube, Constantinople and Bosnia, or in failure of the required numbers in those quarters from other more convenient sources. He begs to observe at the same time, that according to his advices from the Crimea, there is no probability of any portion of the force in question being sent by Omer Pasha, since it appears beyond a doubt, that His Highness is not in a condition to weaken his army with any degree of prudence, and that he is employing the troops commanded by him, in strict agreement with the Commanders in Chief of the Allied Forces.⁷⁷⁵

The governor of Aleppo İsmail Rahmi Pasha in his letter dated 20 May 1855 informs the Porte that until then 430 soldiers of cavalry out of the desired 500 have already been recruited and the rest will soon be found.⁷⁷⁶ He adds that although there was great enthusiasm at the beginning, the recruitment had slowed down somehow. He also anticipates that the "Kolonel Bey", meaning the British colonel (Walpole or Bruce?) charged with the task, being a stranger to the local affairs, may express some complaints because of the delays, but the troops must be recruited by encouragement (*teşvik ve terğib ile tertib olunmak*).

It seems that the province of Baghdad was also charged to recruit 500 or more cavalry. Towards the end of June 1855, Mehmed Reşid Pasha, governor of Baghdad and commander of the Iraq army, sent a complaint to the Porte. He wrote that Hilmi Pasha the *mutasarrıf* of Mosul had informed him that the British consul in Mosul was recruiting cavalry troops with a monthly pay of 150 piastres *excluding* rations and forage under the command of Sergerde Laz Osman Ağa and several officers, who had come from the Anatolian army. It was heard that the British authorities would recruit troops from Baghdad as well.

Mehmed Reşid Pasha wrote that while the purpose of this act was fair and beneficent, it was also well known to the grand vizier that this area was not like Rumelia and Anatolia in that it was not possible to employ local troops there. The

775 Stratford de Redcliffe to His Excellency Saffet Efendi. Pera, 19 April 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 15-16. See Appendix 99.

776 İsmail Rahmi Pasha to the Porte, 3 Ramazan 1271 (20 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/56.

troops there had been brought with much difficulty from Anatolia and Rumelia and up to then they were given a monthly salary of 70 piastres *including* rations and forage. Mehmed Reşid Pasha then warned that if now they were offered twice and three times more pay with the prospect of being sent to the side of “*Rum*”, towards their own country, then no Turkish soldiers would remain in Baghdad, leaving the area open to danger from the Russians and Iranians (*şu aralık ol suretle iki üç kat ziyade maaş verildiği ve memleketleri olan Rum tarafına sevk olunacaklarını anladıkları gibi burada bir nefer Türk olarak asker kalmayıp cümleten asker yazılarak gidecekleri cihetle*).⁷⁷⁷

It is remarkable that the governor uses exactly the words “Turkish soldiers” for soldiers from Anatolia and Rumeli to distinguish them from local (Arabic, Kurdish, etc) soldiers; because Ottoman documents at that time very rarely used the term “Turkish”. Sending exclusively Anatolian or Rumelian recruits to the Arabic provinces was indeed a time-honoured practice of the Porte. The logic behind this measure was that local troops would be inefficient towards their kinsmen, while the Anatolian or Rumelian recruits would not feel sympathy to the local people. Experience had confirmed the correctness of this practice. Even the Russian consul in Beirut had noticed this fact about the Arabistan army in Damascus.⁷⁷⁸

On the other hand, the situation of the Kars army in the summer of 1855 forced the Porte to try to recruit irregular infantry and cavalry from Anatolia at somewhat raised rates of pay. Müşir Vasıf Pasha asked for 3,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry to be sent urgently to Kars. Thus infantry troops were offered 70 piastres per month plus rations and cavalry troops were offered 100 piastres per month plus rations and forage. Nevertheless, it was not possible to find so many soldiers.⁷⁷⁹

On 28 August 1855, General Vivian (already promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General) submitted to the Ottoman seraskier a nominal roll of officers of the Contingent, recommended for “Turkish” rank, which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had approved in consultation with his military adviser General Mansfield. The “Turkish” rank for British officers usually meant the promotion of one or two or even more steps up in rank with regard to the Ottoman officers, thus equalling a British captain with an

777 BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/15 lef 2, dated 13 Şevval 1271 (29 June 1855). See Appendix 104.

778 “Zametili, chto *voinstvenny dukh usilivaetsya v Turetskom soldate kogda on sluzhit vne predelov svoego otechestva*, razumitsya otechestvom ne Imperiyu Ottomanskuyu, kotoraya dlya Musulman olitsetvoryaet edinstvenno vernym v Islame, no svoy rodnoy kray, svoy rodnoy okrug kak ponimayut eto plemena sostavlyayushchiya imperiyu”. [Italics underlined in the original]. See “Doneseniye russkogo voennogo agenta v Konstantinopole generalnogo shtaba grafa Osten-Sakena. 4/16 Fevralya 1852”. RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 47, list 16.

779 Budak, op. cit., 1993, p. 110.

Ottoman major or colonel, and so on. The memorandum from Lord Stratford stressed the fact that these officers would continue to be in the pay of the British government and receive no salaries or rations from the Porte. Their pay and rations would be the same as in the Ottoman army.

General Vivian was first made a *ferik*, but then Lord Stratford seems not quite satisfied with this promotion and demanded the rank of *mushir* for him. Accordingly General Vivian was made *mushir* (full general), 5 officers were given the rank of *ferik* (division general or lieutenant-general), 8 officers received the rank of *mirliva* or shortly *liva* (brigadier general), 9 officers became *miralay* (colonels) and finally there were 42 *kaimakams* (lieutenant-colonels).⁷⁸⁰ The commander was given the authority to make provisional appointments to fill possible vacancies during the war, subject to later approval from the Porte. If the commander wanted to promote an Ottoman *binbaşı* (major) to the rank of *kaimakam*, then the Ottoman officer would receive from the British government the pay equal to this rank in the Ottoman army.

The “Turkish Contingent” was planned to be sent to Gözleve to replace the Ottoman troops to be detached for the Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha, intended to save Kars from the siege of the Russian army. Indeed at first the command of the projected 45,000-strong relief army to be gathered in Redut Kale was offered to Lieutenant-General Vivian on 1 July 1855, as we have seen in Chapter 3. In his report to Lord Stratford, Vivian stated that there are some material questions that must be settled before a serious consideration. He had apprehensions as regards the sea and land transports of the troops and the animals and the supplies of ordnance and commissariat (provisions) on enemy territory. Finally he wanted to have “authority to act independently” and a guaranteed flow of money for the operations. “Unless all these points can be satisfactorily arranged”, asserted Vivian, “I think it would be useless to discuss the measure”.⁷⁸¹

On 11 July, General Mansfield sent a letter to General Vivian, forwarding him the minutes of his conversation with the Ottoman ministers on the matter. Lord Stratford had asked for Vivian’s views. Vivian again pointed out so many deficiencies, being quite unwilling for the campaign. Transport was not sufficient and temporary, so the army landed at Redut Kale would be left “without shipping to fall back upon in case of a reverse”. Vivian further ventured to give his opinion that “as the interests of France

780 BOA. İ. HR. 123/6166, dated 22 Zilhicce 1271 (5 September 1855).

781 Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Turkish Contingent Head-Quarters, Büyükdere, July 2, 1855. *Supplementary PRMA*, Inclosure in No. 2, p. 2-3.

and England are centered in Sebastopol, all our means should be directed to that quarter”. He pointed out that the officers of the Contingent had to employ interpreters to talk to the soldiers and if these interpreters deserted in action great confusion would ensue and this would damage the prestige of the “English” officers. Vivian then expressed his suspicions:

Thirty thousand English troops, with all the appliances of money and shipping, with the whole aid of England, were unsupplied before Sebastopol. What would it be with a Turkish army of 40,000, in an enemy’s country, some 50 or 100 miles from the sea, its base of operation being an open roadstead?⁷⁸²

Vivian then suggested that for the relief of Kars, Batum might be chosen as the base of landing and operations might be directed against Ahısha (“Achalziche”).

The “Turkish Contingent” went from Büyükdere to Varna and from there to the Crimea in September. General Vivian, *commandant du Contingent Turc* met the Sultan together with his retinue before going to the Crimea.⁷⁸³

After so much preparation, the “Turkish Contingent” with its privileged officers and soldiers was wanted neither by Ömer Pasha, nor by Williams in Kars. Finally it was decided to send them to Kerç. After the fall of Sevastopol to the allies and Kars to the Russians, peace talks started again in the winter of 1855. Stratford was not happy with the abrupt end of the war and the “premature” peace negotiations, because, among other reasons, the “Turkish Contingent” had not yet shown itself in battle. He wrote in his memoirs:

The war came to so early a close that the troops in our pay had no opportunity of shewing their prowess, but neither did they afford any grounds of complaint. Even the irregulars submitted with good will to the command of Christian officers and to a degree of discipline which they had not previously undergone. On returning to their respective provinces they expressed so much satisfaction with the good treatment they had experienced in our service that when the Indian mutiny broke out it would have been easy to raise an auxiliary force from among the population of their creed.⁷⁸⁴

Our trader and *destan* writer Ahmed Rıza had been to Kerç at that time and he gives the number of Ottoman troops in Kertch as 30,000, obviously with some exaggeration. He writes that their commander was English but the English had a right to it.⁷⁸⁵

782 General-Lieutenant Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Turkish Contingent Head-Quarters, Büyükdere, July 14, 1855. *Supplementary PRMA*, No. 3, p. 4.

783 BOA. İ. HR. 123/6184, dated 28 Zilhicce 1271 / 11 September 1855.

784 Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 410.

785 “*Leşker-i İslâmiyâna ol zaman, Baş kumandan İngiliz oldu revân. Sonradan geldi alaylardan çeri, Tam otuz bin oldu İslâm leşkeri*”. Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 198.

3.8. Battles in the Crimea and the Siege of Sevastopol

The battles in the Crimea and the siege of Sevastopol are probably the best related parts of the Western and Russian historiography of the Crimean War. Here in this subchapter we will only briefly deal with these events, focusing as always on the Ottoman side.

On 4 September 1854, Nikolai wrote to Menshikov, that he had at his disposal 52 battalions, 16 squadrons, 8 infantry and 2 cavalry batteries and 3 Cossack regiments, besides the fleet and the local garrison. Therefore, he added that he considers these forces enough to repulse the enemy.⁷⁸⁶ According to Albert Seaton, Menshikov had 38,000 troops and 18,000 seamen plus 12,000 troops between Kefe (Feodosia) and Kertch, which more or less corresponds to the above figures.⁷⁸⁷

The allies landed at Eskihisar (Old Fort), between Alma and Gözleve in the Crimea on 13 September 1854. Prince Menshikov had not taken measures to prevent the allied landing. However, it must be admitted that he could not know where the landing would take place and even if he did know, he could not be certain whether it was a decoy for landing somewhere else or not. Thus the allies advanced towards Alma on their way to Sevastopol.

The first battle between the allies and the Russian forces took place in Alma on 20 September 1854. On that day a Russian army of 33,000 to 40,000 met the allied army of about 60,000 men. Mirliya Süleyman Pasha's forces were incorporated into the division of the French General Bosquet. The French had the advantage of their Minié rifles. The Russian army was turned into retreat, but the allies did not follow it. If they had, they could have even taken Sevastopol. The Russians lost about 1,800 killed, 3,900 wounded and missing. The French casualties included 140 to 250 killed and 1,200 to 1,400 wounded. The British loss is put at 362 killed and more than 1,500 wounded.⁷⁸⁸ There is no indication of the Ottoman losses in the existing literature. Most probably they are

786 Emperor Nikolai I to Prince Menshikov in Sevastopol, 23 August (2 September) 1854. RGVA. Fond 481, opis 1, delo 8, list 28.

787 Albert Seaton. *The Crimean War: A Russian Chronicle*. New York, London: St. Martin's Press, 1977, pp. 50-59.

788 See Winfried Baumgart, op. cit., p. 120.

included among the French casualties. The Ottoman commander Mirliva Süleyman Pasha did not report on his casualties in his letter to the Porte either.⁷⁸⁹

The allies restarted marching towards Sevastopol on 23 September. Meanwhile the Russians had scuttled seven of their ships to block the entrance to the bay of Sevastopol. The allies then made the decision not to attack Sevastopol from the northwest side, but to attack instead from the southeast side. However, this was another blunder by the allies, because on the northwest side the city was poorly fortified and defended by only some 5,000 men. Menshikov with his army had gone out of the city to take the road to Bahçesaray and the city was left to the local garrison and the sailors. We must note that both the Russians and the Allies lacked proper reconnaissance services. Meanwhile Marshal St Arnaud died and General Canrobert took the French command.

The allied commanders did not want to risk attacking the city before reinforcements from Varna reached. This was still another blunder. In October the French forces reached 42,000 and the British 23,000, while the Ottoman forces before Sevastopol remained the same.⁷⁹⁰ The Ottoman contingent was kept as reserve. Thus while the allies lost precious time, the Russians improved their fortifications under the supervision of Colonel Totleben and the admirals Nakhimov, Kornilov and others. Some of Menshikov's army also entered the city, raising the total number of defenders to 25,000.

On 17 October the allies began the bombardment of Sevastopol. During the bombardment they made a big damage in the defences but again they were not foresighted enough to begin the assault. Thus they missed another opportunity. Bombardment was also begun from the sea side. The Ottoman fleet with its line-of-battle ships like the *Mahmudiye* and the *Teşrifiyeye* also took part in the bombardment. But the wooden ships proved useless against stone fortifications. The ships got heavy damages and casualties while the Russian damages were smaller. 12 sailors from the *Mahmudiye* were also wounded. The *Mahmudiye* and three ships from the Egyptian squadron had to be sent to Istanbul for repairs. On their way, two Egyptian ships went aground after a gale and about 1,000 sailors were drowned, including the commander of

789 Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha to the grand vizier, 13 Muharrem 1271 (6 October 1854). BOA. İ. DH. 19668. The seraskier wrote that the casualties were not reported and therefore would be asked. Alma is mentioned as Almalu or Elmalu.

790 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 126. Baumgart gives the number of the Ottoman troops as 5,000. Full captain Saim Besbelli gives the same number. See Besbelli, op. cit, p. 76. According to Slade, however, this number must be about 6,000 to 7,000.

the Egyptian division (squadron) Hasan Pasha.⁷⁹¹ The bombardment of Sevastopol from the sea was another lesson which would be used in the construction of ironclads later. The bombardment continued until 25 October but achieved nothing. Admiral Kornilov died on the first day of the bombardment. Thus began the 349 days of siege and trench warfare in Sevastopol.

Menshikov's army, now reinforced up to 65,000, decided to attack the allied positions at Balaklava on 25 October. Part of the Ottoman contingent consisting of little-trained *redif* or *esnan* troops was deployed in the four or five lightly constructed artillery earthworks to the north of Balaklava, with 250 men in each. Lieutenant-General Pavel Petrovich Liprandi (1796-1864) made a surprise attack with a force of 25,000 men on this side early at dawn. The 1,000-strong Ottoman troops, overwhelmed by the far superior enemy, after a resistance of two hours during which 150 to 170 of them were killed, retreated. The *Takvim-i Vekayi* wrote that the Ottoman troops in the first *tabya* (redoubt) were attacked by 8 Russian battalions with 12 guns and their resistance lasted two hours.⁷⁹² Slade depicted the situation as follows:

This exposed and dangerous post, above 2,000 yards away from any support, requiring the staunchest troops of the army to hold, if worth holding, was entrusted to men under depressing influences; men not long enrolled, and never in action. Ignorant and suspicious, in a strange army, they may have fancied themselves placed there by the "infidel" to be sacrificed.⁷⁹³

According to the *Times* correspondent William Howard Russell,

For some mysterious reason or other the Turkish government sent instead of the veterans who fought under Omar Pasha, a body of soldiers of only two years' service, the latest levies of the Porte, many belonging to the non-belligerent class of barbers, tailors, and small shopkeepers. Still they were patient, hardy, and strong...⁷⁹⁴

However, it does not seem mysterious that the Ottoman commander should have given not his best troops, when Lord Raglan wanted some Ottoman troops to dig up earthworks for the defence of British troops. Why should he give his best troops for such a task? Apparently Russell arrived together with Lord Raglan about 8 o'clock. Russell then writes that

791 Besbelli, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

792 See Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65.

793 Slade, op. cit., p. 327.

794 Russell, *The British Expedition to the Crimea*, Rev. Ed., London: G. Routledge & Co., 1858, p. 175. Tarle also gives the number of troops in each redoubt at 250. See Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 169. According to the TV, each of these four *tabyas* had half a battalion Ottoman troops (*asakir-i şahane*). The *esnan* battalions usually numbered about 500. See TV, 27 Safer 1261 (19 November 1854). Also see Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65. Balaklava is depicted as Balıklı in the TV.

It was soon evident that no reliance was to be placed on the Turkish infantry or artillerymen. All the stories we had heard about their bravery behind stone walls and earthworks proved how differently the same or similar people fight under different circumstances. When the Russians advanced, the Turks fired a few rounds at them, got frightened at the distance of their supports in the rear, looked round, received a few shots and shell, then “bolted,” and fled with an agility quite at variance with common-place notions of Oriental deportment on the battlefield... Meantime the enemy advanced his cavalry rapidly. To our inexpressible disgust we saw the Turks in redoubt No. 2 fly at their approach...⁷⁹⁵

Lord Raglan’s nephew and aide-de-camp Colonel Somerset Calthorpe wrote in the same vein with Russell:

A few moments after our arrival the Russians established a battery of field artillery.. and opened fire on No. 1 Redoubt; at the same time a column of infantry (some 1,200) men advanced up to it, the Turkish garrison firing on them in a desultory sort of way with small arms, but without attempting to serve their heavy guns. To our intense disgust, in a few moments we saw a little stream of men issue from the rear of the redoubt and run down the hill side towards our lines...⁷⁹⁶

Yet these eyewitnesses do not mention the fact that these few Ottoman troops had been under artillery fire for about two hours before the arrival of the British forces. The Russian superior forces (three columns, commanded by major generals Levutskiy, Semyakin and Gribbe) had stormed Redoubt No. 1 about 7 o’clock a.m. after a strong cannonade concentrated on this redoubt. The Russians took the Redoubt No. 1 at 7:30, although the “Turks” fought very stubbornly (*ves’ma uporno*) and left 170 dead.⁷⁹⁷ Lord Raglan came to observe the battlefield shortly before 8 a.m. General Canrobert came thereafter. When he looked from the Chersonese Plateau, Raglan saw only the retreating Ottoman troops. As Michael Hargreave Mawson observed on Calthorpe’s narrative:

The evidence in this passage is most unreliable; the author writing not only from a viewpoint nearly three miles from the action, but also with the specific intention of defending the memory of a beloved commander and uncle – Raglan. The fact that Raglan was two hours or more late for the battle has been carefully glossed over with the claim that the Russian Artillery only opened fire once Raglan and the staff were watching, and that the infantry charge was simultaneous. It is contrary to the usages of war to shell a position whilst your own infantry is attempting to capture it. The figure of 1,200 Russian infantry can be taken as

795 Russell, op. cit., p. 184-185. The same passage is available in Andrew Lambert and Stephen Badsey (eds.), *The War Correspondents. The Crimean War*, Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton, 1994, pp. 106-108. Relying upon the depiction of this battle by Russell and Kinglake and distrusting George Buchanan’s observations, Reid (op. cit, p. 268) uses the same argument with the same phrase (“the Ottoman troops bolted and fled”). Reid even argues that the Ottoman “battalions” fled “even before shots were fired by either side”)

796 [Colonel Somerset Calthorpe], op. cit., pp. 302-303.

797 Nikolai Fyodorovich Dubrovin, *Istoriya Krymskoi voyny i oborony Sevastopolya*, Vol. II, St. Petersburg: Tipografiya tovarishestva “Obschestvennaya Pol’za”, 1900, pp. 127-130.

deliberately under-estimated.⁷⁹⁸

Nevertheless, from that time on, the French and the British officers and soldiers in the Crimea started to treat the Ottoman soldiers (“the Turks”) as despicable cowards. On the other hand, according to Oleg Shkedy, the evaluations of Russian researchers and participants of the war about the Ottoman troops in this battle were more balanced. The “Turks” had defended the first redoubt as long as possible, and if it was taken by the Russians they were not to be blamed. Shkedy also wrote that Russian sources in general were of the opinion that the allies commanded everything and the Ottoman generals were in a not-enviable position.⁷⁹⁹

James Reid’s interpretation of the conduct of the Ottoman troops in this battle is very deficient, one-sided and biased due to his reliance on Russell and Kinglake only. He writes that

All optimism about the Ottoman reformed army evaporated with the disgraceful performance of the Ottoman battalions at the battle of Balaklava. Here, Ottoman infantry battalions stationed on hill redoubts in the advance of the entire allied army broke and ran, even before shots were fired by either side. The sight of massive Russian cavalry formations bearing down upon them in their isolated forward positions provoked such fear and panic, that to a man, the Ottoman troops bolted and fled.⁸⁰⁰

Had Reid read other sources as well, such as Adolphus Slade, he could have formed a more balanced view. First, he would see that these were *esnan* and *redif* troops. Second, he would understand that these troops did not “bolt” immediately, but resisted a much stronger enemy for more than an hour. Reid’s treatment of this episode gives the impression that he does not try to understand what happened, but instead he only tries to find support to what he already “knows” about what could have happened. On the other hand, this is not to say that the Ottoman soldiers would not “bolt” in any case. They might have fled, and they did in many cases, like soldiers in any other army. However, one need not distort facts in order to prove that the Ottoman army was not reformed. There are other ways of showing the extent of the effects of reform in the Ottoman army. The point here is to try to understand first what actually happened and then why it happened that way.

After the capture of the redoubts by the Russians, a battle of cavalry followed,

798 Michael Hargreave Mawson, *The True Heroes of Balaklava*, Kent, Bedford, London: Crimean War Research Society Publications, spiral-bound printout, 1996, p. 13.

799 Oleg P. Shkedy, “Turetskaya armiya v Krymskoi kampanii”, *Vostochnaya (Krymskaya) Voina 1853-1856 godov: Novye materialy i novoe osmyslenie*, vol. 1, Simferopol: Krymskiy Arkhiv, 2005, p. 80.

800 Reid, op. cit., p. 268.

with the famous “charge of the light brigade” of the British upon Russian fortified positions, which is still a point of discussion in the British historiography. We will not go into the details of this battle. The British lost from the light cavalry brigade 118 to 134 killed and more than 200 wounded. The Russian loss was 550, of which 238 were killed.⁸⁰¹ The *TV* described the folly of the British charge of the light brigade as “demonstration of bravery at the extreme level” (*aşırı mertebe ibraz-ı merdane-i şecaat*).⁸⁰²

The battle’s result was insignificant from a military point of view, but the Ottoman troops from then on were subjected to all kinds of misery and humiliation. As Robert Edgerton describes, they were “cursed at, spat upon, kicked, and slapped, their only duties to carry supplies, maintain roads, and stay out of sight”.⁸⁰³ According to Tarle, the allies did not sit at the table for dinner even with the Ottoman officers.⁸⁰⁴ Depending on the allies for their food, the Ottoman troops were also left to starvation. Then they started stealing some food, for which they were flogged.

Soon the Ottoman soldiers started dying from cold, hunger, filth and disease. According to the Russian military historian Nikolai Dubrovin, old and torn tents did not protect the Ottoman soldiers from the cold and sometimes up to 300 men died in one day.⁸⁰⁵ They were deprived of all necessities: poorly fed, clothed, and sheltered, without bed and linen, morally depressed, disdained and insulted. They had no money either. Furthermore, they had no press, no Ottoman correspondents to write about their plight. Everyday they buried their comrades and the dogs dug up the dead bodies and devoured them. There was a “hospital”, a building or a hovel where previously Russian prisoners were kept. After they all died of cholera, the building was given to the Ottomans, but the dirt had never been cleaned. About 400 men were strewed on the damp mud floors of its rooms, the doors and windows closed to exclude cold air.⁸⁰⁶ The Ottoman surgeon in charge of the “hospital”, who had been trained in London, told the British war correspondent N. A. Woods: “The deadly fetid air which issued from this charnel-house made me involuntarily shrink back from the door with loathing”. He further

801 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 130. These are, I think, the most up to date numbers. However, there are various numbers on this account. Dubrovin (op. cit., p. 141) gives the British loss as 400 dead, 60 wounded and 22 prisoners. According to the *TV*, Russian casualties were more than 1,500; Ottomans lost 150 and the British 400 in dead and wounded. See Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65.

802 Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65.

803 Robert B. Edgerton, *Death or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, p. 169.

804 Tarle, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 169.

805 Dubrovin, op. cit., vol. II, p. 381.

806 Slade, op. cit., p. 331. Cf. Dubrovin, op. cit., p. 382.

commented: “None of those poor fellows will come out alive. I have not saved a single man who entered that fatal building”.⁸⁰⁷ When Woods asked whether he had enough medicine, the surgeon said he had plenty, but they were useless against hunger.

Mushaver Pasha took a steamer to transport the Ottoman sick to Istanbul. 75 out of the 158 invalids died on the way. He then wrote to the naval council in Istanbul for two hospital ships to be sent to Balaklava and Kamış. A frigate was then turned into hospital with all the personnel and equipment and sent to Kamış in February. But the British fleet could not find a place for it: “the hospital frigate remained ten days in the offing of Kamiesh, waiting the pleasure of the British authorities, and was then sent back to Constantinople by order of the naval commander-in-chief, on the plea of want of room for her either at Kamiesh or Balaclava. Large vessels were then lying in those harbours for the accommodation of a few officers..”.⁸⁰⁸

Slade was an eye-witness of the deprivations of the Ottoman army in the Crimea, thanks to whom we have an idea of their miserable conditions:

One day the pasha in command at Kadykeuy⁸⁰⁹ spoke to the author about the slender rations issued to his troops: each man he said, received a daily allowance only of biscuit and rice, without butter to cook the latter into pilaf, and fresh meat about once a week. Had he represented the case in the right quarter, I asked. He had not: he declined doing so; and the tenor of his remarks showed an indisposition, in common with other pashas serving the Allies, to say or do aught likely, in his opinion, to make him seem troublesome. The loss of a thousand men was not to be named in the same breath with the loss of the English general’s smile.⁸¹⁰

Once again, as in the army of Anatolia, we see that the Ottoman officers take little care of their troops. The problem was that the Muslim soldiers did not accept pork and rum and for this they were issued only an additional half pound of biscuit. As Slade observes, the Ottoman soldiers in the Crimea were theoretically equal with the British soldiers, but not in practice. Interestingly, as Slade observes, the Muslims were not cunning enough to accept the pork and rum and then sell or give it to their European comrades, who would perhaps then regard them with more respect.

Tea, coffee, sugar, etc. – appropriate articles – always abounding in store, were never regularly issued to the Turks; who were more dependent, with their pay in arrears, than others with silver in their pockets, on the commissariat for comforts. The hucksters in the Crimea, unlike the *bakkals* of Constantinople, gave no credit.

807 Quoted by Edgerton, op. cit., p. 170.

808 Slade, op. cit, p. 334.

809 This Kadıköy was a Tatar village near Balaklava, in the Crimea. Not to be confused with the Kadıköy of Istanbul.

810 Slade, *ibid.*

Whence arose this indifference about the Turks is difficult to say; unless one might trace it to the habitual bearing of Anglo-Saxons towards an “inferior race”.⁸¹¹

James Henry Skene, the British consul at the Dardanelles also wrote that the Ottoman troops in the Crimea were so badly paid and so irregularly paid that they begged the British and French soldiers for scraps of food. Skene further described their misery:

When English sailors went from their ships to the Naval Brigade at the front, they would capture three Turkish soldiers apiece, ride on the shoulders of one, and drive the others before them with a long whip, to relieve the first when he should get tired. The poor Turks would then get a few biscuits as payment of their eight miles’ stage, and return to Balaclava perfectly satisfied.⁸¹²

Meanwhile Ömer Pasha was planning to occupy Bessarabia in November 1854 but in December he was also ordered to go to the Crimea. He was to base himself at Gözleve and not to participate in the siege of Sevastopol. From December 1854 to February 1855, three divisions (one of which Egyptian) totalling some 35,000 men with horses and artillery were transported from Varna and Süzebolu to Gözleve.

After the indecisive battle of Balaklava, the Russian and allied armies fought again in Inkerman on 5 November 1854. Nikolai was getting nervous, he sent his two sons, Grand Dukes Mikhail and Nikolai to the Crimea to urge Menshikov for action. Meanwhile Menshikov had received further reinforcements and now commanded 107,000 men inside and outside Sevastopol, excluding the sailors, while the allies had about 70,000 men. For action on 5 November, Menshikov had detached 57,000 troops. But he gave the overall command of the operation to General Dannenberg, who had come from Bessarabia and had no knowledge of the terrain. On the day of the battle of Inkerman, the weather was foggy. Fighting passed in great confusion for both sides. Overall, the battle ended with victory for the allies. This was an infantry battle or a “soldiers’ battle”, as it came to be called later, because the soldiers had fought without much command from officers. Russian massed bayonet attacks proved useless against the longer-range Minié rifles, for which the Russians muskets were no match.⁸¹³ Russian losses were enormous: about 11,000 in dead and wounded. Allied losses in general were around 4,500 dead and wounded.

A terrible gale broke out on 14 November. The Allies lost about 30 ships,

811 Slade, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

812 Skene, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

813 Baumgart, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

including two frigates from the Ottoman fleet. Human losses were around 500. Thus its effect was almost like a lost battle. It became clear that this winter neither the allies could take Sevastopol nor the Russians could drive them away. War had begun in earnest. The ensuing rigorous winter brought all the deficiencies of the armies to the fore. The *Times* correspondent William Howard Russell delivered detailed reports on the disorganization and misery of the British army. These reports were read by a concerned public. This had a revolutionary effect in Britain, now Lord Raglan, his commissariat officials and government ministers were blamed. Soon Aberdeen's government gave way to Lord Palmerston's government. Marx and Engels also wrote in the *NYDT* on the mismanagement of the British war system.⁸¹⁴

The Russians too had a supply problem. There were no railways south of Moscow. The Russians could not solve this problem to the end of the war. In the end it played a big role in their defeat, because they ran out of ammunition and could not replenish it easily. The French were the best organized, while nothing equalled the misery of the Ottoman troops.

The concentration of a large Ottoman force at Gözleve menaced the Russian supply way through Or Kapusu (Perekop). Emperor Nikolai I ordered an attack on them. Prince Menshikov gave the task to General Stepan Khrulev, who attacked the Ottoman forces with an army of 29,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry with 80 guns on 17 February 1855.⁸¹⁵ The Ottoman forces commanded by Ömer Pasha repulsed the Russians, who lost about 700 men.⁸¹⁶ Ottoman losses (including some French and civilians) were 103 dead, 296 wounded. Ferik Selim Pasha and Miralay Rüstem Bey from the Egyptian troops were among the dead. Lord Raglan reported the battle to the Duke of Newcastle (copy to Lord Stratford), praising the "gallant and determined conduct" of the Ottoman troops and testifying the "serious nature of the attack which was made upon them".⁸¹⁷ After this unsuccessful attack Nikolai removed Menshikov from his post and appointed General Gorchakov as Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea. Emperor Nikolai I died soon afterwards on 2 March 1855 and his son Aleksandr II

814 "British Disaster in the Crimea – The British War System", anonymous leading article ("leader"), *NYDT*, January 22, 1855. See Marx, op. cit., pp. 506-512.

815 See the *TV*, 11 Receb 1271 (30 March 1855). Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 73. Baumgart however gives the total number of Khrulev's forces at 19,000. See Baumgart, op. cit., p. 145.

816 Cevdet Pasha argues that the Russians attacked with more than 40,000 men and lost more than 3,000 dead and as much wounded. See *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 29. This seems an exaggerated account.

817 Lord Raglan to His Grace the Duke of Newcastle. Before Sevastopol, 20 February 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 35. Copy to Lord Stratford, lef 34. See Appendices 92-93.

ascended the throne.⁸¹⁸

The death of Nikolai I increased hopes for a diplomatic solution. In mid-March 1855, a new conference for peace among the ambassadors of France (Bourqueney), Britain (Lord Westmoreland), the Porte (Arif Efendi), Russia (Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov) and foreign minister Count Buol of Austria was opened in Vienna. Russia had accepted negotiations on the basis of the “four points”. Since Arif Efendi did not know French, Rıza Bey from the Tercüme Odası was later sent to Vienna.⁸¹⁹ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi is highly critical of the Porte’s conduct of keeping such an ambassador in Vienna and allowing him at first to participate in the conference but not to speak up, “as if the negotiations concerned not us but China”. He also asks why Âli Pasha was not sent immediately. He attributes this to the manipulations of Stratford Canning. However, Türkgeldi is mistaken. Stratford does not seem responsible for this. The problem was that at the beginning of the Vienna conference the Porte did not know what to do with regard to the four points, especially the fourth point, that is the question of the rights and privileges of non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. This question was discussed among 21 Ottoman statesmen in a *Meclis-i Meşveret* which was held on 24-26 March 1855. Türkgeldi does not mention this important meeting and its resolution (*mazbata*), although it is mentioned as an attachment to Âli Pasha’s instructions, published by Türkgeldi.⁸²⁰ We will take up this issue in subchapter 5.3.

Towards the end of March 1855, Foreign Minister Âli Pasha was appointed as extraordinary delegate to the Vienna conference and he first participated in the conference together with French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys on 9 April 1855.⁸²¹ The British had also sent Lord John Russell to the conference. After Reşid Pasha’s resignation from sadaret, Âli Pasha became the new sadrazam while he was in Vienna in May 1855. Fuad Pasha became the new foreign minister. The conference negotiations were stopped (or officially speaking, deferred) at the beginning of June. The conference could not reach an agreement mainly because of the third point, that is, the Straits regime and the constraints on the Russian navy in the Black Sea. During the conference,

818 Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 519-520. Cevdet Pasha (ibid) writes that Nikolai was much distressed by the news of the defeat and died thereafter. General Süer argues that Nikolai committed suicide upon the news of the defeat of the Russian army by the Ottoman army in Gözleve on 17 February 1855. See Süer, op. cit., p. 151. Nikolai did not commit suicide, but took a near suicidal action: he inspected some troops in cold weather while he was ill.

819 Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 45.

820 See Instructions to Ali Pasha, delegated to the Vienna Conference. Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, no. XXV, p. 347.

821 Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 55.

Âli Pasha proposed the following important formulation on 19 April 1855:

The Contracting Powers, wishing to demonstrate the importance they attach to assuring that the Ottoman Empire participate in the advantages of the concert established by public law among the different European States, declare that they henceforth consider that empire as an integral part of the concert and engage themselves to respect its territorial integrity and its independence as an essential condition of the general balance of power.⁸²²

This formulation would later be re-formulated into the Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris, without, however, reference to the European balance of power.⁸²³

The allies continued with the siege and bombardment of Sevastopol. Sardinia-Piedmont joined the allies with 15,000 troops. In April 20,000 Ottoman troops came from Gözleve to take positions outside the siege. Then began a second duel of artillery. The allied forces had a clear fire superiority. During 9 to 19 April, the allies made 165,000 cannon shots, while the Russian responded with only 89,000 shots.⁸²⁴ Meanwhile the allied fleets took an expedition to Kerç and occupied it along with Kefe and Yenikale. By June the allies totaled 224,000 men. Ottoman forces in the Crimea reached 55,000, stationed at Gözleve, Sevastopol and Yenikale. The French forces amounted to 120,000, the British 32,000. The allies now reached a degree of unprecedented fire concentration in a siege war. They could fire 75,000 rounds per day, whereas the Russians had to economize on ammunition and could reply by only one fourth of this number.⁸²⁵ In the end, the result of the siege was determined by the amount of guns and ammunition. Russia simply could not produce and deliver to its troops as much ammunition as did the allies.

On 8 September 1855, after an infernal bombardment of three days in which both British and French troops took part, the French finally took the Malakoff. The fire density of the bombardment was really unprecedented. Indeed, as early as January 1855, General Canrobert had written to the then Seraskier Rıza Pasha that they would open “a fire which has no precedent in the history of the battles of siege”.⁸²⁶ The Russian forces evacuated the southern part of the city and passed to the north side. The allies entered the city on 12 September. The casualties on both sides were heavy. The Russian side lost about 13,000 men and the allies about 10,000 men. The Ottoman troops were not

822 Adanır, “Turkey's entry into the Concert of Europe”, *European Review* 13(3), London, 2005, p. 408.

823 Ibid.

824 Aleksandr Andreyevich Svechin, *Evolyutsiya Voennogo Iskusstva*, vol. II, Moscow-Leningrad: Voengiz, 1928, p. 66.

825 Baumgart, op. cit., p. 159.

826 BOA. HR. SYS. 1336/31, dated 29 January 1855.

among the storming troops; they were stationed on the Chernaya (Karasu) river. Ömer Pasha by then had left the Crimea for his Caucasian campaign. Nevertheless, he did not appoint a deputy for himself. He was criticised of having caused the Ottomans' non-participation in the final victory in Sevastopol. Cevdet Pasha wrote that Ömer Pasha had quarrelled with the French Commander-in-Chief General Pelissier and when he came to Istanbul in July 1855, he had told that “Malakoff cannot be taken this year... Sevastopol can be taken in two or three years. The allies may even be defeated. But they have their ships to pull out their troops and may abandon us there”.⁸²⁷ Cevdet Pasha also criticises Ömer Pasha’s behaviour in Istanbul, arguing that he debased himself in the eyes of the elite and the common people by using his influence to bring back Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha into the fore (meaning the latter’s appointment as Kapudan Pasha) and also appearing in public promenades and having relations with some women of ill-repute.

In fact Cevdet Pasha finds fault in his command of the Rumelian army as well. Cevdet Pasha argues that Ömer Pasha could not manage the *başibozuks* and caused their dispersal and being forced to pillaging. While the Russians passed the Danube along a long line, being vulnerable to attack at any point, he did not have courage to attack the Russians. Cevdet Pasha even argues that Ömer Pasha was about to surrender Silistria to the Russians but local people led by İbrahim Ağa organized the defence. In the Crimea, he passed his days idly in Gözleve instead of participating in the siege and storm of Sevastopol. Then, according to Cevdet Pasha, Pelissier had told him to wait for one more day and promised to give all the fleet for the transport of Ömer Pasha’s troops to Anatolia, but Ömer Pasha had not accepted. Then, instead of marching directly from Batum through Ardahan, he preferred a far away route, leaving Kars to fall into the hands of the Russians.⁸²⁸

The Crimean War was not confined to the Crimea and the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The allies also sent a fleet to the Baltic Sea and the British to the White Sea and to Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula. The battles fought there were not decisive or at least did not affect Ottoman troops and therefore do not require much attention for the purposes of this dissertation.⁸²⁹

After the capture of the south part of Sevastopol, there arose a disunity on aims between France and Great Britain. Napoleon III was basically content with having won

827 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 57.

828 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezahir 13-20*, pp. 34-35.

829 Andrew Lambert and Stephen Badsey, however, argue that “in so far as allied military pressure had any bearing on the Russian decision to accept peace terms, that pressure came from the Royal Navy in the Baltic”. See Lambert and Badsey, op. cit., p. 275.

a victory in the Crimea and now did not want to continue the war. The British on the other hand were not as content. The Russian army had not been beaten yet. Britain had also plans for the independence of Circassia. But there was little to do in the Crimea. The allied armies did not want to go into Russian territory, away from the coast line. The French were then persuaded for a campaign against the fortress of Kılburun. The allied fleets bombarded the fortress and it was surrendered. As we have noted before, here for the first time ironclad floating batteries were used.

As we have seen, the number of Ottoman troops changed during the process of war. However, what was the highest number of Ottoman regular troops involved in war? Probably the best figure is given by a financial report, prepared in October 1855 to be submitted to the loan control commission (more on this will be said in Chapter 4). According to this report, total effective number of Ottoman land troops (infantry, guards, cavalry, fortress and field artillery) was 199,152 men, excluding the 10,000 men of the “Turkish Contingent” on the pay of the British government, the 23,931 men of the Egyptian army, 2,000 Ottoman Cossacks and 485 Tatar cavalry.⁸³⁰ If we add them up, then the figure reaches 235,568 men, of which approximately half was *redif* soldiers. (To the best of my knowledge, this figure is used here for the first time). Furthermore, 77 per cent of the Ottoman troops were infantry and the rest were cavalry and artillery according to this report. As for the navy, it must be within the range of several thousands.

3.9. The End of the War and the Treaty of Paris

While the allied and the Russian armies watched each other from the two sides of Sevastopol, on 28 December 1855 the Austrian ambassador at St Petersburg, Esterhazy, submitted an ultimatum to Russia to accept peace negotiations on the basis of the “four points”.⁸³¹ Otherwise Austria would join the allies. Meanwhile Sweden made a defensive agreement with the allies. The King of Prussia too appealed to his nephew to make peace.⁸³² After some hesitation, Emperor Aleksandr II accepted the terms in January 1856.

Peace negotiations began in February 1856 in Paris. The Ottoman Empire was

830 *Le Moniteur Universel*, Paris, 8 janvier 1856. BOA. HR. SYS. 1355/3 lef3.

831 For a Turkish translation of this note, see Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 370-375.

832 W. E. Mosse, “How Russia Made Peace September 1855 to April 1856”, *Cambridge Historical Journal* 11(3), 1955, pp. 305-307.

represented by grand vizier Âli Pasha and Mehmed Cemil Bey, ambassador in Paris and Sardinia, son of Reşid Pasha. France was represented by Count Alexandre Colonna-Walewski, the new foreign minister and Baron François-Adolphe de Bourqueney, ambassador in Vienna. Russia sent Count Aleksey Orlov and Baron Filip de Brunnov, the former London ambassador. The British representatives were Lord Clarendon the foreign minister and Baron Henry Richard Charles Cowley, the Paris ambassador. Austrian representatives were Prime Minister Charles-Ferdinand Buol-Schauenstein and Paris ambassador Baron Joseph-Alexandre de Hübner. The kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont was represented by Count Camille Benso Cavour the prime minister and de Villamarina. Finally Prussia was represented by Baron Othon de Manteuffel, prime minister and foreign minister and Count de Hatzfeldt, ambassador in Paris.

The war was ended but it was rather the wish of France than Britain, because for Britain (and for Stratford) it was an unfinished war. Britain had spent much money for the “Turkish Contingent” and the “Osmanli irregular cavalry” yet just when they were ready to do service, the war had ended. The victory in Sevastopol was generally seen as a French victory, so the British needed another campaign to gain victory for itself and to destroy Russian military might. Lord Palmerston had rigorously strengthened Britain’s navy and army since he became prime minister in early 1855, replacing Lord Aberdeen. However, Palmerston could not do much because France and Austria had agreed to end the war.

Napoleon III, on the other hand, had already received what he hoped from the war: prestige and glory to his dynasty and to France and the disruption of the Russian-Austrian-Prussian bloc. Why should he fight any more? The French public opinion also favoured an end to the war because the war had now come to be seen more in the interests of Britain. Therefore, the policy of France was now very mild towards Russia, considering that France would need Russian support in the future. In fact the Paris Congress marked the beginning of a Franco-Russian rapprochement.⁸³³ It also marked the end of the Russian-Austrian-Prussian alliance in European politics. While Austria lost the friendship of both Russia and Britain and even of France, Prussia benefited most from the new balance of power in Europe. Prussia would defeat France in 1871 and this would encourage Russia to denounce the neutrality of the Black Sea, while the other powers would accept the new situation.

Before the congress, Abdülmecid issued his Edict of Reforms (*Islahat Fermanı*) on 18 February 1856. The edict promised equality before law for all the subjects of the

833 L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, London: Hurst & Company, 2000, p. 336.

Porte, reform of the police, taxation, etc. We will deal with it in subchapter 5.3.

The Treaty of Paris provided for the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and put it under the guarantee of the great powers. The allies and Russia returned to each other all captured cities and territory, except some Russian territory in south Bessarabia (Budjak) that went to Moldavia. Thus Russia was removed from control of the mouth of the Danube. The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte. None of the powers would exercise exclusive protection over these principalities. All prisoners of war were to be returned. The Black Sea was declared neutral and free of any war ships except for a limited amount of small ships. No fortifications would be built or held on its coasts. It would be open to all merchants ships. All commercial navigation on the Danube was also set free for all nations. Russian protectorate over the Danubian principalities was abolished. The principalities together with Serbia would be under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and the collective guarantee of the great powers. Serbia would continue to be free in its internal affairs but the Porte would have a garrison in Belgrade as before. While Britain would like to press for the independence or autonomy of the Circassians, even the Porte did not seem enthusiastic about this project. Therefore the congress did not bring any regulation for Circassia.

For the Porte, the most important result was the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe. On the question of the rights of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, Âli Pasha and the Porte tried hard to prevent any article that could be used for interference in the internal affairs of the Porte. First they did not want the *Islahat Fermanı* to be mentioned in the treaty. When they could not prevent it, the Porte objected to the expression that the contracting powers “take note” (*prendre acte*) of it, because the ministers looked up dictionaries and found out that the word “*acte*” meant “*sened*”! For the Porte, this would mean that the firman was accepted as a convention.⁸³⁴ Finally Âli Pasha was able to get through the expression “the contracting Powers note the high value of this communication” (*Les Puissances constatent la haute valeur de cette communication*). The same article (Article 9) also stated that the firman would not be used as an excuse for the Great Powers either collectively or separately to interfere with the relations of the Sultan with his subjects.

During the Paris congress and afterwards, Napoleon III ardently espoused the “nationality principle”. The most immediate and urgent manifestation of this principle

834 Roderic Davison, *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms*, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1999, p. 435.

was the cause of the unification of the Danubian principalities. Napoleon III had reason to oppose the 1815 settlement which disregarded nationalities. Therefore he urged for a united Rumania under a foreign prince. Sardinia naturally supported the nationalities principle. Austria was against, fearing that a united Rumania would be attractive for her Rumanian subjects. The Porte was naturally against because it rightly considered unification as a step towards full independence. Britain wavered, while Russia was Napoleon's chief ally in this question. Russia wanted to gain the goodwill of the Rumanian people and to widen the rift between France and Britain.⁸³⁵ The principalities were finally united in 1859 under Colonel Alexander Cuza.

835 Stavrianos, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-350.

CHAPTER 4: FINANCING THE WAR

4.1. Ottoman Financial Crisis before the War

Even in the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman bureaucracy did not possess any economic theory or idea going beyond the immediate necessities of financing the state apparatus. There were no independent economists and very few works on economics in general, even in the form of a translation.⁸³⁶ The only concern of the bureaucracy was the collection of taxes, and as long as they continued to receive their salaries, they did not care about increasing the national product and thus the tax revenues of the country. Stratford Canning, the British ambassador at the Porte, wrote to Lord Palmerston in October 1851, telling of a conversation about finance with Reşid Pasha, that “the Grand Vezir ... disclaims all knowledge of the subject himself”. Likewise, according to Canning, the finance minister (his fifth term in office was from August 1851 to November 1852)⁸³⁷ Abdurrahman Nafiz Pasha (?-1853), although “able and honest”, was “altogether destitute of European knowledge”. Similarly, the British *charge d'affaires* in Istanbul, Colonel Hugh Rose, commented in October 1852: “Only two Turks, Fuad Effendi and Safetti [Safveti] Pasha, know even the commonest European details as to banks, funds, bills etc and no Pasha keeps an account book, or

836 According to İlber Ortaylı, the first Ottoman book on economics is a manuscript titled *Risale-i Tedbir-i Ümran-ı Mülki*, written some time before 1833. According to Mehmed Cavid Bey, the first economics book is Şehak Abru Efendi's translation of J. B. Say's *Catéchisme de Economie Politique* under the title of *İlm-i Tedbir-i Menzil* in 1851-52. According to Z. F. Fındıklıoğlu, the first book is Serendi Arşizen's translation of L. Rossi's book under the title of *Tasarrufat-ı Mülkiye*, published before 1852. See Ahmed Güner Sayar, *Osmanlı İktisat Düşüncesinin Çağdaşlaşması*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1986, pp. 277-279.

837 See Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Maliye Teşkilatı Tarihi (1442-1930)*, vol. 3, Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Tetkik Kurulu Yayını, 1978, p. 6. Quoting some official documents by Nafiz Pasha, Pakalın also portrays him as an able and sparing finance minister. However, Nafiz Pasha had been among the first Ottoman high bureaucrats who were tried on charges of corruption after the promulgation of the 1840 Tanzimat Criminal Code. Nafiz Pasha was then the governor of Edirne. He was convicted but pardoned a few years later and became finance minister many times. See Cengiz Kırılı, “Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi”, *Tarih ve Toplum. Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 4 (244), Güz 2006, pp. 45-199.

knows his own accounts”.⁸³⁸ There is a certain exaggeration here, because the pashas had their *kethüdas* (stewards) who kept an account book, nevertheless, it is generally true that they were not much informed or interested in financial affairs.

The tithe on agricultural products (*öşür*) still formed the biggest item among all tax revenues of the Porte (about one fourth of total revenues).⁸³⁹ This implied that a bad harvest meant a serious decrease in tax revenues. Another important source of revenue was internal and external customs duties, but these duties, especially the import duties were very low. In fact, it was here that the strangest economic policy in the world showed itself, for the Ottomans charged more duties in exports than in imports, contrary to the practise of such industrialising countries as the USA, the German Confederation, and Russia that protected their domestic industries.⁸⁴⁰

The Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 16 August 1838 (Treaty of Balta Limanı) had set import duty at 5 per cent, while export duty and internal customs duty were 12 per cent *ad valorem* for all goods. These rates were not to be changed even in time of war. (Whereas in Britain, import duties averaged about 20 per cent).⁸⁴¹ The treaty also removed the system of state appointed monopolies (*yed-i vahit*) on export and import. After this, other great powers concluded similar treaties with the Porte. Thus a British merchant (or any merchant who claimed protection from any one of the great powers) could sell his goods in all the provinces of the empire after paying the 5 per cent tax, whereas the Ottoman merchant had to pay 12 per cent internal customs duty within the empire.⁸⁴² Referring to Reşat Kasaba, Gülten Kazgan writes that the terms of the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, dictated by Britain to China after the First Opium War, were not as comprehensive as the terms of the Balta Limanı Treaty. This policy was imposed upon the Ottoman Empire first by Britain and then other powers partly for the purpose of suppressing the insurgent Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt by taking away a

838 Christopher Clay, *Gold for the Sultan. Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance 1856-1881*, London, NY: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000, p. 15.

839 Tevfik Güran, *Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Maliyesi: Bütçeler ve Hazine Hesapları (1841-1861)*, Ankara: TTK, 1989, p. 21. Also see: Şevket Pamuk, op. cit., (1994), p. 15. A. [Jean Henri Abdolonyme] Ubcini, *La Turquie Actuelle*, Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie, 1855, p. XVII. Shaw and Shaw, op. cit., vol. II, p. 99. Charles Morawitz, *Türkiye Maliyesi*, Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Tetkik Kurulu Yayını, 1979, p. 17.

840 See Gülten Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002, p. 20.

841 Nassau William Senior, *A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece in the Autumn of 1857 and the Beginning of 1858*, London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1859, p. 185.

842 For more information see Mübahat Kütükoğlu, “The Ottoman-British Commercial Treaty of 1838”, in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations*, North Humberside, UK: The Eothen Press, 1984, pp. 53-61. Also see Puryear, op. cit., (1935). Pamuk, op. cit., (1994), pp. 17-22.

big source of his revenues.⁸⁴³ However, it fitted the Ottoman bureaucracy as well, for in its opinion export goods should be taxed heavier, because exports raised the price of goods to the detriment of the chief internal buyer, the government.⁸⁴⁴

That Britain became the champion of free trade (especially after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846) by the time of the Crimean War is well understandable, because it had excess manufactured goods and sought new markets for its products, but that the Ottoman Empire was probably the most liberal country in the world in terms of customs duties is not easily explainable. In addition to a very unfavourable balance of trade with the West, the Ottoman state also faced the problems of a debased coinage and currency inflation.⁸⁴⁵ Constant wars with Russia and internal troubles from 1768 to 1840 had weakened the treasury very much. The heavy indemnity to be paid to Russia by the Treaty of Edirne of 1829 and the costs of the war against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt in the 1830s had also undermined the finances of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, reform meant additional financial burdens for the treasury. First of all, the establishment and maintenance of a modernized army was expensive. The expanded size of the central and provincial bureaucracy, the new judicial system, educational institutions, public works, the services of foreign experts, etc were all new sources of expense, while the state revenues did not rise so fast.

It was a commonly shared conviction among European contemporary observers that peculation and corruption in the Ottoman bureaucracy was the rule, honesty being the exception. It was difficult for an honest person to rise to high rank or to maintain his position without getting involved in the general system of bribery. The great reformer Mustafa Reşid Pasha was, at least before the 1850's, personally not involved in the corrupt practises of the pashas, thanks to Sultan Abdülmecid's monetary gifts (*atiyye*) to him. Nevertheless, he did not or could not prevent those around him from doing so. On the other hand, even without the corruption and bribery, the Ottoman pashas received very high salaries and rations, which also formed an important burden on the treasury. Those pashas who held the rank of vizier received from 60,000 to 100,000 piastres

843 Kazgan, op. cit., p. 19.

844 Mehmet Genç calls this Ottoman economic policy the principle of provisionalism (*iaşe ilkesi*). He also maintains that the two other economic principles of the Ottoman bureaucracy were fiscalism (endeavouring to increase state revenues and maintaining them at high levels) and traditionalism. See Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000, pp. 45-51 and 59-66.

845 Frederick S. Rodkey, "Ottoman Concern about Western Economic Penetration in the Levant, 1849-1856", *The Journal of Modern History* 30 (4), December 1958, p. 348.

monthly in salary and ration.⁸⁴⁶ This was equal to 545 to 909 pounds sterling, which at the present time approximately corresponds to 33,000 to 55,000 pounds sterling.

Taxes were numerous, irregular and unequal, despite the *Tanzimat* principles of standardization, regularization and simplification of taxes.⁸⁴⁷ In addition to regular taxes, some extraordinary taxes were imposed on the population (like the *iane-i umumiye*)⁸⁴⁸ and these taxes in time became permanent. The rich paid relatively less taxes while the poor peasants bore the brunt of the tax burden.⁸⁴⁹ The rich could also bribe corrupt government officials to avoid some taxes or obligations including the military conscription. For example, when some units of the Anatolian army were quartered in villages around Erzurum, the richer villages paid some bribe and the troops were quartered in the houses of the poorer villages.⁸⁵⁰ The population of Istanbul was exempt from many taxes and from military conscription.⁸⁵¹ Furthermore, in Anatolia, some Kurdish tribes exacted various tributes from non-Muslim villages, mainly the Armenians. The *iltizam* system (farming out tax revenues) meant that a big portion of the taxes went to intermediaries and pashas before ever reaching the state budget. Furthermore, the high bureaucrats received enormous commissions from the sale of these *iltizam* tenders. The *mültezims* borrowed from the *sarrafs*, who also reaped their profits in the form of interest. The Ottoman chronicler Cevdet Pasha writes that while Reşid Pasha and his followers claimed to be working for the prevention of corruption and progress in civilization and education, their practise of selling the tenders caused a change in the public opinion about them.⁸⁵²

After the *Tanzimat* Edict of 1839, the state tried to collect the taxes by its own officials (*muhassıls*) but this system encountered great resistance and was abandoned. In this, as in all reform moves, Abdülmecid was not firm. Budget deficits became chronic in the 1840s. These deficits were being covered by government borrowing in various forms, mainly from the Galata bankers or *sarrafs*. These bankers, mainly Greeks,

846 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, yayınlayan Cavid Baysun, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p. 18.

847 See Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-105. The authors, however, argue (*op. cit.*, p. 96) that the new taxes of the *Tanzimat* protected the peasants from injustice far more than before.

848 For a good account of the *iane-i umumiye* see Ali Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Finans Sisteminde Dönüm Noktası. Kağıt Para ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Etkileri*, İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1996, pp. 51-64. Shaw and Shaw (*op. cit.*, p. 97) present the *iane-i umumiye* as government “bonds”. They seem to have confused it with the *esham-ı umumiye* that were issued later.

849 On tax injustice in the Ottoman Empire, see for example Abdüllatif Şener, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Vergi Sistemi*, Ankara: İşaret, 1990, p. 231. Also see Sandwith, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-176.

850 Sandwith, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

851 Şener, *op. cit.*, p. 109. Sandwith, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

852 Cevdet Pasha, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

Armenians, Jews and Europeans, had direct links with foreign banking houses in Paris, London and elsewhere.⁸⁵³

On 22 August 1850, being aware of the financial difficulties of the Porte, the British ambassador Stratford Canning personally submitted to the Sultan a long memorandum on reform.⁸⁵⁴ He suggested a foreign loan of five to six million pounds sterling, which, he argued, could be secured at four per cent interest, repayable over a period of 25 years. This was not accepted. Many Ottoman bureaucrats were reluctant to apply for foreign loans, fearing that they would fall into the trap of never ending loans and thus Europe would control them tightly. Abdülmecid's attitude towards foreign loans was negative in general, at times he said it was better to curb expenditures than to borrow from abroad.⁸⁵⁵ Yet as usual he contradicted himself and continued his own luxury expenditures.

The Ottoman treasury finally went bankrupt in 1851. The last two years had seen poor harvests and the insurrection in Bosnia had increased military spending. In April 1851, Lord Stratford reported that in the previous year expenditure had exceeded income by 1 million pounds sterling or 1.1 million Ottoman pounds and a deficit of 770,000 Ottoman pounds was expected in the current year. He believed that the government needed about 7.5 million pounds or 8.25 million Ottoman pounds to clear its financial obligations completely. This amount was, as he observed, more than a year's average income of the Porte. Stratford re-emphasized that the only solution was a long-term foreign loan. Stratford feared that the financial crisis might ruin the reform movement.⁸⁵⁶

When the finance minister Nafiz Pasha told the divan that next month's salaries would be delayed, all ministers were shocked. In fact for the ministers the financial crisis had come so suddenly that even there was no counterpart in Ottoman Turkish of the French word "*crise*". Cevdet Pasha tells how they finally agreed upon the word "*buhran*" as an equivalent for it.⁸⁵⁷

Although the first foreign loan was made in 1854, the idea had been expressed first in 1783, when Russia occupied the Crimea and war seemed inevitable.⁸⁵⁸ During Abdülmecid's reign, the first attempt had come in 1841, with a proposal to set up a

853 Clay, op. cit., p. 19.

854 Rodkey, *ibid.*

855 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 22; also see his *Ma'rûzât*, Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980, p. 7.

856 Clay, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

857 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 21.

858 Şevket Akar and Hüseyin Al, op. cit., p. 3.

national bank as well. This did not work because the Ottomans did not want to give the guarantees and immunities under either an Anglo-Ottoman treaty or a treaty between all great powers and the Ottoman Empire. At that time this had an important role in the swing of the Porte toward reaction.⁸⁵⁹ Some time later, in 1849, the *Dersaadet Bankası* (Bank of Constantinople) was set up by foreign merchants. The duty of this “bank” was to provide for the stability of the Ottoman currency against European currencies, especially the sterling.

4.2. The Abortive Loan of 1852

In March 1852, the *Dersaadet Bankası* and the Porte sent Monsieur Couturier, an Izmir merchant, to Paris to find credit for the repayment of the debt of the bank to European markets. In August 1852 Couturier was empowered together with Paris ambassador Kalimaki Bey or London ambassador Kostaki Bey to sign a contract for 40 million francs repayable in 10 years at 6 % interest and 2 % commission fee. The Porte put as lien the tributes of Egypt, Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia. On 7 September 1852, a contract for a loan of 50 million francs (equal to 2 million pounds sterling) was signed for 23 years at six per cent interest and a two per cent commission in Paris.⁸⁶⁰ Afterwards, bonds for 20 million francs were sold. However, Sultan Abdülmecid had given his consent, even reluctantly, for a term of ten years at most. The grand vizier Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha did not bother to tell Abdülmecid the terms of the loan. Therefore Âli Pasha’s rival Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha learned of the terms and then informed Abdülmecid. Mehmed Ali succeeded in persuading the Sultan to reject the loan, arguing that his father had never accepted a foreign loan. Abdülmecid was reluctant because he feared foreign intervention in case of any default in repayments.

Abdülmecid dismissed Âli Pasha and replaced him with Mehmed Ali at the beginning of October 1852. Paris ambassador Kalimaki Bey was also dismissed and replaced by Veli (Veliyüddin) Pasha. The ministers had to collect among themselves an indemnity of 2.1 million francs to be paid to the creditors. As Olive Anderson remarked,

859 Rodkey, op. cit., p. 349.

860 See Akar and Al, “*Dersaadet Bankası’nın tasfiyesi ve 1852 borçlanması*”, *Tarih ve Toplum. Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 4 (244), Istanbul, Güz 2006, p. 162. A. du Velay gives the amount as 55 million francs, payback period 27 years, and the year as 1850. See his *Türkiye Mali Tarihi*, Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1978, p. 80. I could not find the original of this work. Rodkey gives the amount as 50 million francs; other terms are the same as above. See Rodkey, op. cit., p. 350, quoted by Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 4.

this was a “disastrous début” for the Ottoman Empire in the Western money market. This cancelled transaction made it “almost impossible for her to borrow on her own credit alone”.⁸⁶¹

4.3. Ottoman War Expenses

Military expenses in the period from 1841 to 1853 consumed on the average approximately 40 per cent of the state “budget”. During the Crimean War, this proportion went up to 67 per cent of all actual state expenditures.⁸⁶² Most of the ammunition and weapons was being imported. But military imports were not confined to steam ships and fire weapons and ammunition like Minié rifles and Paixhans shells. Even such items as sabres, harnesses (like saddles) and boots had to be imported from Britain and France.⁸⁶³

According to a military report, total salary and rations of the regular land troops (*asakir-i nizamiye*) for the financial (Julian) year 1266 (13 March 1850 to 12 March 1851) constituted 129,231,778 piastres.⁸⁶⁴ This is equal to roughly 1.12 million pounds sterling at the exchange rate of 110 piastres per pound, which was prevalent at that time. In that year the muster-roll was 77,096 for the five armies. Thus we can conclude that at the beginning of the war the salaries and rations alone of the army should have cost almost three times as much, since the army (excluding the *başıbozüks*) had reached around 200,000 men towards the end of 1855, according to a report by the Ottoman finance ministry submitted to the loan control commission in October 1855. This report was also published in the French official newspaper *Le Moniteur Universel* on 8 January 1856.⁸⁶⁵ According to the report, the total war expenses of the three

861 Olive Anderson. “Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-55”, *The Historical Journal* 7 (1), 1964, p. 48.

862 Güran, op. cit., p. 24, 37.

863 See for example BOA. İ. HR. 109/5332, dated 3 Şaban 1270 (1 May 1854) on the purchase of 50,000 Paixhans shells. BOA. İ. HR. 110/5409, dated 22 April 1854 on harnesses to be imported from France.

864 BOA. C. AS. 7517, dated 10 April 1850.

865 See BOA. HR. SYS. 1355/3. Actually the report was sent by the Ottoman foreign minister to Paris to be published in the above newspaper. Upon publication, Mehmed Cemil Bey, son of Reşid Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, immediately sent a copy of the newspaper to Istanbul. The document is titled “Rapport du Ministre des Finances a la Commission de Contrôle”. A. du Velay also refers to this report. See A. du Velay, *Türkiye Mali Tarihi*, Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1978, p. 82. A copy of the first page of the report was published by Sinan Kunalalp, “The Thorny Road to Modernization: The Ottoman Empire and the Crimean War”, in *Kırım*

departments of army, navy, and artillery of the Ottoman Empire for the period from 27 May 1853 to 27 September 1855 (28 months) amounted to 3,015,588 purses⁸⁶⁶ or 11.2 million pounds sterling (exchange rate now 135 piastres per pound). This gives us a yearly average total military expense of 4.8 million pounds, which seems rather small when we consider that the pay and rations alone of the soldiers and officers must have constituted at least 3.36 million pounds as we saw above. According to the same report, the total budget deficit during this period reached 5.8 million pounds.

This figure seems in line with Dr. Tevfik Güran's study based on Ottoman fiscal documents from the BOA, provided we take into account the length of the period, because the war lasted more than two years (almost three years including war preparations) for the Ottoman Empire. Tevfik Güran's study gives us a total of actual military expenditures of 1,782,737,764 piastres for the fiscal (Julian) years 1269-1271, corresponding to the period from 13 March 1853 to 12 March 1856, that is, a period of three years. (See Table 1). If we divide this amount by an average exchange rate of 125 piastres per pound, then we get an approximate amount of 14.26 million pounds sterling for this period.⁸⁶⁷

Table 1: Distribution of State Payments among Various Expense Items (thousand piastres)⁸⁶⁸

Fiscal Year	Military Spending	Sultan's Spending	Salaries	Admin. Spending	Transfer Payments	Total
1269/1853-4	430,372.7	147,485.8	119,180.9	116,437.1	135,416.0	948,892.3
1270/1854-5	601,744.1	57,138.6	119,759.9	90,330.5	31,324.6	900,298.0
1271/1855-6	750,620.8	72,279.1	115,404.7	129,721.7	53,740.8	1,121,767.3
Total	1,782,737.7	276,903.5	354,345.5	336,489.3	220,481.4	2,970,957.6

These numbers become more meaningful in comparison with actual state revenues including budgetary (*mukarrer*) and non-budgetary (*gayri-mukarrer*) revenues for the same period. These revenues amount to 2,970,960,465 piastres, roughly equal to 22.8 million pounds for the period or 7.6 million pounds per year on the average. (See Table 2). During this period non-budgetary or extra-budgetary revenues and their share in total revenues increased considerably. The extra budget revenues consisted of internal

Savaşı'nın 150nci Yılı / 150th Anniversary of the Crimean War, Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfı Sadberk Hanım Müzesi, December 2006, p. 61.

866 One purse (*kise* or *kese*) was equal to 500 piastres (*kuruş*) or 5 Ottoman pounds.

867 Approximately equal to 855 million pounds of today. The exchange rate of pound vacillated between 110 piastres at the beginning and 140 piastres towards the end of the war. Other exchange rates were as follows: 1 pound sterling = 25 francs = 6 silver roubles = 24 marks = 12 florins.

868 See Güran, Table 8 A, op. cit., p. 36. I have made some necessary calculations and simplifications.

borrowing from the Galata bankers (*sarrafs*) and merchants, issue of paper money (*kaime-i nakdiye-i mutebere*, shortly *kaime* or in plural *kavaim*), and bonds (*esham*), special taxes in the form of donations (*iane-i harbiyye*) and finally the two foreign loans of 1854 and 1855. The Galata *sarrafs* lent money at the annual interest rate of 12 per cent, while it was around 4 to 6 percent in Europe.⁸⁶⁹ While such extra budget revenues formed one-digit percentages of total revenues before the war, they increased up to 51.5 per cent during the war.⁸⁷⁰ Among the extra-budget revenues of the period, foreign loans make up roughly 7.5 million pounds sterling.⁸⁷¹ Internal borrowing during the war on the other hand, according to Ali Akyıldız, reached 5,129,790 Ottoman pounds or 4,706,229 pounds sterling at the official exchange rate of 109 piastres per pound sterling.⁸⁷²

If we accept the above mentioned figure of 14.26 million pounds as total war expenses, then we must conclude that approximately half of the actual Ottoman war expenditures was financed by foreign loans.

Table 2: Distribution of state revenues between budgetary and non-budgetary revenues (piastres)⁸⁷³

Fiscal Year	Budget Revenues	(%)	Non-Budget Revenues	(%)	Total Revenues
1269 / 1853-54	799,490,710	84.3	149,279,126	15.7	948,769,836
1270 / 1854-55	487,522,395	54.1	412,966,967	45.9	900,489,362
1271 / 1855-56	543,988,645	48.5	577,712,622	51.5	1,121,701,267
Total	1,831,001,750		1,139,958,715		2,970,960,465

Paul Kennedy, in his table of military expenditures of the warring states, for the Ottoman Empire (“Turkey”) gives only the figures of 2.8 million pounds for 1852 and 3 million pounds for the year 1855, putting a question mark for 1853, 1854 and 1856.⁸⁷⁴ The 3 million pounds here seem to have been reckoned from the first Ottoman loan of 1854, yet Kennedy could be wiser if he had discounted this amount by the issue price of

869 Ali Akyıldız, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kırım Savaşı’nı Finansmanı: İç ve Dış Borçlanmalar”, symposium paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, 2007, p. 14.

870 Güran, *ibid*, p. 30.

871 Of this sum, 2.4 millions come from the revenue from the first loan of 1854 (nominal value 3 millions) and 5.1 millions from the revenue from the second loan of 1855 (nominal value 5 millions).

872 Akyıldız, *op. cit.*, (2007), p. 18.

873 Güran, *ibid*, p. 30.

874 Paul Kennedy. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Vintage, 1989, p. 176. Turkish translation (1990), p. 207.

80 per cent (which reduced the actual amount received to 2.4 millions) and added at least the second Ottoman loan of 1855, amounting to 5.1 million pounds. In any case these two loans of course were not the whole amount of the Ottoman war spending. However, in any case, as seen from Table 3, the military spending of the Ottoman Empire was very modest in comparison with any of the three great powers. Nevertheless, if we take into consideration the revenues of the Ottoman Empire, it seems that it felt the financial burden of the war more acutely than other states.

Table 3: Military expenditures of the warring states (million pounds sterling)⁸⁷⁵

	1853	1854	1855	1856	Total
Russia ⁸⁷⁶	19.9	31.3	39.8	37.9	128.9
France	17.5	30.3	43.8	36.3	127.9
Britain	9.1	76.3	36.5	32.3	282.1
Ottoman Empire	3.5?	4.6?	6.0?	3.2?	17.3
Sardinia	1.4	1.4	2.2	2.5	7.5

The Ottoman official chronicler of the period Ahmed Lutfi Efendi gives the figure of 7 million Ottoman pounds or pounds sterling (*liret*)⁸⁷⁷ as the total extraordinary war expenses of the Ottoman Empire for the 28 months of war. Of this amount, he writes, 3 millions come from foreign loan, and the remaining 4 millions is obtained through internal borrowing, issue of kaime (*kaime*) and the *iane-i cihadiye*.⁸⁷⁸ Yet obviously (and as another proof of his incompetence for his task) he omits the 1855 loan of 5 million pounds. His figures are not reliable at all.

While the war meant expenses for the state and new taxes for its subjects, it brought some benefits as well, especially for the shopkeepers and merchants. The allies also spent significant sums for the provisions of their armies and navies. They had their agents sent everywhere in Anatolia and the Rumelia to buy horses, food, fodder and other items for them. It seems that due to lack of any proper roads and railways in the

875 Figures are from Kennedy, except those for the Ottoman Empire, which I prepared from Güran's study with some modifications.

876 Alexis Troubetzkoy gives the total Russian war expenditure as 142 million pounds sterling, "a mere 15 per cent less than France and Britain together". However, he does not cite any source. See Troubetzkoy, *A Brief History of the Crimean War*, New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006, p. 300.

877 *Liret* appears rather strange here. Most probably it is *lira*, meaning Ottoman pounds. But it could be pounds sterling as well.

878 See Lutfi Efendi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi*, c. IX, Yayınlayan Münir Aktepe, İstanbul: İÜ Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1984, p. 117.

Ottoman Empire, these purchases were made mainly from coastal areas close to ports in order to transport the goods by sea. According to the British economist Nassau William Senior (1790-1864), who visited Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha at his mansion in Istanbul on 4 October 1857, the pasha told him that although the late war was “enormously expensive” to the government, because it raised 300,000 men, it had also profited and “Turkey” was the only country that did so. Mehmed Pasha added that 30 millions sterling or more were spent in Istanbul and if they had had “the means of transport” (meaning roads) they could have sold twice or three times as much to the allies.⁸⁷⁹

4.4. Conspicuous Consumption of Palace Women

Palace women’s conspicuous consumption seems to have played a considerable part in the Ottoman financial crisis. Cevdet Pasha has written in some detail about the extravagance of the palace women. He seems to put the main blame on them for the deficits in state budget. He argues that the palace women came under the influence of Europeans and Egyptian ladies and started spending enormous sums for luxury items like jewellery, furniture and clothing. They also borrowed from the *sarrafs* of Galata at very high interest rates, going up to 45 per cent. While there might be a certain element of exaggeration in the figures given by Cevdet Pasha, they are, in any case, impressive.⁸⁸⁰ These ladies, mainly the sisters, daughters and harem favourites of the Sultan are said to have incurred in the year 1855 a debt of 288,000 purses (approximately 1.15 million pounds sterling); of which, one of the favourites of the Sultan, Serfiraz Hanım alone was responsible for 125,000 purses (approximately 500,000 pounds sterling).⁸⁸¹ For comparison, Cevdet Pasha writes that during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, the expenses of the whole palace did not exceed 1,000 purses while under Sultan Abdülmeçid it had reached 20,000 purses.⁸⁸²

879 See Senior, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

880 See Ali Akyıldız, *Mümin ve Müsrif Bir Padişah Kızı: Refia Sultan*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998, p. 1-5, 67-74.

881 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir* 13-20, p. 4. Cevdet Pasha gives this amount as 120,000 purses elsewhere (p. 8).

882 Cevdet Pasha, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Melek Hanım, the Christian wife of Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha confirms the conspicuous consumption of the palace women under the influence of European and Egyptian ladies:

The Sultan's love for his wives – and numerous they were – was ruining the country. They contrived at once to gratify their caprices, whatever might be their object. They availed themselves of it to obtain from him the most costly presents. Covered with diamonds, and attended by numerous slaves, almost as sumptuously attired as their mistresses, they drove out in carriages, each of which, with its equipments, cost about 900,000 piastres (£8000). Their apartments were constantly replenished with new furniture. In the space of two years the seraglio was furnished about four times over... Frequently the favors of one of the Sultan's wives, or odalisques, were attended with bounties and presents big enough to make the fortune of him who received it. In fact, these women were utterly regardless of the costliness of what they bestowed; it was a regular case of pillage.⁸⁸³

When Abdülmecid's daughter Refia Sultan's debts reached 60,000 purses (240,000 pounds sterling), her *kethüda* (chamberlain) Eşref Efendi was dismissed and put under house arrest in August 1858.⁸⁸⁴ These sums must be compared with the deficit of the state budget for 1851, which was around one million pounds.⁸⁸⁵ A commission consisting of Mehmet, Şekib, Safveti and Rıfat Pashas calculated the deficit of 1853 as 300,000 purses (nearly 1.38 million pounds). When war broke out, the Ottoman treasury first tried to borrow from the *sarrafs* of Galata and from internal merchants in general. Yet only 20,000 purses (roughly 92,000 pounds) out of the planned sum of 30,000 purses could be borrowed from them, secured on the Egyptian tribute for the Muslim fiscal year 1271 (March 1855 – March 1856).⁸⁸⁶

4.5. The Mission of Namık Pasha

The beginning of the war changed the position of the Sultan on borrowing from Europe. When internal borrowing became impossible, international borrowing became a necessity. At the beginning of October 1853 or some time earlier, the Ottoman council of ministers, by the approval of the Sultan, decided to send the Minister of Commerce and Public Works Mehmed Namık Pasha (1804-1892) to Paris and London to contract a

883 Melek Hanım, *Thirty Years in the Harem*, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2005, p. 41. (First published in London, 1872).

884 Akyıldız, op. cit., (1998), p. 67.

885 Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "Ottoman Concern about Western Economic Penetration in the Levant, 1849-1856", *Journal of Modern History* 30(4), December 1958, p. 3.

886 Cezmi Karasu, op. cit., p. 120.

loan.⁸⁸⁷ Reşid Pasha wrote on 5 October 1853 to Mr Rothschild, the well-known banker of Paris and London, requesting him to assist Namık Pasha.⁸⁸⁸ Namık Pasha's instructions were prepared towards the end of October. His son Major Halil Bey was also appointed to his mission as first secretary and Mustafa Fahreddin Bey from the foreign ministry as second secretary.⁸⁸⁹

Namık Pasha's instructions were to contract a loan for 500,000 *kese* (2.5 million Ottoman pounds or around 2.27 million pounds sterling) in favourable terms. In his memorandum, the grand vizier stated that the securities for the loan should not be in the form of a monopoly (*inhisar*) and should not appear as a kind of *rehin* (pledge or pawn or mortgage lien) in the opinion of the foreigners. The tribute of Egypt and the customs revenues of Syria and Izmir should also be avoided to be assigned as security. The *aşar* on the olive oil and the revenue of the province of Hudavendigâr (Bursa) could be safely deposited as security. The loan money would be insured for safe arrival at Istanbul. Exchange bills, drafts and notes were not to be accepted; only gold and silver money was to be accepted. For the secrecy of telegraph communications, ciphers would be given to the secretaries.⁸⁹⁰ Finally the grand vizier added that instructions on the terms of the loan should be kept very secret and would be given separately in a secret instruction.⁸⁹¹

Soon the confidential letter of instructions or regulations (*talimatname*) was also prepared and given to Namık Pasha. It was kept secret from the extended council of ministers (*Meclis-i Mahsus*) and was known only among six trusted members of the inner circle of the grand vizier (*beyn el havass*) who sealed it. The reason for this secrecy was to prevent the limits of the loan terms from being known to the Galata bankers, and through them to the European bankers, who would then have insider information and thus ask a higher price. The first item to be decided was the interest rate. It was stated that according to news from Paris, an interest rate of four to four and

887 See Lütfi (op. cit., pp. 214-215). The firman is dated *Evail-i Cemaziyelevvel* 1270, that is, beginning of February 1854. Namık Pasha gives the same date in his autobiography (*tercüme-i hal*). See Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı, *Şeyhül Vüzera Serasker Mehmet Namık Paşa*, İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1987, p. 280. However, this firman was issued as a matter of formality when Namık Pasha was already in London. Sinaplı (op. cit., p. 159) erroneously gives the date of the firman as the date of Namık Pasha's travel to Paris and London.

888 However, Rothschild replied only on 25 February 1854. See BOA. İ. HR. 332/21357 lef 2. See Appendix 37.

889 BOA. İ. HR. 103/5028, dated 21 Muharrem 1270 (24 October 1853).

890 Telegraph lines in the Ottoman Empire at that time were available only in Belgrade. From Belgrade the telegraph was sent to Istanbul via the Danube. In 1855 a telegraph line was built from Sevastopol to Varna and Istanbul.

891 Tezkire-i Samiye müsveddesi. BOA. A. AMD. 49/90, dated 24 Muharrem 1270 (27 October 1853). See Appendix 8.

a half per cent was the going market rate. Namık Pasha was allowed up to six per cent. The second item was the payback period. Namık Pasha was instructed to try to keep it at 10 years, and at most 15 years. Third and last, the issue price should not be lower than 95 per cent, allowing a maximum five per cent discount. The document was sealed by Musa Safveti Pasha (finance minister), Sadık Rifat Pasha (President of the MVL), Damad Ali Fethi Pasha (*Tophane-i Amire* müşiri), Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha (*Serasker*), Mustafa Reşid Pasha (foreign minister), Ahmed Arif Efendi (the *şeyhülislam*) and the grand vizier Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha.⁸⁹²

Thus in the middle of November 1853 Namık Pasha set out for Paris. He arrived there somewhat late in 15 days on 27 November.⁸⁹³ The Ottoman ambassador in Paris was Veliyüddin Rifat Pasha, known as Veli Pasha, son of the Grand Vizier Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha. On the day of his arrival, Namık and Veli Pasha went to visit the French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys. Namık Pasha asked for assistance in concluding a loan agreement. Namık also told him that the Porte did not want war, but Russia had again put its expansion plan into action, and it had occupied all the northern shores of the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire was not equal to Russia in force, therefore if (God forbid) the Russians occupied their country, then Europe would inherit the problems of the Porte. Drouyn de Lhuys⁸⁹⁴ replied himself that he also thought so but his companions did not agree with him. Then he suggested that they should talk to the Emperor as well. On the question of the loan, he promised that he would urge bankers for the loan.

Namık Pasha talked with Mr Rothschild and some other bankers in Paris. They replied that they could give an answer in seven to eight days after consulting their partners. Namık Pasha comments that this delay was due to their expectations for the outcome of the diplomatic efforts by European cabinets to restore peace. The bankers had also said that due the current situation the market rate of interest was six per cent and a discount of ten per cent in the issue price. Namık Pasha had also written to Kostaki Musurus, the Ottoman ambassador in London.

892 Instructions to Namık Pasha. Attachment to the petition of the grand vizier to the Sultan. BOA. İ. HR. 103/5039 lef 1, dated 28 Muharrem 1270 (31 October 1853). Also available at BOA. A. DVN. MHM. 10/89-2, dated 6 November 1853. See Appendix 9.

893 Namık Pasha to foreign minister Reşid Pasha, dated 27 Safer 1270 (29 November 1853). BOA. İ. HR. 333/21335 lef 1.

894 Lütü, op. cit., p. 216. Münir Aktepe, the editor of *Ahmed Lütü Efendi Tarihi*, transliterates Drouyn de Lhuys as “Verone (?) de Louis” [question mark in the original]. Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı, in his turn, gives the following three variants in his consecutive pages: “Derin Dölives”, “Doroin Dolayı” and “Dinin de Lhinyi”. We must admit that it is not possible to read and spell this French name correctly from the Ottoman script, without referring to works in the Latin script.

A few days later Namık and Veli Pashas were invited to the Tuileries Palace to be received by Napoleon III.⁸⁹⁵ The Emperor however, neither rejected nor approved of Namık's words. On 2 December Namık and Veli revisited Drouyn de Lhuys. In his report dated 10 December, Namık Pasha first pointed out that Musurus had replied that the London bankers were not inclined positively to the Ottoman loan and even some Russian intrigues were involved. Then he described his second meeting with Drouyn de Lhuys.

When de Lhuys asked about the loan, Namık replied that until then some petty bankers and commissioners (*ufak tefek bankir ve simsar takımları*) had come to him and made some “excessive and cold” (*fahiş ve barid*) offers like eight to nine per cent interest rate and 80 per cent issue price for the bonds. Having started the business here in Paris, added Namık, we must conclude it here, otherwise if we go to London then there they will tell that we could not achieve anything here and therefore they will create more problems. For this reason Namık asked for the help of the French foreign minister. Thereupon Drouyn de Lhuys said that the revenue of France was just equal to its expense and he did not have the right to tell the bankers where to give their money, since it was their money. Then he asked whether the Pasha had any instructions or authority to ask for the guarantee of the French government. To this Namık replied categorically that he did not have any such permission either for a guarantee or for a direct loan from the French government. He added that as a friend and ally of the Ottoman Empire, France and Britain should assist it in obtaining the loan at reasonable conditions. The loan issue had been subjected to the intrigues of Russia and the avarice of the bankers, he said. Drouyn de Lhuys promised to talk to the emperor to find a solution.⁸⁹⁶

Napoleon III then urged his finance minister, who in his turn urged both Rothschild and its arch rival, the *Crédit mobilier* and a third group of bankers to sign a three-sided contract with a reasonable interest rate. Namık Pasha also tells that the news of Ottoman victories had also been received well for the facility of the loan. Remarkably he does not mention the news of the destruction of the Ottoman squadron in Sinop, which should have reached Paris by then. The bankers first had an eye on the tribute of Egypt as a guarantee, but they gave up the idea. They had also agreed on the

895 Veli Pasha to Reşid Pasha the foreign minister. BOA. HR. MKT. 68/21, dated 9 December 1853. Namık Pasha calls the French emperor as Napoleon the Second (*İkinci Napoleon*). See Lütfi, *ibid.*, p. 216.

896 Namık Pasha from Paris to the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, dated 9 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (10 December 1853). BOA. İ. HR. 333/21335 lef 4.

duration of the loan. However, the interest rate and the commission were not determined yet. While Namık offered five per cent, the French finance minister said a seven per cent interest should be seen normal. Nevertheless, Namık reported that they were still trying to include other bankers to increase competition and to decrease the interest rate. From this report it seems as if everything was normal and soon the loan would be concluded at a normal price. However, this would not be the case, because at this time diplomatic negotiations had been resumed and it was not certain whether the war would be continued or not. The bankers did not want to commit themselves without having first ascertained the result of these talks.

The reports of Namık and Veli Pashas were discussed at the council of ministers on 28 December 1853. Nevertheless, the ministers could not come up with a solution or clear instructions. Namık Pasha was expected to somehow finish the contracting of the loan without parting from his original instructions. The grand vizier Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha reported the decision of the council to the Sultan next day.⁸⁹⁷

In the meantime the Porte was very hard pressed for want of money. It had almost exhausted all ways of borrowing other than the foreign loan. The amount of the loan was increased up to five million pounds sterling. Thus Namık Pasha was to negotiate a loan of five million pounds sterling in Paris and London. Since money was needed urgently, the French and British governments were also asked to advance 10 million francs each (equal to 400,000 pounds sterling) to be paid with interest out of the loan.⁸⁹⁸

The Ottoman official chronicler Ahmed Lütü Efendi applied to Namık Pasha around the year or some time before 1892, asking him to give information on his mission. The aged *Şeyh ül Vüzera*, in his reply, written years after the event, with the hindsight of the experience of the *Düyun-ı Umumiye İdaresi* (Public Debt Administration), which from 1881 onwards controlled the collection of many of the Ottoman taxes for the repayment of the Ottoman debt, emphasizes his unwillingness at that time to sign a foreign loan. Yet we must allow that his story could be genuine, because fear of a foreign loan was really dominant among some part of the bureaucracy at that time. Apparently his “heart did not wish to be the instrument of the first foreign

897 Grand vizier to the secretary of the Sultan, dated 28 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (29 December 1853). BOA. İ. HR. 333/21335 lef 5. Sultan’s approval is on 29 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (30 December 1853).

898 O. Anderson (op. cit., p. 48) also writes that “after Sinope, France advanced 10 million francs”, however, France advanced only 5 million francs in instalments, the first of which, 1 million francs, was received in January 1854 and the last towards October 1854. See BOA. A. AMD. 50/50, dated 14 January 1854 and BOA. İ. HR. 114/5469, dated 9 October 1854. This amount of 5 million francs was paid back from the loan money together with its five per cent interest.

loan, for until then the Sublime State (*Devlet-i Aliyye*) did not owe an *akçe* to the foreigners”.⁸⁹⁹

In his *layiha* given to Lütfi, Namık Pasha further added that since he did not think that the Russians could be stopped by money alone, he asked the council of ministers for permission to invite the British and the French governments to an alliance, trying to persuade them by explaining the dangers to Europe in the case of a Russian victory. According to him, the Ottoman council of ministers gave him this authority without much hope of gaining the support of the European great powers.

From Paris, Namık Pasha went to London on 17 December 1853.⁹⁰⁰ This was his third visit to London. Namık Pasha had first been to London in 1832 during Sultan Mahmud II’s reign as special envoy to seek help against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. His second embassy to London was in 1834, therefore he knew some of the ministers. The British public was well disposed towards the Ottomans and hostile to Russia. Namık relates how he and the Ottoman ambassador Kostaki Musurus were greeted by the people shouting “Brave Turks! Don’t worry over Sinop!” (*Aferin maşallah Türkler muzaffer olunuz Sinop vakasına esef etmeyiniz deyu çağrışarak*) on their way to the parliament to hear the inaugural speech of the Queen.⁹⁰¹ Together with Musurus, he went to Lord Palmerston, whom he had met before. Palmerston was known for his anti-Russian stand. From the 1830’s onwards the defence of the Ottoman Empire against Russia had become an important policy objective for him.⁹⁰² Therefore Palmerston received Namık well, and said he agreed with him on the necessity of checking the Russian expansion, but the Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance Minister) William Gladstone⁹⁰³ were opposed to him. Namık Pasha

899 For Namık Pasha’s report (*layiha*) on his mission see Lütfi, op. cit., numara 18, pp. 215-217. Translations are mine.

900 BOA. İ. HR. 114 / 5554/08, dated 23 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (24 December 1853). Cf. Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı, op. cit., p. 159. Sinaplı gives the date as Rebiyyülahir, instead of Rebiyyülevvel. Sinaplı also makes many mistakes in transliteration, for example reads Musurus as “mösyö Roz”. See ibid, p. 159, 160.

901 Namık Pasha to Reşid Pasha. BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 86, dated 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (31 January 1854). See Appendix 34. Lef 108 contains the printed leaflet “Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament, on Tuesday, January 31, 1854”.

902 See Rodkey, “Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41”, Part I, *The Journal of Modern History* 1 (4), December 1929, pp. 570-593; Part II, *The Journal of Modern History* 2 (2), June 1930, pp. 193-225.

903 William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898). British Liberal Party statesman, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-55, 1859-66, 1873-74, 1880-82) and Prime Minister (1868–1874, 1880–1885, 1886 and 1892–1894).

also relates that the British Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen quite rudely stated: “Besides spending its money, should Britain shed its blood as well for you?”⁹⁰⁴

In his letter to Reşid Pasha, dated 21 February 1854, Namık Pasha confirms receipt of the instructions from Reşid Pasha dated 29 January 1854 and the attached firman of the Sultan, in reply to his letter dated 28 December 1853. Apparently he had asked for permission to make the contract on an agency basis with a fixed commission (*emanet suretiyle komisyon ile bankirlere havale*), and this was not accepted, because it was argued that this way the Porte would incur a permanent risk while the bankers would safely receive their commission. Namık Pasha states that up to that time he could not find any banker who would undertake the loan at his own risk, at a fixed price. Even on an agency basis, no banker was willing to contract the loan within the limits of Namık Pasha’s instructions. Then he argues against Reşid Pasha that if the loan was contracted to a banker on an agency basis and the desired amount was received, then the Sublime Porte would not incur any losses or profits from the sale and purchase of the loan bonds among the bankers. The risk or drawback (*mahzur*) in this case would be that the banker would not put money from his own pocket if the bonds were not sold.⁹⁰⁵

Namık Pasha added that the British cabinet was making some efforts and the banker Rothschild was visiting him, making, however, such an “exorbitant” offer as 70 per cent issue price and 5 percent interest rate, while Namık offered at 90 percent and 5 percent interest. The British secretary of state for foreign affairs Lord Clarendon and the home secretary Lord Palmerston on the other hand insisted upon Namık that since his government needed money urgently he should not look at the price but try to get the money as soon as possible. To these words Namık replies that his instructions do not allow such an excessive price and he would not accept it even if it was allowed. Then they advised him to consult the “minister for Indian affairs” Charles Wood⁹⁰⁶, who was competent in these affairs and could assist him informally. Palmerston had given Namık

904 Lütfi, op. cit., p. 216-217. Cf. Sinaplı, p. 169-170, where Namık says he was friendly with Palmerston, who was expected to become the prime minister. Namık Pasha calls Musurus a “pasha”, although Musurus was just Kostaki Bey at that time. Namık Pasha's memory again fails him, for he makes Lord Palmerston foreign minister, while Palmerston was home secretary at that time. Sinaplı also quotes an interview of Namık Pasha to an unidentified French journalist in 1883, where Namık mentions Lord “Alberti” (read Aberdeen) as foreign minister (Sinaplı, ibid, p. 171). At that time the foreign minister was Lord Clarendon. In the interview Namık also says that Palmerston had expressed his inability to help him, while the French emperor and ministers were willing to help.

905 Namık Pasha from London to Reşid Pasha, dated 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (21 February 1854). BOA. İ. HR. 332/21357 lef 4.

906 Sir Charles Wood, 1st Viscount Halifax (1800-1885). Wood’s official title was the President of the Board of Control, which was a cabinet level position overseeing the British East India Company. Wood served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord John Russell's government (1846-1852).

Pasha a note in French, where he urged him to conclude the loan and argued that “it was a nonsense to want to fix in Constantinople the price at which the capitalists of London and Paris would like to lend their money”.⁹⁰⁷ Namık Pasha attached this note to his letter, adding that he had not yet received an answer from Sir Charles. He concluded by saying that since it was not possible to find money within the conditions of his instructions, he would rather return to Istanbul than stay there in vain.

In another letter of the same date, Namık Pasha reports to Reşid Pasha on the political situation. He states that since the Russian emperor gave a negative answer to the open letter of the French emperor, France and Britain no longer find it possible to come to a peaceful agreement with Russia and war now seems imminent. Prussia and Austria are also now closer to France and Britain than to Russia. Lord Palmerston told him that Russia should be driven further north from the mouth of the Danube and Georgia and Circassia must belong to the Ottoman Empire. Palmerston also told him that all old treaties with Russia must be annulled and new ones serving the independence and prosperity of the Porte must be instituted instead. Namık Pasha commented that while the British public in general seemed to favour the Porte, most these people were motivated by religious fanaticism (*taassubat-ı diniye*) who were also in some ways opposed to it and therefore should not be seen as reliable. The situation was, according to Namık Pasha, getting closer to turning into a “general war” (*muharebe-i umumiye*).⁹⁰⁸

Stratford and the British ministers blamed Namık Pasha of delaying the loan by insisting on unrealistic conditions. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe wrote privately from Istanbul to the British secretary of state for foreign affairs Lord Clarendon that the Sultan had told him that he had consented to a foreign loan in time of war to stand out in time of peace. The “Great Elchi” added, “In this, as in other matters, necessity is the only lever against Islamism”. Clarendon replied to Stratford on 13 March 1854 that “any man of ordinary experience or capacity would have got the money long ago, but he has insisted on having the same terms as England might make a loan in times of profound peace”.⁹⁰⁹ Anderson also writes that Namık Pasha “was ill-chosen for such a

907 Lord Palmerston to Namık Pasha in London, dated 19 February 1854. BOA. İ. HR. 332/21357 lef 3. See Appendix 36.

908 Namık Pasha to Reşid Pasha, dated 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (21 February 1854). BOA. İ. HR. 108/5293 lef 8.

909 Stratford to Clarendon, 7 April 1854. Anderson, op. cit., p. 48.

mission, and he insisted on abiding by his quite unrealistic instructions not to borrow below an issue price of 95”.⁹¹⁰

The testimony of Namık Pasha, however, confirmed by the correspondence of Musurus, indicates that he did not quite stick to his instructions and he did sign a contract with Rothschild⁹¹¹ on 24 April 1854.⁹¹² Namık Pasha signed an agreement for five million pounds with the London banker Rothschild at six⁹¹³ per cent interest rate at the issue price of 85 per cent. These were indeed relatively good conditions for the loan, because Rothschild would go down to 60 per cent in his offers and the loan would finally be contracted at 80 per cent.

Accordingly, in London and Paris stock exchanges, Ottoman six per cent bonds were issued at 85 per cent issue price, with a two-percent brokerage fee including expenses. The loan was to be collected in four months and to be paid back in 15 years. But the problem was that the demand for them was low due to the bad memory of the cancelled loan of 1852 and due to general lack of confidence in the Porte's financial and administrative affairs. Only 1.1 million pounds were subscribed to in London, while the amount of subscription in Paris was not known.⁹¹⁴

On 23 March (the same day as the date of Namık Pasha's despatch), Musurus also wrote to Reşid Pasha that Aberdeen said that he and the other ministers found the price of 75 per cent and the interest rate of 5 per cent offered previously by Rothschild agreeable and recommended them to sign it. However, he and Namık Pasha had negotiated with Mr Goldsmid and Mr Palmer and then Rothschild had agreed to 85 per cent issue price with 6 per cent interest. Musurus wrote that the terms of the loan were similar to those of the 1852 abortive loan, even better than it because it had a 23 years' term while the new one was only for 15 years. The terms could be better if it had been

910 O. Anderson, *ibid.*

911 Rothschild's name has twice been left blank in Lütüfî, *ibid.*, p. 217. I could not check whether the blank space is in the original Arabic-letter edition or manuscript of Lütüfî, or is the result of the inability of Lütüfî's editor to transliterate the name of Rothschild from the Ottoman script. Most probably, the fault lies with the editor, who also does not transliterate the name of Prime Minister Aberdeen in the same page. While the Ottoman text is troublesome, the editor has no excuse because he could easily find out the name of the British prime minister at that time by simply looking it up in an encyclopedia.

912 Namık Pasha telegraphed the news of the agreement on 24 March 1854 from London to Istanbul via Belgrad. BOA. İ. HR. 107/5272 lef 3. See Appendix 42.

913 In his *layiha* to the chronicler Lütüfî Efendi, written about 1892, Namık Pasha writes “four per cent interest and one per cent sinking fund” (*yüzde dört faiz ile bir amortisman*). See Lütüfî, *op. cit.*, p. 217. This is another inaccuracy from Namık Pasha, as the above telegraph testifies.

914 Namık Pasha from London to Reşid Pasha, dated 23 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (23 March 1854). BOA. İ. HR. 107/5283, lef 1. Sinaplı (*op. cit.*, p. 160-162) gives a simplified transliteration (with many mistakes) of this letter. Cf. Akar and Al, *op. cit.*, (2003), p. 5. Akar and Al do not mention Sinaplı's work at all.

contracted several months ago. But still these were good conditions because the prices of all other loans were lower. Musurus was certain that the business of loan was over now.⁹¹⁵

However, within a week, on 28 March 1854, Great Britain and France declared war against Russia, and this changed the market conditions drastically.⁹¹⁶ The issue prices of all loans went down. Upon this development, Rothschild gave up the loan, and his obligation was given back without demanding any indemnity as a result of the “imperial generosity of the Sublime State (*Devlet-i Aliyye namuna âlî-cenâblık*)”. Namık Pasha later boasted that he had told Rothschild “Thank God, you are dealing with a Turk” (*işiniz elhamdülillah bir Türk ile dir*) upon which Rothschild had become much satisfied and pleased. It would be interesting to know whether Namık actually told him that he was a Turk or an Ottoman or a Muslim.

Namık Pasha finishes his *layiha* to the chronicler Lutfi Efendi by saying that on his return, Abdülmecid Han approved of his not concluding the loan agreement and despite this the loan was contracted through Veliyüddin Rifat and Kostaki Musurus. He boasts that Abdülmecid told him “if it were another person, he would give importance to the loan. But you have proved that you are the right and honourable man as I have known you from childhood”. Namık Pasha's account, given in his very old age, however, is not clear enough, and cannot be taken for granted. He does not give the details, and even if he wanted to, his memory would most probably be inaccurate as he had already made some mistakes. He is furthermore an interested party at an actual question at the time of his writing; therefore his evidence cannot be objective. It must be verified by other sources and above all with his own reports in the BOA that are certainly more reliable.

Meanwhile, the Porte resorted to another way of financing the war expenses by issuing bonds or share certificates (*esham-ı mümtaze*) on the customs revenues of Istanbul. The *esham* was preferred to *kaime* because the value of *kaime* had fallen much. It was a temporary measure until the receipt of the foreign loan. In February 1854, *esham* at the value of 60,000 *kese* were issued at 10 per cent interest for three years.⁹¹⁷

915 Musurus to Reşid Pasha, dated 23 March 1854. BOA. HR. TO. 52/50. See Appendix 40.

916 Namık Pasha in his interview again errs in some details. He says that people protested the prime minister Aberdeen by breaking the window glasses of his house and upon this Lord Aberdeen resigned and Lord Palmerston replaced him and then war was declared. In reality, Aberdeen was replaced by Palmerston nearly one year later on 29 January 1855.

917 Akyıldız, op. cit, (1996), p. 46.

On 3 April 1854, Musurus wrote to the Ottoman foreign minister Reşid Pasha that the British parliament approved the declaration of war on Russia on 31 March. On the question of the 10 million franc advance money, Musurus had pressed again Lord Clarendon, who said that the cabinet did not approve of it. He explained that according to the constitution⁹¹⁸ of Great Britain such advances must be approved by the parliament and there the opposition members of the government would bring it down. He added that the cabinet was of the opinion that the Ottoman bonds should be issued at a lower price than that contracted with Rothschild. Rothschild himself told Musurus that the ministers did not want to give the 10 million franc advance money or a guarantee for the “Turkish loan”. The only way for the Ottoman government to raise money was to offer the loan bonds to the public at favourable conditions. On the question of the guarantee, Musurus makes the following remark:

Although I did not make even an allusion to any guarantee for our loan, the abstention of the British cabinet from this guarantee is, in my humble opinion, not to be regretted. On the contrary, it would be regrettable if (God forbid) the Sublime Empire were compelled to apply to foreign states in order to contract a loan in Europe. Because in that case the reputation and credibility of the Sublime State would be reduced to the degree of states like Greece...⁹¹⁹ [My translation]

Indeed the Porte would soon be forced to ask for foreign guarantees. Musurus adds that two or three months ago he believed they could make the loan on better conditions than those later agreed upon with Rothschild, and now although they (he and Namık) did not achieve this goal, he was still hopeful to do it with Rothschild at the first opportunity (*müsait bir vesile zuhurunda*) on the same or a more convenient conditions without any foreign guarantees. Musurus then argues against the British cabinet, trying to refute their argument that the conditions of the “Turkish loan” were not acceptable to the public and therefore that its price should be reduced. He writes that if this had been so, then their bonds would not have attracted customers to the amount of 1.1 million pounds on the day of its announcement and the price would not go up two per cent and finally Mr. Rothschild, being an expert in these affairs, would not take upon himself the brokerage of the loan. The change in the attitude of the public to the Ottoman loan occurred in one day after the news of the tsar's refusal to accept the British and French ultimatum leading to the declaration of war by France and Britain on 29 March 1854. Had this news reached five days later, or had they signed the contract with Rothschild five days earlier, argues Musurus, they would have succeeded in getting the loan, which

918 Musurus uses exactly the word “*konstitüsyon*”.

919 Translation (from French into Turkish) of the despatch of Musurus to foreign minister Reşid Pasha. BOA. HR. TO. 52/60, dated 3 April 1854. See Appendix 43.

was more favourable to the public than the bonds of other states. The real reason for the failure of the loan was the decrease in the price of all government bonds due to the declaration of war. Since the capital of the public was invested in these bonds, in order to buy the Ottoman bonds they needed to sell their bonds in other bonds, but these being now devalued, they faced incurring serious losses. Thus Britain's declaration of war in defence of the Ottoman Empire ironically worked against the Ottoman loan.

Namık Pasha, on the other hand, in his letter to Reşid Pasha, the day after the despatch of Musurus, writes that in his earlier letter he had already pointed out the necessity of British and French assistance, because the loan brokered by Rothschild had got stuck at the amount of only 1.1 million pounds of subscription in London. Furthermore most of those who subscribed to the loan in London were not financially solvent. Therefore Rothschild had expressed his conviction to the British foreign minister and the French ambassador that the loan was impossible without the guarantee of the British and the French governments. Namık Pasha then writes that he had no authority as to demand a guarantee, whose disadvantages were obvious (*mahzuru dahi aşikar idiğünden*), he went up to Clarendon simply to ask for their help in getting the loan and in urgently sending the advance money of ten million francs, because the Sublime Porte had an acute need for cash in the ongoing war. To this Clarendon is said to reply as follows:

You have dragged the loan along for so long (*istikrazı bunca vakit süründürüp yapmadınız*) and even now you asked such a high price that nobody wanted to buy. Now that we are in war, we have incurred countless costs and increased people's taxes. You spend money in so many inappropriate ways and if we were to submit to parliament such matters as giving taxpayers' money to you or giving guarantees on your behalf, they will not accept it in any way and we will be unable to answer their questions. We can give neither money nor guarantee. Do as you know best.⁹²⁰ [My translation].

Namık Pasha tried to argue that the price of the Ottoman bonds was very low for the public and very expensive for the Ottoman government, that people indeed wanted to buy them, but they could not sell their existing bonds, that the Porte needed money in this war and the help of the allies was essential in this matter as well. Nevertheless, he was not successful in persuading him. Upon this Namık said that he must therefore go to Paris and if unsuccessful there as well, then return to Istanbul. Clarendon agreed with him. Meanwhile Lord Palmerston also enters Clarendon's house and agrees with his words on this question. Despite this the two obstinate Ottomans go to Palmerston as

920 Namık Pasha to Reşid Pasha. BOA. İ. HR. 108/5309, dated 5 Receb 1270 (4 April 1854), quoted by Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 5. See Appendix 44 for the whole text of this letter.

well on the following day. However, Palmerston speaks in even more accusing and humiliating tones:

When all the people of Britain knows that you collect taxes in a corrupt way and squander the money in so many needless things, it is impossible for us to give the money collected from them to you or to act as your guarantor. Even passing the stormy sea is easier. If you need money, then go to the public, they may want to lend their money at the price of fifty to sixty, with seven to eight per cent interest. Try to persuade them as best as you can...⁹²¹ [My translation]

Meanwhile the French ambassador in London stated that they were ready to give a guarantee for the Porte's loan, if Britain agreed as well. The British and the French also recommended assigning the tribute of Egypt as security, but Namık replied that he had no authority to dispose of the tribute of Egypt. Having been unable to get the loan from London, poor Namık Pasha concludes at the end of his letter that if nothing comes out of Paris as well, then the only solution would be rather to issue paper money (*kavaim-i nakdiye*) than to make such an expensive loan. He then suggests waiting for a better moment to borrow from Europe at better conditions and then removing the *kavaim* from the market.

Namık Pasha and Musurus were disappointed when the British cabinet did not use its influence in the City. Gladstone argued that “the wishes of the Ministry weigh exactly nothing in regard to a question of lending money to a Foreign State”.⁹²² Furthermore he was following at the time a policy of financing the war by taxation and not loans.

Having attained no results in London, Namık Pasha returned to Paris. There he went again to the French foreign minister together with Veli Pasha. He explained to the minister the situation. When the minister asked him whether he was authorised to contract the loan at a higher price than that with Rothschild and to assign the tribute of Egypt for the loan and finally to ask for the guarantee of the allied governments, he said that he had already taken the responsibility upon himself of signing a contract at a price beyond his authority, yet still he was not successful. He could not go down from the price of 85 and the up from the interest of six per cent. He had no authority on the Egyptian tribute. Finally, in Istanbul there had not been any discussion of foreign guarantees because it had not occurred to them that it might be necessary. Drouyn de Lhuys answered that the question would be discussed by the cabinet under the supervision of Napoleon III. After that, when Namık and Veli Pasha again visited the

921 Ibid. In the original, there is the expression “*yelli denizi içmek*”, which does not make sense, there must be a writing error here, logically it must be “*yelli denizi geçmek*”.

922 O. Anderson, *ibid.*

minister, he told them that the decision was that they could not give guarantee unilaterally without Britain. If the Porte accepted the assignment of the tribute of Egypt as security for the loan and if it accepted whatever price was available in the market, then the French cabinet would do its best to assist the contract of the loan.⁹²³

Drouyn de Lhuys also wrote to the Ottoman foreign ministry that he regretted Namık Pasha's not having attained the desired result in the loan affair. He suggested that the reason was not the inherent difficulties of the business, but the strictness of the instructions given to Namık Pasha. Therefore he urged his Ottoman colleague to give sufficient independence and licence to the person who would be authorized to negotiate the loan.⁹²⁴

Eventually Namık Pasha abandoned further hopes and left Paris for Istanbul towards end of April. Meanwhile Veli Pasha wrote from Paris to his father the grand vizier, who would soon lose his office, confirming that Namık Pasha could not have attained the loan in conformity with his instructions. Veli Pasha saw two alternatives for the contracting of the loan; either a guarantee from the allied governments or putting the Egyptian tribute as security for the loan. He declared that he would execute whichever of the alternatives would be assigned to him. He also wrote that Rothschild had told that the Galata bankers Baltazzi and Alleon were intriguing through their partners in Paris and London.⁹²⁵

Namık Pasha arrived at Istanbul on 13 May 1854. He was received by the Sultan on 16 May.⁹²⁶ We do not know what passed between them, although Namık Pasha later argued that Abdülmecid was glad that he did not strive for the loan. Namık Pasha's narrative of his role in the alliance of France and Britain with the Porte is of course too much exaggerated. He did not and could not have a role here. British and French policies were determined by their cabinets, parliaments and to a considerable degree, the public opinion. In fact British and French governments did not discuss political matters with the Ottoman ambassadors or envoys in London and Paris, rightly thinking

923 Namık Pasha to Reşid Pasha. BOA. İ. HR. 5348, dated 11 Şaban 1270 (9 May 1854). Cf. Sinaplı, *op. cit.*, p. 167-169.

924 Drouyn de Lhuys to Reşid Pasha, dated 28 April 1854. BOA. İ. DH. 18893 lef 3.

925 Paris ambassador Veli Pasha to the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, Gurre-i Şaban 1270 / 29 April 1854. BOA. İ. DH. 18893 lef 2. Theodore Baltazzi, alias Baltacı Todoraki (1788-1860) belonged to the prominent Levantine family of Baltazzi, bankers to the Sultan. In 1847, together with the French banker Jacques Alleon, he had founded the Bank-ı Dersaadet (Bank de Constantinople) which was forced to close in 1852.

926 BOA. İ. DH. 18966, dated 18 Şaban 1270 (16 May 1854).

that this was a loss of time.⁹²⁷ They had their ambassadors in Istanbul, who also thought it was a waste of time to discuss important political matters with the foreign minister, and sometimes even with the grand vizier. At that time, the Ottoman ambassadors in European capitals in many cases would hear the decision of their governments first from foreigners.

It had become very clear that the Porte would not be able to borrow without the guarantees of the allied governments. Thus it was rather the Porte's instructions, the international conjuncture, problems with the credibility of the Porte and attitudes of the British ministers that had really prevented the loan's materialization rather than Namık Pasha's "amateurishness" and unwillingness. Under such conditions, anyone in his place could be equally unsuccessful.

On the day after Namık Pasha's visit to the Sultan, the finance minister Musa Safveti Pasha gave his report on the financial situation of the Ottoman Empire to the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha. He wrote that from the beginning of the current question, an amount of more than 300,000 purses (1.5 million Ottoman pounds or around 1.36 million pounds sterling) was assigned to extraordinary expenses (*mesarif-i fevkalade*) until October 1853. After that *kavaim-i nakdiye* at the amount of 100,000 purses (500,000 Ottoman pounds) were also assigned to the extraordinary (war) expenses. The revenues of the new financial year beginning from 13 March 1854 hardly make up for the debts. The treasury had borrowed 320,000 Ottoman pounds secured against the tribute of Egypt for the fiscal year 1270 from some merchants and bankers, plus 100,000 Ottoman pounds from Baltacı Todoraki. Furthermore esham bonds at 10 per cent interest rate at the amount of 300,000 Ottoman pounds were being issued. Nevertheless, the needs of the armies were increasing day by day and the revenues of the provinces were directed to these armies. The provinces of Yanya and Tırhala needed assistance from the centre. Now that Namık Pasha had also returned from Europe "empty handed", it was necessary to take urgent measures, because the treasury could only survive two months more. The finance minister ended his report by warning that he had stated the facts and passed his responsibility in advance.⁹²⁸ Money was needed urgently from Europe.

927 Sinan Kunalalp refers to Lord Salisbury on this point. See "Bir Osmanlı Diplomatu Kostaki Musurus Paşa 1807-1891", *Belleten* XXXIV / 135, Temmuz 1970, p. 422.

928 Finance minister Musa Safveti Pasha to grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, 19 Şaban 1270 (17 May 1854). BOA. İ. DH. 18893 lef 1. See Appendix 47.

4.6. The Mission of Black and Durand and the First Foreign Loan of 1854

Since the Porte needed money urgently, this time it sent instead two foreign merchant bankers of Galata, Messrs J. N. Black and Pierre Durand in June 1854. The first was close to the British and the second to the French embassy. Now they were ready to pay the market price. Furthermore they were authorised to offer as securities the Egyptian tribute and the customs revenues of Izmir (Smyrna) and Syria, which were sold to a banker company for a yearly amount of 30 million piastres or 270,000 pounds sterling for four years. Although not mentioned in the instructions, Olive Anderson also cites as a security the deposit of the firman for the loan at the Bank of England.⁹²⁹ Black and Durand still had instructions not to ask for the guarantee of the allied governments unless all independent efforts utterly failed (*comme un "moyen extrême"*).⁹³⁰ Their commission fees were to depend on the terms of the loan, the better the terms, the more the commission.⁹³¹

Meanwhile the French government suggested to the British that only by a guarantee could the allies control the spending of the loan. According to Lord Cowley, the British ambassador in Paris, the aim of the French was to interfere with the revenues of Egypt. Gladstone thought that Britain's "immense" war efforts gave her the right to interfere anyway.⁹³² Yet the discussion between the allies about how to control the expenditure of the loan leaked out, and the Ottomans were naturally indignant. However, by the end of July 1854, they agreed to any controls by the allies in return for their guarantee. On 8 August 1854, the companies of two London bankers, Baron Sir Isaac Lyon Goldsmid⁹³³ and John Horsley Palmer offered to raise a six per cent loan of three million pounds sterling at the issue price of 80, with a payback period of 33 years, on the condition that Clarendon certifies the full authority of the negotiators and the honouring of the terms. The British cabinet was averse to guarantees, while the French were interested and tried to hinder the loan unless their guarantee was accepted. Finally the London firm became the sole contractors for the loan and subscriptions opened. The

929 Anderson, op. cit., p. 50.

930 Instructions to Black and Durand (in French and in Ottoman Turkish), BOA. HR. MKT. 78/51, dated 11 Ramazan 1270 / 6 June 1854. Since 11 Ramazan corresponds to 7 June, one of these two dates must be wrong by one day.

931 BOA. HR. TO. 418/259, dated 11 Ramazan 1270 / 6 June 1854. See the above footnote for explanation on date. See Appendix 48.

932 Anderson, op. cit., p. 50.

933 Goldsmid's name is usually misspelled as Goldschmid, Goldschmidt or Goldsmith in so many sources. See for example, Anderson, op. cit., p. 51; Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), pp. 8, 17.

Egyptian tribute was deposited as security. Reşid Pasha approved the loan with the right of reserving the two⁹³⁴ millions out of the five at the Porte's discretion. However, time had been lost and the issue of the Sultan's firman approving the loan was delayed, which dealt another blow to Ottoman credibility.

Stratford de Redcliffe was anxious to have a mixed control commission for the expenditures of the loan. With Clarendon's support he set out to form a committee of three Ottomans, one Briton and one Frenchman to pay out the loan money and to superintend its application. The Ottoman view would prevail in this committee but it would be independent of the Ottoman government. The Ottoman representatives were Mehmed Nazif Bey (member of the MVL), Kabuli Efendi (the president) and Reşid Bey (controller of the finance ministry). Later Mehmed Nazif Bey was replaced by Kâni Pasha. The British representative was Demetrius Revelaky and the French nominated David Glavany. The Ottomans did not like the idea of a loan commission and accepted it rather grudgingly.

The distribution of the loan money can be seen at Table 4. The effective interest rate is 7.5 per cent excluding costs and commissions. The first problem of the loan commission was the exchange rate of pound to piastres, which was officially 110 piastres per pound, but the market rate was 125 piastres in September 1854 and 137 piastres in January 1855. The commission chose to apply the existing market rates at the time of actual payments. Thus the average rate of exchange for the all transactions until February 1855 was 130.

After preliminary deductions and payments, there remained little more than 2 million pounds, as can be seen from Table 4. More than half of the balance of the loan money remained in London at the Bank of England for bills of exchange drawn on European banks or persons. Only 829,000 pounds were received in cash, equal to 109,199,000 piastres. However, after a net currency exchange loss, only 104,751,000 piastres⁹³⁵ actually entered the Ottoman treasury.

Until 20 February 1855, a total of 239,463,000 piastres was demanded for the needs of the Ottoman armies and the loan control commission released 205,053,000 piastres from that amount. In the work of the commission up to 20 February 1855, the biggest reduced item (and the most outstanding enigma) was the salaries of the Anatolian army which were 15 months in arrears. The commission approved only 7.5

934 Anderson gives this amount as three millions (op. cit., p. 52) but this must be an error.

935 Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 17.

million piastres out of the proposed 21.6 million piastres.⁹³⁶ Next came the reduction in the allocation of the Batum army, from 12.5 million to 5 million piastres. It would be interesting to know on what basis these amounts were reduced, because the commission was supposed to make sure the loan went to the needs of the army, especially the soldiers. This was most probably due to the reports of Colonel (General) Williams, who found out that the payroll of the Anatolian army was greatly swollen by the pashas for purposes of embezzlement, as we have seen in Chapter 3.

Table 4: Distribution of the Loan of 1854 (pounds sterling)⁹³⁷

Amount of the loan	3,000,000
Deduction of 20 per cent because of the issue price of 80 per cent	600,000
Brokerage fee of Goldsmid and Palmer (two per cent of 2,400,000)	48,000
Commission fee of Black and Durand ⁹³⁸	18,800
Insurance and other costs payable to the Bank of England	8,088
Six months interest payment to the Bank of England (half of the 6 per cent of 3,000,000)	90,000
Payment to Mr Hanson ⁹³⁹ for the purchase of gunpowder	20,000
Return of the advance (5 million francs) from the French Govt. with 5 percent interest	205,439
Balance	2,009,673

4.7. The *İane-i Harbiye*

As we have seen above, one of the methods of financing the war expenses was the *iane-i harbiye* or *iane-i cihadiye* or *iane-i seferiye*⁹⁴⁰ (war assistance or donation or benevolence), which was not truly a voluntary donation but rather a compulsory tax. While there was a certain element of enthusiasm especially in the provinces at the beginning of the war, it must have waned in time because there are reports of *iane*

936 Op. cit., Ek 3, p. 35.

937 BOA. HR. MKT. 92/78, dated 29 Safer 1271 / 21 November 1854. Cf. Akar and Al (op. cit., 2003, p. 16), who refer to another document, BOA. İ. MM. 133, dated 20 February 1855.

938 Akar and Al give the commission fee of Black and Durand as £9,628, however, this is only the amount paid in London. Their full commission is £18,800 by contract. The rest they had already received in Istanbul. See the contract, BOA. HR. TO. 418/259, dated 6 June 1854. Also see the documents submitted to Âli Pasha by Black and Durand, BOA. HR. TO. 419/31, dated 29 Ramazan 1273 (23 May 1857).

939 Charles S. Hanson. British merchant in Istanbul. Akar and Al (op. cit., 2003, p. 17) have transliterated his name as “Hallinsot (?)” (Question mark in the original).

940 Not to be mixed with the *iane-i umumiye*, this was another extraordinary tax and was being collected before the war.

arrears even after the war. These arrears seem to have been prosecuted like ordinary tax arrears. Even a cursory look at the list of these “donations” reveals the surprising similarities among the amounts given by governors and *kaimmakams* or provinces and districts so far away from each other. It is clear that these amounts were predetermined from the centre. Yet some governors may have slightly exceeded their quota.

While Namık Pasha was negotiating a loan in London and Paris, the extended council of 121 statesmen under Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha discussed on 27 March 1854 the question of raising the *iane-i harbiye*. It was decided that all dignitaries and persons of power (*erbab-ı iktidar ve itibar*) should contribute a certain amount of money to the war efforts, since the holy duty of *jihad* (*emr-i mefruz-ı cihad*) could be fulfilled bodily or financially (*bedenen ve bedelen*). Despite this Islamic discourse, however, not only Muslims but also non-Muslims paid the *iane*. In 1855, the tax paid by non-Muslim subjects, the *cizye*, was first changed into *iane-i askeriye* and then it was named *bedel-i askeriye*. We will deal with this issue in subchapter 5.3.

The highest officials set the example by paying predetermined sums according to rank. These “donations” began to be published in the official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi* on 19 April 1854.⁹⁴¹ Thus the grand vizier, the foreign minister (Reşid Pasha), and the former Seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha gave 300,000 piastres each, while the others gave sums in descending order.⁹⁴² It is indeed very interesting to look at these lists of “donations” by persons and by provinces because they are really good indicators of their economic power and wealth, though not without exceptions. While the governor of Tunis, Ahmed Pasha (1806-1855) gave the biggest amount (5,700,000 piastres), the governor of Egypt, Abbas Pasha (1813-15.7.1854), being equal in rank to the grand vizier and his son İlhami Pasha gave 4,000,000 piastres and 1,000,000 piastres respectively, totalling 50,000 Ottoman pounds.⁹⁴³

It is indeed not surprising that the Egyptian governor or his son alone contributed more than the total sum collected from all the bureaucrats and traders (*esnaf*) of Istanbul

941 Besim Özcan. *Kırım Savaşı'nda Mali Durum ve Teb'anın Harb Siyaseti (1853-1856)*. Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997, p. 34. Özcan, however, argues that the *iane* was really a donation.

942 The chronicler Lütüfi however asks the question: Were these sums all paid out? His answer is that it is only known to the financial records (*orasın defter-i maliyenin erkamı bilir*). He seems to allude that not all of these sums were paid out. Lütüfi, op. cit., p. 94.

943 Lütüfi writes that Abbas Pasha donated 8,000 *kese* and his son İlhami Pasha 12,000 *kese akçe*, which totalled 50,000 Ottoman pounds. İlhami Pasha was given the hand of Abdülmecid's daughter Münire Sultan and their wedding took place in the Baltalimanı *sahilhane* on 16 Zilkade 1270 (10 August 1854). Abdülmecid married his other daughters likewise to the sons of his pashas (op. cit., p. 98).

until October 1854, which was only 3,944,242 piastres.⁹⁴⁴ If we take into consideration the salary of the *şeyhülislam* which was (around 100,000 piastres) close to that of the grand vizier, it comes a bit surprising that the *ex-şeyhülislam* Arif Hikmet Beyefendi and the recently appointed Arif Efendi gave so little amounts (30,000 piastres and 20,000 piastres respectively) in comparison with other grandees. That the new *şeyhülislam* paid less than the former one seems normal because the change in office took place only on 11 March 1854, therefore the newcomer could not have amassed enough wealth. We must also take into account the fact that at that time the high bureaucrats were receiving their salaries not in full, but only one third or one fifth of it. Among the provincial (*eyalet*) governors, after Tunis and Egypt, the governor of Baghdad Reşid Pasha paid the highest amount at 147,000 piastres. He was followed by Asfer Ali Pasha, the governor of Damascus (100,000 piastres) and Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Crete (98,000 piastres).

Adolphus Slade writes the following on this subject:

a council of Ulema and dignitaries was convened for the purpose of raising a “benevolence” from the civil, military, and naval authorities of the state above the rank of colonel, and from the wealthy denizens of the capital. Hitherto Constantinople had escaped this test of patriotism, while warmly applauding provincial liberality. Although termed voluntary, the gifts were often involuntary. Lists of names were circulated by authority, and no one ventured to signalize himself by writing down less than the expected sum; which, in the case of officers and employees, amounted to about ten days' pay... Certain districts, remiss in responding to the appeal, were long afterwards invited to pay up arrears. Gradually, as enthusiasm waned, benevolence degenerated into requisition.⁹⁴⁵

According to the calculations of Besim Özcan, who seems to have made a thorough research on the *iane-i harbiye* in the Ottoman archives, the sum total of cash “donations” from all state officials and the people of the Empire reached 44,074,742 piastres.⁹⁴⁶ This would be equal to around 352,598 pounds at the average exchange rate of 125 piastres per pound during the war. If we compare this amount with the alleged debt of Serfiraz Hanım (500,000 pounds) it becomes an insignificant sum. It is remarkable that the three Ottoman Arab dependencies of Tunis, Egypt and West Tripoli accounted for more than half of the total *iane*. It is also remarkable that the province of Tunis contributed more than Egypt, which was certainly more prosperous. On the other

944 Özcan, p. 46. Özcan gives this information but makes no comments on it.

945 Adolphus Slade, *op. cit.*, p. 197. Turkish translation (1943), p. 122. Özcan quotes from Slade on the enthusiasm of the provinces for war efforts, (Özcan, *ibid.*, p. 37) but ignores this passage.

946 Özcan, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

hand, “donations” in kind and services are not so easily calculable but they must also constitute a considerable sum, as much as the cash contribution.

Özcan gives the cash “donations” of the non-Muslims at 1,477,734 piastres (11,821 pounds), although it is not clear whether this sum is included in the former sum. Slade in his turn writes that during 1854-55, “the inhabitants of a part of Turkey” gave about 1.5 million pounds in money and an equal amount in kind, as supplies to the army, “under the head of *iani umoumie*”.⁹⁴⁷ However, it is not clear whether this is the same *iane-i harbiye* or the *iane-i umumiye* of previous years.

4.8. The Guaranteed Loan of 1855

By the spring of 1855, little remained of the loan of 1854, yet the needs of the Ottoman armies were still growing. It was necessary to claim the remaining two millions of the first loan. By this time it was also clear to the allies that the capture of Sevastopol was not going to be as quick as they thought. In Britain the cabinet of Lord Aberdeen resigned on 29 January 1855 and Lord Palmerston set up the new cabinet, which was determined to win the war at any cost. On 5 April 1855 the Ottoman ambassadors asked the French and the British governments to guarantee one million sterling each. The British government was still reluctant. Clarendon wrote to Stratford on 9 April 1855 that “we, or rather the House of Commons, object to all guarantees and subsidies”, but then added “the Cabinet will I suppose agree to it if it *must* be”.⁹⁴⁸ Meanwhile the peace negotiations at Vienna had collapsed. War was the order of the day everywhere. On 2 May 1855, Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha took over the government from Reşid Pasha, Âli becoming the grand vizier and Fuad receiving the foreign ministry. They now demanded a totally new loan at the amount of five million pounds sterling. This time it was indisputable that the loan was impossible without a guarantee from the British and French governments. While the French wanted a joint guarantee, the British wanted separate guarantees for each government. The British government also wanted to include an article of the control of the expenditures of the loan, to which Musurus objected because it would “touch upon the dignity of the state” (*namus-i aliyeye dokunacağı*).⁹⁴⁹

947 Slade, *ibid.*

948 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 54. Italics in the original.

949 Kostaki Musurus to Fuad Pasha, 23 June 1855, BOA. İ. HR. 122/6055. Also see Akar and Al, *op. cit.*, (2003), p. 11.

Finally the French view was accepted. On 27 June 1855 an agreement was signed between France and Britain (subject to approval by their parliaments) on the guarantee of the payment of the interest of the five million pound loan to the Porte. While the French parliament approved the agreement without problem, the British parliament passed the resolution by a very slight majority on 20 July 1855. There were heated debates against the guarantee. According to Olive Anderson, these were the result of “dominance inside Parliament of ancient prejudices, financial, constitutional and diplomatic”.⁹⁵⁰ Indeed the British public opinion was more inclined towards the guarantee and towards continuing the war than the House of Commons. Although Stratford again did not want to miss the opportunity to control Ottoman war finance affairs by means of a loan control commission, the Ottomans again dragged their feet, using the conflicts between the British and the French. This was so obvious that the regulations of the new control commission were accepted only in January 1856, when war was practically ended.

The loan of 5 million pounds sterling at four per cent interest was negotiated with the London house of the N. M. Rothschild & Sons. In addition to the interest of four per cent, a sinking fund of one per cent was to be applied as well. Thus in practise the loan's interest rate was five per cent. Article 4 of the Agreement between His Excellency C. Musurus Bey on behalf of the Ottoman Government and Messrs. N. M. Rothschild & Sons as contractors, dated 15 August 1855, was as follows:

The interest and sinking fund are made a charge on the whole tribute of Egypt which remains over and above the part thereof already appropriated to the loan of £3,000,000 negotiated on the 24th August 1854 and moreover on the Customs of Smyrna and Syria.⁹⁵¹

This time the guarantee of the British and French governments on the interest of the loan highly raised the issue price of the loan, which became 102.62 per cent. Thus the terms of the 1855 loan were very advantageous and much better than the previous one.⁹⁵² The actual proceeds from the loan were 5,131,250 pounds sterling.

950 Anderson, *ibid*, p. 56.

951 Agreement as to Ottoman Loan of 1855, 15 August 1855, The Rothschild Archive (London), reference no. 401b015. I am grateful to the Rothschild Archive and personally to Caroline Shaw for sending me this and other documents.

952 Edhem Eldem considers both loans contracted at favourable conditions. See his article, “Ottoman financial integration with Europe: foreign loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman public debt”, *European Review* 13 (3), 2005, p. 434.

4.9. The Loan Control Commission of 1855

Although this time the allies were more seriously bent to control the spending of the loan, they could not get a detailed plan of control simultaneously with the guarantee. Stratford was anxious for this omission. He tried to press for a news three-party commission with more powers but the Ottoman government resisted. Meanwhile both governments appointed official loan control commissioners to Istanbul. For Clarendon, this was a chance for the Ottomans “to learn how to introduce something like order and regularity into Turkish finance”.⁹⁵³

The British loan commissioner Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby (1825-1896) arrived at Istanbul on 8 September 1855 together with his wife, who wrote afterwards her memoirs of Istanbul. The French had sent A. Cadrossi.⁹⁵⁴ The Ottoman side was to be represented by Kâni Pasha. Instructions for the work of the control commission prepared by the French and British embassies were not accepted by the Ottoman government, saying that it contained articles contrary to the dignity of the Sublime State (*şan-ı ali-i Saltanat-ı Seniye*). Then began a long process of negotiations. The Ottoman side resented and resisted the work of the commission for reasons of “pocket and pride”.⁹⁵⁵ A draft instructions (constitution) of 12 articles was prepared on 10 December 1855.⁹⁵⁶ Finally a compromise was reached on 17 January⁹⁵⁷ 1856, when war was practically over.

One of the biggest issues was the tenders of military purchases. While the foreign commissioners wanted to control all big purchases, the Ottoman government argued that this would cause delays that might jeopardize the armies. The sides agreed on subjecting purchases worth more than 600,000 piastres to the approval of the

953 Anderson, op. cit., p. 58.

954 BOA. İ. HR. 6390, dated 3 December 1855. Also see Sir Edmund Hornby. *An Autobiography*, London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929, pp. 75-81. A. du Velay and many others quoting from him send instead Lord Hobart on the British side and Marquis de Ploeuç on the French side. In fact, these gentlemen came later. See A. du Velay, (op. cit., 1978), p. 83. Donald C. Blaisdell, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Avrupa Mali Denetimi*, İstanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1979, p. 32. Emine Kıray, *Osmanlı'da Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, p. 29. Sait Açba, *Osmanlı Devletinin Dış Borçlanması (1854-1915)*, Afyon: Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1995, p. 42. Cezmi Karasu, “Kırım Savaşı Sırasında Osmanlı Diplomasisi (1853-1856)”, unpublished PhD Thesis, Ankara University, 1998, p. 123. Edhem Eldem, *Osmanlı Bankası Tarihi*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, p. 26. André Autheman, *Bank-ı Osmani-i Şahane*, İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2002, p. 18. Anderson, Akar and Al are correct on this point.

955 Anderson, op. cit., p. 60.

956 BOA. İ. HR. 6356, dated 10 December 1855.

957 Anderson (op. cit., p. 58) gives 14 January 1856.

commission.⁹⁵⁸ In any case the ministry of finance was to submit monthly reports of the use of the loan funds.

The practical result of the inability to get the commission working was the delay in the release of the loan money. Thus the Ottoman armies were again without money when they needed it most. According to Akar and Al's excerpts from Ottoman fiscal records, the first instalment of 500,000 pounds came only on 3 December 1855 and second one of 400,000 pounds reached the treasury at the end of January 1856.⁹⁵⁹ Thus by the beginning of February 1856 only 900,000 pounds in cash had been received and no bills had yet been drawn on the Bank of England. However, Anderson refers to a British document according to which, by 6 February, £1,891,919.6 of the loan had been sent out. The big difference is not easily explainable. Lady Hornby, in her letter, dated 10 November 1855, writes that an English merchant speaking Turkish, told them that

there is a great feeling of anger among the Turks about the Commission; that they are bent (three or four of them especially, who are furious at the idea of not being able to finger some thousands for their own private purse) on getting the whole of the loan into their own hands; that they declare they will never consent to disgrace the Ottoman government by asking foreign Commissioners' consent to their spending their own money, and that they are resolved to tire their patience out. How all this will end remains to be seen. Of course they well know that it was only on the solemn agreement that England and France should direct the disbursement of the money, that is was lent. There are five millions here in gold now. Edmund is going to send a dispatch begging that that no more instalments should be sent out...⁹⁶⁰

Lady Hornby is not right on the question of the "solemn agreement". There was no such binding written agreement. That there were five millions (either in pounds sterling or Ottoman pounds) in November 1855 in Istanbul is also doubtful. In any case, this money had not yet been disbursed, because the loan control commission had not yet started working. It seems that the Porte took an advance money of 600,000 pounds sterling from the Rothschilds.⁹⁶¹ On the other hand, it was strongly probable that without some kind of foreign control, part of the loan money would go into private pockets.

Thus most of the loan money was still lying at the Bank of England in London and this was sure to cause indignation even in London. On 4 January, Clarendon wrote

958 Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 19.

959 Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), Ek 5, Ek 6, pp. 42-45.

960 Lady [Emilia Bithynia] Hornby. *Constantinople during the Crimean War*. London: Richard Bentley, 1863, p. 91.

⁹⁶¹ See the financial report mentioned above. *Le Moniteur Universel*, 8 janvier 1856. BOA. HR. SYS. 1355/3 lef 2.

to Stratford that “some of the Tory and Radical papers are already crying out about the injustice done to the Turks and are attributing the fall of Kars solely to our withholding from the Turks the means necessary for relieving the place”.⁹⁶²

Until 12 June 1856, a total of 4,666,976 pounds sterling was spent from the loan. Of this amount 3,705,000 pounds were paid in cash and the remaining 592,025 was drafted on the Bank of England. The exchange rate fluctuated between 116 and 144.5 piastres per pound. The average exchange rate was 128 piastres during this time.⁹⁶³ Of the 3,705,000 pounds cash payment to the treasury, 2,113,137 pounds were spent on the regular army (*Nizamiye*), 721,332 pounds on the navy yards (*Tersane*), 197,958 on the arsenal (*Tophane*) and 672,575 pounds by the finance ministry.⁹⁶⁴ By September 1856 all loan money was spent and the Commission finished its work.

Sir Edmund Hornby gives some information about the work of the loan commission in his autobiography written in old age. According to him, corruption was rampant in the Ottoman army among officers above the rank of major:

It soon became evident that “pay lists”, commissariat lists, etc., whether receipted or not, or even vouched for by the War Department, were not to be depended on. It was necessary to count the corps and ask the rank and file if they had been paid and find out what pay was in arrears. Clothing, provisions, ammunition had to be similarly checked. The officers were not to be trusted either in the field or out of it, and not once, but dozens of times, I had to get officers of rank suspended for embezzlement and malversation.

From this censure I except the “Uzbashis and Bim-bashis,” what we should call non-commissioned officers. These were really splendid fellows, selected from the ranks for their courage and knowledge of regimental duty..⁹⁶⁵

On another occasion, some Ottoman officers had sold the fresh vegetables sent to save the Ottoman soldiers from scurvy to the French and bagged the cash. Nevertheless, Hornby argues that, of the loan money of five million pounds sterling, “not more than half a million was misapplied”.⁹⁶⁶ Some part of this “misapplied” money was simply stolen. Hornby remembers that on one occasion one of the cash bags at the Treasury, which ought to have held £20,000 in gold sovereigns, was found full of copper coins. The thief was not found out. When the Sultan conferred upon Hornby the order of the *Mecidiye* and a snuff-box in brilliants, he thought that he did not deserve it, because he “had only kept him [the Sultan] from squandering his own money”. Hornby then

962 Anderson, op. cit., p. 69

963 Calculated from data given by Akar and Al, ibid, p. 25.

964 Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 44.

965 Hornby, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

966 Hornby, op. cit., p. 77.

remarks that had they been led by the temptation, he and his French colleague could have made a small fortune out of the loan money. “All we had to do was to shut our eyes a little to what the real owners of the money wanted to do with it”.⁹⁶⁷ Hornby also recollects the incident of the Armenian banker Theodore “Batazzi”⁹⁶⁸ trying to give him and Cadrossi a cheque for £1,250 each as commission for the business they brought to him. Hornby refused. His French colleague, on learning of the incident from him, had also felt himself terribly insulted. But for Baltazzi it was business as usual.

After these two first foreign loans, what some Ottoman bureaucrats feared much about the foreign loans all along became true: The Porte got used to foreign loans and finally they reached uncontrollable amounts, leading thus to direct foreign control over Ottoman tax revenues. Damad Ali Fethi Pasha’s prophetic remark in 1852 had become true: “But I know that, if this state borrows five piastres, it will go bankrupt. For if once it gets used to borrowing, then there will be no end to it. It will be drowned in debts”.⁹⁶⁹

The Ottoman loans of 1854 and 1855 were later collectively referred to as the tribute loans (with reference to the Egyptian tribute), while that of 1855 was also called the guaranteed loan. When the Ottoman government defaulted on the interest payments on its, by then, huge foreign debt in October 1875, the guarantee of the British and French governments caused a lot of trouble. As it is well known, the final result of the Ottoman financial crisis was the establishment of the Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-ı Umumiye İdaresi*) in 1881.⁹⁷⁰ This was the clearest sign of the semi-colonial status of the Ottoman Empire. While this was the culminating point, the seeds were sown by the loans of the Crimean War period.

967 Ibid.

968 Hornby, op. cit., p. 78. The banker’s name must be Baltazzi. See footnote 925.

969 “*Lâkin bilirim ki bu devlet beş kuruş borç ederse batar. Zira bir kerre borca alışırsa sonra önü alınmaz. Düyuna müstağrak olup gider*”. See Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 22.

970 See Donald C. Blaisdell, op. cit.

CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON OTTOMAN SOCIAL LIFE

5.1. Contacts with the Europeans

One of the arguments of this dissertation is that the Crimean War has an important place in Ottoman modernization. The war introduced many social novelties and practices into the life of first Istanbul high society and then society at large. While these changes are not always tangible or quantifiable, they are still perceivable. In this chapter we will try to assess the social impact of the war on Ottoman state and society.

The first practical impact of the war was the increase in the number of visitors to Istanbul and in the contacts between Europeans and Ottomans at all levels. During the war years many people came to Istanbul from Europe: soldiers, officers, nuns, diplomats and their families, traders, tourists, engineers, etc. Ottoman Empire and Istanbul also received wide coverage in European newspapers. The appearance of British, French and Sardinian soldiers and officers in Istanbul as allies had a mixed impact on the minds of ordinary people. For example thousands of British soldiers, officers and their wives lived for a while in Üsküdar. This left some impressions on the local people. On the one hand, for the first time people saw the “giaour” soldiers as real allies who had come to shed their blood for the security of the Ottoman Empire. They were suffering and dying for the security and integrity of the Ottoman state and people. Thus people were able to see this for themselves.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that the Europeans produced an altogether positive impression upon the inhabitants of Istanbul. In fact soon they began to worry why the allied troops remained so long in the capital and why they did not advance to Varna and Silistria. Many houses on the Bosphorus were given to the allied officers, the owners being forced to evacuate their homes. While in most cases the Porte paid the rent, there were cases when the owners did not get rent at all.⁹⁷¹ The Allies,

971 For example, Halil Efendi's *sahilhane* in Fındıklı was rented by the Porte for Admiral Boxer. Its monthly rent (3,000 piastres or 24 pounds sterling, equivalent of 1,440 pounds at current prices). See BOA. İ. HR. 114/5607, dated 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854). In another case, 91,100

especially the French had also occupied so many public buildings, including military, naval, medical schools for barracks and hospitals, leaving generously two buildings to the Ottomans. The French were quartered in the barracks of Davutpaşa, Maltepe, Ramizçiftlik, Taşkışla, Gümüşsuyu and Gülhane, in the Russian embassy in the centre of Pera and they also occupied the military, medical and naval schools.⁹⁷² Furthermore they encamped at Maslak and also settled in the quarter of St. Sophia. The British were quartered at the Selimiye barracks in Scutari.

Adolphus Slade's observations of Istanbul towards the end of 1854 are worth quoting at full length here:

The Turks, in stupor, were drinking the bitter waters of humiliation, were expiating the sins of their ancestors. Frank soldiers lounged in the mosques during prayers, ogled licentiously veiled ladies, poisoned the street dogs, part and parcel of the desultory bizarre existence of the East, shot the gulls in the harbour and the pigeons in the streets, ..., mocked the *muezzins* chanting *ezzan* from the minarets, and jocosely broke up carved tombstones for pavement... The Turks had heard of civilization: they now saw it, as they thought, with amazement. Robbery, drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution revelled under the glare of an eastern sun, or did mild penance in the shadow of a dozen legations: to each of whom the withdrawal of a rascal from the station-house was a duty, the shielding of a miscreant from punishment was a triumph. The Sultan still sat in his palace but his power was in abeyance... The Allies' troops had possession of the capital, the English on the Asiatic the French on the European side of the Bosphorus; and their guards patrolled Pera and Galata - sanctuary for hybrid swarm from all parts of the Mediterranean, whose avocations the police were cautious in interfering with, for fear of drawing on themselves the wrath of some legation, by confounding an Ionian with a Hellenist, a Genoese with Sicilian, or a Javanese with a Hindoo.⁹⁷³

Slade then goes on to criticise the capitulations. He argues that the capitulations, instituted in the 16th century for the protection of a few European traders, restrained and responsible for the conduct of their servants, had now become a protector of murderers and unscrupulous profit seekers, as its strict enforcement in favour of 50,000 Europeans of various nationalities and professions in Istanbul and twice as much in the provinces was a disgrace to "Turkey" and a reproach to Europe. He even argues that "probed to their source, the occasional outbreaks in Turkey called fanatical would be seen to be the

piastres were paid by the Porte for 6 months' rent for 8 houses in Scutari rented for British officers. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1337/7, dated 24 Receb 1271 (12 April 1855). The owners of storehouses in Varna had also demanded rent for their stores occupied by the Allies troops. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1356/8, dated 12 January 1855.

972 Besbelli, op. cit., p. 77.

973 Slade, op. cit., pp. 355-356.

natural reaction against the overbearings and insolence of foreigners and protected natives”.⁹⁷⁴

In fact, there are many records of the frictions of the allied troops with the local people. For example, French soldiers who were quartered in the Davudpaşa barracks were going and returning from the French centre in Galata and sometimes especially in nights they used to lose their way and enter Muslim quarters making noise and other drunken demonstrations. It was decided then to put warning signs in French and Turkish on the roads. There were also cases of drunken allied soldiers’ attacking the Ottoman police officers. There also happened some fights between Egyptian and French troops in Galata. Some shopkeepers also complained of the behaviour of the French soldiers. In another case local people did not want to rent their houses even to French doctors; however the houses were given to the French doctors. In Büyükdere, about 200 British soldiers started a fight among themselves but a Croat passer-by accidentally received a slap. Then the fight turned into a fight between Croats and the British. The police arrived and the fight ended.⁹⁷⁵ Most of these events seem to be simple and not serious cases of personal fights. The Ottoman participants of these rows also seem to be rather non-Turkish, like Albanians, Croats, Egyptians and Tunisians. There are also other events of a social and religious character related to the behaviour of some of the allied soldiers. For example, as early as May 1854, it was decided to prepare a warning in French to prevent French soldiers from entering mosques with shoes on.⁹⁷⁶

Economically, the impact of the Westerners was to boost the prices of many items in Istanbul. For example, the price of Yenice tobacco went from sixty *kuruş* (piastres) to three hundred piastres. House rents soared and it became very difficult to find a house in the Bosphorus for rent.⁹⁷⁷

The most well-known English-Turkish dictionary of Sir James Redhouse is also a product of the Crimean War. First published in the spring of 1855 under the title of “Vade-mecum of Ottoman Colloquial Language”, it was intended for the use of the British army and navy.⁹⁷⁸ Fifty copies of the dictionary were bought for the Sublime Porte, army headquarters and the Translation Office. The author was given a gift box

974 Slade, op. cit., pp. 356.

975 Fatih Akyüz, “Müttefik Askerlerinin İstanbul’da Neden Olduğu Bazı Olaylar Üzerine Gözlemler”, symposium paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, p. 180.

976 BOA. HR. SYS. 1336/5, dated 21 May 1854.

977 Cevdet Pasha, *Ma’rûzât*, Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınevi, 1980, pp. 8-9.

978 See Sir James W. Redhouse. *A Turkish and English Lexicon*. Preface. Constantinople, 1890. New Edition. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1996.

worth ten thousand piastres, equal to about eighty to ninety pounds sterling at that time.⁹⁷⁹

The personality of the Sultan himself has played an important role in the transformations. Sultan Abdülmecid was probably not fit as a political or military ruler, but he was quite open to novelties. His character was, in the words of Stratford de Redcliffe, “gentle, understanding, responsible, modest and humane”. Sultan Abdülmecid introduced many novelties into Ottoman social life. Increased contacts with Europe also meant changes in the attitudes of the Sultan and state officials towards European diplomats. These changes in the Ottoman diplomacy that had begun with the Tanzimat now accelerated with so many novelties. Before Sultan Abdülmecid, the Ottoman sultan and the grand vizier did not discuss political matters with foreign ambassadors. The *şeyhülislam*, head of the Islamic clergy, did not meet them at all. During the Crimean War, we witness for the first time the reception of foreign ambassadors by the *şeyhülislam* and the reception of foreign orders by the sultan.

The French ambassador Edouard-Antoine de Thouvenel first succeeded in having Abdülmecid accept the order of *Legion d'Honneur*. Other ambassadors had also offered orders to the sultan but he had refused them. After the French order, Lord Stratford lost no time in offering the Order of the Garter. However, negotiations on the details of the ceremony took much time of Lord Stratford, because the Sultan had apprehensions of losing something from his dignity in receiving an order from a Christian. He also had an aversion to being touched. Stanley Lane-Poole gives a lively description of Abdülmecid's reception of the order:

Sultan Abdu-l-Mejid was invested by Lord Stratford, as the Queen's representative, with the most exclusive order of knighthood in the world. Assisted by the King of Arms, the Elchi made his Majesty a Knight of the Garter. Did the Sultan know what the stately ambassador was saying, as he placed the George and Riband round his neck? ... When a Sultan submits to be enjoined to emulate the career of a Martyr and Soldier of Christ, who shall say that the fanaticism of Islam is inextinguishable?⁹⁸⁰

In February 1856, after the end of the war, Sultan Abdülmecid honoured two balls in three days first at the British embassy on 2 February and then at the French Embassy

979 BOA. İ. HR. 139/7219, 8 Cemaziyelevvel 1273 (4 January 1857). 80 pounds sterling of 1857 are worth approximately 4,800 pounds today. I had slightly erred in this calculation in an earlier article. Cf. Candan Badem, “Kırım Savaşı'nın Osmanlı Toplumsal Yaşamına Etkileri”, *Toplumsal Tarih* 133, Istanbul, January 2005, p. 65.

980 Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888, vol. II, p. 444. Cf. Necdet Sakaoğlu, Nuri Akbayar. *A Milestone on Turkey's Path of Westernization. Sultan Abdülmecid*. Istanbul: Creative Yayıncılık, 2002, p. 99. This is in fact a back translation from the Turkish translation into English.

on the fourth.⁹⁸¹ The first ball at the British embassy was given by Lady Stratford de Redcliffe. The sultan came to the costume ball wearing his Order of the Garter. Lady Emilia Hornby, the wife of Sir Edmund Hornby, the British loan commissioner, gives a detailed description:

The Sultan had, with very good taste, left his own Guard at the Galata Serai, and was escorted thence to the palace by a company English Lancers, every other man carrying a torch. Lord Stratford and his Staff, of course, met him at the carriage-door, and as he alighted, a communication by means of galvanic wires was made to the fleet, who saluted him with prolonged salvos of cannon. Lady Stratford and her daughters received him at the head of the staircase... It would take me a day to enumerate half the costumes. But every one who had been to the Queen's *bals costumés* agreed that they did not approach this one in magnificence; for besides the gathering of French, Sardinian and English officers, the people of the country appeared in their own superb and varied costumes; and the groups were beyond all description beautiful. The Greek Patriarch, the American Archbishop, the Jewish High Priest, were there in their robes of state. *Real* Persians, Albanians, Kourds, Servians, Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Austrians, Sardinians, Italians, and Spaniards were there in their different dresses, and many wore their jewelled arms. There were ... and Turkish ladies without their veils... Abdul Medjid quietly walked up the ball-room with Lord and Lady Stratford, their daughters, and a gorgeous array of Pashas in the rear. He paused with evident delight and pleasure at the really beautiful scene before him, bowing on both sides, and smiling as he went... Pashas.. drink vast quantities of champagne, of which they pretend not to know the exact genus, and slyly call it "eau gazeuse".⁹⁸²

Stanley Lane Poole's biography of Stratford Canning also describes the incident as a great success of the British ambassador and as the first ball of Abdülmecid, but it does not give the exact date of the ball in February 1856:

One evening the ambassador and his staff are standing in front of the embassy. It is the month of February, in year 1856. Over the entrance, the names of Abdülmecid and Victoria are written by colored light bulbs. Then the British lancer riders move towards the outer gate to meet the Sultan. As the Sultan steps over the threshold, thorough an electrical wire tied to the guns, the British Navy salutes the sultan with forty-one cannon shots. In the meantime, the Embassy band is playing 'God Save the Queen'. For the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire, a Sultan becomes a guest to a Christian ambassador. Lady Stratford is holding a costume ball and the Sultan is honouring this ball with his presence. The uniforms of the British, French and Sardinian officers seem lusterless compared to the attire of the Armenian, Kurdish, Persian, Greek and Turkish dignitaries. On one side is the Greek Patriarch, on the other side the Armenian Archbishop, with the Chief Rabbi next to him. Abdülmecid could have believed he was Harun Reshid as he walked up the staircase into the great ballroom that shone as a scene

981 Cezmi Karasu mentions only the French ball as the first appearance of the Sultan in a ball. However, this is not true. See Karasu, *op. cit.*, (1998), p. 184.

982 Lady Hornby, *Constantinople during the Crimean War*, London: Richard Bentley, 1863, pp. 205-208. Cf. Sakaoglu and Akbaya, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105. The latter is again a curious back translation, because the book was not translated into Turkish at that time. Probably it is from another (French?) translation.

out of the 'Tales of One Thousand and One Nights'. The Sultan enjoyed his first ball very much and as the ambassador took him by the hand to lead him to the armchair prepared for the Sultan among the British officers, the onlookers knew that the barriers around the Sultan had been knocked down and that a Moslem and a Christian could meet in equal conditions. If there was an initiator in this event, that was Ambassador Lord Stratford.⁹⁸³

On the other hand, the official Ottoman historian of the time and a member of the councils of the *Tanzimat* and of Education, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, who was among the invited, confirms this event in his *Tezâkir* but his tone is rather disapproving of such practices. He gives a first hand account of the confusion created by the invitation of the British embassy. The şeyhülislam did not accept it and offered his apologies. When Cevdet Pasha asked the grand vizier whether he should go to the ball or not, he said: "Ask the şeyhülislam!" But the şeyhülislam told him: "The grand vizier knows best". Thus Cevdet Pasha could not get an answer to his question and decided not to go.⁹⁸⁴ He tells us that before even grand viziers did not visit foreign embassies but since last year they started visiting embassies and now the Sultan himself visited a foreign embassy. Cevdet Pasha gives us the date of the ball as 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1272, which is 2 February 1856. Interestingly, however, Cevdet Pasha does not record the ball at the French embassy.

Enver Ziya Karal mentions only the French embassy's ball on 4 February and does not mention the ball at the British embassy.⁹⁸⁵ Necdet Sakaoğlu and Nuri Akbayer in their book on Sultan Abdülmecid also maintain that Abdülmecid visited the French embassy's ball on 4 February 1856 (which is correct) and that of the British embassy on 9 February 1856 (which is wrong). Sakaoğlu and Akbayer write that

three days after the victory, on 4 February 1856 Saturday, Abdülmecid honoured the ball at the French embassy, wearing his jewelled *Legion d'Honneur* order. He did the same on 9 February Monday and participated at the ball at the English embassy given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. At his appearance at the French embassy's ball, Abdülmecid was saluted by the Court and Marine subdivisions as well as the French army divisions which were present in Istanbul at the time. French army bands played the Ottoman march and the night was illuminated by the embassy's lights.⁹⁸⁶

The Sultan talked to ambassador Thouvenel and gave him a jewelled *Mecidiye* order and a portrait of himself. He then met Grand Vizier Âli Pasha, other high officials and

983 Ibid, p. 99. For the Turkish translation, see Stanley Lane Poole. *Lord Stratford Canning'in Türkiye Anıları*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999, p. 196.

984 Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 1-12*, pp. 61-62.

985 Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. VI, Ankara: TTK, 1995, p. 104.

986 Necdet Sakaoğlu & Nuri Akbayer, op. cit., p. 103.

all other ambassadors and their spouses. He then went on to the main ball room and watched the dances.

5.2. The Status of Women

An important aspect of social change concerned attitudes towards women. Sultan Abdülmecid had said to his private physician Dr. Spitzer:

I find European women's dresses very attractive. I prefer them very much over our women's dresses. If socializing with these ladies is like their outer appearance, then I certainly envy you Europeans' free social relations with the womankind... I understand that social relations with polite, well-bred women will grant a touch of nobility and refinement to the rough nature of men".⁹⁸⁷

However, he ended up saying "my wives and daughters are the cause of my ruin". Palace women and high officials' wives had become too pompous in their conspicuous consumption as we have seen in the chapter on finances. The appearance of European and Egyptian ladies (wives of officers, nuns, nurses) in the streets of Istanbul had produced a new fashion and Ottoman ladies were quick to follow this fashion. Palace women had become the *avant garde* of Westernization and conspicuous consumption. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha has described this process with some detail in his works *Tezâkir* and *Maruzat*. He writes: "For one and a half year, palace women started strolling here and there, making excursions in public places. They made a lot of scandals".⁹⁸⁸ As we have seen in the chapter on finances, Cevdet Pasha charges them with bringing a heavy debt to the treasury, nearly equal to one thirds of the annual war expenses of the state. However, unless supported by other sources this must be held under suspicion. Cevdet Pasha may have used the palace women as scapegoats for his criticism of Abdülmecid himself.

Women came to be more visible in the daily urban life. Like today's Islamist elite women, the ladies of the time developed new ways of reconciling the traditional style with a modern touch; wearing for example, silk capes (*ferace*) and transparent veils (*yaşmak*). Palace ladies began to appear before the public in their promenade boats in the Bosphorus. Contacts between men and women in public places also found new ways. Ladies travelled in carriages and gallant men tried to make a contact with them by gestures. For example, a lady would drop her handkerchief for a man if she liked him.

987 Karal, op. cit. (1995), p. 99. Dr. Spitzer was an Austrian.

988 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 13-20*, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p. 3.

Ahmet Cevdet Pasha in his *Maruzat* tells us how Turkish men changed their attitude toward love affairs and how they came to see pederasty as a perversion:

Fans of women (*zen-dostlar*) increased and beloved boys (*mahublar*) decreased in number ... Love and affection, which had been felt toward boys for ages, were now transferred to girls, in conformity with natural conditions. Visits to Kağıthane, known from the time of Sultan Ahmed III, became very popular. There and in Beyazıt the practice of flirts by gestures towards carriages became widespread... Âli Pasha was also trying to hide his pederasty (*gulampareliğini*) to avoid the objections of the foreigners.⁹⁸⁹ [My translation]

We do not know how widespread pederasty was, but here we note that an Ottoman conservative statesman now sees it unnatural. Cevdet Pasha even goes so far as to give names of famous pashas known for their inclination to pederasty, such as Kâmil and Âli Pashas. He also tells that Âli Pasha tried to hide his pederasty because he was wary of foreigners' objections.

Beside the attitudes toward women, clothing, furniture and eating habits also started to change. New table manners, new crockery and cutlery sets became fashionable. Thus a distinction came to be made between *a la Turca* and *a la Franca* styles. Fashion started from the palace and quickly expanded into the common folk, as in the case of the "corset revolution". Marie de Melfort, the niece of the French ambassador Edouard-Antoine Thouvenel and the future Baroness Durand de Fontmagne, tells us that Sultan Abdülmecid ordered all palace ladies to wear corsets for a wedding and all tailors in Beyoğlu were busy preparing these corsets. The young French lady narrates how the city was full of talks about this extraordinary event. She wrote her memoirs in 1902. In the preface of the book, she says that Sultan Mahmud II ended the characteristic inertia of the Orient and as a result there remained no fabulous Turkey of the letters of Lady Montague from the 1717s. She maintains that the Turks have not gained much from his reforms but their mode of life has become simplified, with fewer horses, less slaves and less wives. "Instead of the silk from India and China they now wear woollen clothings from Germany and Britain. Their famous turbans have given way to the red fez". But still she adds that she was lucky enough to see Turkey "while there were still genuine Turks around".⁹⁹⁰

989 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Ma'rûzât*, Ed. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980, p. 9.

990 Durand de Fontmagne, op. cit., preface.

5.3. The Question of the Equality of Muslims and Non-Muslims in the Vienna Conference and in the *Islahat Fermanı*

As we have already seen, the question of the rights and privileges of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire had been one of the important questions of the diplomatic efforts to end the war. The fourth point of the famous “four points” concerned this issue. Because of the war, Ottoman statesmen were now in an especially vulnerable position towards reform demands and pressure from the European great powers. The allies helped the Porte in its war against Russia, but they too demanded some improvements for the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. While this process resulted in the famous Reform Edict (*Islahat Fermanı*) of 18 February 1856, the Ottomans had already tackled this question one year before, at the beginning of the Vienna Conference in March 1855.

On 24 and 26 March 1855, about one week after the opening of the Vienna Conference, a council of 21 ministers and some other bureaucrats (*Meclis-i Meşveret*) was convened to discuss the instructions to be given to the Ottoman delegate to the conference.⁹⁹¹ The council focused on the fourth point, which it defined as “the complete removal of the empty claim of Russia on the protection of the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the repeal of all former treaties, especially of the treaty of Kaynarca, whose misinterpretation caused war, as well as entrusting the reforms desired by Europe for all the Christian subjects (*umûm tebe'a-i 'İseviyyesi*) of the Sublime State to the grace of the Sultan”.⁹⁹² Interestingly, throughout the document, only Christians are mentioned, omitting Jews. For practical purposes, however, Christian subjects can be considered to cover all non-Muslim subjects here. The *mazbata* of the *meclis* then recorded that although Britain and France joined war as allies of the Porte, because they were Christian states they had also promised to their subjects and to other states to recommend to the Porte measures for the well-being of the Christian subjects of the Porte, which had been desired for a long time by Europe. Furthermore, it stated that a different to some extent treatment (*bazı mertebe cari olan muamele-i farkıyye*) of the Christian subjects was offensive to Europe and there had been remonstrations since long before. Until then such demands were delayed by sometimes temporizing and sometimes yielding a little bit, however, now the time was

991 See Mehmet Yıldız, “1856 Islahat Fermanına Giden Yolda Meşruiyet Arayışları (Uluslararası Baskılar ve Cizye Sorununa Bulunan Çözümün İslami Temelleri)”, *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 7, İstanbul, Güz 2002, pp. 75-114. The *mazbata* of the *meclis* is on pp. 100-108.

992 Yıldız, op. cit., p. 100.

different (*nasılsa gâh oyalandırılarak ve gâhice biraz şey yapılarak vakit geçirilmiş ise de şimdi vakit başkalaşmış olduğundan*) and if Europe was not satisfied, then the Porte would be subject to their persistent pressure and this would cause the danger of leading them to other thoughts.

The *mazbata* argued that while Europe's disappointment with the Ottoman Empire would be a great danger for the Porte, doing things on the demand of Europe and allowing this to become a responsibility of a treaty was also very dangerous, because in that case the Christian subjects would be grateful to Europe and not to the Porte. Russia on the other hand, might consider itself as morally victorious for serving the Christian cause even if it loses much by the first three points of the four points. The Ottoman ambassador had written from London that Lord Palmerston had stated that if the Porte granted some rights to the Christian subjects, then it would do a great service both for the allies and for itself, otherwise the great powers would have to compel it. While some improvements had already been done, and not all of these were known to Europe, there remained some issues of moral treatment. Therefore the ministers thought that if they could complete the deficiencies to some extent and "sell them sweetly" (*bir tatlıca satılır ise*) to Europe, saying "this and that has been done by the Porte for its subjects", then Europe would be satisfied.⁹⁹³

The question of the non-admission of Christian evidence (against Muslims) in courts was also a "thorn in the eye of Europe", said the *mazbata*, but internal and external objections had now been eliminated by setting up commissions of investigation (*tahkik meclisleri*). These commissions were now to be further improved and incorporated into the new laws. It was also recommended to employ more Christians in state service and even in the land army. It was noted that although some ranks were being given to Christian subjects they were not addressed according to their rank. For example, if addressing a Christian as "*saadetlu efendim*" or "*izzetlu beyefendi*" was to be considered unbecoming in the eyes of Muslims, then general titles and forms of address could be found to suit all subjects. Then it was recommended that it could be announced to Europe that in principle Christian subjects could rise up to the rank of *ûlâ*, but there was no need to announce this inside the country. It was necessary also to show that Christian subjects were already being employed in embassies. As for the military service, this was not an issue for the satisfaction of Europe or Christian subjects only, but an important issue for the state, because Muslims alone carried the brunt of war and therefore their population was decreasing while the population of Christians was

993 Yıldız, op. cit., (2002), p. 103.

increasing. At present, Christian subjects were being employed in the navy and it was necessary to find ways to employ them in the army as well. It would be wise to announce to Europe that Christian subjects would be taken into the army and they could rise up to the rank of colonel.

The *mazbata* mentioned the question of the freedom of restoration and building of churches for Christian subjects as well. Since Christian subjects sometimes used caves in mountains as churches because they did not have a place for religious rituals, it was necessary to allow them to some extent to build some new churches. Finally the poll-tax (*cizye*) paid by the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte was being considered as an insult to Christians and now it was impossible to evade Europe's persistence. Therefore it was necessary to find a way out. For some time, *cizye* had been collected on a *millet* basis instead of direct collection and this had gained some time but what Europe wanted was to remove this name of *cizye* (*Avrupa'nın muradı bu olmayıp şu nâmin kaldırılması sureti olmağla*). Although collection of the *cizye* from Christians was a necessity by *şeriat*, it was a great danger to oppose the 250 million-strong Christian nations. At this point the meeting was adjourned for the *şeyhülislam* to study the matter.

On 26 March the council met again. In the meantime the *şeyhülislam* had searched for a solution in Islamic law. The only example was that of Caliph Ömer's agreement with the Christian Arabic tribe of Beni Tağlib. The latter had expressed their readiness to pay twice more tax but provided that it would not be termed *cizye*, since they found it unacceptable. Ömer had accepted this saying it was *cizye* whatever others might call it. Another way for a *fetva* was to refer to a kind of force major or necessity (*zaruret*) in Islamic law. But such a *fetva* would mean the proclamation of the weak state of the Ottoman Empire to friend and foe. Therefore it was better to collect the *cizye* under the name of *iane-i askeriyye* than to issue such a *fetva*. The British ambassador (Stratford de Redcliffe) had reportedly told the grand vizier: "If the Porte does not do what is required by Europe now, it certainly will be subject to many bad things and great dangers". He had even said "the Porte will do these things by force of treaty". The Vienna embassy too had reported Lord John Russell saying "if the Porte had done what was recommended before on behalf of Christians, then it would have been possible to ward off these issues in this conference by saying 'these have already been done'". Such words from the representative of Britain were like the beginning of what the Ottomans feared much. The ambassador had also reported that one day the representatives had met without the Ottoman ambassador and when he complained they had told him off by saying it was about the general affairs of Europe. Nevertheless, it was possible that they

made an agreement among themselves on the conditions of the Christian subjects of the Porte and maybe they would bring it out signed up later. In view of these and other reports from embassies and the negotiations in Vienna, it was therefore decided unanimously to ward off (*savuşturmak*) this issue by turning the name of *cizye* into *iane-i askeriyye*. If some unaware ulema were to object, they would be informed confidentially about the situation. If some still continued talking against this, then these would be reprimanded and punished, because such kind of people are only those without patriotism and without religious honour (*hubb-ı vatan ve hamiyyet-i diniyye*).⁹⁹⁴

In cases when the Ottoman bureaucracy was squeezed between the *şeriat* and European pressure, it chose a pragmatic way out of the situation, as in the case of the slave trade discussions, which started earlier and which we will also discuss in this chapter. The pragmatism of the Ottoman bureaucracy is best expressed in the two verbs of *oyalamak* (to temporize) and *savuşturmak* (to ward off). Thus *cizye* came to be known as *iane-i askeriyye* or *bedel-i askeriyye*. The fact that a tax was called *iane* confirms our view that the *iane-i harbiyye* which we discussed in Chapter 4 was a tax as well. Actually we have reason to think that non-Muslims in general (except for the poorest of them) would also prefer paying the tax to serving in the Ottoman army. However, as we have seen in the above *mazbata*, it is certain that even if they had shown much eagerness to serve in the army, the Porte would not accept this. Because then they would not pay the *iane-i askeriyye*, which is the *cizye*, and this was contrary to the *şeriat*. Nevertheless, Mehmet Yıldız argues that the decision on the conscription of non-Muslims into the army was not applied because non-Muslims themselves did not want to serve.⁹⁹⁵

The question of the recruitment of the non-Muslims into the army continued to be a hard question long after the Crimean War. There were very practical reasons working against a mixed Ottoman army. Cevdet Pasha was a member of a commission set up to solve this question in the early 1860s. He writes how he argued in this commission against the inclusion of non-Muslims into the army. He told the commission that if non-Muslims were to be admitted into the army, then every battalion would need a priest as well as an imam. If there were only one priest, there would be no problem, he said. However, there were Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian, Protestant and other confessions. Furthermore, even Orthodox Bulgarians would not accept Orthodox Greek priests.

994 Yıldız, op. cit., p. 108.

995 See Mehmet Yıldız, *1856 Islahat Fermanının Tatbiki ve Tepkiler*, unpublished PhD Thesis, Istanbul University, 2003, p. 320.

These confessions would all demand different priests. The Jews in turn would want their rabbis. Thus a battalion would have many religious personnel. Then the Muslims and non-Muslims have different fasts. It would be difficult to administer such a mixed body. Finally Cevdet Pasha touched upon the most important question. He wrote that an Ottoman commander used religious feelings and martyrdom for Islam to encourage his soldiers into action. What would the major of a mixed battalion say to urge his soldiers? The Europeans, Cevdet Pasha added, used patriotism (*gayret-i vataniyye*). However, he argued, *vatan* meant for the Ottoman soldiers only some squares in their villages. It could not replace religious motifs. Furthermore, Muslim soldiers endured all hardships while the non-Muslims would not. Therefore the state could be subjected to European interference, if non-Muslim soldiers complained of not receiving their pay or rations.⁹⁹⁶

While the Ottoman council of ministers thus tried to “ward off” the issues related to Christian subjects by some improvements, we see that the British government increased its pressure for reforms. During the Vienna conference, on 24 April 1855, Lord Clarendon sent a despatch to the British ambassador in Vienna the Earl of Westmoreland, instructing him to give a copy to Âli Pasha as well. This despatch contains important demands indeed and they are not limited to the questions of military service and evidence of Christians. Lord Clarendon asserted that although Christian evidence was admitted in criminal courts, the judges were still “exclusively” Muslims, the only mixed tribunals being the commercial courts. He maintained that Christian evidence was still inadmissible in civil cases and since civil injuries like robbery perpetrated against Christians were oftener than murder, the inadmissibility of Christian evidence in civil cases was a “severe and daily felt grievance”. Therefore he wrote that there ought to be an equal number of Muslim and Christian judges in both criminal and civil cases. Furthermore, Clarendon wrote that all the local authorities in the provinces were Muslims and this led to “endless oppression and injustice committed and connived at towards Christians”. Therefore, he concluded, there ought to be a Christian officer of suitable rank attached to each governor and this officer should have the right to appeal to Istanbul on behalf of injured Christians.⁹⁹⁷

Clarendon then argued that “Christians ought to be allowed to rise to any rank in the military and civil services, and their advancement should not form an exception to the rule by which they are excluded from the higher ranks of their profession”. The

996 Cevdet Pasha, *Ma'rûzât*, p. 113-115.

997 Lord Clarendon to the Earl of Westmoreland, Foreign Office, 24 April 1855. Copy. BOA. HR. SYS. 1030/4 lef 65. See Appendix 100.

British foreign secretary then suggested a reform of schools by establishing mixed primary schools throughout the empire for Muslim and Christian children. Finally the secretary expressed his government's confidence in the "enlightened views and benevolent intentions" of the Sultan, blaming the bureaucrats for not being "animated by his [the Sultan's] spirit".⁹⁹⁸

About this time, Sadık Pasha, commander of the Cossack regiment was ordered by the Porte to prepare a project on the conscription of Christians into military service. Sadık Pasha submitted a project to the grand vizier about places where Christian volunteers could be recruited for the army. He wrote that cavalry troops could be recruited from Tırnova, Niş, Yeni Pazar and Saraybosna and infantry could be recruited from Mostar, İškodra, Janina, Salonica.⁹⁹⁹ Sadık Pasha writes in his memoirs that the Sultan wanted the project to be discussed with the representatives of the European great powers.¹⁰⁰⁰ However, according to Sadık Pasha, they did not like the idea. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe even told him that this should not be allowed because within a few years the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire would have a full army, well trained and capable of fighting. This is not our aim, Lord Stratford allegedly told him.¹⁰⁰¹ Austria was of the same opinion and it feared the appearance of a military spirit among the Ottoman Slavs. Thus according to Sadık Pasha, the Porte met opposition from all sides and eventually the Western powers did not permit it to make this reform.

The decision to enrol soldiers from non-Muslim subjects was proclaimed in the *Takvim-i Vekayi* in May 1855. *Cizye* was abolished and all male subjects would now serve in the army. Those who could not serve in the army, would pay the *iane-i askeriyye* in return.¹⁰⁰² Nevertheless, it was not easy to apply this decision in practice. Attempts to levy troops from the non-Muslim areas of Rumeli led to the dispersal of population to mountains and neighbouring countries.¹⁰⁰³ In the province of Trabzon, governor Hafız Pasha mustered troops from Muslims and non-Muslims for the aid of Erzurum in the summer of 1855. However, the administrators (*müdir*) of districts (*kaza*) abused this decision and caused a lot of mistreatment of both Muslims and non-Muslims. They also collected a lot of money as *iane-i askeriyye* and embezzled most of

998 Ibid.

999 Mehmed Sadık Pasha to the Grand Vizier, 19 April 1855. BOA. HR. TO. 420/5 lef 2.

1000 "Zametki i vospominaniya Mikhaila Chaikovskago (Sadyk-pashi)", *Russkaya Starina* XXXV/12, St. Petersburg, December 1904, p. 573.

1001 Lord Stratford's words are quoted by Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 62.

1002 Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni*, İstanbul: Simurg Yayınları, 2000, pp. 57-59.

1003 Yıldız, op. cit., (2003), p. 170.

it. The Porte sent Kabuli Efendi to investigate into these affairs.¹⁰⁰⁴ On his return from Trabzon, Kabuli Efendi submitted his report to the MVL. The mazbata of the MVL stated that the governor had left the task of recruitment to “men who were used to oppress poor common people as they liked before the introduction of the province into the procedure of justice of the auspicious *Tanzimat*” (*havali-i merkumenin Tanzimat-ı Hayriye usul-i ma'delet-şümüliüne idhalinden evvel fukarayı istedikleri gibi cebr ü tazyika alışmış olan ademlerin ellerine*).¹⁰⁰⁵

The question of the transformation of *cizye* into *iane-i askeriyye* and military service of the non-Muslims was discussed in the *Meclis-i Âli-i Tanzimat* as well in November 1855. (This time the expression was exactly non-Muslim subjects (*tebea-i gayri Müslime*), as opposed to the *mazbata* of the *meclis* of 26 March 1855). Then a special council (*meclis-i mahsus*) discussed the resolution of the said *meclis*.¹⁰⁰⁶ The council determined the amount of the *iane* as 50 gold liras (5,000 piastres). About this time a commission including Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, Şeyhülislam Arif Efendi and some Western ambassadors was set up to work out a new formula.¹⁰⁰⁷ At that time Âli Pasha was the *sadrâzam* and Fuad Pasha the foreign minister. Reşid Pasha was deposed and did not hold any office although his influence was still considerable. The Reform Edict of 18 February 1856 was the work of this commission.

While the Gülhane Edict of *Tanzimat* of 1839 was an important step for the guarantees of the subjects against the arbitrariness of the Sultan, it had not clearly stipulated equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The firman of 18 February 1856, however, radically declared them equal. At the popular level, this was understood as "now we will not call the *giaours* as *giaours*".¹⁰⁰⁸ Christians would no longer be degraded in the official parlance. For example, the pope would no longer be called a pig. Since the grand vizier Âli Pasha had departed for Paris to take part in the peace congress, Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha was the acting grand vizier during the proclamation of the firman, although the tradition required the foreign minister Fuad Pasha to be his *kaimmakam*. According to Cevdet Pasha, Kıbrıslı was

1004 Gülsoy, op. cit., p. 56.

1005 Mazbata of the MVL, dated 28 Muharrem 1272 (10 October 1855). BOA. İ. MMS. 6/213, lef 1. Gülsoy (op. cit., p. 56) mentions this documents but does not make any quotation from it.

1006 BOA. İ. MMS. 132/5650, dated 16 November 1855.

1007 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 67.

1008 Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih Söyleşileri (Müshabe-i Tarihiye)*. Sadeleşiren Mübeccel Nami Duru. İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1980, p. 63.

chosen because he was not known as a westernizer and therefore he might be a shield of course against Muslim reaction.¹⁰⁰⁹

There is no doubt that Lord Stratford did more pressure on the Porte than other ambassadors for reforms for the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. Lord Palmerston told parliament on 1 May 1856 that, when the government changed in 1846, Lord Stratford had accepted the embassy in Istanbul on one condition:

It was, that he should be supported by government at home, ... to obtain that equality between Christians and Mahomedans, which has at last (1856) crowned the efforts of his life. It was that honourable ambition which induced Sir Stratford Canning to continue so long in a post which, under other circumstances, perhaps, he would have been reluctant to occupy¹⁰¹⁰

However, by the end of the war both Britain's and Lord Stratford's influence decreased a bit, while that of France increased. At the beginning of January 1856, Clarendon wrote to Stratford that the Ottoman ("Turkish") government had asked three times Stratford's recall:

They did full justice of course to your eminent talents and goodwill towards Turkey, but declared they could no longer get on with you, as you required, that your influence should be so paramount and notorious that they were lowered in the eyes of the people, and that you would not allow the Sultan to *corégner* with you (that was Aali's expression).¹⁰¹¹

Yet the Sultan honoured Stratford's ball first as we have seen. In fact Stratford would still hold out for some time. He continued to affect the discussions on the reform packet. On 25 January 1856, he sent a new memorandum and an official note on administrative reforms and religious persecutions to the Porte, together with his instructions to head dragoman Mr Pisani. He advised the admission of "all classes" into state service and councils (*meclises*), arguing that in the current state of the things, it was the "union alone of the classes" which could return to the Empire the force which it lacked "in the interior", and without this measure any real union was an impossibility. As for the foreigners, Stratford asserted that while he was supposed to attach less importance than the representatives of France and of Austria to the question of the foreigners' right to possess (purchase) real estate in the Ottoman Empire, this assumption was completely erroneous. He was convinced, on the contrary, that the "cordial rapprochement" of "Turkey" with Europe was essential for the wellbeing and the maintenance of the

1009 Cevdet Pasha, *op. cit.*, p. 66. Cf. Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*, New York: Gordian Press, 1973, p. 103.

1010 Harold Temperley, "The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe", *The English Historical Review* 47(186), April 1932, pp. 216-217.

1011 Temperley, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

Ottoman Empire, and that the most effective measure in this direction would not be other than the right assured to foreigners to possess any kind of real estate there.¹⁰¹²

Cevdet Pasha's treatment of the question of equality of the non-Muslim subjects is interesting. He seems to try to conceal his feelings, he gives the opinions for and against, but he himself does not make a clearly binding statement for himself. He was also the member of a commission (together with Fuad Pasha and Afif Bey) set up to change the forms of address (*elkab*) of the firmans. He writes that Fuad Pasha was fond of creating such novelties, however, since the proclamation of the *Islahat Fermanı* would already offend Muslims (*ehl-i islâma ziyade dokunacağından*), it was not appropriate at that time to be engaged in changing the *elkab* of firmans. Then he notes that according to the firman,

Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were now to be equal in all rights. But this quite offended the Muslims. Before one of the four points that was accepted as the base of negotiations was the question of the privileges (*imtiyazat*) of Christians, provided that sovereignty (*istiklal-i hükümet*) was not sacrificed. But now the question of privileges was left behind, non-Muslim subjects were considered equal to Muslims in all rights of government (*bil-cümle hukuk-ı hükümette*).¹⁰¹³

According to Cevdet Pasha, the non-Muslim subjects rejoiced at the reading of the firman. Not all of them, however, were pleased. For example the Greek patriarchate was not happy with being equal to the Jews, while before the *Islahat Fermanı* they used to come before all other non-Muslim *millet*s.

Cevdet Pasha concludes that Muslims were discontented with the *Islahat Fermanı* and reproached the ministers for this. According to him, the *şeyhülislam* also lost favour. He also argues that people started talking that if Reşid Pasha and the former *şeyhülislam* Arif Hikmet Beyefendi had been in office, the result would have been different. Since Stratford de Redcliffe had striven to pass the equality of the Christian subjects more than any other diplomat, he and Britain also lost favour. Cevdet Pasha writes that the French were happy with this result. The French ambassador even told that the Ottoman government had given too much compromise, and he would have helped if they had resisted Stratford a little. But Cevdet considers these words calculated to further vilify the British embassy. Reşid Pasha then seized the opportunity to criticise his rivals and gain the confidence of the Islamist circles. Therefore he took a

1012 Stratford's instructions in French to Pisani, to be submitted to the foreign minister Fuad Pasha and to be read to the grand vizier (Âli Pasha), dated 25 January 1856. BOA. HR. TO. 222/30 lef 2. See Appendix 107.

1013 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 67-68.

stand against the *Islahat Fermanı*. He even wrote a *layiha* to the Sultan stating his reasons.¹⁰¹⁴

Shortly after the treaty of Paris, the Ottoman Greeks Kostaki Musurus Bey and Kalimaki Bey were promoted to the rank of ambassador (*büyükelçi*).¹⁰¹⁵ Musurus had been minister plenipotentiary (*ortaelçi*).

During the war, the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire in general, except for the Greek insurrection in Thessaly and Epirus, supported the war effort of the state. As we have already seen, some Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks even applied to government to serve in the army. Nevertheless, there were still some fanatical Muslim attacks on non-Muslims in some places like Damascus. We will see them in subchapter 5.5.

One of the visible signs of the improved status of the non-Muslims was the increase in the number of their churches and synagogues. During the war and just afterwards (from 1853 to end of 1857), many churches and synagogues were repaired and some new ones were built. We must note that the building of new churches and synagogues and the repair of existing ones in the Ottoman Empire were dependent upon the Sultan's license (*ruhsat*). During the war, there was a noticeable increase in the number of such licenses. For example, Greek churches in Midilli, İzmit, Büyükada, Mihaliç, Salonica, Vidin, Niş, Tirnova and other places (cities, towns and villages) were repaired.¹⁰¹⁶ Three villages in Filibe (Plovdiv) and one village in Yenice also received licenses to build churches, while the church of the town of Vize was allowed to be built again.¹⁰¹⁷ New Greek churches were built in Jerusalem, Erzurum, Filibe and other places.¹⁰¹⁸ Armenian churches in Kasımpaşa, Rumeli Hisarı, Harput, Erzurum, Van, Muş, Diyarbakir, Trabzon and some other places were allowed to be repaired and new ones were allowed to be built in Diyarbakir, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Muş, Harput, Erzurum, Sivas and other places (in cities, towns and villages).¹⁰¹⁹ New Catholic churches were allowed to be built in Varna, Rusçuk, Drac, İşkodra, Samatya, Büyükada (Prinkipo),

1014 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., pp. 76-82.

1015 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 84.

1016 BOA. İ. HR. 130/6608, 130/6667, 131/6694, 136/7012, 137/7099, 138/7133.

1017 Özcan, op. cit., (1997), p. 153.

1018 BOA. İ. HR. 135/6965, 135/6984.

1019 BOA. İ. HR. 114/5570, 126/6311, 136/7007, 137/7060, 138/7164, 142/7481, 143/7534, 144/7563. Cf. Özcan, op. cit., p. 153. Özcan refers to some other documents from the BOA and writes that 8 Armenian churches were allowed to be repaired and 6 churches to be built again.

Erzurum and other places.¹⁰²⁰ For the repair of the Catholic church in Sinop, that was burnt during the battle of Sinop, the government sent 15,000 piastres.¹⁰²¹ Two Catholic churches in İškodra's districts were repaired.¹⁰²² Synagogues in Salonica and Ruse (Ruşçuk) were allowed to be repaired.¹⁰²³ A Protestant church was allowed to be built in Ortaköy, another one was built in the Bahçecik village in İzmit and a land allotment near the *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye* was given to the British embassy for building a church.¹⁰²⁴ Various churches were also built and repaired in Sofia, Erdek, Limni, İzmir, Mostar, Ereğli, Salonica, Vidin, Yenişehir-i Fener, Hersek and other places.¹⁰²⁵

The Reform Edict of 1856 (*Islahat Fermanı*) among other things stipulated equal opportunity for all Ottoman subjects for admission into civil and military schools and also recognized the right of every religious community to establish their own schools, however, under state supervision. Armenians, Bulgarians and the Greeks made good use of this point and opened many schools. This in turn urged the Sublime Porte to develop an all-Ottoman, empire-wide public school system more rapidly. In 1856 a new educational body, the Mixed Council of Education, (*Meclis-i Muhtelit-i Maarif*) was established in order to coordinate Muslim and non-Muslim schools. Its six members consisted of Muslim, Greek-Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish representatives. This council had the authority to determine the quality and curricula of the schools and the selection of teachers.¹⁰²⁶ Education was at three levels. At the primary level (*sıbyan mektepleri*), the language of instruction was determined by each religious community separately. At the secondary level (*rüşdiye* schools) education was in Ottoman Turkish, because the graduates of these schools were counted as potential civil servants. At the third level, that is, in the professional schools, the language of instruction was in conformity with the taught art or science. Schools at the secondary and higher levels offered mixed education.

The quality of education was also enhanced by including natural science in the curricula of secondary and higher schools. Students had to wear uniforms, which also

1020 BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/61, İ. HR. 130/6592, 132/6768, 137/7109, 138/7175. Özcan (op. cit., p. 154) mentions only Büyükada, Drac and Rusçuk.

1021 BOA. A. AMD. 73/41, quoted by Özcan, op. cit., (1997), p. 155. Also see OBKS, p. 298.

1022 BOA. İ. HR. 131/6726.

1023 BOA. İ. HR. 128/6487, 130/6597.

1024 BOA. İ. HR. 130/6635, 131/6690, 134/6938.

1025 BOA. İ. HR. 132/6743, 132/6781, 132/6784, 132/6790, 134/6901, 135/6946, 136/7007, 136/7047, 137/7085, 137/7128, 138/7142, 138/7153.

1026 Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908*. Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2001, p. 43.

contributed to the process of secularization. This policy of mixed education for Muslims and non-Muslims confirmed the intent of the government to include non-Muslims in government services. After one year, the council of public education and the mixed council of education were merged to form the ministry of public education (*Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti*) in 1857. The new ministry had more authority and a more autonomous structure. The former directorate of public schools was formed into an under-secretariat (*müsteşarlık*) of the new ministry. Thus the Sublime Porte proved its serious intentions towards the modernization of the educational system.

5.4. The Prohibition of the Black Sea White Slave Trade

Slavery was an issue of controversy between the Ottomans and the European states and even Russia during the Crimean War. By the time of the Crimean War, slavery and slave trade were already illegal in Europe. However, slavery was still a legal status and institution in the Ottoman Empire and as such it was never abolished in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰²⁷ The most important source of white slaves for the Ottoman Empire was the Circassian shores of the Black Sea.¹⁰²⁸ Secondly Sub Saharan Africa provided black slaves. There was a demand for beautiful boys and girls as domestic servants for the households (*konaks*) of high bureaucrats and the Sultan's palace. Until 1846 these slaves were sold openly and the most famous slave market was in Çemberlitaş near the grand bazaar. In 1846 Abdülmecid decided to close the open slave market. We do not know whether he did it on his own initiative or upon the remonstrations of foreigners (especially Stratford de Redcliffe). It seems that he has done this on his own behalf. In any case this did not mean prohibition of slave trade, but only that the public exposure of the slaves was brought to an end.

Russia was also trying to prevent the slave trade from Circassia, which was given to Russia by the treaty of Edirne in 1829. However, Russian rule was nominal in Circassia, where local rulers continued to have a significant autonomy. The Circassian tribes were not easy to control either. These tribes had a caste system whereby a part of the society consisted of slaves. The sale of these slaves was a lucrative business for the

1027 Y. Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise 1800-1909*. London & NY: Macmillan Press, St. Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 94-124.

1028 Ehud Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression*. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 14-48.

Circassian nobles and notables. There was also a contraband slave trade from the Georgian coasts by Ottoman subjects.

When Prince Menshikov appeared in Istanbul in the spring of 1853, one of his demands concerned the prohibition of this slave trade from Georgian and Circassian coasts. In his instructions to Argyropoulo, the head dragoman of the Russian embassy, Menshikov stated on 18 April 1853 that a certain Hurşid Reis from Arhavi was engaged in Georgian and Circassian slave trade. The Russian consulate in Trabzon had reported that more than a hundred boys and girls from Georgia had been brought to Giresun. Around 20 of these, under the guidance of two Georgians or Circassians, being Russian subjects, were brought to Trabzon secretly at night to embark on the Ottoman steamer *Vasıta-i Ticaret* going to Istanbul via Giresun and Samsun, where Hurşid Reis would embark other slaves. Sarım Pasha the governor of Trabzon was also accused to be involved in this trade.¹⁰²⁹

The Ottomans were ready to suppress the slave trade to save face against the Europeans, but not to abolish slavery as an institution. When France and Britain became indispensable allies of the Porte in the war against Russia, they acquired additional bargaining power in the Ottoman Empire. The influential British ambassador had been putting pressure upon the Ottoman government to abolish slave trade, but the Sublime Porte was rather unwilling to completely abolish white slave trade in the Black Sea. Because the Ottoman elite used slaves as domestic servants and also frequently chose their wives from among them. Thus they were dependent upon the supply of slaves, especially white slaves. On the other hand, they had to appease their allies somehow.¹⁰³⁰

Towards the end of August 1854 the allies decided to take action to prevent the slave trade going on from the Georgian and Circassian coasts. The British ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe and the French *chargé d'affaires* Vincent Benedetti gave official notes to the Porte through their dragomen to prohibit the slave trade from Georgian and Circassian coasts and the sale of these slaves in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰³¹ Lord Stratford's note, dated 29 August 1854, stated that enslavement of Christian Georgians was offensive to the allies, and enslavement of Muslim Circassians was not legal from an Islamic point of view. He had received authentic information that Georgian children were brought to Constantinople as slaves in an Austrian steamer, and submitted to "a

1029 Copie d'une Instruction adressée à Mr. Argyropoulo, en date du 6/18 Avril 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/10.

1030 Erdem, "Kırım Savaşı'nda Karadeniz Beyaz Köle Ticareti", symposium paper in *Savaşın Barışa*, 2007, pp. 86-87.

1031 Toledano, op. cit., p. 117. Erdem, op. cit., (1996), p. 102.

person high in the Turkish employment”. Stratford warned that the allies, “without whose cooperation the very existence of the Turkish Empire would be endangered”, could in no way be expected to assist such “outrages” and “atrocities”. Such “barbarous practices” were incredible,

when viewed as public transactions occurring at Constantinople under the reign of so benevolent a Sovereign as the present Sultan. Brought to notice at a time when Christian Powers have sent their armies and squadrons into Turkey for its defence, and when those armies and squadrons composed of Christians, are fighting side by side with Mussulmans, and confounding all differences of religion in the common cause of humanity and national independence, they set at nought every calculation and excite the most unqualified disgust.¹⁰³²

Stratford then admitted that slavery in the Ottoman Empire was different from African-American slavery. Nevertheless, he argued, the vices of slavery were still there. Stratford went on to say that a “total relaxation” of the enthusiasm for the Sultan's cause could be produced “throughout Christian Europe”, if the Ottoman authorities did not stop this trade. He did not forget to add that a move against slavery would definitely increase the popularity of the Sultan in Europe:

Such being the case, it is not too much to expect that in its own interest, as well as from consideration for its allies, the Porte will exert itself to check the barbarous and shameful practise which I have described. Let preventive measures be applied to three stages of the traffic, to *purchase*, to *conveyance*, and to *sale*. Let a firman declare the Sultan's pleasure in these respects. Let peremptory instructions prohibiting the purchase of slaves be sent to the commanders of His Majesty's forces. Let the conveyance of slaves be treated as contraband on the responsibility of all concerned. Let their sale within the Sultan's dominions be strictly prevented by the police, and every transgression be visited with punishment on buyer and seller alike.

So long as the trade is permitted or connived at, so long as preventive measures, capable of enforcement, are loosely or not at all, employed, the Turkish authorities will justly be opened to censure, and incur, to their peril, the charge of acting upon principles inconsistent in spirit and effect with the existing alliances. Let them beware of producing throughout Christian Europe a total relaxation of that enthusiasm for the Sultan's cause, which has hitherto saved his empire from the grasp of Russia.¹⁰³³ [Italics are underlined in the original]

The Ottoman Council of Ministers discussed the issue on 18 September 1854. According to the report of the Grand Vizier Kibrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha to the Sultan, there was certainly an increase in the volume of the Black Sea white slave trade. The Grand Vizier pointed out that the total prohibition of Georgian and Circassian slave

1032 Lord Stratford's instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani, 29 August 1854, cited by Erdem, op. cit., (2007), pp. 87-94. Erdem compares the original with the official Ottoman Turkish translation and points out that the translation is somewhat simplified. The same document is also available at BOA. HR. TO. 220/45. See Appendix 56.

1033 Ibid. The last paragraph is quoted by Toledano, op. cit., p. 117.

trade was not desirable, but they never could afford to leave the gate wholly open to the traders. If they ignored the question, that too would cause troubles. Consequently, it was necessary to take some measures which would limit the subject of slavery to its pre-war low level and it seemed possible to ward off (*savuşturmak*) this issue by making such measures public. If they did nothing, then things would compel them to abolish the white slave trade totally. Thus, they had to find a solution by which they would be able to show, with a new proof, to the two allies that the Ottoman Empire abides by the principles of humanity and in this way they would be able to secure their goodwill as well as that of the Georgian people.¹⁰³⁴

For the Porte, the problem was not the slave trade *per se*, but the explicit way in which it was conducted. The grand vizier further remarked in his petition to the Sultan that slaves were sold and bought openly even in Galata and Beyoğlu (the districts of Istanbul where mainly the Europeans live). This was not a good scene before the eyes of the “civilized world”. Therefore it was essential to reduce the slave trade into its pre-war state of seclusion in houses. The Grand Vizier proposed to send two orders to Mustafa Pasha the commander of Batum, prohibiting the Georgian and Circassian slave trade from the posts of the Black Sea. The embassies would be informed. The police and the customs authorities were also to be instructed to suppress the slave trade into secrecy, away from the eyes of the foreigners (*şu aleniyet maddesinin def'iyle şu bey' ve şiranın haneler derununda bir mesturiyet halinde cereyan etmesi*).¹⁰³⁵

Consequently, Abdülmecid issued two firmans in October 1854 to the Commander of the Imperial Army at Batum, Mustafa Pasha, one for the Georgians (to be announced in Batum and Çürüksu) and the other to be publicized in Circassia. Since Christian Georgians and Muslim Circassians were treated differently, the wording of the two firmans also differed. The Circassians, who were an independent-minded Muslim people fighting against the Russians, were to be admonished that selling ones relatives into slavery was not humanly, whereas the Georgian slave trade was prohibited outright.

1034 Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha to Sultan Abdülmecid. BOA. İ. HR. 114/5553, dated 28 Zilhicce 1270 (21 September 1854), cited in Erdem, op. cit., (1996), pp. 102-103 and op. cit., (2007), pp. 94-98. See Appendix 62 for the whole text of this document. Abdullah Saydam also cites this document but first he converts the above *Hicrî* date very strangely into 21 April 1856 and then he mistransliterates several words (such as *rakkiyet* instead of *rıkkıyet*) from the document which he quotes partly. See Abdullah Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (1856-1876)*, Ankara: TTK, 1997, p. 195.

1035 Saydam, op. cit., p. 196. Erdem, op. cit., (2007), p. 98.

Because, while the Circassians sold their relatives themselves, the Georgians did not engage in such a trade, and their children were kidnapped by slave dealers.¹⁰³⁶

The Porte notified the French and British embassies that the enslavement of Georgian women and children had never been endorsed by the Ottoman government. Orders had been sent before but regretfully violated. The Georgians who had been brought in as slaves would be immediately manumitted and sent to their families if they wanted. But there was no mention of the Circassians. Orders were also issued to the police and the customs authorities to prevent the open trade of slaves. On the same day orders were sent to the governors of Trabzon, Lazistan and Canik prohibiting Georgian slave trade. The Austrian embassy was also notified that Lloyd company ships should be warned not to accept slaves on board.¹⁰³⁷

In December 1854 new orders were sent to the *müşir* of Batum and the governor of Trabzon, reminding them of the presence of the British and French fleets in the Black Sea and their duty to prevent slave trade. The commander and the governor were to assist the allies in all efforts to prevent the slave trade.

At the beginning of December 1854, the commander of Batum army and the governor of Trabzon were instructed to prevent the export of slaves from Georgia and the Circassians' sale of their own children, relatives and servants.¹⁰³⁸ Towards the end of December 1854, Grand Vizier Reşid Pasha sent new instructions to the governors of Trabzon, Erzurum and Lazistan and to the commanders of the armies of Batum and Anatolia. They were reminded that during the battles of last year near Şekvetil and Ahışa, some children were kidnapped and sold into slavery and also some young men who came to Ottoman territory to become Ottoman subjects were somehow enslaved. It was pointed out that some officials and officers were engaged in this “inhuman” trade and this had become a great capital for the Russian propaganda, disinclining the population from the Ottoman state and being the cause of bad rumours about the whole Ottoman *millet*. Therefore all such slaves were to be returned. Those boys who accepted Islam and who were willing could be taken into military service. Those boys who were not yet circumscribed and wanted to go home should be sent home. Children should be

1036 Erdem, op. cit., (1996), pp. 104-105. I am grateful to my supervisor Hakan Erdem for giving me the copies of these and other documents on Ottoman slavery from the TNA.

1037 Toledano, op. cit., pp. 119-121. Saydam, op. cit., p. 196. Erdem, op. cit., (2007), pp. 99-103.

1038 BOA. HR. MKT. 93/93, 1 December 1854. See Appendix 77.

deposed at safe hands, to be turned over to their families. Girls of age who accepted Islam could be married off.¹⁰³⁹

When the head of the police Hayreddin Pasha was sent by the Porte as inspector to the Anatolian and Batum armies in January 1854, one of the questions he directed to the military *meclis* in Erzurum was about the slave trade that he had heard about the commander in Ahisha, namely Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha. It was rumored that he had taken some slaves (boys and girls) for sale and then distributed some and retained some of them. The *meclis* did not confirm this information and replied that Ali Rıza Pasha had bought three Georgian slaves (two girls and one boy) from the *müdür* of Şavşat Selim Bey and his brother Şakir Bey (Şavşat is close to Batum). Ali Rıza Pasha also rejected having taken slaves, saying that he had only bought three months before the beginning of the war one Circassian boy and one Circassian girl who had been bought as children and raised by the said brothers.

It seems that as late as February 1855, the slave trade was still being practised by the officers of Kars army. An extract from a report of the British consulate in Erzurum, probably written by General Williams or by one of the British officers in his staff, was given to the Ottoman foreign ministry:

The buying and selling of slaves by the officers of the Kars army is as notorious as any other malpractices on their part. Boys [*köle*] are preferred by these brutes, and the girls [*cariye*] are sent as bribes to Constantinople; and until the allied consuls are authorized to demand the restitution of these victims to Turkish Sensuality [*bu biçare köle ve cariyeleri Osmanlunun sui hirsından kurtarmak*], and are provided with funds to send them back to their families in Georgia; and until the Porte is bound by treaty to send the culprits so detected to the galleys for a certain specified time, this infamous traffic will flourish, and all which has been said or may be written about abolitionary firmans simply adds mockery to crime and woe.¹⁰⁴⁰ [Words in brackets are from the official Ottoman translation]

Furthermore, Sultan's firman on the prohibition of the slave trade had not yet reached Sohum by the end of December 1854. Lord John Hay from the British navy reported on his visit to Sohum(kale) and Çürüksu:

On the 28 December 1854 I visited the Mushir at Choorooksou: having expressed my surprise that the Pacha at Soukoumkale had not received orders relative to the suppression of the Slave Trade the Mushir informed me that he was most anxious to give effect to the Sultan's Firman, but although he had received the Firman 6 weeks previously, no opportunity had as yet presented itself of communicating with Soukoumkale. Indeed the country boats passing were liable

1039 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 63/41 and HR. MKT. 96/99 and 97/16, dated 5 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (26 December 1854). See Appendix 84.

1040 BOA. HR. TO. 221/6, dated 6 February 1855. Extract from a consular report from the British consulate in Ezurum. See Appendix 88.

to capture by the enemy's gun boats out of the rivers at Poti and Anakria, and the only steamer at his disposal was merely sufficient to bring provisions from Trebisonde for the use of the army. Proceeded to and arrived at Trebisonde on 29th Dec. 1854. The Pacha was absent when I visited him. I however learnt from Mr. Stevens, Vice Consul, that Two Boats laden with Circassian slaves had arrived at this Port a few days previous. The Pacha did not clearly see how he could give effect to the Firman of the Sultan not knowing how to define whether the people were slaves or not.

I recommended that Mr Stevens' advice should be acted on and that the Boats and people should be detained on suspicion.

Altogether I think there does not appear to exist among the Turkish officials any excessive anxiety to put a stop to the Circassian and Georgian Slave Trade.¹⁰⁴¹

About this time, Clarendon was giving clear instructions to Stratford to request the Porte to take effective measures to prevent the Black Sea slave trade:

The Turkish authorities in the Porte of the Black Sea have shewn no willingness to give effect to the Sultan's Firman prohibiting the traffic in Circassian and Georgian slaves; and that when two boats laden with Circassian slaves arrived at Trebizond about the 26 of December last, the Pasha's excuse for not detaining them was that he could not define whether they were slaves or not.

I have to instruct Your Excellency to communicate the enclosed extract to the Ottoman Govt and to request that clear and stringent Instructions may be sent to the proper authorities in the Ports of the Black Sea, pointing out to them that there can be no difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the Circassians and Georgians brought to those ports are intended for sale; and that the Pashas must be held strictly responsible for the punctual execution of the Sultan's order declaring that this traffic is to cease.¹⁰⁴²

The Ottoman statesmen also tried to convince the Europeans that the conditions of slavery in Turkey were somewhat different from others and that the Ottoman slavery was idiosyncratic. Let us give an anecdotal example. In 1856, Fuad Pasha invited Mme Thouvenel and Marie de Melfort to his harem. There he introduced a young lady and said: "this lady is my bride. Originally she was a Circassian. We bought and brought her up to marry with our son. You see, our conception of slavery is different from yours".¹⁰⁴³ When urged again by the British to end the white slave trade in 1857, the Foreign Minister Âli Pasha also replied that "the so-called slaves are no slaves as most of them come to Constantinople of their own accord".¹⁰⁴⁴

Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the most violent reaction to the prohibitions on the slave trade came (as could be expected) from a religiously sensitive area. This was

1041 Extract of a dispatch from Lord John Hay to Sir Edmund Lyons dated 8 January 1855, inclosed in a letter from Admiralty dated January 29th 1855. BOA. HR. TO. 221/13 lef 2. See Appendix 90.

1042 Clarendon to Stratford, date unknown, translated 26 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (16 March 1855). BOA. HR. TO. 221/13 lef 4. See Appendix 89.

1043 Baronne Durand de Fontmagne, *op. cit.*, (1977), p. 255.

1044 Erdem, *op. cit.*, (1996), p. 51.

Hijaz, which included the two holy cities of Islam and which was ruled semi-autonomously by *emirs*, appointed by the Sultan from among the descendants of prophet Muhammad (*şerifs*). Although Hijaz was excluded from the prohibition of black slave trade, the religious notables of Arabistan were disturbed. The *emir* of Mecca Şerif Abdülmuttalib Efendi was not in good relations with the governor of Jidda Kamil Pasha. Fearing his deposition, Abdülmuttalib seems to have wanted to use the discontent of the notables of Jidda, Mecca and Medina to get rid of Ottoman supremacy. Therefore he urged some notables of Jidda to write a letter to some *şerifs* and *ulema* of Mecca. They wrote the letter on 13 Receb 1271 (1 April 1855) in which they criticised what they saw as the recent concessions given to the Europeans. They argued that besides the prohibition on slave trade, the Porte had sent orders to governors permitting the non-Muslims to build any edifices in the Arab peninsula, letting non-Muslims women free to marry Muslim women, and not allowing interference with women's dress, etc. They urged them to petition the emir of Mecca to petition the Sultan.

Meanwhile the Porte had already been suspicious of Abdülmuttalib's behaviour and in August 1855 sent Ferik Raşid Pasha with confidential orders to depose Abdülmuttalib and appoint Şerif Muhammed bin Avn if necessary. Cevdet Pasha writes that by that time, grand vizirial orders (*evamir-i aliyye*) prohibiting black slave trade had been sent to governors in order to feign or dissimulate friendship (*müdara*) to European states.¹⁰⁴⁵ In any case, it implies the temporary character of the orders due to the necessities of war.

Cevdet Pasha writes that according to the investigations of Ferik Raşid Pasha it was established that the letter of the notables of Jidda was the product of a secret order from Abdülmuttalib, who was at that time in Taif.¹⁰⁴⁶ According to Cevdet, Abdülmuttalib then invites Şeyh Cemal Efendi, the head of the *ulema* (*reis-ül ulema*) from Mecca to Taif and tells him:

The consequence of the present war will be grave for the Sublime State. It cannot overcome this. Even if this war were to end in some way, it cannot survive its debt and it will be crushed. What is more, the Turks have become apostates [*Hem de Türkler mürted oldular*] and though they are concealing their apostasy for the time being, obviously they will declare it later. This time of war is an opportunity for us. We can obtain the power of government which was our right from old time and the prohibition of slavery [read slave trade] can serve as an excuse. Although it has not come here yet but it has been exercised elsewhere. Soon it will be executed here as well. We must wait until the season of pilgrimage passes, for during pilgrimage there will be many troops around. Thereafter we

1045 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 102.

1046 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 103.

must take care of our affairs. However, it is already necessary to take measures.¹⁰⁴⁷ [My translation]

The governor Kamil Pasha tried to carry out the orders of the central government to stop the importation and sale of slaves. In Jidda he ordered the public reading of the order on the prohibition of the slave trade, while the Meccan ulema, supported by Şerif Abdülmuttalib, declared the order contrary to the *şeriat*. Widespread rioting broke out. Houses belonging to French and English protégés were looted. The ulema and the rioting mobs demanded complete expulsion of all Christians (including consuls) from the Hijaz.¹⁰⁴⁸

Raşid Pasha reached Jidda on 28 October 1855. On 15 November 1855, the order appointing Şerif Muhammed ibn Avn as the new *emir* was read in Jidda.¹⁰⁴⁹ But Abdülmuttalib refused to accept his deposition. He tried to urge the Beduin chiefs of the desert Arabs (*urban*) to rebellion as well. 600-700 *urban* led by some şerifs sent by Abdülmuttalib attacked Ottoman troops in Bahre, between Jidda and Mecca, but they were repulsed. After a few days, Abdülmuttalib sent again about 2,000 *urban* against the Ottoman forces in Bahre but these were also repulsed.¹⁰⁵⁰ While there were riots in Mecca and Jidda, Madina was relatively quiet.¹⁰⁵¹ While Abdülmuttalib continued to revolt and fight, Şeyhülislam Arif Efendi sent a letter dated 11 January 1856 to all the religious dignitaries of Mecca, trying to explain that the rules of *şeriat* were not violated. Among such rules or bases of he cited the sale of slaves, giving women the right to divorce and receiving help from non-Muslims as well. Defending the rightfulness of receiving help from non-Muslims, the şeyhülislam gave the example of the prophet Muhammad's asking the Jews of Beni Kaynaka for help against the tribe of Beni Kureyza. The *şeyhülislam* further argued that the Ottoman caliphs were always guided by the *şeriat* and they would not prohibit the rights of legitimate possessions belonging to Muslims. By these possessions he meant slaves.¹⁰⁵² The revolt of

1047 Ibid.

1048 William Ochsenwald, "Muslim-European Conflict in the Hijaz: The Slave Trade Controversy, 1840-1895", *Middle Eastern Studies* 16, 1980, p. 119. Reprinted in *Religion, Economy, and State in Ottoman-Arab History*, Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1998, p. 83.

1049 Cevdet Pasha (*Tezâkir 1-12*, 1991, p. 121) gives the date as 3 Rebiyyülevvel 1272 Thursday, which corresponds to 13 November 1855 Tuesday, which is contradictory. But if we accept Thursday, then the date becomes 15 November. Ochsenwald, however, referring to the 1953 edition of the *Tezâkir* (which I have not seen), writes that the date is 17 November according to Cevdet and 15 November according to the French consul. Cf. Ochsenwald, op. cit., (1980), footnote 14, p. 125, and op. cit., (1998), footnote 4, p. 83.

1050 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 122.

1051 Ochsenwald, op. cit., (1998), p. 84.

1052 Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 136. Cf. Ochsenwald, op. cit., (1998), p. 84.

Abdülmuttalib was ended in 1856 when he was captured and brought to Istanbul. He was not punished however, he was simply required to live in Istanbul. The tensions however between the Hijaz notables, dignitaries and owners of slaves on the one hand and the European consuls and the Porte on the other continued, which led to a massacre of consuls in Jidda in 1858.

We can conclude that European pressure did not bring much change on the Circassian slave trade. However, the breaking point of the measures against slave trade came in 1857 when black slave trade was totally prohibited by a *firman* of the Sultan. Again it was not black slavery *per se* that was prohibited; it was the trade, that is, the import and export of black slaves that was prohibited. That meant the existing slaves would not be freed. Nevertheless, this was an important decision for the Ottoman Empire, even if it was not applied for a long time. As argued by Erdem, practically, the Porte could ban slave trade, and prevent all supply of slaves, but it could not challenge the legal status of a category sanctioned by Islamic law, that is *şeriat*. Even the Sultan could not do it, because he would need a *fetva* from the *şeyhülislam*.

After the war and the prohibition of the black slave trade, Ottoman officials were not interested any more in preventing the Circassian white slave trade in the Black Sea. Âli Pasha told the British dragoman Simmons in August 1857 that “had Circassia been given over to Turkey [in the Paris Peace Congress] they would have managed to alter things”.¹⁰⁵³ But these words come strangely from Âli Pasha, because according to Cevdet Pasha, he did not want to do anything for Circassia during the peace congress in March 1856. Cevdet Pasha writes that he heard that Lord Clarendon and the British ambassador in Paris (Lord Cowley), the two British representatives, had asked Âli Pasha to present jointly to the congress a motion for a new arrangement for Caucasia, but Âli Pasha had replied them: “For us those places are not so much important, we have only some disputed area around Çürüksu, we will be content with saving that area”.¹⁰⁵⁴ Again according to Cevdet Pasha, the British representatives were surprised and Lord Clarendon later said: “I cannot be more Turkish than a Turk”. Therefore, either what Cevdet Pasha heard was wrong, or Âli Pasha forgot in August 1857 (or rather did not want to remember) what he had said during the Paris Congress.

1053 Erdem, op. cit., (1996), p. 107.

1054 Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 1-12*, p. 101.

5.5. Law and Order in the Provinces

During the Crimean War several revolts broke out in various parts of the Ottoman Empire. These were either directly related to the causes of the war, like the revolt of the Greeks in Thessaly and Epirus, or indirect results of the general lack of authority in the provinces due to the concentration of troops in the fronts, like the revolt of the Kurdish *beys*. Then there were those revolts which were mainly a reaction to the alliance of the caliph with Christian powers, like the revolt of the Arabs in Hijaz. The disturbances in Damascus were also a reaction of some Muslims to the equality of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

After the declaration of war, some fanatical Muslims had attacked Christian subjects of the Porte and foreigners. Therefore Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha sent an order to the governors of Damascus and Jerusalem in December 1853 to prevent such treatment of the Christians. He wrote that the Christian subjects of the Sublime State were by heart and soul together with Muslims in the current war against Russia (*Hiristiyan tebaa-i Devlet-i Aliyye ise bu muharebede velinimet-i bi-minnet padişahımız efendimiz hazretlerinin uğur-ı şahanelerinde ez dil u can ehl-i İslam ile birlikte olarak*).¹⁰⁵⁵ It was very unbecoming to look with suspicion and hostility at such loyal subjects (*tebaa-i sadıka*) who had been showing their loyalty and righteousness. The perpetrators of such acts of violence against them were “certain fanatics and featherbrains, who cannot distinguish between good and evil and who cannot tell friends from enemies” (*nik ve bedi fark etmez ve dostunu düşmanını bilmez bir takım mutaassıban ve sebükmağzan*).

Apart from the revolts, the most disturbing internal source of disorder was the infamous bands of irregular soldiers, the so called *başbozüks*. These volunteers proved more of a trouble than of help to the war effort of the Ottoman state. While they attacked and robbed both Muslims and non-Muslims on their way, the chief victims were nevertheless the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Meanwhile banditry in general also increased in the entire Empire. Some nomadic Kurdish tribes in Anatolia were engaged in robbing non-Muslim villages, caravans and merchants. Nomadic Arab sheiks (*urban meşayih*) also warred among themselves. We will analyse here in some detail the revolt of the Kurdish emirs or *beys* in Kurdistan and the problems related to the actions of the *başbozüks*.

1055 Grand vizier to the governors of Damascus and Jerusalem, 7 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (8 December 1853). BOA. A. MKT. UM. 149/7. See Appendix 19.

5.5.1. The Insurrection of Yezdan Şer

Towards the middle of the 19th century, Kurdistan¹⁰⁵⁶ was one of the places where central authority of the Porte was weakest and that of the local lords highest. Although Sultan Mahmud II had done a lot to reduce the power of these local notables, in remote and traditionally autonomous areas like Kurdistan, local *beys*, emirs, khans, still swayed power. Especially due to the turmoil caused by Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt in Anatolia in the 1830s, Kurdish beys tried to make use of the situation in order to develop their power bases. They did not want to share their power with the Sultan, though recognizing him as the caliph of the (Sunnite) Muslims. In particular they did not want to share taxes and to allow military recruitment. Indeed, the Prussian military adviser Helmuth von Moltke, who served in Mahmud's army in its campaign against the Egyptian forces in 1838-39, writes in his letters that the two biggest problems for the people were taxes and military conscription. Taxes were very arbitrary and the military service too long (15 years in theory, but practically lifelong). If only these were reformed, he advised, the state could enjoy the support of the local people.¹⁰⁵⁷ However, reform was not easy because it was harmful for so many vested interests. Corrupt pashas and governors (*valis*) paid bribes to get appointed to their provinces and then tried hard to squeeze out the amount they paid (often borrowed on interest from the *sarrafs* of Constantinople) from the local people as soon as possible, because they knew that their term of office would be short. Other pashas were engaged in all kinds of intrigues in Istanbul against them to get those provinces for themselves. Thus these governors looked upon their offices as short term opportunities to fill their purses. Therefore they did not embark upon any long term project.

On the other hand, the local *beys*, while equally corrupt and tyrannous, were still better for the local people because these *beys* saw the provinces as their permanent home, as hereditary property and they cared relatively more for the local people. One of these Kurdish beys, Bedirhan Bey, bearing the traditional title of the *emir* of Botan (or Bohtan) and the Ottoman title of *mütesellim* (deputy of a governor in a *sancak* or *kaza*)

1056 Kurdistan was the name of a region from Diyarbekir to Van and to Mosul where mostly Kurds lived. From 1847 to 1867, it was the name of an Ottoman province (*eyalet*) centred in Harput, and then in Diyarbekir. Şemseddin Sami, author of the *Kamus ül A'lam*, the first encyclopaedia in Turkish, defines Kurdistan as follows: “*Asya-i garbîde kism-ı âzâmu Memalik-i Osmaniye’de ve bir kısmı İran’a tabi büyük bir memleket olup, ekseriyet üzere ahalisi bulunan Kürd kavminin ismiyle tesmiye olunmuştur*”. See *Kamus ül A'lam*, vol. 5, Istanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1896, p. 3840. Cf. M. Emin Bozarıslan, *Tarihteki İlk Türkçe Ansiklopedide Kürdistan ve Kürdler*, Istanbul: Deng Yayınları, 2001, p. 45.

1057 See *Moltke'nin Türkiye Mektupları*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1999, p. 238.

of Cizre, became the actual ruler of this area in the beginning of the 1840s, subduing all other Kurdish and Armenian notables in the region. Moltke writes that Bedirhan participated in the war against Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt (son of Mehmed Ali) and he was given the rank of colonel. According to some ethnic Kurdish authors, Bedirhan Bey struck out coins in his own name, sent students to Europe for education, established manufacturing of gunpowder and weapons.¹⁰⁵⁸ However, this is not confirmed by other sources and seems doubtful. Bedirhan had first served in the Ottoman army's campaign against some rebel Kurdish chiefs in 1838. Now he had become a powerful chief himself revolting against the Ottomans. According to the Soviet Kurdish historian Naftula Halfin, Bedirhan Bey had become the de facto ruler of a vast area extending from Lake Van to Diyarbekir to Baghdad while these provinces belonged to the Ottoman Empire in theory.¹⁰⁵⁹ While Halfin and some other ethnic Kurdish writers consider the revolt of Bedirhan as a national (liberation) movement, it seems rather a conflict of power of the local feudal notables with the modernizing central authorities, without an apparent nationalist ideology.¹⁰⁶⁰ Bedirhan was finally besieged by Ottoman troops in the castle of Evreh in 1847.¹⁰⁶¹ While he still held out, Yezdan Şer¹⁰⁶², who was the grandson of his uncle and his left wing commander, betrayed him and joined the Ottoman forces in return for promised rank and position. Bedirhan Bey was forced to surrender, then he was brought to Istanbul and later exiled to Crete (to the fortress of Kandiye) together with his retinue and with some other insurgent Kurdish beys.¹⁰⁶³

1058 See for example Celile Celil. *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kürtler*. İstanbul: Özge Yayınları, 1992, pp. 127-135. Kemal Burkay. *Geçmişten Bugüne Kürtler ve Kürdistan*. Cilt 1. İstanbul: Deng Yayınları, 1997, pp. 355.

1059 *Bor'ba za Kurdistan. (Kurdskiy vopros v mejdunarodnyh otnosheniyakh XIX veka)*. Moscow, 1963. Turkish translation: *19. Yüzyılda Kürdistan Üzerine Mücadele*. Ankara: Komal Yay., 1976, pp. 62-63. Second edition: İstanbul: Komal Yayınevi, 1992.

1060 For example, Kemal Burkay considers Bedirhan's movement a "national movement". Burkay has also written that Bedirhan was not an Ottoman pasha. See Burkay, op. cit., p. 306. However, it is well known that Bedirhan Bey was later pardoned and the title of pasha together with the order of Mecidiye was conferred upon him for his services in Crete in reconciling the Muslims and Christians of the island. He died in Damascus.

1061 See Malmîsanij, *Cızira Botanlı Bedirhaniler*. İstanbul: Avesta Yayınevi, 2000, p. 57. Malmîsanij gives the alternative spelling of Ewrex. As he has pointed out, Nazmi Sevgen and İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa have misread this fortress as "Orak" or "Oruh". Cf. Nazmi Sevgen, *Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu'da Türk Beylikleri. Osmanlı Belgeleri ile Kürt Türkleri Tarihi*. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1982, p. 99, p. 104. İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 1, İstanbul: Yedigün Neşriyat, undated, pp. 67-68. Sinan Hakan on the other hand writes that the castle is called "Erwex" in Kurdish. See Hakan, *Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Kürtler ve Kürt Direnişleri (1817-1867)*, İstanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 2007, p. 226.

1062 Yezdan Şer's name passes as İzzeddin Şir in Ottoman official documents. Sinan Hakan uses the spelling of "Êzdin Şêr".

1063 Sevgen, op. cit., p. 103. Sevgen or his editors have supplied wrong dates so many times throughout the text. It seems that he thinks or they think that the hicri year fully coincides with the Gregorian years. Thus for example they have equated the Muslim year 1263 with the Gregorian year 1846.

Thus Ottoman authorities were able to abolish autonomous Kurdish *beyliks* and started ruling the area directly.

After the suppression of the revolt of Bedirhan, Kurdistan was in a way “conquered anew” in 1847 in the words of the then grand vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha.¹⁰⁶⁴ A new *eyalet* (province) of Kurdistan was created, including the *eyalet* of Diyarbekir, the *sancaks* of Van, Muş and Hakkâri; and the *kazas* of Cizre, Botan and Mardin. Here and elsewhere, we see the most favourable tactic or method of the Porte in dealing with local insurgents. It consisted in trying to appeal to some of the beys or relatives of the leaders within the revolting group by way of promises of good office, title and pay. Thus the revolt would be suppressed with help from inside. Another method was to provide amnesty (*rey ve aman tezkiresi* or *buyrulduzu*) for the leader(s) and thus deprive the revolt of leadership. A study of the archival documents concerning Kurdish revolt of the time of Bedirhan and Yezdan Şer reveals some frequently used formulas in the official discourse. Many documents depict the Kurds as “those ill-natured Kurds who have long been well known for insurgence and rebellion” (*öteden berü bağı ü isyan ile meluf olan ekrad-ı bednihad*).¹⁰⁶⁵ It was necessary to bring into them into the “circle of obedience” (*daire-i itaat*). They were to be both frightened by force and assured by pledges of good treatment after submission (*te'min ve terhib*). Promises of rank and pay could be given provided that these should be taken back at the first opportunity.

For his services in the suppression of Bedirhan Bey, Yezdan Şer was first given Bedirhan's title of the *mütesellim* of Cizre with a salary of 3,500 piastres, but soon he was dismissed.¹⁰⁶⁶ Cizre was now to be administered by an Ottoman kaimmakam, Mustafa Pasha. Nevertheless, the Porte did not dare to cut Yezdan Şer's salary as well or to completely alienate him. He was given secondary jobs and temporised. Thus we read in a petition of the grand vizier to the Sultan that Yezdan Şer should not be alienated from the state, although he was quite useless for any government office

1064 Sevgen, op. cit., p. 106. Hakan, op. cit., pp. 253-258. Sevgen or his editors again give a wrong Gregorian year. They indicate the date of Reşid Pasha's petition as “20 Cemaziyelevvel 1263 (1846)”. However, in reality this date corresponds to 6 May 1247. As the title of his work suggests, Sevgen considers Kurds as Turks. He even takes issue with the Porte, arguing that “by a very wrong understanding and expression”, a certain “territory” [*arazi*] in the “East” was officially called Kurdistan. Then he argues that “in reality there is not and there cannot be such a region and such a division” [My translation]. See Sevgen, op. cit., p. 105.

1065 See for example BOA. İ. MSM. 69/2015 lef 2 or A. AMD. 49/76, quoted in my symposium paper “Kırım Savaşı Sırasında İsyanlar ve Asayiş Sorunları (1853-1856)”, in *Savaşın Barışa*, p. 289.

1066 Hakan, op. cit., pp. 283-285. Quoting from Kendal [Nezan?], James Reid (op. cit., p. 299) writes that Yezdan Şer became the “governor of Hakkârî province” after the fall of Bedirhan. This is not supported by archival evidence.

because he did not have an understanding of the workings of the government (*henüz usul-i Devlet-i Aliyye ve idare-i umur-ı mülkiyeyi bilemiyeceğinden*).¹⁰⁶⁷ Thus he was first sent to Istanbul in March 1849 and then sent back to Mosul in the same year. He was not allowed to return to Cizre.¹⁰⁶⁸ This he must have resented, for he revolted at the first opportunity during the Crimean War.

Meanwhile, the *Tanzimat* had begun to be applied in earnest in Kurdistan. The state started collecting military levies and taxes. An example of the new taxes was the *iane-i umumiye* which was a kind of temporary tax installed in 1852. According to the table of allocations, for example, the *sancak* of Diyarbekir was to pay 19,093 purses and 460 piastres, Dersim 554 purses and 60 piastres, Muş 1,363 purses and 100 piastres, Hakkâri 415 purses, Cizre 458 purses and 240 piastres, etc.¹⁰⁶⁹ However, these amounts must have been reduced later, because in a resolution of the MVL, dated 31 July 1853, we read that only 6,000 purses (300,000 piastres) out of the 12,400 purses (620,000 piastres) allocated to the province (*eyalet*) of Kurdistan (which included at that time the *sancaks* of Diyarbekir, Dersim, Siird and Muş) were collectible, that is, assigned to the male population. It was stated that the local authorities had petitioned that if the remaining part were also collected, then the population would become scattered and miserable (*müteferrik ve perişan*).¹⁰⁷⁰ Therefore they had asked for the cancellation of this part. The council stated that the population of the region had just been saved from the oppressions (*mezalim ve teaddiyat*) they had been subjected before, and they were really in poor conditions. However, the council decided that since cancellation would serve as a bad example for similar places (*bazı emsaline sirayet edeceğinden*) and since the amount was recorded as revenue in the budget, it could only be deferred for some time (*bir müddet imhâli*). The Sultan endorsed this decision.¹⁰⁷¹ On the other hand, the *kaimmakam* of Hakkâri İsmail Kâmil Pasha had visited the districts and villages of the sancak and explained the temporary character of the tax. He had also distributed gifts to sheikhs and other local notables. He had been able to register an additional male population of 12,418 persons, thus raising the total *iane* of the sancak up to 911 purses 360 piastres. The difference stemmed from unregistered nomadic tribes who frequently

1067 BOA. A. AMD. 13/79, dated 1265 (1849), quoted in my paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, p. 300. Sinan Hakan (op. cit., p. 283) refers to a *mazbata* of the MVL on this point.

1068 Hakan, op. cit., p. 285.

1069 See Akyıldız, op. cit., (1996), p. 54.

1070 BOA. İ. MVL. 280/10958, 24 Şevval 1269 (31 July 1853).

1071 Sultan's *irade*, 4 Zilkade 1269 (9 August 1853). BOA. İ. MVL. 280/10958 lef 1. Cf. Akyıldız, op. cit., (1996), p. 57. Akyıldız mentions the *mazbata* but he does not quote from it.

passed in and out of the Iranian border.¹⁰⁷² As we have seen in Chapter 4, another extraordinary tax (*iane-i harbiye* or *iane-i cihadiye*) was also levied during the Crimean War.

We have seen in Chapter 3 that several battles took place between the Ottoman and the Russian armies at the eastern frontier near Kars in the autumn of 1853. Although the Ottomans won one of these battles, they faced a heavy defeat in the Battle of Başgedikler in December 1853. In this battle there were around 15,000 to 16,000 Kurdish irregular cavalry. But they dispersed very soon after the first shots. From then on Kurdish *başbozüks* were not eager to go to war against Russian regular forces. In fact most of these irregulars came from borderline Kurdish nomadic tribes who were inclined towards plunder and robbery even in peace time. Even before the war, they had been engaged even in plunder and slave trade from Russian territory. The Russian embassy had given many protest notes on account of these intrusions into the Russian territory.¹⁰⁷³

The British consul in Erzurum, in a letter to the British embassy in Istanbul, dated 25 June 1853, wrote that “in every part of the country the Koords are actively engaged in robbing, both on the high roads and in the villages”. He stated that if the country was left “at the mercy of the Koords”, then “incalculable injury to the cultivator” would ensue. He further stated:

The militia has been called out, and altogether the forces to be collected here will, it is said, amount to about 40,000 disciplined troops. I hope that with such an imposing force the Porte and the General may not be tempted to make an attack on Georgia, as from the want of skill in the Turkish officers, there would not be much hope of success. But if Russia were to meet with reverses in Europe, so as to disable her from succouring Georgia, and if an [sic] European force were landed in that country to cooperate with the Turkish force, then indeed a forward movement, combined with an attack on the part of the Caucasian tribes would not fail to drive the Russians out of Georgia, for they would find few friends among the natives, were they to experience a reverse.¹⁰⁷⁴

We must add that the Russians too had their own *başbozüks* (*militsiya*) from their Kurds and also some Ottoman Kurds who joined them. These Kurds formed two cavalry regiments of 1,500 men each, one under the command of Ahmet Ağa and the

1072 Akyıldız, *ibid.*

1073 See Dr. Hasan Şahin, “Kırım Harbi (1853-1856) öncesinde Erzurum vilayetinde ve Doğu Anadolu Kafkas sınırında meydana gelen karışıklıklar”, *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi* 9, Erzurum, 1998, pp. 159-164.

1074 BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 8, dated 25 June 1853. From the British consulate in Erzurum. See Appendix 3.

other under Cafer Ağa.¹⁰⁷⁵ While both Ottomans and Russians tried to attract these frontiers Kurds to their side, they were in general not devoted to any side, trying to appease both of them. They tried to ascertain who will be the victor and side with him just to avoid the results of having joined the wrong side. Furthermore they were more of a nuisance to any side than real help because they were given to all the vices of the *başıbozüks* in general. They did not even hesitate to plunder their own army quarters in the event of a defeat or retreat. They robbed Armenian villages and caravans coming from Iran as well.

After the Battle of Başgedikler in December 1853, some 14 of the Kurdish chiefs at the border went to the Russian quarters at Gümrü (Aleksandropol) to reach an agreement with the Russian army. The task of developing relations with the Kurds was given to Colonel Loris-Melikov. Loris-Melikov also met Ahmet Ağa of the Zilanlı tribe (*aşiret*) in March 1854. Then in November he succeeded in gaining to the Russian side the powerful Kurdish chief Kasım Khan or Kasım Ağa who held the rank of kapucubaşı in the Ottoman service. Kasım Ağa was given the rank of colonel and a salary accordingly. Other chiefs also received valuable gifts from the Russians. According to Colonel Williams, Kasım Ağa's 300 Kurds ("Koords") received 6 silver roubles each from the Russians.¹⁰⁷⁶ If we compare this amount (equal to about one pound or 125 piastres) with the pay of the Ottoman soldier (20 piastres and not paid regularly at all) and of the *başıbozuk* cavalry (80 piastres including rations) then it becomes clear that the Russians paid much better.

Nevertheless, these Kurds were not yet entirely out of control of the Ottoman forces. Thus Kasım Ağa had to obey the order of the governor of Erzurum and commander of the Anatolian army Zarif Mustafa Pasha to provide a cavalry force for the Ottoman army. But Kasım Ağa supplied only 200 of them. According to Russian military intelligence officer Pyotr Averyanov, although the Kurds could not openly depart from the Ottomans, every day their chiefs visited the Russian camp near Gümrü, promising that they would join Russian forces at the first retreat of the Turks towards Kars and that at the first Russian victory they would abandon openly the Turkish government.¹⁰⁷⁷ In April 1855, General Muravyov reported to Russian war minister

1075 Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 280.

1076 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Erzurum, 7 December 1854. PRMA, No. 79, p. 74.

1077 Averyanov, op. cit., 1900, p. 93. Turkish translation is at Averyanov, op. cit., 1995, p. 54. This Turkish translation of Averyanov's important work is full of translation errors and misspellings. Beginning with the name of the author himself (turned into Avyarov) almost all Russian proper names have been misspelled.

Prince Dolgorukov that Prince General Bebutov had reported his relations with the Kurdish chieftains. Bebutov had sent a Cossack regiment and the regiment of Colonel Loris-Melikov to the village of Kızıl Kilise in Kağızman. Loris-Melikov's task was to meet Kasım Khan and to force him to make his position known, to meet the heads of the 11 Armenian and Karapapak villages on the frontier and to see how many irregular cavalry could be recruited from the Kurds.¹⁰⁷⁸ Thus those Kurds who had hoped easy plunder by joining the Ottoman army at the beginning of the war were now very cautious of going against the Russians. They fled the Ottoman army. In fact their number had now fallen to 500 at the battle of Kürekdere on 5 or 6 August 1854. This battle proved devastating for the Ottoman army: an 18,000-strong Russian army had utterly defeated the 40,000-strong Ottoman army in an open field battle. From then on, few Kurds fought against the Russians in the Crimean War. A certain Russian colonel (Suslov?), commander of Russian forces in Erivan, sent a letter dated 20 August [1 September] 1854 to Yezdan Şer.¹⁰⁷⁹ In his letter the Russian commander warned Yezdanşer not to participate in the Russo-Ottoman war.

At this time the situation was indeed very conducive for a revolt in Kurdistan. Ottoman forces were concentrated in Erzurum and Kars against the Russian army. Few regular troops remained in the countryside. For this reason some Kurdish tribes were now pillaging villages. For example, the Kurdish tribes of Abbas Uşağı and Pilvenkli in the sancak of Dersim belonging to the province of Harput had revolted and they were involved in banditry due to lack of troops there. The governor of the Harput reported in July 1854 that the revolting “ill-natured Kurds” had been subdued.¹⁰⁸⁰

Yezdan Şer was ordered to recruit Kurdish infantry and cavalry for the Ottoman army from Cizre and Botan. He came to Cizre from Mosul with 200 cavalry and recruited 900 troops. However, soon he came into conflict with Ottoman pashas over the amount of money for his recruitment activities.¹⁰⁸¹ In the autumn of 1854, Yezdan Şer gave first signs of disobedience. While it is not clear exactly at what point in time and how he rebelled, we might begin it from November 1854, because his salary was

1078 General Muravyov to Prince Dolgorukov, dated 21 Mart (2 April) 1855. See AKAK, vol. XI, Tiflis, 1888, p. 79.

1079 Averyanov, op. cit., 109. An Ottoman Turkish translation of this letter is at BOA. İ. MVL. 353/15435, translated into modern Turkish by Hakan, op. cit., p. 287, p. 379. The date of the letter here is 24 August [5 September] 1854. Hakan has transliterated the Russian colonel's name as “Suçifirt”, but I could not find such a name in Russian sources.

1080 From the governor of Harput to the grand vizier. BOA. A. MKT. UM. 163/35, dated 23 Şevval 1270 (19 July 1854), full transcription is in my paper in *Savaşın Barışa*, pp. 305-306.

1081 Hakan, op. cit., p. 286.

cut as of end of the financial month of *Teşrin-i Evvel* 1270, which corresponds to 11 November 1854.¹⁰⁸² Lieutenant-Colonel (*Kaimmakam*) Salih Bey from the Anatolian army was sent to him for negotiation. There are some petitions of Yezdan Şer in the Ottoman archives, probably given to Salih Bey, written at various dates from November 1854 to January 1855. In these petitions, Yezdan Şer complains of the wrongdoings of some local officials (especially Osman Pasha, the *kaimmakam* of Mardin) towards him, trying to excuse himself, maintaining that his actions are not intended for a revolt. Nevertheless, there are other letters as well, by him and his brother Mansur Bey to some administrators of districts (*kaza müdürleri*), written in Arabic and Persian and captured by the Ottomans, where they urge these müdurs, most probably Kurdish notables themselves, who were given such little titles in return for their hereditary fiefs (*yurtluk* and *ocaklık*) to join his forces. Therefore the Porte did not of course believe in Yezdan Şer's words.¹⁰⁸³

In one of his letters, dated 17 November 1854, Yezdan Şer writes that Hacı Süleyman Ağa and Molla Sadık were engaged in conspiracy against him and the *kaimmakam* of Mardin Osman Pasha did not pay him the rations of the one thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry troops that he mustered. Angered by this, he seizes these two conspirators and punishes them accordingly (he does not specify how). Then he argues that if he had intentions of rebellion, he would have brought his family to his side and as a further proof of his obedience he offers to send his son or his *kethüda* (steward) as hostage.¹⁰⁸⁴

Yezdan Şer offers his terms for dispersing his troops and surrendering in a letter from Siirt, dated 7 January 1855. First, his family in Mosul must be allowed to come to Cizre. Second, the administration of the districts of Cizre and Botan must be given to him and the district of Hacı Behram to his brother Mansur Bey. Both of them should be issued orders of amnesty (*rey ve aman buyruldu*). Third, Said Bey of Şirvan, who holds the rank of *kapucubaşı*, should also receive that district and amnesty. Fourth, troops garrisoned at Garzan and Midyat should be removed from there. Fifth, his men, who were prisoners of war in Garzan, Midyat and Cizre should be released. He still argues that he came to Siirt on order to levy 1500 soldiers in order to join the Anatolian

1082 Finance minister to the grand vizier, 25 Zilkade 1271 (9 August 1855). BOA. İ. DH. 21234.

1083 See the *tezkire* of the grand vizier, dated 2 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (21 February 1855). BOA. İ. MMS. 4/135 lef 75. See Appendix 94.

1084 BOA. İ. MMS. 4/135 lef 62. See Appendix 76.

army in spring time. He was apprehensive due to the plots of some persons and would continue in good service if these plots and conspiracies against him were removed.¹⁰⁸⁵

No matter what he wrote in his letters, Yezdan Şer captured Bitlis with a force of two thousand horsemen in January or February 1855. Then in the middle of February 1855, he attacked the town of Midyat and plundered it. The British consul in Diyarbekir reported this event as follows:

Ezdeen shir Bey has lately attacked the district of Mediat which he has plundered and almost totally ruined. The Government troops, consisting solely of Bashi Bozuk, under a certain Abdullah Bey made little or no resistance, a portion returned to Mardin, and Abdullah Bey with the rest retired to his native village Sour between Mediat and Mardin, plundering all the villages on his way. He then tendered his resignation of his command which was accepted by Osman Pasha, Caimakam of Mardin without any kind of enquiry into his conduct... Troops, sent from Baghdad to Mosul to the amount of about three thousand regulars and four thousands bashi bozuk, are now said to be on their march towards Jezireh. His movement has caused Ezdeen shir Bey to withdraw from Mediat towards that place, and has prevented a threatened attack on Mardin.¹⁰⁸⁶

It was also reported that Yezdan Şer was on friendly terms with the Arabs in the vicinity of Mardin by sending them rich presents. His successes had greatly encouraged him, and it was believed that if he could disperse the government troops now on their way to Cizre, the Arabs would unite with him to attack and pillage Mosul.¹⁰⁸⁷ Yezdan Şer then subordinated Musul, Siirt and Van. Meanwhile the rebellion grew in size. Apart from Kurds, many Arabs, Nasturians and Greeks joined his forces. While Averyanov and some Kurdish historians write that the number of rebel forces reached 60,000 and even 100,000 according to another source, these figures are obviously much exaggerated.¹⁰⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the number of participants in this revolt was probably higher than that of Bedirhan. Some Ottoman sources as well confirm that the revolt of “İzzeddin Şir” was a bigger problem. For example the kaimmakam of the *sancak* of Zaho (that included Cizre, Hacı Behram and Bohtan as well) reported that it was by far bigger than that of Bedirhan, with an unheard of union and alliance among the Kurds from the time of the conquest of Kurdistan by the Ottomans and with unequalled violent

1085 BOA. İ. MMS. 4/135 lef 67, dated 17 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (7 January 1855). For the full transcription of this document, see my paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, pp. 309-311.

1086 BOA. HR. TO. 221/14, 15 February 1855. This report was sent to the British embassy in Constantinople and from there it was forwarded to the Ottoman foreign ministry. See my paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, pp. 311-312 for the original and Appendix 91 for its official translation into Ottoman Turkish.

1087 Ibid.

1088 Averyanov, op. cit., 1900, p. 149. Celile Celil (op. cit., p. 164) agrees with him.

battles.¹⁰⁸⁹ However, these expressions must also be viewed with some caution because the *kaimmakam* of Zaho is interested in exaggerating the number of insurgents so that his services be better appreciated.

Yezdan Şer had also written letters to the Russian army command for a joint operation. He thought the Russian army to be in Bayezid, but it army had retreated to Erivan to spend winter there. Thus his letters most probably did not reach Russian command.¹⁰⁹⁰ But it is doubtful whether the Russian army would take a initiative even if the letters had arrived, because at that time Prince Bebutov was very cautious or had received orders not to move too far beyond Erivan.

5.5.2. British Interference and the Supression of the Rebellion

Meanwhile the allies of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France began to be worried about the growth of this rebellion and weakening of the eastern front. Especially Britain was anxious to prevent the revolt from enlarging. So the British consul in Musul was given the task of negotiating between Yezdan Şer and Ottoman authorities. On the other hand, the British military commissioner at the Anatolian army, General Williams, had met Yezdan Şer in Cizre (Jezire) in 1849, then as Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, British representative in a commission¹⁰⁹¹ for the resolution of a border issue between the Porte and Iran. Williams decided to give him a guarantee on his life and property if he takes refuge at the British consulate in Musul. According to Adolphus Slade, Williams “had been led to believe him [Yezdan Şer] an oppressed man”.¹⁰⁹² Williams had, in his report to Clarendon, dated 12 December 1854, interpreted the news of the revolt as follows:

Sinister rumours of the insurrection of the Koords at Sert [Siirt], and in the direction of Bitlis, have reached me: this is the natural result of the robbery of the Bashi-Bozouks' pay by Zarif Mustafa Pasha, and Hassan Yaziji of Damascus.

1089 *Mazhar* (memorial or petition) of the *sancak* of Zaho, dated 15 January 1854. BOA. A. MKT. UM. 150/86. See Appendix 35.

1090 Averyanov, op. cit., 1900, p. 109. Halfin, op. cit., p. 59. Celil, op. cit., p. 165.

1091 The commission included Ferik Derviş Pasha from the Ottoman side, Mirza Cafer Han from Iran and Russian Colonel E. I. Chirikov as well. See Celile Celil, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

1092 Slade, op. cit., pp. 423-24. The Turkish translator of this work has simply put a question mark after the spelling of the name of İzzeddin Şir (or Yezdan Şer) by Slade (“İsdirinshir”), thereby showing his unawareness of Yezdan Şer. See *Türkiye ve Kırım Harbi*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, Gnkur. X. Ş., 1943, pp. 250-51.

These men returned to their camps full of discontent and vengeance against those who, instead of robbing them, should have led them against the enemy...¹⁰⁹³

General Williams did not want any detachments from the Anatolian army to be sent to suppress the revolt, because he was worried that this would weaken its position against the Russians. Therefore he wrote to Lord Stratford to urge the Porte not to use any part of the Anatolian army against this revolt.¹⁰⁹⁴ Lord Stratford accordingly advised the Porte not to send a detachment from the army at Kars against Yezdan Şer, but to use instead troops from Constantinople, joined by others from Syria (Halep).¹⁰⁹⁵ The Porte seemed to have accepted this proposal and decided to use troops from Bagdad as well. Nevertheless, Williams reported to Stratford that upon orders from Istanbul, Şükrü (Shukri) Pasha, the acting commander-in-chief of the Anatolian army, had ordered a regiment of infantry, a regiment of cavalry and a battery of six guns to leave Toprak Kale to advance upon Siirt and Cizre. Therefore Stratford gave a written instruction to the head dragoman Stephen Pisani, to be read to Grand Vezir Reşid Pasha, which reads in part as follows:

Besides the contradiction which is thus shown to exist between fact and assurance, it appears that, Toprak-Kaleh is the most important outpost of the Kars army, that the detachment could never reach its destination, owing to the deep snow and intense cold, and finally, that so hazardous a measure as the one in question was adopted without reference to the opinion of the British commissioner and by orders transmitted from Constantinople.

You will read what precedes to Reshid Pasha, and you will express the deep concern with which I contemplate this inconsistency of conduct on the part of Government, over which he presides. You will prepare him for the impression which will be made in England by a knowledge of the circumstances, and you will observe how impossible it is for the allies to act with any confidence of success, or to provide for their own responsibility, if the principal functionaries of the Porte exhibit so lamentable a want of fair dealing and common prudence.¹⁰⁹⁶

According to Pisani's report, Reşid Pasha did not accept "the charge of having dealt inconsistently and unfairly with Her Majesty's Embassy". He said that the order to Şükrü Pasha was made long before Stratford's representation to the Porte. Upon Stratford's suggestions, the Seraskier had sent a counter-order to abstain from detaching any of the troops under his command, informing him that the Porte had adopted other measures to quell the disturbances. Pisani also reported the Reşid Pasha had given

1093 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Erzerroom, December 12, 1854. PRMA, No. 72, p. 68.

1094 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, 19 February 1855. PRMA, No. 136, p. 130.

1095 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani, 17 February 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 136, p. 131.

1096 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani, 17 February 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 136, p. 131.

verbal instructions to the new commander-in-chief (Vasif Pasha), two days prior to his departure, to prevent any of the troops of the army at Kars or Erzurum leaving their posts. As to the non-reference to the opinion of the British Commissioner, Reşid Pasha

observed that Shukri Pasha was not bound to do so, because the orders he received from his superiors were peremptory, and consequently could on no account disregard them without swerving from his duty. The British Commissioner, added he, has a right to be consulted on matters immediately connected with the army in general, but not to interfere with orders issued direct from the Porte to its own officers on internal questions.¹⁰⁹⁷

Lord Stratford sent to the Earl of Clarendon, the British foreign minister, copies of his instruction to Pisani and Pisani's report of Reşid Pasha's reply, expressing his regret in a highly patronizing tone:

It is a matter of regret that Reshid Pasha allowed so important a step as the withdrawal of a portion, however comparatively small, of the army at Kars from the defensive positions which it occupies, to be taken without the knowledge of Her Majesty's Embassy, and I intend to apprize him in becoming language of my opinion in that respect.¹⁰⁹⁸

Meanwhile Williams decided to act on his own and he sent to Yezdan Şer a messenger, a certain Major Mahmud Ağa or Efendi, a Polish convert in the Anatolian army in Kars, who had come to Erzurum on duty. According to the reports of Hamdi Paşa, the ex-governor of Diyarbakir¹⁰⁹⁹ (now of Kastamonu), Osman Paşa, the kaimmakam of Mardin, and Kenan Paşa, the *kaimmakam* of Siirt, this Mahmud "Ağa", went directly to the side of Yezdan Şer, without ever visiting the commander of the Ottoman forces surrounding him.¹¹⁰⁰ In his letter to Yezdan Şer, dated 28 January 1855, Williams told him that they were aware of his correspondence with Kurdish chiefs in Van, Bitlis and Muş. In his capacity as the special commissioner of Britain, holding the rank of ferik from the Sultan, Williams warned Yezdan Şer not to go against three states. Williams guaranteed life and property to Yezdan Şer on behalf of Britain and France, if he surrendered on his own.¹¹⁰¹

1097 M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Pera, 18 February 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 2 in No. 136, p. 131.

1098 Stratford to Clarendon, 19 February 1855. PRMA, No. 136, p. 130.

1099 Although that province (*eyalet*) was formally known as the province of Kurdistan at that time, we see in grand vezir Reşid Pasha's petition to Sultan Abdülmecid the expression of "*Diyarbakir eyaleti*" as well. This suggests that both names were being used interchangeably.

1100 BOA. İ. DH. 20545. March 1855. See my paper in *Savaşın Barışa*, pp. 313-314. Sinan Hakan (op. cit., pp. 296-299) seems to be unaware that this Mahmud Efendi and Mahmud Ağa are the same person. Hakan guesses that Mahmud Efendi was probably the famous "Mele Mahmud-i Bazidi", which is not correct. Hakan (op. cit., pp. 299-300) also mentions the "King" of Britain (*İngiliz Kralı*) twice as guarantor. However, at that time Queen Victoria sat on the British throne.

1101 BOA. İ. MVL. 353/15435, quoted in simplified form by Hakan, op. cit., pp. 295-296.

British doctor Humphry Sandwith, the medical inspector in the Anatolian army under General Williams, on the other hand, writes in his memoirs that Mahmud “Efendi” visited first the Ottoman commander Kavaklı Mehmed Paşa, who on learning his mission arrested him, believing that he would already capture Yezdan Şer. However, for fear of the influence of General Williams, Mehmed Paşa later released Mahmud, and Mahmud went to Yezdan Şer, giving him the letters (or word?) from Williams.¹¹⁰² Yezdan Şer accepts Williams's offer of terms and promises to go to the British consulate in Musul to surrender together with his brother Mansur Bey and his retinue. Mahmud believed in the promise of Yezdan Şer and wrote to Ferik (Lieutenant-General) Veli Paşa of the Anatolian army that there was no need for his coming. Finally Yezdan Şer, his brother Mansur Bey, Şirvanlı Said Bey and İbrahim Bey, son of Said Bey of Hacı Behram went to Musul together with Major Mahmud and took refuge in the British consulate. Sandwith fully endorses the initiative of Williams as a “bold and prompt measure”, that “effected in a few days what it would have taken a larger Turkish army than that under Mehemed Cavakli Pasha as many months to accomplish”. Arguing that Williams probably saved the southern half of Turkey in Asia, Sandwith writes in unmistakably Orientalist, arrogant tones:

The word of an Englishman has such magic power in the East, that this rebel, when he had ascertained the validity of Mahmud Effendi's mission, at once chose rather to deliver himself up to the safekeeping of the Consul at Mosul, than run the risk of a hazardous mountain campaign, with followers difficult to manage, and ready to desert their colours on the least reverse. Not all the promises of all the viziers and pashas of the Turkish Empire could have enticed this wary chief into their power, since he well knew the faithlessness of such men.¹¹⁰³

Comparing the account of Sandwith and Williams with those of Hamdi, Osman and Kenan Pashas, it is not easy to establish the truth. If Williams had not interfered, would Yezdan Şer still be captured or forced to surrender by the forces of Kavaklı Mehmed Pasha? We can only speculate on this question. Williams, on the other hand, defending his action in his reply to Ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe, stated that he had obtained the consent of the Ottoman pashas and he had not assumed a right or an authority to make proposals to the rebel chief, but he had “entirely thrown himself on the favourable interpretation of Her Majesty's Government”, and also on that of His Excellency (the Ambassador). He begged to remark:

1102 Humphry Sandwith. *A Narrative of the Siege of Kars*. London: John Murray, 1856, 3rd edition, p. 213.

1103 Ibid, pp. 214-215.

- 1) That Mahmoud Effendi the officer in question was desired by Kherim Pasha, the officer in command at Kars to wait on me to put into my hands the letters of the traitor's correspondence with the enemy and to follow my directions. I therefore inclosed those letters to Your Excellency, and detained Mahmoud Effendi to fulfill the mission to the rebel Kurdish chief.
- 2) Before drawing up these letters, I consulted with the Governor General of this province, and also with Shukri Pasha, who pronounced the project as one worthy of being tried to save the flames of rebellion from spreading throughout Kurdistan.
- 3) The Governor's secretary wrote these letters for me, by the permission of His Excellency.
- 4) The Defterdar of the Army supplied Mahmoud Effendi with the necessary funds for prosecuting his journey; and the Governor General gave that officer orders for Horses etc.
- 5) My having made the personal acquaintance of the rebel at Jezireh in 1849, induced us all to hope that he would not turn a deaf ear to my appeal.¹¹⁰⁴

If these are correct then it becomes evident that Williams did not act on his own. Nevertheless, this may also show the helplessness of the pashas in Erzurum before him. When Major Mahmud and the Kurdish chiefs arrived in Mosul, the Ottoman pasha residing there tried to get them into his disposal. Nevertheless, the French consul did not give them away even in absence of the British consul. So Yezdan Şer and his associates in rebellion remained in Mosul until September 1855 and then sent to Constantinople via Diyarbekir under heavy security measures.

After the surrender of Yezdan Şer, his brother Mansur and some other chiefs, the rebel forces dispersed very quickly. The Russian army, on the other hand, during all the revolt of Yezdan Şer, remained too cautious and lost a very favourable opportunity to bring the Ottoman army between two fires by coordinating with the Kurdish rebels. Averyanov also argues in the same manner that had Yezdan Şer postponed his revolt until spring, when the newly appointed Russian commander in chief and governor general of the Caucasus (*Namestnik Kavkazskiy*) Nikolai Muravyov arrived; he could have received help from the Russians. But Prince Bebutov, the commander of the Russian army in Erivan, opposed all proposals to attack Van and to join the Kurds.¹¹⁰⁵

Yezdan Şer, Mansur and their retinue were imprisoned in Istanbul, where they remained until April 1856 and then they were exiled to Vidin. In the meantime the MVL had tried and found him guilty of killing sixty civilians in addition to his crimes against the state. Nevertheless, on learning of the exile of Yezdan Şer and his retinue to

1104 BOA. HR. TO. 221/18, dated 4 March 1855. An extract from Williams' letter to Stratford was presented to the Ottoman foreign ministry, bearing the title of "Excuses for and explanations of his reason for sending Mahmoud Effendi to Yez-di-sheer Bey". See my paper in *Savaşın Barışa*, p. 312.

1105 Averyanov, op. cit. p. 87.

Vidin without prior agreement with him, Stratford de Redcliffe protested in an official note to Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha on 17 April 1856. Stratford reminded Fuad Pasha that while he (Stratford) was “unwilling to interfere in a matter of internal concern”, nevertheless, Yezdan Şer and his retinue had surrendered to a British Officer and he (Stratford) had handed over them to the authority of the Porte provided that “their lives and properties being spared, they should be tried by the Supreme Council, and on conviction be disposed of according to what should be agreed upon between the Porte and Her Majesty's Embassy”. Stratford maintained that “the offenders” remained at the department of the Seraskier several months without trial. Stratford then wrote that, three days ago, his

attention was drawn to the unexpected circumstance of their having been sent away from Constantinople without any previous communication of the proceedings instituted against them, or any preconcerted arrangement for their ultimate disposal. This negligence is the more to be regretted as questions of property were at issue, and Her Majesty's Government in sanctioning the promise given to Yez-di-sheer Bey, that his property as well as his life should be spared did not lose sight of the circumstances which throw a suspicion on his manner of acquiring that property, and give a presumptive claim upon part of it, at least, to those whom his violence and cruelty had despoiled.

The Undersigned remembers that when he had the honor of being received in private by Fuad Pasha more than a fortnight since, His Excellency spoke incidentally of the Porte's inclination to send the above mentioned rebels into exile, to which he could have seen no objection, if the concerted engagements had been previously fulfilled, and his Government duly apprized of the intended decision.

On learning the real state of the case from Mr. Pisani, the Undersigned conveyed to Fuad Pasha his expectation that the rebels, who had surrendered to a British officer, and been transferred under agreement to the Porte, should be brought back to Constantinople as the only effective way of correcting the error which had been committed, and enabling the Porte to redeem the pledge which it had previously given to Her Majesty's Embassy.

The Undersigned formed an additional cause of surprise in learning from His Excellency that the required measure would be deemed a disparagement of the Sovereign's dignity. Surely no movements, however inconvenient to himself, of a rebel in custody of the Porte's officers, could have such an effect. The only point of view, in which the interpretation can be admitted, is that of the change being occasioned by foreign interference. But in the present case there was a previous agreement, founded on very peculiar circumstances, between the Porte and the Embassy, and, if there were really any question of disparagement, it could only result from the neglect of that agreement.¹¹⁰⁶

Upon this note, Fuad Pasha replied first verbally that the matter had already been agreed upon between them and then in an official, carefully worded note, explained how

1106 Stratford de Redcliffe to Fuad Pasha, 17 April 1856. BOA. HR. TO. 222/59. Official translation into Turkish is in BOA. İ. HR. 131/6698 lef 1, dated 3 June 1856. See my paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, pp. 317-320.

the Sublime Porte amnestied a savage criminal, deserving capital punishment under any law, just out of respect to its ally and enclosed a list of the crimes committed by the rebel against the population.¹¹⁰⁷

Yezdan Şer and his associates fled to Bosnia in January 1858, but they were captured and returned to their exile in Vidin in April 1858.¹¹⁰⁸ A year later his family was allowed to join him in exile.¹¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, his receivables from some Kurdish notables were also collected and sent to him.¹¹¹⁰ In 1865 the brothers apply for an appointment in state service. In reply, it was said that they were now free within the vilayet of *Tuna* (the Danube), but they still had to wait for some time to get appointed to state service.¹¹¹¹ Finally Yezdan Şer was appointed as the administrator of the district of Adliye within the province of *Tuna*, and then in 1868 became the mutasarrıf of Janina.¹¹¹² He probably died in this post, in the 1870s.¹¹¹³

5.5.3. Desertions and the *Başbozuk* Troops as a Source of Disorder

Desertions from the Ottoman army had started even before the war. Especially the reserve troops (*redif*), who were middle aged, married men with a family to feed, tended to desert at the first opportunity. For example, in August 1853, 500 *redif* soldiers on their way to Erzurum had deserted in the vicinity of Sivas and Tokat, becoming outlaws and robbing caravans and passengers. They had also killed a Greek on the way to Amasya.¹¹¹⁴ During the Crimean War, Ottoman recruits were caught and delivered from the villages, by way of arresting anyone who happened to be eligible and there, without subjecting them to the draft. This was especially so for the Anatolian army. The levies from Egypt were collected likewise. According to Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha, 30 *redif* soldiers deserted on their way from Kars to Ardahan in October 1853.¹¹¹⁵ According to

1107 BOA. İ. HR. 131/6698 lef 2. See my paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, pp. 321-323.

1108 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 130/74. Cf. Hakan, op. cit., pp. 304-305. Hakan refers to another document from the BOA.

1109 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 374/53.

1110 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 387/29 ve A. MKT. UM. 396/68.

1111 BOA. İ. MVL. 24032.

1112 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 407/76.

1113 Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 845.

1114 Grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 25 Zilkade 1269 (30 August 1853). BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 88/46. For the transcription of this document, see my paper in *Savaştan Barışa*, 2007, p. 301.

1115 Ali Rıza Pasha's statement. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4. See Appendix 79. On desertions from the Anatolian army before and during the war, also see, BOA. A. MKT. UM. 162/53, dated 9 August

Doctor Sandwith, early in 1855, “desertions had become so numerous that it was well-known the province of Sivas alone contained 10,000 men who had left their colours”.¹¹¹⁶

Some of the soldiers who deserted from the Kars army during the siege of Kars in 1855 were taken prisoner by the Russians and returned during the exchange of prisoners of war after the end of the war. Upon their return to Istanbul by ships, these deserters were tried at the military court (*Divan-ı Harb*) presided by Ferik Hafız Pasha. Thus we have the opportunity to “hear” soldiers’ voices as recorded in the court records. One of them, Sergeant Said of Muş from the 8th company of the 3rd battalion of the 4th regular infantry regiment of the Anatolian army said during his interrogation that although he had been proposed for promotion to the rank of lieutenant, he received a sergeant’s salary for two years during his service in Kars and he became indebted (*borçlu düştüm*). His children in his hometown were left starving (*Vilayetimde çoluk çocuğum aç kaldı*). Said then says that he decided to go to Erzurum and told the doctor (Tabip Ahmed Efendi) about his intention, whereupon the doctor urged him to take his (doctor’s) horse as well. He fled during the night and he was caught by the Russians. Said repeatedly told that the reason for his desertion was debt and hunger (*Gider ve borçtan ve açlıktan ziyade sıkıldım firar ettim*). Nevertheless he had re-married in Kars. To the question of why he left his wife in Kars, he answered that his wife’s father could take care of her and he fled because one’s life is dearer than everything (*Can cümleden akdem olduğundan kendimi kurtarırım hülyasıyla kaçtım*).¹¹¹⁷

Another deserter, Sergeant Osman of Istanbul (*Asitane*), from the 7th company of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regular infantry regiment of the Anatolian army also answered that his desertion was due to hunger (*açlıktan dolayı*). When he was asked whether he received less rations than others, he said that they all received equal rations but he could not endure hunger any more (*Lakin ben açlığa sabır ve tahammül edemedim ve biraz daha kalsam idi açlıktan telef olacak idim. Anın için kaçtım*). Sergeant Osman had deserted 45 days after the Battle of Tahmas (meaning the Battle of Kars on 29 September 1855, Tahmas was one of the bastions of Kars) and 7 days before the fall of Kars in his own words. The interrogators of Osman questioned Corporal Halil and

1854, from the governor of Sivas on desertions after the battle of İncedere (Kürekdere). Also see Veysel Şimşek, *Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit: 1826-1853*, MA Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2005, pp. 74-79 and Colonel Atwell Lake, *Narrative of the Defence of Kars*. London: Richard Bentley, 1857, p. 132.

1116 Sandwith, op. cit., p. 229.

1117 *Mazbata* of the *Divan-ı Harb*, BOA. İ. DH. 362/23964, dated 12 Safer 1273 (12 October 1856). See Appendix 112.

Captain İbrahim Ağa as well about Osman's desertion. Captain İbrahim told that there were five soldiers together with Sergeant Osman who deserted during their night duty. Corporal Halil told that Sergeant Osman had taken him and Corporal Hasan for duty. They told him that they would desert and asked him to go with them. However, Halil did not accept, while the two deserted.

The *başıbozuk* troops or the *asakir-i muvazafa* as they were called interchangeably and more officially, had always been a source of trouble.¹¹¹⁸ They robbed and killed civilians wherever they passed or stayed. While they committed crimes against all population, the non-Muslims were affected more because being unarmed they were more vulnerable. During the Crimean War the *başıbozüks* continued their atrocities and plunder. However, this time their activities were exposed to the attention of the Ottoman authorities more energetically due to the presence of the allied armies and allied officers in Ottoman armies. Now that the British and French embassies were in an excellent position to dictate policy to the Porte, they pressurized the Porte to bring the *başıbozuk* into order and to prevent their atrocities. In this respect Stratford de Redcliffe really stands out among ambassadors. It seems that there are simply more official notes submitted by him to the Porte than all other ambassadors put together. Aided by the net of British consuls spread out all over the Ottoman Empire, the British ambassador was well-informed of many events even before Ottoman ministers heard of them and energetically pressed for measures.

The *Hariciye Siyasi* and *Hariciye Tercüme Odası* collections of the BOA contain many extracts of from British consular reports submitted to the Sublime Porte. These reports include complaints about *başıbozüks* and also about the pashas who were supposed to bring the *başıbozüks* under order. Such complaints about local officials are also sent by individuals and local *meclises* but these councils were in most cases in the hands of the governor who dictated his will. Non-Muslim members of these local councils, the primates (*kocabaşı*) were not in a position to influence its decisions either. It is even doubtful that they understood fully what was written in the *mazbata* (resolution or round robin of the council) to which they put their seals. Among the non-Muslims, the representative of the Greek millet (*Rum kocabaşı*) came first. Then came the Armenian and Jewish *kocabaşıs*.

1118 James Reid (op. cit., p. 270) argues that they were also called *muâvine asker* (auxiliary troops), probably referring to Mahmud Nedim Pasha during his governorship of Beirut. However, my research in the BOA has shown that he words *asakir-i muâvine* meant the allied troops in the context of the Crimean War.

The mobilization of the *başıbozuk* troops started in the summer of 1853 and the reports of British consulates started to come in at this time as well. The first reports seem to come from places like Amasya, Thessaly, Salonica and Damascus, where Muslims and Christians lived close to each other. Thessaly and Salonica were sensitive areas of Greek nationalism and later insurgence, where some Albanian and other *başıbozuk* troops were concentrated. As early as 15 June 1853, a British consular report probably from Trabzon stated that the *redif* troops had committed “excesses” towards Christians in Amasya.¹¹¹⁹ Lord Stratford immediately sent a note to Reşid Pasha, protesting the “insults and offenses” against “persons under British protection”.¹¹²⁰ This suggests that these Christians were probably Protestants. Then we have the following report in July 1853 from the British consulate in Salonica:

By the last accounts up to the 19th instant, which I have received from Volo and Larissa, the alarm still continues both in consequence of the conduct of the irregular troops and the number of other Albanians in that vicinity, who have come to Thessaly in the hopes of being employed by the several chiefs. The irregulars are also clamorous for the pay which is due to them...

The Archbishop of Salonica has received intelligence of the Greek monastery on Mount Olympus having been plundered of every thing, and that the monks were afterwards tormented in the, I may say, now usual Thessalian way; viz, with drops of boiling oil upon their chests, because they did not confess where the money of the monastery was secreted. There is also advice that another monastery in the vicinity Cosnia has been plundered and the monks tormented in the same way with drops of boiling oil. These sacrileges are supposed to have been committed by the disbanded Derbent troops of Haggi Hussein Pasha. There can be no doubt but that the Christians will suffer in certain districts during the passage of the irregular troops to their homes, in the event of present differences being arranged without coming to hostilities, unless indeed the Porte provide for the safety of the people either by the escort of each corps of irregulars by a troop of cavalry, or conveying them by steamers to the coast of Albania. These irregulars enlist more for plunder than patriotism.¹¹²¹

The consul also suggested that an “active military man of rank” with some troops should be appointed to command all irregular chiefs from his head quarters in Larissa.¹¹²²

Another report from the British consulate in Damascus at about the same time stated that a certain Resul Ağa's “300 Koordish irregular horsemen” had robbed and killed 12 persons at Raşiye (Rasheya).¹¹²³

1119 Extrait d'une lettre d'Amasia. BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 3, dated 15 June 1853. See Appendix 6.

1120 Stratford à Monsieur Etienne Pisani. BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 1, dated 22 June 1853. See Appendix 7.

1121 Extract from the report of the British consulate in Salonica to the British embassy in Istanbul, July 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1928/14 lef 2. See Appendix 11.

1122 Salonica, July 11 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1928/14 lef 1. See Appendix 11.

The grand vizier wrote orders (*tahrirat-ı samiye*) to the commander of the Rumeli army Ömer Lütü Pasha and to the governor of Tırhala on 29 October 1853. In the instructions to Ömer Pasha, the translation of a report submitted to the Sublime Porte on the disorders (*uygunsuzluklar*) of the başıbozuk troops in some places, is said to have been attached. (This is most probably another British or French consular report). The grand vizier wrote that needless to say, it was necessary in those troublesome (*gaileli*) days to satisfy all subjects of the state more than ever and not to offend them in any way (*umum tebaa ve zirdestanı her vakitden ziyade hoş tutup hiçbir suretle incitmemek*) and to protect their property and honour (*emniyet-i maliye ve namusiyelerini muhafaza etmek*). However, the grand vizier stated, the başıbozuk troops were perpetrating all kinds of cruel and indecent treatment (*muamelat-ı zalimane ve bi-edebane*) towards some wretched people and other subjects (*birtakım aceze ve tebaa*). Then the grand vizier reminds of the recently issued imperial order (*irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i padişahi*) and the grand vizirial orders (*evamir-i aliyye*) sent to all the commanders, demanding the prevention of such actions.¹¹²⁴

The order to the governor of Tırhala also mentioned an enclosure, a letter from Yenişehir-i Fenar (it is not indicated from whom) about the atrocities (*muamelat-ı zalimane ve gaddaraneleri*) of the başıbozüks employed in that region. Such actions were very harmful and causing all kinds of evil in that critical time, if those things that were stated to influence the opinion of the people were also correct (*bu muameleden dolayı efkâr-ı ahaliye arız olacağı beyan olunan şeyler dahi sahih ise şu nazik vakitte gayet muzırr ve dürlü fenalığı müntic olacağına*).¹¹²⁵ The governor was accordingly ordered to prevent these atrocities.

We have seen that başıbozuk troops committed atrocities in Şekvetil, Ahışa and around Gümrü in Armenian villages. They also decapitated some enemy troops or civilians in order to receive cash rewards. At Bayındır, in the battle of the irregular cavalry about 100 severed heads were brought to Ahmed Pasha who gave 50 piastres each to those who brought them, officially registering their names (*defter tanzimiyle*). Then he had them loaded into carts and sent to Kars to the müşir.¹¹²⁶ Ahmed Pasha had also sent the müdir of the kaza of Şüregel Meded Bey together with chiefs of Kurdish

1123 Extract from the report of the British consulate in Damascus. BOA. HR. TO. 219/50, dated 16 July and 1 August 1853.

1124 *Tahrirat-ı Samiye* to Ömer Pasha and to the governor of Tırhala. BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/41, 29 October 1853.

1125 Ibid.

1126 BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, question 15. See Appendix 83.

tribes such as Kasım Ağa of the Zilanlı tribe, Beto (Tebo?) and Hasan Beys of the Kaskan tribe, Serhenk Ağa of the Cemedanlı tribe and the like to a Cossack village called Tuhaber (?) on the Russian side. They had plundered the village and taken some prisoners as slaves. While the military *meclis* in Erzurum stated that they heard that Ahmed Pasha had taken one of the slave girls as *odalık* for himself but Abdi Pasha had had him release her. Other slaves had remained in the hands of the Kurdish chiefs. Inspector Hayreddin Pasha also asked the *meclis* about 10,200 cattle and horses, 29,838 sheep, 2,760 *somars* (about 550 tons) of barley and 3,280 *somars* (about 650 tons) of wheat that was said to have been plundered from some ten villages. The Erzurum *meclis* stated that such acts of plunder were committed by the local tribes and voluntary troops with the approval of Ahmed Pasha but regular and irregular troops were not sent. Abdi Pasha said that it was rumored that the Revan tribe had plundered some Russian villages and returned to Ottoman territory and probably this news had taken such a form.¹¹²⁷

At the beginning of March 1854, the Armenian Patriarch and the *meclis* of the Armenian *millet* applied to the grand vizier, complaining about the atrocities and plundering of the *başıbozuk* volunteers going to the Anatolian army (to Erzurum and Kars). According to the petition of the Armenian patriarch and the *meclis*, these *başıbozüks* had collected by force 5,000 to 10,000 piastres each for their chiefs (*başbuğ*) and 40 to 50 piastres for each *başıbozuk* as well as horses from the *reaya* in the villages of the districts of Eğin, Arapkir, Kuruçay, Çemişkezek and Divriği in the provinces of Harput and Sivas. They had severely beaten those who could not pay this amount, entered houses, demanded food and even dishonoured women (*ırzlarına tasallut*). They had also closed churches during Easter for 15 days in some places. Therefore the patriarch and the *meclis* asked for orders to be sent to the administrators of the region to prevent these outrages.¹¹²⁸ The grand vizier sent orders to the governors of Harput and Sivas and to other governors and *mutasarrıfs*.¹¹²⁹

In March 1854, there were reports from the British consuls in Varna, Edirne and Erzurum as well on pillaging, outrages and other disorders by the *başıbozüks*. The British consul at Varna reported to Lord Stratford on 12 March 1854 on the outrages and disorders perpetrated by “Turkish irregular troops” in the vicinity of Rahova (Rassova) on the Danube. According to him,

1127 Ibid, question 19. See Appendix 83.

1128 BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/18 lef 1, dated 2 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (2 March 1854). See Appendix 38.

1129 BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/18 lef 2.

A party of Mokans (Transylvanian shepherds) driven by the concentration of Russian troops in Wallachia, sought refuge with their flocks on an island situated opposite Rassova. The Turkish irregular troops appear to have gone over to the island and although the Mokans stated that they were Austrian subjects and occupied the island for no hostile purpose and urged in proof of this statement that they were unarmed thirty of their number were decapitated on the spot and six or seven thousand sheep were carried off by the Bashi Bozuks. One of the Mokans who escaped has arrived in Varna, and the depositions he has made upon this event form the subject of a report which the Austrian Vice-Consul here has addressed by this occasion to the Internuncio.¹¹³⁰

The consul added that similar and still greater atrocities had been committed by the *başıbozüks* upon the inhabitants of the village of Keserler, five hours distant from Rahova. The women were dishonored and many of the men and children killed. Those who managed to escape, had fled to the woods.

Thanks to regular steamship mails between Varna and Istanbul, the report reached Istanbul quickly and Stratford lost no time in remonstrating against the Porte, although the shepherds were Austrian subjects. The tone of his instructions to his head dragoman, to be read to Reşid Pasha, was indignant and even vehement:

Not many days have elapsed since I reported the crimes which had been perpetrated by the Bashi-Boosooks at Eski-Zaara and other places in that neighbourhood and the Turkish minister promised to redress by adequate measures the wrongs of which I complained.

The steamer from Varna has brought in this morning a fresh catalogue of crimes perpetrated by the same people. I inclose Consul Neale's dispatch describing the disorderly and atrocious acts which he so justly reprobates. The places where these acts occurred are an island *on the Danube near Russova* and *Kesserler* five hours distant from that place. The decapitation of thirty shepherds and the plunder of their numerous flocks are circumstances which, standing in connection with each other exhibit at once the sanguinary character of the *Bashi-Boosooks* and motive of their cold blooded cruelty. Such outrages on humanity are a dishonor to the country where they occur and to the army which allows their perpetrators to cooperate with it. Measures must be adopted to check them, or it will ultimately be found impossible for Christian Powers to act in concert with the Turkish Authorities...

There is no excuse to be found for this shameful indifference either in religion or in policy. True religion cannot possibly warrant such horrors. The professors of a religion acting with such barbarous inhumanity would deserve to be treated as the enemies of mankind. As for policy, the true policy of the Porte is to obtain the sympathies of Christendom and to maintain discipline in its armies. The Bashi-Boosooks are notorious cowards in presence of the enemy. All their prowess is exhausted in ravaging their Sovereign's country, and slaughtering his peaceful subjects. They are worse than useless. Their disorders unsettle the regular army; their example disheartens the good soldier.

1130 British consul in Varna Lt. Col. Edward St. John Neale to Stratford de Redcliffe, dated 12 March 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 125. See Appendix 39.

I repeat that means must be found to put down so intolerable a scandal, and I call upon the Porte to acquaint me with its intentions in this respect.¹¹³¹ [*Italics underlined in the original*]

Within a few days the consul in Erzurum also wrote on the plundering of the helpless peasants in the neighbouring villages by the *başibozuk* troops. He added that he heard that the infamous *başibzouk* chief Hasan Yazıcı had been arrested by Selim Pasha in Bayezid.¹¹³² Another consular report from Edirne stated that the *başibozuks* from Maraş and Ankara had committed atrocities on their way to Şumnu.¹¹³³ Another British consular report stated that the Muslim and non-Muslim notables of Yenişehir-i Fenar were demanding regular troops to be sent to disperse the *başibozuks*. These inhabitants also stated that if the Sublime Porte did not send troops, then they would apply to the insurgents (*usat*) who were already offering their services to free the people from the tyranny of the *başibozuks*.¹¹³⁴

British chief engineer General Sir John Burgoyne wrote from Varna to Lord Stratford that some inhabitants of villages around Şumnu and Varna addressed to him complaints about the insults made on them and their wives and their daughters, by the *başibozuks*, who crossed the country. According to him, the inhabitants were ready to provide residences, provisions and horse fodder to these people and even to make expenditures for them; but they asked only for personal protection for themselves and their families. Burgoyne suggested to have small detachments of regular cavalry troops or mounted gendarmes, who would go round the villages, obtain necessary information, and have the authority to punish culprits in a summary way.¹¹³⁵ At the beginning of April 1854 Stratford again applied to the Porte about the disorders of the Albanian *başibozuks* under the command of Nureddin Ağa.¹¹³⁶ Another complaint on the irregular troops came from the Prussian embassy, which stated that the oppressions of Christian subjects at the hands of these quite worthless irregular troops could turn the European public opinion against the Porte.¹¹³⁷

1131 Lord Stratford's instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani, 14 March 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 130-131.

1132 BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/21 and HR. TO. 220/18, dated 16 March 1854.

1133 BOA. HR. TO. 220/16, dated 16 March 1854.

1134 BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/28 lef 2, dated 21 March 1854.

1135 Extrait d'une lettre du Général Burgoyne à Lord Stratford en date du 23 Mars 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 142. See Appendix 41. A translation of this letter into Ottoman Turkish is in BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/28 lef 1. The translator indicates the date of the original letter as 3 March but this must be a typing error.

1136 BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 170, dated 9 April 1854.

1137 BOA. HR. SYS. 1336/3 lef 1, dated 19 April 1854.

The British officer George Palmer Evelyn noted that the *başibozuk* cavalry in Ömer Pasha's army committed "great ravages and atrocities, violating and murdering women, and burning villages" during the retreat of the Ottoman army from Machin in April 1854.¹¹³⁸

On 18 April 1854 Sultan Abdülmecid issued a firman on the punishment of the unlawful acts of the *başibozuks*.¹¹³⁹ The firman was published on 7 May 1854 in the *Takvim-i Vekayi* as well.¹¹⁴⁰ It declared that some persons of the *asakir-i muvazzafe*, known by the name of *başibozuk*, who were unable to distinguish between good and evil, perpetrated acts of violence and plunder against the life, property and honour of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Such actions and behaviour was to be punished severely. The perpetrators were to be arrested and sent to army commanders and *müşirs*, whose military courts were authorized to pass capital punishment on the perpetrators. However, this firman and other orders from the Porte seem not to have changed much. Reports and complaints from various parts of the empire and from British and French consuls continued to come in.

The Greek insurgence in Thessaly and Epirus increased complaints of the conduct of the *başibozuks*. For example, the British Acting Consul in Salonica Henry Razy reported the following on 9 May 1854 to the British ambassador Lord Stratford:

A body of the insurgents who landed at "Seikia" proceeded to "Poleiros" and endeavoured to excite the inhabitants to rise. Their efforts were ineffectual, the Primates on the 14/26 April sent off intelligence to Galatesta, about 5 hours distant, where Hassan Aga and Mahmut Bey were at the head of 800 Bashee-Bozouks entreating them to come to their assistance and drive out the invaders who were only 200 strong and tormented them. The Bashee-Bozouks of 4 times that force, however, hesitated and it was only after repeated requests personally made by the Primates that they at last consented to set out. This was on the 20/2 May. While on the march and near "Votenia" they encountered a poor woodcutter about 55 years of age upon whom they alleged to have found papers proving a connection with the insurgents, him they beheaded instantly. This was but the preliminary to more horrible excesses. Arrived within about 10 minutes walk of Poleiros, they were met by two of the Primates and conducted to the outskirts of the village where the rest of the Primates 23 in number received them with all cordiality; the 200 insurgents having some days previously decamped. For a few minutes the best understanding seemed to be established between the leaders of the Bashee-Bozooks and the Primates, and it is even said that the customary cup of coffee had been served, when the former exclaimed pointing to the mountains, "who are these people approaching", nothing was visible but some flocks of goats

1138 George Palmer Evelyn, *A Diary of the Crimea*, London, 1954, p. 54, quoted by Reid, op. cit., p. 246.

1139 BOA. İ. DH. 18680, dated 20 Receb 1270. The language of this firman is full of Arabic and Persian words and not understandable for the *başibozuks* themselves. Nevertheless, this did not really matter because they were illiterate anyway.

1140 TV, 9 Şaban 1270. For its transliteration, see Yapıcı, op. cit., pp. 40-44.

and the Primates replied, of course, in that sense. Presently a Bashee-Bozook was dispatched as if to reconnoitre. In a few minutes, a preconcerted signal was heard, a shot was given by the bidette (?) the chiefs of the irregulars at once exclaimed “cut them down” an order you may well supposed promptly responded to by their followers. The work of slaughter commenced and the 23 primates soon succumbed under the edge of the yatagan, nor were their lifeless corpses unmolested, but were hacked and mutilated in such a manner as to become unrecognisable – nor was this all. 4 or 5 of the Kirajis actually employed by the troops in carrying their ammunition were at the same time indiscriminately massacred.

That this sanguinary scene was not an act of insubordination on the part of the soldiers, but one of deliberate resolve on the part of Hassan Aga and Mahmut Bey is quite clear. The troops on subsequent entering the village committed no excesses whatever; that the act was a premeditated one is evident, for previous to this butchery the Bulak-Bashis ordered the “Kirajis” about a hundred in number who accompanied the expedition, to keep close to their horses – the 4 or 5 unfortunate individuals who fell in the massacre it appears had unhappily not heeded the injunction.

All these victims were personally and well known to Hassan Aga and Mahmut Bey, what may have been their motive, it not easy to divine! Let the cause be what it may the effects stand before us as an incontestable fact and while it makes our best feelings revolt and cause the blood of Christian men to boil with indignation, it must ever stamp all concerned in the diabolical atrocity and most of all the Master fiends Hassan Aga and Mahmut Bey with undying infamy”.¹¹⁴¹

Upon receiving this report Lord Stratford again applied to Grand Vizier Resid Pasha to demand justice in very strong words:

His Highness will find in Mr. Razy’s dispatch an ample confirmation of the massacre previously denounced to him. The discrepancies of detail are few and unimportant. We have in both reports the butchery without provocation or resistance, of about thirty Christians, more than twenty of whom were primates of district, by a band of irregular troops, or *Bashee-Bozooks*, [underlined in the original] summoned from Salonica to protect them against the Hellenic marauders, who had vainly endeavoured to seduce them from allegiance, and acting by command of two Turkish leaders, whose names are given identically in both accounts.

No words of horror and indignation, however natural, no cries for vengeance, however just, can give any additional weight to simple statement of facts like these. We have at once in view of the cruel, cowardly, calculated butchers, together with the innocent, unarmed, unsuspecting victims, - the former betraying the honor of their Sovereign, the latter sacrificed by their submission to his authority. In every heart not rendered callous by brutal passion or senseless fanaticism there is what calls for judgement on the one and sympathy with the other. I will not insult the Turkish Ministers by supposing it otherwise with them. Indeed I am assured by you that they are alive to the requirements of justice in this case, and to the obligation of punishing with exemplary rigour an outrage which is

1141 BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 213-214, dated 9 May 1854.

no less treasonable towards the Porte, than disgraceful to humanity, and ruinous to the Empire. It is enough therefore, I hope for me to repeat.¹¹⁴²

The French ambassador Baraguey d'Hilliers also made a representation to the Porte in June on the atrocities committed by the *başıbozüks* in Thessaly. Baraguey d'Hilliers stated that the government had raised 5,000 *başıbozüks*, but with the consent of the pasha of Larissa their number had risen to more than 20,000 and they were doing all kinds of repressions against Christians. He maintained that,

Thessaly and its inhabitants are treated by them like a conquered territory and an enemy population. The cries of the Christians, victims of these disorders, will resound soon in all the capitals of Europe, and the public opinion, moved, irritated, will accuse the Ottoman government and its allies of improvidence or partiality.¹¹⁴³ [My translation]

Another consular report from Salonica stated that the depredations committed by the Albanians were increasing daily. The *başıbozuk* should be recalled from the interior to Salonica. Mehmet Pasha was weak and timid against them¹¹⁴⁴.

After the concentration of French and British troops in Varna, reports started to come from Bulgaria on the disorders there. Towards the end of July 1854, Stratford had “again to perform the painful duty of bringing to the knowledge of the Ottoman secretary of state a barbarous outrage committed by one class of the Sultan's subjects upon another” in the immediate vicinity of the British camp in Bulgaria. Stratford wrote that according to the report of General Sir de Lacy Evans, the Christian inhabitants of a village had been “turned out of their homes by a band of Mussulman strangers”, and “forced to seek shelter from worse violence in the neighboring forest”.¹¹⁴⁵ Shortly afterwards on 12 August Stratford again had to complain of the wrongful treatment of Bulgarian peasants in the purchase of provisions for the army.¹¹⁴⁶

We have seen in Chapter 3 that the British tried to reinforce their army in the Crimea by hiring regular and irregular Ottoman troops. Thus in the spring of 1855 British recruitment officers were sent to some provinces for this purpose, including

1142 Stratford de Redcliffe's instructions to head dragoman Pisani to be read to Reşid Pasha. BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 215-216, dated 14 May 1854. See Appendix 46.

1143 “*La Thessalie et les habitants sont traités par eux comme une terre conquise et une population ennemie. Les cris des chrétiens, victimes de ces désordres, retentiront avant peu dans toutes les capitales de l'Europe, et l'opinion publique, émue, irritée, accusera le gouvernement ottoman et ses alliés d'imprévoyance ou de partialité.*” BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 34, dated 11 June 1854.

1144 BOA. HR. TO. 220/35, dated 15 June 1854.

1145 Redcliffe to Reşid Pasha. BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 42, dated 29 July 1854. See my paper in *Savaştan Barişa*, pp. 306-307.

1146 Redcliffe to Reşid Pasha, 12 August 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 24-25. See my paper in *Savaştan Barişa*, p. 307.

Colonel Walpole who was sent to Damascus (Şam-ı Şerif). With the help of local authorities Walpole started recruiting irregular cavalry there in March 1855 and the number of his troops reached about 500 hundred by mid May. However, according to reports from the governor, the city *meclis* and the chief of staff of the Arabistan army Mehmed İzzet Pasha, he recruited his men from disreputable and ignorant persons who wanted to take revenge from some persons. These levies also started molesting women and the shopkeepers in the city. Colonel Walpole himself had an Ottoman soldier from the second infantry regiment arrested at the gate of the *idadiye* school and taken his *konak* where he had him beaten, because the soldier had not saluted him.¹¹⁴⁷ It seems that these levies increased their acts of violence against the population to such an extent that signs of serious mass violence became evident in the city (*asakir-i muvazzafadan bazı cühela takımının meşhud olan hareketleri üzerine bayağı ihtilal emaresi runüma olduğu halde*).¹¹⁴⁸ Therefore the governor Vamık Pasha sent an official note to Colonel Walpole and kindly requested him either to take the troops out of the city or to take measures that they went about unarmed and did not molest anybody.¹¹⁴⁹

Next day the *meclis* of Damascus convened and discussed the matter together with all the foreign consuls in the city except for the British consul Mr Wood, who was in Beyrut at that time. A *mazbata* (round robin) signed by Governor Vamık Pasha and other members of the council of the province (*eyalet meclisi*), including the representatives of the Greek, Catholic and Jewish communities, was sent to the Porte complaining of the misdeeds of the British officer and his recruits.¹¹⁵⁰ First it confirmed the receipt of the relevant order from the Porte, dated 17 February 1855, on the recruitment of irregular cavalry for the British army. (The order seems to have reached Damascus rather late, on 7 April 1855). The order was read in the council of the province. The *mazbata* further stated that the British officer sent for the recruitment paid no attention to the Ottoman authorities, did not consult them and recruited around 500 soldiers for cavalry and infantry from among the riff raff (*süfefa ve erazil takımı*) of Damascus. Yet these ruffians (*haşerat*, literally “insects”) enjoying the liberties given to them by the British officer, started committing outrages, molesting women and taking

1147 Mehmed İzzet Pasha to the Seraskier, 29 Şaban 1271 (17 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/51.

1148 Mehmed İzzet Pasha to the Seraskier, 7 Ramazan 1271 (24 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/61.

1149 Vamık Pasha to Colonel Walpole, 28 Şaban 1271 / 15 May 1855. (Copy). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/71. Both Julian and Muslim dates are shown in the original, however, there is an error: 28 Şaban corresponds to 16 May.

1150 *Mazbata* of the *meclis* of Damascus, Selh-i [29] Şaban 1271 (17 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/49. See Appendix 97.

revenge on people against whom they had old grievances. The British officer was kindly requested to put a stop these acts but he apparently did not accept it.

After that the irregular troops of Colonel Walpole became more impudent and increased their violence. The shopkeepers shut up their magazines and came to the governor's office to make a complaint. Therefore a special council consisting of the chief of staff and the Defterdar of the Arabistan army, Molla Efendi, some members of the grand council of the province, the consuls of France, Austria, Sardinia and Iran, the dragomans of the consulates of Britain and Prussia convened and decided that the troops in question should be sent to Hama or to the village of Kibbe (Kıyye?) near Damascus or if these are not accepted then allowed to go around disarmed, otherwise there would no other solution than applying the law against them. Then Colonel Walpole took offense and moved to the village Dum (?) with his troops in protesting mode. The *meclis* then sent deputies to invite him back to Damascus.

It seems remarkable that the British military commissioner (Colonel Walpole) apparently defied Ottoman authority by arresting an Ottoman soldier in daylight and the governor or the chief of staff of the Ottoman Arabistan army cannot not do anything against him, except apply to the foreign consuls resident in the city. The British commissioner seems to have acted in total disregard for the local authorities.

One of the main problems with the *başıbozüks* was that the *başıbozüks* were themselves robbed by the pashas of their rations and secondly, they were in most cases collected from unreliable elements, who looked upon the war as a means of getting booty or who were fanatically anti-Christian. In any case, unable to receive food for themselves and for their horses, they resorted to pillaging the population. Even the regular soldiers did not receive any pay for months and years. General Williams reported that in the Anatolian army in Erzurum there were soldiers who had not received any pay for the last 15 to 22 months.¹¹⁵¹ These payments did not reach them even if they were sent. The command of the army, beginning right from the *müşir* down to regimental commanders was involved in embezzlement. Nevertheless, even if these pashas were not corrupt, they were under constant pressure because there were constant conspiracies in Constantinople against them from people who wanted to get their positions. During the war, the *müşir* of the Anatolian army was changed five times.

The *Morning Chronicle* correspondent Charles Duncan met a *başıbozuk* chieftain, who admitted their despised situation but complained thus:

1151 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, September 26, 1854. PRMA, No. 31, p. 30.

But see how we are treated. We leave our homes with a formal engagement with our government, and we are promised eighty piastres the month (about fourteen shillings), provided we bring our horse, our arms, and that we feed ourselves. Now, look at our condition, and say if we are not rather to be pitied than condemned. Government has not paid us; we have spent the little money we possessed and many have sold their arms; then, when abandoned to starvation, can my men be blamed if they help themselves at the villages they may pass to whatever they may meet?¹¹⁵²

Abdi Pasha, the former commander of the Anatolian army who was under arrest together with his successors Ahmed Pasha and Zarif Mustafa Pasha in Istanbul for charges of corruption and mismanagement, during his interrogation was asked why he did not prevent the *başibozuk* chiefs (*sergerdes*) from unbecoming acts (*harekât-ı gayri layıka*). Abdi Pasha answered that among the *başibozuk sergerdes* a certain İnce Arab was said to have committed much evil on his way from Damascus to Kars. He was appointed to Bayezid but he committed some mischief (*biraz fenalığı*) there as well and he was imprisoned. Abdi Pasha then gave the following answer to the question of why he did not prevent the Kurdish *başibozuks* from plundering villages around Erzurum:

The *başibozuk* troops from the neighbouring villages asked for permission to go to their villages in order to complete some affairs of theirs and to get [buy?] food and fodder from the villages and from the bazar. It is probable that they might have dared to commit such deplorable acts during their trips there and back, but it is also doubtless that it is impossible to prohibit them from this way.¹¹⁵³ [My translation]

As it is seen from the above, the *müşir* admits his powerlessness in preventing the *başibozuk* from plundering (*bunların bu yoldan men' olunmaları dahi mertebe-i imkânda olmadığı şübhesizdir*). The *başibozuk* cavalry commanders in the Kars army, especially Hasan Yazıcı and İnce Arap from Damascus had also been notorious for their many outrages. They had not shown themselves in the battles and since they did not get paid they started pillaging (*nehb ü garet*). General Williams and the British consulate in Erzurum repeatedly wrote complaints to the British embassy and finally managed to get them arrested. One of these documents is sent from Erzurum, dated 4 January 1855 (author not specified). It is stated that the *başibozuk* cavalry under the command of Hasan Yazıcı had not been of use against the Russians last year. This year they were again expected to oppose the *başibozuk* cavalry of the enemy, that had occupied and looted the Ottoman villages in the line of Kars-Gümrü. However, it was also stated that

1152 Duncan, op. cit., vol. I, p. 277.

1153 Abdi Pasha's statement. BOA. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6. See Appendix 82.

some Ottoman subjects from Kars to Bayezid had also accepted service in the irregular cavalry and infantry of the enemy, who knew how to make use of money.

From the British embassy an extract of the letter was given to the grand vizier and the grand vizier wrote to the seraskier to look into the matter on 14 March 1855. The seraskier replied on 21 March that the commander in chief of the Anatolian army was instructed to make an interrogation into the behaviour of these *sergerdes*.¹¹⁵⁴

The irregular Arab, Albanian other troops recruited for the British army and camped in Kala-i Sultaniye (Çanakkale) under the command of General Beatson were also a constant source of disorder. As noted by Skene and Money, Beatson had been too mild with these *başibozuks* and he was unable to discipline them. They looted the bazar, and used all kinds of violence including rape and murder against the population and even wounding an Ottoman officer and attacking French soldiers. When the governor of the province remonstrated to General Beatson, the general either defended his troops or made a feeble effort to top stop them.¹¹⁵⁵ Finally the Ottoman governor collected all the consuls, negotiated with them and decided to ask for help from Istanbul in July 1855. Therefore the Porte sent a punitive force of three companies of infantry with artillery from the Hassa army in Istanbul under the command of Miralay Muhiddin Bey.¹¹⁵⁶ According to Captain Money, this force consisted of 500 infantry, 250 cavalry, 250 artillery and 8 field pieces.¹¹⁵⁷ Only after this show of force did the *başibozuks* agree to go unarmed in the town.

By September 1855, the Porte decided to send special punitive missions to the Balkans and Thessaly. Thus Midhat Bey, second secretary of the MVL and *Mühendishane-i Hümayun Feriki* (Engineer General) Selim Pasha were appointed to special missions each, the former to Varna and its environment and the latter to the left (south) side of Rumelia until Janina. Their duty was to inspect the administrators and punish the culprits of the atrocities and disorders.

In the instructions to Midhat Bey (the future famous Midhat Pasha) it was stated that the army commanders were naturally too involved in the current affairs of the war

1154 HR. SYS. 1336/57 lef 1, dated 4 January 1855. Translation of an extract from a letter from the British consulate in Erzurum. Lef 2: From the grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 24 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (14 March 1855); and the reply of the seraskier, dated 2 Receb 1271 (21 March 1855).

1155 Money, op. cit., pp. 103-105; Skene, op. cit., pp. 49-50. Cf. Reid, op. cit., pp. 274-276.

1156 BOA. HR. SYS. 1337/35, dated 19 July 1855, HR. SYS. 1353/33, dated 26 July 1855 and HR. SYS. 1353/34, dated 29 July 1855. Also see Skene, op. cit., pp. 48-50; Money, op. cit., pp. 103-106.

1157 Money, op. cit., p. 103.

to give time to such disorders and the governors were also very much busy, so the small administrators had shown indifference in their duties to prevent the various oppressions and barbarian treatment (*teaddiyat ve barbarca muamelat*) to Muslim and Christian subjects. Then the victims are more specifically described as some helpless Bulgarians (*bazı biçare Bulgarlar*). Midhat Bey was empowered with special authority to deal with the issue on the spot, to go directly to the places of atrocities and try to capture the perpetrators and to punish them according to law and regulations. He would also punish indifferent administrators according to the degree of their crimes.¹¹⁵⁸ Instructions to Selim Pasha were similar. The perpetrators of the inhuman actions were to be punished severely (*mücazat-ı şedide*).¹¹⁵⁹

5.6. Municipal Matters in Istanbul

Galata was the European section of Istanbul with its embassies and the European and native non-Muslim population enjoying the protection of capitulations which meant that Ottoman laws were not applicable to them, and only their own laws as applied by their consulates. These protected and privileged communities included foreign merchants and bankers and some Ottoman Greeks, Jews and Armenians who had connections with the embassies and acquired their protection. Although the number of these Europeans and protected Ottomans of Galata is not accurate, we can assume that it was about 50,000.¹¹⁶⁰ During the war trade increased manifold and some of these enjoyed an immense increase in their wealth. As we have seen in the chapter on finances, some of them became as powerful as being commissioned to negotiate a foreign loan for the Porte in Europe. During the war and after the victory the Christian inhabitants increased their cultural and political influence.

As everywhere in Istanbul, the influx of foreigners had increased rents in Galata as well. It was also as filthy as others sections of the city. Many travellers have noted the filth of the streets of Pera. Colonel Atwell Lake for example writes that “of all the filthy dens I ever beheld in the course of my experience Pera is the filthiest... You are obliged to walk about Pera in jack boots, to keep you out of the mud and dirt”.¹¹⁶¹

1158 Draft of instructions to Midhat Efendi, second secretary of the MVL. BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/68 lef 1, 12 September 1855. See Appendix 102.

1159 BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/68 lef 2, 12 September 1855. See Appendix 102.

1160 Slade, op. cit., p. 356.

¹¹⁶¹ Lake, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

Crime in the suburb had also increased considerably. The perpetrators of crime were often the Greeks and Armenians under foreign protection. The Ottoman police was helpless against them because only their consuls could judge them.

New cafes were built along the Grand Rue de Pera (today's *İstiklal Caddesi*) and a French restaurant was opened right beside the Mevlevi *tekke* of Galata.¹¹⁶² Rich Ottomans were attracted by the European goods and style of the Galata shops. The poor and traditional Muslims most probably saw Galata or Pera as an infidel place where women went unveiled.

The city had no municipal organization and some municipal functions were executed by the *ihtisab nezareti* that regulated the provisions of the city and the daily affairs were handled by Islamic judges, the *kadis*, who mainly regulated prices and the markets. However this traditional structure, was almost unchanged from the time of the conquest of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror. The Crimean War brought to the fore the inadequacies of this traditional structure. Especially the enlarged foreign community of Galata and the allies now demanded new services. The Ottomans also felt ashamed of the filth of the streets before the foreigners. Thus it is no surprise that the first municipal organization was founded during the war. Even before the foundation of that organization there were attempts to make urban development in Western lines. One of the first novelties in city life was naming the streets and numbering the houses.¹¹⁶³

The *ihtisab nezareti* was abolished and a new body called *Şehir Emaneti* was instituted instead in June 1855. The regulations (*nizamname*) of the *şehremaneti* were published in the TV on 16 August 1855.¹¹⁶⁴ The *Şehir Emaneti* was modelled after the French *préfecture de ville*. It was responsible for the procuring of necessary provisions (staple goods) for the people of Istanbul, guild and market supervision, the regulation of prices, building of roads, pavements and their repairs, the cleanliness and embellishment of the city, and the general assurance of the good condition of the streets and bazaars, control of price, weight, quality, measure as well as the collection of taxes and dues collected before by the *ihtisab nezareti* to be submitted to the general treasury.¹¹⁶⁵

The *Şehir Emini* (like the *Préfet*) was to be assisted by a municipal council of 12 persons elected by the Porte and the work of the *şehir emaneti* would be supervised by

1162 Steven Rosenthal, "Foreigners and Municipal Reform in Istanbul: 1855-1865", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11(2), April 1980, pp. 229.

1163 BOA. HR. TO. 419/7, dated 5 February 1855. The decision was sent to the Nafia Nezareti for consideration.

1164 İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840-1878)*, Ankara: Türkiye ve Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1974, pp. 116-117.

1165 Ortaylı, *ibid.* Cf. Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

the MVL. The first council of the *emanet* consisted solely of Muslims and Salih Pasha the former *mutasarrıf* of Amasya was appointed as the first *emin*. However, this first body did not perform anything other than the traditional functions and in three months Salih Pasha was dismissed and superseded by Hacı Hüsam Efendi, who was more experienced. However, he lacked personnel to function properly.

The *şehremaneti* was not successful because its members did not have competence or influence. Therefore a new commission, the *İntizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu* (*Commission Municipale*) was formed through the initiative of Emin Muhlis Efendi, a member of the MVL who had seen for a while the working of the municipality of Vienna. This time the commission consisted mainly of influential Christians and Jews like Antoine Alleon, Avram (Abraham) Behor Camondo and David Revelaki.¹¹⁶⁶ The commission worked out a set of rules for regularizing the street network and straightening, widening and paving the main roads of Istanbul, especially Pera, Galata and Tophane, where the commission members owned many buildings or parts of buildings. These members of the commission also lent money for a renewal project and for the building of new *hans* in Karaköy. They (especially Camondo) also used the municipal information for their future investments on real estate.¹¹⁶⁷

5.7. Public Opinion and Patriotism

In the introductory chapter, we have seen that there are many *destans* and *zafernames* on the Crimean War. Only two of these give useful information for the historian: Salih Hayri's *Hayrabat* and Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni's *Manzume-i Sivastopol*. We have already seen them to some extent in Chapter 3. The rest of the *destans* are rather pure literary works imbued with religious heroism and valour. We have also seen that among these poets Yusuf Halis Efendi stood out with his patriotism. His *Vatan Kasidesi* and *Destan-ı Askeri* exalt love of homeland (*hubb-ül vatan*). The former poem is also remarkable for its Turkish nationalism. Halis Efendi criticised the former poets of Arabs, Anatolia and Iran (*şuara-i Arab u Rum ü Acem*) for not being patriotic poets. He also accused them of cloaking Turkish with Arabic and Persian expressions. The following verses exemplify this:

1166 Ortaylı, op. cit., (1974), p. 124.

1167 Nora Şeni, "The Camondos and Their Imprint on 19th-Century Istanbul", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26(4), November 1994, p. 669.

*Giydirüp maşlahı Urban ü Acem kalpağın
Sanki pek çıplak idi Türki-i zibây-i vatan
Mustalahdan kaba Türkçe yolu güç hem dardır
Zahiren gerçi kolaydır reh-i mecray-ı vatan*¹¹⁶⁸

The fact that the writer of these lines is a translator from the Translation Bureau gives the impression that he might have been influenced by European concepts of nationality.

According to Captain Fevzi Kurtoğlu, during the battle of Oltenitsa (4 November 1853), the Ottoman army band in Tutrakan across the Danube played an army march which included the expression “lion-hearted Turks” in its repeat:

*Başlar kesilip ser-be-ser dehşetli toplar patlasun,
Arslan yürekli Türkleri görsün de düşmen çatlasun.*

This is very interesting, but unfortunately Kurtoğlu does not give any reference to his sources, so we are not certain as to the authenticity of this information.¹¹⁶⁹

It is well known that Europeans and Russians called the Ottoman Empire Turkey for short, while the Ottoman official language used other names. In 1855, Sultan Abdülmecid’s official title included the word “*Türkistan*” in the ratification of the agreement on the guarantee of the Ottoman loan by Britain and France (*Biz ki bi-lütfihi Teala Türkistan ve Türkistan’ın şâmil olduğu nice memalik ve büldanın padişahı*).¹¹⁷⁰ This was probably the first time when an Ottoman Sultan used the word *Türkistan* (a translation of the French word *Turquie*) in his title. In the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, Sultan Abdülmecid again defined himself as “by the grace of God, we the *Padişah* of *Türkistan* and the countries and territories which it encompasses”.¹¹⁷¹

Ottoman press life was also enriched by the Crimean War with the appearance of European newspapers in Istanbul. These newspapers were publishing very recent news of war by the standards of the time. In the Ottoman press there was the official *Takvim-i Vekayi* and the semi-official *Ceride-i Havadis*. Ottoman newspapers started quoting from European newspapers. In the 1860s Ottoman press life became enriched with the appearance of the first independent newspapers like the *Tercüman-ı Ahval* of Şinasi and Ağâh Efendi in 1860 and especially the *Tasvir-i Efkâr* of Şinasi, Ahmet Vefik Pasha and Namık Kemal in 1862. Thus criticism towards the government increased. These years were also the formative years of an Ottoman public opinion.

1168 See Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, op. cit., p. 54.

1169 Kurtoğlu, op. cit., p. 17-18. Also quoted by Kırzioğlu, op. cit., p. 53.

1170 OBKS, No. 19, dated 14 July 1855, p. 58.

1171 See Erdem, “Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?”, *Toplumsal Tarih* 10 (58), Istanbul, October 1998, p. 40. Also see OBKS, s. 67.

The notion of public opinion (*efkâr-ı umumiye*) itself was a novelty and it soon became a high-frequency word in the vocabulary of the new intelligentsia that came to be known as the Young Ottomans, such as Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Ali Suavi etc. Şinasi had been excluded from membership of the *Encümen-i Daniş*, the Ottoman “Academy of Sciences” in 1856, because he had shaved his beard. The ulema thought that a learned man of letters should bear a beard¹¹⁷². On close examination, however, it turned out that he had shaved his beard due to reasons of health. Other popular words of the new intelligentsia included *vatan* (fatherland or *la patrie*), *millet* (nation) and *hürriyet* (liberty). Actually these words gained new meanings. Originally *vatan* meant one's birth place, on a local level. *Millet* mainly meant religious community, and only gradually came to mean nation. Finally *hürriyet* originally would just mean the state of not being a slave and it did not imply political freedom or freedom of opinion. All these words began to acquire their modern meanings in these years. The government reacted by setting up censorship offices and issuing a press law (*Matbuat Nizamnamesi*) that prohibited any criticism of the government in 1864.

Muslim reactions to the *Islahat Fermanı* and to the extravagance of the Sultan gave way to a conspiracy in Istanbul in 1859. The event was later called *Kuleli Vakası* (Kuleli Incident) because the arrested conspirators were tried in the barracks of Kuleli. The leader of the conspiratorial organization or the secret society was a certain Şeyh Ahmed of Süleymaniye, a medrese teacher at the Sultan Bayezid Mosque. Şeyh Ahmed had participated in the Crimean War in Kars. Prominent members of the organization included Cafer Dem Pasha, Ferik Çerkez Hüseyin Daim Pasha, Major Rasim Bey and Arif Efendi, a secretary of the *Tophane-i Amire*.¹¹⁷³ The conspiracy was betrayed by an officer in September 1859. The aims of the conspirators are not clear and there are two basic approaches among historians. Some consider it as the first constitutional movement. Others find it merely an Islamic, anti-Western movement in opposition to Sultan Abdülmecid's way of life. According to Davison, “the basic motif of the conspirators was opposition to westernization”.¹¹⁷⁴ As Davison has noted, while the general dissatisfaction might have arisen from economic difficulties, excessive spending of the palace and arrears of pay in the army; it took the shape of a religious fanaticism and hostility to equality of the non-Muslims. However, the religious character of the

1172 BOA. İ. MMS. 8/312, dated 18 September 1856.

1173 Uluğ İğdemir, *Kuleli Vakası Hakkında Bir Araştırma*, Ankara: TTK, 1937, p. 11.

1174 See Davison, op. cit., 1973, pp. 101.

conspiracy is not surprising, in the Ottoman Empire most reactions to the government usually took a religious character, probably for the lack of other ideologies.

Although only 41 persons were arrested, it was certain that many members of the ulema were involved. The Russian military agent in Istanbul, Captain Frankini reported the event to St Petersburg as a conspiracy against Sultan Abdülmecid and in favor of Sultan Abdülaziz.¹¹⁷⁵ Frankini noted that the causes were the dissatisfaction of the people because of financial problems and the carelessness of the Sultan. The report also stated that “the benefits of some foreigners, the luxury and the riches exhibited by the Turkish dignitaries, the venality of their entourage and the administrators, the feeling of complete dependence in which place since the last war, Turkey finds itself with respect to Europe” had caused a major resentment in the Muslim population. Interestingly the report also noted that Cafer Dem Pasha had been “particularly protected by Lord Redcliffe who had even obtained the rank of the general of division for him”. Abdülmecid forgave the organizers and lessened their punishments, turning death sentences into life-long imprisonment. This leniency was interpreted by the Russian agent as weakness.

Finally let us note that the first patriotic Ottoman theatre play was inspired by the Crimean War: Namık Kemal's *Vatan yahut Silistre* (Homeland or Silistria) took its subject from the defence of Silistria. Namık Kemal seems to have taken the names of his heroes from real people, because the two prominent heroes of his play, İslam Bey and Abdullah Çavuş are the names of an officer and a sergeant who have served in the Rumeli army. There is a Colonel (Miralay) İslam Bey mentioned with praise by Ömer Pasha in the correspondence of the war ministry.¹¹⁷⁶ Abdullah Çavuş is an orderly sergeant (*emir çavuşu*) serving under the command of İsmail Pasha in the Rumeli army. Together with a certain Süleyman Ağa, he was nominated by İsmail Pasha and then Seraskier Rıza Pasha and accordingly decorated with the *Mecidiye* order for his bravery during the battle of Çatana (Cetate).¹¹⁷⁷ Namık Kemal had probably read or their names from the lists of decorations, probably published in the *TV* or *CH* or heard from people. The play ends with the words “Long live the homeland (*vatan*)! Long live Ottomans!”.

The topic of another play by Namık Kemal (*Akif Bey*) is taken from the naval battle of Sinop. The hero of the drama is the commander of a frigate from the Ottoman squadron in Sinop, which was attacked and burnt by a Russian squadron under the

1175 Staff Captain Frankini to the Russian minister of war, 17 (29) October 1859. RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 60, list 81-87.

1176 BOA. İ. DH. 17361, dated 6 Zilkade 1269 / 14 July 1853.

1177 BOA. İ. DH. 302/19167, dated 11 Ramazan 1271 (7 June 1854).

command of Vice-Admiral Pavel Nakhimov. Akif Bey survives the battle, is taken prisoner by the Russians, but flees from prison and returns to Batum only to find his wife married to another person. We must also note that Namık Kemal came to Kars when he was 13-14 years old and spent one year (from June 1853 to July 1854) there during his grandfather Abdüllatif Pasha's office term as the governor (*kaimmakam*) of Kars. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu argues that the young Namık Kemal was influenced by the "moral atmosphere" and folk literature traditions of Kars.¹¹⁷⁸

Another social impact of the Crimean War on the Ottoman Empire was the acceleration of immigration of many Crimean Tatars, Circassians and Nogays of the Kuban into the Ottoman Empire. After the peace with Russia, the Crimean Tatars had been left to their destiny by the allies and the Porte. Many of them immigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Although immigration had started in 1853, the big wave did not come immediately after the war, but it came only in 1860.¹¹⁷⁹ This suggests that the war did not have an immediate effect of mass exodus for the Crimean Tatars. But then what caused their mass emigration in 1860? Unfortunately, Kazas does not provide us a sufficient answer and the topic goes beyond the scope of research of this dissertation. Neither does Saydam give an answer. Saydam writes that big increases took place in the number of immigrants from the Crimea from 1859 onwards but does not explain why.¹¹⁸⁰

1178 Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, "Folk Traditions in Kars during the Last Six Turkish-Russian Wars on the Anatolian Front", *Kars and Eastern Anatolia in the Recent History of Turkey. Symposium and the Excavation*, Ankara: Publication of Governor's Office of Kars and Atatürk University, 1994, p. 152.

1179 Elvira Kazas, *1853-1863 Yıllarında Kırım'dan Osmanlı Topraklarına Yapılan Göçler*, unpublished MA Thesis, Istanbul, Marmara University, 1994, p. 19.

1180 See Saydam, op. cit., p. 104.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the Crimean War was not given much attention in Ottoman and Turkish historiography although it ended with victory for the Ottoman Empire and its allies. One of the reasons for the lack of monographs on the involvement of the Ottoman Empire is the lack of personal narratives and memoirs by Ottoman statesmen, officers, journalists, doctors, intellectuals, etc. Although there are many documents related to the Crimean War in the BOA, these are mostly official correspondence and as such they do not show the motives and struggles behind many decisions or acts. Unfortunately Ottoman officers did not leave memoirs or such memoirs did not survive. Nevertheless, I found the statements of the Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha, Bahriye Feriki Mustafa Pasha, Müşir Abdi Pasha, Müşir Ahmed Pasha, Müşir Zarif Pasha and Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha at the MVL. Thus for the first time the lost voices of some officers have been recovered here. This could be regarded as one of the contributions of this dissertation to the existing literature. These statements give us an idea of the elite struggles among the Ottoman pashas. The statements also help us clarify some details of some battles and how the military commanders led the war.

The present study was not primarily interested in the reasons for the breakout of the war, it was rather about the process of the war itself and its impact and outcomes for the Ottomans. In the narrative of the war, I have endeavoured to present a non-biased, balanced and comparative view of the strengths and weaknesses of the warring sides. I have also tried to find out the reasons for the defeats of the Ottoman armies, examining the Ottoman method of waging war or the Ottoman warfare as well.

From a political point of view, the results of the war were not altogether beneficial for the Ottoman bureaucracy, especially from a conservative point of view. Victory in this war did not bring any significant material gain for the Ottomans, not even a war indemnity for their losses, whereas the Ottoman treasury was nearly bankrupted due to war expenses which were solely because of the Russian occupation of Ottoman territory, without any provocation from the Ottoman side. The Ottoman Empire did not

gain any significant territory except some areas in Bessarabia. Like many of the other guarantees and stipulations of the Paris Treaty of 1856, this gain would also be nullified soon, because the war gave impetus to the union of the Danubian principalities and ultimately to their independence. The Ottoman Empire became a European protectorate in reality, although in theory it had become a member of the European Concert or the European state system. Although it was on the side of the winners, the Porte also lost the right to have a navy in the Black Sea together with Russia. Actually the Ottoman Empire had become a part of the European Concert, but not an actor in the European balance of power. Thus it was not recognized as a great power that could claim compensation in case of territorial gain by another member of the system. By the beginning of the 1870s, after the defeat of France by Prussia, the European balance of power was changed and Russia took advantage of the new situation by declaring the neutrality of the Black Sea void.

The war brought about the *Islahat Fermanı*, which is one of the most important documents of the 19th century Ottoman history. This firman was meant to prevent European interference in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of its Christian subjects. The Porte wanted to make some improvements for its non-Muslim subjects in order to prevent the question from being included in an international treaty. It rightly feared that if rights were given by an international treaty and not by the grace of the Sultan, then the non-Muslim subjects would feel gratitude towards the great powers and not to the Sultan. The Porte did not want the firman even to be mentioned in the treaty but it could not prevent its mention.

We have seen that some historians consider the alliance of the Porte with France and Britain and the result of the Paris Treaty a success of Ottoman diplomacy. I do not find this position tenable. The alliance was dictated by the interests of the ruling classes of France and Britain. In fact the great powers tried to solve the problem among themselves with little reference to the Porte. On one occasion they even did not forward the note of the Porte from Vienna to St Petersburg, finding it unacceptable on behalf of Russia. During the war, Vienna was the centre for diplomatic negotiations and the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna Arif Efendi did not know French and had limited relations with the *corps diplomatique*. Nevertheless, Reşid Pasha and the Porte were not just passive onlookers. Reşid Pasha showed much diplomatic skill in handling the question. The Porte even rejected the Vienna Note which all the Great Powers pressed for admission.

Relations between the Porte and the allies during the war were not full of accord either. There is no doubt that the allies fought not for the sake of the Porte, but for their own ends, namely the containment of Russia. For one thing, the allies did not want the Porte to gain territory, especially Christian territory. Thus for example they did not want to put the Christians of Georgia under Ottoman sovereignty. As for the Muslim Circassians, the allies (especially the French) were not interested much in their independence or annexation into the Ottoman Empire either. The British former Secretary of State for War, the Duke of Newcastle even remarked that it was “monstrous to see the Turkish flag flying” in Circassia and “to witness attempts to establish Turkish government in the Country”. In the summer of 1854, the allies effectively blocked an Ottoman fleet to appear on the Circassian coasts with agents and war material. On the other hand, the Porte could not coordinate its actions with Shamil on the Caucasian front. The defeats of the Ottomans on this front forced Shamil to remain passive. Nevertheless, even his passive stand led Russia to detach many troops away from the front to keep him at bay. Thus it was rather the Ottomans’ fault not to seek an effective alliance with Shamil. The issue of Shamil’s kidnapping of some women including a French governess also did much harm to relations between Shamil and the Porte.

The equality of the non-Muslim subjects with Muslims was imposed upon the Porte and the Islamist or conservative sections of society and the bureaucracy did not like it, although even those statesmen who opposed it were aware of the necessity of such reforms. The question was rather about the pace of reforms. For some statesmen like Mustafa Reşid Pasha the political equality of non-Muslims was too fast and too radical a reform. The war indeed made the Porte very sensitive towards the demands of its allies Britain and France. We have seen that the basic Ottoman approach in the question of reforms was the method of dissimulation and temporizing towards Europe. The Ottoman elite was also in a dilemma between religious (*şer’i*) rules and the necessities of the time. This was especially sharply felt in the issues of slavery and the *cizye*. In such issues, the Porte chose to ward off the objections of Europe by issuing many edicts and orders. However, the application of these orders went very slowly. We also see that practical necessity rather than a planned activity was the real force behind the Ottoman reforms.

The Ottoman elite lost a great opportunity by not being serious in accepting the non-Muslim subjects into the army. Many non-Muslims indeed showed eagerness to serve their country during this war. If non-Muslims were accepted into the army (not

just as rank and file of course, including the right to become officers as well) and if they were given equal opportunities in other state services perhaps the eventually failed project of Ottoman citizenship might have had a better chance. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the great powers did not favour Christian conscription, neither did the non-Muslim communities. Military service was not popular among neither Muslims nor non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. The people had good reasons for this, because it lasted too long and the poor soldiers were much abused in every way, without receiving pay for months and being subject to all kinds of diseases because of malnutrition and ill-treatment. More soldiers died of diseases than of battles in the Crimean War.

With retrospect, Nikolai I seems to be simply more outspoken among the other imperialists to seek the partition of the Ottoman Empire. However, he began and conducted the war in an indecisive way. As Friedrich Engels noted at that time, he ought to have known that Europe would not allow him to destroy or subdue the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁸¹ Engels then argued that once Nikolai decided war, he should have crossed the Pruth with a much larger force, reaching across the Balkans before the Ottomans gathered forces. This indeed seems possible. What Engels did not take into account, however, was that not all of Nikolai's generals, including Field Marshal Paskevich, believed or favoured such a plan. In fact Nikolai did give orders to act more firmly than his generals actually did, but he had not chosen the right commanders for this task. The best examples are Paskevich, Gorchakov and Menshikov who all proved ineffective. In most of the battles where the Russian army was successful, it did not fully utilize its success by following the Ottoman army and dealing a decisive blow. For example, after the battles of Başgedikler and Kürekdere, even if not immediately after, but some time later, General Bebutov could have captured Kars, had he followed the scattered Ottoman army. Muravyov was successful before Kars but he achieved it at an enormous cost for Russia by his unsuccessful storming of Kars. Nevertheless, even if Nikolai had appointed more effective generals and even if his armies had taken Edirne and Kars as in 1829, it is very doubtful that they could go farther or sign a treaty similar to the Treaty of Edirne of 1829. Because then Russian armies would have been projected too far and their supplies would most probably fail as in 1829. The allies would certainly defend Istanbul and then Russia might have faced a heavier defeat. Yet one is tempted to ask another speculative question: What would have happened if Russia had attacked the Ottoman Empire from the Caucasian frontier only, as

1181 "The Russian Failure", *NYDT*, 11 July 1854, in Marx, op. cit., p. 398.

Menshikov had once advised, instead of occupying the principalities? Probably Britain would still be willing to oppose Russian expansion towards India, but would Napoleon III still be as much interested?

In the end, Russia was not defeated in a strict sense even in the Crimea. The Russian army had evacuated the southern part of Sevastopol but it was still there and ready to fight. The allies could not afford to go deep into Russian territory. In fact they had to stick to the shore for a constant flow of supplies. On the other hand, Russia had now firmly entrenched itself in the Caucasus showing that even the alliance of the most powerful naval states with the Porte could not drive it away from the Caucasus. Thus within three years after the end of the war, Russia captured Shamil and ended the long Caucasian war. (We must also take into account the discontent of much of the population from Shamil's or his naibs' already corrupt rule). In fact the new post-Soviet Russian orthodox nationalism considers that Russia was not defeated in the Crimean war, rejecting most of what Tarle and other Soviet historians said on the topic. These "new Russians" do not accept the backwardness of Russia at that time either.¹¹⁸²

Britain later tacitly accepted the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Around twenty years later, when Russia again attacked the Ottomans, Britain only took advantage by seizing Cyprus in 1878. This time the British public opinion was not pro-Ottoman because of the default on Ottoman debts and the "Bulgarian horrors" of 1876. A good example of the change in the attitude of the British can be observed in the person of Doctor Humphry Sandwith, who, as we have seen, was attached to the Anatolian army in Erzurum and Kars during the war and wrote his memoirs after the war. Sandwith was also one of those few British men who spoke Turkish. In his book on the Crimean War, which was published in 1856, he mentioned the Ottoman Armenians only negatively. But in 1878 he wrote an article in which he was much anti-Ottoman.¹¹⁸³ He had also mentioned the atrocities of the *başıbozüks* before, but now he made a direct link between the *başıbozüks* and the plight of the Ottoman Armenians. Actually the precedents of the British attitudes in the 1870s about the Ottoman Christian subjects can

1182 These arguments were expressed in a conference in Moscow on 7-8 November 2006 under the title of "The Crimean War in the Cultural Memory of the Peoples of Russia and the World" (*Krymskaya Voina v kul'turnoy pamyati narodov Rossii i mira*), organized by the *Tsentr Natsionalnoy Slavy Rossii* (Centre for the National Glory of Russia, an endowment close to President Putin). Prof. Vitaliy Sheremet has also participated in this conference and read a paper. For papers presented in this conference, see <http://www.cnsr.ru/projects.php?id=10> (Retrieved in November 2006). Also see my news article, "Unutulmuş Bir Hikaye: Kırım Savaşı", *Toplumsal Tarih* 156, Istanbul, December 2006, p. 6.

1183 See James Reid's article in Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Armenian Karin / Erzerum*, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003, pp. 147-187.

be found in some British reports about the disorders of the *başıbozüks* during the Crimean War. A few of these reports are in the appendices. Later, in World War I, those very allies who fought Russia in the Crimean War in order to prevent the partition of the Ottoman Empire finally reached an agreement with Russia (the Sykes-Picot secret agreement) on the partition of the Ottoman Empire.

I have also shown that the Ottomans did not consider the defeat in Sinop as a “massacre”. They called it as the deplorable (*müteellime*), or distressing (*mükeddire*), or heart-rending (*dil-sûz*) event, as if it was a natural disaster, but I did not see any reference to a massacre in the documents that I saw in the BOA. Kostaki Musurus, the Ottoman ambassador in London, uses a similar expression (*déplorable événement*).¹¹⁸⁴

We have seen that actually the disorders, atrocities and plunders of the *başıbozüks* were mostly because of their being deprived of pay and rations by the governors and pashas. Unable to feed themselves, the *başıbozüks* then attacked civilians. The *başıbozuk* troops contained some roots of the Armenian question of the last quarter of the 19th century. By 1876 European and especially British public opinion had turned against the Ottoman Empire because of the Bulgarian and Armenian events.

Economically, the war accelerated the process of the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the European financial system. The two foreign debts contracted during the war were followed by other loans until the Ottoman Empire defaulted on its loans. The Porte actually never recovered from these first loans. These loans and others were not used for productive ends but rather for consumption and debt servicing. We have also seen that the interests of the London financial circles, (the City) were paramount in British policy. With regard to Namık Pasha’s loan mission to Paris and London, I have argued, *pace* Anderson, Akar and Al, that the failure of Namık Pasha was not a result of his amateurishness, but a result of the financial conjuncture at that time. With regard to the *iane-i harbiye*, I have shown that it was not a donation but a war tax.

Culturally, the Crimean War has been a period of close contacts with Europeans and some improvements for non-Muslims along with some fanatical attacks on them. The war also presented material for a kind of Ottoman Muslim patriotism and even Turkish nationalism. Namık Kemal’s theatre plays and the *destans* of Ahmed Rıza, Salih Hayri and many others are good examples of this spirit. The war has also shown the importance of public opinion, and contributed to the spread of the notion of public opinion among the Ottomans. The war has also contributed to the formation of the future “Young Ottomans”.

1184 Musurus to Reşid Pasha. Londres, le 15 Décembre 1853. BOA. İ. HR. 105/5151 lef 37.

From a military-technical point of view, the war showed that the Ottoman army was not like a modern European army. As the Russian General Prince Mikhail Gorchakov noted, the Ottomans had destroyed the old army, but they had not yet built a new regular army in a European sense. Except for a few units, the army was poorly trained, poorly armed, poorly clothed. We have seen that the soldiers' pay was in arrears for many months. There was much corruption in the army and the poor soldiers did not receive proper rations, clothes, shelters, etc. I have demonstrated by quoting a letter of the grand vezir that the practise of muster-roll fraud in the army was well known to the Ottoman dignitaries. The fact that this fraud was not rigorously investigated by the MVL during the trial of the former commanders of the Anatolian army is another proof of the involvement and complacency of the military and civil authorities in this act. As James Reid has pointed out, the Ottoman strategy of piecemeal deployment of troops is among the causes of Ottoman defeats in the Caucasian front. However, we must not forget that even the scattered Ottoman forces were in most cases still equal or superior in numbers to the Russian forces that opposed them. Thus the real reasons for the defeat were rather in the low quality of the officer class and lack of training of the troops. The Ottoman regular and irregular cavalry were especially very useless. Ottomans had also much difficulty in the provisioning of the troops. More troops died of diseases, malnutrition, cold and lack of proper housing than of participation in the battles.

Ottoman troops had no press to relate their deprivations and their bravery. They were unqualified to engage in the open field due to lack of discipline, lack of training and most important of all, lack of confidence in their officers. The high ranking officer class, with few exceptions, proved inefficient. The system of promotion prevented honest and talented officers from ever being promoted to a rank higher than the major. The Ottoman army was also paralyzed by personal rivalries and corruption. Especially in the Anatolian army there was much factional strife, jealousy, and lack of discipline. Many foreign and refugee officers from Europe (Hungarian, Polish, Italian, British, French, etc) and even from America served in this war in the Ottoman army. Some of these officers were really good officers. Yet their use was also limited and cancelled off because of rivalries and jealousies.

Very few of the guilty officers were punished. In fact many of the accused pashas were rehabilitated. The most notorious is Mustafa Zarif Pasha who was made a member of the *Meclis-i Tanzimat* just two years after his dismissal. Other commanders of the Anatolian army also returned to official posts. On the other hand, the British military commissioner Williams Pasha's accusations against Zarif Pasha are a mixture of right

and wrong. For example, he accused Zarif Pasha of making an open field attack upon the Russian army in K rekdere. However, as we have seen, Zarif Pasha himself accused Guyon and other generals, pashas and staff officers on this account. Williams also made false accusations of disrespect by some Ottoman officers towards himself, when he had in fact been respected more than was necessitated by his rank. However, such faults of Williams, and even his Orientalist views on the Ottomans do not necessarily refute his concrete accusations of corruption.

The Marxist notion of “uneven and combined development” refers to the coexistence of most modern modes of production with pre-capitalist modes in underdeveloped countries in the age of imperialism. It also describes regional or sectoral inequalities or irregularities of the capitalist mode of production. I think this model can be applied to Ottoman military reform in the 19th century. The Ottoman army during the Crimean War is an interesting case from this point of view. On the one hand, some of its units, such as the artillery or the *chasseurs* had the most modern weapons of the time such as rifle carbines or Mini  rifles. These units were also recognized by many European observers as worthy of the best armies in Europe. On the other hand, the Ottoman army had ignorant and even illiterate commanders (even an army chief of staff), irregular troops with archaic weapons and tactics, archaic methods of provisions and archaic systems of fortifications. The Rumeli army in general was better organized than the Anatolian army. Within these armies some regiments or battalions were better than others. Overall, however, the backward side of the army weighed decisive. As noted by James Reid, the Ottoman generals did not demonstrate a sufficient understanding of European warfare.

The military contributions of Egypt and Tunis were important in the war. We have seen that these dependencies were still part of the Ottoman Empire and sent troops to the war accordingly. In the case of Egypt, there was also some sort of bargaining between the Porte and the governor of Egypt Abbas Pasha and later Said Pasha. These governors were then trying to conclude a contract with the French on the Suez Canal and another contract with the British for a railway line. In both cases, the Porte asserted its right of approval for such plans, while the Egyptian pashas thought it was their internal affair. So by sending troops, they planned to get the approval of the Porte as well. Another subject for bargaining was the expenses of the Egyptian troops in Istanbul and the Crimea. In the end, the Porte agreed to pay them from its treasury.

Ottoman high officers, ministers and governors did not want to take personal responsibility. Even in battle operations, a single hierarchical line of authority and

responsibility was not favourable for them to maintain. If anything went wrong, all put the blame on others, while the commander in chief also did not take responsibility. All pashas had their representatives and also enemies in the capital. In the provinces they had to take into consideration the local notables. Then there were the numerous councils in the capital and provinces (*meclis*), a novelty of the *Tanzimat*. Although they were intended to prevent personal arbitrariness, these councils did not function properly. They took away personal responsibility from many officials but did not give results in turn. In most cases, they were in the hands of the governor.

Abdülmeccid seemed to be a weak Sultan to many observers. During the time period of this dissertation, there is hardly any original sentence, important decision, or thought that can be attributed to him. He was fully indulged in women and drinking. Nevertheless, he was believed by some Western diplomats to be holding some “enlightened” views about such topics as slavery and the rights of Christian subjects. Whether he really held such enlightened views or he was engaged in the same kind of dissimulation and temporizing just as his subordinates is difficult to answer. But one thing is certain: he was mild in character and did not like bloodshed. He even pardoned those who plotted to assassinate him in 1859.

There was little unity among the Ottoman statesmen at the top. Many pashas were jealous of their superiors and waited for an opportunity to replace them. The system of promotion in the bureaucracy was not based upon merit at all. Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha, Reşid Pasha, Ali Pasha and Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha all had their grudges against each other. The seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha and commander in chief Ömer Lütfi Pasha did not get along well. A harmful side effect of the reforms and Westernization was that the Ottoman ruling class lost its dignity, as admitted by Cevdet Pasha. They swallowed so many insults and slights from the allies. On the other hand, the xenophobic discourse that claims that the Ottoman Empire or Turkey had no friends is also problematic. For in this war almost the whole of Europe was behind the Ottoman Empire. True, the allies had their own interests, but this does not change the fact that they were allies and defended the independence of the Porte by arms. Such a discourse cannot take (and does not want to take) lessons from history, because it too readily assigns the role of the injured party to the Porte in every case, even in cases when it is rather the injuring party.

I have also argued that there is no clear cut, permanent dichotomy among Ottoman statesmen as “reformers” versus “conservatives”. Most of the Ottoman statesmen were pragmatists. Their positions and views on many issues depended upon

their being in office or deposed. Reshid Pasha also showed himself on the downslide of his influence and reforming energy, despite his last two terms of grand viziership. He opposed the reform edict and the political equality of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire.

While some aspects of the war and its effects require further research, the present study has hopefully presented a fair view of the “Ottoman Crimean War”.

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APPENDICES

Appendices are given in chronological order. Numbers in brackets refer to line numbers. Numbers separated by slash in the references to the BOA indicate *Dosya/Gömlék* numbers. Editorial notes are given in brackets. All documents, including copies of Western documents, are from the BOA, unless otherwise indicated.

Appendix 1: HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 11, dated 4 June 1853. Stratford de Redcliffe to the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs on the export duty on Wallachian grain.

It being generally understood that the Government of Wallachia intended to increase the duty on grain destined for exportation to a degree which would contravene the Commercial Treaty of 1838, the Undersigned received Instructions from his Government to enter his Protest against any such departure from the engagements subsisting between the Two Governments.

In execution of those instructions the undersigned now protests in the customary form against this supposed infraction of Treaty, and holds the Porte responsible for any losses which may accrue therefrom to any subject or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.

Stratford de Redcliffe
Pera, June 4, 1853.

Appendix 2. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 1, dated 22 June 1853. Stratford à Monsieur Etienne Pisani.

Therapia, le 22 Juin 1853.

Monsieur,

J'ai en occasion plus d'une fois de me plaindre des injures, reçues par des persons sous la protection Britannique de la part des soldats aux services de la Porte Ottomane. Nos Consuls en cherchant satisfaction ont trouvé une disposition dans les officiers qui les commandent de servir au bien de corriger le mal dont on se plaint, et les Gouverneurs civiles sont trop souvent inclinés de sympathiser avec les commandant militaires, plutôt que d'insister à la punition des coupables. Maintenant que les Rediffs sont appelés de plusieurs provinces de l'Empire sous des circonstances qui tendent à exciter un esprit de fanatisme, il est probable que des offenses dont il a été question seront commises plus souvent, et peu être d'une nature plus grave pour ceux qui en souffriront. En effet, des plaintes me sont déjà parvenues et je vous transmets ci-joint une pièce contenant des faits d'une mauvais traitement nonteux [?] dernièrement subi par quelques Chrétiens à Amasia. Afin d'écarter un mal qui ne demande que l'occasion et l'impunité pour augmenter dans des proportions formidables, je fais un appel officiel à S. E. Reshid Pasha [sic] et à ses Collègues. Comme serviteurs de la Porte, ils sont grandement intéressés au maintien de la discipline militaire et à la cultivation des sentiments amicaux entre les Chrétiens et les Mussulmans. Des insultes et des offenses ne peuvent pas être commises par des soldats portant l'uniforme du Sultan, soit sur les sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté ou sur des sujets des Puissances Chrétiennes, sans déshonneur au Gouvernement Ottoman et des embarras sérieux. Il est fort à désirer pour cela que des mesures promptes soient prises pour réprimer l'esprit de licence et d'animosité antichrétienne dont font parade ceux qui sont appelés en service actif, non pour la propagation de leur foi mais pour la défense de leur Souverain et de leur Empire.

Tout ce qui est exigé n'est que de mettre en vigueur la discipline militaire, et des instructions à S. E. le Seraskier Pasha [sic] de transmettre aux Commandants des Rediffs et des troupes régulières tels explications qui pourraient les mettre à même d'introduire un meilleur esprit parmi les hommes qu'ils commandent.

Devant à l'incident qui est arrivé à Amasia, j'espère que la Porte ne manquera pas de blâmer immédiatement le Gouverneur de cette ville pour sa nonchalance à protéger les Grecs et leur Clergé des insultes et que les coupables reçoivent une leçon pour leur conduite à l'avenir.

Vous lirez cette instruction à S. E. Reshid Pasha [sic] et vous lui en donnerez une traduction.

[Signé] Stratford de Redcliffe

Appendix 3. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 8, dated 25 June 1853. From the British consulate in Erzurum. "the Koords are actively engaged in robbing"

Erzurum, 25th June 1853.

In every part of the country the Koords are actively engaged in robbing, both on the high roads and in the villages.

It is said that within a few days about 7 battalions will have come in from Harpood; and some time since seventy pieces of artillery set out on its way hither by a circuitous route, as the direct one was not practicable for guns. The detachments in the various out stations have been called in, but I trust some troops may be left there as the country will be at the mercy of the Koords, and incalculable injury to the cultivator will ensue. The militia has been called out, and altogether the forces to be collected here will, it is said, amount to about 40,000 disciplined troops. I hope that with such an imposing force the Porte and the General may not be tempted to make an attack on Georgia, as from the want of skill in the Turkish officers, there would not be much hope of success. But if Russia were to meet with reverses in Europe, so as to disable her from succouring Georgia, and if an [sic] European force were landed in that country to cooperate with the Turkish force, then indeed a forward movement, combined with an attack on the part of the Caucasian tribes would not fail to drive the Russians out of Georgia, for they would find few friends among the natives, were they to experience a reverse.

Appendix 4. HR. SYS. 1928/14 lef 1, dated 11 July 1853. From the British consul in Salonica to the British embassy in Istanbul. Extract. Salonica, July 11th 1853.

Selanik taraflarında bulunan başıbozuk asakiri üzerinde bir büyük zabitin nasb ve tayin olunması lüzumuna ve asakir-i mezkure bir iki manastırı yağma ettiklerine dair İngiltere sefaretine gelen tahrirattan iki kıta hulasası

“To appoint some active military man of rank, with only a few regular troops, say, 100 cavalry and 100 infantry, and that such an officer have his headquarters at Larissa, but invested with the command of all their several chiefs and their irregulars.

I believe that some of the chiefs are well-intentioned men, particularly Ismael Bey and Abbas Agha, still, from what I know of most of these chiefs, generally speaking, they have neither the intellect nor the judgement required to be entrusted with the command in the vicinity of the Hellenic Frontiers.

“The appointment of some superior officer over these several Albanian chiefs, to prevent any unhappy collision between their men – collisions which are not unfrequent

when different Albanian clans (as I may term them) are employed upon the same service”.

Lef 2. Extract. Salonica, July 1853.

By the last accounts up to the 19th instant, which I have received from Volo [Volos?] and Larissa, the alarm still continues both in consequence of the conduct of the irregular troops and the number of other Albanians in that vicinity, who have come to Thessaly in the hopes of being employed by the several chiefs. The irregulars are also clamorous for the pay which is due to them. In consequence of a misunderstanding between the new Ismail Bey and Nouredin Bey they have been obliged to separate to prevent a collision. A few days since Vassif Pasha arrested two Albanians who were intoxicated, but afterwards released them owing to the menacing aspect of the rest of irregulars.

The Archbishop of Salonica has received intelligence of the Greek monastery on Mount Olympus having been plundered of every thing, and that the monks were afterwards tormented in the, I may say, now usual Thessalian way; viz, with drops of boiling oil upon their chests, because they did not confess where the money of the monastery was secreted. There is also advice that another monastery in the vicinity Cosnia has been plundered and the monks tormented in the same way with drops of boiling oil. These sacrileges are supposed to have been committed by the disbanded Derbent troops of Haggi Hussein Pasha. There can be no doubt but that the Christians will suffer in certain districts during the passage of the irregular troops to their homes, in the event of present differences being arranged without coming to hostilities, unless indeed the Porte provide for the safety of the people either by the escort of each corps of irregulars by a troop of cavalry, or conveying them by steamers to the coast of Albania. These irregulars enlist more for plunder than patriotism.

**Appendix 5. İ. MVL. 26350 lef 2, dated 7 Zilhicce 1269 (11 September 1853).
*Mazbata of the Meclis-i Meşveret on the petition of some hoca efendis.***

Rusyalu'nun tekalif-i vakiasından ve memalik-i şahaneye tecavüz ile nakz-ı ahd eylemesinden bahisle nas?let-i cihadı mübeyyin bazı ulema tarafından bu kere Meclis-i Vâlâ'ya getirilip rehin [?] olan arzuhal şehr-i carinin altıncı Cuma günü havass-ı vükela-i [2] fihamdan mürekkeb olarak sahilhane-i sadaretde akd olunan Meclis-i Meşveret'de kıraat edilerek iktiza-i halin müzakeratına ibtidar olundukda bu meselede Devlet-i Aliyye'nin tutmuş olduğu usulün ve mecalis-i umumide cümle ittifakıyla verilen kararın [3] ez ser nev şerh ve izahıyla hukuk-ı saltanat ve istiklal-i hükümete dokunur şeyleri maazallahu teala tecviz etmeklik velinimetimizin nimet-i celili ile mütenaim ve perverde olan hiçbir bende-i sadakat-kârın işi ve şu meselede beka-i sulh ile beraber muhafaza-i hukuk [4] ve istiklal kabil olduğu halde asayiş-i umumiye bozmak ve bila mucib muharebe gibi mechul-ül akıbet bir şeyin kapusunu dahi açmak kâr-ı akil olmamasıyla beraber bu yolda husul-i matlub mümkün olmadığı takdire göre dahi her şey göze aldırılıp [5] ve kat'a fedakârlık edilmeyip [sic] cümleten muharebeye duruşmak ve bu yolda büyük ve küçük hepimiz kanlarımızı dökmek emr-i tabii olup bidayet-i meselede kuvve-i berriye ve bahriyece meydanda hiçbir tedarikat olamaması ve tedarikat ve ve istihkamatin meydana gelmesi dahi [6] vakte muhtaç bulunması cihetle devletlerin kuvve-i muavenelerini calib olmak üzere cümle ittifakıyla bir taraftan icra olunan tedabir-i politikiye arasında saye-i şevket-vaye-i hazret-i şahanede Rumeli ve Anadolu taraflarında teşkil olunan orduy-ı hümayunların kuvve-i [7] askeriyesi ve kıla'-i şahanenin istihkamati ve gerek kuvve-i bahriye mertebe-i hazıraya isal olunarak şimdiye kadar muharebeye şuru' olunmaması dahi Rusyalu

Memleketeyn'e girmezden evvel ve gerek sonra bahis buna geldikçe kuvve-i müctemianın henüz rütbe-i [8] kâfiye vasıl olamadığı memurin-i kiramı hazeratı tarafından vaki olan ifadata mebni bulunup hatta devletlu Ömer Paşa hazretleri canibine gönderilen istilanameye cevaben bundan evvelce vürud eden tahriratda dahi karşıya geçmek kuvve-i mevcudeye [9] daha kırk bin asakir-i nizamiye ilavesine ve ancak birkaç mah müddetde meydana gelebilecek köprülerin dahi hazırlanmasına mütevakkıf olacağı yazılmış ve Anadolu tarafından hududu tecavüz etmek Tuna'yı geçmeğe nisbetle daha suhuletlice ise de bunun [10] için dahi ol canibdeki orduyu şimdikinden ziyade kuvvetlendirmek lazım geleceği ve bunun dahi biraz zamana tavakkuf edeceği kaziyesi dahi bugünkü meclisde canib-i cenab-ı sipehsalariden dermiyan buyurulmuş idüğünden ve şimdiye kadar mecalis-i meşveretde zat-ı vâlâ-i meşihatpenahi ve bazı sudur-ı izam hazeratı dahi buldukları cihetle meselenin cihet-i şeriyesini tedkik anlara ait olduğu halde her ne yapılmış ise cümlelerin ittifakıyla olarak hepimizin başı şer'-i şerife bağlı [12] olduğu halde canib-i şeriat-ı garradan ilan-ı muharebeye hükm olunmuş olsa idi hiç kimsenin bir şey diyemeyeceği dahi derkâr olup devletler ile Devlet-i Aliyye'nin muamelat ve münasebatı ve hususat-ı cesimede vesatet ve ittifak keyfiyatı [13] beriki şey olmayarak ezman-ı kadimedan berü cari olmuş şeyler olduğu halde bu defa onların kuvve-i muavenelerini calib olmak üzere tutulan usul dahi mücerred bir istiane ve öte tarafla husul-i ittifakları halinde müsellemler olan mehazir-i adideyi [14] vaki tedabir-i hekime ve dürendişaneden madud olarak istiane ise muvafık-ı şer'-i şerif olmasıyla buna kimsenin itiraz edemeyeceği bu meclisde dahi ityan olunup bunda asıl teessüf edilecek ve nazar-ı dikkati celb eyleyecek madde [15] halkın mesalih-i devlete müdahaleye cüret ve cesareti olup böyle şeyler ezman-ı salifede dürlü vukuat-ı müdhişeyi müntic olduğu halde bi-tevfik-i teala saye-i kudretvaye-i cenab-ı mülükânede pek çok vakitlerden beri görülmemiş bir hareket [16] olarak bunun önü alınması pek ehemm ve elzem görünmesiyle ve kuvve-i mevcude kâfi görüldüğünün ihbarı üzerine muharebeye şer'an hüküm olduğu halde devletlerin muavenetlerine bakılmayarak hemen ilan-ı harb edilmesinde dahi nakz-ı ahdin öte taraftan [17] vukuuna ve gösterilen haheş ve arzuya bakılınca usulce kat'a beis olamayacağı irad olunmasıyla taraf-ı sami-i meşihatpenahiden dahi bu babda hükm-i şer'iyi mutazammın verilecek fetva-i şerife kuvve-i mevcudenin kâfi olup olmadığının [18] bilinmesine mütevakkıf olduğu beyan olunarak anın üzerine memurin-i kiramı hazeratı tarafından sual olunduktan zikr olduğu vechile orduların kuvvetce bazı noksanı olduğundan harbin tahakkuku halinde kuvve-i berriye ve bahriyece lüzumu görünen [19] noksanın ikmalî biraz vakte daha muhtac olduğu cevap verilerek ol babda cereyan eden ebhas ve mütalaatın neticesinde ilan-ı harbe hükm-i şer'î kuvve-i mevcudenin kâfi olup olmadığının bilinmesine mütevakkıf olduğu misillü [20] esbab-ı mukabalenin daha noksanı olduğu dahi beyan olunup eğerçi ilan-ı harb olduğu halde bunun dahi istikmaline çalışılacağı ve şimdiki kuvve-i mevcudenin hal-i hazırı hükm-i şer'î ül hakk olduğu halde tehire sebep [21] olamayacağı cihetle burası bais-i tereddüd olmaz ise de Viyana'dan alınan habere göre Viyana müsveddesine cümle ittifakıyla istenilen tağyirat hakkında Viyana'ca müşkilat gösterilmeyip Devlet-i Aliyye'nin tashihatın kabulü sureti dahi [22] Petersburg'a yazılmış olduğundan şayed istenilen tağyirat Petersburg'ca kabul olunur ise kazanılacak muzafferiyet-i politikiye velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padişahımız efendimizin enzar-ı alemde bir kat daha i'tilâ'-i şan ve şevket-i mülükanelerini müstelzem olacağından [23] ve bil-cümle vükela-i fiham ve ulema-i i'lam ile mecalis-i umumide bil-ittifak karargir olan bir sureti böyle netice-i hali derk ve i'zana muktedir olabilenlerin efkârı üzerine tağyir etmeliği dahi kat'a zihinler kabul edemeyip ve Petersburg'dan [24] muntazar olan cevap dahi nihayet sekiz on güne kadar gelebileceği irad olduğundan ve eğerçi adem-i kabul cevabı gelür ise ol halde karşı durulmak dahi evvelki karar iktizasından olduğundan hasıl olacak neticeye intizaren usul-i mukarrere [25] ve müttehidenin tağyiri bir vechile tecviz edilemeyeceği dahi cümleten beyan olunduktan sonra bahis bu

hale göre işbu arzuhali veren hoca efendilere ne denilmesi ve nasıl muamele olunması lazım geleceğine intikal ederek bunların işbu hareketleri doğrusu [26] pek yolsuz ve uygunsuz bir şey olduğuna ve cümle ittifakıyla geçende neşr ü ilan olunan tenbihata muğayir ve bayağı hükümeti istihkak demek olacağına ve bu itirazat yalnız heyet-i devlete olmayıp en büyük hissesi canib-i meşihat-i İslamiyeye [27] ve sudur-ı kirama ait olacağı cihetle bunda namus-ı celil-i şeriat-ı garranın dahi gözedilmesi lazım geleceğine nazaran bu harekete cüret edenlerin tedibi levazım-ı hükümdariye muvafık görüldüğü misillü Devlet-i Aliyye'nin bunları ikta' ve ilzama [28] kat'a ihtiyacı olmadığı dahi bedihi olup şu kadar ki bunların şu hareketleri mücerred adem-i vukuf ve noksani-i mülahazadan ve ihtimal ki bazı kendüyi bilmezlerin ikval-i gayr-i makulelerinden neşet eylediğinden ve her ne kadar Vidinli Hoca Efendi'nin [28] böyle arzuhal takdimi tasmimine dair bazı ifadatı vuku bulmuş ise de taraf-ı hazret-i meşihatpenahiden vaki olan tenbihe mebni arzuhali temhir etmediği anlaşılmiş ve bu takım Hoca Behi [?] Efendi'ye müracat etmişler ise de muvafakat görmediklerinden başka [30] muamele-i tevbihiyeye mazhar oldukları dahi işidilmiş olup her ne ise bunda meşahir-i ulemadan hiç kimsenin mühür ve imzası bulunmadığına nazaran şimdi bu arzuhal takdim edenlere taraf-ı vâlâ-i şeyhülislamiden bizzat beyan-ı hal edilmek [31] münasip olamayacağından zat-ı vâlâ-i fetvapenahi bazı sudur-ı izam hazeratı hazır oldukları halde meşhur ve muğber hocaefendiler ve huzur-ı hümayun dersinde mukarrer olan efendilerin güzidelerini işbu Pazar günü bab-ı fetvapenahiye [32] celb ile mesele-i halide tutulan usulün evvel ve ahiri ve hal-i hazırı kendülerine ifade ve tefhim olunarak anlar kani oldukları halde kendülerinden sened alınarak sonra anların vesatetiyle dahi işbu arzuhali veren ve gerek anların emsali [33] olanların ilzam ve iskat ve hareket-i vakıalarından dolayı kendülerine lisan-ı şer'i ile bazı tenbihat ve tevbihat icra edilmesi zımında keyfiyetin canib-i cenab-ı fetvapenahiye havalesi ve biraz vakitten berü Dersaadet'ce ve taşralarca ahalinin efkârında [34] galeyana hasıl olduğu dahi irad ve ityan olunmasıyla işbu tenbihatın ve gerek alınacak senedin ahalinin efkârınca dahi tesirâtı olacağı misillü işbu arzuhalin tertib ve tanzimine hayli günlerden berü teşebbüs olunmuş olduğu rivayet-i vakıadan [35] tebeyyün ederek ta ki bunun takdimine kadar polis memurları tarafından bir guna ifadat vuku bulmaması emr-i tahkikatda adem-i takayyüde mahmul ve böyle nazik vakitlerde her şeyden ziyade polis memurlarının mütebassır ve muktedir bulunması esas-ı [36] mesalih-i mühimmeden madud olmasıyla ahalinin ikval ve if'aline hasr-ı nazar-ı dikkat ve itina edilerek bir guna uygunsuzluk vukua getürülmesi esbabının istihsaline bakılması suretinin dahi iktiza edenlere ve zabita müşiri devletlu paşa hazretlerine [37] kaviyyen tenbih olunması suretleri dahi müttehiden tansip olunmuş ise de iray-ı aciz-i intiha-yı bendeganın mükemmeli olan emr ü ferman-ı keramet-beyan-ı hazret-i padişahi her ne vechile şerefsudur buyurulur ise mehakim-i hayr ü isabet-i mantuk-ı celil-i elham- adliyenin [38] icrasında olacağı ve salif üz zikr arzuhal dahi meşmul-i negah-ı dakayık-ı iktibah-ı cenab-ı cihanbani buyurulmak için takdim kılındığı rehin-i ilm-i ali buyuruldukta her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir. Fi 7 Z sene 69.

[Seals from right to left] Şevket, Mehmed Arif, Mehmed, Mahmud, Rifat, Ali Fethi, Mehmed Ali, Mustafa Reşid, Rauf, Esseyid Ahmed Arif, Mustafa Naili.

Appendix 6. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 8, dated 16 October 1853. Stratford to Reshid on bringing the fleet to the Bosphorus.

Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye 1853 senesi Teşrin-i Evvel'inin on altısı tarihiyle müverrahan Dersaadet'de mukim İngiltere devleti büyükelçisi Lord Stratford de Redcliffe tarafından gönderilen takririn suret-i tercümesidir.

Zirde muharrer-i imza İngiltere devleti büyükelçisi Rusya'nın hareket-ı vakıası cihetiyle Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin ilan-ı harbe karar vermeğe mecbur olduğuna ve bu babda Prens Gorçakof'a yazılan mektubda tayin olunmuş olan müddetin inkızasından evvelce hareket-ı hasmanenin vukua gelebilmesi melhuz ve muhtemel bulunduğu mebni el haleti hazihi Çanak Kalesi kurbünde lengerendaz-ı ikamet olan İngiltere donanmasının bir miktarının Boğaz'dan içerü girmesi davetini havi nazır-ı umur-ı hariciye-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye übbetli devletlu Reşid Paşa hazretleri tarafından irsal olunan takrir-i resmiyi ahz eylediğinin arz ve ifadesiyle beraber ahval-i mezkureyi ve ba husus hareket-ı hasmane müddet-i muayyenenin inkızasından mukaddemce vukua gelebilmesi madde-sini kemaliyle halisane sencide-i mizan-ı tefekkür eyledikten sonra tebliğat ve tedarikat-ı lazıme icra olunduğu gibi zat-ı hazret-i mülükânenin arzusuna muvafakat etmeğe hazır bulunduğunu arz ve işar ile kesb-i fahr eder. Şu kadar ki mevsimin ilerlemekte bulunduğu binaen donanma-i mezkurdan lazım geldiği kadarını Dersaadet'e celb ederek kalanlarının dahi Çanak Kalesi'nin berü tarafında barınmak üzere içeriye girmeleri hususunun münasip görüldüğünü dahi ihtaren beyan eyler. Binaberin ol babda iktiza eden feramin-i aliyenin ısdar ve Çanak Kalesi canibine irsali hususunu nazır-ı müşarün-ileyhden rica eylediği beyanını derkar olan hürmet-i faikasının tecdidine vesile ittihaz etmiştir.

Appendix 7. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 9, dated 16 October 1853. French ambassador Edmond de la Cour to Reshid on bringing the fleet to the Bosphorus.

Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye 1853 senesi Teşrin-i Evvel'inin on altısı tarihiyle müverrahan Fransa sefiri Mösyö de la Cour tarafından takdim olunan bir kıta takrir-i resmînin tercümesidir.

Beşike'lerde lenger-endaz-ı ikamet olan Fransa donanmasının bir mikdarının Bahr-i Sefid boğazından içerü girmesini davet eylemeğe Saltanat-ı Seniyye karar vererek işbu kararın tebliğini mutazammın ba irade-i hazret-i padişahi taraf-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i nezaret-penahiden Fransa sefaretine irsal buyurulan takrir-i resmiyi muharrer-i imza ahz eylemiştir. Takrir-i resmi-i mezkurda beyan olunduğu üzere Prens Gorçakof'a yazılan mektubda tayin olunan müddetden evvelce bile asakir-i şahane ile memleketeynde bulunan Rusya asakiri beyninde hareket-ı hasmaneye mübaşeret olunması melhuz bulunduğundan Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin bu defa kendisinden vaki olan iltimasına bila ikate-i vakt muvafakat eylediği halde metbu-i mufahhamı olan imparator hazretlerinin niyatına mutabık hareket etmiş olacağına muharrer-i imzanın itimadı vardır ve çünkü Saltanat-ı Seniyye kendüsünün temami-i mülkünden olan eyalata Rusya asakirinin girişinden dolayı Boğazlara dair olan hukukunu ber vech-i serbesti tamamen icrasına kesb-i istihkak etmiş olduğuna ve Fransa donanması Devlet-i Aliye'nin talebi üzerine Bahr-i Sefid boğazından içeri girmesiyle uhud-ı meriyeye bir gûna hanel iras eylemeyeceğine binaen muharrer-i imza devlet-i metbuasının Saltanat-ı Seniyye hakkında derkar olan efkar-ı hayırhahına ve dostanesine bir delil ibraz etmek için işbu vesileyi bil-müsaraa ittihaza kendüsünü mezun addeder. Kaldı ki mevsimin haline nazaran bütün donanmanın Boğaz'ın içeri tarafında barınmaları pek arzu olunacak mevaddan idüğünü ihtar ile beraber muharrer-i imza kendüsinden Bab-ı Ali namına olarak vaki olan talep ve iltimasa muvafakata hazır bulunduğu ve bunun icrasına muvafakat etmek için Fransa donanmasının Akdeniz boğazından içerü girişinden evvel canib-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'den ittihazı lazım gelen tedabire taraf-ı alisinden dahi teşebbüs buyurulduğunun haberine muntazır olduğunun beyanı zaten derkar olan ihtiramat-ı faikasının tekrar-i teminatına vesile-i hasene ittihaz kılınmıştır.

Appendix 8. A. AMD. 49/90, dated 24 Muharrem 1270 (27 October 1853). *Tezkire-i samiye* [draft]. On instructions to Namık Pasha concerning the loan.

Ahval-i hazıradan dolayı lüzumu tahmin olunan beş yüz bin kise akçenin tedariki ve celbi memuriyetleriyle Avrupa canibine tayin kılınan Ticaret Nazırı devletlu Namık Paşa hazretlerine verilmesi lazım gelen talimat mahsusca bir komisyonda müzakere olunarak kararının arz ve istizan kılınması müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulan emr ü irade-i seniyye-i cenab-ı cihanbani muktezay-ı celilinden olduğu Reis-i Meclis-i Vâlâ ve Maliye Nazırı devletlu paşalar ve müşarünileyh Namık Paşa hazeratı beynlerinde bil-müzakere ol babda tanzim olunan bir kıta müzekkere şehri carinin yirmi ikinci Salı gününde akd olunmuş olan Meclis-i Mahsus'da led el-kırae mevadd-ı mündericesi yolunda ve muvafık-ı hal ve maslahat olup mukaddemce dahi arz ve beyan olunduğu vechile bunda asıl gözedilecek şey bu akçeye karşılık gösterilecek mahallerin inhisar suretinde olmaması ve enzar-ı ecnebiyede rehin rengine girmemesi kaziyeleri olduğundan mesela Mısır virgüsü ve Beriyyet-üş Şam ve İzmir gümrükleri gibi şeyler olmayarak alelittlak varidat-ı Devlet-i Aliyye'den olması lazım geleceğinden maliye nazırı müşarünileyh tarafından tanzim ve ibraz olunan iki kıta pusuladan birinde gösterildiği vechile mahall-i malume zeyt yağı aşarı ve zecriyeden hasıl olan gümrük resmi ve memlehaler bedelatı ve sair aşar ve rüsumu varidatı olan altmış bin kise akçe havale gösterilip şayed buna razı olmadıkları halde diğer pusulada muharrer gayr ez mesarif-i mahalliye Hüdavendigâr eyaleti virgüsü olan otuz üç bin bu kadar kisenin dahi havalesinde beis olamayacağı cihetle bu pusula dahi ihtiyati olarak müşarünileyhe verilip her nasıl mümkün olur ise ol vechile tesviyesine terhis olunması ve bu alınacak akçenin bin beş yüz kise miktarı sigorta mesarifi olup böyle emr-i cesimde tahsil-i emniyet için bu kadar mesarifin ihtiyarı caiz olabileceğinden ve mevsim dahi şıtaya tesadüf ettiğinden gönderilecek mebalighin sigortaya rabt ettirilmesi ve kat'a poliçe ve kambiyo kabul olunmayıp evvelki karar üzere cümlesi altın ve gümüş olarak ele geçirilmesi ve müşarünileyhin memuriyeti sıfat-ı resmîyede olacağından elinde evrak-ı resmîye bulunması dahi icab edip hariciye nezareti tarafından Londra ve Paris umur-ı ecnebiye vekillerine ve sefaret-i seniyyelere tahrirat-ı resmîye yazılarak bu tarafta olan sefaretler canibinden dahi kağıtlar alınıp kendisine ita olunması ve bu halde her taraftan muavenet-i mukteziye ve teshilat-ı mümkününe ifa olunacağı derkar ise de şayed bankirler tarafından tamaa düşölüp de bir guna müşkilat zuhur eder ise derhal bu tarafa bildirilmesi ve nezaret-i hariciye canibinden ensile [isale?] olduğu üzere telgraf vasıtasıyla teshil-i muhabere için mahsus huruf tertib olunarak verilmesi ve mebaligh-i matlubenin güzesteşi ve müddet-i tayini hususlarında verilecek ruhsat ve mezuniyetin daire-i mahremiyette tutulması lüzumuna mebni bu maddeler için gayet mahremane olarak müşarünileyhe başkaca talimat-ı hafiye itası hususları beyn-el hazerat tezkir ve tansip olunmuş ve müzekkere-i mezkura mutalaat-ı meşruhaya tatbikan talimat suretinde kaleme alınarak mezkur pusulalar ile beraber manzur-ı ali-i cenab-ı padişahi buyurulmak için arz ve takdim kılınmış olmağla hususat-ı maruza hakkında her ne vechile emr ü ferman-ı hazret-i padişahi müteallik buyurulur ise m*hasır-ı firdahin [?] inha olacağı ve zikr olunan talimat-ı hafiye müsveddesi dahi ayruca arz ve istizan kılınacağı beyanıyla tezkire..

Appendix 9. İ. HR. 103/5039 lef 1, dated 28 Muharrem 1270 (31 October 1853). Draft of confidential instructions to Namık Pasha. [Also available in A. DVN. MHM. 10/89-2].

Kendüye verilen ruhsat iktizasınca hariçten alınacak beş yüz bin kise akçenin suret-i tedarik ve celbi hakkında mevadd-ı lazıme diğer talimat-ı mahsusada beyan olunmuş olup anın ahkamına tatbikan tesviye-i maslahata sarf-ı himmet olunacağı misillü itası

icab eden güzeştenin dahi bir ehven suretle kararlaştırılması lazımeden olduğuna ve mukaddema Paris'den alınan haberlere nazaran nihayet senede dört, dört buçuk guruş güzeşte ile istenilen mebaliğ alınabileceği memul bulunduğu binaen hin-i mukavelede kararlaştırılacak güzeştenin bu mikdarı tecavüz etmemesine ziyadesiyle ikdam ve gayret olunup mümkün olamadığı halde nihayet ül nihaye altıya kadar mezun olacaktır.

Bu husus-ı nazikenin şayan-ı dikkat olan bir yeri dahi alınacak mebaliğin tediyesi zamanının tayini sureti olup çünkü bunun emr-i tesviyesi bir müddet-i tevileyeye rabt olunur ise uzun uzadıya deyn-i bari altında kalınacağından mümkün olduğu mertebe sa'y ve himmet olunarak tayin olunacak müddet-i tediyezin on sene olmasına ve olmadığı surette nihayet on beş seneye kararlaştırılmasına çalışılacaktır.

Rivayet ve tahkik olduğuna göre Avrupa'da bu makule teati olunan mebaliğin senevi güzeştesi nihayet yüzde altı olarak andan ziyadeye olmayıp fakat ahval-i ihtiyaciyede güzeştenin zammı yerine alınacak akçeyi tamamı tamamına vermeyip iskonta tabiriyle mesela yüz kuruşa mukabil doksan kuruş verilmek veyahud yüz kuruş verilip prim tabiriyle yüz on kuruşa sened alınmak ahval-i mesbukaları iktizasından olmasıyla eğerçi paşa-yı müşarünileyh istikamet-i zatiyesi iktizasınca ve olunan talimat-ı şifahiye vechile sipariş olunan akçeyi tamamı tamamına almağa kemal-i derece cedd ve sa'y edeceği memul ise de şayed ahval-i mücbire-i zamaniye icabınca akçe verecek bankirler tarafından bu nevi bir teklif vuku bulur ise maslahat gecikmemek için nihayet yüzde beş kadar noksan alınmasına biz-zarure mezun olacaktır.

[Seals] Sağdan sola: Safveti, Rifat, Fethi, Mehmed Ali, Mustafa Reşid, Ahmed Arif, Mustafa Naili.

Lef 2: [from the petition of the Sadrazam] “... çünkü bunların mikdarı ve keyfiyeti şayed bir takarrüb ile bankirler duyar ise elbette tamaa düşerek ziyade isteyecekleri mülahazasına göre bu madde gayet hafi tutularak Meclis-i Mahsus'da dahi tezkir olunamayıp beyn el havass kararlaştırılmış ve bir kıta müsveddesi dahi kaleme aldırılıp temhir kılınmış olduğundan bu maddeye dair maliye nezaret-i celilesi tarafından tanzim olunan cedveller ile beraber manzur-ı... fi 28 M 70.

[İrade] Gurre-i Safer 70.

Appendix 10. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 17, dated 4 November 1853. French ambassador Edmond de La Cour's instructions to head dragoman Schefer on bringing the rest of the allied fleets to the Bosphorus.

Ambassade de France á Constantinople

Therapia, le 4 Novembre 1853

Monsieur

J'ai reęu hier au soir le rapport que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'envoyer pour m'annoncer que le conseil avait r solu de nous adresser a S. M. Mr l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et a moi, l'invitation de faire remonter les Escadres du d troit des Dardanelles dans celui du Bosphore. Je vous invite a faire savoir a S. A. Rechid Pacha que je n'attends que la communication officielle qui doit m' tre adress e a cet  gard pour la transmettre a Mr l'Amiral Hamelin qui ne manquera pas de d'y conformer.

Je ne saurais toutefois dissimuler que je n'ai pas appris sans surprise la d termination de la Porte de donner a la Flotte Ottomane l'ordre de mettre a la voile: cette mesure me semble au contraire pr matur e: peut  tre les conseillers du Sultan

penseront ils qu'il y aurait avantage avant d'y donner suite, d'attendre que les Escadres combinées ai eut mouille devant Constantinople afin que le Capitan Pacha puisse avant de prendre la mer, se concerter avec les amiraux commandant les flottes combinées. Je vous invite a faire part serais de lui de ces observations a S. A. Mr le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

Recevez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

[signed] E. de la Cour

Appendix 11. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 16, dated 4 November 1853. Official translation of the above instructions of the French ambassador into Turkish.

Fransa sefiri Mösyö de la Cour tarafından bin sekiz yüz elli üç senesi Teşrin-i Sani'sinin dördü tarihiyle müverrehan Fransa sefareti baştercümanı Mösyö Schefer'e ita olunan talimatnamenin tercümesidir.

Donanmaların Kala-i Sultaniye'den Boğaziçi'ne celbi hususu gerek benden ve gerek İngiltere sefiri cenablarından iltimas olunmağa Meclis-i Vükela'da karar verildiği beyanını mutazammın irsal kılınan takririniz ahz olunmuş olmağla bu babda tarafımıza icra buyurulacak tebliğat-ı resmiyeye intizar eylemekte olduğumuzu ve bu tebliğat Amiral Hamelin'e irsal olunarak mumaileyhin dahi buna tevfiğ-i hareket eylemekte tecviz-i kusur etmeyeceğini übbebetlu devletlu Reşid Paşa hazretlerine beyan eylemeğe sizi davet ederim. Mahaza donanma-i hümayunun buradan azimet etmesinin emr ü ferman buyurulmasına canib-i Bab-ı Ali'den verilen karara hayret ve istiğrab ile kesb-i vukuf eylediğimi ketm edemem. Çünkü bu tedbir bilakis bana vakitsiz gibi görüldüğünden tedbir-i mezkuru icra etmezden evvel devletlu Kapudan Paşa hazretlerinin donanma-i müttefika kumandanlarıyla kabl-el hareket müzakere edebilmesi için mezkur donanma-i müttefikaların Dersaadet'e muvasalat etmesine intizar buyurulmak hususunun faideden hali olmayacağına vükela-i fiham-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyye hazeratı tarafından sarf-ı efkar buyurulacağı memul bulunduğundan işbu ihtararı hariciye nazırı übbebetlu devletlu paşa hazretlerine serian beyan eylemeğe sizi davet eder, derkar olan hürmet-i mütemayizemin teminat-ı mükerreresini size ibraz ve tekid eylerim.

Appendix 12. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 15, dated 4 November 1853. British ambassador Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's instructions to head dragoman Etienne [Stephen] Pisani on bringing the rest of the allied fleets to the Bosphorus.

Extrait. Instruction a Mr E. Pisani de la part de Lord Stratford. Therapia, le 4 novembre 1853.

Monsieur de la Cour et moi sommes prêts d'envoyer chercher le reste de la Flotte, désque la demande nous en sera faite et nous sommes sensibles du courage et de l'esprit de patriotisme manifestes par les Ministres Ottomans en se faisant voir empresses d'envoyer leur Escadres, a la exception des trois ponts, dans la Mer Noire. Toutefois, nous croyons que l'opinion des gens de la profession, soit anglaise soit française, est défavorable à cette entreprise. On pourrait bien avoir des doutes si, dans cette saison avancée et connaissant la grande force disponible à Sevastopol, il serait prudent de risquer une si grande partie de la flotte Turque. Aussurement [?] le danger serait très grand et un insuccès dans ce moment serait un mal immense à la Porte.

Dans tous les cas, je sous décidément d'opinion que ce serait une folie de faire partir les bâtiments avant que nos Escadres soient réunis ici, et, même alors, il serait

beaucoup mieux, dans l'opinion de notre Amiral d'envoyer trois au quatre grands bateaux a vapeur, que d'envoyer des vaisseaux de ligne a voile.

En conclusion, si la Porte se décide a envoyer des bateaux a vapeur au des bâtiments a voile, il serait fort a désirer d'attendre pour cela l'approche de la pleine lune, qui diminuerait de beaucoup le danger de la navigation dans la mer noire au mois de novembre.

Appendix 13. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 14, dated 4 November 1853. Official translation into Turkish of the above instructions of Lord Stratford.

İngiltere sefiri Lord Stratford de Redcliffe tarafından bin sekiz yüz elli üç senesi Teşrin-i Sani'sinin dördü tarihiyle müverrahan İngiltere sefareti baştercümanı Mösyö Etienne Pisani'ye ita olunan bir kıta talimatnamenin tercümesidir.

İki donanma-i müttefikanın ma bakiyesini istenildiği gibi bu tarafa getürtmeğe Mösyö de La Cour ile beraber hazır ve amade olduğumuz halde üç anbarlulardan maada donanma-i hümayunun Karadeniz'e çıkarılmasına müsaraat ile gayret-i vataniyelerini ibraz ve izhar etmiş olan vükela-i fiham hazeratının cesaret-i meşhudelerinden müessir olmuşuzdur. Fakat gerek Fransalu ve gerek İngilterelü erbab-ı vukufun rey ve efkarı işbu hareket ve azimete mugayir olacağını zannederiz. Vakıa mevsim bu kadar ilerlemiş ve Sivastopol'de müheyya bulunan kuvve-i külliye-i bahriye mevadd-ı malumeden bulunmuş iken donanma-i hümayunun bunca sefainini böyle muhataraya ilka etmeklik kâr-ı âkıl olacağına iştibah etmek doğrusu caiz olup çünkü muhatara-i melhuze pek büyük olduğundan şu aralık bir âdem-i muvaffakiyetin vukuu Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin hakk-ı alisinde pek büyük bir mazarrat iras edeceği derkardır. Her halde bizim donanmalarımız burada tecemmu etmezden süfun-ı hümayunu yola çıkarmaklık cinnet hükmünde bir hareket olacağı efkar-ı mukarresindeyim. Donanmalarımız buraya geldikten sonra bile amirallerimizin reyine göre birtakım bayağı kapaklar göndermekten ise üç dört kadar büyük vapur sefineleri irsal olunsa daha eyü olur. Velhasıl Devlet-i Aliyye yelken veyahud vapur sefaini göndermeğe karar verdiği takdirde Karadeniz'de Teşrin-i Sani'de seyr ü sefer eylemenin muhataratını hayliden hayli taklil edecek olan ay mehtabına kadar tevakkuf olunması temenni ve arzu olunacak mevaddandır.

Appendix 14. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 19, dated 5 November 1853. French ambassador Edmond de La Cour's instructions to head dragoman Schefer on the Porte's determination to send the fleet to the Black Sea.

Ambassade de France
à Constantinople

Therapia le 5 Novembre 1853

Monsieur

Il paraît, si je suis bien informé, que la Porte persiste dans la détermination qu'elle a prise de faire sortir demain l'escadre ottomane, malgré les observations que je vous ai charge de soumettre a S. A. Rechid Pacha.

Les rapports qui existent, en ce moment, entre le gouvernement de S. M. le Sultan et l'ambassade, m'imposent le devoir de faire part a la S. Porte, jusqu'au dernier moment, des graves inconvénients qui pourraient être la conséquence d'une semblable mesure ; vous voudrez bien vous rendre, de nouveau, au pris de S. A. Rechid Pacha, pour lui réitérer sans perdre un instant, les considérations qui devraient engager le Cabinet ottoman a ajourner, au moins, le départ de l'Escadre. Je veux, dans tous les cas, qu'il soit bien établi que je n'ai négligé aucun soin pour faire partager mon avis aux Conseillers de S. M. I. le Sultan et qu'ils porteront exclusivement la responsabilité de

toutes les conséquences auxquelles peut dernier lieu une détermination que j'aurai vainement combattre.

Recevez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

[signed] E. de la Cour

Appendix 15. HR. SYS. 1189/54, dated 28 Safer 1270 (30 November 1853). Official note [takrir-i resmi] to the French and British embassies on the danger of the Russian battleships around Sinop.

Bab-ı Ali
Hariciye Nezareti
Takrir-i Resmi

Rusya sefain-i harbiyesinin bir fırkasının Sinop limanı ağzında ve Sinop sularında ve bir fırkasının dahi Bartın boğazı ve Amasra havalisinde dolaşmakta olduğuna dair Sinop'ta bulunan süfun-ı hümayun kumandanları tarafından tevarüd eden tahriratın bir sureti manzur-ı sefiraneleri olmak üzere leffen taraf-ı asilanelerine irsal kılındığının ve keyfiyetin İngiltere devleti sefaretine dahi bildirildiğinin beyanı zaten derkar olan ihtiramat-ı faikamın teyid-i teminatına zeria ittihaz kılınır. Fi 28 S 270.

Appendix 16. A. AMD. 50/30 and HR. SYS. 1189/55, dated 3 Rebiülevvel 1270 (4 December 1853). Official note to the French and British embassies.

Rusya sefain-i harbiyesinin Sinop havalisinde dolaşmakta oldukları bundan evvelce taraf-ı asilanelerine takrir-i resmi ile beyan ve ihbar olunmuş idi. Bu defa Sinop'dan vürud eden Taif vapuru kumandanının vaki olan ifadesinden müstefad olduğu vechile şehir-i Safer'in yigirmi dokuzuncu Çeharşenbe günü Rusyalunun üç kıta üç anbarlı ve üç kıta kapak sefinesiyle iki fırkateyni Sinop limanına duhul ederek Devlet-i Aliye donanmasından fırkateyn ve korvetten mürekkep olarak orada bulunan bir fırka-i bahriye ile muharebeye tasaddi etmişlerdir. Muharebenin neticesi henüz malum değil ise de işbu fırka-i müfrezinin bulunduğu mevkiye ve düşman sefinelerinin daha kuvvetli bulunmasına nazaran ziyadece sakatlık olması melhuzatdandır. İngiltere ve Fransa devletleri donanmalarının Boğaziçi'nde bulunmaları Devlet-i Aliyye'nin memalik-i sahiliyesini muhafaza niyet-i halisesiyle olup şimdi Rusya kuvve-i bahriyesinin şu hareketi ise gözüne kesdireceği mahallere tasallut edeceğine delalet eder bir keyfiyet olarak bu kadar sevahil-i vasiyanın muhasesesi dahi derece-i kifayede kuvve-i bahriyenin Kara Deniz'de bulunmasına mütevakıf olduğundan ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye her ne kadar kendi donanmasını Bahr-i Siyah'a çıkarmak niyetinde ise de işbu Sinop vakası sebebiyle gidecek kuvve-i bahriye kifayet rütbesinde görünmediğinden iki devlet-i müttefikanın himmet-i fiiliyesine müracaat lazım gelmiş olmağla bu keyfiyetin Fransa devleti sefaretine bildirildiği misillu taraf-ı asilanelerine dahi beyanı zaten derkar olan ihtiramat-ı faikamın teyidine zeria ittihaz olunur.

Appendix 17. TNA. FO 195/309, dated 6 December 1853. Translation. “Deposition of the Captain & Officers of the Turkish Steamer “Tayf” [sic], concerning the action at Sinope on Wednesday the 30 November”.

I was cruising in company with the Ferik Moustafa Pasha & returned after I had fulfilled my mission to Sinope under the orders of the Patrona Bey Pasha. On the following day Hussein Pasha also arrived with several ships, while the other ships arrived scatteredly by ones & twos. The “Erekly” and “Tayf” Steamers were necessarily kept with the ships and on Tuesday last they sailed from Sinope with the Steamers

attached to them. Wednesday, the day following, the wind being from the East, the Russian Commander with a flag in the Bow [?] was seen off the Port, that is at a place called Kerze six or seven miles distant with these Line of Battle Ships & with one "Batrika", altogether four ships and a gun was fired from the Battery at Kerze to apprise the fleet & the Castle of Sinope that the enemy was coming. The Erekli Steamer was immediately got under weigh & sent to reconnoitre the Ships; but it was clear that they were the enemy's ships. When the Tayf fires [?] were lighted the Patrona Pasha signalled to her to get under way and Steam against the wind & she did so. Hussey Pasha made a signal for the ships to make sail, but Osman Pasha signalled twice that this should be delayed a little & the ships remained. Having been drawn up as near to the shore as possible Osman Pasha signalled that they should be ready to make a stout resistance and they all made ready. The Enemy's Ships came down upon Sinope & remained at about a shot's distance. While the Tayf was coming right before them the Enemy's Commander made a signal and they all made as if to enter the port and then drew off again and remained under sail as if blockading it, dispatching brigs on an errand. These three line of battle Ships thus remained night and day, and in order to ascertain what they were about signals had been established between the Castle and the fleet.

It had been reported that besides these ships four others had been to "Ayandjik" to water, but we had disbelieved that report.

One day all the Captains had been assembled on board the Patrona. The second in command of the Tayf was sent and the Patrona Pasha gave the following instructions to all the Captains: "The enemy's ships are at sea and we cannot cope with them. If we put out to sea we will be lost; the best thing is to fight them, if they come, so long as we have a gun left. If there be any danger of their capturing you, slip your cable, run your ships on shore and let fire to them." So it was agreed upon.

The Captain of the Nizamiye Kadri Bey having been at that time charged to enquire whether any one had been sent to give intelligence of the state of matters at Constantinople, it was replied that a Tartar had been sent an hour afterwards. Hussey Pasha came on board the Tayf and on being asked whether he had sent information to the Porte when the enemy's ships came off the Island, he replied that as it was a long way by land he would send by the Austrian Steamer which was expected; and it was heard that he had sent.

While in daily anxious expectation of Steamers or succour from Const'ple the English Screw Steamer arrived on Tuesday and on being questioned about Const'ple news he replied that no steamers or Ships had left it.

The eighth day after [the Russians] had made their appearance, Wednesday the 29 inst. [30 Nov.] it was foggy and rained and no ships were seen in the offing. The wind was from the East and at six o'clock [?] [11 a.m.] "Navik Bahri" signalled that the enemy had come inside the island. When the fog was dispelled, all at once three three deckers; three line of battle ships and two frigates appeared bearing down upon our Squadron. The Patrona Pasha having signalled the Tayf to get up her Steam & go out to sea in the direction from which the wind blew, we immediately prepared to get under way.

The following signal was also made to the Squadron: "The moment has now come for acquiring glory & renown & for serving our King. Let me see what you can do. Be valiant."

Everything being ready the Enemy's fleet came into port so close to the Ships as to touch them almost. They each had two boats in tow. On this the Patrona Pasha again signalled "be valiant".

At 11 a.m. the action commenced, and the Tayf slipped her cable got under way and put out to sea between the Squadron and the shore. Two of the enemy's frigates

were blockading the port under sail and bore down upon us and engaged with us. Continuing to h*y [?] the Coast we distanced the frigates and while doing the best to escape three Russian Steamers bore down upon us from the island and engaged with us during an hour and a half. They then left us on a signal made from their fleet & returned towards it.

On looking in the direction of Sinope it was observed that several of the enemy's masts had fallen. As the Nizamiye, the Avn Allah & the Damietta fired broadsides we expect that one of the enemy's three deckers and a line of battle ship were sunk. We then plugged up the holes made by the enemy's shot and observed a fire proceeding from the Greek Quarter at Sinope. The firing was heard until 4 p.m. & until 8 o'clock [?] in the evening. Now and then there was an appearance of an explosion.

It had been several times represented to the Patrona Pasha to get under weigh with the Squadron, but as there were different opinions on this subject he did not move. We know nothing further as to the result of the action; because of we [?] had staid behind on this account the three steamers which had already chased us would have again fallen upon us and mischief might have befallen us. We therefore made straight for Const'ple and arrived on Friday.

Return of Turkish Ships at Sinope when the Russians entered that Port

Frigates	Nizamiye Kaidi Zafer Nesimi Zafer Naviki Bahri Avn Allah Fazl Allah Damietta
Corvettes	Feizi Maboud Nedjmi Nishan Kulsefid
Steamers	Erekli Pervazi Bahri

Appendix 18. TNA. FO 195/309, dated 7 December 1853. Adolphus Slade to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

H.M.S. Retribution
Bay of Sinope. 7th Dec. 1853

My Lord

With deep sorrow I write to inform you of the total destruction by a Russian Squadron of the Turkish Squadron excepting of the Taif / named in the margin in the Bay of Sinope on Nov. 30, 1853. The destruction is complete, the Battered wrecks of eleven vessels are stranded in the shores of the Bay, of 4000 gallant men who manned the squadron not more than 400 are with certainty in existence and of their nearly one half are wounded. Not a ship struck her colors, only two, namely the Avni Allah and the Nesimi when resistance had ceased to be possible, were taken possession of by the enemy but their condition was so bad as to cause them to be abandoned and destroyed the following day. The Gallant Commander in chief of the Turkish Squadron Osman Pasha was taken prisoner, wounded, in the Avni Allah and carried to Sevastopol. The second in command Husseyn Pasha left his burning ship in the evening of the action

after she had stranded, to swim to the shore: He reached it but a fragment of grape shot struck him on the head and terminated his existence. His remains were recovered and interred at the tekkieh adjoining the town. This officer's career commenced at the battle of Navarin and the last day of it has been marked by rarely if ever equalled devotion.

The Turkish Squadron anchored in the Bay of Sinope about the 15th of November last; about the first a Russian Squadron of three two-decked ships and a frigate and a Brig stood in [?] the Bay and ranged within two guns shot of the Turkish line. Having made this reconnaissance it established a blockade of the Bay by cruising off Cape Indjey. Keeping its station day and night in very bad weather. Seeing this as *?* informed, Husseyn Pasha and Emin [?] Bey (the Liman Reis of Sinope) counselled Osman Pasha to get under weigh and return to the Bosphorus either by forcing the blockade or by passing the blockading squadron in the night unnoticed.

Osman Pasha having previous to his anchoring at Sinope suffered in his ships from a gale of wind and swayed by other appreciable motives, assumed [?] an action at anchor preferable to an action under way, but had he contemplated the reinforcement which subsequently arrived to the enemy, he would doubtless not have come to this conclusion. His 7 frigates, 3 corvettes and two steamers, whatever might have been the inexperience at sea of the captains and crews, would have made their way good against 3 line of Battle Ships and a frigate at the same time as he appeared to be in expectation of being attacked by that force only, he ensured complete success by awaiting it at anchor. A few days then passed. The Russian brig with the blockading squadron having been noticed from the Turkish signal station to part company it was presumed that the Russian squadron composed of 3 3-deckers and 3 two deckers, two of the ships having respectively the flag of a Vice Admiral and of a Rear Admiral, stood into the bay before the wind, towards the Turkish Squadron under all plain sail including Royals each ship towing some of her boats astern, the frigates and 3 steamers remained outside to cut off the escape of any of the intended prey. The Turkish Squadron forswore [?] the advantage of firing on the enemy during his approach and allowed him unmolested to take up his position. About noon the Russian ships clewed up their sails and came to an anchor with springs on their cables. Although the Pasha's flags were not hoisted, the position of their ships was denoted by their signals and opposite this part of the line the Russians anchored their three deckers.

Husseyn Pasha in the Nizamiye opened the fire it was taken up by all the Turkish line and immediately responded to by the enemy, then for the first time frigates were opposed to three deckers.

The Avni Allah (36) had a three decker directly abeam of her and as the survivors say they could not avoid striking her, for she appeared like a great wall beside them. At the commencement of the action the Taif slipped her cable and steamed out to sea and passing the frigates and steamers outside reached Constantinople on the 2nd inst as you Excellency already knows.

Half an hour after the action commenced, the Navik Turkish frigate blew up. Her Captain Ali Bey, seeing as he thought an enemy's ships about to board him exclaimed that he would blow his ship up rather than be captured, and descending to the Magazine he fired the powder; the crew not involved in the explosion jumped overboard a few reached the shore; most of them were drowned.

In one hour or one hour and a half, the action had virtually ceased, save dropping shot here and there from the want of means on one side to continue it, half the crews of the Turkish Ships were slain, their guns were mostly dismantled and their sides literally beaten in by the number and weight of the enemy's shot. Some of the ships were on fire either from their own or the enemy's fire balls, the ships one by one excepting two slipped their cables, some went foul of each other, all went ashore and there lay wrecks. The Russians then manned their yards and cheered, they had obtained the object for

which they had come into the bay, viz. the destruction of the Turkish Squadron in it, on every consideration they should then have ceased firing, and had they done so, they would have avoided merited censure, but they reopened their fire on the stranded bulks, and in addition to the ships already engaged, their frigates came into the Bay to range close to them and complete their demolition. Many men thus lost their lives either by the shot or by drowning in their attempts to reach the shore. While the Turkish ships lay at their anchors, however feeble their fires might have become through the exhaustion of the means of prolonging it, I am not prepared to say that the Russians would not have been satisfied, strictly speaking in continuing to fire at them although a generous foe would have shrunk from doing so, but when resistance had not only ceased, but had become impossible, it was wrong to fire another shot. It was the imperious duty rather of the Russian admiral to send his boats to the wrecks to take off the survivors of the action. He refrained from doing that duty the two days he lay at Sinope - the town was without head or guidance and in consequence many remained on the wrecks till the Friday night or Saturday morning following. How many thus perished from cold and starvation it is impossible to say. Together with the ships the Russians destroyed the Turkish quarter of Sinope with shells and carcasses, the ruin is complete, not a house is standing, the inhabitants having followed the Governor and Kadif [?] of Sinope in their flights from the town at the first shot, the flames had then over [?] way.

On Friday morning December 2nd the Russian admiral sent a boat on shore but finding no person to communicate with he recalled it and addressed a letter to the Austrian Consul a copy of which is enclosed.

On the same day, the Russian squadron left the Bay of Sinope to return to Sevastopol. Four of the ships disabled in their spars were towed out by steamers. Examination of the Russian missiles shew that 68 pr [?] guns are numerous in their ships and that fire balls and shells are used.

On December the 6th the French war steamer the "Mogadore" and HMS [?] "Retribution" arrived at Sinope on their mission of Humanity. There were found at Sinope out of the crew of the destroyed Turkish Ships, 13 officers including three doctors, (120 (about) sound men and about as many wounded. About 150 Sound men had been taken by the Russians out of the Avni-ilah and the Nesimi [?] as also Ali Mahir Bey and ~~Radshid~~ Hassan Bey, two of the Captains and carried prisoners to Sevastopol with Osman Pasha. Hundreds of men were supposed to have escaped from the beach in which they landed from their ships to adjoining villages but nothing certain is known thereon. Several wounded men have however been brought in from neighbouring villages in the course of this day the wounded in the town were found lying in the various cafés in a state of great destitution, and suffering in want of commonest necessaries. The three medical men landed from the Turkish ships had been unremitting in their attentions to them but were totally without means to alleviate their sufferings. This care was immediately taken up by the Medical Officers of the Mogadore and of the "Retribution" and by the Medical Officers sent for occasion from the squadron at Beikos and too much praise cannot be to given to these gentlemen for their skilful and persevering exertions in the face of unaccustomed obstacles. At first it was proposed to convert the lazarette into a hospital but it being non apparent that disappointment would follow that Captain Le Vallé and Captain Drummond adopted the wise and humane resolution of embarking all the wounded whose cases admitted of removal and of conveying them to Constantinople. They have also consented to convey the unwounded officers and seamen at Sinope to Constantinople; their embarkation has accordingly been effected. Seeing the probability of more wounded men being brought in from the country after the departure of "Mogadore" and "Retribution"; I have directed two officers, two medical men and 8 seamen belonging to the late Turkish Squadron to remain at Sinope for the purpose of attending to them, and they have been

supplied with money and the necessary medical appliances. I cannot close this letter without expressing my sense of admiration of the gallantry and devotion of the Turkish Officers and Seamen of the late Turkish squadron at Sinope during their unexampled contest against an overwhelming force.

I have the honor to be
My Lord
Your most obedient Servant
Adolphus Slade

**Appendix 19. A. MKT. UM. 149/7, dated 7 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (8 December 1853).
From the grand vizier to the governors of Damascus and Jerusalem on the
prevention of ill-treatment of Christians.**

Devlet-i Aliyye asakirinin Rusyalu ile ind-ül muharebe mazhar oldukları muzafferiyet-i harbiyenin ol taraflara vasıl olduğu esnada ahali-i İslamdan bazı sebükmeğazan bir takım mutaassıbinin tahrikat-ı vakıalarına mebni orada mütemekkin Hıristiyanlar ile sair tebaa-i ecnebiye haklarında na-marzi muameleler icra eyledikleri bu kere istihbar olunmuş olup ol havalide bulunan tebaa-i ecnebiye içinde Rusyalu az olarak ekseri dost devletler tebaasından oldukları ve memalik-i mahruse-i mülukanede bulunan düvel-i mütehabe memurin ve tebaasına her dürlü hüsn-i muamele olunması nezd-i ali-i hazret-i padişahide matlub ve mültezem olduğu halde bunların böyle evza-ı barideye duçar olmaları yolsuz ve layıksız olduğuna ve Hıristiyan tebaa-i Devlet-i Aliyye ise bu muharebede velinimet-i bi-minnet padişahımız efendimiz hazretlerinin uğur-ı şahanelerinde ez dil u can ehl-i İslam ile birlikte olarak bununla beraber Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin meşmul-i afak olan merhamet ve adalet-i celile-i hakkaniyet-perverisi icabınca tebaa-i merkumenin evvelkinden ziyade hoş tutulmaları ve hiçbir yüzdence ü reva-i elemnak olmamaları kaziyesi muahharen ittihaz buyurulan karar üzerine her tarafa tamimen işar ve beyan kılınmış iken yine anın aksine gidilerek sadakat ve istikamet ve hidayetlerini bila fütur ibraz etmekte olan bir tebaa-i sadıkaya nazar-ı garazla bakılması dahi doğrusu pek çirkin ve rıza-i meali-irtiha-i padişahiye mübayin bulunduğu mebni bu kaziyenin lazım gelenlere bildirilmesiyle beraber meftur oldukları şime-i meham-ı aşınayi ve fetanet iktizası ve mukaddemki işarat ve ilanât muceb ve mukteziyesi üzere gerek düvel-i mütehabe tebaası ve gerek sunuf-ı tebaa-i Devlet-i Aliyye haklarında her suretle neşr-i müessir-i sahabet ve ve ma'delet olunarak edna mertebe muamelat-ı cevriye ve tahkiriye vukua getirilmemesi ve bir de çünkü böyle şeylere cesaret nik ve bedi fark etmez ve dostunu düşmanını bilmez bir takım mutaassıban ve sebükmeğazan tarafından tahaddüs edeceğinden ve o misillülerin hareket ve niyat-ı vakıalarından öteden berü müşkilat tekevvün edeceğinden bu makulelerin ıslah-ı efkar ve etvarı ile muğayir-i adab-ı insaniyet halat-ı na-makulede bulunanlarının dahi terbiye-i lazımleri icra olunarak derhal bu tarafa beyan-ı keyfiyete müsaraat kılınması ve orada mevkufen bulunacak Rusya tebaasından bazı uygunsuz hareket edenler olur ise icabına bakılmak hükümete aid olacağından anlara dahi ahali tarafından bir şey denilememesi hususlarına ale-t-tevali medd-i enzar-ı dikkat ve ihtimam buyurulmaları şukka.

Appendix 20. HR. SYS. 903/2 lef 55-57, dated 11 December 1853. Stratford to Reshid Pasha on the Battle of Sinop. [See HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 24 for its translation into Ottoman Turkish]

His Highness Reshid Pasha

Pera, December 11th 1853

The notes addressed to me by Your Highness under the respective dates of the 29th ultimo and the 4th Instant have been duly received and I should have done myself the honor of acknowledging them at an earlier moment, had it not been advisable for me to consult previously with the French Ambassador to whom similar notes had been addressed end in concert with His Excellency to wait for the return of the steam vessels which we sent to Sinope soon after receiving Your Highness's second note.

It is with sentiments of deep affliction that we have learnt the full extent of loss sustained by the Porte's flotilla in its late unfortunate conflict with a Russian force of disproportioned magnitude and for my own part I find no adequate consolation either in the heroic devotion displayed by the Turkish seamen on that occasion, or in the relief which has been conveyed to the wounded survivors by the vessels dispatched to Sinope under the respective colors of England and France. There is more reason to lament a disaster so distressing to humanity, as the exposure of the Sultan's vessels at Sinope to certain destruction might, to all appearance, have been avoided, if earlier attention had been paid either to the dangers of their position or to the means of protecting them by effective batteries on shore. It now only remains for me to hope that greater foresight and more activity will be henceforward employed by the Porte in rendering available for the protection of her coasts, her naval forces such means as are still left at her disposal I should ill discharge the duties of a Representation if I omitted this opportunity of pressing one upon the Porte's most serious attention what I have so often recommended in previous communications.

Your Highness's note of the 4th Instant, announces the readiness of your government to send their squadron into the Black Sea, intimates at the same time an expectation that the Allied Squadrons, which are now anchored in the Bosphorus will concur in lending their active assistance for the protection of the Turkish Coasts.

A friendly attention has already been paid to his appeal, and indeed the presence of the Squadrons in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople is itself a very significant fact. It can hardly be necessary either for me or for the French Ambassador to assure Your Highness that such measures will be taken by the respective Admirals as the season may permit, and as circumstances may require for giving effect to the instructions, under which they are called upon to act. Their principal object is the protection of the Turkish territory against any direct aggression, but in the performance of that defensive duty they can not be expected to lose sight of those considerations which are prescribed by the earnest desire of both Governments to render their operations as much as possible conducive to the restoration of peace as well as to the maintenance of the Sultan's rights.

With respect to the Turkish Squadron, I can not too strongly advise a reconsideration of the Porte's intention under such further information as may be obtained from the experience and professional judgement of those distinguished officers who are in command of the united Squadrons. I can not conceal from Your Highness that the impressions which I have derived from that source are anything but calculated to inspire me with confidence in the fitness of the Ottoman Squadron for active service at sea in presence of an imposing enemy and this unfavorable season. My observation is particularly directed to vessels under sail.

Your Highness is too enlightened not to appreciate the frankness with which I have expressed my sentiments at a moment of such pregnant importance to the interests of this Empire and its August Sovereign.

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to Your Highness the assurances of my high consideration.

Stratford de Redcliffe

Appendix 21. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 25, dated 12 Kanun-ı Evvel [December] 1853. Translation of the official note of the French embassy in response to the Porte's request to sail into the Black Sea.

[tebyizi 16 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (17 December 1853)]

Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye 1853 senesi Kanun-ı Evvel'inin on ikisi tarihiyle müverrahan Dersaadet'te mukim Fransa devleti büyük elçisi Ceneral Baraguey d'Hilliers tarafından ita olunan takrir-i resminin tercümesidir.

Nezd-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'de mukim Fransa devleti büyükelçisi on yedi numerosuyla murakkam ve 1853 senesi Kanun-ı Evvel'inin dördünde vaki bin iki yüz yetmiş senesi Rebiyyülevvel'in üçü tarihiyle müverreh olarak nazır-ı umur-ı hariciye-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye übbetlu devletlu paşa hazretleri tarafından ita buyurulan bir kıta takrir-i resmiyi ahz ile kesb-i fahr eylemiş ve takrir-i mezkurda altı kıta Rusya kapak sefinelerinin iki gün mütemadiyen Sinop limanı önünde görüldükten sonra şehir-i Teşrin-i Sani'nin otuzu tarihinde liman-ı mezkura girerek orada lenger-endaz-ı ikamet olan ve fırkateyn ile korvetten ibaret bulunan donanma-i hümayunun fırka-i müfrezesi üzerine hücum eyledikleri beyan ve ifade olunmuştur. Vuku bulan muharebenin netice-i mükedderesi sefir-i mumaileyhin malumu olarak işbu neticeden dolayı an samim-ül kalb teessüf etmekte ise de şan ve namus ile icra olunup fakat hasımın kuvvetiyle mukabele olunan kuvvet beyninde pek çok tefavüt olduğundan asakir-i bahriye-i şahanenin şecaat ve gayret-i vataniyeleri bi semere kalmış olduğu halde meşhud olan sadakat ve istikametlerini kamilen pesend eder. Mamafih sefir-i mumaileyhmanın ne nazayihi ve ne de hareket-ı vakıasıyla medhali bulunmayan böyle bir vaka-i mükeddereye sebep olan tedabirden dolayı kendü hakkında en cüzi bir mesuliyet eserini bile göremeyeceği derkardır. Çünkü vükela-i fiham hazeratı taraflarından her ne vakitle donanma-i hümayunu Karadeniz'e çıkarmak arzusu izhar buyurulmuş ise sefir-i mumaileyh suğur-ı Osmaniye'nin muhafaza-i meşruası için Devlet-i Aliyye'in kuvve-i bahriyesini istimal buyurması hususuna hiçbir vechile muhalefet etmek istemediğini ve fakat bununla beraber donanma-i hümayunun yelken sefinelerinin ahval-i askeriye ve maddiyesine ve gerek adetce Rusyalulardan azlığına ve alel husus bu mevsimde Karadeniz'de daima muhataralu olan seyr-i sefain maddesinin derkar olan müşkilatına nazaran ya bir şedid furtuna zuhuru veyahud düşmanın adetce faik olan kuvvetine tesadüf olunması takdirlerinde bir musibet ve felaket zuhur etmesinden havf ve istiraz üzere olduğu cevabını ita eylemiş idi. İşte sefir-i mumaileyh işbu mülâhazat ü ihtaratını bugünkü günde dahi tecdid ve tekrar ile beraber Saltanat-ı Seniyye vapur sefinelerini bir hüsn-i tedbir ve ittifak ile sevk ve istimal eylediği halde Rusya devleti aleyhinde faidelü surette mukabele buyurabileceği zann ü memulünde bulunduğundan bu babda nazır-ı müşarünileyh hazretlerinin dikkat-i kamilesini davet eyler. Vakıa Fransa ve İngiltere donanmalarının Boğaziçine gelmeleri mücerred gerek haşmetlu İmparator Napoleon ve gerek haşmetlu İngiltere kraliçesi hazeratının Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin istiklal ve tamami-i mülki kaziyeleri ne derece mültezemleri olduğunun bir delil-i alisini ibraz etmek niyetine mebni olduğu bi iştibahtır ve bizim gemilerimizin Büyükdere'de bulunmalarının politikaca bir büyük manası olduğundan başka hususen muvafık-ı şan ve namus bir musalahanın istihsalı ümidi münkatı olmadıkça mezkur gemilerin huzuru bir müzaheret-i maneviye demek olduğu aşıkardır. Kaldı ki eğer Rusyalular Karadeniz boğazını zorlamağa tasaddi ederler veyahud hareket-ı harbiye üzerine veya Memalik-i Mahruse-i Şahane'nin emniyet ve asayişine doğrudan doğruya bir tesiri olacak surette sevahilin bir mevkiine asakir çıkarmağa sa'y ederler ise ol mahalde muhafaza-i Memalik-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye için donanma-i müttefikaların bila tereddüd fiilen ve müessiren muavenet edecekleri teminatını sefir-i mumaileyh asaletlu İngiltere elçisi cenablarıyla bil-itifak

Saltanat-ı Seniyye'ye ibraz eylediği halde devlet-i metbuası niyatının tercümanı olmuş olacağını zann eder. İşte Fransa ve İngiltere vapur sefinelerinin Sinop ve Varna'ya bu niyete mebni gönderilmiş oldukları misillü donanma-i müttetikaların dahi Karadeniz'e çıkmaları yine bu niyetle olacağı beyanını sefir-i mumaileyh devletinin Saltanat-ı Seniyye hakk-ı alisinde derkar olan efkar-ı hüsn-i muvalatının teccid-i ifade-i halisane-sine zeria ittihaz eyler.

Appendix 22. İ. HR. 105/5151 lef 37. Musurus à Son Altesse Rechid Pacha. La nouvelle du déplorable événement de Sinope. Londres, le 15 Décembre 1853.

La nouvelle du déplorable événement de Sinope, reçue par une dépêche télégraphique de Vienne, a produit ici une impression des plus pénibles une tristesse universelle et l'on peut dire une indignation contre l'inaction imposée aux flottes mourillées dans le Bosphore. Ce sentiment d'amour-propre national est partagé par le Cabinet lui-même, quels que soient ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix.

... Je lui ai rappelé ce qu'il m'avait dit dans le temps sur l'assistance que les deux flottes, prêteraient a la Sublime Porte, et qui se bornerait a l'aider en cas d'attaques agressives de la part de la Russie, mais nullement dans une guerre offensive de notre part. J'ai fait observer à Sa Seigneurie que c'était certainement par suite de cette promesse d'assistance que la Sublime Porte n'avait pas envoyé, ou peut-être avait été conseillée, de ne pas envoyer toute sa flotte dans la mer noir, convaincue qu'elle était qu'une telle promesse n'aurait pas été donnée sans une engagement préalable de la Russie envers les Puissances a cet égard...

Appendix 23. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 4, not dated, written 4 to 18 December 1853. Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha to the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha on the battle of Sinop before his dismissal on 18 December 1853.

Çend gün mukaddem Amasra açıklarında Rusya gemileri gezmekte buldukları haber alındıkta donanma-i hümayun kalyonları dahi denize çıkararak geşt ü gūzar eylemeleri lazım geleceği ve iki filoya taksim olunarak bir filosuyla [2] Ferik saadetli Mustafa Paşa ve bir filosuyla dahi Fırka-i Mısriye kumandarı saadetli Hasan Paşa hazeratının çıkması ve müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa İngiliz ve Hasan Paşa Fransız lisanlarına aşına bulduklarından ve düvel-i bahriye [3] gemilerinden dahi birlikte çıkıldığı halde anların zabitanlarıyla müzakerede kolaylık olacağı ve Büyükdere'de Mahmudiye ve Mesudiye ve Memduhiye kalyon-ı hümayunlarıyla bazı firkateyn ve sair süfun-ı hümayunlardan [4] birazlarının eyyam-ı şita olmak münasebetiyle kalması lazım geleceğinden ferik-i bahriye saadetli Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin süfun-ı hümayunlara kumanda etmek üzere burada kalması ve Tersane-i Amire'nin işine sekte iras [5] etmemek, düvel-i bahriye donanmalarının dahi Deraliye'ye vürud edeceklerinden anlar ile müzakere olunmak bazı hususda kendilerine müracaat kılınmak ve noksan bulunup matlub eyledikleri eşya olur ise [6] Tersane-i Amire tarafından tesviye olunmak üzere şimdilik Kapudan Paşa bulunanın dahi bu tarafda bulunması karargir olmuş idi. Bunun üzerine ba-irade-i şahane kalyon-ı hümayunlar ferik-i müşarünileyh kumandalarıyla [7] denize çıkarılacak iken ol günlerde düvel-i bahriye donanmaları Beykoz pişgahına vürud etmekte olduklarından bunların amiralleriyle müzakere olunarak büyücek gemiler ol vakit çıkarılmasun şimdilik birkaç gün [8] tevkif olunsun da yalnız firkateynler çıkarılusun deyu emr ü ferman buyurulmuş idi. Anın üzerine donanma-i hümayuna gidilip Mahmudiye kalyon-ı hümayununun kamarasında Ferik-i Bahriye saadetli Ahmed ve Mustafa Paşalar [9] hazeratı birlikte buldukları halde Patrona-i hümayun izzetli Osman ve Bahriye mirlivalarından izzetli Hüseyin Paşalar celb olunarak şimdilik kalyon-ı hümayunlar birkaç gün tevkif olunarak yalnız firkateynler çıkacaktır.

Fakat Amasra açıklarında Rusya gemileri bazen görünmekte bulduklarından anların mürur u ubura tasallut eylemelerini men' etmek için gideceksiniz. Daima biriniz Amasra ve biriniz dahi Ereğli [11] üzerlerinde bulunacaksınız. Eğerçi düşman gemilerine tesadüf ederseniz mukabele edeceğinizi gözünüze kestirebildiğiniz halde hemen hasmane harekete mübaşeret edeceksiniz lakin düşman tarafı kuvvetlice görünüp de mukabele olunamayacağı hissölunduğu halde ol vakit dirayet ve istikametiniz iktizası üzere süfun-ı hümayunları muhataradan vikaye ve muhafazaya gayret edeceksiniz fakat düşman gemilerine olsun veyahud denizde muhalif havaya [13] tesadüf etmiş bulunsun selamet tarafı neresi ise süfun-ı hümayunları nerede muhafaza edebilecekseniz ve dirayet ve sadakatiniz iktizası üzere ol vakit bir çaresine bakacaksınız fakat naçar kalıp da Dersaadet'e [14] avdetle Boğaz'dan içerü girmek lazım geldiği halde bu vechile dahi içerü girmeğe mezunsunuzdur deyu kendülerine tenbih olunarak ve birbirinizden pek çok ayrılmayup daima aralık aralık birleşesiniz deyu tekraren [15] tenbih buyurularak maiyetlerine verilecek süfun-ı hümayunlar süvarileri dahi celb olunup paşa-yı mumaileyhima hazeratının yanlarında süvari-i mumaileyhime lazım gelen tenbihat arasında maiyetde bulduklarını ve paşa-yı [16] mumaileyhimanın emirlerinin hilafı hareketde bulunmayacaklarını ve sonra bir uygunsuzluk ve kumandarlarınız tarafından bir şikayet vuku bulur ise mesul ve muateb olacaklarını ve şu vakitte güzelce gayret ve sadakat [17] eyledikleriniz müşahade olunduğu halde cümlenize mükafat olunacağı ilan ve tenbih kılınarak ve paşa-yı mumaileyhimaya ahval-i kadimi üzere lazım gelen harcırahlar ile muhtasar birer talimat verilerek ertesi günü sabahleyin [18] mahall-i memuriyetlerine çıkarılmış olduğu ve çend gün sonra vuku bulan emir üzerine saadetlu Mustafa Paşa hazretlerinin vapur-ı hümayunlardan Saik-i Şadi ve Feyz-i Bari ve Taif ve Ereğli vapurları verilip Tophane-i [19] Amire istihkam alayları Mirlivası izzetlü Rüstem Paşa dahi tayin buyurularak ve donanma-i hümayundan dahi mühtedi ve müstaidd birkaç nefer zabitan verilerek kendüsi ve müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri hazır olduğu halde marr-ül zikr [20] Mahmudiye kalyon-ı hümayununda müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa hazretlerine sizin memuriyetiniz Sinop ve Trabzon ve Batum ve Çürüksu'ya uğrayarak Batum orduy-ı hümayunu müşiri devletlu paşa hazretlerini bulup tahrirat-ı aciziyi vererek görüşülüp oradan dahi bir malumat alarak Sohüm tarafına gidilip oraların suları ve ahval-i hazırası ne heyettedir tahkik olunabildiği mertebe anlayıp Çerkes sevhilinden geçerek eğerçi oralarda bir münasip [22] mahalle biraz cephaneye çıkarılmak mümkün olabilür ise ve hava dahi muhalif olmadığı ve düşman gemilerinin galebeliği bulunmadığı surette heman ihtiyaten verilmiş olan fişenk ve külçe kurşun ve bir miktar barut-ı siyah [23] ile maiyetine verilen Çerkes İsmail Bey'in yedinde bulunan emirname-i samileri serian mahall-i mezburaya çıkarılıp badehu o kıyılardan Soğucak taraflarına gidilip oraları dahi Sohüm misillü muayene olunarak [24] oradan dahi Kırım sevhilinden doğru Rumeli tarafından Deraliye'ye avdet olunması ve şayed Sohüm'a uğrayıp da Çerkes sevhilinde hava muhalif bulunup kıyı tarafına inilemeyip ve düşman sefineleri dahi çok olduğu [25] halde ol vakit mezkur cephaneye ve saire ile evrakları ol mahalle bırakmaktan sarf-ı nazarla hemen doğrudan doğruya mahall-i malumeler dolaşarak avdet olunması ve eğerçi ziyade muhalefet-i hava vuku bulup da hiç [26] dolaşamaz ise ol vakit gerüye avdet olunması ve kendüsünün dirayet ve sadakat ve istikametine havale kılınarak bir muhtasar talimat dahi verilmiş ve ahval-i kadimi üzere harcırahi dahi ita kılınmış idi. [27] Fakat müşarünileyh hazretleri Çürüksu'dan kalkıp gayet hava müsaid olduğu halde Sohüm'a uğramayıp doğru Çerkes sevhiline giderken gece bir düşman fırkateynine tesadüf etmiş ve sabahleyin birbirlerini müşahade [28] ettikleri ve kezalik hava eyyam bulunduğu surette birbirlerine bir mikdar top endahtıyla oradan düşman sefinesini bırakarak kıyıya inip sandallar ile mezkur cephaneye ve saireyi çıkarmış ve orada birkaç kıta [29] Rusya uskunalarından ufak şeyler görülmüş ise de anları dahi hava muhalif olmadığı halde kovalamamış ve hava eyyam bulunduğu surette kendisine tenbih olunan

mahallere dahi uğramıyarak gerüye avdet edip [30] üç kıta vapur ile doğru Sinop limanına vasıl olmuş ve mukaddema denize karakola çıkarılmış olan patrona-i hümayun mumaileyh Osman Paşa çend kıta süfun-ı hümayun ile liman-ı mezkurda görülüp çend gün sonra mumaileyh Hüseyin Paşa dahi maiyeti bulunan süfun-ı hümayunlar ile birer ikişer limana dahil olup müşarünileyh hazretleri kumandar-ı mumaileyhimadan niçün geldiniz deyu sual eyledikte hava muhalif olduğundan her birimiz bir tarafa dağılarak liman-ı mezkuru tutabildik deyu ifadelerinde müşarünileyh hazretleri maiyeti bulunan vapurlardan Taif ve Ereğli vapurlarını bırakıp ben gideceğim sizler de kalkın deyu tenbih etmiş ve ol esnada [33] liman-ı mezkur açıklarında Rusya gemilerinden bazı sefineler müşahade olunmuş olduğundan mukaddem ol tarafa maslahata gönderilmiş olan Persud vapuru dahi orada bulunmuş idüğünden mezkur vapuru karakola göndererek [34] görünen sefineler kaç kıta olduğu tahkik olunup badehu vapur-ı mezkur avdet ederek haber verdikten sonra müşarünileyh hazretleri gece maiyeti bulunan vapurlardan Saik-i Şadi ve Feyz-i Bari ve Persud vapurlarını [35] alıp Deraliye'ye avdet etmiş olduğundan keyfiyet bu vechile vuku bulmuş olduğu tahkik kılınmış ve siz bahriye feriki bulunduğunuz halde donanma-i hümayunu ol hal ile orada niçün bırakdınız ve böyle bir muhataralı [36] mahalde ol vechile donanma-i hümayunu bırakarak vapurları alıp bu tarafa gelmeniz pek layıksız bir şey olmuş deyu müşarünileyh hazretlerine ifade olundukta ben onlara tenbih ettim ve yanlarına vapurlar bıraktım ve liman-ı [37] mezkurdan her rüzgar ile kıyam olunur ve bir açık mahaldir ki muhatarası yokdur ve durmayacaklardır deyu taraf-ı acizaneme ifade eylemiş olduğu ve tekrar ne sebebe mebni sana tenbih olunan mahallere gitmediniz ve hava muhalif değil [38] imiş ve tesadüf eylediğiniz düşman sefinelerine galebe edeceğiniz dahi memul iken niçün bırakıp avdet ettiniz deyu sual-i acizanemde eğerçi o gemiyle uğraşmış olaydık geceye kalacaktık [39] ve belki hava muhalif olduğu halde bir muhatarada bulunur idik veyahud düşmanın donanması gelip de bir zarar eder idi ve biz ol gemiyi hayli korkuttuk ve Sohüm ve Soğucak sevahillerini dahi uzakdan [40] gördük ve hava muhalif olduğundan anın için avdet ettik cevabını vermiş ise de bazı vapur-ı hümayunlarda bulunanlardan işidilmiş göre ziyade vehmlerinden avdet etmiş oldukları anlaşılmiş ve bunun üzerine [41] donanma-i hümayunun Sinop'ta kalmış olduğu anlaşıldığından düvel-i bahriye amirallerinin ifadelerine nazaran bundan sonra yelken gemilerinin Kara Deniz'e çıkması caiz olmayacağından donanma-i hümayundan dahi bundan sonra [42] büyücek gemilerin çıkmasından sarf-ı nazar olunarak yalnız Boğaz'a karib mahallerde beş altı fırkateynin karakolda gezmesi münasip olup fakat münavebe tarikiyle büyük vapurlardan üç kitanın bir ferik kumandasıyla [43] sevahillerde [sic] gezmesi emr ü ferman buyurulmuş olduğundan serian birkaç gün zarfında müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin üç kıta vapur ile denize çıkılması kendüsüne tenbih olunup hazırlanmakta iken Sinop tarafında bulunan [44] donanma-i hümayun kumandaları tarafından vürud eden tahrirata nazaran Rusya gemileri mahall-i mezkuru abluka suretinde gezdiklerini beyan etmiş oldukları beyn-el vükela anlaşıldığı anda mezkur gidecek vapurlara birkaç kıta vapur dahi ilave olunarak hemen gönderilmesi emr ü ferman buyurulmuş olmasıyla ol ahşam Meclis-i Ali'den Tersane-i Amire'ye avdet-i acizide bahriye meclisi reisi saadetlu paşa ile müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazeratı celb olunup [46] müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerine “beş altı kıta vapur-ı hümayun ile serian bir iki gün zarfında çıkacaksınız ve süfun-ı hümayunları muhataradan kurtarmağa dirayet ve istikametiniz iktizası üzere oraca bir çaresini düşüneceksiniz” [47] deyu ifade olundukta ol anda “beni siz muhatarada bulunduracaksınız ve düşmanın gemileri geziyormuş ve müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa hazretlerini gönderdiğiniz vakit bir iş görmeden bıraktı geldi. Şimdi beni muhataraya [48] gönderiyorsunuz” deyu cevaplar vermiş olduğundan taraf-ı aciziden cevap olarak “siz vapur ile gideceksiniz öyle bir muhatarada bulunacağınızı aklınız kestiği anda avdet edersiniz niçün böyle söylüyorsunuz ayıp değil mi eğerçi gidemiyecesiniz bana resmen cevap verin Bab-ı

Ali'ye gideyim bu hal ve keyfiyeti ifade edeyim ben kendim vapur-ı hümayunlar ile yarın inşaallahu teala giderim” deyu ifade eylediğimde keyfiyetin neticesi uygunsuz [50] olacağını hissettiği anda ol vakit “ben mutlak gitmem demiyorum fakat ümera-i bahriye toplansın da bir müzakere edelim vapur-ı mezkurlar ile mahall-i mezkura gittiğim halde ne hareket edeceğimi kararlaştıralım ondan sonra gideyim” [51] deyu ifade eyledikte “ümera-i bahriye sizden ibaret değil midir ve siz onlardan talimat aldığınız halde mi hareket edeceksiniz ve denizde bulunduğunuz müddetçe ol talimatın haricinde hiçbir şey yapmıyacak mısınız ve deniz halidir [52] bu talimat derununda muharrer bulunan şeylerin hiç birisi icra olunamayıp da kendü dirayet ve malumatınız iktizası üzere bir şey yapacak olduğunuz halde hiçbir şey icra etmeyecek misiniz ve bu ana kadar [53] denize çıktığınız vakit ümera-i bahriye toplanıp size bir talimat vermedikçe çıkmadınız mı idi? Böyle şey ayıp olmaz mı?” denildi ise de yine kel evvel bir meclis olunsun deyu ısrar ederek [54] ertesi gün mevcut bulunan ümera-i bahriye meclis-i bahriyeye celb olunarak müzakere olundukta badehu kulunuza gelip ifade ettikleri halde kulunuz dahi cümlesine hitaben “bu ana kadar Rumeli’de [55] ve Anadolu’da saye-i Resulullah’da ve saye-i şahanede haylü fütuhathlar oldu bahren daha hiçbir şeylere muvafık olmadık. Ben hiçbir zatın yanına gidemiyorum ve gittiğim halde dahi hicabımdan [56] ne yapacağımı bilemiyorum. Ayıp değil midir ? Saye-i şahanede bu rütbelere ve nişanlara nail olduk hiçbir iş görmedik ve kağınızı bir memuriyete gönderecek olsak birtakım muğalata [57] gösteriyorsunuz. Resmen size ifade ederim ki eğerci gidemiyeceskeniz ve korkuyorsanız bana haber verin Bab-ı Ali’ye gideyim bu keyfiyetleri beyan-ı hal edeyim yarın içinizden reis paşayı veyahud [58] birinizi alırım vapur-ı hümayunlara rakib olarak giderim” deyu kendülerine ifade eylediğimde “gideriz fakat düşman gemileri böyle ziyade görünmekte bulduklarından biz yalnız vapurlar ile gitmemiz kuvvetsiz [59] bulunacağından yalnız karakol gezmemiz lazım gelür zira bundan sonra bizim yelken gemileri eyyam-ı şita olmak münasebetiyle dışaru çıkması münasip olmayıp İngiltere ve Fransa amirallerinin efkarı da [60] budur ve hatta bu defa giden fırkateynler muhalif havaya tesadüf ederek Sinop limanına gittiler ve çıkamadılar bundan sonra Amasra açıkları geçildiği halde bu tarafa avdet etmek güçtür. [61] Rusya donanması geziyor ise de Kırım taraflarından kalkıp Sinop üzerlerine gelmek pek kolaydır ve pek yakındır yine o taraftan Kırım tarafına avdet etmek veyahud Batum ve Sohum [62] tarikine gitmek kolay olup ve Rusya’nın limanları oralara yakın olduğundan anın için o sulara geziyor ve daima rüzgar üstünde bulunup fakat bu vakitlerde Boğaz’a yakın [63] büyük gemilerini getiremez eğerci gelse bir muhalif hava esdiği anda karaya gider gerüye avdet etmek mümkün değildir veyahud Boğaz’dan içerü girmesi lazım gelür başka selameti yokdur” [64] deyu ifade etmiş oldukları ve bazen ferik-i müşarünileyhima hazeratıyla birlikte müzakere olunup bazı tenbih olunan şeylerin arasından üç beş gün geçip de şayed bir aksi veyahud [65] kendülerine dokunacak bir şey olur ise “ol anda siz böyle demediniz başka surette söylediniz” diyerek sözlerinden nükul etmekde buldukları pek çok [defa, CB] taraf-ı aciziden nefsimce [66] müşahade etmiş olduğumdan ve hatta kendülerine bundan sonra sizler ile bir şey müzakere olunduğu vakit daima yanımda başka bir adam daha şahadet etmek için bulunmak veyahud her olunan [67] müzakereyi yazıp sizlere temhir ettirmek lazım gelecek deyu ifade eyledim ve bu keyfiyetlerin böyle vuku bulduğunu tamamı tamamına ifade eyledim ise de birazlarını vükelay-ı Devlet-i Aliyye’den [68] bazı zat-ı alikadirlere dahi ifade eyledim ve hatta her ne vakit donanma-i hümayundan bir veyahud çend kıta süfun-ı hümayun bir mahalle kendüleri getürecek olsalar sekiz aydan berü Tersane-i Amire tarafındaki [69] anbarlardan ve taşradan mübayaa olunarak daima süfun-ı hümayunlara mühimmat verilmekte olduğu Tersane-i Amire nazırı atufetlü bey efendi hazretleriyle meclis-i bahriye ve sair memurin-i [70] tersanenin cümlesinin malumlarıdır. Elan bugün yine bir mahalle ufak bir sefine ile gidecek olsalar pek çok muğalata göstermekte oldukları ve bu verilen mühimmat daima [71] mevcut sefine

bulunduğu donanma-i hümayunun külliyyet üzere bir tarafa çıkmadığı ve “sekiz mahdan berü niçün noksanlarınızı ikmal etmediniz ve daima bir şey noksan kalmasun deyu sizlere tenbih olunur [72] her vakit noksanımız yokdur her bir şeyimiz tamamdır deyu ifade ediyorsunuz sonra bir memuriyet sizlere gösterildiği anda böyle muğalatalara kalkışıyorsunuz” deyu tekraren taraf-ı acizanemden ifade [73] kalmakta olduğu ve cenab-i Hakk velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padişahımız efendimiz hazretlerine bitmez ve tükenmez ömr ü afiyetler ihsan buyursun Tersane-i Amire ümerasının bazılarının hal ve ahvalleri [74] işte bu merkezdedir. Ve bunların böyle olduğunu bildiğim halde beyan-ı hal etmek kulunuza yakışmayacağını bilürüm ve elden geldiği mertebe bunları muhafaza eylemek sevdasında idim. Fakat [75] şimdi şu vakit şu hale nazaran bunların ne ahlakda ve ne efkarda olduklarını nefis-i acizanemde tecrübe eyledim. Ve bazı daha bilen başka zatlar dahi olmalıdır. Bunlar kendü kabahatlerini [76] kapayup daima üst tarafında bulunan amirlerini nas beyninde kötölemek efkarında buldukları ve bazılarının dahi şu vesile ile belki bir kapudanlık memuriyeti tahsil ederiz [77] sevdasında olduklarından babaları hakkında bile cenab-ı Hakk’dan havf etmeyip her dürlü hilaf ve kizbi irtikab ederek gezdikleri ve yürüdükleri mahallerde bazı sözler söylemek ve söylettirmek efkarında bulunuyorlar ve hatta bu defa vuku bulan Sinop keyfiyetinden dolayı birtakım sözler söylemişler ki pek çok nas beyninde ve sair uşak makuleleri yanlarında güya vuku bulan keyfiyetlerin cümlesine Kapudan Paşa sebep olmuş diyerek havadis ettirilip söylemekte bulunduğunu kulunuz ve sair bendeleriniz işitmekte olduğumuz ve zat-ı devletleri dahi [80] bazı sözler elbette işitmişsinizdir. Bu hale nazaran bunlara nasıl emniyet olabilir kulunuzdan mukaddem makam-ı acizlerinde bulunan zatların bazıları müşarünileyhima bendelerinin bazıları hakkında vuku bulan şikayetlerinde hakları olduğu şimdi şu vakitte kulunuz müşahade eyledim ve kendülerine dahi acizane hak verdim ve zat-ı ali-i hıdivilerinin işte [82] bu keyfiyete malumat-ı tammeleri bulunmak ve hin-i icabında kulunuzdan dahi sual buyurulmak lazım geleceği zira şu keyfiyetleri kulunuz işitdikçe alimallah ne derecelerde mükedder ve me’yus [83] oluyorum. Zira birtakım nas bu vechile bu keyfiyetleri bilmediklerinden ve bilemeyeceklerinden birtakım ehl-i fesadın sözlerine inanıp ağızdan ağıza pek çok şeyler aks [84] ederek söylemekte olduğu ve kulunuz dahi saye-i resulullahide ve saye-i şahanede bu ana kadar familyaca kazanmış olduğumuz namusu gayb etmemek için her dürlü şeyi ihtiyar [85] ederim ve canımı dahi uğur-ı padişahiye telef ederim ve bu namus-ı acizanemin vikayesi mücerred emr ü irade-i seniye-i devletlerine menut ve mütevakıf mevaddan idüğü malum-ı ali-i hıdivileri [86] buyurulmak babında ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh ül emrindir.

Appendix 24. HR. TO. 219/84, dated 23 December 1853. Translation of an extract from a report from the British consulate in Erzurum to the British embassy. On Hurşid Pasha’s (General Guyon’s) appointment.

İngiltere sefaretine 1853 senesi Kanun-ı Evvel’inin yigirmi üçü tarihiyle müverrehan Erzurum canibinden tevarüd eden tahriratdan müstehrec bir bendin suret-i tercümesidir.

Bazı rivayete nazaran Hurşid Paşa kendüsünün bir ferman-ı âliyi hamil olduğunu kemal-i metanetle tasrih ve ifade ile kendü rey ve efkârını açıktan açığa beyan edeceğini ve ârâ ve efkâr-ı mübeyyenesine havale-i sem’-i itibar buyurulmasına ve nesayih-i vakiasının icra olunmasına muntazır olduğunu ve rey ve efkar ve nesayih-i dinlenilmediği takdirde serian Dersaadet’e avdet ile canib-i Devlet-i Aliyye’ye beyan-ı hal edeceğini müşir paşa hazretlerine arz ve beyan eyledikte kendüsi gerek paşa-i müşarünileyh ve gerek meclis azası taraflarından cümleten nesayih-i vakiasına itibar olunacağından orduy-ı hümayunun muamelat-ı harbiye-sine dair kaffe-i mesalihi idareye davet olunarak ifay-i memuriyete mübaderet eylemiştir. Şehrin muhafazası zımında bazı istihkamat inşasına

mübaşeret olunmuş olduğundan mumaileyh Hurşid Paşa bunları ledel muayene mevakii beğenmediğinden hedm ü mahvını tebeyyün ve diğerlerini tertib ile bizzat kendüsi nezaret ederek bunların inşasına neferat-ı askeriyeyi serian sevk eylemiş askerin kışla ve makulat ve maaşlarını teftiş ile beraber hastahaneleri gezmiş ve nihayet askerin maaşı ne kadar mütedahilde olduğunu bit-tahkik ekserisi on iki ve on dört ve bazıları dahi on sekiz mahdan berü maaş almadıklarını ve müteakiben paşaların kaç aylık alacakları olduğunu sual ile bazıları üç ve ekserisi bir mah kadar tedahül ile maaş aldıklarını tahkik eyledikte kendülerinin menafiini bu derecede vikaye ettikleri halde zir-i kumandalarında bulunan ademlere kat'a bakmadıklarını takbih ile bu kadar maaş alur iken müddet-i medide neferatın maaşını tedahülde bırakacak yerde bir senelik maaşlarından vazgeçmeleri kendülerine hiç bir bâr ü sıklet olmayacağını ifade eylemiş ve hazine-i askeriyede mebaliğ-i külliye bulunduğunu haber almış olduğundan nukud-ı mevcudenin neferat-ı askeriye tevzi' olunmasını emr ile kâffe-i ordunun iki aylık maaşını tesviye ve tediye ettirmiştir. İşte bu keyfiyet ve gerek paşa-i mumaileyhin ifay-i memuriyet emrinde vuku bulan ikdam ve gayretiyle beraber neferat-ı askeriye'nin istihsal-i saadet-i haline nazar-ı imtina ve dikkat eylemesi kendüsünün makbuliyetini vücuda getirmesiyle kâffe-i asakir esnayı-i harbde ta son derecesine kadar kendüsüne icray-i muavenet edeceklerini vadetmişlerdir. Hurşid Paşa piyade ve atlu karakolları için güzel bir usul ihdas edip herkesi [sic] kendü farıza-i zimmetini müessiren ifa etmekte olduğunu müşahade eylemektedir.

[at the back of the paper] Tebyiz olunmuştur. Fi 15 R 70 [15 January 1854]. Mübeyyizi arz olunmak üzere saadetli amedci bey efendi hazretlerine verilmiştir. Fi 16 R 70. Aslı Mösyö Pizani'ye iade olunmuştur.

Appendix 25. HR. MKT. 68/42, dated 26 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (27 December 1853). From Ferik Hurşid Pasha [General Guyon] in Kars to Reşid Pasha the foreign Minister. On the causes of the defeats of the Kars army in the battles of Ahışa, Bayındır and Başgedikler.

Hakpay-i ali-i nezaretpenahiye bin iki yüz yetmiş sene-i hicriyesi mah-ı Rebiyy-ül-evvel'inin yigirmi altısı tarihiyle müverrahan Kars canibinde bulunan ferik rütbesinde Hurşid Paşa tarafından takdim olunan bir kıta arizanın tercümesidir.

Erzurum'a gitmem için taraf-ı valay-i sipehsalariden irsal buyurulan emirnameyi ahz eylediğim anda yola çıkmağa şibat etmedim ve menzil ile gece ve gündüz [2] gittiğim halde şehir-i Kanun-ı Evvel'in dokuzuncu gününde Kars ordusuna muvasalat eyliyebilirdim. İşte şehir-i Teşrin-i Sani'nin dokuzu tarihiyle lutfen taraf-ı [3] bendeganeme irsal buyurulan emirname-i ali-i nezaretpenahilerini işbu Kars mevkiinde ahz ile kesb-i iftihar ettiğimden canib-i seniyy-ül cevanib-i Devlet-i Aliyye'den müceddiden [4] mazhar olduğum işbu itimad-ı aliden dolayı hakpay-ı sami-i hıdivanelerine arz-ı teşekkürler etmekle beraber hizmet ve memuriyet-i bendeganemin ne olacağını katiyyen [5] bilmekliği arzu etmekteyim. Eğerçi harcırahımı evvelce almış olaydım vaktiyle yola çıkarak bu tarafa daha erkence vasıl olmuş olacağımda ıstibah yoğidi. Fakat [6] harcırahıma destres oluncaya kadar bendenizi iki hafta beklettiklerinden Şam-ı Şerifden bu tarafa daha az vakitte gelmeklik emr-i muhal olduğundan artık birisi şehir-i Teşrin-i [7] Sani'nin on üçünde Kara Kilisa ile Gümrü'den iki saat mesafede Bahandır [Bayındır?] beyninde ve ikincisi şehri mezkurun yigirmi altısında Ahışa kurbünde ve üçüncüsü [8] dahi Kanun-ı Evvel'in ibtidasında Baş Gedi [Başgedikler?] ve Orta Gedi ve Kolveren nam mahallerde Rusyalular ile vuku bulan üç muharebelerimizde hazır bulunacak suretde [9] bir süratle gelemediğimden dolayı izhar-ı teessüf etmekten gayri bir çarem yokdur. Şu kadar ki usul-i harbce bizim ordumuz tarafından vuku bulan

hatalar hakkında halisane [10] ve acizane beyan-ı efkara mücaheret ettiğim halde zat-ı übbehet-ayat-ı daverilerinin işbu cesaret-i bendeganemi mücerred Saltanat-ı Seniyye'ye sadıkane ve gayurane ibraz-ı hizmet [11] etmeklik babında derkar olan arzu-i çakeraneme haml ü isnad buyurmalarını niyaz ederim. Şöyle ki, evvela işbu ordunun beher topu için ibtidaları dörder yüz atımlık [12] hartucu olup şimdi ise herbir topun yalnız ikişer yüz atımlık hartucu kalmış olduğundan ordunun toplarıçün kifayet mikdarı mühimmat olmadığı, [13] saniyen Kars'dan birisi Ahışa ve diğeri Bayezid için iki kol asker ifraz olunup halbuki mezkur iki mahal Kars'dan pek uzak buldukları cihetle ledel hace [14] Kars ordusundan oralara imdad olunamayacağına nazaran işbu tedbir ile asıl orduya iras-ı vehn ü zaaf olunduktan maada mezkur iki kol askerinin dahi beyhude yere [15] tehlikeye ilka olunduğu, salisen asıl büyük ordu ile Gümrü üzerine yürümek için hiçbir sebep yoğidi çünkü alelacele sefere gitmek üzere cem' ve tertib [16] olunarak yalnız yigirmi sekiz bin askerden ibaret olan bir ordu Gümrü gibi cedid ve metin ve mütehakim bir kale aleyhinde ne yapabilirdi? İşte doğru Tiflis [17] üzerine gidilmek lazım iken gidilmemiş ve birtakım yanlış tedbirlere teşebbüs olunmuş olduğu halde bizim askerimizin nısfı mikdarı olan ve kale-i mezkure derununda bulunan [18] Rusya askeri şehir-i Teşrin-i Sani'nin on üçüncü gününde Gümrü'den iki saat mesafeye kadar bize karşı gelerek Kara Kilisa'da tertib-i saff-ı harb etmiş olmaları bize tekrar bir [19] büyük fırsat idi ve eğerçi bu vakada Rusyalu'nun pek çok zayıat ve telefatı olmuş ise de ancak bütün kavga dört buçuk saat mümted olmuş olan top ateşinden [20] ibaret olup ol esnada ne piyade ve ne de süvari asker sevk olunmadıktan başka düşmanın kaleye avdetini bile kesmeğe çalışılmadı. Düşman ise pek ilerülememiş [21] olmasıyla bunun icrası pek kolay ve neticesi gayet azim olacağı, rabian Ahışa maddesinde ol tarafa sevk ve irsal kılınan birkaç taburlar birbirlerinden [22] pek uzak tertib ve ikame olunduklarından cümlesi kesb-i zaaf eylemişti çünkü bir taraftan düşmanın mikdarı bizimkine müsavi olduğu halde anlar top ve müctemi' [23] buldukları cihetle bizim taburlarımıza nisbetle kuvvetli ve bir de bizim taburları-mızın mevkileri dağınık olmasıyla kumandada b**?lik mümkün olmadıktan fazla kumandar [24] bulunan Ferik Ali Paşa hazretleri ibtida kendüsi meydan-ı muharebeden çekilmekle orada mevcut olan on dört pare kadar toplarımız eyâdi-i düşmana geçerek külliyyen [25] münhezim ve perişan olduğumuz, hamisen şehir-i Kanun-ı Evvel'in ibtidasında Başgedi ve Ortagedi ve Kolveren'e eğer düşman yine kaleden çıkar iken kumandar bulunan [26] Reis Ahmed Paşa hazretleri evvel emirde nizam üzere girü çekilerek Arabistan ordusunun Kars'da boş duran sekiz tabur piyade ve on sekiz pare top ile [27] üç alay süvarisi gelip kendüsiyle birleşmek üzere bazı tedabire teşebbüs etmiş olaydı ol halde Kars'dan iki veya üç saat mesafede vuku bulan işbu kavgada kuvvetimizin ziyadeliğine nazaran muzaffer olmaklık memuli bütün bütün bizim tarafda olmak lazım geleceğinden ol vakit hem düşman saff-ı harb üzere kavgadan [29] istinkaf eder ve hem de bizim taraftan vuku bulan bu kadar külli zayıata duçar olunmaz idi. Kaldı ki işbu vakada yalnız yigirmi altı pare topumuz zayı olmayıp belki askerinin [30] gayret-i maneviyelerine *?* iras *?* olunmuşdur çünkü kavganın akıbetinde nizamsız bir halde vuku bulan ricatdan sonra askerimiz beyninde firar maddesi ve kumandarlarından [31] adem-i emniyet keyfiyetleri pek uygunsuz bir surette zuhura gelmeğe başlamış olduğu derkardır. Binaberin Kars'da bulunan ordunun hal-i hazırına ve bir de [32] Rusya askerinin mevsim-i şitada unsur-ı tabiisinde gibi bulunacağından şimdiki halde Gürcistan dahilinde her bir guna hareket-i taarruziyenin icrası imkansız görüldüğüne binaen şu mevsimde [33] fakat öyle bir hareketin istihsali esbab-ı lazımesiyle iştiğal olunabilir. Mesela Devlet-i Aliyye evvel bahara kadar buradaki ordusunun kuvvetini elli veya altmış bin nefere ve toplarının [34] adedini yüz veya yüz otuz pareye kadar iblağ buyurduğu halde evvel bahar hululünde Gümrü civarında bir kolordu bıraktıktan sonra Şamil Bey ile iltihak hasıl etmek [35] ve kaffe-i ahali-i İslamını ayaklandırarak Tiflis'e doğru gitmek ve Rusyalu'yu ovalara düşürerek Şamil Bey'in kuvve-i müctemiası ve

birtakım tavaif-i İslamiyenin ayaklanmaları sebepleri ile [36] bizim tarafda hasıl olacak kuvve-i cesime ile Rusyalulara galebe etmek velhasıl kala ü mütehakim mahallerini birer birer zabt ü teshir eylemek misillü pek müsaaid bazı tedabirler ile [37] Rusyalu aleyhinde harekât-ı tecavüzîye ve taarruzîyeye mübaşeret olunabileceği vareste-i kaffe-i beyandır. Bundan maada ehem-i umurdan olan bir madde yani ordunun suret-i [38] idare ve kumandası hakkında dahi bazı söz irad eylemekliğime müsaade-i mekârim-âde-i nezaretpenahilerinin şayan buyurulmasını rica ederim. Şöyle ki aşırı fena olmak üzere birkaç haritadan başka [39] hiçbir haritamız olmadığından ve Rusya erkân-ı harbi marifetiyle tanzim ve tersim olunmuş olan Kafkas haritasının bir sureti ise Paris'de umur-ı harbiye nezaretinde mevcut idüğünden taraf-ı ali-i [40] hıdivanelerinden talep ve iltimas buyurulduğu takdirde bir suretini bize gönderecekleri bi-ıştibahdır ve bir de para az verildiğinden casuslarımızın tertibi kifayet mertebede olmadığı ve zahire [41] tedarikinin usulü bütün bütün indî ve örfî olduğu ve erkân-ı harbiyemiz nukuda ve bir meydan icraata muhtaç bulunup çünkü vuku'at-ı ahire askerinin yeis ve füturu [42] müstelzem olmuş olmağla askerinin hizmetine mücteni [?] tezyid ettirecek suretde işgal olunmaları lazıme-i halden olduğu bedidârdır.

Appendix 26. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 1. End of December 1853 – Beginning of January 1854. Mahmud Pasha's defence statement after his dismissal on 17 December.

Rabbimiz teala ve tekaddes hazretleri velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padişahımız efendimiz hazretlerine bitmez ve tükenmez ömr ü afiyetler ihsan buyursun ve cem-i düşmanlarını kahhar ismiyle kahr etsün. Kullarının hiçbir şeye liyakat ve istihkak-i acizanem olmadığı halde ve ba husus deniz fennine [2] malumat-ı acizanem bulunmadığını velinimetim efendimiz ve saniyen vükela-i azam bildikleri surette bendehanelerinde dua-i tezaid-i ömr ü ikbal-i şahaneye devam etmekte iken mabeyn-i hümayun-ı şahaneye celb olunarak kapudanlık memuriyeti ihsan-ı hümayun buyurulmuş idi. Kaderullahi [3] bu defa infisal-i acizanem vuku bulmasıyla hasımım bulunan asakir-i bahriye-i şahane ferikanından saadetli Ahmed ve Mustafa Paşalar hazeratıyla Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Vükela'da kulunuzun ru be ru muhakeme olunmaklığım lazım geldiği halde Tersane-i Amire nazırı sabık atufetli Zühdi Bey [4] ve Bahriye Meclisi Reisi saadetli Rağb Paşa ve meclis-i mezkur azasından saadetli Salih Paşa hazeratı beynlerine liman reisi ve Kurşunlu Mahzen limanı memuru izzetli paşalar kulları ve mekremetlü müftî efendi dailerinin Meclis-i Mahsus-ı mezkurda bulunmaları lazım gelür ise de [5] zaten Tersane-i Amire ümerasının ve zabitanının ekserisi müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa bendelerinden ziyadesiyle havf etmekte ve birkaç defa infisali vuku bularak yine muahharen hidemat-ı sabıkasında istihdam olunmakta olmak mülasebesiyle ümera-i müşar ve zabitan-ı [6] mumaileyhimin ekserisini takdir etmiş ve ettirmiş ve bazılarını dahi muamele-i tehdidiye ile kullanmış olduğundan ümera-i müşar ve mumaileyhimden her kangisi meclis-i mezkura celb olursa çünkü bunların ber vech-i muharrer müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa'dan kimisi havf [7] üzere ve kimisi dahi tarafdarı olup hiç birisi müşarünileyhin vuku bulacak ifadesine muğayir ve mübayin cevap vermiyecekleri ve ba husus bu defa vuku bulan infisal-i acizi üzerine müşarünileyh Ahmed ve Mustafa Paşalar hazeratının ibkaları münasebetiyle [8] ümera ve zabitan-ı mumaileyhim bir kat daha havf edecekleri derkar olduğu misillü kullarının ve müşarünileyh nazır bey efendi hazretleri bendelerinin infisal-i acizanelerimiz vuku bulup müşarünileyhima memuriyetlerinde buldukları halde ümera-i müşar [9] ve zabitan-ı mumaileyhimin meclis-i ali-i mezkurda müşarünileyhima haklarında hiçbir şey diyemiyebilecekleri aşikar olduğundan eğerçi müşarünileyhima dahi memuriyetlerinden azl ve infisalleriyle hanelerinde dua-i padişahide buldukları ilan olduğu halde [10] ol suretle meclis-i ali-i mezkurda ol vakit müşarünileyhima hazır buldukları surette ümera-i müşar ve

zabitan-ı mumaiylehim kulları belki doğruca ifade ve cevap etmeğe cesaret geleceği memuldür. Zira bunların ikisi birbirinin aleyhine olarak kulunuz [11] makam-ı kapudanide bulunduğum müddetçe pek çok lakırdılar söyledikleri halde şu günlerde ittifak ederek daima gezdikleri mahallerde kullarının aleyhimde bulunmaları ve geçen gün Meclis-i Vâlâ'da çakerlerinin ve bazı ümeranın hakkında hilaf söyleyorlar [12] diyerek kasem etmeleri kendilerini doğruluğa çıkarıp vuku bulan keyfiyeti bendelerine azv etmek sevdalarında buldukları ve hatta müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa'nın kulunuza dargınlığına sebep müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa'nın kendisine takaddüm ettirildiği [13] ve "Sinop canibinde sefain-i şahaneyi bırakıp niçün geldin?" deyu bazı sözler söylemiş olduğundan ve müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa dahi çend mah mukaddem bil-vasıta Fransız gazetesine birtakım layıksız şeyler derc ettirip muahharen tahkik ve tedkik olunarak [14] kendisine ifade olundukta aşuru mahcub bulunduğundan ve bu defa vapur-ı hümayunlar ile Kara Deniz'e gideceksin söylenildikte bazı mertebe cevaplar verdiğinin üzerine "Bab-ı Ali'ye sizi şikayet ederim" deyu taraf-ı acizanemden ifade [15] vuku bulmasından dolayı havfa düşerek müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa ile birleşip icray-i nefsaniyete kalkışmış oldukları ve asakir-i bahriye-i hazret-i şahanenin elbise ve erzak tayinatlarıyla süfun-ı hümayun-ı mülukanenin tamiratından ve mühimmat-ı lazımlerinden [16] dolayı bazı şikayetleri vuku bulmuş olduğundan bunların verilip verilmediği ve tamiratı olup olmadığının nazır-ı müşarünileyh ile Bahriye Meclisi'nden ve liman reisi paşa tarafından ve aklam-ı bahriyeden tahkik ve tedkik buyurulması lazım geleceği [17] ve eyyam-ı şita olmak cihetle bundan sonra donanma-i hümayunun Bahr-i Siyah'a çıkamıyacağı ve çıkıldığı halde dahi nerelerde gezilebileceği bil-müzakere kaleme alınan layihanın dahi takdim kılındığı ve süfun-ı hümayun denize çıktığı vakitlerde ne surette hareket edeceklerini ve kaç filoya taksim olunmalıdır bunun dahi elan bir müzakeresi vuku bulmuştur deyu ifadeleri vuku bulmakta olduğu ve tanzim ettirilen mezkur layihayı kulları beraber bulunduğum halde asakir-i bahriye-i şahane ümera ve zabitanıyla Fırka-i Mısıriye süvarileri ve bazı kilağuzlar dahi Mahmudiye kalyon-ı hümayununa celb ile meclis olunarak tanzim ettirilip ahz olunan layiha hakpay-i ali-i sadaretpenahiye ve makam-ı vâlâ-yı hariciye ve seraskeriye takdim kılınarak manzur-ı alileri buyurulmuş olduğu ve mezkur filo pusulası dahi [20] birkaç kere ümera ve zabitan-ı mumaiylehim hazır oldukları halde Reis Paşa hazretleri tertibinde donanma-i hümayunda birlikte bulunduğu surette yapılip bendelerine verilerek geçenlerde saye-i şahanede hitam bulup havuzdan dışarı ihrac olunan [21] kalyon-u hümayunun cemiyeti gününde sair jurnaller ile beraber bir kıtası hakpay-ı hümayun-ı şahaneye ve diğerleri dahi bazı zevat-ı kiram hazeratına takdim ve ita kılındığı ve kulunuz donanma-i hümayuna altı aydan berü güya beş altı defa gidip kalmıştır deyu [22] ifade etmiş olduklarından halbuki kulları donanma-i hümayuna altı mahdan berü kaç kere gidip bazısında bir gece ve bazısında dahi iki üç gece kaldığım ve icabına göre on günde bir ve bazen yigirmi veyahud bir ayda bir gidip bulunduğum asakir-i bahriye-i neferatlarının dahi malumları bulunduğu ve beş altı defası zat-ı vâlâ-yı hazret-i seraskeri ile bil-maiye bulunmuş idüğüm ve makam-ı kapudanide bulunan zatın ve bahriye ferikleri olan paşaların kangısı Deraliye'de kalıp [24] ve kangısı denize çıkacak ise Bab-ı Ali'de bil-müzakere taraf-ı acizanemden dahi tansip kılınarak anın üzerine vaki olan emr ü ferman vechile gönderilmekte idüğü malum-ı ali olan halatdan bulunmuş olduğu ve hatta asakir-i şahanenin sayfiye [25] ve şitaiye elbiseleri kanun üzere altı mahda bir defa verilmekte olduğu ve Kasım duhulünde irade-i şahane vuku bulduğu anda taşrada bulunanlara beylik ve kumpanya vapurları ve bazıları dahi yelken sefineleriyle icab-ı mevkiine göre [26] gönderilmekte olduğu cümlelerin malumudur ve neferat-ı bahriyenin denizde buldukları müddetçe lahm tayinatı ekl ettiklerinden eğerçi şikayet vuku bulmuş ise de donanma denizde ve yelken üstünde buldukları vakitlerde usul-i kadim-i bahriye üzere peksimad ve zeytun [27] ve saire ile eğer taam tabh olunması mümkün olabilür ise şurba ve pilav dahi tabh olunacağı ve şayed bir

liman veyahud bir memleket kenarına yakın vardıkları halde ol vakit taze lahm ve etmek alıp asakir-i bahriye-i şahaneye tevzi [28] olunmak usul-i kadim-i bahriyeden bulunduğu ve süfun-ı hümayunun yedeklik mühimmattan bazı noksan şeyler var imiş deyu söylenmekte imiş bunların dahi mukaddema tersane-i amire ümera ve zabitanının ittifak ve kararı üzere tanzim [29] olunup elan destur-ül amel tutulmakta olan muktefi[?] mucibince kamilen yedeklik verilen mühimmattan maada usul-i tersanenin harici olarak pek çok mühimmat verilmiş olduğu liman defterlerinde mukayyed bulunacağı [30] ve asakir-i şahanenin bu sene-i mübarekede denizde bulunacakları memul olduğundan fevkalade tertibatdan tesviye olunması ve asakir-i merkume rahat etmeleriyçün bin beş yüz kese akçelikden ziyade gömleklik fanila çend mah mukaddem konturato [31] olunmuş olacağından bu günlerde vürud etmek üzere bulunduğu ve süfun-ı hümayunun bazı çürük mahalleri var deyu şikayet olunmakta ise de öteden berü Tersane-i Amire'nin usulü üzere beher sene ruz-i Kasım duhulünde memurlar marifetiyle vizite [32] olunarak direk ve tekne ve sair mahallerde bulunan çürükleri derhal tamir olunup evvel bahar hululünde hazır ve müheyya buldukları misillü bu sene-i mübarekede dahi sair seneler gibi tamir ve termimleri bil-ifa Büyükdere pişgahına çıkarılmış idi. Şimdi Kasım hulül etmiş idüğünden sene-i sabıkada olduğu misillü vizite olunarak icab eden tamiratlarına mübaşeret kılınmış olduğu ve bazı süfun-ı hümayun çürükdür denize çıkamaz deyu şikayet olunmuş ise de Memduhiye kalyonu ile Suriye ve Şerefresan nam fırkateynlerin dahi denize çıkarılmasında bir mahzur olmadığını ferik-i müşarün-ileyhima ifade ve beyan etmiş olduklarından heman saye-i şahanede asakir ve mühimmat-ı sairesi serian bit-tanzim donanma-yi hümayuna ilave [35] kılınmış olup fakat zikr olunan Şerefresan pek çürük olduğundan ve ziyadesiyle tamire muhtaç görüldüğünden anın için taraf-ı aciziden memurin-i sairenin re'yi beraber olduğu halde tevkif kılınmış idi. Şimdi cenab-ı Hakk'dan haya [36] etmeyerek gezdikleri yerlerde çürükdür havadisini edeyorlar ve müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa hazretlerinin Sinob limanından donanma-i hümayunu nizamen çıkaramamış deyu ifade etmekte bulunmuş ise de “kanğı kanun ve nizama tatbikan demiştir ve Devlet-i Aliyye [37] donanmasının feriki olup da maiyetinde üç dört kebir vapur bulunarak bazı mahal sevahillerini viziteye gidip hava müsaid olduğu halde oralarını dahi nakıs dolaşarak avdetle Sinob'a gelip süfun-u hümayunun furtunadan birer [38] ikişer perakende toplandıklarını gördüğü halde orada bulunan ümera ve zabitanı celb edip sularınızı ve sair levazimatınızı ahz ederek memuriyetleri bulunan mahallere azimet edeceklerini haber vererek fi 20 S 70 [22.11.1853] tarihinde akşam [39] vapur-ı hümayunlar ile müşarünileyh bendeleri kıyam etmiş ve yanlarına iki vapur bırakarak mahall-i mezburda batmak muhatara olduğunu bildiği suretde bu misillü bir büyük ümeranın vapur-ı hümayunları alıp savuşarak bu tarafa gelmesi layık ve reva mıdır? [40] ve “Sinob limanına gidip orada yatacaksınız ve orası donanma merkezinizdir” deyu taraf-ı acizanemden mühürlü talimat verilmiş olduğu halde meydana çıkarsunlar ve donanma-i hümayunun liman-ı mezkurda yatıp bu kazanın vuku bulması sui [41] tedbirden mi neş'et etmiştir?” deyu sual vuku bulmuş ise de bu keyfiyet sui tedbir ise de kumandarlarının muhalif havaya tesadüf ederek liman-ı mezkura gidişlerinden neşet etmiş ve müşarünileyhin bunlara bir vechile iane etmeyip güya sair [42] devletin donanması gibi orada bırakıp avdet edişi için acaba yedinde bir talimat var mı ki “Devlet-i Aliyye donanmasından Kara Deniz'de muhatarada bulunanları gördüğün vakitte veyahud denizde tesadüf ettiğin esnada sakın hiçbir şey [43] deme ve bir kumanda verme sonra hakkında fena muamele olur” denilmiş midir? ve hatta süfun-ı mezkureden ol furtunada beraber bulunarak ayrılıp Ereğli limanına gelen Cay-i Ferah nam brik-i hümayun bis-sıhhat ves-selamet Deraliye'ye vasil olmuşdur [44] ve mukaddem kendülerine şifahen ifade kılındığı vechile Amasra ve Ereğli açıklarında bulunarak Ferik Mustafa ve Hasan Paşalar maiyetlerinde bulunacaklarını müşarünileyhima bu günlerde düvel-i bahriye amiralleriyle müzakere olunduktan sonra

kalyon-ı hümayunlar ile [45] denize çıkacakları ve Patrona Osman Paşa'nın Hasan Paşa ve Mirliva Hüseyin Paşa'nın Mustafa Paşa filolarına mukaddem tayin olduğunu ve hatta mumaileyh Osman Paşa fırka-i Mısriye kalyonlarının yerine eşyalarını götürmüş ve muahharen eşyasını ihraç [46] ederek rakib olacağı firkateyn-i hümayuna va'z ve nakl etmiş olduğu ve hava ziyadesiyle sert ve furtuna olup da münasip bir mahalde kendinizi muhafaza etmek ve çaresiz kalarak Boğaz'dan içerü girmek lazım geldiği halde ol vechile içerü girmelerine [47] dahi mezuniyet verilmiş idiği ve havanın gayet sisden ve baran ve telatum-i deryanın kesretinden Sinob'a gittikleri merhum Hüseyin Paşa'nın taraf-ı aciziye vürud eden tahrirat meali dahi ispat eder ve müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa'nın liman-ı [48] mezkura duhulünde “burada durmayın kalkın memuriyetiniz olan mahallere gidin” deyu tenbih edişinden anlaşılan memuriyetleri Sinob değil imiş ve gidecekleri mahal neresi olduğunu müşarünileyh bilür imiş ve şimdi müşarünileyh [49] “benim sefain-i mezkureyi liman-ı mezburdan kaldırmağa mezuniyetim yokdur” deyu bazı mahallerde ifade etmekte bulunmuş ise de liman-ı mezburda bulunan zabitan ol vakit “burada durmayın memuriyetiniz olan mahalle azimet ediniz” deyu tenbih etmemek [50] lazım gelür iken ne sebebe mebni tenbih etmişdir ve eğerçi bu keyfiyetler çakerleri donanma-i hümayunu kamilen bil-istishab Bahr-i Siyah'a çıkıp böyle bir filo süfun-ı hümayunu bir mahale getirip orada bir muhatarada kalarak çakerleri tarafından iane [51] olunmayıp da hali üzere bırakaydım binaen aleyh bu keyfiyet vuku bulmuş olaydı vakıa kulunuzun sui tedbirinden neşet etmiş olur idi ve patrona-i hümayun mumaileyh Osman Paşa müddet-i vafireden berü Tersane-i Amire'de istihdam olunmakta [52] olduğu halde Bahr-i Sefid ve bu kere dahi birkaç defa Bahr-i Siyah'a yedi sekiz kıta süfun-ı hümayun ile gidip yine avdet ederek salimen gelmiş olduğu ve merhum Hüseyin Paşa dahi mukaddem Tersane-i Amire'de pek çok vakit hizmet-i şahanede [53] terfi-i rütbe eylemiş ve bu defa bil-intihab mülkiye hizmetinden asakir-i bahriye-i şahaneye mirlivalık rütbesiyle nakl olunmuş idi ve mumaileyhimanın ikisi dahi mücerreb olmamış olaydı şimdiye kadar kapudan-ı deryalık memuriyetinde bulunan zatlar [54] tard ve ihraç ederler idi. Bu babda kulunuzun kusurum olmadığından maada ferik-i müşarünileyhin kendisi müttehem bulunduğu halde kullarınızın hakk-ı acizanemde birtakım sözler söylemesi garaz ve nefsanîyet olduğu aşikardır ve süfun-ı hümayunun [55] derununda bulunan topların ekserisi ecnas-ı muhtelif olup ve çapları dahi küçük olduğu rivayet kılınmakta ise de Devlet-i Aliyye'nin tersanesinde mevcut bulunan alel-ıtlâ [?] olanların top ve mühimmat-ı sairenin cümlesi süfun-ı hümayuna [56] verilmişdir ve elan anik [?] bulunan şeylerin bazıları Tersane-i Amire varidatının zuhurat-ı tertibatından ve bazıları dahi mahsus olan tahsisatdan peyderpey tesviye olunmak üzere konturatoya rabt olunarak mübayaa olunmakta olup fakat [57] Tersane-i Amire'nin zıkr olunan mühimmatlarının kaffesi defaten düvel-i bahriye gemilerine tatbik olunmak mümkün müdür? ve anıklarının tebdili dahi kaç yüz bin kese akçeye tevakkuf eder ve bu akçenin verilmesinin çaresi var mıdır? eğerçi mezkur [58] tebdili ve anıklarının birden bire ka't olunması mümkün olmuş olaydı mukaddem kapudanlık hizmetinde bulunan zat-ı alikadrlar icra buyururlar idi. Çend seneden beru donanma-i hümayunun nizam u intizamı ve mühimmatının derunlarına [59] va'z olunması ve asakir-i bahriye-i şahanenin talim ve taallümleri ne surette tanzim ve icra olunmak lazım gelür ise cümlesi ferik-i müşarünileyhima re'y-i inhimamlarıyla yapılmış ve yapılmakta bulunmuş olduğu ve hatta çend mah mukaddem Meclis-i Umumi'de [60] bazı zat-ı alikadr hazeratından sual olduğu misillü kullarından dahi sual buyurulduktan saye-i resul-ül uhde ve saye-i şahanede mevcut bulunan donanma-i hümayun ile Kara Deniz'e çıkarız ve düşmanımız ile muharebe ederiz fakat Akdeniz tarafında Rusyalunun Bahr-i Baltık donanması bulunup da Boğaz tarafına doğru gelür ise ol tarafa gönderecek donanmamız yokdur deyu ifade eyledim. Cümleden sual olduğu misillü ferik-i müşarünileyhimadan dahi sual olunduktan saye-i şahanede gideriz ve muharebe ederiz deyu cümlesi yekzeban olarak ifade eyledikleri

malum-ı alilerinizdir. Eđerçi kulları ol vakit din ü devlet ve millete cenab-ı Hakk göstermesün bir ihanet etmek için hilaf bir şey ifade etmiş [63] olaydım ol anda ferik-i müşarünileyhima sadık oldukları halde donanma-i hümayun çürük ve fena haldedir muharebe edemeyiz deyu meclis-i aliye ifade etmek lazım gelmez miydi? Şimdi birtakım gezdikleri yerlerde kulunuzun aleyhinde hilaf [64] olarak biraz sözler ilan etmekte buldukları layık mıdır? Donanma-i hümayunun mevcudu büyük ve küçük kaç kıtadır ve ne kadar noksan neferatı vardır ve ne kadarı fevkalade mesarife muhtaçdır bunların cümlesi Meclis-i Bahriye'de [65] müzakere olunarak bir kıta defter ve mazbatası bit-tanzim Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Vükela'da kıraat olunduğu malum-ı alilerinizdir ve Rusya devleti askeri kanğı mevkilerdedir ve ne miktardadır ve donanması kaç kıtadan ibaretdir? Bunları bilip [66] ana göre haritalar meydana konularak devletlu atufetlu serasker paşa hazretleri ve saire bunları mülahaza ederek icabına göre asker tertib olunmalıdır deyu bazı zat-ı alikadrlar tarafından sual varid olmuş idi. Anın üzerine [67] Rusya'nın ne kadar askeri olduğu na-malumdur ve bazı yüz bin ve bazı kere ziyade denilmekte olduğundan mikdarı bilinemediği misillü donanması dahi donanma-i hümayundan ziyade veyahud eksik deyu söylenmekte ise de bunun aded ve miktarını mevla-i müteal hazretlerinden başka kimse bilmeyip fakat muharebeye mübaşeret olunduğu vakitlerde bozmak ve bozulmak da cenab-ı Hakkın emridir maazallahu teala bizim taraftan bozğunluk vuku bulur ise sonra Serasker Paşa [69] hazretleri şöyle ve filan böyle dedi diyerek muharebeye mübaşeret olunub da işte bu hali kesb ettin diyerek lanet olsun sebab olanlara deyu muahharen bir şey denilmesün işte mevcut olan asakir-i berriye ve bahriye [70] bu miktardır biz askeriz ne emr ü ferman buyurulur ise elimizden geldiği mertebe dinimize ve devletimize hizmet etmekte sa'y ve gayret-i namütenahi ederiz deyu kulunuz tarafından ifade ve cevap verilmiş idi ve hatta hace efendilerin biri [71] kim lanet olsun diyecektir öyle şey olur mu o cenab-ı hakkın bileceği şeydir deyu cevap buyurmuşlar idi ve süfun-ı hümayunlar harb tahakkuk etmezden evvel Kara Deniz'e çıktıkları vakit ne surette hareket edeceklerine dair [72] bahriye meclisinden bir kıta talimat tanzim olunarak Bab-ı Ali'ye takdim kılınıp ol vechile icra buyurulmasına emr ü ferman buyurulmuş idi. Badehu meclis-i mezkurdan ve taraf-ı aciziden temhir olunarak denize çıkan kumandarlar tarafına ita kılınmış idi. [73] Muahharen birkaç mah sonra bazı müzakere üzerine Rusya devletine çend gün mehil verilerek sonra hasmane harekete mübaşeret olunsun deyu bir karar verilmiş idi. Bunun üzerine taraf-ı aciziden mehl-i mezkura tekmil olunduğu anda [74] hasmane harekete ne surette mübaşeret olunacaktır deyu bir kıta arıza ile Bab-ı Ali'den istizan kılınmış idi. Muahharen şifahen Rusya sefinelerine hitam-ı müddette tesadüf olunduğu vakit hasmane harekete mübaderet olunmak lazım gelir [75] ve böyle tenbih edin deyu çend kıta emr ü ferman buyurulmuş idi. Binaberin taraf-ı aciziden ol vakit denizde bulunan kumandan kullarına tahrirat yazılarak Büyükdere'den bir vapur ile gönderilsün deyu donanma-i hümayun tarafına [76] irsal kılınmış iken birkaç gün sonra sahilhane-i ali-i hazret-i seraskeride Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Ali'de “birkaç gün daha mehil verilecektir hasmane harekete bizim taraftan şimdilik mübaşeret olunmasun öte taraftan vuku bulmadıkça” [77] deyu karar-ı ali vuku bulduğu anda “aman efendim kulunuz ol vakit emr ü iradeniz ile tahrirat yazdım vapur ile gönderdim geriye ahz edeyim” deyu ifade eyliyerek serian ve acilen Yaver Besim Efendi kulları Büyükdere'ye donanma-i hümayuna gönderilip mezkur tahriratı götürecektir vapur gitmek üzere iken mezkur tahrirat-ı aciziye geriye ahz ile sabaha yakın sahilhane-i ali-i mezkura getirdiler ve meclis-i alileri muvacehelerinde lillahi hamd vel minnet gitmemiş diyerek şükür olunmuş idi. [79] Muahharen harb tahakkuk etmiş olduğundan badehu çıkacak süfun-ı hümayun Rusya sefinelerini gördükleri anda mukabele edeceklerini akılları kestiği halde berri ve bahri hasmane harekete mübaşeret edecekleri daima vükela [80] meclisde cereyan etmekte olduğundan ve mukaddem tezkire-i acizi ile matlub eylediğim talimatın dahi hükmü kalmamış olduğundan Bab-ı Ali'den cevap-ı alisi zuhur etmemiş

idi. Bunun üzerine yine denize çıkan ümera-i bahriyeye şifahen ve tafsilen eyleyecekleri hareket tenbih olunarak birer muhtasar talimat dahi verilip dirayet ve istikametlerine havale kılınarak donanma-i hümayun-ı muhataradan muhafaza etmek ve düşmana tesadüf olduğu halde mukabele edeceğini aklı [82] kestiği surette hasmane harekete mübaderet eylemek ve mukabele edemeyecek oldukları halde bir selamet tarafa savuşmak ve bazı ufak ve tefek bir şey denizde düşman tarafından derdest olunmak gibi şeylere muvafık olduğu [83] halde kendilerine mükafat olunacağı dahi tenbih olunmuş velhasıl her halde donanma-i hümayunun muhataradan ve furtunadan muhafazası kendilerinin dirayet ve malumatlarına havale kılınmış idüğü ve hatta kumandar-ı mumailiyhima taraflarından [84] ferik-i müşarünileyhima hazır oldukları surette Mahmudiye nam kalyon-ı hümayunda kullarından sual eylediler ki “hava şiddetli olup bir tarafda muhafaza olunmak üzere gidilemeyip de Boğaz'dan içerü girmemiz lazım geldiği halde ne yapalım?” demelerinde [85] “kendinizi muhafaza edemediğiniz halde Boğaz'dan içerü girmeğe mezsunuz” deyu alimallahu teala şifahen cevab ve tenbih eyledim. Kullarının pek büyük isyanım budur ki feriki müşarünileyhimaya emniyet etmeğlim ve saniyen her bir [86] müzakeremizi tahriren ve temhiren olmayıp da şifahen olmaklıktan bu fenalık ve fesatlıklar zuhur etmiş idüğü ve donanma-i hümayuna gittikçe ve canib-i Tersane-i Amire'de bir şey tenbih olunması lazım geldikçe daima süvari beyler paşa sefinesine cem olunup ferik-i müşarünileyhimanın ikisi beraber buldukları halde taraf-ı aciziden verilecek tenbihat Ahmed Paşa'ya ve müşarünileyh bulunmadığı surette Mustafa Paşa'ya ifade ve tenbih olunarak süvari beylere gidin bu vechile divan [88] verin deyu ifade olunmakta idi. Daima süvari beylere bunlara ifade etmeksizin tenbih edecek olursam ol vakit müşarünileyhima “bizi adam yerine koymuyor ve bize söylemiyor ve emniyet etmiyor kendi tenbih ediyor” [89] diyeceklerinden her bar kendilerine riayet olunmak üzere müşarünileyhimaya ifade ve tenbih olunmakta idi ve süvari beyler dahi kalyon-ı Mahmudiye'ye cem oldukları vakit kulları orada bulunduğum müddetçe ekseri süvari beyleri [90] gördüğümde istifsar-ı hatırdan sonra asakir-i bahriye-i şahanenin süfun-ı hümayunların noksanları ve talim ve taallümleri ve taharet ve nezafetleri sual birle “bazı tenbihat vardır paşalar hazeratı sizlere emir verecekler güzelce [91] icrasına sa'y ve gayret edin” diyerek hemişe taraf-ı aciziden bu vechile icra olduğunu ve yalnız bir şey yapmadığımı ispat ederim ve hatta çend defa müşarünileyh Mustafa Paşa Ahmed Paşa hazretlerini beni işaret çekip [92] süvari beyler gibi celb ediyor deyu ve hakkıma hiç riayet etmeyerek ber minval-i muharrer hususlar için ve sair ettiği fesadları için olsun her bar kulunuza şikayet edip malumat vermekte iken müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa dahi [93] müşarünileyhin nerelerde gezdiğini ve kimlere havadis verdiğini daima şikayet etmekte oldukları halde Sinob maddesinden berü Mustafa Paşa'nın ve Fransız gazetesinden dolayı Ahmed Paşa'nın kulunuzu mukaddem [94] hafiyen ve muahharen alenen kötülemek sevdasında buldukları bazı zevat-ı kiram hazretlerine dahi şifahen ifade etmiş idim. Heman bu günlerde kendilerini resmen şikayet edeceğimi hiss etmeleriyle ittifak ederek [95] bu işlere teşebbüs ettiler. Allah-ı zülcelal havale eyledim. İnşallahu teala ıyal ve evladlarıyla perişan olurlar vallahul azim ve billahul kerim bunlar bazı zabitan ve neferata hilaf ve kizb şeyler öğreterek kulunuz hakkında [96] her dürlü iftirayı ederler ve ettirirler zira bunlar Allahu teala ve tekaddes hazretlerinden havf ve tehaşi etmezler ve bu Ahmed Paşa'nın devletlu atufetli Halil Paşa ve Süleyman Paşa hazeratının zaman-ı kapudanilerinde askerlikten ihraç ettirdikleri ve defterde müşir-i müşarün-ileyhima hazeratı haklarında nasıl layihalar yapıp ve nerelere takdim ettiği ve Cuma günleri sailler marifetiyle rikab-ı şahaneye dahi arzuhal takdim ettirdiğini ve elan mevcud olan bazı zevat-ı kiram [98] hazeratı ve müşir-i müşarünileyhima hazeratının hakk-ı alilerinde birtakım sözler söylediğini kendisi kulunuza ifade etmiş olduğu halde işte bu şeyleri unutup da bunlara emniyet etmeğlim pek büyük hata eyledim ve müşar-ün ilehima [99] kulunuz hakkımda bu derecede hasmane harekette bulunmaları yalnız

kendilerini kurtarıp kulunuzu lekedar etmek garazından ibaret olduğundan saye-i resulullahda ve saye-i hazret-i padişahide altmış seneden berü familya-yı acizi hidemat-ı şahanede bulunarak [100] hiçbir yüzden lekedar olmadıkları misillü kulunuz dahi otuz beş seneye karib küçük yaşından berü Tophane-i Amire ve asakir-i hassa-i şahane ve Tersane-i Amire ve tekraren asakir-i hassa-i şahane orduy-ı hümayunu müşirliğinde min gayr-i liyakatin hizmet-i şehinşahide [101] olup hiçbir suretle lekedar olmadığım halde bu defa Tersane-i Amire'de iki seneye karib kapudanlık hizmetinde vü's ve kudret-i acizanem teallük ettiği mertebe hizmet-i şehinşahide bulunmakta iken birkaç mahdan berü böyle bir iki defa hizmet-i sabıkasından [102] tard ve ihrac olunarak muahharen merhameten yine Tersane-i Amire hizmetinde istihdam olunmak üzere alınıp da işiyle meşgul olmak lazım gelür iken bu defa kulunuz ile uğraşmağa kalkışan vasıfsız olduğu halde buna tayin eden [103] paşa kullarının dahi böyle memuriyetlerinde bulunduğu surette kulunuz ile muhakeme olmalarını vükela-i azam hazeratı tecviz buyurmaya-cakları aşıkardır ve eğerçi hiçbir kabahatları tebeyyün etmeyip de yine memuriyetlerinde istihdam olunmak iktiza ettiği [104] halde istihdam olunmaları hususları rey-i alilerinize menut ve mütevakkıf olup fakat bunların ihracıyla Tersane-i Amire'nin işine zerre kadar sekte iras etmeyeceği dahi aşıkardır ve mukaddem yine müşarünileyhin sebebine Tersane-i Amire'den [105] hasb-el kader infisalleri vuku bulmuş olan ümeradan daha dirayetli bendeleriniz vardır bir kere de bunlar istihdam olunarak tecrübe olumak lazım gelür gibi zann olunur. Kullarının bu ana kadar padişah nan-ı parasından başka bir taraftan medar-ı maaşım [106] yokdur ve elan bazı mahallere dahi haylice düyunum vardır. Bendehanenizde olan malımı furuht etsem kendimi iki mah idare ederim. Bu halde bulunan adem ve bu vakte kadar bir ihaneti zuhur etmeyip de şimdi Devlet-i Aliyye'ye [107] sadakat izhar edecek vakitte kanğı hal ve malına mağruren ihanet eder ve böyle mazulen hanesinde oturduğu surette kendisi ve familyası ne halde muzdarib bulunacakları aşıkardır. Bir adam mecnun olsa yine buralarını mülhaza eder. [108] Mevla-i müteal hazretleri için ve Resulullah aşkına olsun bu makule ehl-i fesadın sözüyle namus-ı acizanemin hetk olunması layık ve reva değildir ve efendilerimiz dahi bir vechile hakkaniyetden ayrılmazsınız ve kulunuzun bu derecelerde hakpay-i alilerini [109] tasdi etmek layık olmadığını bilürüm fakat bunların hakk-ı acizanemde vuku bulan şikayetlerine nazaran çaresiz bu kadarcık ifade-i hal-i acizaneme mecbur oldum. Padişahımız velinimetimiz efendimizin başı için olsun ber minval-i meşruh layiha-i [110] acizanem kiraat olunarak icabının icrası emr ü ferman-ı devletlerinize menut mevaddan idüği malum-ı alileri buyuruldukta ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh ül emrindir.

Appendix 27. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 17, not dated. Evidence of Ferik (Vice-Admiral) Mustafa Pasha on the Battle of Sinop.

Devletlu Kapudan Paşa hazretleri süfun-ı hümayunun bu kere Sinob'da duçar oldukları halat-ı mükeddireyi bi-gayr-i hakkın bendeleriyle saadetlu Ferik Ahmed Paşa [2] hazretlerine isnad etmek istiyor ise de bu babda delail ve senedat ve beyyine-i sahiha ile müspet olan hakikat-i hal şu vechiledir ki altmış dokuz senesinde [3] vaki Teşrin-i Evvel'in yigirmi üçüncü günü [4.11.1853] ümera-i bahriye ve bil-cümle süvari ve süfun-ı tüccar kapudanları birlikte akd-i meclis olunarak mevsim-i şitada [4] donanma-i hümayun-ı mülukane Bahr-i Siyah canibine çıkarıldığı surette limanca ittihazı lazım gelen tedabire dair kaleme alınıp makam-ı cenab-ı kapudaniye [5] takdim kılınan on yedi bendi şamil diğer bir kıta varakanın sekizinci ve onyedinci bendinde Sinob limanı vakt-i muharebede muhataradan salih ola- [6] -mıyacağı beyan ve tezkar kılınmış iken varaka-i mezkurenin takdiminden çend gün sonra tamamen mefadının aksi olarak kapudan-ı müşarünileyh hazretleri [7] iki filo olmak üzere Bahr-i Siyah'a memur eylediği süfun-ı hümayun-ı mülukane kumandanları Patrona-i Hümayun izzetlu Osman

Paşa ve Mirliva Hüseyin Paşa [8] bendeleriyle sefain-i merkume süvarilerini celb ile Bahriye Feriki saadetlu Ahmed Paşa hazretleriyle bendeleri hazır bulunduğumuz halde mumaileyh Osman Paşa'ya taht-ı [9] kumandana verdiğim süfun-ı hümayunlar ile Bahr-i Siyah'ın Anadolu Ereğli'den Amasra'ya ve kezalik mumaileyh Hüseyin Paşa'ya dahi müsteshab-ı maiyetinde [10] olan süfun-ı hümayun ile Amasra'dan Sinob'a kadar memursunuz binaberin led-el hace bile Boğaz'a avdet etmemek üzere havali-i memurenizde [11] geşt ü güzar ederek icabı takdirinde birleşip Rusya sefinelerine tesadüfle mukabele edebileceğinizi aklınız kesdiği takdirde muharebeye ibtidar [12] ediniz ve muhalif havalara tesadüf eylediğiniz veyahud süfun-ı hümayunların suları tükendiği surette Sinop limanına gidip suyunuzu alınız deyu emr ü tenbih eylediğinin üzerine süfun-ı hümayunun böyle talimat ile iki filo olarak gönderilmesi denizde perişanîyetlerini muceb olacağından icabı [14] vechile hareket olunmak üzere süfun-ı mezkure ile müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa ile bendelerini göndermeleri hususu Kapudan-ı müşarünileyh hazretlerinden niyaz olundukta [15] “sizin gitmeniz icab etmez” deyu redd ile cevab vererek beş günden sonra çakerlerini celb ile Feyz-i Bari ve Saik-i Şadi ve Taif ve Ereğli naman [16] vapur-ı hümayunlar ile Çerkes'e cebhane götürmek üzere memur etmiş ve memuriyetiniz yalnız cebhaneyi salimen mahalline isal etmektir deyu emr ile zikr [17] olunan iki fırka donanma-i hümayuna rast gelür isek şu vechile bu vechile hareket etsünler deyu süfun-ı hümayun-ı mezbure kumandanlarına bir guna tenbih [18] etmekliğimi tecviz etmemişdir. Çakerleri ol gün ahşam üzeri vapur-ı hümayunlar ile Bahr-i Siyah boğazından huruc ve Sinob limanına duhul birle [19] vapur-ı hümayunların icab eden kömürlerini aldıktan sonra mahall-i mezbur kale ve tabyelerini muayene eylediğimde Sinop limanı bir büyük liman ise de rüzgar altı [20] bulunduğundan başka kale ve tabyelerinin istihkamatı bahren derece-i matlubda olmayıp şimdiden buranın istihkamat-ı lazimesine bakılması icab-ı hal [21] ve maslahattan bulunduğu ve müstashab-ı maiyetim olan Ereğli nam vapur batı' ül hareke olmasıyla ilerüde işimize sekte vereceğinden Trabzon'dan bazı [22] havadisle gerüye iade olunacağı ba ariza-i kemteri makam-ı müşarünileyhe arz ve işar olunup işbu ariza-i acizinin müşarünileyh hazretlerine [23] vasıl olarak meali malumları olduğu Tersane-i Amire mektubisi izzetlu efendi bey ve sair zevatın şahadetleriyle müsbet olduğu ve Sinop'tan [24] kıyam Trabzon ve Batum ve Çürüksu sevahillerini dolaşıp on iki günden sonra tekrar Sinop limanına vusulümde Patrona-i Hümayun [25] mumaileyh Osman Paşa bendeleri beş kita süfun-ı hümayun ile muhalif havaya tesadüf ettiğinden maada rakib olduğu fırkateynin ter*mkt[?] [26] sizi[?] şikest olduğundan liman-ı mezkura vusulümden dört gün evvel süfun-ı hümayun ile liman-ı mezkura gelmiş olduğu avdetimde gördüğümde [27] Trabzon'dan Deraliye'ye avdet edecek Ereğli vapurun Osman Paşa filosunda kalmasını makam-ı kapudaniden mumaileyh Osman Paşa'ya ba tahrirat işar olunmuş olduğunu Sinop'ta mumaileyh Osman Paşa bendelerinde görülmüştür ve bahriye mektubisi izzetlu efendiden dahi isbat olunabilür ve paşa-i [29] mumaileyh bendeleri ve maiyetinde bulunan süfun-ı mülukane süvarileri celb olunup liman-ı mezkur rüzgar altı bir mahal olduğundan başka kale ve tabye- [30] -lerinin istihkamatı süfun-ı mülukaneyi vikaye edebilecek derecede olmadığından orada asla muhataradan salim olamayacaklarını beyanen [31] denize çıkmaları tenbih kılındıktan sonra ferdası ahşam üzeri liman-ı mezkurdan kıyam olunur iken mumaileyh Mirliva Hüseyin Paşa maiyetinde bulunan [32] süfun-ı şahane ile furtunaya tesadüf ederek ve istif sularının dahi ikmalı zımnında liman-ı mezkura gelip temürleyerek furtuna esnasında [33] Rusya donanmasının şiddet-i hava münasebetiyle perakende olarak Sivastopoli limanına pocalamış olduğunu taraf-ı çakeriye ifade eylediğinin [34] üzerine paşa-i mumaileyhe dahi liman-ı mezkurun ol vechile uygunsuzluğunu tafsilen ifade birle taht-ı kumandasında bulunan süfun-ı şahanenin [35] vapuru olmadığından refakat-ı acizide bulunan vapurlardan Taif nam vapur-ı hümayun paşa-i mumaileyhimin niyazına mebni maiyetine birağılup ol [36] ahşam oradan kıyam ederek Dersaadet'e vusulümüz-

de Rusya donanmasının Sivastopoli'ye pocaladığını paşa-i mumaileyhimden istihbar eylediğimden [37] talimat-ı kapudanelerinin hilafında olarak süfun-ı mülukaneyi atıf-ül beyan Sinop limanından ihraca cesaret edemeyeceğim bahsiyle beraber liman-ı mezkur [38] rüzgar altı olarak kale ve tabyelerinin istihkamata dahi donanma-i hümayunu muhafaza edebilecek halde olmadıklarından süfun-ı merkumenin [39] Dersaadet'e celbine dair kumandanları tarafına emir göndermeleri kapudan-ı müşarünileyh hazretlerine ihtar olundukta buna asla havale-i sem' ve itibar [40] etmediğinden iki günden sonra husus-ı mezkur tekrar ifade ve rica olundukta artık ne hal ise liman memuru Ahmed Paşa bendelerini celb ile [41] İngiliz vapurunun iki saat evvel kıyam eylediğini paşa-i mumaileyhden istihbar eylediğinden ihtar ettiğiniz emri kara postasıyla gönderelim [42] deyu ifade eyledikleri misillü Sinop'tan kıyam-ı aciziden on bir gün sonra Taif nam vapur-ı hümayun bil-vürud donanma-i hümayunun havadis-i mükeddire-sini getirdiğinde ber vech-i meşruh evvel ve ahir vaki olan bunca ihtarat ve mütalaatımızı ıskat etmeyerek donanma-i hümayunun bu haline kendü [44] talimatlarıyla sebep olduğu halde kapudan-ı müşarünileyh hazretleri bu khtl[?] bendeleriyle müşar-ü ileyh Ferik Ahmed Paşa hazretlerine isnad zımnında Bab-ı Ali'ye layiha [45] takdim etmiş ise de hakikat-i halin salif üz zikr mevadd-ı sahiha ve müsbete delaletiyle müstebandır ve bendeleri donanma-i hümayunda öyle bir tehlike-i azime [46] halinde veyahud düşman muhasara etmiş bir halde görmediğim donanmaca cümlelerin malumudur. Fakat ilan-ı harb gününden berü Bahr-i Siyah'da bulunan [47] limanlarımızda donanma temürlemesi tehlikeden hali olmayacağından daima ihtirazda bulunduğumuzdan ihtar olunmakta bulunulduğu ve öteden berü bu kulunuzun [48] gerek Akka ve Beyrut kalelerinin zabt ü teshirlerinde ve gerek ol tarihten bu ana kadar müstakilen süfun-ı hümayun ile ablukalarda [49] ve sair tayin buyrulduğum memuriyetlerde meşhud olan sıdk u besalet ve hüsn-i hareketim keyfiyatı sadr-ı esbak devletlu ubbehettü İzzet Mehmed Paşa ve devletlu [50] ubbehettü Serasker Paşa ve devletlu atufetlü Halil Paşa ve devletlu Said Paşa ve Darbhor devletlu Reşid Paşa ve devletlu Süleyman Paşa hazeratından [51] tahkik buyurulmak babında ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh ül emrindir.

[Sealed by] Mehmed Emin, İsmail, Ahmed ?, ??, Mehmed Pir, Mustafa, ??.

Appendix 28. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 6, not dated. Instructions to Osman and Hüseyin Pashas.

Patrona Osman ve Mirliva Hüseyin Paşaların yedlerine verilen talimatlara makam-ı kapudaniden yazılan buyrulduğunun suretidir

Beyandan müstağni olduğu üzere Devlet-i Aliyye ile Rusya devleti beyninde harp tahakkuk etmiş olmasına mebni mevcut maiyetiniz bulunan süfun-ı şahane ile Bahr-i Siyah'da geşt ü gūzar eylediğiniz mahallerde Rusya sefain-i harbiyesine tesadüf olunduğu ve kazanacağınızı aklınız kesdiği ve gözünüze kesirdiğiniz halde anlar tarafından top atılmasına bakılmayıp tevekkeltu alellah deyip hemen hareket-i hasmaneye mübaderet edip bundan böyle işbu talimat-ı atıkaya riayet olunmayıp avn-i Hakk'la ber minval-i muharrer harekete itina ve dikkat olunmak.

Appendix 29. İ. DH. 19277 lef 3, dated 12 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (13 December 1853). From Sheikh Shemuil the Imam of Dagestan to Abdi Pasha, the commander of the Anatolian army.

[1] Es seniyy-ül himem kerim üş şiyem halen orduy-i hümayun seraskeri paşa-i celil-üş şan hazretleri edamallahu ikbaluhu ve nasere cunuduhu, Amin. [2] Bundan akdem sene bin iki yüz altmış dokuz tarihinde hazret-i Devlet-i Aliyye'nin kefer-i Rusya üzerine seferi etraf-ı erbaadan tevatüren ihbar ile sabit ve mukarrer iken ve asakir-i nusret marufu dahi [3] sınır u hudud bulunan Arpaçay kenarında kain kefer-i mezburenin Gümrü ve Erivan ve Üç Kilise nam kalelerini ihata etmiş deyu mesmu'umdur. Harbe mecalim kalmayıp kabzımda olan asakir-i Dağıstaniye [4] ile huruc-ı Gürcistan semtine azimet edip ba'de muharebe-i şedid çar ülkesine duhulümüzde bi-takdir-i Yezdan kar ve yağmur düşüp ve dağlar kapanık gibi buldukları halde olmağla bit-tekrar diyar-ı [5] Dağıstan'a rücu edip mülakatımız müyesser olmadı ise de bu tarafın ahval ve ahbarı malumunuz olmak ehemmi-i lazımeden olduğu ecilden işbu şukka tahrir olunup taraf-ı eşrefinize ba's ve irsal [6] kılınmıştır. Bi mennihi teala led-el şeref el vusul manzur-ı ayn-ı inayetleri buyuruldukta bu küffar-ı haksarın ekser cem' ve a'zam-ı sevaddı esliha ve alat-ı harbiyeleri taht-ı kabzımızda olan İslam taifesindedir. [7] Mücerred sevadı çokça izhar eyleyip bir taraftan mekr ü hüdeat ile sulh ve barışık duzağını ilka edip bir fırsat ve fitne tahayyür etmesine sa'y ederler. Zira anlar bilürler ki ol hududlardan bir kere ayakları [8] kopar ise hiçbir aher yerde sebata mecal vermeyip ol taraftan sizler bu taraftan bizler kendülerini ortalığa alıp etraf ve diyar-ı Kafkaziye'den tard ve müzmehel edeceklerini ve bu sebepten her hal [9] sulha kasd edeceklerdir. Gayet mekrlerinden ihtiraz ve hüdaetlerinden içtinap oluna ve bu tarafda bizler dahi kabzetimizde olan asakir-i Dağıstaniye ile kanğı tarafa sa'y ve seferimiz esleh ise [10] işaretini ve ol taraftan Kazak ülkesinden Karabağ ve Şemahi üzere Demir Kapu'ya bir kul gönderilür ise esna-yı mürurlarında müdahiller [?] olmayıp vüsulları muayyendir efendim. Fi 12 Ra sene 1270.

Dağıstan imamı

El Gazi

[Sealed] Şemuil

Appendix 30. HR. SYS. 1346/38, dated 21 December 1853. Stratford de Redcliffe à Son Altesse Reshid Pasha. Pera, le 21 Décembre 1853.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Je viens d'apprendre d'une manière digne de foi que les Softas et autres individus ont eue recours à des réunions qui menacent la Capitale d'une insurrection immédiate, et les Chrétiens d'un désastre.

N'ayant ni le tems [sic] ni les moyens de vérifier soit la cause soit la portée de cet incident, je crois devoir m'adresser en premier lieu à Votre Altesse pour avoir des informations plus exactes de ce qui en est, et en même tems [sic] de lui exprimer toute la confiance que je place dans la fermeté, la rigueur et la loyauté du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Le gouvernement n'hésitera pas, sans doute, de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir le bon ordre, et je croirais lui faire tort si je rappelais à Votre Altesse la grave responsabilité qui pèserait, aux yeux de toute l'Europe, sur la Porte et son Empire, s'il était permis aux factieux de donner le défi à l'autorité des loi et de fouler aux pieds les droits et la vie des Chrétiens, ou d'autres classes des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Altesse doit comprendre que dans cette occasion je suis l'organe du Corps diplomatique, dont les membres, à l'exception de ceux qui ne sont pas en ville, m'ont fait l'honneur de se réunir chez moi.

Je profite de cette occasion pour renouveler à Votre Altesse l'assurance de ma haute considération.

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe

**Appendix 31. İ. HR. 21334 lef 1, dated 20 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (21 December 1853).
Renewal of peace negotiations with Russia. Meclis-i Umumi mazbatası.**

[1] İşbu mazbata ve fetva-i şerife manzur ve meal ve müeddaları malum olmuştur. Fetva-i şerife mucebince mahfuziyet-i hukuk ve tamamiyet-i mülk ile bir müsalahaya akdi mücaz olduğu ve emniyet-i istikbaliyenin lüzumu dahi meclisce maruz-ı kabulde görüldüğü cihetle [2] harb haline hiçbir cihetle halel getirilmemek ve kaffe-i tertibat ve tedarikata evvelkinden ziyade ikdam ve ihtimam olunmak üzere mesele-i hazıra hakkında ittifak-ı ârâ ile verilen kararın icray-ı iktizasına ibtidar olunsun. Fi 22 Ra 70.

[3] Şayan buyurulan ruhsat-ı seniye-i hazret-i padişahi mukteza-i münifi üzere işbu şehir-i Rebi-ül evvelin on yedinci Cuma irtesi günü Bab-ı Ali'de münakıd olan Meclis-i Umumi'de mesele-i sulhiyeye dair mazbata-i memhure ve İngiltere sefaretinin müsalahayı tervec yolunda mukaddemce vermiş olduğu layiha ile ana cevaben [4] düvel-i bahriye sefaretlerine verilen layiha birer birer kıraat olunarak mebhas-ı sulhda süfera taraflarından vuku bulan nesayih ve teşvikat ve anın üzerine tertib eden mülahazat meclisce malum olduktan sonra yevm-i mezkurda ve gerek ferdası Pazar günü cereyan eden müzakeratın fezlekesinde müsalahaya maddesi hemen [5] hazır gibi olmayarak sefaretler canibinden irad olunan sual devlet-i aliyenin ne suretle sulha rağbet edebileceğini anlamaktan ve şayet mahfuziyet-i hukuk ve tamamiyet-i mülk ile kanaat olunmayıp da bazı menafi-i cedide istihsali dahi arzu olunduğu takdirde devlet-i metbualarının o raddelere gidemeyeceğini anlatmaktan [6] ibaret olup ve muceb-i harb olan şeyler Eflak ve Boğdan'ın Rusyalu tarafından zabt ve istila olunması ve hukuk-u seniyeye dokunacak bazı tekalif-i anife [*] meydana konulması keyfiyatı olduğundan bunlar bertaraf olunduğu gibi muharebe dahi bit-tabii münkatı olmak lazım gelir ise de ila-i kelimetullah farizasından naşi [7] yine harbe devam ile bu sırada din ve devlete hayırlı bazı kavaide vusul dahi diyanet ve hamiyet iktizasınca cümlelerin arzu ettiği bir keyfiyet olarak hususiyle bu kadar mesarif-i kesire vukuuna Rusyalu sebep-i müstakil olduğu cihetle bunun tazmini kaziyesinin ise netice-i amal olduğunda hiç şübhe olmayıp [8] şu kadar ki şimdiki hale göre devletlerin muaveneti bir dereceye kadar giderek andan ileriye varamayacağı tebeyyün etmesine nazaran ol dereceden ötesini saltanat-ı seniye kendi kuvve-i mahsusasıyla istihsal etmek lazım geleceğinden devletlerin nesayihi dairesinden çıkıldığı halde onların dostluk halinde kalıp [9] kalmayacağı ve yalnızca harekete Devlet-i Aliye'nin kuvve-i hazırası kafi olup olmadığı mübahesatında cümlelerin malumu olduğu üzere Devlet-i Aliye'nin ilan-ı harb etmesi devletlerin muaveneti ile meşrut olmadığı misillu saltanat-ı seniyenin mahfuziyet-i hukuk ve tamamiyet-i mülk ile iktifa etmeyip de ziyade şey [10] istemesi dahi onların muvaffakiyeti muallak ve merbut olmadığından Devlet-i Aliye rey-i alisinde müstakil olarak talep buyuracağı şeylere ve muharebenin temdidi maddesine hiçbir taraftan mümanaat olmayacağı ve iki devlet-i bahriyenin nesayihi mevki-i itibarda tutulmasından dolayı anlardan adavetkarane [11] hareket vukua gelmeyeceği ve donanmalarının burada bulunması dahi saltanat-ı seniyenin murad buyuracağı harekate kuvve-i mania suretinde olmayarak şimdi buradan gitmeleri ifade olursa derhal kalkıp Bahr-i Sefid'e azimet edeceklerinde şübhe olmadığı velhasıl bunlar beyan ettikleri dairenin dahilinde [12] muavin olmalarıyla beraber kuvve-i mahsusaya istinaden anın haricine çıkılmak istenildiği surette ana dahi mani olmayacaklarından bu devletler donanmalarının burada bulunup bulunmaması müsavi addolunarak maslahatın sair cihetlerini mülahaza etmek iktiza edeceği ber vech-i tafsil irad olduğuna binaen [13] bundan sonra müzakerat kuvve-i mahsusa üzerine deveran ederek şu meselenin bidayetinden berü millet-i İslamiye ve heyet-i mecmua tarafından gösterilen asar-ı gayret ve hamiyete ve asakir-i hazret-i şahane taraflarından berren ve bahren ibraz

olunan şecaat ve besalete hiç diyecek olmayarak bununla [14] yar ve ağyara karşı Devlet-i Aliye'nin şevket ve satveti dahi isbat olunmuş olduğundan ve Rumili tarafında bulunan orduy-ı hümayunun dahi kaffe-i tedabir ve hareketi tahsine seza bulunduğu bunlardan dolayı cümlemizin bir hal-i şükr altında bulunduğumuz bedihi olup fakat bir su-i tedbirin [15] neticesi olarak donanma-i hümayunun bir fırkası Sinob'da kazazede olarak Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununda dahi kavaid-i harbiyeye adem-i riayetin seyyiesi olmak üzere bazı uygunsuzluk zuhura gelmesi kuvve-i hazıraya nakisa vermiş ve Batum ve Şekvetil taraflarının askerce ve zehair [16] ve mühimmatça müzayakası kemalde olduğu ve saye-i şevketvaye-i hazret-i hilafetpenahide burada asakir-i külliye ve mühimmat-ı vafiye mevcut bulunduğu halde bahrin mesdudiyeti cihetle muavenet icrası rütbe-i istihsalde görünmüş olmasına ve Anadolu ordusunun rütbe-i matlubeye isali dahi zamana muhtaç bulunacağına [17] nazaran kuvve-i hazıraya düşmanın şevketini kesr ile istenilecek şeyleri istihsale kafi denilemeyeceği ve düvel-i bahriye donanmalarının buradan tebaidi takdirinde anların bitarafılığı Yunanlı ve Karadağlı gibi mutarassıd-ı fırsat olanları uyandırmak ve sair bitaraf bulunanları dahi o halden çıkarmak gibi [18] fenalıkları intac edeceği yani gailenin büyüyeceği ihtimaline göre bir kat daha tezyid-i kuvvet olunmak icab edip bunda dahi mülkce ve malca müşkilat bulunduğu ve mesela def'-i mazarrat ile iktifa olunmayıp da celb-i menfaat vadisine gidildiği halde böyle şeylere Rusyalu kolaylıkla [19] muvaffakiyet etmeyeceğinden sair metalib şöyle dursun yalnız tazmin akçesi almak için bahren Sivastopol'ü yakmak ve berren dahi Moskov şehrine kadar varmak iktiza edip buna ise şimdiki halde imkan müsaid olmadığı mülhazatı üzerine uzun uzun mübahaseler ile mahfuziyet-i [20] hukuk ve tamamiyet-i mülk ile bir müsalaha akdinin lüzumu rütbe-i sübuta reside olduğu esnada maslahatı mesele-i şeriasına tatbik için hoca efendiler hazeratı taraflarından ümera-i bahriye ve berriye başka başka isticvab olunarak kuvve-i bahriyenin mevcudu Rusyalunun kuvve-i bahriyesine muvazin olmadığı [21] ve bu mevsimde yelken sefinelerinin Bahr-i Siyah'a çıkarılamayacağı tahakkuk edip kuvve-i berriye dahi Rumili tarafında tahaffuza elverir ise de tecavüz ile düşmanın kesr-i şevketi derecesine henüz kafi olamadığı ve Anadolu hududlarının muhafazası himmete muhtaç olacağı anlaşılmış ve malca olan müzayaka dahi [22] ber tafsil bildirilmiş olduğundan ve düşman tarafından sulha rağbet olunmak mesele-i şeriyesi iktizasından olduğu cihetle bu keyfiyet dahi hoca efendiler hazeratı taraflarından istifsar olduğuna mebni her ne kadar düşman canibinden doğrudan doğruya buraya haber veyahud mektup irsaliyle taleb-i musalaha olunmamış [23] ise de Rusya devletinin gerek evrak-ı resmiyesinde ve gerek sair devletlere olan tebliğatında sulha meylini beyan olduğu cevabı verildiğinden keyfiyat-ı meşruhaya mebni sulhün mücaz olduğu müşar-ı fetva-i şerife verileceği taraf-ı meşihat-i İslamiyeden beyan olunmuş olmasıyla ve ber minval-i meşrua mahfuziyet-i huku ve tamamiyet-i [24] mülk ile iş bittiği takdirde Devlet-i Aliye'nin ihtiyar ettiği teklifat ve mesarifat ile def'-i mazarrat olunmuş olacağı cihetle buna beyhude denilemeyerek Rusyalunun Viyana müsveddesine icra olunan tashihatı kabul etmeyeceğini ilan ettiğinin üzerine şimdi tashihat-ı mezkure gibi muhafaza-i hukuka salih [25] bir suret ile tesviye-i maslahat olunur ise zarar ve rezaletin Rusyaluya raci olacağı ve beyn-ed düvel cari olan emniyet-i umumiyeden hissedar olacak vechile bir şey istihsal olunur ise atiyi temin edeceği bahsinde bunun sübab-ı muharebe edip etmeyeceğine dair vaki olan suallere dahi [26] inşaallahu teala Devlet-i Aliye'ce matlub derecede istitaat husulünde vesail dahi aksak olmayacağı cihetle muharebeye bunun hail olamayacağı cevabı verildiğine mebni böyle bir emniyet-i istikbaliyenin lüzumu dahi meclisce maruz-ı kabulde görüldüğünden sefaretlerle bu yolda müzakere-i maslahat için [27] hariciye nezaretine mezuniyet verilmesi emrinde ittifak-ı ârâ hasıl olmuş ve canib-i fetvapenahiden dahi iktiza eden fetva-i şerife ita olunmuş olmağla ol babda ve bir de bu karar müzakere-i maslahata ruhsat itasından ibaret olarak müsalaha değil mütareke bile henüz meydanda olmayıp hususuyla [28] burada sefaretlerle

kararlařtırılacak esası Rusyalunun kabul edip etmeyeceđi dahi meçhul olduđundan řu meydanda olan harb haline hiçbir cihetle hanel getirmek caiz olmayarak bilakis kaffe-i tertibat ve tedarikata evvelkinden ziyade ikdam ve ihtimam olunmak lazım geleceđi dahi cümlenin reyile [29] muvafık bulunmađla bu hususta dahi her ne vechile irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı tacidari müteallik ve řerefsudur buyurulur ise inřallahu teala mehaz-ı hayr u isabet-ade olacađı rehin-i ilm-i ali buyruldukta her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 20 Ra 70.

[Sealed by 163 persons]

Appendix 32. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 37-38, dated 31 December 1853. Extract from a despatch of the British consul in Monastir Mr. Longworth to ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe on Hakkı Pasha and the Albanian irregulars.

On the subject of the additional levy of Rediff [the recruitment for want of money I believe] has been almost entirely suspended.

Of the Rediff at Monastir 2,000 are provided [?] with muskets and clothing. Abdi Pacha is indefatigable in his endeavours with the slender means at his command to give them discipline and efficiency. He is night and day engaged in drilling them; but owing to the bad weather, the exercise, I observe, is chiefly **mal [?]; there is not much parade or field duty. The health of these troops is on the whole good, though more sickness has prevailed within the last four days. There are at present 285 men in hospital which out of a force of 7,100 is no great number. The average proportion of deaths thereon, which I am informed has for some time been 9 per cent is in the absence of epidemic diseases, too heavy. The medical department as regards personnel is at present inefficient. The native physicians, Greek, Armenian, and Turkish, who have diplomas from the college of Galata Serai, are in the most part incompetent, their practise lying chiefly, in intrigue and peculation.

The Government is about to have recourse to a measure of somewhat questionable expediency. Namely a levy of the Spahis. Though the superannuated among them may send substitutes still as the majority must consist of elderly persons, some of them Shopkeepers [Esnafs] and people of sedentary habits; I do not suppose they will make a very formidable body. In one respect this levy will have the advantage of that of the wild and fierce Albanian mercenaries. They have some property and respectability, nor are they likely either from choice or necessity, to be guilty of the excesses which have begun to mark the track of the Albanians.

I stated before that a certain Hakkı Pacha had come here with a commission from the Government to raise a corps of 5,000 Albanians; the only possible reason for conferring this appointment on a man who is an invalid, bowed down by adversity and bodily infirmities, must have been to indemnify him for the injustice to which at a former period he had been subjected by the Porte; his property at Dobra having been confiscated on a false charge of favouring the revolt in that quarter. The consequences of this job have been already bad enough and no less a remedy be applied may prove still more serious. While at Monastir Hakkı Pacha was confined by sickness to his chamber. Facilities however were afforded him by Abdi Pacha and emissaries were employed to recruit in Albanians. But the sole aim of Hakkı Pacha being to make as much as could upon the pay and rations assigned by the Government to the 5,000 men he had to raise. The very worst / as they were the cheapest / that could be found, both with respect to equipment and character, the scum and refuse of both North and South Albania were enrolled by them. Nor was this all: fearing perhaps that he might not complete his contingent, he had empowered each of his recruiting agents to assemble an indefinite number. M*[?] mustering therefore at Monastir it was found there were several hundreds more than were wanted and these without receiving a piastre for their

expenses were disbanded and turned adrift here. These vagabonds have consequently weakened their fury and disappointment on all the villages they could contrive to visit on their way home again. Nor have the hands, which have proceeded to Sophia under Hakee Pacha behaved themselves much better. Their leader in the last stage of debility [?] travels with his military chest in a close carriage, while his ruffianly followers make themselves everywhere at home in the Bulgarian villages, revelling, pilfering and committing all sorts of outrage wherever they come. For the 200 men who form this body guard even, he habitually issues 20 billets only. While they were at Monastir, the authorities managed by dint of threats and severe chastisement to preserve some order among them. But once upon the tra* [?] again, all control has been improbable. Such has been the result of this recruiting speculation. I can affirm on authority of the best kind in these matters that out of this rabble of 5,000 men not 1,000 would stand fire a face the enemy. In the meanwhile the firmans that have been issued for the protection of the Rayahs by the Government are to this extent rendered nugatory by its own incurable spirit of jobbery. Had the regular authorities either civil or military been commissioned to raise this body of irregulars, they would by exacting securities for each individual have insured steadiness and good conduct on their part.

Appendix 33. İ. HR. 114/5554-09 İef 1. From Ömer Lütfi Pasha in Şumnu. 13 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (13 January 1854). Battle of Çatana [Cetate].

Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki

Asakir-i şecaat-müessir-i cenab-ı mülukane on dört tabur piyade ve dört batarya top ve üç alay süvariden mürekkeb ve müretteb olduğu halde Kalafat'dan hareket ve mezkur piyadeden üç taburu ihtiyat suretiyle geri köylerde birağılıp maadası Kalafat'dan altı saat ilerüye sevk ve azimet ettirilip oraya gelmiş olan on beş tabur piyade ve yigirmi dört kıta top ve üç alay süvari Rusya askeriyle Çatana nam karye ile sahrada azim bir muharebeye mübaşeret olunmasıyla lillahil hamd vel menna asakir-i hazret-i şahanenin piyadesi düşman piyadesinden dört tabur noksan olduğu halde fevkalade galebe ve nusrete muvafık olarak Rusyalu'yu fena suretle münhezim ve perişan ve mahall-i mezkurdan nizamsız suretle firar u kertiran [?] ettirmişler ve muharebe-i mezburede Rusyalu'nun sahih olarak dört bin kadar telefat ve birçok mecruhatı olup asakir-i şahaneden dahi üçyüz mikdarı şehid olup yedi yüz nefer mecruh zuhura gelmiş ve bu sırada Rusyalu'dan hayy olarak hayli esir tutulmuş ise de asakir-i şahane kemal-i hiddet u şiddetinden sağ bırakmayıp kaffesini süngüden geçirerek yalnız birkaç neferi hayyen Kalafat'a getirmiştir. Mücerred keyfiyet şimdilik bu kadarca malum-ı ali-i seraskeri olmak ve bunun arkasından vukuatın tafsilatı dahi beyan kılınmak üzere suret-i ihbalde [?] arz ve **-i keyfiyetle tebşir-i muzafferiyet-i celileye mübaşeret olundu. Her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir. Fi 13 R 70. An Şumnu.

Müşir-i orduy-ı Rumeli
Ömer Lütfi [mühür]

Hengam-ı muharebede zikr olunan Çatana karyesinde asakir-i şahane Rusyalu'nun dört bölük piyadesinin bir takrib-i ıstılatını kat' ile öteye alıp bir can kurtulmamak üzere kaffesini alef-i yatağ [batağ?]-ı telef eylemiş ve muharebe-i mezburede asakir-i şahanenin ümera ve zabitan ve neferatı bir derecede fevkalade ibraz-ı şecaat ve gayret ve sebat ve metanet eylemiştir ki tarif ve beyanı na-kifayet?-i husule-i hame ve lisan olup hatta ferikandan reis-i erkan saadetlu İsmail Paşa ve saadetlu Mustafa Paşa hazeratı bendeleri hafif suretle yaralanıp süvari miralayı izzetli Hüseyin Bey ve piyade miralayı

Ali Bey ve topçu miralayı Abdullah Bey bendeleri dahi cerhayab [?] olmuş ve piyade redif miralayı Hüseyin Bey bendeleri dahi mecruh bulunmuşdur.

Bu haberin üzerine derakab daha yedi tabur piyade asakir-i şahane ile iki batarya top bit-tertib bu gece zuhuratlar ihracıyla Vidin'e sevk ve tesrib [?] olunmaktadır. Her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir.

[Sealed] Ömer Lütfi

Appendix 34. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 86, dated 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (31 January 1854). From Namık Pasha in London. Demonstrations of the British people in favour of the Ottomans.

Maruz-ı çaker-i keminelidir ki

Tarih-i ariza-i çakeri gününde İngiltere parlamentosunu haşmetli kraliçe hazretleri bizzat küşad ettiğinden resm-i mezkurda bulunmak üzere kulları dahi Saltanat-ı Seniye sefiri Musurus Bey cenablarıyla birlikte azimet olunmuş ve esna-i tarikte ve iki taraflu hanelerin pencelerinde müctemi' ve memlu bulunan zükur ve inasın kaffesi azimet ve avdetle rakib olduğumuz arabaları gördükçe şapkalarını çıkarıp, nisa taifesi ellerindeki mendillerini sallayıp aferin maşallah Türkler muzaffer olunuz Sinop vakasına esef etmeyiniz deyu çağrışarak velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padişahımız efendimize ve devlet-i aliyelerine olan meyl ve muhabbet-i kamilelerini ilan ve izhar eylemişler ve haşmetli kraliçenin ehli Prens Albert cenabları kan-ı mesele-i hazırardan dolayı Rusya ve Avusturya tarafını tutmuş ve bahçede İngiltere sefirine dahi mahremane bazı kağıtlar yazmış olduğu beyn-en-nas mütevatır bulunduğundan prens-i mumaiylehin aleyhine gazeteler birtakım şey yazmakta ve halk dahi söylenmekte bulduklarından saraydan parlamentoya kraliçe ile beraber alay ile gider iken prensin bu ahvalinden adem-i hoşnudiyetlerini ibraz zımnında halktan bazıları şapkalarını çıkarmadıktan maada bazı ıslık çalmak ve daha bazı şeyler söylemeğe ictisar etmiş oldukları istima olunmuştur ve resm-i mezkura Rusya elçisi gelmemiştir ve kraliçenin nutuk-ı resmisi manzur-ı ali-i cenab-ı nezaretpenahileri buyrulmak zımnında ariza-i çakerime tya? takdim kılınmıştır. Ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi 2 Ca 70.

Mehmed Namık 245 [Sealed]

Appendix 35. A. MKT. UM. 150/86, dated 15 January 1854. Memorial [mazhar] of the sancak of Zaho on Yezdanser.

[1] Cizre ve havalisi kazalarda vuku bulan uygunsuzluğun arz ve ifadesine şu vechile ibtidar olunur ki kazaha-i mezbure ahhalilerinin min el kadim mevsuf ve maruf oldukları tavr-ı fesadane ve hareket-ı bağıyane iktizasından olarak daima suret-i [2] tuğyan ve şekavete meyyal ve izhar-ı saire-i fesad ve isyan ile malum ve mefhum ül ahval oldukları derkar ise de bir müddetten berü bağı Bedirhan Bey'in zamanından şimdiye kadar meram-ı bağıyane ve dilheva-i müfsidanelerine adem-i nailiyetleri ancak saye-i [3] kudretvaye-i mülukanede havali-i mezbur mevakilerinin asakir-i fevzmealleri cenab-ı şahane ve top ve mühimmat-ı hüsvaneden hali olmadığından olup beş altı mahdan berü mesele-i hayriyeden dolayı mevaki-i mezbureden asakir ve mühimmat-ı mezbure [4] orduy-ı zafer-buy-i şahaneye celb buyurulduğundan naşi ekrad-ı bednihad önlerini boş gördükleri gibi vakt-i ganimet ve hengam-ı fırsat ittihazıyla hafiyen birbirleri meyanlarında leylen ve neharen ba tezkir şerar-feşan ve süluk-i tarik-i bağı [5] ü tuğyan olduklarından başka Kürdistan eyaleti dahilinde kain kazaha-i saire ve belki Musul ve

beri taraftan Harput eyaletleri kazalarının dahi ahalilerini dahi tahrik ve iğfale mübaderet ederek hem ol vechile mekasıd-ı derunelerine ibtidar ve hareket-ı [6] bağyanelerini izhar edecekleri sırada Zaho sancağı kaimmakamlığına memur ve tayin buyurulan rifatlı Hüsnü Bey bendeleri bu ateş [?] üzerine kaza-i mezbura gelmiş ve eşkıya-i merkumenin bu hallerini irae ve müşahade eylediklerinde şu vaka-i nazikede [7] gaile tahaddüs ettirmemek niyet-i mergubesiyle itfa-i nar-ı fesad için bid-defeat eşkıya-i merkumeye kavlı-ı leyyin ile vesaya-i lazıme-i ifa ve **men uğur-ı meyamin-mevfur-ı tacidaride bezl ü baş ü can ederek eşkıya-i [8] merkumenin cemiyetleri perakende olması için hilat-i fahire-i külliye verilip pend ve nesayih-i mukteziye-i resmiye icra etmiş ise de bir vechile iskan olunamayıp ahir ül emr iki bin beş yüzden mütecaviz ekrad-ı bednihad birbirleriyle ahd ü [9] şart edip kaffe-i memurin ve nefsi-i Cizre ahali-i fukarasını katl ü idam ve emval ü eşyalarını nehb ü garet eyledikten sonra etraf ve eknafı bütün bütün kendilerine ram etmek hülya-i fasidesiyle Cizre'nin [10] üzerine hücum etmişler [?] ve kaimmakam-ı mumaileyh bendeleri iş işten geçtiğini gördüklerinde muhafaza-i mülk-i devlet ve vikaye-i fukara-i raiye zımında Cizre'de bulunan asakir-i muvazzafa-i cüziye-i bil-istishab cenab-ı hakkın ianesine istinaden [11] Şehrizor tarafından gelip muhasarada bir mahalle kapanmış asakir-i muvazzafa sergerdeleri müteberanından Kolçaklı Hacı Mehmed Ağa kullarını asakir-i muvazzafa üzerine kumandar nasb ü tayin ve mukabele-i bil-misile ibtidar ve şeciane hareketle herkese kuvvet ve [12] metanet vererek ve terğib ve teşvik ederek dört saat muharebe-i şedideden sonra bi-inayetullahi teala imdad-ı ruhaniye-i hazret-i peygamberide talih ferhunde metalih-i mülukane iktizasından olmak üzere ekrad-ı bednihadın [13] cemiyetlerini tarümar eylediği derkar ve lilhamd bunun üzerine havali-i mezburda alelgir-i iştial olan ateş-i fesadteskin olduğu misillu emsal ve akranlarına ibret olarak mahall-i saire dahi temkin [?] olmuş ve Hüda nekerde [14] eşkıya-i merkume metalib-i fasidanelerine nail olmuş olsalardı değil bu havali, maazallahu teala beri taraftan Sivas ve öte taraftan Bağdad canibine kadar bu uygunsuzluk nüksederek taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniye mesarifat-ı [15] külliye-i müstelzem ve bu hususun Bedirhan Bey mesele-i müfsidesinden dahi azim ve giderek kat ender kat cesim olacağı nemudar ve emr-i aşikar bir keyfiyet olduğu ve zaman-ı teshirden beri bu havalide bu makule ekradın böyle yekdil [16] ve yekvücut müttefik oldukları ve bu misillu muharebe-i şedide vukuu görülmüş ve işitilmiş mevaddan olmadığı ve kaimmakam-ı mumaileyh bendelerinin bu babda vuku bulan gayret ve şecaat ve tedabir-i hüsn-i hem [?] külliyesi hiçbir şeye mukayyes olmayıp [17] vedia-i cenab-ı kibriya olan fukara ve reayanın can ve ırz ve malları vikayesinde ve mülk-i mülukanenin muhafazası emrinde cansiperane ve şeciane hareket-ı merğubeleri kaffemizin meşhud ve malum-ı acizanelerimiz olmuş [18] olduğunu mübeyyin işbu arz-ı mahzar-ı ubudiyet-eser-i çakeranelerimiz tanzim ve takdimine ictisar olunmuştur. Ol babda ve kaffe-i halde emr ü ferman ve lutf ü ihsan-ı feravan hazret-i men leh ül emr ül ihsanıdır. Fi 15 R 270.

Appendix 36. İ. HR. 332/21357 lef 3, dated 19 February 1854. Lord Palmerston to Namık Pasha in London. Recommending Sir Charles Wood as someone who can give good advise on the loan.

Carlton Gardens, 19 Febr. 1854

Mon cher Pacha,

Je vous envoie une lettre adressée au Chevalier Wood autrefois Ministre de Finance dans le Gouvernement de Lord John Russell. C'est un Homme qui entend parfaitement toutes les affaires de la Bourse, et qui pourra vous donner de bons Conseils par Rapport à votre Emprunt.

Je vous recommande fortement de vous laisser guider d'après ce qu'il pourra vous dire. Et si vous ne pouvez pas obtenir l'argent dont votre Gouvernement à Besoin, aux Conditions fixées par vos Instructions il faut absolument que vous mettiez ces Instructions de Coté, et vous devriez dans ce cas rendre un Service important a votre Pays malgré les ordres de votre Gouvernement. C'était une absurdité que de vouloir fixer à Constantinople le Prix auquel les Capitalistes de Londres et de Paris voudraient prêter leur Argent. Si votre Gouvernement pouvait se dispenser de faire un Emprunt a la Bonheur dans ce cas la ils auraient bien pas vous dire de ne faire l'Emprunt qu'a telles ou telles Conditions mais puisque l'argent leur est indispensable la Saine politique aurait du leur présence de vous dire, apportey [sic] nous l'argent qu'il nous faut aux meilleures Conditions auxquelles vous pouvez l'obtenir.

Mille compliments

Palmerston

Appendix 37. İ. HR. 332/21357 lef 2, dated 25 February 1854. Rothschild from Paris to Reshid Pasha the foreign minister on the loan.

Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye bin sekiz yüz elli dört senesi Şubat'ının yigirmi beşi tarihiyle müverrehan Mösyö Rothschild tarafından takdim kılınan bir kıta arizanın tercümesidir.

Devletlu Namık Paşa hazretlerine havale buyurulmuş olan memuriyetin savb-ı bendeganeme işarıyla beraber elimizden geldiği mertebe müşarünileyh hazretlerine muavenet etmekliğimize dair geçen şehr-i Teşrin-i Evvel'in beşi tarihiyle lutfen tahrir ve irsal [2] buyurulmuş olan bir kıta emirname-i ali-i hazret-i nezaretpenahilerinin ahzıyla kesb-i fahr etmiş idim. Tahrirat-ı mezkure-i hıdivanelerine daha evvelce cevab tahrir edememekliğim bu babda istihsal-i malumat ile hakpay-i ali-i [3] safderanelerine oldukça işe yarar bir cevap vermek isteğimden neşet etmiştir. Bundan akdem fırsatıab olduğu esnada Devlet-i Aliyye ile mesalihce akd-ı münasebat ederek kendüsüne faidelü [4] suretle iş görmeğe arzukeş olduğumuzu arz ettiğimizden maada lafz-ı elçisinin kefaletiyle evvelce oldukça külliyetlu bir peşin itasıyla kendüsünün ikrar-ı alisine olan itimadımızın [5] delil-i sahihini ibraz eyledik zannederim. Ve atıf-ül beyan münasebatın devamını ma-al memnuniye müşahade ile beraber sair devletler için ettiğimiz misillü burada kendüsünün itibarını daimi suretle tesis etmek [6] zımında Devlet-i Aliyye'ye bezl-i muavenet etmek niyetinde olduğumuzun isbatı zımında mevadd-ı meşruhanın beyanı kifayet eder ise de bir maddeyi taahhüd eylediğimizde her şeyden evvel müteahhid olduğumuz ol maddenin tesviyepesir [7] olması kamilen muhtemel olmasını istediğimiz misillü müteşebbis olduğumuz umurda muvaffakiyetimiz her ne mertebe meczumumuz olur ise mücerred kendimizi ol kadar meydana çıkaracağımız derkar olduğundan müşarünileyh Namık Paşa hazretleriyle [8] gerek burada ve gerek Londra'da görüşerek müşarünileyh hazretleri canibinden teklif olunan hudud-ı şurutun el-haleti hazihi derkar olan ahval-i politikiye ve maliyeye gayr-i muvafık olduklarına cezm-i yakin [9] hasıl etmiştir. Burada mücerreden bir itibar tesisi için sermaye sahiblerinin mukaddem kendüsünden akçe istikraz etmiş olan bir devletin yeni bir akçe teklifine birbirlerine rekabete tamah ve rağbet etmeleriyçün [10] şübhesiz bir faide bulmaları lazımedendir. Alel husus mübalağalı olan akçe ihtiyacatıyla korkulur ki bizim dolgun bahalarımızı her tarafta pek aşağı bahalara tenzil ettirmekte buldukları [11] işbu esnada bile müşarünileyh Namık Paşa hazretleri müesses olan şurutunun itmar için gayr-i kafi oldukları ve hatta kendüsüyle ber vech-i matlub muhabere ve münasebetimiz derkar olması mülasebesiyle [12] bu babda olan efkarlarımızı devletlu Veli Paşa hazretlerine bildirmekle kesb-i fahr etmiş idik. İşte Devlet-i Aliyye'nin menafii ve bu babda tehirat-ı muzırradan vikayesiçün sefirlerinin

bahaca [13] daha ziyade vüsatlüce terhis buyurulmalarından maada be tekrar Dersaadet'e istizana mecbur olmaksızın katiyen karar vermeleri için bu babda muktezi olan ruhsat-ı kamileleri olması lazımeden idüğünü zan ve kıyas ederiz. Çünkü ol halde süfera-i mumaileyha istikrazın tesviyesiy için müsaid fırsattan istifade etmek ve karz-ı mezkurenin zuhurunda yeni baştan tacil [?] ve tehir ile [15] elden çıkarılmamak için eyü bir mevkide bulunacakları aşıkardır. Kaldı ki işbu maddenin tesviyesine muvafık olunacak ahvale vasıl olduğunu müşahade etmeğe ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin memnun [16] olacağı bir karara vasıl olmasına arzukeş olduğumun beyanı zaten derkar [olan] ihtiram ve ubudiyetimin arz ve ibrazına vesile-i cemile ittihaz kılınmıştır.

Appendix 38. HR. SYS. 1347/18 lef 1, dated 2 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (2 March 1854). From the Armenian patriarch and Armenian *millet meclisi*. On the atrocities of the başıbozüks.

Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki

Anadolu tarafında kain ordu-yu hümayuna gitmek emeliyle gönüllü yazılarak berren müteazim olan başıbozuk askeri takımı esna-i rahda mürur [2] ve ubur eyledikleri mahallerde ve hususiyle Harput ve Sivas eyaletleri dahilinde vaki Eğin ve Arapkir ve Kuruçay ve Çemişkezek ve Divriği kazalarından [3] geçtiklerinde başbuğları bulunanları karye be karye gezerek reaya-i mevcudeden beşer ve onar bin kuruş ve maiyetlerinde bulunan gönüllü takımı neferatı [4] dahi kırkar ve ellışer kuruş ve bargirler talep ve cebren ahz ü tahsile mütecasir olup ve vermeye iktidarı olmayanları şediden darb ve hanelere [5] nüzul ile envai erzak ve makulat talep ve ırzlarına tasallut etmek misillu gunagun zulm u teaddiyata cüret eyledikleri ve bazı mahallerde dahi geçen [6] Paskalya günleri on beş güne değin kilisaları sedd ve bend ile reaya kullarını icra-i ayinden men' eyledikleri cihetle reaya kullarının asayiş [7] ve emniyet-i haliyeleri külliyyen münselib olarak bir guna takat ve tahammülleri kalmadığı beyanıyla teaddiyat-ı merkumenin külliyyen men'i esbabının istihsali ve haklarında [8] sahabet-i aliye ve himayet-i seniyyenin ibzali hususu bu kere mahall-i merkumeden iş'ar ve istirahat olunmuş ve bu keyfiyet-i mültezim ali olan ma'delet-i mültezime-i [9] asriye ve hakkaniyet-i seniyyenin bil-vucuh hilafı ve reaya-yı merkumenin dahi iş'ar-ı mağduriyet ve perişani hallerini müeddi olarak her vechile [10] şayan-ı merhamet ve sahabet ve himayet-i seniyye buldukları emr-i vazıh ve bu halde mugayir-i rıza-i ali keyfiyetin hiçbir tarafda vukuu caiz görülmeyeceği [11] derkâr olmağla teaddiyat-ı meşruhanın külliyyen menniyle reaya-i mevcude kullarının kemakan himaye ve sıyanesi emrinde itina ve dikkat olunması irade-i [12] aliyyesini şamil Anadolu tarafında bulunan vülat-ı izam ve mutasarrıfın-i kiram hazeratı bendelerine hitaben evamirname-i [sic] samiye-i hazret-i sadaretpenahinin tasdirine [13] müsaade-i merahim-ade-i aliyyeleri erzan ve şayan buyurulması babında ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehül emrindir. Fi 2 C 70. [Sealed by the Patriarch and the Armenian *meclis*]

Appendix 39. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 125, dated 12 March 1854. British consul at Varna Lt. Col. Edward Neale to Lord Stratford. Outrages and disorders committed by bashi bozüks in the vicinity of Rassova

Varna, March 12th - 1854

My Lord,

I have this moment been informed that great disorders and atrocities have been recently perpetrated by the Turkish irregular troops in the vicinity of Rassova on the Danube.

A party of Mokans [Transylvanian shepherds] driven by the concentration of Russian troops in Wallachia, sought refuge with their flocks on an island situated opposite Rassoava. The Turkish irregular troops appear to have gone over to the island and although the Mokans stated that they were Austrian subjects and occupied the island for no hostile purpose and urged in proof of this statement that they were unarmed thirty of their number were decapitated on the spot and six or seven thousand sheep were carried off by the Bashi Bozuks. One of the Mokans who escaped has arrived in Varna, and the depositions he has made upon this event form the subject of a report which the Austrian Vice-Consul here has addressed by this occasion to the Internuncio.

I also regret to report to Your Lordship that similar and still greater atrocities have been committed by the Bashi Bozuks upon the inhabitants of the village of Keserler 5 hours distant from Rassoava. The women were dishonored and many of the men and children killed. Such of the inhabitants as escaped, have fled to the woods.

I have etc.

[Signed] Edward St John Neale

Appendix 40. HR. TO. 52/50, dated 23 March 1854. The despatch of Musurus to Reshid Pasha, translated from the French. On the loan and advance money of 10 million francs.

Londra sefiri Kostaki Bey [Musurus] tarafından Reşid Paşa'ya takdim olunan arızanın tercümesi. İstikraz. 10 milyon frank avans.

Taht-ı müzakerede bulunan istikraz akçesinden tediye olunmak üzere İngiltere ve Fransa devletlerinden on milyon frank istizan olunması zımında canib-i [2] Bab-ı Ali'den devleteyn-i müşarünileyhima sefirleri nezdinde vuku bulan teşebbüsâtave bu husus hakkında Lord Clarendon nezdinde taraf-ı acizanemden [3] dahi teşebbüsât-ı lazıme icra kılınması emrine dair cemaziye-ı ahirin ikisi [2 Mart 1854] tarihiyle müverrahan huruf-ı mahsusa ile tahrir buyurulan emirname-i ali-i nezaretpenahilerini [4] ahz ile kesb-i mübahat etmiştir. Emirname-i mezkurun vürudunu müteakıben Lord Clarendon ile mülakat olunup Lord-ı mumaileyhe madde-i [5] muharrereye dair vuku bulan tebliğât ve tahrihat ve itirazat-ı abidanem üzerine Devlet-i Aliyye'nin işbu iltiması Lord Stratford tarafından dahi [6] kendisine tahrir olunduğunu ifade ile İngiltere devletinin bu hususa vuku'-ı muvafakiyetinin davet edeceği müşkilatı tasrihden sarf-ı nazar ederek fakat [7] parlamentoda evvel be evvel müzakere olunacak madde Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin ahval-i hazırada muhtaç olduğu akçeyi istikraz vasıtasıyla tedarik ve istihsale muvafık [8] olup olmayacağı hususunun bilinmesi olduğunu ve Mösyö Rothschild işbu istikrazı yüzde beş faiz ile yüzde yetmiş mübayaa etmeğe arz ettiğinden [9] ve işbu teklif dahi gerek kendisinin ve gerek sair İngiltere ministrolarının rey ve efkarına göre şu aralık Devlet-i Aliye hakkında faidelü ve kabule [10] şayan bulunduğu halde taraf-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyye'den karin-i kabul-i rağbet buyurulduğundan İngiltere kabinetosu işbu ahvali parlamento mecalisine bildirmeğe mecbur olacağını [11] ve bu ise Devlet-i Aliyye'nin balada muharrer iltimasının redd olunmasını davet edeceğini beyan ve tasrihe hasr-ı itiraz edip Lord-ı mumaileyh istikraza [12] muvafık olunamadığı takdirde İngiltere kabinetosu Devlet-i Aliyye'nin iltiması üzerine sarf-ı efkar ederek ne yapılmak lazım geldiğine karar vereceğini tebliğ [13] ile beraber Mösyö Rothschild'in vuku bulan teklifinin kabul buyurulmasını taraf-ı acizaneme nihayet-ül gaye ibram ile hatm-i kelim eyledikde Mösyö Rothschild'in arzettiği [14] yüzde yetmiş fiyatı pek dun olduğu cihetle devletlu Namık Paşa hazretlerine ita buyurulan talimatın hududu haricindedir lakin Londra'nın pek zengin [15] ve muteber sermaye sahiblerinden Mösyö Goldsmid ve Mösyö Palmer ile Mösyö Rothschild'in teklif ettiği şeraitten daha

faidelü şerait ile istikrazın tesviyesi üzerine katiyen bir şeye karar vermek üzere olduğumuzu ve bu sırada vukua gelen ikdamatımızın neticesini kariben kendilerine ifadeye kesb-i iktidar [17] eylemeğe memul etmekte olduğum cihetle emirname-i ali-i hıdıvilerinde musarrah madde üzerine bundan böyle yine söz açacağımı tebliğ ile cevap verilmiştir. [18] Bunun üzerine Lord Clarendon zaten bildiği Mösyö Goldsmid ve Mösyö Palmer haklarında hüsn-i şahadet etmekle beraber istikrazın serian ve katiyen [19] tesviyesi hakkında ibramat-ı vakıasını teyid ve tekid etmiştir. Zaten istikraz maddesine gelince Mösyö Rothschild Avrupa'nın kaffe-i ashab-ı sermayesinden [20] ziyade bu misillü mevaddın hüsn-i neticesini temine muktedir olduğu cihetle madde-i mezkurenin mumaileyhe ihalesi hususunu ta ibtidasından berü tercih etmiş isek de [21] Rothschild sair ashab-ı sermaye nezdinde ikdamatımızın neticesiz kalacağını memul ettiğinden devletlu Namık Paşa hazretleriyle vuku bulan mülakatlarında [22] bazen izhar-ı tereddüd ettiği ve bazen dahi kabul olunamayacak metalibi meydana koyduğu cihetle pek çok vakit zay' etmemize sebep olmuş [23] olduğundan muahharen Mösyö Goldsmid ve Mösyö Parker ile bu maddeyi cidden ve hakikaten müzakere etmeği iltizam ettiğim hasebiyle yüzde altı faiz ve yüzde [24] seksen beş fiyat ve istikrazın kaffe-i mesarifine mukabil sermaye-i hakikiye üzerine yüzde iki komisyon ile şehir-i Nisan'ın ibtidasından itibaren [25] dört beş ayda akçe tahsil olunmak ve on beş senede tediye ve iade kılınmak teklifini mumaileyhimadan istihsale muvafık olduğumda paşa-i müşarünileyh [26] hazretleri dahi şerait-i muharrereden daha faidelü bir suret-i tesviyenin icrası mümkün olmadığına mülzem olmuş olduğundan teklif-i mezkuru kabul edip konturatoya [27] vaz'-ı imza etmek üzere olduğu halde Mösyö Rothschild konturatonun imzasından bir gün evvel müşarünileyh hazretlerine çakerleri dahi hazır olduğum halde [28] gelip teklifat-ı sabıkasını tekide başlamış ise de kendi hakkında beheme-hal tecviz-i rüchaniyet edeceğimizi temin ile beraber imza atmamak üzere bulunduğumuz [29] konturato maddesini kendisine ifade ettiğimizde ferdası sabaha kadar mütalaa etmek üzere kendisine vakit vermemizi niyaz ve iltimas etmiş idi. [30] Vakıa ferdası günü Paris'de bulunan ammisıyla telgraf vasıtasıyla muhabere ettikten ve bazı teklifat-ı cedide ile kendi hakkında faidelü [31] olacak şeraitin istihsalinden kat'-ı ümid eyledikten sonra Mösyö Goldsmid ve Mösyö Palmer ile akd olunacak konturatonun imza olunmasına [32] tayin olunan müddet heman hulul edeceğini görünce mumaileyhimanın arz ettiği kaffe-i şeraite ve bizim ısrarımızın üzerine istikrazın bir şilini [33] komisyonun bir şiliniyle mumaileyhimanın vuku bulan ruhsat ve gayretlerine mukabil kendilerine terk etmeğe muvafakat etmiş ve Mösyö Goldsmid ile Mösyö Palmer dahi [34] bu babda pek çok şikayat ve itirazatından sonra işbu teklif-i ahiri kabul ile artık bir diyecekleri kalmadığını beyan etmişlerdir. Binaberin istikrazın [35] kararı bugün ilan olunacaktır. Bunun bir şilini mumaileyhimanın muvafakatiyle temin olunmuş olduğu ve Mösyö Rothschild pek çok itibarı [36] bulunduğu cihetle istikrazın hüsn-i neticesi kamilen ve serian hasıl olacağı muhakkak olup madde-i mezkureye şimdiden bitmiş nazarıyla bakılarak sermaye-i [37] müstakrizenin küllisi dört mah zarfında Londra'da tarafımıza tediye olunacaktır. İşbu istikraz 1852 sene-i Miladiyesinde [38] Paris'de karargir olan istikrazın şeraitiyle tesviye olunmuş ise de mukaddemki yigirmi üç seneye olup şimdiki ise dilhah-ı âliye [39] muvafık olarak on beş senedir. İstikraz-ı ahir vakıa emel ettiğimiz derecede faidelü olmayıp bir kaç mah mukaddem olsa daha menfaatlu [40] suretle tesviye olunabilür idiye de el haleti hazihi Devlet-i Aliyye ile Rusya devleti meyanında zuhur eden muharebeye Fransa ve İngiltere devletlerinin [41] iştiraki olduğu ve kaffe-i istikrazın fiyatı külliyetlüce tenzil ettiği halde bizim istikrazımız cümlenin efkarına göre menafi-i mümkinneyi şamil [42] olduğundan tebrike şayan mevaddan bulunmuştur. Bu maddenin kaffe-i tafsilatı devletlu Namık Paşa hazretlerinin tahriratında musarrah olup [43] paşa-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinin vaki olan müzakerat-ı meridede menafi-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin vikayesi zımında mevadd-ı sairede müşahade olunmuş olan gayretini [44] bezl etmiştir.

Müşarünileyh hazretleri hakpay-i hazret-i hıdivilerine takdim ettiği arizalar da işbu maddenin vusul-i hüsn-i neticesine ale-t-tevali sarf eylediğim ikdamat hakkında hüsn-i şahadet buyurmuş olduğunu ümid ve memul ettiğim ifadesi zat-ı hazret-i nezaret-penahilerine [46] derkar olan ubudiyet-i kamile ve kadimemin tecdid-i teminatına hüsn-i zeria ittihaz olunmuştur.

Appendix 41. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 142. General Burgoyne to Stratford Redcliffe. Extrait d'une lettre du Général Burgoyne à Lord Stratford en date du 23 Mars 1854.

Je prends la liberté de dire à Votre Excellence que pendant ma tournée de Schumla à Varna, plusieurs plaintes m'ont été adressées par les habitants des Villages, sur les outrages commis sur eux et leurs femmes et leurs filles, par les Bashi-Bozuk, qui ont traversé le pays, et m'ont instamment prié que je passe des représentations à cet effet aux autorités à Constantinople, dans le but qu'on porte un remède à cet état de choses.

Les habitants tout vois leur empressement de fournir à ces gens là, des logements, des provisions et du fourrage, et se soumettraient même avec patience de faire des dépenses pour eux ; mais ils demandent seulement une protection personnelle pour eux-mêmes leurs familles. Une vieillard qui est venue me voir, était dans une telle agitation, qu'il était clair qu'il venait d'être victime des attaques des Bashi Bozuk. Il n'y a pas le moindre doute que le même mal existe partout dans l'arrière de l'armée, ainsi que sur la route que j'ai traversé.

Il me paraît que le remède à appliquer serait d'avoir de petits détachements de troupes régulières, de Cavalerie, ou des Gendarmes à Cheval, sur lesquels on puisse compter, dispersés dans les différents districts et qu'on rendrait responsable pour empêcher ces actes de violence. Ils doivent faire la ronde dans les villages, obtenir les informations nécessaires, et pour sciere ? tous les coupables, et avoir l'autorité de les punir d'une manière sommaire.

Une cause piste souffre gravement d'un mal flagrant.

Il y a de grands doutes à quel point ces irréguliers pouvaient être adites à armée et s'il ne voudrict ? pas mieux de les décourager d'avancer en avenue manière, s'il est possible.

Appendix 42. İ. HR. 107/5272 lef 3, dated 24 March 1854. Telegraph of Namık Pasha from London to Istanbul via Belgrad.

Londres vendredi.

Izzet Pacha Belgrade. par Semlin.

L'emprunt Ottoman est conclu avec la maison Rothschild au prix de quatre vingt cinq et six pour cent d'interet. Le premier versement se fera le trois Avril et le dernier premier Août. Le Gouverneur de Belgrade est prit transmettre par expresse cette nouvelle a la Sublime Porte en accusant même temps a Londres la réception de cette Dépêche.

Namik Pacha

Appendix 43. HR. TO. 52/60, 3 April 1854. Translation [from French into Turkish] of the dispatch of Musurus to Reshid Pasha. On the declaration of war by Britain and the loan.

Londra sefiri Kostaki Bey [Musurus] tarafından Reşid Paşa'ya takdim olunan arizanın terciümesi. İngiltere'nin ilan-ı harb etmesi. İstikraz.

Rusya aleyhine ilan-ı muharebeye dair kraliçenin nutuk-ı resmisine cevaben tazim olunan mahzar şehri-i Martin otuzbirinde parlamentonun iki meclisinde dahi ittihad-ı ârâ [2] ile kabul ve tasdik olunduğu cihetle bugün mezkur iki meclisin kaffe-i azası saraya gidip takdim edeceklerdir. İşbu hal mahzar-ı mezkurun [3] fevkalade kesb ettiği ehemmiyeti müsbet olmağla şehri-i mezkurun otuzbirinde parlamentoda vuku bulan müzakeratın zabtını havi bazı evrakı leffen [4] takdim ile kesb-i mübahat kılınmıştır. Parlamentonun muhalifin takımı yevm-i mezkurda harbin ilanını tamamıyla kabul ve tahsin eylemiş iseler de muhaberat [5] ve mükalematın ibtidasında kabinetonun muamele-i mütereddidesine bazı mertebe itiraz etmişlerdir. Rusyalunun Tuna'dan mürur ile Dobruca kazasına [6] duhulü üzerine burada dürlü dürlü tevilat cereyan edip ez cümle saltanat-ı seniye hayırhahları ve gerek funun-ı askeriyeye vakıf olan zevat [7] işbu hareketin Rusya ordusu hakkında netayic-i vahimeyi davet edeceğini istidlal eylemektedir. Viyana kabinetosu malum olduğu üzere Avusturya devletinin [8] beka-i usul-i bitarafiyesi Rusyaluların Tuna'yı geçmekten ictinab eylemelerine muhtaç ve mütevakıf olduğunu beyan eylediğinden zikr olunan kabinetonun bu vukuat [9] üzerine kesb edeceği heyet cümlelerin matah-ı nazar-ı itinası olmuştur. Bazı karain-i haliyeye nazaran Viyana ve Berlin kabinetoları ahval-i hazırada [10] Almanya hükumat-ı müttefikası meclisiyle müttehiden ihtiyar edecekleri meslek-i politikaya karar vermek üzere şimdiki halde birbirleriyle icray-ı muhabere ve mükaleme eylemek [11] ve meslek-i matluba karar verildiği gibi kendi menafi-i müşterekelerine aid olan avarız-ı melhuzanın vukuu halinde başka başka nasıl ve ne vechile hareket edeceklerini [12] tayin etmek için düvel-i erbaa taraflarından Viyana'da bir mazbata tanzimi lakırdısı deveran etmekte ise de bu babda malumat-ı sahiha henüz kesb-i itla [13] olunamamıştır. İstikrazımızın emr-i icrasına müşkilat-ı adide arız olduğundan istikraz-ı mezkurun temami-i icrasıyla hitamında iade etmek üzere [14] Fransa devleti gibi tarafımıza itası mültemis olan on milyon frank maddesine muvafakat olunmasının eşedd-i lüzum ve ehemmiyeti üzerine Lord Clarendon [15] nezdinde ısrar eylemekliğim lazım gelmekle Lord-ı mumaileyh işbu maddeyi ministrolar meclisine arz ile beraber tervic edeceğini vadetmiş ise de ne çare ki [16] meclis-i mezkurun kararı memul-i acizaneme tevafuk etmeyip şöyle ki Lord Clarendon İngiltere konstitüsyonu iktizasınca parlamentonun rızası [17] istihsal olunmadıkça hiçbir iane-i nakdiye icra olunamayacağı cihetle madde-i mültemis parlamentoya arz ve beyan olursa kabinetonun muhalifin takımı [18] bunu tasib edeceğinden madde-i mezkureye red ile cevap verilmesi ve istikrazın Mösyö Rothschild ile mukavele olunandan dunca bir baha [19] ile icrasına gayret olunması üzerine vükelanın müttehid ül rey olduğunu serd ve ityan ve Mösyö Rothschild dahi İngiltere ministrolarının [20] bizim istikraza hiç bir guna kefalet etmek veyahud istenilen on milyon frankı vermek istemediğini ve Devlet-i Aliye'ye iane etmekliğim çare [21] ve tedbiri istikrazın halk tarafından kabul olunabilecek şerait ile icrası olduğunu ifade ve beyan eylemiştir. Bizim istikraza [22] kefalet olunması sözü hiçbir vechile ima bile etmediğim halde İngiltere kabinetosunun bu kefaletten istinkaf etmesi rey-i acizaneme göre mucib-i esef olacak mevaddan olmayıp bilakis Saltanat-ı Seniye [23] Avrupa'da icray-i istikraz etmek için düvel-i ecnebiyenin kefaletine maazallah müracaat etmeğe mecbur olsa keyfiyet-i mezkure cay-i teessüf olur idi. [24] Çünkü o halde Devlet-i Aliye'nin itibarı Yunan hükümeti gibi devletler derecesine tenzil etmesi ve bir kefalet-i ecnebiye olmadıkça istikrazat-ı Osmaniyenin icrası [25] bundan böyle kesb-i suubet etmesi ve belki bütün bütün muhal olması velhasıl malum-ı dakik-i mlr?-fehm-i hidivileri buyurulduğu üzere Devlet-i Aliye'ce [26] bir takım mehazir-i külliyyenin vücuda şita ile kesb-i vücud eylemesi lazım gelür. İki üç mah mukaddem istikrazımızı muahharen Mösyö Rothschild ile tayin olunan [27] şeraitten faidelü şurut ile bila kefalet-i ecnebiye icra edebileceğimize mülazemet-i acizanem hasıl olmuş ve vakıa şimdiki halde bu surete muvafık [28] olunamamış ise de müsait bir vesile zuhurunda yine bila kefalet-i ecnebiye Mösyö Rothschild ile karargir olan şerait

veyahud daha biraz faidelü suretle [29] istikraz maddesini icra edebileceğimizi memul etmekte olduğumdan istikrazımızın halk tarafından kabul olunamayacak şerait ile arz ve teklif olunması [30] adem-i icrasına sebep irae olunarak bunun icrasını istihsal etmek için bahasının tenzili hususunun lazım geldiğine dair İngiltere kabinetosunun vaki olan [31] ifadesini cerh etmek üzere eğer bizim istikrazımızın şeraiti makbul ve muteber olmamış olsa ilanı gününde bir milyon üçyüz bin lira isterlin kadar müşteri zuhur etmez [32] ve bahası dahi yüzde iki fazla bulmaz idi ve bundan başka Mösyö Rothschild'in bu misillü mesalihe vukuf-ı kamili olduğu cihetle mumaileyh bizim istikrazımızı kendi [33] üzerine almaz idi. Lakin halkın işbu temayülat-ı hayriyesinin bir gün sonra tağyir etmesi Rusya imparatoru tarafından zuhur eden cevab-ı reddin ilan-ı harbin [34] vukuunu müstelzem olmasına mebni olduğundan eğer bu cevab-ı red haberi beş gün sonra vürud etse veyahud Mösyö Rothschild ile mukavelemiz beş gün [35] evvel vuku bulmuş olsa istikrazımızın icra olunmuş olacağı ve şeraiti halkça düvel-i saire istikrazatından ziyade faidelü olan işbu istikrazımızın [36] adem-i icrasının asıl sebebi kaffe-i istikrazat-ı düveliye tahvilatının ilan-ı harb vukuundan dolayı pek çok tenzil etmiş idüğü aşikardır. Fi-l-hakika İngiltere'de efradın sermaye-i mevcudesi ale-t-tevali tahvilat-ı istikraziye üzerinde olduğu cihetle İngiltere halkının bundan gayrı boştaki akçesi hiçbir vakitte [38] kalmadığından bizim istikrazımız daha faidelüdür deyü tahvilatımızı mübayaa etmeğe talib olanlar mutasarrıf olduğu evrak-ı saire-i istikraziyeyi biz-zarur [39] elden çıkarmağa mecbur olup lakin evrak-ı mezkurenin rayici şimdiki halde pek tenzil edildiğinden istikraz-ı Osmaniye'nin teminat-ı melhuzasıyla [40] kapanamıyacak bir zarar-ı külli ihtiyar etmedikçe evrak-ı mezkureyi bey' ve furuht edemeyecekleri derkardır. İşte bu keyfiyet ashab-ı sermayeyi tebrid [41] etmeğe sebep-i müstakil olduğundan el haleti hazihi istikrazın şerait-i vakıası halka daha ziyade faidelü surete idhal olursa bile keyfiyet-i muharrere baki oldukça [42] Mösyö Rothschild'in ifade-i musaddıkasına göre yine istikrazın icrası mümkün olamayacağı bi-iştibahdır. Şimdiki halde istikraz-ı Osmani her ne kadar [43] icra olunamamış ise de mevaki-i muharebe ve Kara Deniz veyahud bahr-i Baltık'tan ümid ve temenni ettiğim vechile havadis-i hayriye zuhur ettiği veyahud Avusturya devletinin düvel-i garbiye lehinde daha bir kararlı heyet kesb ettiğine teminat geldiği anda ashab-ı sermayeye dahi cesaret gelerek tahvilat-ı [45] istikraziyenin ve hususiyle İngiltere devleti tahvilatının rayici tekessür edeceği cihetle bunlar ehvence zarar ile elden çıkarılabildikçe bizim [46] tahvilatımızın tervici kesb-i suhulet edeceğinden istikraz-ı Osmaniye'nin icrası ol halde bila kefalet-i ecnebiye Mösyö Rothschild ile mukavele [47] olunan şerait veyahud daha biraz fark ile mümkün olacağı derkar olup lakin devletlu Namık Paşa bendeleri bu akşam Paris'e azimet edeceğinden şu adem-i muvafakiyetimiz [48] üzerine üç dört hafta daha Londra'da meks ü ikamet etmeği tansib buyurduğundan dolayı beyan-ı esef ederim. Her nasıl ise Mösyö Rothschild'in [49] vaadine nazaran istikrazatın şeraiti halkça faidelü olacak surette tağyir olursa dahi imkan-ı icrası temin olunamayacağına binaen talimat-ı seniye-i [50] nezaretpenahilerine bila muttasıl on milyon frankı koparmak üzere Lord Clarendon nezdinde ısrara devam edeceğim ifadesi hakpay-i [51] ali-i hıdivilerine derkar olan ubudiyet-i kamile ve kadimemin ibraz-ı teminat-ı mükerreresine vesile-i hüsn ittihaz olunmuştur.

Appendix 44. İ. HR. 108/5309, dated 5 Receb 1270 (4 April 1854). From Namık Pasha in London to Reshid Pasha on the loan.

Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki

Rothschild marifetiyle açılan istikraz-ı nakit Londra'da bir milyon yüz bin liraya kadar talipleri tarafından yazılıp Paris'de ne miktar mebaliğe yazılmış oldukları bilinmemiş ve görünüşe göre istikrazın husulüne sekte gelmiş idüğünden İngiltere ve Fransa devlet-

leri tarafından muavenet eylemeleri lazım geleceği geçen posta ile takdim-i hakpay-i ali-i nezaretpenahileri kılınan ariza-i çakeride arz ve beyan olunmuş idi. Paris'deki Rothschild'in oğlu mahsusen Londra'ya gelip ifadesine göre Paris'de kimse yazılmamış olduğu haber alınmış ve Londra'da yazılan ademlerin ekserisi dahi akçeyi tedarik edip veremiyen takımdan olup şu halde İngiltere ve Fransa devletlerinin kefaleti olmadıkça istikrazın husulü muhal görünmüş olduğunu mumaileyh Rothschild İngiltere devleti hariciye nazırı Lord Clarendon ile Fransa elçisine ifade eyleyip keyfiyeti savb-ı çakeraneme dahi haber vermiş ve bu babda henüz bir guna sened dahi imza olunmamış ve kefalet talebine memuriyetim olmadığından ve mahzuru dahi aşikar idüğünden muavenetlerini talep eylemek ve hususuyla matlub buyurulan on milyon frankın isbaline ikdam eylemeleri iltimas olunmak üzere Kostaki Musuruz [sic] Bey bende-leriyle birlikte nazır-ı müşarünileyhe gidilip istikraza ne suretle sekte geldiği ve Devlet-i Aliye'ye şu esnada muharebede akçenin şiddet-i lüzumu derkar olup istikrazın husulüne muavenetleriyle beraber matlub buyurulan meblağ-ı mezburun irsaline himmet eylemeleri ehemmi idüğü bil-etraf beyan olundukta bazı mertebe müşkilat beyan eyledikten sonra “Şimdi meclis-i meşverete gideceğim ve keyfiyeti dahi arz edeceğim bu akşam bize meduvv olduğunuz cihetle teşrif edersiniz ne suretle karar verilür ise size haber veririm” demiş ve ol akşam nazır-ı müşarünileyhin hanesine gidildikte “Siz istikrazı bunca vakit süründürüp yapmadınız ve şimdi dahi pek bahalu yaptığınızdan kimesne rağbet edip almadı. Şimdi biz muharip olduğumuz ecilden bunca mesarif-i la-yuhsaya duçar olup halkın vergisini arttırdık ve siz akçeyi bunca nabeca mahallere sarf-ı itlaf edeyorsunuz şimdi biz halktan virgü alıp da size para vermek veyahud kefalet etmek gibi şeyleri parlamentoya arz edecek olsak bir vechile kabul etmezler ve diyecekleri kelimelere cevap bulup söylemekten aciz kalırız bunu yapmak bize muhaldir ne bir akçe vere-bilirüz ve ne de kefalet ederiz nasıl bilür iseniz öylece ediniz” deyü katice ve kavice menhurane cevap verdikte şu istikraza konulan fiyat halka pek ucuz ve Devlet-i Aliyye'ye pek bahalu ve herkes dahi pek talip ise de sair istikrazları bahaları ziyadesiyle tenzil etmiş ve herkes yedinde bulunan istikrazı satıp akçe tedarikiyle bunu almak lazım gelmiş ve bu da ahval-i haliyeden iktiza eylemiş bir keyfiyet idüğünden esna-i muharebede Devlet-i Aliye'ye akçenin şiddet-i lüzumu ve müttefiklerinin bu babda dahi muavenetleri ehemmi idüğünü tekrar bahs olunarak bu vechile cevapları nareva idüğü bil-etraf beyan olunmuş ise de asla tesiri görülemedikte çakerleri bu halde burada ikametim bihude idüğü ve bir ayak evvel Paris'e avdet ile bir çare aramak ve orada da bir şey yapılamadığı halde Dersaadet'e ricatle keyfiyeti beyan eylemem lazım geleceği ifade olundukta bizden bu babda bir şey memul etmeyiniz ve bir ayak evvel Dersaadet'e gidip keyfiyeti beyan ediniz deyü cevap vermiş ve Lord Palmerston dahi sonradan oraya gelip anınla dahi söyleşdikte anın dahi ifadesi diğerine mutabık bulunmuş ve ertesi gün de Musuruz Bey cenablarıyla Palmerston'un hanesine gidilip istikrazın husulüne ve matlub buyurulan mebalığın ita olunması ehemmiyetine dair iki saat kadar bahs olunmuş ise de siz devletinizin varidatını yolsuz cem edip nice yolsuz ve lüzumsuz şeylere sarf ile itlaf ettiğinizi İngiltere halkının kaffesi bilür iken anlardan cem ve tahsil olunan maldan tavizen size akçe vermek veyahud kefalet etmek bize göre muhaldir ve yelli denizi içmek [geçmek?] daha kolaydır. Eğer size akçe lazım ise halk akçelerini elli ve altmış yüze ve yüzde yedi sekiz faizi isterler nasıl ırza edebilür iseniz ol vechile istikraz edin deyü kesdirme cevab vermiş ve bu babda pek çok şeyler taraf-ı çakeriden ve Musuruz Bey tarafından söylenmiş ise de yine bildiğinden şaşmamış ve bankir Rothschild'in savb-ı çakeriye yazmış olduğu mektubun leffen takdim-i hakpay-i ali-i nezaretpenahileri kılınan sureti mütalaasından malum buyurulacağı vechile şu aralık her ne fiyata olur ise olsun istikrazın husulü muhal görünmüş ve vakt-i müsaidin hululü na-malum olup mutarassıdan bihude burada ikamet etmek ve birtakım maaş ve mahiye alarak mesarife bais olmaktan ise Paris'e avdet eylemek ve orada bir şey yapmak mümkün ise icra-i iktizasına bakmak ve olmadığı halde doğruca Dersaadet'e azimet eylemek üzere tarih-i

ariza-i çakeranem günü Londra'dan hareket olunmuş ve şu aralık böyle altından kalkılmaz mertebe nemalı ve fiyatlı bir istikraz etmekten ise kavaim-i nakdiyeyi çoğaltıp dahil-i memalik-i mahruse-i şahanede cereyanına ruhsat ita buyurulmak ve vakit müsaid olduğu vakitte ehven fiyat ile Avrupa'dan külliyetlü istikraz alınıp ol vakit kavaim-i mezbureyi toplatmaktan başka çare maa-el huzur hatıra gelmemiş idüğü muhat-ilm-i ali-i nezaretpenahileri buyuruldukta ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh ül emrindir. Fi 5 Receb 70.

[Sealed] Mehmed Namık

Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki

Rothschild'in mektubu sureti leffen takdim olunduğu metn-i ariza-i çakeride tahrir bulunmuş ise de sureti çıkarılması yetiştirilememiş olduğundan hafta-i atide takdim kılınacağı muhat-ilm-i ali-i nezaretpenahileri buyuruldukta ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir.

Appendix 45. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 44, dated 22 April 1854. Extract from a British consular report from Monastir on banditry.

İngiltere sefaretine 1854 senesi Nisan'ının yigirmi ikisi tarihiyle müverrehan Manastır tarafından tevarüd eden tahriratdan müstehrec bir bendin suret-i tercümesidir.

Beş Kuyular nam mevki-i mersumun hala eşkıya tasarrufunda olduğu Yanya canibinden ahz olunan havadis-i ahireden istibraz [?] olunmuştur. Abdi Paşa mevki-i mezkur üzerine hücum etmek üzere bulunup zabt ü istilasına muvafık olur ise fesad u ihtilal o semtlerden bütün bütün bertaraf olunmuş olacaktır. Lakin Yenişehir sancağında ahval-i cariyeye pek de memnun olacak vechile ilerülemekte olmayıp Selanik'den muahharen gelen posta ile alınan havadise nazaran üç bin kadar Rum Kasandra ile Aynaroz meyanında vaki Sakya nam mahalle çıkmışlardır. Mahall-i mezkur civarında pek çok ahali-i Hıristiyan bulunduğu cihetle bazı rivayete göre bunlar isyan etmekten istinkaf etmişler ise de nihayet-i emrde tuğyan etmeğe mecbur olacakları havf olunmaktadır. İşbu eşkıyanın takarrüb etmekte olması Selanik şehrinin İslam ahalisinin zihnini muhatarayı davet eyleyecek surette tahrik eylemiştir. İşbu tahrikat birtakım kura [?] ve meclis azasından bazıları tarafından tervic ve teşvik olunmaktadır. Selanik valisi ise asayiş-i hali hıfz u sıyanet eylemek zımnında tahsin olunacak cihetle bezl-i ikdam ve gayret etmektedir.

Appendix 46. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 215-216. Redcliffe's instructions to Stephen Pisani. Pera, May 14th: 1854.

Sir,

You have already by my direction apprized the Ottoman ministers, verbally, of the afflicting intelligence received from Salonica. Although the letter which I instructed you to shew them, contained the leading circumstances of a massacre, as wanton as it was barbarous, yet, as it came from a private source, I confined myself for the moment to a general expression of my sentiments both as to the fact and as to the redress to be expected. I am now in possession of the official report from H. M. Acting Consul at Salonica, and you will lose no time in placing it under the eyes of Reshid Pasha with a request that it may be submitted forthwith to the Council, and also to His Majesty the Sultan. His Highness will find in Mr. Razy's dispatch an ample confirmation of the massacre previously denounced to him. The discrepancies of detail are few and unimportant. We have in both reports the butchery without provocation or resistance, of

about thirty Christians, more than twenty of whom were primates of district, by a band of irregular troops, or Bashee-Bozooks, summoned from Salonica to protect them against the Hellenic marauders, who had vainly endeavoured to seduce them from allegiance, and acting by command of two Turkish leaders, whose names are given identically in both accounts.

No words of horror and indignation, however natural, no cries for vengeance, however just, can give any additional weight to simple statement of facts like these. We have at once in view of the cruel, cowardly, calculated butchers, together with the innocent, unarmed, unsuspecting victims, - the former betraying the honor of their Sovereign, the latter sacrificed by their submission to his authority. In every heart not rendered callous by brutal passion or senseless fanaticism there is what calls for judgement on the one and sympathy with the other. I will not insult the Turkish Ministers by supposing it otherwise with them. Indeed I am assured by you that they are alive to the requirements of justice in this case, and to the obligation of punishing with exemplary rigour an outrage which is no less treasonable towards the Porte, than disgraceful to humanity, and ruinous to the Empire. It is enough therefore, I hope for me to repeat ...

Appendix 47. İ. DH. 18893 lef 1, dated 19 Şaban 1270 (17 May 1854). Finance Minister Musa Safveti Pasha to Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha on the financial situation.

Maruz çaker-i keminelidir ki

Malum-ı ali-i sadaret-penahileri buyurulduğu vechile maliye hazine-i celilesinin biraz senelerden berü varidat ve mesarif-i asliyesi muvazin olamayıp külli açığı görünmesiyle bu babda tedbir-i icabiyeye sarf-ı efkar [2] buyurulmakta olduğu halde mesele-i hazıra zuhuratından naşi altmış dokuz senesi Eylül'ü nihayetine [12.10.1853] kadar varidat-ı asliye tahsilatının üç yüz bin kiseden ziyadesi nakden ve havaleten mesarif-i fevkaladeye verilmiş [3] ve muahharen mesarif-i fevkalade için alınacak mebalığden yerine konulmak üzere açılan yüz bin kiselik kavaim-i nakdiye dahi yine mesarif-i fevkalade için tahsis ve ita olunarak ardı alınmış olduğundan sal-i hal varidatına destres olununcaya ve Avrupa'dan tedarik olunacak akçe vürud edinceye kadar sene-i mezbure Teşrin-i Evvel'i ibtidasından [13.10.1853] Şubat'ı gayetine [12.3.1854] değin beş mah müddette muvazeneye tatbikan tahmin olunan mesarif-i asliyeden taşra emvalinden itası mukarrer olan [5] ve sal-i hale tehirinde beis olmayan bazı şeyler aşağı varıldıktan sonra küsur-ı kabil-i tehir olamayan mesarif üç yüz bin kiseye ve Bağdad ve eyalet-i Berr-i Şam misillu varidatı mesarifiyle mahdud [6] ve havalat ile mesdud olan mahallerden maada eyalat ve elviye ile Dersaadet'ce olan varidatın sinin-i sabıka bakayası ve altmış dokuz senesi emvalinden tahsilat ve mesarif-i mahalliye ve mürettebat-ı sabıka-i askeriye ile mesele-i mezbureye dair [7] fevkalade mesarif için olunan havalat bit-tenzil maadasıyla iane-i umumiye bakayası olarak matlub-ı hazine görünen yedi yüz altmış üç bin bu kadar kise meyanında altmış dokuz senesi gayetine [12.3.1854] kadar sarrafan'ın [8] hazinece taahhütlerinde bulunan varidat-ı bedelatdan ve sinin-i sabıka zimmetiyle mevadd-ı saireden tahsili ve Cezayir ile Anadolu canibinden vürudu memul olan mebalığ dahi yüz yetmiş yedi bin şu kadar kiseye balığ [9] olarak maadasının tahsili vakte ve ikdamat-ı kamileye muhtaç olması ve o da hazinenin düyun-ı mevcude-i külliyesinin karşuluğu bulunması cihetle Dersaadet'ce olanların mensub oldukları zevat-ı kiram [10] ve hazain-i şahane ve taşrada bulunanların tanzim olunan talimata tevfikkan mahalli memurları marifetiyle bir taraftan tahsiline fevk-al-gaye ikdam ve ihtimam olunmak üzere ber minval-i muharrer husul ve vürudu [11] memul olan yüz yetmiş yedi bin şu kadar kise kabil-i tehir olamayan üç yüz bin kise ile bil-muvazene

daha ihtiyaç görünen yüz yigirmi iki bin bu kadar kisenin şehriyesi yigirmi beşer bin kise [12] itibarıyla beş aylığı birden olmazsa da Avrupa'dan celbi musammem olan akçenin vusulüne değin üç aylığı ve hiç olmaz ise iki aylığı mikdarı olan elli bin kisenin dahi çaresine [13] bakılması ol zaman hazine-i celilede bazı vükela-i fiham ve memurin-i hazineden teşkil olunan komisyon-ı muvakkatta bit-tezkir ol babda tanzim ve takdim olunan mazbata Meclis-i Hass-ı Vükela'da dahi bil-mütalaa [14] küsur-ı bakayanın ol vechile bil-ittifak bir taraftan tahsiline ikdam ve gayretle beraber şu açık görünen yüz yigirmi bin kise için mümkün olunabildiği mikdar mebalığın marifet-i acizanemle tedariki bit-tensib [15] irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı şehinşahi dahi ol vechile şerefsunuh buyurularak saye-i imkan-vaye-i cenab-ı mülukanede Mısır'ın yetmiş senesi virgü-i aslisi karşılık ittihazıyla bazı tüccar ve sarrafandan altmış [16] dört bin şu kadar kise ve muahharen mesarif-i fevkalade için İzmir ve Aydın ve sair elviye-i mütecavirenin sinin-i sabıka bakayası ile sal-i hal emvalinden sarf-ı fazla olarak hazineye gönderilecek akçenin tesviye-i havalesiyle [17] Baltacı Todoraki bazergandan yigirmi bin kise akçe ki ceman seksen dört bin kise akçe alınarak bunlardan ve hazinenin beyan olunduğu vechile husul-i vürudu memul olan varidatıyla bakaya-i saireden [18] vukua gelen tahsilat ile saye-i muvaffakiyetvaye-i hazret-i padişahide Şubat gayetine kadar beş ay müddetle şimdiye değin iki ay ki tam yedi ay mesarif-i asliye-i hazine rüyet ve tesviye olunduktan sonra mesarif-i [19] fevkaladeye dahi pek külli akçe verilmiş ve bundan böyle bir iki maha kadar ikdamat ve tasarrufat-ı kamile iltizamıyla bazı bakaya ve zimem tahsilatından ve esham-ı kadimeden bazı cihetle mümtaz olarak yüzde on faiz verilmek üzere küşad olunup tab' olunmakta olan altmış bin kiselik esham-ı cedideden ve saireden uyuşdurularak mehma emken idare olunması kuvve-i tali'-i ferhunde-metali'-i cenab-ı mülukane icab-ı alisi ma-la-nihaye-i sübhaniyeden memul ve muntazır [21] bulunmuş ise de beyandan müstağni olduğu vechile karar-ı mezburdan berü rabbim mezdad ve feravan eylesün kuvve-i askeriye ve tedarikat-ı harbiye an be an tezaid ve terakki ederek orduy-i hümayunlar ve mevaki-i saire-i [22] askeriye dairesinde eyalat ve elviye varidatı kaffeten oraların cemiyet-i askeriye ve mesarif-i istihkamiyelerine münhasır ve muahharan Yanya ve Tırhala sancaklarıyla civarı bazı mahaller dahi kesb-i nezaket ederek [23] mürettebatı ilişik peyda eylediğinden mesarifat-ı mahalliye ve mesarif-i cedide-i zaruriyelerinin canib-i hazineden ianeye ihtiyaçları zahir olarak ve eyalat ve elviye-i saire varidatı emvali mesarif-i mahalliye [24] ve mürettebat-ı askeriye ve havalat-ı mühimme-i saire ile ve İzmir ve Aydın ve elviye-i saire-i mütecavire fazla-i varidatıyla Mısır'ın virgü-i aslisi dahi salif-üz zıkr alınan akçelerle mesdud bulunarak devletlu Namık Paşa [25] hazretleri de bu defa Avrupa'dan bir şey tedarik edemeyerek tehi-dest avdet etmiş ve buraca Avrupa'dan akçe alınmasının imkanı meçhul bulunmuş olduğundan mehma emken idare memul olan şu iki ayın [26] hitamında artık mesarif-i asliye ve fevkaladeye hazinece vaki olan gayret ve ikdamatın bir semere husulü memul olamayıp be-heme-hal Avrupa'dan sürat-i tedarik ve celbine şiddet-i ihtiyaç [27] görünen külliyetlu akçenin şimdiden bil-mütalaa tedabir-i lazıme ve acilesinin serian icrası himem-i celile-i sadaretpenahilerine mütevakıf olarak ber mukteza-i memuriyet ve ubudiyet sonra hakk-ı abidanemde [28] bir guna mesuliyete mahal kalmamak üzere bil-mecburiye işte şimdiden ihtar ve beyan-ı hakikat-ı hale ibtidar kılınmış olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 19 Ş 70.

[signed] Safveti

Appendix 48. HR. TO. 418/259, dated 6 June 1854. Translation of Black and Durand's letter submitted to the minister of finance.

1854 senesi Haziran'ının altısı tarihiyle müverrehan Mösyö Durand ve Mösyö Black taraflarından istikraz maddesine dair vaki olan bazı mütalaatın müsveddesi tercümesidir.

Muharrer ül-imza Mösyö Black ve Mösyö Durand Avrupa'ya giderek tanzim ve icrasına memur oldukları istikraz maddesinde Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin mesarifatını mümkün mertebe taklil etmek arzusunda bulduklarından Maliye Nazırı ve Reis-i Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye devletlu paşalar hazeratı taraflarından vaki olan teklif üzerine istikraza destres oldukları halde komisyonlarını ati-ül beyan mikdara göre tayin ve tanzim eylemeğe razı olmuşlardır. Şöyle ki evvela eğer istikraz yüzde yetmiş beş hesabıyla icra olunur ise mumaileyhima komisyonları için işbu istikrazın yekunu üzerinden yüzde yarım demek olup cem'an on yedi bin beş yüz lira isterlinden ibaret olan meblağı ahz etmekle iktifa edeceklerdir. Saniyen istikraz yüzde seksen hesabıyla icra olunduğu halde bu surette Devlet-i Aliyye'ye yüz yetmiş beş bin lira isterlin kar ve faide olacağından mumaileyhima yirmi iki bin lira komisyon alacaklar ve bu ise yüzde seksen [sekize?] beş demektir. Salisen istikraz yüzde seksen beş hesabıyla icra olunduğu takdirde Devlet-i Aliyye'ye üç yüz elli bin lira faide hasıl olacağından mumaileyhima yirmi beş bin lira isterlin ahz edecekler ve bu ise yüzde üç rubdan dahi az demektir. Fakat mumaileyhima mahvel-i uhde-i memuriyetleri işbu istikrazı hiçbir suretle tanzim ve icra edemedikleri halde bunlar kendilerine harcırah olmak üzere burada verilecek ve istikraz icra olduğu halde komisyonlarının yekunundan tenzil olunacak olan yirmi beş bin frankdan maada mükafat namıyla hiçbir şey iddia etmeyeceklerdir.

Appendix 49. HR. TO. 418/273 lef 1, dated 13 June 1854. Durand to Revelaky to Ali Şefik Paşa the minister of finance. On the price of the Turkish Loan. Translation into Turkish.

Mösyö Durand tarafından 1854 senesi Haziran'ının on üçü tarihiyle müverrahan Paris canibinden tevarüd eden bir kıta mektubun suret-i tercümesidir.

İstikraz-ı Osmani maddesine dair şehr-i Mayıs'ın otuzu tarihiyle müverrahan bir kıta mektubunuzu ahz eylemiş ve icray-ı icabı mahal olmayıp müşkil olduğunu telgraf vasıtasıyla tarafınıza bildirmişizdir. Ahval-i adide ve ez cümle devletlu Namık Paşa hazretleri Paris'de bulunan Kredi mobiliye [Credit Mobilier] nam sarraf kumpanyasının pek meylî olduğu halde maslahatı bitirmemesi ve sonra dahi Rothschild kumpanyasının fahiş baha ile istikrazı iltizam etmesinden naşi ma'yub olacak vechile muvafık olamaması madde-i mezkureyi bozmağa medar olmuştur. Binaberin bu maslahatı tekrar canlandırmak pek müşkil olup halkı terğib etmek için tayin olunacak baha dun ve verilecek teminat pek kavi olmak lazım geleceğinden bu maddenin bil-mükatebe müzakeresi zann-ı acizanemize göre mümkün olmayub mezuniyet-i kamile ve vasia ile bir seyahat etmeği göze almalıdır. İstikrazın bahasına gelince, Avusturya devleti yüzde beş faiz ile otuz beş milyon frank yüzde yetmiş istikraz eylediğine nazaran Devlet-i Aliyye yüzde altı güzeşte ile yüzde yetmiş beşten ziyadeye istikraz edemez. Hengam-ı harbde akçeye muhtaç olan devletler yüzde beş on misillü farklara pek de itina edemezler. Bu kadar ağırlığın ihtiyarı elzemdir.

[Submitted to the Ottoman minister of finance on 4 Şevval 1270]

Appendix 50. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 41. Extract from a British consular report from Calabaca to ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe, dated 19 June 1854. Fuad Efendi defeats the Greek insurgents.

Calabaca, June 19th 1854

The division of the Turkish army commanded in person by Fuad Effendi, the Imperial Commissioner, and consisting of 7000 regulars and irregulars, yesterday defeated the forces of the forces of [sic] the Greeks and insurgents at Calabacca at three o'clock P.M. The Turks marched, drums beating and colors flying, along the bed of the river Salymbria, into the centre of the strong positions occupied by the enemy to the number of 4000 and in the course of an hour the latter were flying in all directions – Fuad Effendi distinguished himself not only by the ability displayed in his military combinations and by his personal bravery, but also by his humanity in the heat of the action itself, bestowing rewards on such as brought him prisoners and discouraging the barbarous practise of decapitulation, of which I am glad to report to Your Lordship that there occurred only two instances. The loss of the Greeks must have amounted to more than 100 killed – that of the Turks to about forty and as many wounded. Five standards have been taken, but what the Turks prize more than any other trophies, are the four pieces of cannon taken from Selim Pasha, when his army, under the influence of a paine [?] [*“dehşet-i kazibe”* in official translation] was routed in this place three weeks ago.

Appendix 51. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 49. Extract from a British consular report from Monastir, dated 30 June 1854.

“As regards the reputation of the invading force, I believe Fuad Effendi has proved himself fully equal to the task, if, indeed, it be not already accomplished. Protection of the Christian inhabitants against the licence of the Bashi Bozuks is more difficult. Money is required in both Epirus and Thessaly, but the great difficulty is to get the local authorities to proceed with sufficient severity, or to execute the firmans of the Government. The time is come for making some severe examples, not only in Thessaly and Epirus but also in Macedonia, where the evil is making alarming progress – the roads are every day becoming more insecure villages are plundered and all this I cannot help thinking has in some measure arisen from the remissness of the authorities in restraining and punishing such disorders in the beginning as they should have done.

In passing the rough Serfidje on my way hither, I learnt that excesses similar to those committed at Grevena had also been committed in that district villages had been destroyed and the cattle and effects of the Christians carried off by the Mussulmans of the neighbouring district of Sari Ghieul. All this had been done without any reasonable pretext, as the people were not in a state of insurrection. The chief of the marauders was a certain Ahmed Aga Mudir of Kailar.

Among other atrocities, he had cut off the heads of several Kodja Bashis or elders, who were returning to their villages with “Rai – bourouldis” or letters of amnesty from the Pasha. The only punishment inflicted on him for his misdeeds has been his dismissal from his office as mudir of Kailar; and though I understand some of the cattle stolen from the people of Serfidje have been restored to them; many of their villages are reduced to ruin and starvation; and much remains to be done for the relief of the oppressed and the punishment of the guilty.

Appendix 52. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 36, dated 10 July 1854. Lord Stratford’s instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani on Egypt’s impediment of free trade. Therapia, July 10th 1854.

Sir

Her Majesty's Government having received information from Egypt that the Pasha of that Province has of late allowed measures to be adopted by his officers calculated to impede the free trade in grain, I am instructed to inform the Porte that the system adopted by His Highness is clearly an infraction of the Treaty, and to request that proper communications may be addressed to him for his future guidance in that matter.

Her Majesty's Government attach much importance to a due compliance with their requisition, because as the supplies usually drawn from Russia, are now interrupted, it is extremely desirable that the trade should be unfettered in all other quarters and His Government are fully entitled to expect that in the dominions of the Sultan no unnecessary impediments shall be thrown in their way.

I am informed by Reshid Pasha, that the Porte, to his [sic] best of his knowledge, has authorized no measures in Egypt tending to monopolize the trade in grain, and therefore in communicating this instruction to His Highness, you will notably find too difficult in obtaining the adoption without delay or reserve of such measures as may be required to satisfy the just demand of His Government.

You are at liberty to leave a copy of this instruction in the Ottoman minister's hands, should he apply for it.

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe

Appendix 53. HR. TO. 52/78, dated 5 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (13 July 1854). From Musurus on the loan commission.

Mösyö Black ile Mösyö Durand'ın istikraz edecekleri akçenin sarf olunmasına nezaret için bir komisyon-ı muhtelit teşkil olunması efkarından sarf-ı nazar olunmadığını havi Mösyö Musurus tarafından varid olan bir kıta tahriratın tercümesi. Fi 5 Ra 70.

İngiltere ve Fransa devletlerinin kefaletleri olmaksızın istikraz edebileceğimizi memul etmekteyim. Mösyö Black ile Mösyö Durand'ın dahi mesai ve mehudatları işbu maddeye sarf olunmaktadır. Kaldı ki talimat-ı seniyye-i hazret-i nezaretpenahileri mucibince memurin-i mumaileyhima yed-i iktidarlarında olan kaffe-i esbab ve vesail-i mümkineyi istimal ettikten sonra bila vasıta istikraza destres olunmak mümkün olamayacağına cezm [haberim?] hasıl etmedikçe devleteyn-i müşarünileyhimanın kefaletini iltimas eylemiyeceğimiz bedihi ve aşıkardır. Fakat İngiltere devletinin mebusan-ı millet kamarası tarafından mezun olmadıkça kefalet veremeyeceği ve parlamento meclisi ise gelecek ayın ibtidalarına doğru hitampezir olacağı cihetle devlet-i müşar-üm ileyha bizim bu babda olan niyet-i katiyemizi bilmeğe istical ettiğinden memurin-i mumaileyhimanın kaffe-i esbab-ı mezkureyi sarf için lüzumu görünen vakti bulabilecekleri cay-i iştibahdır. İstikraz akçesinin sarf ve istimaline nezaret etmek için bir komisyon-ı mahlut teşkil olunması efkarını redd ve cerh zımında vaki olan itirazat-ı acizanemi hakpay-i ali-i hazret-i nezaretpenahilerine arz ve ifade ile kesb-i fahr etmiş idim. Fakat işbu nezaret ve teyakkuz usulünden bütün bütün sarf- nazar olunmadığı ve belki istikraz akçesinin bir miktarı tevkif olunması üzerine ısrar olunacağı maznun ve muhtemeldir. Eğer işbu ihtiyattan murad Devlet-i Aliyye'nin bir istikraz-ı cedide veyahud iane-i nakdiyeye muhtaç olmaksızın gelecek sene dahi muharebeye devam buyurması esbabını temin etmekten ibaret ise rey-i acizaneme göre işbu fart-ı ihtiyata riayet için Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin namus-ı alisine daha ziyade münasip olan başka çareler bulunması mümkünatdandır. İşbu çareler dahi ya Fransa'nın istikraz-ı ahiri misillü istikraz-ı mezkurun teslimat-ı ahiresinin coste coste ve bir müddet-i medide icra olunmasından veyahud beş milyon lira isterlinden ibaret olan istikrazın yalnız bir miktarı şimdilik ahz u kabz olunarak işbu mebaliğin bakiyesi bir istikraz-ı cedid ile tahsil olunmaktan ibaret bulunmuştur. Her nasıl ise kaffe-i şurut nezaret ve teyakkuz talimat-ı seniyye-i hazret-i nezaretpenahilerinin haricinde bulunduğundan ve Paris ve

Londra'da mukim Devlet-i Aliyye sefaretlere dahi Saltanat-ı Seniyye canibinden bir izin ve ruhsat-ı mahsusa olunmadıkça şerait-i mezkureyi kabul edemeyeceklerinden devleteyn-i müşarünileyhimanın kefaletini iltimasa kendimizi mecbur göreceğimiz halde ana göre tazyik-i hareket edebilmemiz için bu babda talimat-ı mukteziyenin taraf-ı acizanemize irsal buyurulması menut-ı rey-i zerrin-i hazret-i nezaretpenahileri idüğü beyanıyla zat-ı ubbehesimat-ı hidivilerine derkar olan ubdiyyet-i amikamın arz ve ibrazına teamül?-i vesile ittihaz kılınmıştır.

Appendix 54. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 21-22, dated 8 August 1854. Raglan to Redcliffe. From Varna. On the complaint of the vali of Varna on British troops forcibly taking corn in villages of Varna

My Lord

In consequence of the accompanying complaint from the civil Pasha of Varna, in which it is stated that some corn cut by the inhabitants of the village of Sumbey had been forcibly taken by Her Majesty's troops and paid for at a price infinitely below the value, I directed Lieut. General the Duke of Cambridge to make inquiry into the matter.

...

... unwillingness manifested by the Bulgarian Peasantry to bring supplies into our camp arises from their having received notice not to sell their grain or forage to either English or French troops lest there should be none left for the Turkish army... [After protesting this] I deem the Ottoman Government most fortunate in having to deal with an ally who is willing to pay for that which is provided. [Arpa fiyatından hiç söz etmiyor, ardından daha önemli bulunduğu konuya giriyor]

... the monstrous treatment of the Bulgarian population by the robbers who live in the Turkish villages and by the Bashi Bozouks.

Appendix 55. İ. HR. 113/5512 lef 2, dated 16 August 1854. Musurus to Reşid Pasha via telegraph to İzzet Pasha in Belgrad. Loan.

Deutsch-Österreichischer Telegraphen-Verein
Station Simlin

A Son Excellence Izzet Gouverneur général a Belgrade

Londres à 16 Août 1854 a 9 heures et quart du soir

Le ministre de la Sublime Porte a Londres. Je pris Votre Excellence de transmettre immédiatement par courrier extraordinaire a Son Excellence Rechid Pacha la présent dépêche par la quelle j'annonce positivement a son Altesse que notre emprunt a complètement réussie au taux de quatre vingt a six pour cent de intérêt sans la garantie des deux Gouvernements.

C. J. Mousurus

Appendix 56. HR. TO. 220/45, dated 29 August 1854. Redcliffe's instructions to head dragoman Pisani to be read to Reşid Pasha. On the sale of women and children taken from the Christian population of Georgia, and the revival of a traffic in slaves from among the Mahometan population of Circassia. Therapia. August 29th 1854.

Sir,

I have heard with feelings of painful concern that the retirement of the Russians from certain parts of Circassia, and the irruption of the Turkish Forces last year into Georgia, have been attended with consequences which tarnish the brightness of military success, and diminish the satisfaction to be derived from the Sultan's triumphs in a just cause. The circumstances, to which I allude are the sale of women and children taken from the Christian population of Georgia, and the revival of a traffic in slaves from among the Mahometan population of Circassia. It is well known that such acts with respect to Christians have none but a religious justification in the eyes of a Mussulman, and even this uncertain plea extends not to children of tender age. It is also notorious that to enslave a Mahometan is illegal in any country where the creed of Mahomet prevails. Notwithstanding these unquestionable truths, one kind of slavery insulting to Christians, and another condemned by Mahometans, - both being a scandal to humanity, - have been of late revived, and are now practised with impunity by the Sultan's subjects, at the very seat of Government. Worse than all this, the renewal of atrocities, which cannot be too strongly reprobated, is made to stand in contrast with the enemy's conduct in that respect, and the Sultan's Allies, without whose cooperation the very existence of the Turkish Empire would be endangered, Christians in faith, and champions of legality, are called to assist at outrages which, in both characters, they repudiate with unutterable abhorrence.

These are not idle assertions. Circassians themselves are here to bear witness to what concerns their own country. I have received authentic information of Georgian children, brought to Constantinople, as slaves, in an Austrian Steamer, and conveyed to a person high in the Turkish employment. It is matter of public notoriety that boys and girls from Georgia are sold in Pera and Galata.

Such things are inhuman enough at any time. They are scarcely credible when viewed as public transactions occurring at Constantinople under the reign of so benevolent a Sovereign as the present Sultan. Brought to notice at a time when Christian Powers have sent their armies and squadrons into Turkey for its defence, and when those armies and squadrons composed of Christians, are fighting side by side with Mussulmans, and confounding all differences of religion in the common cause of humanity and national independence, they set at nought every calculation and excite the most unqualified disgust.

There are persons who distinguish between slavery in the East and slavery in the West. The distinction is not wholly unfounded. Unlike the negro in America, the slave in Turkey is rather a domestic servant than a field-drudge or beast of burthen. He is not ostensibly ill-treated. If a male, he rises occasionally to posts of profite and honor; if a female, ease, and even luxury, may be her portion in the Harem of some Court favorite or opulent functionary. The degradation nevertheless, remains, and the privation of liberty, not forfeited by crime, is itself an intolerable evil. But the injury does not stop there; the slave can hold no property: he is a property himself; and, worse than all, he is but too often an instrument of vice, and sometimes even of crime. His life is at his owner's mercy. If a Christian, his children are born to slavery, as if to reconcile those, who never can be parents to the mutilation which deprived them of that hope. In one respect there is no difference between negro and Circassian slavery. Black or White, wherever slavery exists, the whole society suffers. A curse is on the trade. Dealer and owner are alike inflected by the taint. They treat their fellow creatures like brutes, and are themselves brutalised in return.

In Turkey where the disease, appearing in a milder form, is, nevertheless, fatal to a sound state of health, imported slaves fill many places in the state, and most places in private families, which might be better occupied by free natives. So placed, they

minsiter to those habits of expense and sensuality which undermine the strength of the Empire, and convey but too often the sentiments of a slave into posts of high command and honorable trust.

Such being the case, it is not too much to expect that in its own interest, as well as from consideration for its allies, the Porte will exert itself to check the barbarous and shameful practise which I have described. Let preventive measures be applied to three stages of the traffic, to purchase, to conveyance, and to sale. Let a firman declare the Sultan's pleasure in these respects. Let peremptory instructions prohibiting the purchase of slaves be sent to the commanders of His Majesty's forces. Let the conveyance of slaves be treated as contraband on the responsibility of all concerned. Let their sale within the Sultan's dominions be strictly prevented by the police, and every transgression be visited with punishment on buyer and seller alike.

So long as the trade is permitted or connived at, so long as preventive measures, capable of enforcement, are loosely or not at all, employed, the Turkish authorities will justly be opened to censure, and incur, to their peril, the charge of acting upon principles inconsistent in spirit and effect with the existing alliances. Let them beware of producing throughout Christian Europe a total relaxation of that enthusiasm for the Sultan's cause, which has hitherto saved his empire from the grasp of Russia.

You will read this instruction to the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and you will leave a copy and Turkish translation of it in His Highness's hands.

I have reason to believe that the French Embassy takes a similar step.

I am etc.

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe

Appendix 57. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 31 dated 7 September 1854. Instruction to M. Stephen Pisani on export restrictions.

The British Embassy cannot assent to the Porte's memorandum of the 8th Zilhidje 1870 [sic, the *Hicri* year must be 1270, 1 September 1854], with participating in what appears to be an unfounded and unnecessary measure. The Commercial Treaty stipulates for unrestricted liberty of commerce in articles of Turkish produce, as well for exportation as for internal trade. The occasional restrictions which have been submitted to with respect to grain were justified by urgent necessity. In the present instance no such necessity exists. There is an abundant harvest, and the armies no longer look to Constantinople for their supplies. A continuance of restriction with partial exceptions can therefore be of no benefit except to speculators and those who encourage them. The plan is contrary to treaty and warranted by no necessity. On these grounds I rely upon the Porte's sense of justice and wisdom not to persevere in its original intention as stated in the memorandum.

Therapia, September 7th 1854.

Appendix 58. HR. SYS. 1928/48, dated 14 September 1854. Extract. Sale of the Ushour duties to the prejudice of the Government.

The Ushour duties on Grain in this neighbourhood were put up to public auction both here and at Magnesia and the biddings amounted to about 8 millions of Piastres. The Minister of Finance refused to accept these offers when submitted for his approval, but sold the duties to parties at Constantinople for the same sum payable in Paper Money, whereas the biddings here were to be paid in Cash (Beshliks) and between these two modes of payment there was then a difference of 20 to 25 per Cent, causing a loss of a Million and a half to two Millions of Piastres to the Government. The Purchasers who have resold the Duties for Cash, have profited to the above extent over and above any

advance which they may have obtained on their bargain, but the Pacha and the Municipal Council cannot with justice be blamed for the acts of the Minister of Finance, whose conduct in accepting worse conditions than had been offered here, can only be accounted for by supposing that he thereby served his private interests.

Appendix 59. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 3, dated 3 Muharrem 1271 (26 September 1854). From İsmail Pasha the Governor of Erzurum to the grand vizier on the reception of Colonel Williams.

Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki

Erzurum'da mukim İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi konsolosu rütbetlu Mösyö Brant cenablarının vaki olan tebligatına nazaran devlet-i fahime-i müşarünileyhanın feriklik rütbesini haiz olarak miralaylık umurunda müstahdem [2] bulunan asaletlu Mösyö Williams cenabları mah-ı sabıkın yigirmi ikinci Pençsenbe günü alessheer Erzurum'a muvasalat edeceğinden ve mumaileyh merai ül hatır memurin-i mütehabeden idüğünden hakkında merasim-i [3] istikbalkâri ve ihtiram-şiarinin kemaliyle icrası ihtar olunmasına ve bu misillü memurin haklarında resm-i behiyye-i meralet[?]sazinin kema yenbağî icrası mütehattim-i zimmet bulunmasına mebni yevm-i mezkurda heyet-i [4] erkan-ı eyaletle Erzurum'da bulunan mevaki-i askeri memurları üniformalarıyla mumaileyhi bil-istikbal alay ile meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun dahi orada ikamet etmekte olan vali konağına getirmeleriyle çaker-i keminelere dahi [5] hakk-ı mumaileyhde levazım-ı hürmet ve riayeti mea ziyadeten ifa ve şan ü şekvede [?] Saltanat-ı Seniyye'ye layık suretle acizane resm-i hoşamedî ve birsen-i [?] hatır ve ahval sıraları icra ile konsolos-ı mumaileyh tarafından tehiyye [6] ettirilmiş olan misafirhaneye izam ettirilmiş ve ferdası günü dahi resmen izzetlu Defterdar Bey bendeleri ve sair zabitan-ı askeriye ile bulunduğü konağa gidilerek vizite resminin ifası sırada [7] mumaileyh esas-ı memuriyeti orduy-ı hümayuna tefri' eder bazı şeyler olduğunu bil-beyan buna dair taraf-ı abidaneme gerek taraf-ı ali-i sadrazamiden ve gerek efendimizden ve makam-ı celil-i seraskeriden bir gûna [8] evamir göstermemiş ise de konsolos-ı mumaileyhin sureti ifadesi üzerine tanılarak [?] suver-i ifadatının birincisi Erzurum'da kışlayacak asakir-i şahane için mukaddemce tedarik ve istihzar olunmuş olan [9] han ve hane ve mevaki-i saireyi ve alelhusus hastahaneleri gezmeye talib bulunması cihetiyle orduy-ı hümayun meclisi livası izzetlu Mustafa Paşa bendeleri mumaileyhin yanına bit-terfik mahall-i mezkure ile hastahaneleri [10] gezip beğendiğini ve şu kadar ki mezkur hanlardan bazıları ufak tefek bazı tamirat-ı cüziye ile badanaya muhtaç idüğünü ifade ve beyan ve zehair ve hatab ve sair levazımdan mukteziyenin tehiyye ve istihzarı [11] kaziyelerinde ihtarat-ı tesevviayı [?] dermiyan eylemiş ve bunlar ise pek de ihtara muhtaç olmayarak saye-i muvaffakiyet-vaye-i cenab-ı şehinşahide telahak [?] intizar [?] kimya [?] asar hıdivileriyle evvelden yapılmış ve yapılmakta [12] bulunmuş şeyler olmağla mamafih ihtaratına teşekkürle beraber mezkur hanların tamirat-ı lazımlerine ibtidar ettirilmiş ve mumaileyh dahi çend gün sonraca Kars'a azim olarak esna-i azimetinde savb-ı abidaneme [13] göndermiş olduğu Franseviyy-ül ibare bir kıta varaka-i dostanesi manzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı huzur-ı nezaret-sazileri buyurulmak üzere leffen takdim-i huzur-ı mekarim-neşur-ı hıdivaneleri kılınmış [14] ve ber vechi muharrer memur-ı mumaileyhin şu ihtarat ve sairesinin kabulü bir guna irade-i seniyyeye z*f*r [?] bulunamamak mülasebesiyle mücerred konsolos-ı mumaileyhin mültezimce [?] ifade-i harime-i vakıasından [15] ve bu misillülere ihtiramat-ı mütehayyize-i layıkanın lüzum-ı icrasından neşet eylemiş idüğü arz ve beyanı ile takdim-i ariza-i ubudiyete ictisar kılındığı muhat-ilm-i alem-ârâ-i daveraneleri buyurul-dukta [16] ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 3 M 71. Bende Vali-i eyalet-i Erzurum

[Sealed] İsmail

Appendix 60. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 2, 4 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (25 November 1854). Promotion of Colonel Williams to the rank of *ferik*.

Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki

İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi memurlarından Mösyö Vilyams [Williams] cenablarının Erzurum'a vusuliyle hakkında ne vechile muamele-i ihtiramiye icra olunmuş olduğuna ve vuku bulan ihtararı keyfiyetiyle ol babda sair bazı ifadata dair Erzurum valisi devletlu paşa hazretlerinin tahrirat-ı varidesiyle makam-ı ali-i asafanelerine takdim kılınan tezkire-i çakeri hamışine muharrer cevab-ı ahirimi de mumaileyhin devletce olan itibar ve rütbesine ve İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi sefareti canibinden vuku bulan tebligata nazaran uhdesine feriklik rütbesi tevcihi ve orduy-i hümayunca vuku bulan ifadat ve ihtararı üzerine tertib edecek şeylerin bil-müzakere ifay-i mukteziyatı suretinin dahi devletlu İsmail Paşa hazretlerine bildirilmesi emr ü izbar buyurulmuş ve mucebince mumaileyhe rütbe-i mezkurenin tevcihini mutazammın emr ü alisinin tastiri taraf-ı eşref-i hazret-i vekaletpenahiye işar ve suret-i hal müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine dahi şimdilik tahkiye ve tezyar kılınması ve vali-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinin bu hususa dair makam-ı celil-i asafanelerine olan tahriratı mumaileyhin melfuf şukkası ve tercümesiyle beraber leffen yine huzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı daverilerine takdim kılınmış olmağla ol babda emr ü ferman hazreti men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 4 Ra [12]71.

[Signed] Rıza?

Appendix 61. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 1, dated 16 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (7 December 1854). Approval of İsmail Pasha's treatment of Williams

Erzurum valisine tahrirat-ı samiye

İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi memurlarından Mösyö Vilyams'ın [Williams] Erzurum'a vusuliyle hakkında ne vechile muamele-i ihtiramiye icra olunmuş olduğuna ve vuku bulan ihtaratının tafsiliyle buna müteferria sair bazı ifadata dair tevarüd eden tahrirat-ı behiyeleri malum-ı senaveri olarak mumaileyh hakkında ol suretle icra buyurulan muamelat-ı ihtiramiye pek yolunda ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye ile İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi beynlerinde payidar [?] olan revabıt-ı kaviye vifak ve ittihadı [?] merkez-i muvafakatda bulunmağla beyan-ı hal siyakında şukka-i hulusveri terkim kılındı.

Appendix 62. İ. HR. 114/5553, 28 Zilhicce 1270 (21 September 1854). Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha on Georgian and Circassian slave trade.

Atufetlu efendim hazretleri

Çerakize ve Abaza ve Gürcistan sevhilinden ahz ü nakl-i üsera maddesi bu esnada vüsat ve serbestiyet ile icra olunmakta olduğu ve müttefik donanmalar oralarda iken bu maddenin kesb-i tevsii' etmesi [2] Avrupa'da efkar-ı umumiyenin galeyani mudi ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye hakk-ı alisinde olan temayülata hanel irasını muceb olacağı vadisinde ve sair surette birçok tafsilatı şamil ve bu maddenin vukuunu [3] menne kafi görünecek esbab ve tedabirin icrasına taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliye'den himmet buyurulmasını müstedi İngiltere ve Fransa sefaretleri taraflarından baş tercümanlarına verilen talimnamelerin suretleri tercümeleri işbu [4] şehr-i Zilhicce-üş Şerife'nin yirmi beşinci günü [18.9.1854] akd olunan Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Vükela'da kıraat olunarak cereyan eden

müzakeratın fezlekesinde malum-ı ali buyurulduğu vechile Gürcistan kıtasından bir hayli vakitten beri [5] üsera celb ve nakli münkatı olduğu gibi Rusyalu Bahr-i Siyah'ın sevahil-i şarkiyesini istila ettikten sonra oralara kala' ve husun yaparak ve sefain tayiniyle bahren dahi esbab-ı maniaya teşebbüs ederek [6] Çerkezistan tarafından dahi esir çıkarılmasını men' etmiş ve hatta sefaretinin istidasına mebni Bahr-i Siyah'ın Anadolu sevahilinde memurin-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'ye evamir-i aliyye ve tahrirat-ı mahsusa ile icra olunmağa [7] tenbihat-ı resmiye ve aleniye icra olunmuş olduğundan vuku-u muharebeye değin Çerkezistan'dan kaçırma tarikiyle getirilen üsera dahi pek az olduğu halde Rusyaluların muahharen Gürcistan'ın hududa yakın yerlerinden [8] ve Çerakize sevahilinden çekilmeleri ve müttefik donanmaların dahi inzimam-ı muavenetleriyle Kara Deniz'in serbestlik halinde bulunması üzerine bu esir ticareti maddesi filhakika serbestiyet-i kâmile ile icra olunmağa [9] başlamış ve Çerkezler beyninde evlad ve akrabalarını satmak adet-i garibesı var ise de Gürcüler beyninde ol suretle olmayarak mukaddemleri getirilen Gürcü üserası dahi sirkat olunarak getirildiği hususla [10] Gürcistan ahalisi Rusyaludan müteneffir olduklarından asakir-i hazret-i şahanenin oralara satvet-endaz-ı vusul olduklarında ma'delet-i seniyyeden hissedar olmak üzere orduy-ı hümayuna dehalet ve arz-ı [11] hizmet etmiş oldukları halde çocuklarını Lazistan ahalisinin ve sair şunun bunun seby ve istirkaka başladıklarını görünce tahvil-i efkar ve niyet eyledikleri kazaya-i malumedden [12] bulunmuş olup halbuki Çerkezler millet-i İslamiyeden bulunarak sair edyanda bulunanların bile eşya ve hayvan gibi akçe ile satılıp alınması caiz olmadığına ve bu esaret maddesinin menni düvel-i mütemeddinenin [13] emeli olup hatta Fransa ve İngiltere devletlerinin Afrika'nın Bahr-i Muhit tarafında bulunan sevahilinde zenci esaretinin menni için bunca tekellüfler icra edegeldikleri dahi bedihi olarak ber vech-i meşruh [14] Bahr-i Siyah'da Rusyalunun mennine çalıştığı Gürcü ve Çerkez üserası nakli hususunun şimdi gözleri önünde ve bayağı kendilerinin teshilat ve müsaadatına azv olunacak surette bu ticarete alışmış [15] olanlar ve birtakım akli ermeyen ademler tarafından kemal-i serbesti ile icra olunmakta olması filvaki Avrupa'ya münakıs oldukça Devlet-i Aliyye'ce maddi ve manevi tesirat-ı muzırrayı istilzam edeceği misillü [16] şu ahval-i harbiyenin neticesinde inşallahu teala Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin ol havalice istifade buyuracağı şeyler hakkında dahi mazarrat-ı adideyi müstelzem olacağında iştibah olunmamak lazım geleceğine ve eğerçi husus-ı [17] mebhusun menn-i küllisi takdirinde sedd-i bab-ı rikkiyet demek çıkacağı cihetle şu teklif üzerine maslahatın bu derecesine kadar gidilmek istenilmez ise de bu ticaret erbabına kapuyu bütün bütün açık bırakmak dahi [18] asla caiz olmayarak gösterilecek kayıdsızlığın mazarratı dahi görüleceği cihetle şimdi teşebbüs olunacak tedabirin nümayış ve şayiası ile şu hamle savuşdurularak esaret maddesinin kabl-es-sefer [19] bulunduğu daire-i mahdudedede cereyan etmesi kabil gibi görünüyor iken hiçbir şey yapılmadığı takdirde maslahatın ta memnuiyet-i külliyeye derecesine kadar gideceğine şüphe olmadığına mebni hem Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin kavaid-i insaniyet ve şiar-ı [20] hamiyete muvafık hareketi hemişe iltizam buyurageldiğinin iki devlet-i müttefika nazarında bir delil-i cedidesini daha ibraz ile anların temayülât-ı halisanelerini ve hem de Gürcü taifesinin hoşnudilerini celb ve istihsal buyurmak [21] olmasığıün bu babda bir usul-i münasibe vaz' ve icrası şan-i celil-ül unvanına çesban olacağı bahsinde efkar-ı huzzar ittihad edip bunun icrasında dahi Gürcistan'dan bazı ademlerin bir takım nisvan ve sübyan [22] tutup esir ederek satmakta oldukları nezd-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'de malum olduğundan bahisle bu muamele ve hareketin men' olunduğu ve ba'd-ez-in buna oralarda her kim cesaret eder ise bayi ve müşterisi tedip ve mücazat [23] olunacağı mazmununda Batum orduy-ı hümayunu devletlu Mustafa Paşa hazretlerine hitaben bir kıta ve kişinin evlad ve akrabasını satması şiar-ı insaniyete yakışmayacağından bu babda Çerkezlere nesayih-i lazıme [24] ve üseraya mahrec olan iskelelerde dahi tedabir-i mukteziye icra olunması babında dahi diğer bir kıta evamir-i aliyye ısdar ve kendisiyle ol tarafa tisyarının müşarünileyh

hazretleri tarafından birinin gerek Batum ve Çürüksu [25] taraflarında ve diğerinin dahi Çerkezistan'da ilanıyla beraber icab edenlere ve hususen ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriyye tenbihat-ı ekîde dahi icra olunarak ol havaliden üsera nakl ü ihracının menni suretine bakılması [26] ve buraca dahi çünkü şu aralık İstanbul'un ekser sokaklarında ve belki Galata ve Beyoğlu taraflarında bile birer suret-i alenide üsera alınıp satılmakta olduğundan umur-ı zabtiye ve ihtisab nezareti ve gümrük emaneti [27] taraflarına bildirilip şu aleniyyet maddesinin def'iyle şu bey' ve şiranın haneler derununda bir mesturiyyet halinde cereyan etmesi tedbirinin dahi hakimane istihsal ettirilmesi ve zikr olunan sefaretlere dahi [28] bu kararın nezaret-i hariciyeden Divan-ı Hümayun tercümanı saadetlu bey efendiye hitaben talimname itasıyla bildirilmesi hususları tansib ve tezkar olunmuş ise de efkar-ı aciz-asar-ı bendeganın mükemmeli emr ü ferman-ı [29] hazret-i padişahi olmağla ol babda dahi her ne vechile irade-i isabet-ade-i cenab-ı cihanbani müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulur ise hükm-i celili icra olunacağı ve marr-ül beyan talimname tercümeleri manzur-ı mealimevfur-ı hazret-i [30] hilafetpenahi buyurulmak üzere arz ve takdim kılındığı beyanıyla tezkire-i senaveri terkim olundu efendim. Fi 28 Z 270. (mim)

Maruz-ı çaker-i keminelidir ki

Reside-i dest-i tazim olan işbu tezkire-i samiye-i asafaneleriyle mezkur tercümeler manzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı hazret-i padişahi buyurulmuş ve tensib ve istizan buyurulduğu üzere zikr olunan evamir-i aliyyenin ısdar ve müşarünileyh hazretleriyle ol tarafa tisyarı ve hususat-ı sairenin dahi ber minval-i muharrer icray-i iktizaları müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulan emr-i irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı cihanbani muktezay-i münifinden bulunmuş ve marr-ül beyan tercümeler yine savb-ı sami-i asaflerine iade kılınmış olmağla ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi Selh-i Z 70.

Appendix 63. HR. TO. 220/48, dated 23 September 1854. Stratford de Redcliffe's instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani on Sheikh Shamil's kidnapping of women in Georgia.

Therapia, September 23rd 1854. Stephen Pisani Esquire etc etc etc

Sir,

I brought verbally under Reshid Pasha's notice some days ago an occurrence which has been stated in the public prints. It appears from the published statement, to which I allude, that an act of barbarous atrocity has been committed in Georgia by a party of soldiers, - it may be presumed, irregulars, detached from Sheik Shamil's army. These practical marauders are described as having attacked the country house of some person of wealth and official distinction in Georgia. The owner was absent. No resistance was made. Two young ladies and their French governess were, nevertheless, murdered by them in the house. The proprietor's wife, a lady of rank and education, was carried off to the mountains with several female friends, her guests at the time. I need not remark to you that these are circumstances which shock every feeling of humanity. They are not the acts of soldiers, but of assassins. Honorable war rejects them, and honorable men can have no sympathy with the perpetrators.

Such, I am well persuaded, is the the view which Reshid Pasha and his enlightened colleagues will take of the matter, and I apply to them in full reliance on their willingness to assist in redressing the evil in so far as it is still susceptible of redress. The innocent victims of cruelty cannot be recalled to life but the ladies, who

have been carried off, may be restored to their friends, and the Sultan's influence may be employed to prevent the recurrence of such horrors.

It is in this sense that you will apply to Reshid Pasha, and if need be, to the Grand Visir. Perhaps His Majesty the Sultan would deign to write to Schamyl, or cause a letter to be written to him; and some officer might be detached from the army of Kars to present it to the Sheih, and to see to the recovery of the ladies, who were carried off, in concert with a British officer whom I would undertake to have sent with him. No expense need be incurred by the Porte for the object of benevolence, and under present circumstances, of sound policy also.

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe.

Appendix 64. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 32 dated 25 September 1854. From Stratford de Redcliffe on the cessation of the temporary restriction on grain exports.

The undersigned has received the Porte's official note, dated yesterday, announcing the cessation of the temporary restriction which, for certain specified reasons, had been laid on the exportation of grain from Turkey..

...certain reservations are still made as to the purchase of that article for exportation. It is therefore, his duty, to state that all restrictions on the exportation of grain, as upon any other article of Turkish produce, are contrary to the stipulations of the Commercial Treaty and only to be justified by special necessity and during the undoubted existence of that necessity. If the Porte's note is to be understood in its literal sense, the Turkish authorities are still instructed to prevent the purchase of grain for exportation, until they are satisfied that provision is made for local consumption, seed, and the arrangements for supplying the Imperial army.

As this state of things would open a wide door for arbitrary proceedings and exclusive speculations, it is desirable that some further explanation should be afforded and that whatever is really objectionable in those respects should be removed.

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe

Therapia, September 25th 1854.

Appendix 65. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 54, dated 27 September 1854. Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the appointment of Müşir İsmail Pasha to command the Kars Army. (Extract in PRMA, No. 13).

With reference to the observation contained in your dispatch No 489 of the 9th of September respecting the appointment of Ismail Pasha to command the Turkish Army at Kars, and the objections stated by the Porte to the chief command of that army being entrusted to General Klapka, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have little doubt that a deep rooted jealousy of foreigners is, as you suppose, the main cause of the neglect of the army in Asia; but the suicidal indulgence of that feeling ill becomes a Government whose very existence depends upon the support of foreigners.

Repeated disasters may possibly overcome the feeling but these disasters must prolong the war at the cost of the blood and treasure of England, and as H. M. Government will not submit to disaster or disgrace that common precautions may avert, Y. E. will inform Reshid Pasha of the great dissatisfaction which all the proceedings in connexion with the Army of Asia have caused to Her Majesty's Government who must insist that their advice shall be taken if their support is to be continued.

Appendix 66. HR. SYS. 1190/12 lef 1, dated Evasıt-ı Muharrem 1271 (1-10 October 1854). Instructions to Mustafa Pasha, commander of the Batum army, on the prohibition of the Circassians from selling their children into slavery.

Evladlarını satmak isteyen Çerkeslerin tedibi hakkında Batum ordusu kumandanı Mustafa Paşa'ya ita olunan talimatname.

Bab-ı Ali
Hariciye Nezareti
Hazine-i Evrak Müdiriyeti.
Hulasa

Sohum sevahili muhafazası memuriyeti inzimamıyla Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanı bulunan ve Mecidiye [2] nişan-ı hümayununun birinci rütbesini haiz ve hamil vezir-i dirayet-semirim Mustafa Paşa iclalehu hüküm. Cenab-ı Hakk [3] nev'-i beni ademi eşref-i mahlukat olarak hulk ve icad ve hürriyet-i zatiye ve tabiiye ihsanıyla dahi karin-i [4] is'ad buyurmuş olduğu halde bu hilkat ve mazhariyetin hilafı olarak Çerkesistan ahalişi evlad [5] ve akrabalarını esaret suretiyle satmak ve bazıları dahi birbirlerinin evladını serika ile bayağı [6] hayvan ve eşya gibi bey' ve furuht eylemek adet-i garibesini itiyad etmiş olduklarından bu keyfiyet doğrusu [7] şiar-ı insaniyet ve hamiyete münafı ve rızay-i hazret-i barinin hilafı bi-gayet mezmum ve çirkin bir şey olduğundan [8] redd-i ma'delet-vafir-i mülukanemde bir vechile tecviz olunmadığına mebnı bunun men'-i esbabının istihsalı zımında [9] ahali-i merkumeye lazım gelen nesayih ve vesaya ve tenbihat-ı müessirenin tebliğ ve ifasıyla beraber bu misillülerin [10] irsaline mahrec olan iskelelerde dahi men'-i mürurları için tedabir-i mukteziyenin ifası ve keyfiyetin [11] ol havalide bulunan bil-cümle zabitan-ı askeriye ve memurin-i mülkiyeye dahi beyan ve tefhimi hususuna bu kere [12] emr ü irade-i seniye-i mülukanem müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulmuş olmağın ilanen ve tenbihan divan-ı hümayunuma [13] mahsusen işbu emr-i celil-ül kadrim ısdar olunur. Sen ki müşir-i müşarünileyhsin keyfiyet malum-u [14] rüyet-melzumun oldukta mecbul ve meftur olıcak kemal-i mehamm-i iştiba ve hamiyet muktezası üzere [15] emr ü irade-i seniye-i ahali-i merkumeye ve sair lazım gelenlere bil-etraf ilan ve işaretle balada [16] beyan olunduğu üzere fi-ma-ba'd bu misillü evlad ve akrabasını satmak adet-i mekruha ve gayr-i meşruasının [17] men'i zımında nesayih ve tenbihat-ı mukteziye-i lazımenin ifası ve mahrec olan iskelelerde dahi men'-i mürurları için [18] tedabir-i icabiyenin icrası ve tenbihatın hilafına olarak gerek evlad ve akrabasını satmağa veyahud [19] sairin evlad ve akrabasını çalmağa mütecasir olanların ve gerek bu makuleleri satun alub aher [20] mahallere çıkarmak isteyenlerin tedib ve terbiyeleri lazımeden olmağla bundan dahi kat'a gaflet olunmaması [21] hususlarına derin itina ve sarf-ı makderetle her halde ifay-i muktezası karşınası ve ruyete bezl-i cell-i meknet [22] eyliyesin. Şöyle bilesin, alamet-i şerifeme itimad kılasın. Tahriren fi evasıt-ı şehri Muharrem ül haram sene [23] ihda ve seb'in ve mieteyn ve elf.

Appendix 67. HR. MKT. 89/99, dated 22 Muharrem 1271 (15 October 1854). Orders to the police director, municipal and customs authorities. On the prohibition of the open slave trade in the streets.

Zabıta müşirine ve ihtisab nezaretiyle gümrük emanetine tezkire-i samiye

[1] Bu aralık İstanbul'un ekser sokaklarında ve Galata ve Beyoğlu taraflarında bile bir suret-i alenide üsera alınıp satılmakta olduğu mervi olup bu üsera bey' ve şırası maddesinin kabl es sefer [2] bulunduğu daire-i mahdude ve mesture içinden çıkarılarak

şimdi öyle göz önünde ve sokak aralarında icra olunması caiz olmayacağından [3] işbu aleniyet maddesinin def'iyle üsera bey' ve şırası kaziyesinin haneler derununda ve bir mesturiyet halinde cereyan etmesi tedbirinin hakimane suretle istihsalı [4] hususunun taraf-ı valalarına ve ihtisab nezaret-i behiyyesiyle gümrük emanetine tevcih ve havalesine Meclis-i Vükela kararı üzerine bil-istizan emr ü ferman-ı hümayun-ı cenab-ı cihanbani [5] müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurularak mucebince keyfiyet nezaret-i müşar-ve emanet-i mumaileyhaya bildirilmiş olmağla ve bu maslahatın suver-i icraiyesinde olunacak muamelat [6] ve işin bir daire-i mesture içine alınmasında görülecek muhasenatın derece-i nezaketi nezd-i devletlerinde tavzihten müstağni bulunmağla ber manzume iradesine ana göre iktiza-ı halin icrasına [7] himmet buyurmaları siyakında tezkir.

Appendix 68. HR. MKT. 89/100 dated 22 Muharrem 1271 (15 October 1854). From the sadrazam to the governors of Trabzon, Lazistan and Canik. On the slave trade.

Trabzon valisiyle Lazistan ve Canik mutasarrıflarına tahrirat-ı samiye

[1] Gürcistan'dan bazı kesianın bir takım nisvan ve sübyanı tutup esir ederek satmakta oldukları tahkik ve istihbar olunup böyle bir hareket pek mezmum [2] ve menfur şey olduğundan başka cemiyet ve insaniyete dahi yakışur şey olmadığından bunların külliyyen men'iyle bad-ez-in buna ol havalide her kim cesaret eder ise bayi'i [3] ve müşterisi hakkında lazım gelecek mücazat-ı şedidenin icrası ve şunun bunun ellerinde kalan etfal ve nisvanın bit-taharri bulundurulup familyalarına [4] teslim ettirilmesi hususlarının Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanı devletlu Mustafa Paşa hazretlerine ve bu makule mağsub olan etfal ve nisvanın [5] berren Anadolu içlerine geçirilmesi ve bahren dahi bir tarafa salıverilmesi kaziyelerinin taraf-ı valalarıyla Lazistan ve Canik mutasarrıfları saadetli [6] paşalara tevcih ve iş'ar olunması hususuna emr ü ferman-ı cenab-ı cihanbani [7] şerefsunuh ve sudur buyurularak mucebince kumandan-ı müşarünileyh ferman-ı ali icraya ve paşa-yı mumaileyhimaya dahi tahrirat-ı [8] mahsusa irsal kılınmış olmağla ve bu keyfiyetin derece-i mezmumiyeti ise tavzihten müstağni bulunmağla dirayet-i fitriye-i desturileri [9] kumandan ve mutasarrıf-ı müşar-ve mumaileyhim ile bil-muhabere ber mantuk-ı seniye iktizayı halin icrasıyla isbat-ı asar-ı rüyele himmet buyurmaları [10] lazım geleceği beyanıyla şukka

Appendix 69. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 14, dated 11 Muharrem 1271 (4 October 1854). From Mustafa Pasha, commander of Batum army, to the Abkhazian prince Hamid Bey [Mikhail Shervashidze].

Abaza ahalsi beyi olup Rusya tarafında bulunan Hamid Bey'e fi 11 M 71 tarihinde yazılan tahrirat suretidir.

[1] Tarife hacet bu kadar ki nice yıllardan berü Devlet-i Aliyye'nin en büyük hasım ve düşmanı olan Rusyalu ile padişahımız azim gavgaya başladı [2] ve bu Moskovlunun zalim ve gaddar ve haksız olduğunu bütün cihan anladığından şunun hakkından gelmek ve haddini bildirmek için kaffe-i devletler [3] bizim devletimizle birleşti. Artık Rusyalu asla başa çıkamayıp Allahu Teala'nın lütuf ve ihsanıyla yakın vakitte bütün bütün altı üstüne gelecektir. [4] Zira karada ve denizde bozulmağa ve tarumar olmağa yüz tutarak Kırım'dan ekseri yerleri alındıktan başka Sivastopol limanı dahi alınmak derecesine [5] geldi. Kendi milletimizden bulunan Abaza ve Çerkes ahalsine şimdiye kadar Rusyalu'nun ettiği zulm ve tasallut hadden aşarak şimdi bu açılan [6] ğavğa münasebetiyle hamd olsun anlar dahi Rusya belasından kurtulduklarından inşallah bundan

sonra zinhar devletimiz bu toprakları Rusyalu'ya [7] vermeyecek ve ahalisine el uzattırmayacaktır. Bunun için padişahımız bu defa Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanlığı ile bütün Abaza [8] ve Çerkesistan muhafızlığını uhde-i acizaneme tevcih ve ihale buyurduğundan külliyyetli maslahat ve asakir ile İstanbul'dan çıkıp Batum'a ve Sohum'a geldim. [9] Siz hayli defaattan beri Rusya tarafına geçerek orada kalmışsınız ve kend ve vatan ve memleketi terk etmişsiniz. Halbuki siz buranın büyük hanedanından [10] olup belli başlı ve akıllı, hatırı sayılır bey olduğunuzdan burayı terk edip de düşmanımız olan Moskovluyu isteyeceğinize inanmam. Hatta [11] Sohum'a geldiğimde Devlet-i Aliye tarafına gelip hizmet etmek niyetinde olduğunuzu işittim. Bunun için sizin orada şimdiye değin kalmaklığınızın [12] sebebi şöyle hatırıma geliyor ki acaba siz iç yüzünden buralı ve zahirde Rusyalu olup asıl gayretiniz ve muradınız Rusya'nın halini ve kolayını [13] anlamak mıdır yahut çünkü dünyada olmadık şey yoktur hususiyle böyle vakitlerde ara yerden fesad ekmek değildir. Size dahi öyle uygunsuz [14] ademler gelüb de birtakım yalanlar ile zihninizi mi bozdular? Yoksa Devlet-i Aliye'nin senin gibi işe yarar beylere ihsanı ve muhabbeti çok olacağını [15] şimdiye değin layıkıyla size anlatamayıp da sizi küstürecek bir şey mi yaptılar? Sizin orada kalmaklığınız elbette şu sebeplerden birisi içindir. [16] Her ne ise böyle şeyler olağandır. Senin nasıl işe yarar ve dirayetkar bey olduğunı ben iyi bildiğimden ve pek sevdiğimden hem devletimize [17] ve milletimize el birliğiyle bir hizmet etmek ve hem de senin gibi cesur ve hanedan bir beyi öyle düşmanımız içinde bırakmayıp padişahımızın ülkesinde [19] ve sayesinde büyütmek için dostane ve halisane işbu mektupla sizi bu tarafa davet eylerim. Ey hemşerim işitmişsinizdir ki ben dahi zaten Anapa'dan çıkmış olduğumdan buralı demek olurum. Her vakit de devletimize ve milletimize hizmet etmek üzerlerimize lazımdır ve insaniyet dahi [20] budur. Artık Rusyalu'nun burnu kırılacaktır. Bundan sonra dahi orada kalacak olur iseniz size pek yazık olur. Balada beyan [21] olunduğu vechile eğer ara yerde size bir müfsitlik eden olup da zihninizi bozdular ise hepsi boştur. Hiçbirine inanmayıp hemen [22] gelesiniz. Size doğru söylerim ve şimdiden söz veririm ki Rusyalu'dan nasıl rütbe kazandı ise andan ziyadesi geldiğin anda [23] taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliye'den size verilecektir. Ve sen devlet ve millete bir güzel hizmet eyle de daha her ne talep eder isen padişahımız [24] cümlesini ihsan buyurur. Bu babda asla ve kat'a şüphe ve endişe etmeyip bir gün ola bu tarafa dehalet ederek gelmenizi isterim. İşte benim [25] sahihen muradım devlet ve milletimize hizmet etmek ve size dahi dostluk eylemektir. İmdi mektubumuz vusulünde benim bu sözlerimi kırmayıp aklınız [26] ve dirayetiniz iktizasınca hemen gelmenizi memul ederim.

Appendix 70. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 15, 22 Muharrem 1271 (15 October 1854). From Mustafa Pasha the Müşir of Batum to Circassian tribal chiefs.

22 Muharrem 1271 tarihinde Çerakise'ye yazılan buyruldukların suretidir.

Ubıh, Suca [?], Dardan [?], Hize [?], Subas [?], Çohok [?], Ğuba [?] kabilelerinin uleması ve sair söz sahipleri inha olunur ki: Öteden beri devlet ve milletimizin büyük düşmanı olan Moskovlular yigirmi beş otuz seneden beri [2] gerek sizlere ve gerek ol tarafda bulunan sair Çerkes ve Abaza ahalisine ettiği zulm u teaddi haddini aşmış ve taşmış ve aramızda birleşmeye mani olup sizler dahi anın mukabelesinden başlı başınıza nasıl çalışıp [3] çabaladığınız ve izzet ve metanetiniz bütün aleme ibret nişandır. İşte sizlere şimdiye değin Moskovluların öyle zulm ü tasallut etmesine kemal-i merhameti ve şefkati dünyayı tutmuş olan padişahımız ziyadesiyle acıyıp [4] anın zulm ve pençesinden kurtarmak pek büyük murad-ı şahaneleri olduğu halde fillah-il hamd ve-l menna vakit ve saati gelerek işitmişsinizdir ki Moskovlular ile azim muharebeye başlamış ve Moskovluların [5] haksızlığı artık dünyayı doldurduğundan devletimizle sair

devletler dahi birleşerek bi-nusret-illahi teala gerek karada gerek denizde Moskovlular münhezim ve perişan olmağa yüz tutmuş ve hatta Kırım'ın çok yerleri bile [6] zabt olunmuş olduğundan padişahımız Anadolu'nun bu havalisinde yani umum Çerkesistan ve Abaza memleketleri muhafızlığı ile Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanlığını uhdemize tevcih ve Sohum'da ve Batum'da ve sair ol havalide [7] bulunan paşalar ve beyleri maiyetime tayin buyurmuş olmağla külliyetlu asakir ve mühimmat ile Dersaadet'den kalkıp Batum'a geldim. Ol emirde Batum'un ahval-i hazırasını gereği gibi anlayıp inşaallah yoluna kodukdan sonra [8] Çerkes ve Abaza memleketlerinin icab eden yerlerine bin-nefs geleceğim ve padişahımın fermanı üzere sizlerle görüşüp birleşerek müstainen bi-inayet-illahi teala ve müstezaen bi-imdad-ı hazret-i Resul-i Huda el birliğiyle bu taraftan dahi [9] şu düşmanımızın hakkından gelmeğe sa'y ve gayret eyleyeceğimiz musammemdir. İmdi vusulümden evvel tarafınızdan tercümanımız bulunan rifatlı ... [void in the original] mahsusen memur ve tisyar ve buyrulduklar ıstarıyla ilan keyfiyetine ibtidar olundu. [10] Tarife hacet bu kadar ki padişahımıza her cihetle itaat ve itikad ve birbirlerimizle ittifak ve ittihad idüb düşmanımızla can u gönülünden uğraşmak ve vatan ve memleketimizi muhafazaya çalışmak Allah'ımızın ve peygamberimizin [11] emirleriyle üzerimize farzdır ve padişahın emrine itaat ve elbirliğiyle düşman muharebesine mübaşeret edenler dünya ve ahrette selamet ve saadeti bulacağı misillu maazallah bir kimse zerre kadar padişahın emrinden [12] çıkar ise ol halde zahiren ve manen kendüsünü ağır ve şedid azaplara i'tablara ilka idüb hiçbir mahalde rahat ve necat bulamayacağı güneş gibi aşikardır. Hususiyle rabbim ömr ü ikbal ü şevket-i şahanesini günden güne [13] müzdad ve feravan ve düşmanını makhur ve perişan edip bizleri sayesinde ayırmasun. Asr-ı ma'delehasr-ı şahanelerine nail ve zıll-ı zelil-i mülukanelerine mustazil olduğumuz padişahımız efendimiz hazretleri öyle bir müşfik ve adil [14] padişahdır ki daima efkar-ı seniye ve eşfak-ı aliye-i tacidarileri her halde tebaasının istikmal-i esbab-ı huzur ve rahat ve asayiş ve istirahatlarına masruf olarak evlad u ıyal u ırz u can u vatan [15] ve mallarımızın muhafazası için bunca akçeler sarf ile askerler topçular cephaneler tertib buyurmaktadır ve sayesinde sığınmış olan bilcümle nasın kemal-i rahat ve asayişleri ile hiçbir zaman da görülmemiştir. Böyle bir adil [16] ve merhametkar padişahın uğurunda canımızı feda etmek ve her ne ferman buyurur ise mahaza kendi rahat ve selametimiz için olduğunu bilip her emrini tamamıyla icra ve eda eylemek bizlere dahi ne mertebelerde lazım olduğu [17] muhtac-ı tekrar değildir. Balada beyan olduğu vechile sizler öteden berü düşmanla uğraştığınız ve gayet şeci ve azimli ve doğru ademler bulduğunuz padişahımızın malumu olduğundan sizlere kemal-i meyl ü muhabbet-i [18] şahaneleri vardır. Hatta bu abd-i aciz gibi nice kulları var iken Çerakise ve Abaza idaresinin uhdemize tevfiik ve havale buyurulması zaten içinizden çıkıp hemşehriniz bulunduğum içindir. Zira hallerinize [19] vakıf olduğumdan rahat ve selametinize herkesten ziyade çabalayacağım ve küçüklerinizi evladım ve karındaşım ve büyüklerinizi babam gibi hoş tutacağım derkardır. İşte padişahımızın sizlere olan kemal-i meyl ü muhabbet [20] ve şefkat-i şahanelerini bundan dahi anlarsınız ve geçende Dersaadet'e bu defa bizimle gelen bazı hemşehrinizden dahi işiteceksiniz ki padişahımızı anları bizzat huzur-ı şahanesine celb edip [21] haklarımızda olan muhabbet-i şahanelerini beyan ve her biri dünya degecek ve kimse nail olamayacak surette iltifatlar erzan buyurdu. İnşallah bundan böyle sizler dahi görüp pek çok yüzden anlayacağımıza [22] şübhe yoktur. Heman hazret-i Allah böyle doğru yoldan giden ve hakkaniyeti isteyenleri darında rahat ve düşmana galibiyetle mesrur ve handan ve devlet ve milletimiz aleyhinde olan düşmanı her halde muzmahil ve perişan [23] eyliye amin. Hulasa-i murad *?* itiyad sizlerden umarım ki padişahımızın matlub-ı alisi vechile el birliğiyle çabalamağa gayret ve şimdiden keyfiyeti cümle ahaliye birer birer söyleyip anlatmağa himmet ve mahkemelerde [24] ahkam-ı şer'ianın tamamıyla icrasına ihtimam ve dikkat eylemeniz sibakında divan-ı mektubi-i orduy-i hümayun bulunan ve Çerkesistan ve Sohum'dan işbu buyruldu tastir

ve imla olunmağın mucibince amel ve harekete bi-gayet [25] itina ve himmet eylemenizdir.

Appendix 71. HR. SYS. 1190/12 lef 2, dated 10 Safer 1271 (2 November 1854). Answer to the official notes of France and Britain on the Georgian and Circassian slave trade.

Saadetlu tercüman bey efendiye verilen talimatname. Gürcü ve Çerkes üserası.

Bab-ı Ali
Hariciye Nezareti
Hazine-i Evrak Müdiriyeti

Gürcistan ve Çerkezistan taraflarından esaret suretiyle çıkmış olan eşhasdan dolayı İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi [2] sefir-i kebiri asaletlu Lord İstratfort [Stratford] cenabları ve Fransa devlet-i fahimesi maslahatgüzarı Mösyö [3] Benedetti taraflarından sefaretləri baş tercümanları Mösyö Pisani ve Mösyö Şefer'e [Schefer] verilmiş olan talimatname-lerde [4] suretleri meclis-i meşveretde mütalaa olunup bu babda vuku bulan ihtarat usul-i insaniye ve Devlet-i Aliye'nin [5] efkar-ı adlisine muvafık olduğu nezd-i saltanat-ı seniye de kemaliyle takdir olunmuşdur. Gürcistan halkının [6] nisvan ve sıbyanına tasallut vukuu Devlet-i Aliyye'ce asla tecviz olunur mevaddan olmadığı cihetle bunun için [7] evvelce dahi icraı tenbihat olunmuş iken her nasıl olmuş ise bu misillü hareket-ı kabiha vuku bulmuş [8] olması doğrusu teessüfü mucib olup Çerkezlerin evlad ve akrabalarını satmaları veyahud [9] birbirlerinin evladlarını sirkat ile be'y ve furuht eylemeleri keyfiyat-ı garibesi dahi şayan-ı takbih [10] olarak bunların menni lazımeden olacağına bu babda müteallik buyurulan irade-i isabet-ade-i hazret-i padişahi [11] mukteza-i münifi üzere ısdar olunan ekid ül mazmun ferman-ı alilerin suretlerini iki düvel-i fahime sefaretlere [12] ita ile beraber bundan böyle bu hususa daha ziyade takayyüd ve ihtimam olunacağı ve Gürcistan'dan bu [13] tarafa vürudu mervi olan eşhasın dahi derhal nail-i hürriyet olmak ve istedikleri halde [14] familyaları nezdine iade olunmak üzere taharrisine dikkat olunmakta olduğu ve bu üsera maddesinden dolayı [15] iktiza eden mahallerde tenbihat-ı şedide icra kılındığı dahi zikr olunan sefaretlere tebliğ buyurmalarını [16] rüyet-hamane?lerinden ümid ederim. Fi 10 S 271.

Appendix 72. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 19, dated 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854). From Mustafa Pasha in Batum to the grand vizier.

Maruz-ı çaker-i keminelidir ki

Mukaddemce Çerkes ve Abaza ahalisinin her kabilesine başka başka yazdırıp göndermiş olduğum buyrulduların ve Rusya tarafında bulunan Hamid Bey'e gönderdiğim [2] tahrirat-ı bendeganemin bu defa canib-i vâlâ-yı seraskeriye birer suretleri ile bazı hususat-ı mühimmeye dair iki kıta tahrirat-ı mufassala [3] irsal kılındığından kaffesinin birer aynı dahi leffen hakpay-i mekarim-intiha-i asafanelerine min gayr-i resmin takdim ve isal kılındı. Ahval-i hazırta [4] ve efkar-i kasire-i çakeranem meallerinden müsteban olacağından ol babda ve her halde muhtaç bulunduğum teshilat-ı seniye ve talimat-ı dakayık-ayat-ı [5] aliye-i sadaret-penahilerinin sezaver ve şayan buyurulması babında emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 15 S 71. An Çürüksu

Bende

Müşir Kumandan-ı Orduy-i Hümayun-ı Batum.

[Sealed] Mustafa.

**Appendix 73. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 21, 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854).
From Müşir Mustafa Pasha, commander of Batum army to the seraskier.**

Fi 15 S 71 tarihinde canib-i hazret-i seraskeriye yazılan tahrirat suretidir.

Şimdiye değin vuku bulan işaret-ı bendeganemin cümle-i ibtidaiyesi ve mesele-i memuriyet-i çakeranemin re's ve esası olduğu vechile şu hal ve mevkide ordu-i hümayunun heyet-i tahaffuziyesi muhavver-i layıkında [2] görülemediğinden bunun bir suret-i kaviye-i mümkün tahtına vaz' ve idhali maddesinin derece-i evlada mevkuf-ı aleyhi olan tezyid-i kuvve-i askeriye hususunda çare-i seria görüp evvel ve ahir celbi istidasında [3] bulunduğum Tunus'tan memur asakir-i hazret-i şahanenin bir taburu vürud ederek küsurunun dahi zuhuruna terakkub olunmakta ve mevcud olan üç bin nefer mikdarı asakir-i muvazzafadan başka [4] şimdilik üç bin nefer dahi Lazistan ve Trabzon sancaklarından bit-tertib celb kılınmakta olduğuna ve diğer ariza-i çakeride beyan olunduğu vechile tedabir-i lazime-i mevkîyenin icrasına dahi [5] teşebbüs olunduğuna mebni meyamin-i tevcihat-ı aliye-i sipehsalariyle bu keyfiyet şöylece tasarlanmaktadır. Bu sırada Gürcistan ahalisinin tamamıyla celb ve imaleleri zımında bu havalide en muteberleri olan [6] Melakiye ile bil-vasıta hafiyen söyleşilip şimdiye kadar her dürlü teminat ve teşvikat ibrazı ile celpleri kuvve-i karibeye getirilmek rüknü görülmüş yani merkum Melakiye Rusyalu'nun [7] ordusunu gezdirmek ve ahvalini bildirmek için taraf-ı çakeriden bir adem isteyip derhal zabitan-ı askeriyeden bir bendeleri gönderildiğinden filhakika kendü hükümeti dahilinde vaki [8] Rusya ordusunu gezdirmiş olduğu halde bu tarafa dehaletleri maddesinin merkez-i fiiliyatı gelecek sırada merkum Melakiye renk ve revş değiştirerek Sivastopol tamamıyla [9] zabt ve teshir olunmadıkça ve orası alındıktan sonra Rusyalu dahi külliyyen içlerinden çekilip gitme-dikçe dehalet etmeyeceklerini ve şu kadar ki her ne vakit istenilir ve adem gönderilir ise [10] Rusyalu'nun ordusunu gezdirip ahvalini bildireceğini cevaben haber göndermiş ve bu hale Gürcülerin bazı ef'al ve etvar-ı meşhudelerine göre bunların cidden ve sahihen Rusya [11] taraftarlığı iltizamında oldukları anlaşıldığından bu tarafa meyl ve dehalet etmeleri memul olamayıp celpleri suretine teşebbüs olundukça böyle meyl-i ruşeni [revşini?] göstermeleri dahi [12] mücerred satvet-i seniye-i hazret-i şahaneden gözleri yılıp halleri kuvve-i cebriye-i saltanat-ı seniye-i müntec ve müncerr olmamak için **sanıa**[?] imaliyle bu tarafı dahi iğfal etmek garazından ibaret [13] olması teferrüs ve istidlal olunmuştur. Mamafih salif-üz zıkr Rusyalu'nun teftiş-i ahvali emrinde merkum Melakiye'nin verdiği söz netice-i hasene-i matlubeden ümidin münkati' [14] olmama-sına bir vasıta ittihaz olunarak dakayık-ı matlub-ı aliyeyi mutazammın Dersaadet'de almış olduğum talimat-ı şifahiye-i seraskerilerine itbaen yine bir taraftan teminat [15] ve teşvikat ibrazıyla celpleri sureti iltizam ve buna halel vermemek için bu taraftan hiçbir ferdin Gürcülere tecavüz ve tasallut etmemesine begayet dikkat ve ihtimam [16] olunmakta olup hatta geçende Şekvetil havalisinde asakir-i nizamiye karakollarından bir ince karakol gezerken ormanlıktan bağıteten bir takım Gürcü silah endahıyla bir nefer [17] şehid ederek serini dahi alıp götürmüş olduklarından bu madde-i müellimenin üzerine bile ma-et-teessür sabr ü sükut kılındı. Fakat Gürcistan'ın öbür tarafında bulunan [18] Megral ve Dadyan taifeleri anlar gibi olmayıp daima hareket-i hasmane göstermekte ve bazı tedabir-i kaviye-i seriaya icab ve sebep vermekte olduklarından izaha ibtidar [19] olunur. Şöyle ki Abaza sevahilinden Çamçıra tabir olunan mahallin sekiz saatlik içerüsünde ve Anakra nehrinin iki tarafında dört bin haneden mürekkep Samirzağan [Samurzakan] [20] nam mahal bulunup buranın ahalişi zaten Gürcülerden olduğu halde Abazaların en büyük reisi ve muteberleri olarak el-yevm Rusya tarafında bulunan ma'hud Hamid Bey'in [21] zir-i idaresine tefviz etmiş ve çünkü mezkur Samirzağan ahalisinin iki bin hanesi nehr-i mezkurun şimal tarafında

ve iki bin hanesi cenub [22] yakasında bulunmuş olduğundan mesele-i hazıranın zuhurundan sonra Abaza takımının canib-i eşref-i saltanat-ı seniyyeye dehaleti sırasında nehr-i mezkurun şimal [23] tarafındaki Samirzağanlular dahi dehalet etmiş iseler de zikr olunan Megral ve Dadyan taifeleri bunları Rusya'ya avdete mecbur etmek ve oradan ilerleyip [24] Abaza ahalisine dahi tecavüz ve taarruz eylemek garazıyla Rusya askeriyeye mahlutun daima sarkıntılık ederek tazyikten hali olmadıkları cihetle muhafazaları zımnında ahali-i merkume [25] feryad ve bu babda Abazalar dahi telaş ve istimdad etmekte olduklarına ve eğerçi tiz elden Abaza canibinden bin beş yüz nefer mikdarı asakir-i muvazzafa cem' ve tertibiyle hudud-ı mezkureye [26] tayini maddesine teşebbüsle asakir-i merkumenin hududdan zinhar tecavüz ettirilmeyerek suret-i tedafü ve tahaffuzda bulundurulması zımnında tenbihat-ı kamile ve tekidat-ı mümkün icra olunmuş ve mukaddemce [27] Sohum'a azimet-i bendeganemde zikr olunan Megral ve Dadyan taifelerinin celp ve imaleleri zımnında münasip zemin ile haberler gönderilmiş ise de buna elan bir guna cevabları zuhur etmeyip ber vech-i muharrer [28] suret-i isyanlarını artırmakta olduklarından hudud-ı mezkurenin öyle cüzi asakir-i muvazzafa ile muhafazası kabil olama-yacağına ve mezkur Samirzağanlular ile bütün Abaza ahali bu tarafa henüz [29] ısıttırılmakta olup hususiyle reisleri Hamid Bey'in celbi zımnında melfuf olan sureti mucebince mukaddemce hafiyen bir kıta tahrirat gönderilip el-yevm çabalanmakta ve dehalet edeceğine dair bazı haberler alınmakta [30] idüğüne ve eğerçi mezkur Dadyan taifelerinin şu hallerden geçirilip celp ve telifleri suretine çalışılmakta ve ol tarafa azimet-i çakeranemde dahi yine bil-etraf çalışacağı rütbe-i bedahette ise de [31] şimdiki hal ve hareketleri ol merkezde bulunduğu binaen ol havalinin hüsn-i muhafa-zası esbab ve tedabir-i seriasının istihsali farizadan ve malum-ı alileri buyrulduğu üzere orduy-ı hümayunun kuvve-i mevcudesi dun olmak hasebiyle [32] buradan asakir-i nizamiye sevk ve irsali mümkün olamayacağından yine Abaza ve Çerakise ahalisinden mikdar-ı kafi asakir-i muvazzafa tertib ve tayin olunmaktan başka çare bulunamayacağı vazıhattan bulunmuş ve şu kadar ki ahali-i merkumeden [33] bu suretle hudud-ı mezkureye kuvvetlice asakir tertib ve tayin olduğunda Megral ve Dadyan taifeleri yine tek durmayıp kema fi-s-sabık Rusya askeriyeye tecavüz ve taarruza ibtidar edecekleri [34] ve ol halde salif-üz zikr cem' olunacak asker dahi cunud-ı nizamiye gibi olmayıp müdafaa sırasında ileriye yürüyerek Megral ve Dadyan toprağına geçmeğe davranacaklarından [35] ol vakit mev'ud-ı Sübhani olan muzafferiyet runüma oldukda zikr olunan taifeler biraz zedeleneceği derkar olup halbuki bu babda dahi suret-i aherle imkan ve çare [36] görülemediğimize olmasına nazaran ol vechile ahali-i merkumeden mikdar-ı kafi asker tertib ve sevk olunması emrinde istizan-ı irade-i aliye-i seraskerî-lerine mecburiyet görünmüş olmağla [37] bu babda müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulacak irade-i seniye-i asafanelerinin lutfen ve serian beyan ve iş'arına müsaafe-i aliye-i sipehsalarîleri şayan buyurulması babında emr ü ferman [38] hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir.

Appendix 74. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 1, dated 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854). Stratford to the Porte. Ottoman Irregular Cavalry.

İngiltere sefareti tarafından tevariüd eden bir kıta varakanın tercümesidir

İngiltere devletinin hizmetinde olmak üzere başıbozuklardan mürekkep bir süvari fırkasının tertip ve teşkilini şimdiye kadar bazı mevâni'-i gayr-i melhuze tehir [2] etmiş ise de devlet-i müşarünileyha bu babda olan tasminini bu defa fiile getirmeğe azim ve niyet etmiştir. Binaberin paşa unvanıyla hizmet-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'de [3] bulunan Kolonel Beatson zikr olunan süvari fırkasının teşkiliyün en eyü başıbozuklar beyinde dört bin nefer süvari askeri intihab etmeğe [4] mezun ve memur olmuştur. Fakat öyle bir fırka-i askeriyenin bazı esbab-ı malumeden dolayı ne Kırım tarafında bulunan İngiliz

ordusu ve ne de [5] devletlu refetlu Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerinin kumandasında olan orduy-ı hümayun maiyetlerine verilemeyeceği misillü zikr olunan firkanın işbu iki [6] orduların haricinde olarak kullanılması dahi caiz olamayacağına nazaran kolonel-i mumaileyhin zikr olunan süvari firkasını gelecek evvel baharda [7] Lord Raglan cenablarının zir-i kumandasında olduğu halde ibraz-ı hidemat-ı fiiliye edecek surette teşkil ve tanzim etmesi ve şimdiki halde kolonel-i mumaileyh [8] kendisini yine Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerinin maiyetinde bilmesi hususlarını İngiltere devleti arz ve teklif eder. İşte niyat-ı meşruhanın [9] canib-i Bab-ı Ali'den müşarünileyh Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerine işar buyurulmasıyla beraber bu babda lazım gelen evamirin dahi kendisine gönderilmesi arzu [10] olunmaktadır. Vakıa infak ve idarelerinden aciz olup bir takım ademlere nezaret etmek sıkıntısından kurtulacağı cihetle işbu suretle [11] müşarünileyh Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerinin dahi memnun kalacağı memuldür.

Appendix 75. İ. MMS. 3/97 lef 3, dated 20 Safer 1271 (12 November 1854). The Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha's *tezkire* to the Sultan on the recruitment of some irregulars for the Batum army and rewards to Georgian and Circassian nobility.

Batum orduy-ı hümayununun neferat-ı muvazzafası pek cüzi kaldığından eşedd-i lüzumuna mebni Lazistan sancağından şimdilik bin neferin tedarik ve celbi suretine ibtidar olduğu ifadesini [2] ve asakir-i nizamiyesinin dahi mikdarına noksan tari olduğundan bu tarafda kalan Tunus askerinin serian yetiştirilmesi lüzumunu ve Abaza ve Çerakize ümerasının taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliyye'ye celbleri ne suretle [3] hasıl olacağına dair mütalaat ve ol babda olan teşebbüsatını mutazammın orduy-ı hümayun-ı mezkur kumandanı devletlu paşa hazretlerinin tevarüd eden bir takım tahriratı iki kıta tezkire-i behiyye-i sipehsalariyle [4] şehir-i halin on yedinci günü akd olunan meclis-i meşveretde kıraat olunup siyak-ı işara nazaran zikr olunan orduy-ı hümayunun esbab-ı adideden dolayı kuvve-i muvazzafa ve nizamiyesi [5] tenakus ederek düşman askerinin dahi hareket-ı müstahbere ve merviyesi cihetle saye-i kudret-vaye-i hazret-i mülukanede ordunun tezyid-i kuvveti ehemmiyet olduğundan ve irsali mukarrer ve matlub olan [6] Tunus askerinin bir taburu gönderilüb maadasının dahi heman izamına canib-i vala-i seraskeriden himmet olunacağı misillü marr-ül beyan bin nefer asakir-i muvazzafanın celbi suretine kumandan-ı müşarünileyh [7] canibinden teşebbüs olunmuş olmasıyla bunun dahi kariben merkez-i orduy-ı hümayuna vasıl olacağı derkar idüğinden asakir-i merkumenin ol vechile celb ve istihdamına mezuniyet verilerek keyfiyetin [8] ve fakat bu misillü asakir-i muvazzafanın ekser mahallerde tertibi faraza yüz nefer olduğu halde zabıtları altmış yetmiş nefer istihdam ederek küsurunun yalnız maaş ve tayinatlarını almakta olduğundan [9] işbu celb olunacak neferat-ı muvazzafanın nüfusu adedine muvafık olmasına ve bulunacakları mahallerde hiç kimse hakkında cevri ü teaddi edememeleri için hüsn-i zabt ü rabtları maddesine itina ve dikkat [10] olunması kaziyesinin kumandan-ı müşarünileyhe işarıyla muamele-i kuyudiyesinin tesviyesi maddesinin *?* [one word unreadable] vechile maliye nezaret-i celilesine bildirilmesi ve zikr olunan asakirin bir an akdem tedarik [11] ve izamı suretinin tekidiyle Lazistan mutasarrıfı saadetlu paşaya tahrirat gönderilmesi ve Abaza ümerasından orduy-ı hümayun maiyetinde bulunmak emeliyle mukaddemce taraf-ı eşref-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'ye dehalet [12] ve iltica etmiş olan Mağan Kasi¹¹⁸⁵ oralarca sahib-i itibar ve ikinci derecede malik-i nüfuz ve iktidar olduğundan mumaileyhin ve oğullarının temin ve taltifiyle hizmet ve Devlet-i Aliyye'de kullanılmaları [13] filhakika Abaza beyi Abdülhamid Bey'in ve refte refte sair ümeranın berü canibe mümayilet ve meclubiyetlerini istilzam etmek ve oralarda Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin bu suretle dahi bir

1185 Lieutenant-General Katsi Marganiya of the Russian army. (C.B.).

kuvveti hasıl olduğunu [14] berü yanda Gürcüler görünce havf ederek Devlet-i Aliyye'nin istihkâma-tına tasallutdan mübaadet ve belki onlar da orduy-ı hümayuna arz-ı dehalet eylemek gibi nice fevaidi müstevcib olacağına [15] ve mumaileyh Mağan Kasi ve oğullarına Rusyalu tarafından rütbe ve nişanlar ve maaşlar verilmiş olduğu cihetle kendülerinin ve gerek emsali-nin berü tarafa meclubiyetleri Rusyalu'dan gördükleri [16] itibarata mukabil elbette haklarında taltifat-ı seniyyenin icrası lazım geleceğine binaen kumandan-ı müşarünileyhin bu husus hakkında olan mütalaat ve teşebbüsâtı yolunda ve muvafık-ı maslahat görünmesiyle [17] inhası vechile mumaileyh Mağan Kasi uhdesine mirmiranlık rütbesi tevcih ve şehriye iki bin kuruş maaş tahsis olunarak rütbe-i mezkure için bir kıta emr-i alî ısdarıyla [18] müşarünileyh hazretlerine irsal ve mumaileyhin oğullarıyla müteallükatına dahi vaad olunan rütbe ve maaşların dahi tevcihi ve itasıyla keyfiyetleri bu tarafa bildirilmesinin tavsiye ve işar olunması ve bu husus [19] hakkında dahi nezaret-i müşarünileyhaya iktizası vechile malumat verilmesi ve müşarünileyh hazretlerinin işarından müsteban olduğuna göre gerek Abaza ve Çerakize ümerasından ilerüde [20] iktiza edenlere verilecek rütbelerin rütb-i askeriyeden olması ve her ne rütbe verilir ise maaş dahi tahsis olunması lazım gelip şu kadar ki ita kılınacak rütbelere ve maaşlar [21] bila lüzum ve istihkak verilmeyerek Devlet-i Aliyye'ye hüsn-i hizmetleri görülüp de taltife sahihan ve hakikaten kesb-i liyakat ve istihkak edenlere verilmek icab edeceğinden ve burasını müşarünileyh dahi [22] inhasında izah ve tasdik eylemiş olduğundan bu şarta riayeten ümera-i mumaileyhimden iktiza edenlere mülazımlıktan ferikliğe varınca rütb-i askeriye ita ve münasibi mikdar maaşlar dahi [23] tahsis ve ifa eylemek üzere müşarünileyh hazretlerine mezuniyet verilmesi hususları merkez-i tasvibde görünmüş ise de ol babda dahi her ne vechile irade-i isabet-ade-i hazret-i şehriyari [24] müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulur ise mantuk-ı münifinin icrasına mübaderet olunacağı ve evrak-ı mezkure şimdi meşmul-i lihaze?-i şevket ihaze?-i cenab-ı cihanbani buyurulmak için arz ve takdim kılındığı [25] beyanıyla tezkire-i senaveri terkim olundu efendim. Fi 20 S sene 71. İrade fi 21 S sene 71.

Appendix 76. İ. MMS. 4/135 lef 62, dated 25 Safer 1271 (17 November 1854). From İzzeddin Şir to the sadrazam.

Cizreli İzzeddin Şir Bey'in nemikası suretidir.

Saadetlu efendim hazretleri

[1] Evvel ve ahir hakpay-ı samilerine takdim kılınan maruzat-ı acizanem meallerinden malum-ı valaları buyurulduğu vechile bu tarafa vürudumuzdan berü teshil-i umurumuza hiçbir taraftan ruy-i müsaade gösterilmediğinden başka Hacı [2] Süleyman Ağa ve Bedirhan Bey'in vekili bulunan Molla Sadık nam ile daha bazı taraflar[ın?] dahi muhalefet-i sa'y-i na-mahsur etmişler ve burada cem' ve tahrir kılınan bin nefer piyade ve iki yüz nefer süvariye yirmi beş bin kuruş Cizre [3] emvalinden havale gösterilmiş ve mebalîğ-i mezburun ahzıyla mevcut neferatın ma-zimmatlarını tesviyesiyle dört güne kadar mahall-i memuriyetimize azimet ve müddet-i mezburda çıkılmadığı halde verilü gelen tayinatları dahi [4] kat' eyleyeceklerine dair Mardin kaimmakamı saadetlu Osman Paşa tarafından tahriren ve şifahen verilmiş ve bu melanet dahi Hacı Süleyman Ağa ile Bedirhan Bey'in vekili bulunan Molla Sadık'ın tahrikiyle [5] olduğu bil-etraf haber alınmış ve ez gayr-ı hem Cizre sakinun bir çend kimesneler dahi burada mevcut olan askerin tebrid ve tahriklerine çabaladıkları halde kaimmakam-ı mumaileyh bu vechile emirname-i kat'isi tamam [6] ellerine serrişte ve vesile-i fırsat ittihazıyla doğruca cevab verdiler ki buradan size ne havale var ve ne bundan böyle tayinat verilecek ve şu yirmi bin kuruş dahi hatıra mer'aten verilmiş demeleriyle artık [7] ol vakit bir vechile

tahammüle takat getiremeyerek heman merkumları girift ile tedibat-ı layıklarını icra ettim ve bunun üzerine süfeha-i merkumların ol vechile tedibatları icra olunduğu bil-istima' çar taraftan herkes kemal-i şevk ve sürur ile tarafımıza gelmişler ise de parasız bin beş yüz neferi idare edip getiremezken şimdi üç bini tecavüz eyledi ve vakit dahi mürur ederek eyyam-ı şita takarrüb [9] eyledi. Artık bu kışı burada çıkarıp ve biraz daha asker cem'iyile inşallahu teala vakt-i merhunda veyahud müsaade-i eyyam olur ise heman kış ortasında beş altı bin nefer ile canib-i orduy-ı [10] hümayuna iltihak olunacağı musammem-kerde-i acizanem bulunmuş olduğu ve bu kere Bağdad ve Şehrizar caniblerinden bil-vürud Kürdistan tarafına mürur edecek zuhurat postasını Bişabur önünden çöl [11] tarikiyle savuşturulmuş olduğu haber alınmış ve bu keyfiyet havsala-i tasvirde hariç kulunuza endişe ve azar na-madud olmuş Huda alim ve danadır ki bendeniz Devlet-i Aliyye'ye isyan etmek emellerinde [12] olmayıp ancak uğur-ı hücum-ı şahanede bezl-i vücud etmek ve hizmet-i mefruzeyi eda etmek emeliyle bu tarafa geldim ve şimdilik tedbir-i takdire muvafakat ettiğinden bir iki mah daha bu tarafda [13] lazım gelmiş olduğu muhat-ilm-i alileri buyurulduktan bundan böyle gerek posta ve gerek sair guna ebna-i sebin kema fi-s-sabık doğruca bu taraftan mürurlarına ruhsat buyurulmuş ve zat-ı [14] şevket-simat-ı hazret-i tacidarının adeta bir bende-i hakir erleri olduğundan elimden geldiği kadar mürur-ı uburun müreffehen izam ve imrarlarına bezl-i makderet olunacağı ve bir de bendenizi el-ıyazu billâh [15] suret-i şekavette ittihazıyla ol tarafta olup familya-yı çakeranemi bir güne rencide buyurmayıp kapu pişgahında misillu memur tayin buyurulması akdem amal-i acizanemdir ve beyana hacet olmadığı üzere [16] Huda ne kerde bendenizde isyan etmek hulyası olsaydı familya-yı acizanemi şimdiye kadar bu tarafa celb etmiştim ve icab eder ise oraca muteber kefil irae olunacağı ve her vechile rıza-ı [17] ali-i tahsilden başka maksud ve meramım olmadığı ve vuku'u hale kesb-i itla' olunmak ve ifadem dahi kanaat gelmek üzere ya mahdum-ı a'li-vekarları fütüvvetlu Tahir Bey Efendi [18] veyahud kethüda-yı samileri fütüvvetlu İzzet Efendi'nin bu tarafa irsaline himmet buyurulmak niyazı maruzunda ifade-i hale mücaseret kılınmağla ol babda irade ve himmet efendimindir. Fi 25 S 71. Bende.

Appendix 77. HR. MKT. 93/93, 1 December 1854. From the grand vizier to the commander of the Batum army and the governor of Trabzon.

Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanına ve Trabzon valisine tahrirat-ı samiye. Esaret maddesi.

Gürcistan'dan esaret suretiyle hiçbir şahsın çıkarılmaması ve Çerkesistan ahalsinin dahi evlad ve akraba ve müteallukatlarını satmaktan men' kılınması tenbihatını mutazammın bundan mukaddemce mahsusen evamir-i [2] aliye taktir ve irsal kılınmış ve bu makule eşhasın irsaline mahreç ittihaz olunan iskelelerde takidat-ı lazımenin icrası vesayası dahi tahrirat-ı mahsusa ile başkaca bildirilmiş idi. [3] Bu husus insaniyetçe ve maslahatça kemaliyle itina olunacak mevaddan olduğuna binaen bu babda kaffe-i memurinin ziyadesiyle dikkat ve sarf-ı mesai ve gayret eylemeleri devlet-i aliyenin matlub-u [4] kat'isi olup el haleti hazihi İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi ve donanmasının Kara Deniz'de bulunması münasebetiyle bu misillu esaret suretiyle çıkarılacak eşhasın men'i azimeti hususunda [5] led-el hace memurin-i saltanat-ı seniyyeye İngiltere donanması tarafından muavenet olunması hususunda haşmetlu İngiltere padişahı hazretleri tarafından İngiltere devleti amiraline mezuniyet [6] verildiği dahi bu kere İngiltere sefir-i muteberi cenapları cihetinden ifade olunarak Kara Deniz'de bulunan Fransa devlet-i fahimesi amiralinin dahi böyle bir madde-i mühimmeye [7] sarf-ı himmet edeceği bedihiyyattan olmağla icabı takdirinde anlar ile dahi bil-muhabere maznun olan iskelelerden o makule eşhasın hiçbirinin çıkamaması esbabının [8]

istihsaline himmet buyurmaları lazım geleceği ve bu maddede cüzice müsamaha pek büyük mesuliyeti davet edeceği beyanıyla nemika-i mahsusa-i senaveri terkimine ibtidar kılındı.

Appendix 78. İ. DH. 19997, dated 14 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (5 December 1854). From the grand vizier. On Ömer Pasha's appointment to the Crimea and İsmail Pasha's appointment to the Rumeli army.

Atufetlu efendim hazretleri

[1] Geçende İngiltere elçisi Lord Stratford cenabları nezd-i senaveriye gelerek Kırım'da devam etmekte olan hareket-ı harbiyenin bir ayak evvel hüsn-i netice bulmasının ehemmiyet-i müsellemesinden ve İngiltere ve Fransa devlet-i fahimelerinin [2] oradaki kuvve-i askeriyelerinin tevfirine teşebbüs olduğundan ve şimdiki halde Gözleve tarafında bir fırka-i kaviye-i askeriye bulundurulup da Sivastopol'un haricinde ve düvel-i müttetika askerinin arka tarafında içtima eden [3] Rusya kuvve-i askeriyesini şaşırtacak tedabire teşebbüs etmeklik lüzumundan bahisle Rumeli orduy-i hümayunundaki asakir-i hazret-i mülukaneden yigirmi bin nefer kurbünde ve muharebe görmüş asker ile bir büyük kumandan [4] gönderilmesini ifade ile bu kumandanın devletlu Ömer Paşa hazretleri olmasını dahi Lord Raglan'ın tarafına vaki olan iş'arı üzerine derece-i evla'da [?] olarak irad etmiş olduğunu ve bu mülahaza [5] nezd-i devlet-i aliyyede karin-i kabul olacağını anladığı gibi çünkü bu maddeyi Lord Raglan Fransa ordusu kumandan-an-şefi Ceneral Canrobert ile dahi müzakere etmiş olduğundan Fransa maslahatgüzarıyla [6] birlikte ve suret-i resmîyede Bab-ı Ali'ye beyan-ı keyfiyet olunmak üzere bu babda mahremane mülahaza-i vükelayı istifsar eylediğine mebni ifadat-ı meşruha şehri-i sabıkın evasıtından sonraki günlerin birinde beyn el-havas [7] dermiyan olundukda vakia Sivastopol'un tahriri ve Kırım'ın teshiri mesele-i mevcudenin ruhu olup inşallahu teala orada vücuda gelecek muzafferiyet harp ve sulhun hüsn-i netayicinden emniyet bahş [8] olacağı ve oranın işini yalnız devleteyn-i muavine asakirine ve kumandanlarına bırakmayıp devlet-i aliyenin dahi bir kuvve-i kamile ve muntazama ile müşareketi hem teshil maslahat-ı mev'udu ve hem de şanı mealî-unvan-ı [9] hazret-i şehinşahiye muvafık ve çesban idüğü ve çünkü Avusturya devleti asakirinin Memleketeyn'e duhulü mülabesesiyle Rusyalu'nun oralara tekrar tahattisi takdirinde ana karşı durmak Nemçelü'ye ait [10] bir hizmet olarak işbu yigirmi bin asakir-i muntazamanın tefrikinden sonra orduy-ı hümayunun baki kalacak kolu dahi Bulgaristan'ın muhafazasına bakmak lazım gelip Rumeli orduy-ı hümayununun [11] ilerisinde hasıl olacak faide dahi yalnız Rusyalu ol havalideki asakirini bütün bütün Kırım imdadına gönderememek mülahazasından ibaret olduğu halde bu hareketin vaktiyle icrası kabil [12] olamadığı cihetle el-yevm Rusyalu Kırım tarafına külliyetlu asker sevk etmiş olduğundan maslahatın bu günkü haline göre müşarünileyh Ömer Paşa hazretlerinin orduy-ı hümayunda bulunmasından Kırım'da devleteyn büyük kumandanlarıyla [13] birlikte olması daha elzem görüldüğü cihetle bu mülahaza devleteyn sefaret ve kumandanları nezdinde ber minval-i muharrer tasvip ve istihsan olduğu takdirde devlet-i aliyenin dahi re'y ve rızası anlarla beraber [14] bulunacağını sefir-i mumaileyh ifadesine müsteniden karar verilerek ol vechile mahremane beyan-ı keyfiyet edilmiş ve devlet-i aliyenin evvelden Kırım'da yigirmi bin kadar kuvve-i askeriyesi bulunduğu üzerine [15] bu kere dahi yigirmi bin asker daha irsal olunur ise bunun topu kırk bine baliğ olacağı cihetle böyle külliyetlu asakirin makulat ve mühimmatını nakl ve isale yalnız saltanat-ı seniye vapurları kafi [16] olamayacağı mülahazasına göre asakirin nakli hizmetinden başka zehair ve mühimmat-ı mukteziyenin peyapey Kırım'a irsali maddesine dahi düvel-i müttetika donanmalarının muavenet ve himmet eylemeleri iktiza edeceği dahi [17] sefir-i mumaileyhe bildirilmiş

idi. Sefir-i mumailleh Lord Raglan'ın işaretini üzerine mülâhazat-ı meşruhasını maslahat-güzar-ı mumailleh ifade eylediği vakit Canrobert tarafından kendüsi böyle bir iş'ar [18] olmamış olması cihetle suret-i resmîyede Bab-ı Ali'ye tebliğat itasında sefir-i mumailleh mürafakatında mütereddid bulunması üzerine Lord-ı mumailleh, Ceneral Canrobert'in bu maddeye dair işaret-ı müttehidanesine göre [19] icab-ı halin icrasına bakmak üzere bu keyfiyet meskut kaldığı halde bu kere iki kumandanın efkârı birleşerek maslahatgüzar-ı mumailleh dahi tahrirat gelmiş olduğundan şimdi iki sefaret tarafından dahi [20] ol miktar mücerreb ve münteheb asakir ile müşarünileyh Ömer Paşa hazretlerinin Kırım'a azimetini ve bu asakirin nakli zımında amiraller tarafından mahsus vapurlar tertip olunacağı ecelden müşarünileyh Ömer Paşa hazretlerinin asakir-i matlubeyi [21] tertip ve teheyü eyleyerek müşarünileyhima Raglan ve Canrobert ile bil-muhabere ircaı memuriyetine müsaraat eylemesi resmen ifade olunarak bu halde Anadolu ordusu müşiri devletlu İsmail Paşa hazretlerinin Rumeli [22] orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanlığı kaimmakamlığına tayiniyle Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa büyük kumandanlığa muktedir ve münasip bir zat intihap ve tayin kılınması tabiiyet-i maslahattan olacağına ve asakir-i matlubenin sevk [23] ve irsali ve müşarünileyh Ömer Paşa hazretlerinin bu asker ve devleteyn kumandan-an-şefleriyle birlikte bulunup müşarünileyh İsmail Paşa hazretlerinin Rumeli orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanlığı kaimmakamlığına tayini hususu [24] mukaddemce mecliste dahi güzeran etmiş idüğüne mebni ber minval-i muharrer müşarünileyh Ömer Paşa hazretlerine beyan-ı hal ve müşarünileyh İsmail Paşa hazretlerinin dahi kaimmakamlık ile Rumeli orduy-ı hümayununa derhal irsal [25] edilmesi hususunda her ne vechile emr ü ferman-ı keramet-unvan-ı hazret-i hilafetpenahi müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulur ise mhsrhir [?] ve isabet inha olacağı ve Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununun ıslahat-ı layıkaya [26] ihtiyacı umur-ı müsellemeden olmasıyla oraya dahi münasip ve muktedir bir zat intihap olunarak ve Kırım'da bulunacak kuvve-i askeriye için bir rabitalı defterdar tayini dahi [27] muktezi görüldüğünden bu memuriyet için münasip bir zat bulunarak bu keyfiyetlerin dahi mübarek hakpay-i aliden istizan kılınacağı beyanıyla tezkire-i senaveri terkîm olundu efendim. Fi 12 Ra sene 71 (mim)

Maruz-ı çaker-i kemîneleridir ki

Hame-pira-yı tazim olan işbu tezkire-i samiye-i asafaneleri manzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı hazret-i padişahi buyurulmuş ve ber minval-i muharrer müşarünileyh Ömer Paşa hazretlerine beyan-ı hal ve müşarünileyh İsmail Paşa hazretlerinin dahi kaimmakamlık ile Rumeli orduy-ı hümayununa derhal irsal edilmesi ve Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa münasip ve muktedir bir zat intihap olunarak ve zikr olunan kuvve-i askeriye defterdarlığı memuriyeti için dahi münasip bir zat bulunarak bu keyfiyetlerin dahi istizan kılınması şeref-sünuh ve sudur buyurulan emr ü irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı şehinşahi mukteza-ı celilinden bulunmuş olduğu muhat-ilm-i sami-i sadaretpenahileri buyuruldukta ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi 14 Ra sene 71

Appendix 79. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4, undated. Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha's testimony on the battle of Ahışa. (Comments of others are given in italics. Texts in red ink are from the original).

Ahışa'da vuku bulan bozgunluğun sebebi Ferik Ali Paşa hazretlerinden sual olunduktan orada olan vukuata dair yazmış olduğu işbu varaka meydana konulup Abdi Paşa ve Ahmed Paşa hazretleri hazır oldukları halde irad olunan suallere müşarünileyhim tarafından verilen cevaplardır ki maddeleri yanlarına surhla işaret kılındı.

Mesele-i hazırardan dolayı Ardahan'a sevk olunmak üzere teheyryü olunmuş olan fırka-i askeriye bil-istishab Erzurum'dan hareket olunarak ber tıbk-ı dilhah-ı ali nezaret-i icabiye ve ikdamat-ı kamilenin icrasıyla esna-i rahda ve Ardahan'da ikamet bulunduğu müddetçe saye-i ihsan-vaye-i hazret-i şahanede asakir-i merkumeye zerreten zaruret çekdirilmediği misillü muğayir-i rıza-i bari ve ali bil-cümle tebaa ve sekeneye vechen min el vücuh teaddi ve hasar vuku bulmayarak kaffe-i sekene memnun ve müteşekkik olduklarını an zahr?-il gayb hakpay-ı aliye ba mazbata inha etmiş ve mazbata-i mütekaddimleri *Ceride-i Havadis* nüshalarında be-ibaretha tab' ve temsil buyurulmuş idüğü

Suret-i hareketini beyandan ibaret olmağla hükmü olmadığı

Fırka-i mezkure ile Ardahan'a bil-muvasala bölük heyetiyle rükz-i hiyam ve ordunun etrafına nizamı vechile karakollar tesvik ve hasb-el ihtiyat Batum ve Ahılkelek ve Ahışha ve Kars ve Erzurum ve nefsi-ı Çıldır caddelerine pişrev karakollar tayiniyle ihtimam ve ihtiyat-ı icabiyenin icrasında ikdam-ı tam olunmuş olduğu

Bu maddenin dahi hükmü olmadığı

Düşmanın ahvaline kesb-i itla' ederek ona göre hareket ve emr-i tedabire mübaderet-i lazime-i halden ve usul-i harb iktizasından olduğuna mebni müteaddid casuslar tedarikiyle Ahışha ve Tiflis ve Ahılkelek taraflarına def'aten ba'd aheri irsal ve isra ve ol babda olunan istihbarat ve istirahat peyderpey Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu müşiri devletli Abdülkerim Paşa hazretleri tarafına tafsilen arz ve inha olunmuş olduğu

Bu dahi

Fırka-i mezkurenin Ardahan'da müddet-i ikameti imtidad olacağı mütalaasıyla Çıldır sancağı kaimmakamı saadetli Feyzullah Paşa ile bil-muhabere vel-mükatebe gerek müşarünileyh tarafından ve gerekse taraf-ı bendeganemden müteaddid memurlar tayin ve tıyarıyla bir sene-i kamile idare edecek erzak liva-i mezbur kazalarından mübayaa ve isticlab birle Ardahan'da iddihar-ı anbar kılınmış ve an zahr?-il gayb vuku' bulan arz ve işar-ı saireye mebni sübut-i Ceride-i Havadis olmuş idüğü

Bu dahi

İşte bala-i hikaye bulunan asakir ve ümera-i zabitan-ı askeri yekdil yekvücut cümlemiz derecesiz dikkat ve cansiperane hizmet ederek hatta taburların nıfları dahi geceleri bile münavebe ile hazır durmakta olup artık kuvve-i metanet pek yolunda olarak düşman tarafından fırsat olmak pek memul olmaz idi. Fakat Telfiz [Tiflis?] caddesinin zabt ü ihtimamına muvafik olamadığımız cihetle buradan her vakit muhatara memul olur idi. Bu memule göre fi 24 S sene 70 [26.11.1853] tarihinde Rusya askerinin saat sekiz raddelerinde beş tabur piyade bir takım süvari yedi kıta top imdadı gelip cadde-i mezkurdan geçip Ahışha'ya azimetlerini ümera-i zabitan-ı askeri ve neferat ve cümlemiz müşahade ederek bunun üzerine tarafımızda daha ziyade kuvve-i metanet ve basiret ve gece gündüz gaile-i gafletten beri olmak üzere memur bulunan mirliva paşalara ve ümera-i zabitan-ı askerinin [sic] cümlesine şifahen ve gerek tezkire-i ekid ile tenbih-i tekrar olunarak bu halde kuvve-i ihtimam ve basiretde iken fi 25 S sene 70 [27.11.1853] tarihinde ale's-sabah Rusya askeri kaleden dışarı çıkıp Suhlic [sic] karyesi üzerine doğru gelmekte oldukları müşahade olundu-ğuna mebni bizim dahi hazır ve müheyya olmağımız lazime-i hizmetten olduğuna binaen bit-tertib ve icab tedarik-i basiret birle durmakta iken bir top menzili kadar tarafımıza yakın geldikte hatt-ı harb üzere karşuda durup bizim tarafa toplar atmağa mübaşeret eylediğinden biz dahi bizim topların atılmasına mübaşeret ederek Suhlic'deki [sic] olan piyade üç tabur ile ma süvari bir hat olmak üzere sağ cenahdaki [sic] bulunan üç taburdan birisi Harput redifinin dördüncü taburu Binbaşısı Mustafa Ağa kumandasıyla derakıb Suhlic'e

gönderildi. Sağ cenah-ı mezkurda kalan iki tabur piyade ve beş kıta top birinci hatta ihtiyat olmak üzere Mirliva Mustafa Paşa'ya şifahen tenbih olunarak tertib olunduğu cihetle vaktinde hemen geldiler ve bendeleri dahi iki hattın ortalık yerinde bir tepecik üzerinde durdum. Ol vakit nizamiye altıncı alayının iki taburunu dahi kaimmakam ve binbaşılar kumandasıyla Suhlic'e gönderdim. Mahall-i mezkurda altı tabur piyade bir alay süvari yedi kıta top mevcut oldular. İki tabur piyade ve beş kıta top dahi ihtiyatdan kaldılar. Dört saat kadar top muharebesi oldukça gerek zeminin buharı ve gerek tarafeynden atılan topların dumanı çöküp gece misillü karanlık olduğundan artık birbirimizi görmez olduk.

Ol vakit düşman tarafından daha top atılmadığından bizim taraftan dahi attırmadan beş on dakika kadar tarafeyn sükunetle durdular ise de badehu düşman askeri "uğra" [sic] deyu haykırmalarıyla bizim asker dahi "padişahım çok yaşa" deyu bülend-avazlar ile haykırıp top ve tüfenk ve kılıncı artuk tarafımızdan bir vaveyla-i azim ile muharebe etmekte iken saat sekiz raddelerini bulunca Harput redifinin bazıları gerüye ricat etmeğe başladıklarını gördüğüm halde bunların gerü çevrilmesiçün durduğum noktadan bunlara nazaran yanımda duran zabıtana dahi bunları çevirin ve çevirdin deyu söyleyerek öyle uğraşırken daha ziyade kesret bulmakta olduğundan bulunduğum nokta mahallinde iki tertib koyup toplanma tranpetesini urdurdum çünkü muharebeden bir mah mukaddem yeni gelen kanunname-i hümayun herkese başka başka ve bölüklerde dahi okutturulmuş idi. Ol vechile icray-i hareket olunarak ricat eden neferatın cem'i hakkında bendelerinin ve zabitanın uğraşıp yine mümkün olamayarak önü alınamamış, ol vakit bendelerine yüz hatve mesafe mahal hayliden hayli başıbozuk neferim [sic] askeri ve gerek nizamiye dağa doğru kaçmakta olduklarını gördüğümde arkaları sıra şu vechile haykırdım: 'Yahu asker kanununu okudunuz. Niçün kaçıyorsunuz? Dönün, gelin!' dediğimde sem' ü iltifat etmediler ve hatta başıbozuklara dahi ayrıca haykır-dım: 'Kendü gönlünüz ile gelip de şimdi niçün kaçıyorsunuz? Askere de sebep oldunuz, sizi ururum!' dediğimde bunlar dahi iltifat etmediklerinden ber mucab-i kanunname bir el silah attım ve 'Dönmediğiniz halde size top attırırım!' deyu haykırdım. Yine dönmenin mümkünü olmayıp gittiler. Fakat attığım bir el silah kimesneye isabet edip etmediğini bilemiyorum. İşte bu firariler için uğraşmakta iken Mirliva Ali Paşa'nın uşağı gelip paşanın urulduğunu haber verdikte bendeniz süratle hayvanı sürüp vardığımda kendüni askere bildirme deyu ifade edip oradan Bamık (?) karyesine getürdüm ve yine bulunduğum nokta mahalline geldim. Tranpet urulmak sebebiyle ricat eden askerden biraz nizamiye tecemmü olup ihtiyat ile beraber yine muharebeye başladılar ise de yine içlerinden ricat eden eksik olmayıp kesretde zuhur eylediğinden bunların zabt ü tecemmüü olamayıp ve cem' olunsalar dahi yine kaçmakta olmalarıyla düşman ise bu halleri ve bozgun misillü hareketleri hiss etmesiyle daha üzerimize varmakta olmasına ve askerinin çevrilmesine led-el meşgul rakib olduğum esb ile sağ ve sola derken esb dahi yorulup yıkıldıkta bendeniz altında kaldım. Ol vakit yanımda bulunan sekiz on nefer Kürt bendenizi kaldırdılar. İşte bu vechile uğraşıp ve muharebe olmakta iken muahharen ihtiyat tarafları bozulup bir daha tecemmü mümkün olmayıp her biri bir tarafa kaçtılar. Bunun üzerine Rusyalu dahi hücum ederek topları zabt eyledi. Ol hale nazaran bendeniz de avdet eyledim.

Ve rivayet olduğuna göre esnay-i rahda başıbozuk ve asakir-i nizamiyeye silah attı deyu hakk-ı acizanemde mekal olmuş ise de bunların aslı olmayıp bala-i beyan muharebe arasında attığım bir el silahtan ibaret idi ve malum-ı alileri buyurulduğu vechile böyle bozgun müteferrik gittiği halde değil silah dun muamele bile olamaz. Bozgun olarak avdetimiz ile esnay-i rahda başıbozuk askerine şu vechile ifade eyledim ki 'Düşmanın bize galib gelmesi ancak onların itaatlı olmasındandır. Hatta başıbozuk kulları bile boru ile kumanda icra ederler. Ben size ol mikdar haykırdıktan sonra

muharebe mahallinde yine bir el silah dahi attım, yine çeviremedim. Yazıklar olsun!’ dedim.

Ve Hurşid Paşa’nın inhasından anlaşılın muharebeye mübaşeret olunduğu vakit ferik paşa gerüye çekildi deyu hakk-ı acizanemde rivayet olunmuş bu misillü keyfiyat vuku bulma-mışdır ve hem dahi bu guna mekalatı asla kabul etmem. Şu muharebede değil bendenizin kaffe-i zabitan can ve baştan hizmet ettik ve bendelerinin dahi bu hal üzere can ve başım uğur-ı meyamin-i padişahide heba ve itlaf etmek ve alel husus din ve millet yolunda cansiperane hizmet etmek hususunu nimet-i celil bilerek muharebe-i mezkur bidayetinden nihayetine kadar iki hattın aralık yerinde ne vechile uğraşdığımı batinen cenab-ı hakk bildikten sonra zahiren Erzincan şeyhlerinden Hilmi Efendi ve Hacı İbrahim Efendi ve Erzurumi Hacı Mustafa Efendi ve Gevleve (?) kazasından Küçük Arslan Bey sekiz on ademler ile ve Oltu meclis azasından Coşkun Bey bunların cümlesi heyet ve hizmet-i acizanemi gördüler ve batınî dahi ne vechile idim ancak cenab-ı hakk bilür. Bu cihetle istek ve gayret var iken düşman-ı mezkuru münhezim etmek memulünde iken muvafık olamamış olduğumuzdan vuku’-ı muharebenin bed ve nihayeti bil-etraf hikaye-i acizanem üzere der cenab-ı halık için kudretlu padişah-ı velinimetimiz efendimiz hazretlerinin ömr ü afiyetlerini mezdad ve ber karar buyurup âdâ-i bedhahilerin perişan ve şu hallerin ahz-ı intikamlarını müyesser ve mukadder eylesün amin.

[page 6]

Hasb-el ihtiyat Ardahan’da bazı istihkamatın icrası hususu müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri taraflarından bil-istizan iktizasına irae-i ruy-i müsaade buyurularak istihkamat-ı mezkureye lüzum görünen adatı matlub olduğu halde irsal buyurulmadığından biz-zarur Şavşad kazasından bin aded kürek ve yüz elli kadar kazma celbiyle iki aded tabya ve yigirmi beş göz zeminlik inşa olunmuş ve elyevm mamur ve mevcut bulunmuş olduğu

Bu dahi

İlerüye azimet olunduğu vakit lüzum mütalaasıyla mezkur Şavşad kazasından fındık çubuğu celb olunarak iki yüz aded sepet ve altı kalkan imal ve çayı geçmek için lüzumu mikdar tahta ve tulum dahi tehiye ettirilmiş ve el haleti hazihi Ardahan’da mevcut bulunmuş olduğu

Bu dahi

Bu cümle-i tedbir üzerine kuvve-i askeriye kemalinde olmuş olması lazıme-i halden ve faraiz-i umurdan olduğuna ve fırka-i mezkur ise altı tabur redif ve iki tabur nizamiyeden mürekkebe olup zikr olunan redif taburlarının üçü Kars’dan Ardahan’a muahharen gelmiş ve on iki saat mesafede otuz neferi esnay-i rahda firar etmiş olduğuna ve suret-i hale nazaran hin-i muharebede gevşek davranacakları maznun olup nizamiyenin dahi zaten az görüldüğü-ne mebni lüzumu kadar nizamiyenin irsal ve kuvve-i askeriye ikmal buyurulması hususu müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine arz ve inha olunduğu halde bir guna semere müşahade olunmamış olduğu.

“Bu askerin muallim nizamiye ile tebdili mümkün değil mi idi?” sualine “işe yaramayacağı beyan olunan asker Taşköprü redifinin pek güzidesi olup, olmasa bile işbu terfik olunandan ziyade sevk etmek veyahud bunları tebdil eylemek maddeleri hayyiz-i imkanda olamayıp çünkü asakir-i mevcude iktiza eden mahallere yerleşdirildiğinden bir yerin huluvviyle diğer mahalle kuvve-i kafiye sevki caiz olamayacağı” cevabı müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından verilmiştir.

Fırka-i mezkurede bulunan topçu binbaşısı ve neferatının ekserisi redif olduğundan topçu binbaşılardan harb görmüş, cesur ve dirayetli bir binbaşının irsalı hususu müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine arz ve inha olunmuş olup geçenlerde kol ağalığı inha olunan Yüzbaşı Şakir Ağa'nın istidadından bahisle irsal olunarak matlub vechile binbaşı irsaline müsaade buyurulmamış idüğü

“Böyle bir binbaşının gönderilmesi lazım idi” denildikte “Erzurum’da iken Ali Paşa’nın intihabıyla bir topçu binbaşısı tayin olunmuş ise de muahharen bunda işe yaramadığı tarafından inha olunması üzerine keyfiyet meclise havale olunup Ali Paşa’nın maiyetinde bulunan Yüzbaşı Şakir Ağa’nın ehliyeti cihetle rütbesinin kol ağalığına terfiyle istihdamı kararlaştırıldığından iktizası vechile keyfiyet kendülerine yazılmışdı. Bunun üzerine mumaileyhin işe yaramadığı beyan ile diğerinin irsalini müşarünileyh bi-tekrar yazdı ise de öyle zabitan memuriyetleri üzerinde olduğundan biz-zarur tayin olunamadığı ve mumaileyh Şakir Ağa’nın ehliyeti meclisce bilinip istihdamı kararlaştırılmış idüğü” cevabı müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından verilmiştir.

Fırka-i mezkure ile Ardahan’da bulunan cephaneye bil-muvazene fırka-i mezkurenin mevcudu dört bin olduğu halde beher nefere sekiz deste ve mevcut sekiz bine balığ olacağı takdirde beher nefere dört deste fişenk düşeceği ve bu suretle mezkur fişenklerin az olduğu misillü topların dörder yüz atım cephanesi olduğundan bunların altışar yüze iblağı ve mikdar-ı vafi fişenk irsalı hususu kezalik müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine yazıldığı halde irsal buyurulmamış olduğu

Bu cephanenin niçün gönderilmediği ve suret-i tesviyesi ne vechile olduğu led-es sual, “topçu binbaşısı tarafından noksan neferata ve mevadd-ı saireye dair verilen pusulayı Ali Paşa bana gönderdi. Ben dahi usuli vechile meclise havale eyledim. Meclis dahi topçu livası burada olmadığından vürudunda iktizasına bakılacağını istilam etmekle mucebince (?) kendüsine yazmış idim” cevabı müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından verilmesi üzerine “şu gönderilmiş olan pusulada muharrer olan şeyler ne idi?” denildikte müşarünileyh Ali Paşa işte bunlardır diyerek bir kıta pusula irae eylemiş ise de muharrere olan yalnız neferata verilen fişengin mikdarını mübeyyin olmasıyla hudud-ı haric bulunduğu anlaşılıp müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri dahi Ali Paşa’nın buna dair gelen tahriratı hasb-el usul meclise verildikten sonra meclis dahi topçu livasına havale eyledikte müşarünileyhin beraber aldığı cephanenin kafi olduğu ve ilerüde lüzumu olur ise icabına bakılacağı derkenar olunup mucebince meclisten dahi ilam olunarak müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri biraz cephaneye daha gönderildiğini ifade eyledikte müşarünileyh Ali Paşa dahi “vaktiyle vasıl olamayıp avdetimde cephaneye yolda tesadüf ettim. Cephanenin ol kadar lüzumu var idi ki gavgasnasında asakir cephanesizlikten düşmana el ile taş attılar” demiştir.

Mirliva Veli Paşa lüzumu mikdar asker ile avangard tarikiyle Kars’dan Arpaçayı’na doğru irsal buyurulmuş olduğundan bahisle Ardahan’dan dahi münasip bir zabıt ile Ahışa’ya hudud başına avangard olarak asker sevk olunması ba emirname-i müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafından emr ü işar buyurulmuş olduğundan iki bölük süvari ve iki bin kadar asakir-i muvazzafa ile Miralay Hasan Bey avangard tarikiyle hudud başına sevk ve izam olunup ve orada ne vechile amel ve hareket edeceğini bilmek ve ona göre hareket eylemek üzere emirname-i mezkure mir-i mumaileyhe irae ve meal-i valası bil-etraf ifade ve tefhim ettirilmiş idüğü

Meclisce teşebbüs olunan tedabire dair olmağla hükmü olmadığı

Mumaileyh Hasan Bey re’s-i hududa muvasalatından çend gün sonra düşman tarafından tahatti zuhur ve silah endahtından naşi beri taraftan def’-i kıyam ve muharebeye atf-i

licam olunarak cenab-ı hakkın lütf ü ihsanıyla asakir-i İslam muzaffer ve düşman askeri münhezim olarak hayliden hayli telefât vukuundan başka bir bab karantinahane ve yigirmi bab postahaneleri ihrak ve yüzbaşı ve çavuş ve onbaşı ve neferattan çend re's esir ahz ve ol esnada kelle ve kulak kesilmesine dair men' iradesi henüz şeref-tevarüd etmemiş olduğundan beş on kadar kelle kesilerek mezkur üsera ile beraber Ardahan'dan taraf-ı çakeraneme irsal ve tisyar ve bunun üzerine düşmanın külliyetli asker ve topu geleceğini müşahade etmiş olduğundan kuvve-i zuhuriye yetişdirilmesi hususu mir-i mumaileyh tarafından suy-i abidaneme işar olunmaktan naşi derhal üsera-i mezkure ve kelle ve kulaklar müşir-i müşarünileyh taraflarına irsal ve mir-i mumaileyhin işarı vechile imdad yetişdirilmesi istizan olundukta cevaben varid olan iradelerine mebni üç tabur piyade ve altı kıta top ile Mirliva izzetli Ali Paşa mumaileyh Hasan Bey tarafına sevk olunmuş olduğu

Vukuatın beyanını mutazammın olup paşa-i müşarünileyhin istizanı üzerine mumaileyh Hasan Bey tarafına Mirliva Ali Paşa'nın kumandasıyla mikdar-ı کافی asker gönderilmesi yazılmış olduğunu müşarünileyhima Abdi Paşa ve Ahmed Paşa hazeratı ifade ve beyan eylemişlerdir.

Mirliva-i mumaileyh miralay-ı mumaileyhe muvasalatında bi-tekrar muharebe vuku' bularak bi-avn-i rabbani asar-ı muzafferiyet asakir-i İslamiye tarafında ve müdemmeriyet Rusyalı canibinde zuhur edip hayli telefâtı olduğundan yedi nefer dahi esir alınarak düşman askeri müzhezimen avdet ve kaleye kapanmak üzere müsaraat ve asakir-i nusret-müessir-i hazret-i şahane dahi bit-takib hücum birle hatta süvari nizamiye ve asakir-i muvazzafa derun-ı Ahışa'ya girip yine avdetle kaleye yarım saat mesafede vaki Suhlis nam karye ile civarında bulunan karyelere yerleşerek mezkur esirleri taraf-ı bendeganeme irsal etmiş ve bendeleri dahi Ardahan'dan hareket etmiş bulunduğundan üsera-i merkumeye yolda tesadüf eylediğimden onlar dahi emsali misillü müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafına irsal ve fakat bu muharebede bir nefer onbaşı ve bir çavuş şehid olmuş olmağla keyfiyetleri müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine işar ve lüzum görünmesi cihetle Kaimmakam Hacı Eyüp Bey ile iki tabur piyade taraf-ı çakeriden derhal imdaden ilerüye irsal ve tisyar olunmuş olduğu

"Liva ve miralay-ı mumaileyhimanın böyle tecavüz eylemelerine ne tarikden emir verilmiş-dir?" denildikte müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri "Tecavüz olunmayıp tahaffuzi durulmasını yazmış idim. Bilmem nasıl oldu" demeleri üzerine müşarünileyh Ali Paşa "Vakıa müşarünileyh hazretlerinin böyle bir tahriratı gelerek mumaileyhimaya gösterdüm ve mealini dahi bil-etrafı tefhim eyledim. Onlar bu tecavüzi hareketi kendüliklerinden ihtiyar eylediler" demiştir.

Mirliva-i mumaileyh keyfiyet-i meşruhayı evvelce taraf-ı bendeganeme işar ve müsaraaten yetişmemizi izbar etmiş olduğundan derhal keyfiyet müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafından bil-istizan ol babda ruhsatı nümayan olmağla bir gün sonra gelmek üzere bir tabur piyade ve dört bölük süvari ile Mirliva Mustafa Paşa Ardahan'da birağılıp çakerleri iki tabur piyade ve altı kıta top istishabıyla Ardahan'dan hareket ve Poshov kazasına tabi Diğor karyesine muvasalat olunmuş ve salif-üz zıkr Suhlis karyesine varılıp varılmaması mumaileyh Ali Paşa'dan istihrac olundukta hemen mezkur Suhlis karyesine yetişilmesi lazımeden olduğunu işar etmekten naşi oradan hareket ve Suhlis karyesinde mirliva-i mumaileyhe muvasalat olunmuş ve Ahışa kalesinin bir çaryek mesafesinde Nevabet [?] dağına ve sair icab eden mahallere liva-i mumaileyh tarafından evvelce va'z ve ikame olunan karakollara bir kat dahi taraf-ı çakeriden nezaret ve takviyet verilerek kalenin etrafı bütün bütün zabt olunmuş ve mumaileyh Mustafa Paşa dahi beraberinde bulunan piyade ve süvari ile bir gün sonra taraf-ı çakeraneme muvasalat ederek Çenek [Cenk?] nam karyede bir tabur ile ikame ettirilmiş idüğü

Bu harekete suret-i mezuniyetleri ne vechile olduğu sual olundukta müşarünileyh Ali Paşa, “İlerü gitmek için ba-tahrirat istizan eyledim ve şu gelen cevaba göre hareket ettim” demesi üzerine “Vakia meal-i tahrirata göre ruhsat verilmiş demek oluyor. Mukaddemki tahriratınızda tecavüz olunmayıp tahaffuzi halde durulmasını yazmış olduğunuz halde, sonradan böyle hareket-i tecavüziyeye ruhsat verilmesi neden iktiza eyledi?” denildikte müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa, “Şu gösterilen mektubda beyan olduğu üzere Ali Paşa ilerü gitmek için ruhsat istemiş ve bunda ne suret memul idüğünü kaviyyen tasrih eylemiş olduğundan bunun üzerine ruhsat vermemek nasıl caiz olurdu?” demiştir.

Gerek mirliya ve miralay-ı mumaileyhimanın Ahışha üzerine ve gerek Ardahan müdiri Hüseyin Bey ile biraderi Çıldır müdiri Hasan Bey’in Ahılkelek tarafına sevk olduğu vakitlerde işbu serzede-i zuhur olan mesele hiçbir vakitte zuhur etmemiş olup bu halde cihad üzerinde bulunan ehl-i İslam “esteizu billahi teala innema el muminun ihvatun” irade-i hikmet-adesi mucibince yekvücut karındaşı olması ve bu umur-ı muazzama-i diniye ve dünyeviyenin hüsn-i ifası zımnında fiilen ve kalben bezl-i mechud eylemiş ve mukaddemki vakada Rusyalu’nun mahruset-ül memalik-i hazret-i şahaneden bazı mahalleri istila etmesine sebep adem-i ittihad ve ittifak olmuş olduğu ve mamafih şu vakitte bir ehl-i İslam ile diğer bir ehl-i İslamın kıtal iddiası olsa bile tarafeyn terk-i dava ile şime (?)’i ittihad-ı diniyeye can-ı hakla sarılıp uğur-ı din ve Devlet-i Aliyye’de fedakârane hareket ve “cahidu fi sebilullah” nass-ı celili üzere cihada himmet etmek lazım geleceğini ve maazallahu teala bunun hilafına hareket eden ve taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliyye’ye öte taraf ahalisinden istihak üzere bulunan reayaya hilaf-ı şer’-i şerif ve kanun-ı münif teaddi ve hasar eyliyenlerin tedibat-ı icabiyeleri icra kılına-cağı asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafaya layıkıyla tefhim eylemeleri ve kendüleri dahi minval-i meşruh üzere hareket eylemeleri mir-i mumaileyhim taraflarından suy-i çakeriden ba nemika-i mahsusa beyan kılındığı misillü anif-ül beyan Suhlis karyesine muvasalat-ı bendeganemde Ahışha’nın havi olduğu kazalarda kain ehl-i İslam ve reayaya velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padişah-ı faruk-sıfat efendimiz hazretlerinin şamilet-ül afak olan adl ü dad ve merhamet-i seniyyelerini işaren ve ihbaren ilan ve taraf-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyye’ye dehalet ve istiman edenlerin irad ve akar ve emlak ve sair her neleri var ise kemakan ihsan buyurulacağı ve mal ve can ve ırz-ı namusundan emin olacaklarını ityan eylediğime ve min gayri liyakatin bu suretle iknaa muvafık olduğuma mebni bil-cümle kazaların söz anlarları taraf-ı abidaneme gelmiş ve merasim-i şükr-güzarinin ifasıyla birer nefer müdir nasbını istida etmiş ve ol vechile altı kazaya altı nefer müdir nasb u tayin ve yedlerine istiman-ı kamileyi mutazammın ahaliye hitaben birer kıta buyruldu ita olunarak mahallerine tesrib ve buyruldukların birer kıta suretleri-nin leffiyile vukuuhal müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafına arz ve işar kılınmış ve yalnız kalesiyle nefsi Ahışha kazası Rusyalu’nun elinde kalmış olduğu ve kale-i mezburun teshiri kale döğer toplara mütevakıf ve imdad olarak biraz asker irsaline menut olduğu izbar olunmuş olduğu

Hikayeden ibaret olmasıyla hükmü olmadığı

Bunca defa olan arz ve istiday-i bendeganem üzerine kuvve-i askeriyece bir guna müsaade runüma olmadığı gibi noksan olan altı kıta kapaklunun irsali hususu müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine işar olunarak zuhur etmediğinden tehirine sebep bargirin olmaması ise oralarda lüzumu mikdar hayvanat muvafakat-i çakeranemle alınıp irsal olunacağından bahisle işin gerü kalmaması tekrar istizan olundukta ona dahi irae-i ruy-i ruhsat olunmayarak nihayet mezkur kapaklular öküzlere ile Ahışha’ya irsal olunmuş olduğu

“Bu kapaklular niçün gönderilmedi?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Mümkün olabildiği ve mevcud bulunduğu kadar gönderildi” demesi üzerine Ahmed Paşa

hazretleri, Ali Paşa'nın Ardahan mevkiine memuriyetinde gerek kendüsünün bil-istishab götürdüğü ve gerek muahha-ren irsal olunan toplar on iki kıta ve kapaklular altı aded idi. İşbu on iki kıta topun dörder yüz atım olmak üzere cephanelerinin bir mikdarı mezkur altı kıta kapaklulara ve küsuru dahi sanduk ve sepetler derununda hayvanata tahmilen mükemmel olarak Erzurum'dan gönderil-mişdi ve bunlardan başka diğer altı kıta kapaklunun dahi gönderilmesi her çend murad olundu ise de bazıları tamir olunmakta bazıları dahi Cizre [?] tarafından gelmekte olduğundan vakit ve zamanıyla yetişdirilemediğini ifade eyledikten sonra öyle öküzler ile gönderilmesi neden iktiza eylediği sorulduktan müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa "Öküz ile gönderildiğini bilmiyorum. Revş-i halden anlaşıldığına göre keyfiyet Ali Paşa tarafından Kars'a yazılmış ve orada müsteşar efendi marifetiyle gönderilmiş demek oluyor demekle bunların vürudundan kaç gün sonra bozgunluk zuhur eylediği sual olundukta üç dört gün sonra vuku' bulduğunu Ali Paşa ifade eylemesi üzerine müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa'nın "Şimdi maslahat meydana çıktı. Bizim Kars'dan hareketimizden on - on beş, belki on yedi gün sonra bozgunluk zuhura gelmiş idi. Demincek dediğim gibi Kars'a yazılmış ve müsteşar efendi marifetiyle göndermiştir. Çünkü hesabca o vakit Kars'dan çıkmış idi" demesini müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa tasdik edip, "Hal böyle olunca bu kapaklulara niçün bargir tedarik olunmadı?" sualine "Mukaddem bulunduğum Ardahan ve civarından bargir tedariki mümkünatdan idi. Mübayaasına her bar tahriren ruhsat istedim. Abdi Paşa vermedi ve mennine dair gelen tahriratu işte budur" cevabını vermesi üzerine müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa, "Evet öyle bir tahriratu geldi lakin meali maiyetinde bulunan topların hayvanat ve sairesi noksan olduğundan ibaret bulunup meclisine bil-havale kendüsiyle sevk olunan asakirin kaffe-i levazımatı mükemmel olmak iktiza edeceğinden bundan şimdilik sarf-ı nazarla eğerçi bu işar neferat-ı mevcudenin tekessür etmesinden neşet eylemiş ise bilinip ona göre icabına bakılması kararlaştırıldığından keyfiyet kendüsinden istizah kılınmışdı. Bu hale göre bargir mübayaasına ruhsat istenilmesi o kapaklu ve topların vürudundan evvel demektir" deyu beyan-ı hal edip "vakta bu tahriratın meali bunu musaddık olduğundan ve kapakluların vürudundan evvel işar olduğundan bunun sıhhati nasıldır?" denildikte, Ali Paşa, "Ben bilmem. Yazdım gibi hatıra gelür" demesine mebni "mektub tarihe göre evvel yazılmış" denildikte "Belki öyledir. Pek de bilmiyorum" dedikten sonra "Bunlar için ifadeniz vechile sahihen bargir istemek veyahud mübayaa edilmek lazım gelür idi" sualine buna vakit kalmayıp bozgunluk zuhur ettiği ve "O kapaklular ve toplar nerelerde kaldı?" denilmesine dahi eyadi-i düşmana geçtiği cevabını vermişdir.

Bir gün Ahışa kazası üzerine hücum olunmak üzere asakir-i nizamiye kol heyetine konulup kasabanın pişgahında bulunan tepe üzerine varılarak asakir-i muvazzafa kasabanın kenarına sevk olunmasıyla beraber muharebeye ibtidar olduğu anda zıkr olunan asakir-i muvazzafaya düşman tarafından fakat bir top endaht olduğu halde redif askerine fevkalgaye havf ve dehşet tari olup hatta Harput redifinden on beş – yigirmi kadar neferat ittisalinde bulunan meşeliğe doğru yüz çevirdiklerinden hazır bulunan erkan ve ümera ve zabitan her ne hal ise askeri heyetinden çıkarmamağa gayret ederek düşmana renk vermeksizin ol gün hücumdan sarf-ı nazarla ahşama kadar fakat top muharebesi olunmuş idüğü

Ahışa'ca zuhur eden muharebeye ve asakirin ahvaline dair olmağla hükmü olmadığı

Ber minval-i meşruh Ahışa'nın abluka heyetinde etrafı zabt olduğu kumandanı tarafından Tiflis serdarına ba-posta çıkarmış olduğu dörder beşer nefer Kazak süvarileri müstesahib oldukları çanta ve muharebatla ahz ü gereft ve mezkur çantalar derununda olan evrak keşf ve Rusyalıca [sic] bilür asker etbasından birine tercüme ettirildikte Tiflis'den irsal olunacak asker ve mühimmat ve sairenin araba ve esblere tahmilen ve irkaben sürat-i irsalini yazmış oldukları anlaşılacak mezkur çantalar ve Kazaklar ve

tercüme olunan evrak takımıyla müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafına tısyar ve düşmanın bu vechile olan hareketi üzerine serian ve acilen imdad yetiştirilmesi izbar olunmuş ve bu babda fevkalade terci ve ***? kılınmış ise de yine bir guna eser müşahede olunamamış olduğu

Bu istenilen asker niçün gönderilmediği sual olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Öyle asker irsaline imkan bulunamayıp olsa bile kumandan olarak Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin mevcut maiyeti olan başıbozuk askeriyle oraya gitmesine pek de hacet yok gibi idi” cevabını verip “Ne tarihte istimdad olundu?” denildikte Safer’in yigirmi beşinci gününden evvel istimdad eylediğini Ali Paşa söylemiş, müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa dahi “çünkü Ali Paşa daima asker ve levazımat istemekden hali olmaz idi. Lakin Kars’ca ve mevaki-i sairece ol vakte kadar asker ve levazımat lüzumu derecesinde olduğundan ve eğerçi Kars’da üç tabur asker mevcut idi. Bunun ihracıyla oranın hali birağılmasını tecviz etmediğimden tevkif edip arası biraz geçerek yine tekid ettiğinden ve Zarif Paşa dahi yazdığından şiddet-i lüzumu anlaşılıp Arabistan ordusundan gelecek asker dahi Kars’a yaklaştığından Kars’da mevcut olduğu beyan olunan üç taburun ikisi Ardahan’a sevk olundu” demiş olmasıyla “İşte asker gönderilmiş demektir. Geldi mi?” denildikte, “Bu askeri bozgunluk zuhurundan sonra Ardahan’a avdetinde orada bulunduğunu ve Miralay Mustafa Bey’e “Niçün imdada gelmediniz?” denildikte miralay-ı mumaileyh “Biz üç gün oldu buraya geleli. Bize bir guna emir olunmadı ki gidelim” deyu söylemiş olduğunu Ali Paşa ifade eylemesi üzerine bu askerin orada sebab-i tevkifi sual olundukta “Bilmem ben sevk eyledim. Artık orada kim kumanda etmişse ondan sormalı” cevabını müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa verdikten sonra “Rusyalu’nun tutulan posta kağıtları geldi. Lakin defaatle kıraat ettirildikte içinde işe yarar bir lakırdı bulunmayıp tayinata dair jurnal ve sair misillü evrak olduğu anlaşıldı” demesi üzerine Ali Paşa dahi “O kağıtların içinde pek çok işe yarar şey var idi. Hatta tercümelerinin hulasesi dahi işte budur” diyerek bir varaka ibraz etmiş ve “Buna itimad olunmaz ise asılları dahi mahallinden celb olunsun” demiştir.

Bu hal ile beş defa muharebe vuku’ bulup muzafferiyet asakir-i İslamiye tarafında bulunmuş ve Rusya askeri münhezimen kaleye ricat eylemiş ise de Tiflis tarafından külliyetlü imdadı geleceği sahihen haber alınıp serian bir alay piyade ve bir alay süvari ve iki kıta kebir kale topu ve bir havan gönderilmesi ve şayed Kars’da mevcut yoğise kale-i Erzurum’dan celb ile yetiştirilmesi defaten ba’d aheri müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine arz ve işar olunduğu halde maiyyet ve refakat-i çakeride bulunan asker mertebe-i kifayede olduğunu cevaben işar edip ondan kat’-ı ümid olunup suret-i hal bil- etraf devletli Zarif Paşa tarafına işar kılınarak müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine on yedi defa yazmış ve bilahere mühürdarı Ahmed Bey’i dahi göndermiş ise de bir faide müşahede edememiş olduğundan biz-zarur çakerleri refakatinde gelmiş olan Erzurumi Cennetzade fütüvetli Ziya Bey’i şifahen ifade etmek üzere müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine Kars’a Kars’a [sic] irsal ederek mir-i mumaileyh tarafından keyfiyet bil- etraf ifade olundukta ondan dahi bir faide olmamış ve bir nefer imdad gelmemiş idiği

Bu madde dahi nasıldır sualine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Demincek beyan eylediğim vechile imkanı bulunabildiği derecede icab eden mahallere asker gönderildiği sırada Ali Paşa tarafına dahi bir miktar asker gönderilmiştir” cevabını vermiştir.

Heyet-i mezkur üzere yigirmi beş gün üzerinde kalınp bir gün iane ve imdad yetişmediği gibi Ahışa ile Kars’ın arası on beş – yigirmi saatten ibaret mesafe iken bari heyet-i ordu ve abluka ne vechile olduğunu ve ne suretle hareket olunmakta idüğünü müşahade etmek üzere erkan-ı harb memurlarından olsun birisi irsal buyurulmamış ve bin-nihaye yetmiş senesi Safer-ül Hayr’ının yigirmi üçüncü Pencşenbe günü Rusyalu- nun beş tabur piyade ve bir miktar süvari imdadı gelip bil-müşahede keyfiyet yine müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine yazılmış ve şehir-i mezbur yigirmi beşinci günü

[27.11.1853] ale's-seher asakir-i mevcud-ı külliyle Ahışha'nın yerlü reayasını bil-istishab mezkur Suhlis karyesinin karşusuna toplarını çekip endahtıyla beraber tarafeynden muharebeye mübaşeret ve dört saat kadar top muharebesi olunarak bura taburları sevk olunup bi-hikmetillahi teala ol gün havan'ın sesiyle beraber tarafeynden topların dumanı bil-izma' (?) tarafeyn birbirini görmez olup o ara beş dakika kadar tarafeynin topları kesilip sükut olunduğu halde düşman askeri tarafından "ura!" lafzı ve asakir-i nusret-müessir-i hazret-i şahane canibinden "padişahım çok yaşa!" sadai vacib-ül edası icra ve dört saat dahi top ve tüfenk muharebesi olunarak Harput redif taburları karma karışık ricat ederken sol cenahımızda bulunan süvari askeri Rusya askerinin perişan olduğunu görüp taraf-ı çakeraneme haber vermiş ve derhal mezkur redif taburlarının çevrilmesi hususuna cümle tarafından pek çok ibram ve düşmanın inhizamını ifham eylediğimiz halde bir vechile anlatılamayıp düşmanın avdet etmiş olan askerine nefer-i amm-ı İslam askerinin ricatini görüp ilan etmiş olduklarından münhezim olan düşman askerinin topçusundan maada piyade ve süvarisi tekrar ricat ve asakir-i İslamiye üzerine hücum mübaderet ederek mezkur redif taburlarının ricat ve teferrükü cihetle nizamiye taburları dahi yüz çevirip her taraftan tecemmüllerine mübaşeret ve tabur-ı evvel tranpeteleri çaldırılarak bunların toplanmaları hususuna cümle zabitan tarafından kumanda-i çakeranemizle pek çok ikdam ve gayret olunmuş ise de cenab-ı hakkın murad-ı ilahiye ve hikmet-i baliğa-i samedanisi bir guna kâr kesr-i tesir olmayıp cümlesi birden ricat etmiş ve işbu muharebe arasında topkeşan hayvanatının ekserisi tüfek ve top daneleri isabetiyle telef olduğundan başka zaten dahi miktar-ı kifayede olmaması cihetle beraber bulunan çend aded meydan topu ve kopuzun tahliyesine çare bulunamayarak semt-i düşmanda kalmış ve hakikat-i hal bu merkezde bulunmuştur. Cenab-ı rabb-ül izzet velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz velinimet-i alem padişahımız efendimiz hazretlerine ilel ahir-ül zaman serir-i şevket-masir?-i mülukanelerinde ibka ve hem kerdar?-ı şehinşahilerinde hazır ve tevfiyat-ı ilahiyesini rehnüma ve ***-ı Devlet-i Aliyye'lerini mübtela-i cah buyursun, amin. Bi hürmet-i min ca-i aliye-i Cebrail amin.

Bu muharebe keyfiyeti sizce nasıldır sualine Abdi Paşa hazretleri "bu maddenin tafsilatı ve ordunun suret-i firarı ve inhizamı meçhulümdür fakat erkan-ı harbiye zabitanından iki nefer zabıt bulundurulmuştu" cevabını vermiş ve Ahmed Paşa dahi "benim de bu hususa malumatım yoktur" demiştir.

Ahışha'da zuhura gelen bozgunluğun sebeplerine dair komisyondan vaki olan sualler üzerine vaki olan sualler üzerine taraflarımızdan irad ve beyan olunan cevaplar maddeleri balalarına surh ile işar kılınmış olduğundan temhirine dahi ibtidar kılınmıştır.

[Seals from left to right: Abdülkerim Nadir, Ahmed, Ali Rıza]

Ahışha pişgahında olan muharebenin tafsilatını tahriren beyan etmek üzere komisyon tarafından vaki olan talebe mebni Ali Paşa'nın yazıp verdiği varakadır ki aynıyle bu mahalle kayd olundu.

Rabbimiz teala ve tekaddes hazretleri zat-ı şevketsimat-ı padişahımız velinimetimiz efendimiz hazretlerine bitmez ve tükenmez ömr ü afiyetler ihsan ve kaffe-i hutur ve kederden masun ve âdâ-i bedhahilerin münhezim ve perişan olsun amin.

Saye-i kudretvayelerinde nusret-i celilullah ve iane-i resul-i enbiya ve kuvvet-i evliya-i feyz-i meserretle salhal-i yetmiş senesi mah-ı Safer-ül Hayr'ın üçüncü gününden [5.11.1853] bil-hayr vel-niyet Ahışha hudud başında Rusyalu ile muharebeye bed ve mübaşeret olunarak bi-lütf-i Hüda nail-i nusret-i İslam ile düşman-ı haksarın ekserisini itlaf ve helak ile gerüye ricat ettirilerek gereft olunan esirleriyle ve kelleri dahi taraf-ı

müşiriye gönderilmiş ve mezkur kellelerin kat'ına kadar kelle kesilmemesi hakkına dair irade-i aliyye-i cenab-ı padişahi müteallik ve sudur etmemiş idi.

İkinci muharebede düşman-ı mersum yine üzerimize gelip tekrar muharebeye mübaşeret olundukta bi-avnullahi teala nusret-i İslam asakir-i şahanede olup düşman-ı haksarın münhezim ve perişanlarıyla gerüye ricat birle asakir-i nizamiye-i şahane ve başıbozuk dahi arkaları sıra yarım saat kadar koğaldı [sic] ve ol vakit abluka heyetiyle Ahışa'nın lazım gelen etraflarına karakollar tertib ve tayin ile tutulmuş olan esirlerini dahi yine taraf-ı müşiriye irsal kılınmış ve mahall-i mezkura gülle menzili mesafe karşusunda bir çıplak dağ olmak hasebiyle üzerinden şehri döğüp zabtına destres olmak için oraya dahi münasip vechile karakollar tayin ve tertip kılınmış çünkü dağın şehir ve kale tarafları gayet sarp olduğundan iştibah vaki olmaz idi. Fakat bu yüzden her ne kadar yoğise de sağ ve sol cenahlarından memul olur idi. Bu memul münasabetiyle sağ cenah bulunan Ab karyesine üç tabur piyade asakir-i nizamiye-i şahane ile beş kıta top ve binden müteceviz başıbozuk ve sol cenah Suhlic [sic] nam karyeye üç tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari askeri asakir-i şahane ile yedi kıta top vaz' olunarak ve sol cenahlarında dahi bulunan karyelere ihtiyat olarak iki binden müteceviz neferim ve başıbozuk askeri konulmuş idi ve Suhlic nam karyeye bir çaryek saat mesafe karyeye iki tabur nizamiye askeri konulmuş idi. Çünkü düşmanın bu iki cenahın birisinden hücum ve galebe etmesi memul ve maznun olur idi. Onun için bu ihtiyatlara kuvve-i metanet vermek suret-lerini bil-cümle ümera-i zabitan-ı askeriyle bil-ittifak tertip ve vaz' olunmuş idi ve ihtiyat-ı mezkure tertip ve tayin olunan karakollara taraf-ı çakeriden şu vechile ekid-i tenbih olunan düşmanın memul ettiğimiz mahallerin sağından gelecek olduğu halde sol cenaha ve solda geldiği halde sağ cenaha tüfenk endaht ile tarafeyn birbirine ihtar etmelerini zabitan dahi başka başka tenbih olunmuş idi ve Suhlic nam karyede bulunan toplar için tez elden tabya misillü bir şeyin imal olunmasını orada bulunan istihkam bölüğüne ve mühendis binbaşısına ve zabitan-ı askeriye tenbih ile çarçabuk imal ve toplar vaz' olunmuş idi.

Ve sağ cenahda olan askerin üzerine Mirliva izzetli Mustafa Paşa kumandar tayin kılınmış idi. Yani Yenişehir tarafı demek ve sol cenaha Suhlic'de olan asker üzerine Mirliva izzetli Ali Paşa tayin kılınarak bendeleri dahi bu mahallerde bir çaryek saat mesafe Yemak [Bamık?] nam karye ki merkez add ettiğimiz mahalde bulunmakta idim.

Asker ve gerek toplar her bir tarafda dağılık deyu rivayet olunmuş ise de değil dağılık zikr-i bala cihetle birbirine karib ve mürtefi' ve harbce dahi şu zeminler ve tertib-i mahal pek yolunda olduğuna binaen ona göre hareket ve dikkat nusretle sırasını gözederek cümlemiz birlikte beş defa Ab karyesine tecemmü olduk. Rusya askeri dahi kezalik şehirden taşra çıkıp beş defa dahi top ve başıbozuk muharebesi oldu ve beş defasında dahi asakir-i şahane ve başıbozuk s**f*r? ve muzaffer olarak Rusyalı'yı münhezim eyledik. Çünkü tecemmü olduğumuz karye gayet sıralu mahal idi.

Ve bu muharebeler hengamında Rusya'nın Ahışa kumandanıyla ve istihkamat memuru mühendisinin Tiflis taraflarında olan kumandanları tarafına dört defa çıkarmış oldukları postalarını tutup alınan muharreratları tercüme ettirildikte bu bizim tuttuğumuz ve asker ve top vaz' eylediğimiz mahaller mahal [sic] ve mevkilerin pek yolunda olduğunu dahi tasdik eylemişler ve muharrerat-ı mezkur taraf-ı müşirinin manzur ve malum-ı alileri buyurulmak için bir büyük çantaya mevzuen postacıları olan iki nefer Kazak ve üç nefer süvari Rusya askeri dahi derakıb taraf-ı müşiriye irsal kılınmış idi.

Appendix 80. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5, undated (end of 1854 or beginning of 1855). Abdi Pasha's testimony at the MVL on the defeat at Gedikler.

Kars canibinde vuku bulan bozgunluğun sebebi Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta orada olan vukuata dair yazmış olduğu işbu varaka meydana konulup Ahmed Paşa ve Ali Paşa hazeratı dahi hazır oldukları halde ibraz olunan suallere müşarünileyhim tarafından verilen cevaplardır ki maddeleri yanlarına surh ile işaret kılındı.

Beyana hacet olmadığı üzere meydan-ı ceng ü gavgada (?) düşmanı bozmak ve bozulmak mukadderat-ı ilahiyeden olduğu misillü esbab-ı zahirde dahi kusur etmemek akdem-i umurdan ve bu dahi strateji ve taktik fenlerine kesb-i vukuf ve malumat etmeğe mütevakıf mevaddan olarak çakerleri saye-i ihsanvaye-i hazret-i şahanede bu fenleri oldukça okumuş ve ameliatını görmüş bulunduğum cihetiyle bu memuriyet-i acizanemde her bir hareket ve sekenat-ı çakeranemi fünün-ı harbiyeye tatbik ve fence madud olan ihtimalatın içinde cüzi mahzurlu add olunanları terk ile harbiyyunun en ziyade intihab ve itina eyledikleri usule tevfiik eylediğimi fenn-aşına olan zevat indlerinde her suretle isbata muktedir olduğumdan fazla emr-i muharebeye memuriyet-i çakeranemin vukuunda ıyal ü evlad ü dünyanın muhabbetini sahife-i dil-i sıdk-i muil-i (?) acizanemden külliyyen tayy ü imha ederek ancak velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz şevketlu kerametlu padişahımız efendimiz hazretlerine ve din ve milletime bu uğurda hidemat-ı mebrure ibrazıyla feda-i can ü baş etmekle gayret-i sadıka ederek ol hal ile icra-i emr-i memuriyete çalışmış olduğum hazret-i alim-üs sırır vel hakikata malum olup bunun isbat ve izharını dahi merhamet ve madelet-ir rabbiden niyaz ve istirham etmekteyim. Ne çare ki beyan ve tafsili tekrar hüznün ve melal getirecek esbab-ı adideden naşi dilhah-ı kemteranem vechile hareket ve merkez-i matluba muvasalat müyesser olamamış ve eğerçi nefis-i kemteraneme aid bulunan hususatda her ne dürlü muamele ve teaddi vukua gelse ona sabr ü sükut etmek min el kadim ihtiyar eylediğim usul ve meslek iktizasından ise de velinimetimiz padişahımıza ve devletimize raci olan mevadda yolsuz hal ve hareketde bulunanları söylememek dahi bir nevi ihanet ve muğayir-i şiar-ı ubudiyet bulunmuş olduğundan binaberin bu babda vaki olan yolsuz hareketin ve haylulet eden mevaniin bazı mertebesi ma't-teellüm beyana cüret ederim.

İlan-ı harb olduğu haberinin Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa vürudunda oralarda şita hulul ederek hükmünü icraya başlamış ve çünkü Anadolu tarafında matlubun husulü Dağıstan ahaliyle birleşmeğe mütevakıf olarak ol esnada yollar kapanıp onlar tarafından dahi iane olunmak ve birleşmek zamanı geçmiş olması cihetle emr-i muharebenin evvel bahara tehiri her suretle hayr ü faideyi müstelzem görüldüğünden bu kaziye mahremane erkân ve ümera-i askeriye ile müzakere olundukta ittifak-ı ârâ ile karar verilerek hakikat-i hal ol vakit makam-ı vâlâ-i seraskeriye beyan ve işar ve çünkü asakir-i şahanenin cümlesinin kış mevsiminde Kars'a yerleştirilmesi halinde sıhhat-i bedeniyelerinin muhafazası mümkün olamayacağına ve Arabistan orduy-ı hümayununun celb ve Anadolu tarafına sevk buyurulmuş olan iki alay piyade ile iki alay süvarinin dahi yolda gelmekte oldukları haber alındığına binaen bunların Erzurum'da tevkifiyle yerleştirilmeleri zımında Ferik saadetlu Abdülkerim Paşa dahi Erzurum'a irsal ve tısyar olunarak Kars'da bulunan asakir-i şahane dahi hem bir guna zahmet ve zaruret çekmemek ve hem de fenn-i harb kaidesi dairesinden taşra çıkmayıp düşmanın hal ve hareketini gözetmek üzere Mirliva izzetli Veli Paşa beş tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari asakir-i nizamiye ve mikdar-ı kifaye asakir-i muvazzafa ile Kars'dan ilerü Subatan nam mahal ile daha ilerü köylere avangard suretinde tayin ve izam olunup ve mevaki-i ehem ve lazıme dahi karakollar konulup küsur asakir-i şahane dahi Kars'a ve civar bulunan mahallere yerleştirilmiş idi.

Bu maddeyi Ahmed Paşa hazretleri tasdik ile beraber o vakit asakir çadırda iken kışlaklara nakl ü iskan ettirildiğini beyan ve Ali Paşa dahi evvelce hareket etmiş olduğundan o esnada orada bulunmadığını ityan eylemiştir.

[page 2]

Bunun üzerine Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu müsteşarı nasb buyurulmuş olan atufetlu Rıza Efendi hazretleri Kars'a gelür iken müşarünileyh Abdülkerim Paşa'ya Kars ile Erzurum'un beyninde vaki Yeniköy nam mahalde tesadüf ederek keyfiyet-i memuriyetini anlayıp Erzurum'a gitmeyerek Yeniköy'de eğlenmesini ve kendüsünün Kars'a muvasalatında celb ettireceğini paşa-i müşarünileyhe ifade ve tenbih ederek kendüleri Kars'a muvasalat edip hakikat-i hali anlamaksızın Rumeli tarafında fütuhât-ı mütevâliye vuku bulmakta ve Anadolu tarafında ağır davranılmakta olduğuna dair tefevvühat ile teşvikata başlayıp eğerçi efendi-i müşarünileyh hazretleri zaten nezaket ve iffet ve istikametle mutasavvıf esdika-i bendegan-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'den ve bu babda çalışması dahi kemal-i gayretinden neşet eder bir halet idüğü umur-ı müsellemeden ise de kendüleri fenn-i harbden bi-behre bulunmaları cihetle bu babda akılsız dost hükmünde olup çakerlerinin ihtiyatkârane hareket ve devlet ve milletime zull ü mazarrat irasını muceb bir keyfiyet vuku bulmamak için vakitsiz ve mevsimsiz muharebe vukuundan mücanebetimi beynlerinde cebanetime haml eylemelerine ve hakikat-i hale vakıf bazı erkan ve zabitan dahi şayed kendüsüne töhmet-i cebanet azv ü isnad olunur vahimesiyle efkâr-ı sahihasını ortaya koyamayıp biz-zarure mümaşat ederek evvelki karar ve neticeden tekevvül ve udül ile şiddet-i şitaya bakmayıp muharebe olunması tarafını iltizam ve tercih eylediklerine ve efendi-i müşarünileyh hazretlerini müteakıb devletli Zarif Paşa hazretleri Kars'a gelerek onlar dahi muharebe etmek efkârında olup bu hal neferata varınca sirayet eylediği hiss olunduğuna binaen ba'dezin tevkif olunması muharebeden ziyade mahzurlu görünmekden ve evvel günlerde her ne kadar şedid soğuk var ise de hava fil-cümle açık bulunmaktan naşi zabitan ve neferatın hahişlerine fütur getirilmiş olmamak ve havaya bir fenalık geldiği anda asakir-i şahane kar altında bırakılmayıp derakıb yine avdet olunmak üzere ma el huzur fenn-i harbde *petit guerre* tabir olunan bazı ufak ve muhtasar çarha muharebeleri icra olunması sureti ihtiyar olunarak orduy-ı hümayunun ol vakit reis-i erkânı bulunan devletli Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin kumandasına altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ile mevcut olan asakir-i muvazzafa verilerek orduy-ı hümayunun mumaileyh Veli Paşa kumandasıyla avangardı bulunan askeri dahi istishab ile götürülmesi ifade kılınarak memur ve tayin ve Arpa Çayı civarında Baş Şüregel denilen mahal bu vechile harekât-ı askeriyeye gayet elverişli münasib bir mahal olmak ve mezkur Şüregel'in karşusunda vaki Bayındır'da Rusyalı'nun bir mikdar Kazak atlası bulunduğu haber alınmak mülasebesiyle mevcut maiyeti olan asakir-i nizamiyeyi mevki-i mezkurda olan tepenin arkasına fenn-i harb üzere tayin edip bir mikdar asakir-i muvazzafa ile mezkur Kazak atlası urulup yerlerinden kaldırılması ve Arpa Çayı'ndan karşıya geçilmeyip Gümrü kalesinde olan Rusya askerinden bir kıta-i müfreze çıkar da berülere doğru gelerek kaleden uzatılabilir ve gözlerine kesdirilür ise urulması ve her bir hareket ve vukuatın dahi peyderpey taraf-ı acizaneme bildirilmesi kaziyeleri çünkü kendilerinin okuyup yazmaları olmadığından talimat-ı muharrere verilmiş olsa aherine kıraat ettirmeğe mecbur bulunduğu ve bu halde kaziyeye kendüsinden evvel aheri mahrem ve vakıf olacağı cihetle biz-zarure şifahen yegan yegan tekid ve tenbih kılınarak sevk ve izam olunmuş idi.

*Bu keyfiyet sual olundukta Ahmed Paşa, Kerim Paşa ile müsteşar efendi beyninde olunan müzakereyi bilmem, fakat Kerim Paşa Kars'a avdetini istizan eylemesi üzerine Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından memuriyetle gitmesi ba tahrirat kendüsüne yazılmış olduğunu beyan ile Ali Paşa dahi bu bende *?* olunan maddeyi yani müsteşar efendinin suret-i ifadatını Kerim Paşa'dan işittiğini ifade edip müsteşar-ı müşarün-*

ileyhin teşvikat ve terğibatı maddesinin sıhhatini müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri dahi tasdik eylemiş ve ümera-i askeriyenin bu babda mümaşat edenlerinin isimleri sual olunmakta Abdi Paşa hazretleri livalara kadar vardır demesiyle Ahmed Paşa'dan sual olunup cevabında Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin Kars'a geldiğinin ertesi günü ziyaretlerine varmış idim. Raşid Paşa ve müsteşar efendi mevcut olduğu halde gavga etmek için bazı mertebe sohbetler arasında "Bu ne hamiyetsiz ve gayretsizliktir" diyerek makam-ı tevbihde bana dahi hitabet etmelerine cevaben "Benim dahi büyük memurum vardır. Onun emriyle hareket ederim" der iken Abdi Paşa hazretleri dahi gelmesiyle sohbet kapanmış ve yine o gün bir saatden sonra sıraya gitmiş idim. Orada dahi Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin yanında müsteşar efendi ve Mustafa Paşa ve Raşid Paşa mevcut olarak yine bunun sohbeti açılıp teşvikat üzerine tevbihane sözler deveran ederek hatta Mustafa Paşa "Maiyetime asker verilsün ben gavgaya giderim" ve müsteşar efendi dahi "Ben politika memuru olduğumdan gavga etmek için size sened veririm ve siz gitmez iseniz ben dellal çağırıp ahaliyi toplar giderim" demesine cevaben Abdi Paşa hazretleri "Eğerçi bir fenalık olur ise sizin sözünüz beni kurtarır mı?" dedikte "Evet ben memurum kurtarır" demesine Abdi Paşa hazretleri "Pek memul etmem ki beni kurtarsın" demesiyle müsteşar-ı müşarünileyhe bir nevi infial gelerek o meclisten kalkmış olduğu ve bunun üzerine sairleriyle müzakere olunup olunmadığını bilmeyip fakat bir gün kendüsünü Abdi Paşa hazretleri celb edip halkın ağzı kapanmak için alel itlak icabı vechile gavga etmek için memur ettiğini ve tepenin arkasında askerin tabiye edilmesi ve Kazakların kaldırılması gibi şeyler tenbih olunmayıp bu madde mufassalen verdiği kağıdda yazmış olmağla ondan malum olacağından ve tecavüz olunmasını tenbih eylediklerini müşarünileyh hazretleri evvelce itiraf eyledikleri dahi zabt olunmuş olduğundan tekrara hacet olmadığını ifade eylemiştir.

Müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri Kars'dan harekete şıtab ve ilerüde mumailiyh Veli Paşa kumandasıyla orduy-ı hümayunun avangardı bulunan askeri dahi istishab ederek vakia ibtida taraf-ı acizanemden kendüsüne vaki olan tenbihat ve tarifat vechile hareket edip Rusyalu'nun Bayındır'da olan atlasunu yerlerinden kaldırmış ve keyfiyeti dahi taraf-ı acizaneme işar eylemiş ise de Rusyalu'nun Bayındır'da bulunan şirzime-i kalilesinin kaldırılması müşarünileyh hazretlerine cesaret getirüp ertesi günü mevcut maiyeti bulunan asakiri istishab ile Arpaçayı'ndan Bayındır'a mürur eylediğini suyu acizaneme inha etmiş olduğundan paşa-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinin bu vechile muğayir-i tenbihat Bayındır'a geçtiği haberi geldiği gibi çünkü Rusyalu'nun Gümrü'de yigirmi tabur askeri olduğu evvelce vaki olan tahkikat-ı çakeranem cümlesinden olmak ve bunların üzerine geleceğine ihtimalat-ı kaviyye bulunmaktan naşi hemen çakerleri dahi altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve on sekiz kıta top alıp hareket ve seyr-i seria ile azimetre ferdası günü Kars'ın sekiz saat ilerüsünden Kars suyu geçilip asakir kamilen suyu geçer geçmez Rusyalu müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin üzerine gelip muharebeye başlanıldığı haber alındığından refakat-ı çakeranemde bulunan piyade gerüden yetişmek ve süvari ile toplar dahi arkandan gelmek üzere erkan ve ümeraya tenbih olunarak çakerleri biz-zarure münferiden kemal-i sür'atle Bayındır'a yetişip top muharebesi olunmakta olduğu halde Rusyalu'nun icra eylediği manevra müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin kumandasında bulunan asakir-i şahanenin sağ başını urmak üzere bir hareket olduğundan bizim ordunun sağ başını bayağı sıkışdırmış olduğu halde gerüden gelen süvari ile toplar yetişip derakab sağ başa toplar ile süvari sevk olunarak gerek işbu topların ateşinden ve gerek süvarinin lillahil hamd vel menna tarif-i acizanem vechile harekete muvafık olmasından ve piyade dahi yetişip karşı Bayındır'a geçürülmesinden dolayı Rusyalu ricat ve hezimete mecbur olup Gümrü kalesine çekilmiştir. Bunun üzerine orduy-ı hümayunun mühimmatı yoklama olunarak top muharebesi mümted olmak hasebiyle hartuçları ziyade telef olup mevcudu cüzi kalmış olduğundan eğerçi bu halde orduy-ı hümayun avdet eder ise Rusyalu fen-aşına düşman

bulunmak hasebiyle orduy-ı hümayunun bir cihetle noksani-i levazımatından olduğunu hissederek takib edeceği ağleb-i ihtimalatdan olduğundan derhal avdetden sarf-ı nazarla bulunduğumuz mahalle tabya inşasıyla istihkam verilerek ve bir taraftan dahi Kars'dan müsaraaten cebhane celb olunarak on iki gün kadar orduy-ı hümayun ile Bayındır'da ikamet olunmuş ise de Rusyalu bir taraftan baş gösterememiş ve havalar fenalaşmağa başlamış idüğünden ba'd-ez-in orada tevakkuf kabil olamayacağı misillü orduy-ı hümayunun mevcudu fakat yigirmi iki yigirmi üç tabur piyade ve üç alay süvari ve otuz bu kadar toptan mürekkeb bulunmuş ve zahire ve cebhane ve esbab-ı nakliye henüz başluca bir hareket-i tecavüziye icrasına kafi bulunmaması hasebiyle ilerüye gidilmesi dahi orduy-ı hümayunu göz göre muhataraya ilka demek olacağından biz-zarure kavaid-i harbiyeye tevfikân Bayındır'dan hareket ve Kars'a müteveccihan avdet olunarak Kars suyu geçilip suyun berü tarafında kain Aküzüm karyesinde bir gece beytutetle ferdası günü yine hareket ve Gedikler karyesine muvasalat olunup orduy-ı hümayunun avangardı bulunan mumaileyh Veli Paşa mevcut maiyeti olan asakir-i şahane ile yine avangard olarak merkez-i kadimi olan Subatan nam mahalle izam olunup çakerleri küsur-ı asakir-i şahane ile Gedikler'de ikamet eyledim.

Muğayir-i memuriyet Arpaçayı'nı mürur eylemesi keyfiyeti Ahmed Paşa'dan sual olunmakta "Öyle geçdim diyerek yazdığını bilmeyip fakat asker gönderin veyahud siz teşrif buyurun diyerek yazmış idim" demesiyle Abdi Paşa, "Dediğim gibi yazmışdır ve gelen mektub mahallinde mevcuttur. Celb ile keyfiyet anlaşılır" demesi üzerine Ahmed Paşa, "Abdi Paşa'nın geldiği ve askerinin suret-i tertibi ve gavga keyfiyeti verdiğim takrirden muharrerdir. Müşarünileyh Bayındır'da yetişdim demiş ise de o vakit Baş Şüregel'e gelmişler idi" dedikte müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa dahi "Yanlış olmuş, Baş Şüregel denilecek iken Bayındır denilmiştir ve o vakit cebhanenin celbiyle beraber asker dahi gelmiştir" cevabını vermiştir.

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Salif-üz zikr Gedikler karyesine muvasalat olunduğu gibi Rusyalu dahi Gümrü'den çıkıp Arpaçayı'ndan berü tarafa geçtiği haberi alındığından çakerleri Miralay İsmail Bey'e kendü hayvanımı verip Rusyalu'nun ordusunu ve keyfiyetini keşf etmek üzere acelelen ilerüye tayin ve izam eylediğimden mir-i mumaileyh gidip Rusyalu'nun ordusunu keşf ve muayene ederek avdet edip on iki tabur kadar piyade ve iki alay süvari ve bir mikdar başıbozuk askeri olduğunu keşf ü tahmin eylediğini haber verip Rusyalu'nun bu hal ile gelişi aranıp bulunamayacak bir keyfiyet olduğundan mumaileyh Veli Paşa kumandasında bulunan asakir ile avdet ve sabahleyin tayin olunan vakitte Gedikler'e yetişip muvasalat eylemiş ve Kars'da bulunan Ferik saadetlu Abdülkerim Paşa hazretleri dahi iki alay piyade ve iki alay süvari ile Ardahan tarafına memur ve tayin kılınmış ise de diğer tahrirat-ı acizanemin vusulüne kadar Kars'da tevakkuf eylemesi ahşamdan kendülerine haber gönderilmiş ve orduy-ı hümayunun karakolları tertib ve tayin olunmuş ve mumaileyh Veli Paşa dahi vakt-i muayyende yetişmiş ve Rusyalu dahi Kars suyunu geçmek üzere olduğu haberi gelmiş olduğundan orduy-ı hümayun her suretle saff-ı harb nizamına konulmağla elverişli münasip bir mevkide nizam-ı harb heyetine konularak ve süvari ve topçu ve ihtiyat kumandanları tefrik ve tayin kılınarak çakerleri bir mikdar ilerüde bulunan mevkii bir kat daha keşf ü muayene etmek üzere ilerüye azimet eylediğimden Rusyalu'dan bir alamet görülemeyip her ne kadar Kars çayından bir mikdar süvari berü tarafa geçürmüş ise de böyle süvariye berü geçürmesi ordusunun gerüye ricat edeceği hareketini setr için olup süvarisini berü tarafa sevk ile beraber ordusunu gerüye avdet ve ricat ettirip muahharen süvarisini dahi gerüye alıp savuşmuş olduğu tahkik olunmuşdu.

Kendü layihasında dahi böyle yazmış olduğunu beyan ile bu bendin mealini Ahmed Paşa hazretleri tasdik edip "Fakat ol gün Miralay İsmail Bey'in tahkik için

gönderilmiş olduğunu bilmiyorum. Ertesi Pazar günü göndermişler idi ve Rusyalu gelir deyu Pazar günü sabahleyin o haber getirdi ve onun üzerine hareket ettik” demekle Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Ben İsmail Bey’i birkaç defa göndermiş idim. Galiba siz yalnız Pazar günü geldiğini görmüşsünüz” demiştir.

Bend-i sabıkda beyan olunduğu üzere Rusyalu savuşup gitmesi ve ol gece Ahışa tarafında bulunan Ferik saadetlu Ali Paşa hazretlerinin bozulduğu haberi gelmesi cihetle derhal müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri nezd-i acizaneme celb ile müşarünileyh Ali Paşa’dan ve buna dair mahall-i saireden gelen tahrirat kendüsine kıraat olunmuş ve bu havadis beyn el asakir şüyu’ bulmamak için mahrem tutulması tenbih kılınmış ve şu hal icabınca iki tarafa dahi kumanda olunmak için çakerlerinin Kars’a azimetime lüzum-ı kavi hasıl olmuş olup ancak ona dair müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerine bir şey açılmayıp mütefekkir bulunduğum halde Kars’a azimet-i çakeranemin ehemmiyetini müşarünileyh hazretleri dahi idrak ederek bir an evvel Kars’da bulunmaklığımın şiddet-i lüzumunu tezkir ve dermiyan ve eğer bir guna vukuat olur ise derhal taraf-ı çakeraneme ihbara müsaraat edeceğini ifade ve beyan eylediğinden onun üzerine Gedikler mevkiinde bulunan orduy-ı hümayunu hemen Subatan mevkiine kaldırması ve çakerleriyle dahi bu cihetle muhabereye müsaraat eylemesi kendüsine ariz ve amik bil-etrafi ifade ve telkin olunarak ve eğer hiçbir vukuat olmaz ise yigirmi dört saat zarfında dört defa vukuat olur ise ol anda süvariden tertib olunan postalar vasıtalarıyla taraf-ı çakeraneme haber gönderilmesi tekid kılınarak çakerleri dahi sürat üzere Kars’a avdet ve azimet eyleyip derhal Ahışa tarafının tahkik-i ahvali zımında memurlar tayin ve irsal olunmuş ve müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerine her ne kadar şifahen ve tafsilen tenbihat tenbihat icra kılınmış ise de daha hareket ve Subatan’a azimet etmediği muahharen aldığı tahriratdan anlaşılması olduğundan Kars’da mevcut olan erkan ve ümera ile bil-müzakere müşarünileyh hazretlerinin Subatan’a azimeti tahriren dahi beyan ve tekid olunması tasvib olunmuş olmasıyla ol vechile Subatan’a azimet eylemesini cevabnamede dahi tekid ve işar eylediğimden cevabname-i mezkur el haleti hazihi müşarünileyh hazretleri nezdinde olacağından mütalaa buyurulduğu halde malum-ı ali buyurulur. Müşarünileyh hazretlerine manevranın suver-i icraiyesi bil-etrafi tarif olunmasına ve Rusyalu bu suretle gelecek olur ise aranıp bulacak şey olmadığı ifade olunması hatırlarında kalmasına binaen mücerred kemal-i gayretlerinden naşi kendüleri bir hizmete muvafık olmak emeline düşerek tenbihat ve işarat-ı acizaneme havale-i sem’-i itibar etmediğinden başka Rusyalu bunların üzerlerine geldiği gün ilerü karakollar vasıtasıyla kendülerine Rusyalu’nun gelmekte olduğuna dair haberler gelmiş ve anifen beyan olunduğu vechile vukuat olmaz ise yigirmi dört saat zarfında vukuat olur ise ol anda haber gönderilmesi tenbihat-ı acizanem icabından bulunmuş iken ol gün taraf-ı acizaneme asla haber gönderilmemiş olduğundan şübhelenerek sebebi anlaşılacak için suy-i kemteranemden yaver-i harb irsal olundukta müşarünileyh hazretleri kendü kendülerine muharebe ederek bozulup avdet eyledikleri haberi yaver vasıtasıyla alınmıştır. Eğerçi müşarünileyh hazretleri tenbihat-ı acizanem vechile hareket etmiş olsalar idi tertib ve tasmin olunan manevra icabınca Kars’da müheyya bulunan kuvve-i kafiye ile derhal hareket olunarak müşarünileyh hazretleriyle birleşmek eshel ve Rusyalu’yu şu suretle berbad ve perişan etmek harbiyyun indlerinde yüzde doksan dokuz derece muhtemel iken ne çare ki şu fırsat beyhude za’y olunduktan başka eğerçi Rusyalu’nun gelmekte olduğu haberi verildiği vakit olsun suy-i kemteraneme bildirilmiş olsa idi muharebeden evvelce oraya yetişilmesi ve cenab-ı hakkın avn ü ihsanıyla yine muharebenin kazanılması mümkünatdan iken inhaen beyan olunduğu vechile mücerred kendüleri bir iş görmek ve vukua gelecek galebe ve nusret kendüsine aid olmak için bunların hiçbirini icra buyurmayıp bu derecelere netice vermiştir.

Bu madde Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta, “Ahışa bozğunluğunun haberi vürudu üzerine Abdi Paşa hazretleri beni celb ettiler. Yanlarında üç kıta tahrirat var

idi. Birini bir top ateşe attular diğer ikisini ceplerine koydular ve Ahışha bozgunluğuna muttali oldum. Ama tahriratları okudular da mı muttali oldum yohsa şifahen mi ihbar eylediler ve ol ateşe attığı kağıd ne idi bilmiyorum ve dediler ki 'müsteşar efendi Ahışha bozgunluğuna bizim Bayındır'dan kalkmamız sebep oldu deyu yazmış. Biz Bayındır'dan Cuma günü kalkdık. Ahışha bozgunluğu Cumartesi günü olmuş. Rusyalu Ahışha'da ne çabuk oradan kalkdığımızı haber almış ki bozgunluğa sebep bizim kalkmamız olsun' deyu söyledi. Müşarünileyhin Kars'a gitmesini ben tasdik ve dermiyan etmek şöyle dursun 'Düşman buradadır. Bir yere gitmemiştir. Sizin bir yere gitmeniz caiz değildir' dediğimde 'Düşman çekildi gitti. Benim de Kars'a gitmem lazımdır' demekle ben dahi biz-zarur mümaşat ederek 'siz bilürsünüz' dedim. Bunun üzerine Mirliva Mustafa ve Hafız ve Hüseyin Paşaları celb edip Kars'a gideceklerini beyan ederek benim kumandamda bulunmalarını ve sair hususatı tenbih edip sonra giderken Veli Paşa'ya dahi yolda rast gelip bu tenbihatı ona dahi eyledi ve birkaç günden sonra ordunun Subatan karyesine kaldırılmasını ve vukuat olur ise kendüsine bildirilmesini tenbih etti ve sonra dahi Subatan'a çekilmek üzere bir tahriratı geldi. Liva paşaların cümlesi hazır oldukları halde tahrirat kıraat olundu ve mumaileyhimden Hüseyin Paşa hazır bulunmadığından ondan maada cümlesi kalkılmasını tensip etmediler ise de yine ben ertesi günü kalkılmasını tenbih eyledim ve verdiğim layihada yazdığım gibi kalkılmak üzere iken düşman gelip gavgı oldu" deyu ifade eyledikten sonra tekrar müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri kelama ibtidar ile "bu bendde Abdi Paşa hazretleri Rusyalu'nun Gümrü'ye çekilip gittiğini yazmışlar mahaza ki çekilip gitmemiş idi. O civarlarda idi ve böyle olduğunu şu iki kıta tahriratlar ki tevarih-i malume ile müverrehdir isbat ederim" dediklerinde tahrirat-ı mezkureden fi 28 S sene 70 [Wednesday, 30.11.1853] tarihiyle olan Hasan Yazıcı ile Alişan Bey nam kimesnelerin tahriratı kıraat olundukta Rusyalu'nun süvari ve karakolu dünkü mahalle kadar gelmiş ise de bu defa Aküzüm nam karyeye vardıklarında orada bulamadıklarından ve uzak yakalarda bazı süvari karakollarını gördüklerinde asıl orduları nerelerde olduğunu tahkik etmek için beş on atlı ile Hacı Hüseyin Bey nam kimesneyi gönderip Rusyalu'nun Arpaçayı'nın bu canibinde mukaddem asakir-i şahanenin imrar olduğu köprü'nün tahtında haymenişin olduğunu tahkik eylediklerini ifadeden ve diğer fi 29 S sene 70 [1.12.1853] tarihiyle Hasan Yazıcı'nın tahriratı dahi okundukta mahall-i mezkurda olan Rusya askeri tarih-i mezkurda sabah vakti tranpet çaldırıp talim eder gibi askerini oralarda gezdirdikten sonra evvelki gün gibi Kars suyunu bu tarafa geçip Yılanlı ve Aküzüm karyelerine doğru gelmekte olduklarını işardan ibaret olmağla bunun üzerine Ahmed Paşa hazretleri Rusyalu'nun İstehane [?] karyesinde bulunan ordusu üzerine gidilmesini ve peksimad gönderilmesi ve bu babda olan rey ve tedbirlerini sual ve beyan etmişdim. Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin 28 S 70 yevm-i Salı tarihiyle müverreh cevaben gelen tahriratlarında Rusya ordusuyla bulunduğumuz mahallin arasında Kars suyu olup geçmesi suubetli olacağından ve suret-i karar yine işar kılınacağından Pencşenbe gününe kadar bu babda teemmül ve mülahaza olunarak iktiza-i hale bakılmasını yazmışlar idi. Halbuki müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri Rusyalu'nun Gümrü'ye çekilip gittiğini ve Kars'a azimetlerinde arkamdan sen de gel deyu bana tenbih ettiğini işbu bendde beyan etmişler. Halbuki müşarünileyh hazretleri o gün kalkmamızı buyurmuş olsalar işbu tahriratlarında dahi işar ederler idi" demeleriyle tahrirat-ı mezkure kıraat olundukta meali vech-i muharrer üzere olduğu anlaşılmalıdır. Badehu Ahmed Paşa hazretleri kelama ibtidar ile Abdi Paşa hazretleri yine işbu bendde Subatı karyesine çekil deyu Salı gecesı saat üçde yazmış olduğu tahriratlarında manevranın suret-i icraiyesi ve kendüleri Kars'da bulunduğu halde tedabire teşebbüs olunması muharrer ise de tahrirat-ı mezkurda Subatı karyesine doğru çekilerek Rusyalu Kars çayını geçtiği haber alındıkta alel gafle basdırılrsa bir iş görülür deyu muharrer olduğundan led-el iktiza tahrirat-ı mezkure kıraat olduğu halde keyfiyet anlaşılacağını ifade eylemiştir.

Ardahan mevkiinin dahi Rusyalu'nun bulunduğu mahalle ve gerek Kars'a on iki baidiyeti olmakdan naşı orası dahi boş birağılmış olmayup tahaffuzi hareket etmek ve ilerüde operasyon icrası lazım geldiği vakit orduy-ı hümayun ile birleştirilmek üzere Ferik saadetli Ali Paşa hazretleri dahi sekiz tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve malum-ül kıtaat top ile mevki-i mezkura tayin kılınmış ve ilan-ı harb haberi geldiği gibi ferik-i müşarünileyh hazretleri kemakan Ardahan'da tahaffuzi halde bulunmak üzere ne vechile hareket ve ne suretle karakollar tayiniyle mübaderet eylemesi lazım geleceğini mübeyyin kendüsine tahriren talimat-ı کافیye gönderilmiş ve bunun üzerine Rusyalu hududu berü tarafa tecavüz etmekte olduğunu ve kendüsünün dahi ilerü hareketine lüzum göründüğünü suy-i acizaneme işar eylemiş olduğundan evvelki talimat-ı acizanemin hükmünü şerh ve tekidi ve çünkü şita hükmünü icra edeceği mevsim olarak pek de hareket-ı askeriye zamanı olmadığından asakir-i şahanenin şevk ve kuvvetleri mübeddel-i beis ve zaaf olmamak için kış mevsiminde hareketden ictinap olunmasını mutazammın tekrar talimat kaleme alınarak ve muahharen makam-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i seraskeriden vürud etmiş olan talimatın dahi bir sureti ihrac ettirilerek irsal ve tisyar ve her halde tahaffuzi tedafüi harekete ibtidar kılınması derc ve tezkar ve bu aralık devletli Zarif Paşa hazretleri orduy-ı hümayuna memur buyurulmuş olmasıyla mukteza-i memuriyetleri üzere evvel emirde Kars'a gelmiş ve mevcut maiyetleri bulunan asakir-i muvazzafa ile Ardahan kolu ordusunun kumandasına himmet buyurmaları beynimizde kararlaştırılarak vali-i müşarünileyh hazretleri dahi ol vechile Ardahan tarafına tevcih ve azimet buyurmuş olduğundan badezin ferik-i müşarünileyh hazretleri dahi nasıl hareket olunmak lazım geleceğini vali-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinden istizan ederek her halde rey ve kumandaları vechile harekete mübaderet eylemesi lazımeden bulunmak cihetle bu kaziye dahi kendüsine yazılan tahrirat-ı acizi de bir guna kırgınlığını muceb olmamak için ibarat-ı münasibe ile tevcih ve izbar kılınmışdı.

Vali-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinin Ardahan'a gelmek üzere olduklarını ferik-i müşarünileyh hazretleri haber aldıkları gibi müşarünileyh hazretlerinin Ardahan'a muvasalatlarından yarım saat evvel ferik-i müşarünileyh hemen hareket ve ilerüye azimet eylemiş ve hatta avdet eylemesine dair müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretleri tarafından kendüsine gönderilen ademe "sizin paşanız nasıl müşir olmuş ise ben dahi ilerüye azimet ve ibraz-ı hüsn-i hizmet ederek müşir olacağım" demiş olduğunu müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretleri muahharen mülakat-ı acizanem vukuunda çakerlerine maruz-ı (?) hasbihalde beyan buyurdular. İşte ferik-i müşarünileyh hazretleri gerek talimat ve gerek vali-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinin tenbihatının muğayiri olarak Ahışha üzerine karar-ı azimet etmiş ve badehu bazı mertebe fütuhata muvafık olduklarını ve Ahışha'da Rusyalu'nun pek cüzi askeri olduğunu ve ahaliden dahi el tutularak Ahışha kalesini Devlet-i Aliyye'ye teslim edecek olduklarını şamil ferik-i müşarünileyh suy-i acizaneme tahriratı gelmiş ve müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretleri dahi muvaffakiyet-i mezkureyi suy-i aciziye işar ve kendüleri dahi mevcut maiyetleri olan asakir-i muvazzafa ile Ahışha'ya müteheyyi-i azimet bulduklarını beyan ve izbar buyurmuş ve Rusyalu'nun oralarda bulunan asakiri beş taburdan ibaret olduğu tahkikat-ı vakıa-i acizanem iktizasından olarak müşarünileyh Ali Paşa hazretlerinin kumandasında ise sekiz tabur piyade ve bir alay süvariden başka Çıldır sancağının asakir-i muvazzafası dahi olmak hasebiyle şu halde Rusyalu'dan hayliden hayli kuvvetli bulunup vali-i müşarünileyh hazretleri dahi mevcut maiyetleri olan asakir-i muvazzafa ile azimet ve bunlara muvasalat buyurdıkları takdirce kuvvetleri Rusyalu'nun üç dört misli derecesine vasıl olacağı derkar bulunmuş olmakdan naşı maslahatın bu dereceye geleceği hayalhane-i tasavvura gelür şey olmadığından ferik-i müşarünileyh tecavüzi hareket eylemesi her ne kadar talimat ve işaret-ı acizanemin muğayiri ise de müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretlerinden ber vech-i muharrer tahrirat gelmesi cihetle reyleri bu merkezdedir zan ve kıyas olunarak muceb-i mahzuziyet olduğuna dair

kendülerine ve ferik-i müşarünileyhe cevab tahrir ve ol vechile kalenin istihlasına himmet ve her halde müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretlerine müracaat eylemesi derc ve **tezbir** (tedbir?) kılınmış olup halbuki muahharen vaki olan tahkikat-ı acizaneme göre ferik-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinin işbu hareketi müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin inzimam-ı rey ve iradeleriyle olmayıp hod be hod icra eylediği ve kumandasında bulunan cunud-ı nizamiye ve asakir-i muvazzafa kaide-i harbiyeye muğayir perakende olarak karyelere tefrik olunduğu anlaşılmış olduğundan derhal asakiri toplayıp gerü hududdan içerüye avdet eylemesi zımnında suy-i çakeranemden kendüsine ekid-ül mazmun tahrirat gönderilmiş ise de iş görmek gareziyle ışğa etmediği ve hatta yanında bulunan erkan ve ümera dahi tahrirat-ı acizanem vechile harekete müsaraat eylemesini hayırhâhâne ihtar eylemişler ise de kulak vermeyip muahharen Rusyalu bunların üzerine pek cüzi asker ile geldiği halde bunlar karyelere müteferrik bulunmalarından dolayı kuvvetleri dağılmış olduğundan mukavemete tâb-âver olamamalarına sebep olduğu cümle-i tahkikat-ı çakeranemden bulunmuştur.

Bu madde Ali Paşa'dan sual olundukta "Zarif Paşa Ardahan'a geldiği gün vakia ben çıkmış idim ve ol gün müşarünileyhin geleceğinden haberim yok idi ve çıktıktan sonra müşarünileyhin bana ademi gelmedi ki 'sizin paşanız gibi ben müşir olacağım' diyeyim ve ahaliden el tutarak Ahışa kalesini bize teslim edecekler deyu ben kimesneye kağıd yazmadım. Vakia asakir karyelerde müteferrik idi ise de verdiğim layihada muharrer olduğu vechile muharebe vaktinde cümlesi yerlerinde bulundular ve muahharen asakiri toplayıp hududdan içerü çekilmeğe dair Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin tahrirâtı bana vasıl olmadı. Ben Ahışa'da iken bana başıbozuk askeri gönder deyu vali paşaya yazmış idim. Ne asker gönderdi ve ne de iane eyledi. Velhasıl müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin işbu bendde azv ü isnad buyurdıkları taksiratın hiç birisini kabul etmem. Her bir hareket ve sekenatım müşarünileyhin emriyle olduğundan ve bunların her birisinin emirnamesi mevcut olduğundan isbata muktedirim. Hatta Ahışa'nın Yenişehiri üzerinde vuku bulan muharebe keyfiyetine dair gönderilen tahrirata cevaben fi 4 S sene 70 [6.11.1853] tarihiyle gelen tahrirâtı ibraz ederim" demesiyle tahrirat-ı mezkur kıraat olundukta vakia ferik-i müşarünileyhin bu babda olan gayret ve himmetlerinden izhar-ı mahzuziyetden başka kendüsine tezyid-i kuvvet olmak üzere devletlu Zarif Paşa hazretleriyle Ferik saadetlu Abdülkerim Paşa'nın asakir-i kaifiye ile ol tarafa sevk ve izam kılındığı muharrer olup bu bendde yazıldığı vechile geriye avdet olunmasına dair fikra olmadığı ve bunun üzerine müşarünileyh Ali Paşa "Şu ibraz eylediğim tahriratın tarihinin ertesi günü ki Safer'in yigirmi beşinci günüdür [27.11.1853] bozgunluk vuku buldu. Müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin geriye avdet etmemize dair işbu bendde muharrer tahrirâtı bana nasıl vasıl olabilir?" demesi üzerine müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri "Ben o tahrirâtı Ali Paşa'nın bozulduğunu duymazdan evvelce göndermişdim. Galiba tarafına vasıl olmamış" demişlerdir.

Umum orduy-ı hümayunun uygunsuzluğu sebeplerine dair komisyondan vaki olan sualler üzerine tarafımızdan irad olunan cevablar maddeleri bâlâlarına surh ile işaret kılınmış olacağından temhirlerine dahi ibtidar kılınmıştır.

[Seals from left] Abdülkerim Nadir, Ahmed, Ali Rıza.

Appendix 81. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2, undated. Ahmed Pasha's report on the defeat of Gümrü (Gedikler) and his answers to questions together with those of Abdi Pasha and Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha. [Marginal notes in red above the paragraphs are written in red ink in the original and they are given here below the paragraphs]

Gümrü'de vuku bulan bozgunluğun sebebi devletlu Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta orada olan vukuata dair yazmış olduğu işbu varaka meydana konulup

devletlu Abdi Paşa ve Ali Paşa hazeratı dahi hazır oldukları halde irad olunan suallere müşarünileyhim taraflarından verilen cevablardır ki maddeleri bâlâlarına surhla işaret kılındı.

Kars'da bulunan asakir-i nizamiye-i cenab-ı şahanedan altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ile on beş kıta top ve ilerüde Kars'a dört buçuk saat mesafede vaki Subatı karyesinde bulunan beş tabur piyade ve beş bölük süvari ile Mirliva izzetlu Veli Paşa'yı alıp Şüregel ve Zarşat kazalarında mevcut bulunan üç binden müteceviz neferat-ı muvazzafaları dahi bil-istishab Gümrü pişgahında Arpaçayı'nın önüne doğru azimet etmek ve düşmanın kuvvetini anlayarak harb eylemek ve icabı takdirinde kazanılacağı anlaşıldığı halde Arpaçayı'nı geçip bir nokta tutup keyfiyetin serian taraflarına yazılmak hususunu tekiden irade buyurmuş oldukları.

Beyan-ı hal kabilinden olmağla hükmü olmadığı

Müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinin iradelerine imtisalen şehri Safer-ül Hayr'ın dokuzuncu Pencşenbe [11.11.1853, but Friday!] günü Mirliva izzetlu Mustafa Paşa kumandasıyla Kars'da bulunan altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve on beş kıta top ve lüzumu kadar mühimmat-ı harbiye ile Kars'dan hareket ve yevm-i mezkurda ahşam saat on ikide mezkur Subatı karyesine varılarak ferdası Cuma günü bir tabur piyade ile iki kıta top karye-i mezkurda terk olunarak dört tabur piyade ve beş bölük süvari ve dört kıta sürat topu dahi alınarak ve mezkur Şüregel ve Zarşat kazalarında bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafanın Arpaçayı'nın bu tarafında vaki Baş Şüregel nam karyeye cem' olunması hususuna memur-ı mahsus çıkarılarak on tabur piyade ve bir alay beş bölük süvari ve on dokuz kıta top ile oradan dahi kalkıp Kars çayının bu tarafında kain Aküzüm karyesine saat on raddelerinde muvasalat ve beytutet olunmuştur.

Bu dahi

Rusya toprağında bulunan Tukaber [Tuhaber?] nam karyede Rusyalı'nın üç yüz kadar Kazak süvarisi ve iki kıta topu bulunduğu haber verilmekten naşi bunların ahz ü gerefti için müşarünileyhin ifadeleri vechile Şüregel kazası müdiri rifatlu Meded Bey ile ol havalinin Karapapak ve aşair atlasundan bin kadar atlu ol gece mezkur Tukaber karyesine gönderilmiştir.

Bu dahi

Ferdası yevm-i sebt [13?.11.1853] mezkur Aküzüm'den hareket birle Kars suyunu geçip mezkur Baş Şüregel karyesine vakt-i zuhurda muvasalat olunmuş ve asakir-i muvazzafa dahi vaki olan işar üzerine orada hazır ve müheyya bulunmuştur.

Mezkur Baş Şüregel karyesinin karşusunda Arpaçayı'nın öte tarafında kain Bayındır karyesinde Taştımur kumandasıyla Rusyalı'nın iki binden ziyade Karapapak atlasu orada mevcut bulunmuş olduğundan asakir-i nizamiye-i şahane ve toplar yerlerine konularak karye-i merkume pişgahında bit-tevfik neferat-ı muvazzafa üç kol tertip olup sınıf-ı evveli Arpaçayı'nın kenarına varmak üzere iken düşman tarafından mezkur çayın kenarına inilerek silah endahtına mücaheret etmeleri cihetle bu taraftan dahi mukabele-i bil-mislin icrasıyla mezkur çayın öte tarafına geçip bizim taraftan vaki ve irae olunan kuvvete düşman askeri tâb-âver olamayarak münhezimen Gümrü'ye doğru yüz çevirmişlerdir.

Bu bendin meali Abdi Paşa tarafından tasdik olunmuştur.

Mezkur üç kol neferat-ı muvazzafadan bir takımı ihtiyat olarak mezkur Bayındır'ın kenarında alıkonulup iki takımı düşman arkasından takib ettirilmiş ve Gümrü kazası pişgahında muvasalatlarında Gümrü canibinden bir alay Rusya süvarisi süratle bizim

tarafa hücumları görülmüş olduğundan Erzincan kazası müdiri izzetli Alişan Bey kumandasıyla ihtiyat bırağılan mezkur neferat-ı muvazzafa dahi erişip yerleşerek düşman askerini bozup münhezim ve perişan ederek Gümrü kazasına kadar sokturulmuş ve mezkur kazanın karşusunda neferat-ı muvazzafa yarım saat miktarı tevkif ettirilerek badehu gerüye alınmış ve ol gün bir hayli Rusyalu tarafından telefât vuku bulup beş on esir ile yüzden ziyade kadana bargiri ve hayli süngü ve kama ve tabanca ve kılıç alınmıştır ve ol gün cenab-ı hakk saye-i hazret-i şahanede nusret ve muzafferiyet ihsan eylemiştir.

Bu dahi

Ve evvelce neferat-ı muvazzafanın bir takımı Bayındır karyesinde ve asakir-i nizamiye dahi Baş Şüregel karyesinde aram ve beytutet ve ferdası Pazar günü cümleten asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafa Bayındır karyesine geçileceği keyfiyetiyle bir takım süngü ve silah-ı saire gönderildiğine dair yaver-i harb Mülazım Osman Efendi vasıtasıyla müşarünileyh hazretleri taraflarına ba tahrirat işar ve işaat kılınmıştır.

Muharebenin vukuunu yazmışlar ise de karşıya geçilmek üzere yazıldığı hatırlarında olmadığından olan tahrirata müracaat olunması iktiza edeceği Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından ifade olunup tahrirat kıraat olundukta karşıya geçileceği sarahaten beyan olunmamış ise de Gümrü üzerine doğru hareket olunacağı ve düşman kaleden çıkar ise muharebe olunacağı beyan olunmuştur.

Şehr-i mezkurun on ikincisi [14.11.1853] olup zikr olunan Pazar günü Bayındır karyesine geçilip bir nokta tutulması mahsenatı (?) muceb olacağından Arpaçayı'na köprü yapılarak mevcut maiyetimizle karye-i merkumeye geçilmiş ve lazım gelen mahallere karakol vaz' ve tertip olunmuş olup ol gün Rusyalu tarafından hiçbir hareket vukua gelmemiştir.

Abdi Paşa hazretleri bu bendin müştemil olduğu nokta maddesi bir şeyi (?) müfid (?) olmadığını ifade eylemiş ise de noktanın tutulması mahsenatı (?) müstelzem olacağını mukaddemce Abdi Paşa hazretleri inha etmiş olduğunu Ahmed Paşa beyan etmesiyle buna dair tahrirata müracaat olundukta muharrer bulunan nokta keyfiyeti başka bir nokta olup bu noktaya hiç münasebeti olmadığı anlaşılmıştır.

Müşarünileyh hazretleri altı tabur piyade ve dört bölük süvari ve malum-ül kıtaat top ile Subatı karyesine geldikleri beyanıyla iki yüz kadar atlunun Miralay izzetli İsmail Bey taraflarına gönderilmesine ve Pazar ertesi teşrif edecekleri ifadesine dair bir kıta tahrirat-ı müşiraneleri vürud etmekten naşi hemen ol gece atluy-ı mezburi hazır ederek mir-i muma-ileyh taraflarına gönderilmiştir.

Bu bendin meali kendüsince bir guna hüküm getirür şey olmadığını Abdi Paşa hazretleri beyan eyledikten sonra Ahmed Paşa hazretleri bu bendde muharrer olup fi 12 S sene 70 [14.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin tahriratını bil-irae kıraat olundukta meali zir-i kumandalarında olan piyade ve süvari asakir-i nizamiye-i şahane ile Subatı karyesine geldiklerini ve ferdası hareket olunarak ol tarafa muvasalat edeceklerini beyan ile zikr olunan asakir-i şahane için orada yer var mıdır yohsa burada tevkif olunması mı icab eder ve oraca suret-i hareketleri ne merkezdedir istifsar ile beraber icabı kadar atlu ile Kaimmakam İsmail Bey'in veyahud Meded Bey'in taraflarına gönderilmesini mutazammın olduğu anlaşılmıştır.

Mezkur gece sabahı ve gündüz saat yedi buçuka kadar düşman tarafından bir guna hareket görülememiş ve müşarünileyh hazretleri dahi Bayındır karyesine birbuçuk saat mesafede vaki Kars Suyu'nu geçtiği haber alınmış iken hemen ol halde var kuvvetiyle Rusyalu kaleden çıkıp orduy-ı hümayun canibine hareketleri görüldüğünden derakıb dokuz tabur piyade ve bir alay ile beş bölük süvari ve on dokuz kıta top ile mevcud

bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafayı alıp düşmana karşı yavaş yavaş varılmış ve düşmanın böyle hareket etmeleri keyfiyetiyle bir ayak evvel teşrif eylemelerine dair müşarünileyh hazretlerine haber gönderilmiştir.

Bu bendin müfадından anlaşılan haber maddesinin vuku' bulmadığını Abdi Paşa hazretleri beyan edip Ahmed Paşa dahi vukuunu musirren ifade etmektedir.

Asakir-i şahane mezkur karyeden haylice ayrılıp piyade taburları iki hat üzere tertib olunup süvari alayı bölükleri sağ ve sol cenahlara ve neferat-ı muvazzafa dahi nizamiyenin sağ ve sol taraflarına ve toplar cenah ve ortaya konularak ve mumaileyhima Veli ve Mustafa Paşalar sağ ve sol cenahların kumandalarına tayin olunarak ve ben dahi asakir-i şahaneye metanet ve cesaret gelmek üzere sağ ve sol tarafı ve tabur aralarını gezer iken saat dokuzda düşman tarafından top endahtına mücaseret ve mukabele-i bil-mislin icrasıyla bizim taraftan dahi harbe mübaşeret olunmuştur.

Hikaye kabilinden olmağla hükmü olmadığı

Düşmanın on tabur piyade ve iki alay süvari ve iki binden mütecaviz Karapapak atlasu ve kırk kıta top [sic] meydan-ı muharebede görülmüştür.

Bu dahi

Saat on buçukta müşarünileyh hazretleri mezkur ül miktar asakir-i şahane ile birlikte bizim gavga etmekte olduğumuz mahalle yigirmi dakika mesafe bulunan mezkur Baş Şüregel karyesine geldikleri haber alınmaktan naşi yanlarında bulunan Ferik saadetli Raşid Paşa hazretleri dört yahud üç tabur piyade ve bir batarya top ile bizim sol ve düşmanın sağ tarafından hareket etmesini müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine birkaç defa ifade etmiş ise de müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri asla sem' ve itibar etmediği muahharen ferik-i müşarünileyh ifadelerinden anlaşılmış, eğerçi ol vakit müşarünileyhin vaki olan ifadesi üzerine sevk-i asker olunmuş olsa idi avn-i hakla bütün bütün kazanılacağına şüphe yok idi.

Bu madde Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sorulduğunda "Ahmed Paşa gavga eder iken geldim. İmdat için süvariye hemen karşı yakaya geçürdüm ve düşman bozulup Gümrü canibine ricat eyledi. Lakin Reşid [sic] Paşa benden ne asker istedi ve ne de rica eyledi" deyu söylemiştir.

Müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri ahşam ezanından evvelce Bayındır karyesine geçmezden evvel maiyetlerinde bulunan dört bölük süvari ve topları mahall-i muharebeye gönderdiler ve kendüleri dahi mezkur Bayındır karyesine teşrif eylediler.

Bu bendin müfадını Abdi Paşa hazretleri tasdik eder.

Ol gece saat iki buçuka kadar muharebe mümtedd olduğu halde müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafından sevk-i asker ve kendüleri dahi bir taraftan teşrif edip asakir-i şahaneye şevk ve gayret verilememiş olduğundan ümera ve zabitan cümlemiz asakir-i şahanenin içlerinde bulunmakta ve asakir-i şahaneye şevk ve gayret gelmek üzere kelime-i tayyibeler ile pend ve metanet verilmekte bulunduğu halde gece saat iki buçukta ateş kesildiği müşarünileyh hazretlerine bildirildikte hemen asakir-i şahaneyi gerüye çekip gelsün deyu haber göndermiş ise de düşman gidip gitmediği ve ne halde buldukları anlaşılmaq için saat beşe kadar durulmuş ve sol cenaha doğru gezer iken düşman tarafından yol şaşırıp süratle bir kapaklı gelmekte olduğu müşahade olundukta derakıb süvari dördüncü nizamiye alayı Kolağası Şerif Ağa ve birkaç süvari neferatı sevk olunmuştur.

Muharebe esnasında büyük kumandarların asakirin içinde bulunması lazım gelmeyeceğinden ba'del muharebe dahi askerin içine gitmeğe lüzum görünmediğinden munasip gördükleri yerde kalmış olduğunu Abdi Paşa beyan eder.

İşbu kapaklunun yanında bulunan bir nefer Rusyalu mülazımı ve bir nefer topçu Kazağı teslim olunmasına ikdam olunmuş ise de teslim olmamaları cihetle mersumlar katl ve telef ve derununda gülle ve kobuz mahmul olduğu halde mezkur kapaklu ve dört re's kadana bargiri bizim topçu zabitlerine teslim ve ita kılınmış ve saat beşde asakir-i şahaneyi bil-istishab karye-i mezkura gelinerek müşarünileyh hazretleriyle mülakat olunmuştur.

Bu bendin istintakça hükmü olmadığı

Ve şehir-i mezkurun on dördüncü Salı [16.11.1853] günü müşarünileyh hazretleriyle esblerimize binip muharebe olan mahalle varılmış ve birçok Rusyalu laşesi ve topkeşan hayvanatı meydan-ı muharebede kaldığı müşahade olunmuş işbu laşeler ile muharebe evvelinden nihayetine kadar Gümrü kalesine götürmüş laşe ve mecruh binden ziyade olduğu ve fena suretle perişan ve münhezimen leylen Gümrü kalesine sokuldukları ve İslam olup Rusyalu tarafında bulunan Karapapak atlasu bütün bütün dağılarak hemen yüz elli kadar kaldıkları ve işbu yüz elli atlıyu dahi siz İslamla gavga etmediniz diyerek emniyetleri selb olup cümleten Rusyalu tarafından katl ü idam oldukları muahharen tahkik ve istihbar kılınmış ve bu muharebede dahi bi-tevfik-i teala saye-i fütuhattvaye-i cenab-ı şahanedede nusret ve muzafferiyet bizim tarafda olmuştur.

Bu dahi

İşbu muharebede bizim taraftan yigirmi üç şehid ve kırk yedi kadar mecruh vukua gelmiş ve mukaddem ve bu kere neferat-ı muvazzafadan dahi hemen bu kadarca şehid ve yaralı vuku bulmuş ve topkeşan ve binek ve neferat-ı muvazzafa hayvanlarından yüzden ziyadece telefât olmuştur.

Bu dahi

Ve Cuma ertesi gününe kadar atılan top danelerinin yerine Kars'dan celb olunarak üç yüz atıma balığ olmuştur.

Bu dahi

Ve mukaddem Subatı karyesinde bırağılmış olan bir tabur piyade ve iki kıta top yevm-i Çeharşenbe Bayındır karyesine götürülmüştür.

Bu dahi

Ve Mirliva izzetli Hafız Paşa kumandasıyla Kars'da bırağılmış olan üç tabur redif ve bir tabur nizamiye dahi yevm-i mezkurda Bayındır karyesine gelmiştir ve şehir-i mezkurun on dokuzuncu Pazar günü asakir-i Hassa şeşhane taburu mükemmelen mezkur Bayındır karyesine gelmiştir.

Bu dahi

Mukaddemce mezkur Tukaber [?] tarafına gönderilmiş olan mumaileyh Meded Bey yigirmi kadar esir ve bir miktar bargir ile Salı günü Bayındır'a gelmiş ve bunlardan dahi bir miktar Rusyalu tarafından dahi haylüce telefât vuku' bulmuş olduğu mir-i mumaileyhin ifadesinden anlaşılmıştır.

Bu dahi

Bizim kuvve-i mecmuamız yigirmi iki tabur piyade ve iki buçuk alay süvari ve sekiz yüz kadar topçu ve otuz sekiz kıta top ile üç binden ziyadece neferat-ı muvazzafa olduğu düşman askeri pek gayet zaafiyetde ve gereği gibi imdadsız kaldığı ve asakir-i şahane ber vech-i matlub şevk ve gayretde bulunduğu halde düşman askeri kasabadan dışarı çıkarlar ise üzerlerine varılıp harb olunması ve çıkmadıkları suretde Gümrü'ye

daha karib mahalde vaki Kara Kilisa karyesine geçip bir münasip istihkam verilerek oraya on saat mesafede kain Üç Kilisa nam mahalde bulunan Rusyalu'nun üç tabur askerini bir fırka asakir-i şahane ile gidip basdırılması ve bu dahi olmaz ise kalenin arka tarafına yani Tiflis tarikini dolaşarak Ahılkelek tarikinin üzerine bir münasip istihkam verilerek kaleye bir karaltı gösterilip beş on tabur ile Ahışa'ya doğru Ferik saadetli Ali Paşa'nın tarafına hareket ve azimet kılınması ve şu üç suretten her kanğısı mütenasip görülür ise ol vechile emr ü icra buyurulması hususu Ferik saadetli Raşid Paşa ve Kerim Paşa ve muahharen atufetli müsteşar efendi hazeratı hazır buldukları halde bid-defeat müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine ifade ve beyan kılınmış ise de hiç birisine itibar etmeyip orada bir güzelce istihkâm verilmiş iken on iki gün beyhude eğleşmiştir. **Yalnız işbu beyan olunan üç suret değil daha pek çok suretler düşünöldü ise de hiçbirisinin faidesi olmayacağı anlaşıldığından akıbet-öl emr Kars'a avdet sureti mürecceh görünerek cümle ittifakıyla ol vechile Kars'a avdet olunmağa karar verildiğini Abdi Paşa hazretleri ifade eder.**

İşbu on iki gün zarfında beyhude oturulması cihetle asakir-i şahanenin şevk ve gayretleri gün be gün zail olarak bir gevşeklik arız olmakta ve tayinat dahi Kars'dan layıkıyla gelmemekte ve Tiflis ve Çaçak [?] tarafından peyderpey düşmana imdad gelmekte olup hatta kaleye sokulup dışarıya çıkamaz iken beş altı günden sonra ordusunu kasabanın sol tarafında karşımuza çıkarıp hayme-nişin-i ikamet olmuşlardır. **“Esbab-ı nakliyenin fikdani ve yolların çamur ve bozukluğu cihetle zahire celbinde noksanıyet oldu. Fakat mev'ud zahire ile asker idare olunup aç birağılmadı ve biz orada iken düşmana imdad geldiğini görmedik ve haber almadık ve Rusya ordusunun kaleden dışarı çıkması imdadının gelmesinden olmayıp Gümrü kalesinin etrafı müstahkem ordu mesabesinde olmağa her ne vakit murad olursa yüz binden mütecaviz askerle kale-i mezburun istihkamata altında barınılabılır”** deyu Abdi Paşa hazretleri ifade eder.

Ve bu aralıkta **r*b*z*?** cenah-ı müstelzem ül-felah hazret-i şahaneye dehaletle Dersaadet'e gelmiş olan Rüstem Bey ve kolağası orduy-ı hümayuna gelip Rusyalu'nun gayet zayıf vakti olup harb olursa bizim taraftan iş görüleceğini müşarünileyh hazretlerine ifade etmiş ise de ona dahi sem'-i itibar etmeyip velhasıl her ne mütalaaya mebni ise orduy-ı hümayunun Kars'a avdetini münasip gördüler. **İşbu Rüstem Bey mechul-öl hal bir adem olmağa bazı mütalaata mebni ifadatına havale-i sem'-i itibar olunamadığını Abdi Paşa hazretleri ifade eder.**

Müşarünileyh Raşid ve Kerim Paşa ile birlikte taraflarına celb birle havaların soğuklarından bahisle orduy-ı hümayunun [sic] Kars'a avdet ve hareket ettireceğini ifade ve beyan buyurdular ve bizler dahi “Muharebe olmuyor ve bir mahalle gidilmiyor burada beyhude oturmaktan ise iradeniz vechile Kars'a gidelim” denildikte “Askerin hazır olmalarını tenbih ediniz fakat ne tarafa gidileceğini bu dördümüzden başka kimesne duymasun” deyu irade buyurmuşlardır.

Bu bendin mealini Abdi Paşa hazretleri tasdik eder.

Müşarünileyh hazretlerinin iradelerine imtisalen Cuma ahşamı mirliva paşaları ve neferat-ı muvazzafa sergerdeleri celb edilerek yarın kalkılacak hazır olup ve yükleri dahi yüklettirip ordunun Gümrü canibinde falan mahalde durmalarını ve süvari alaylarıyla iki batarya süvari topu Mirliva izzetli Veli Paşa kumandasıyla yine ordunun Gümrü cenahında neferat-ı muvazzafanın sol cenahında kol heyetiyle durup amade ve müheyya olmaları ekiden tenbih ve ifham olunmuştur.

Bu dahi

İşbu tenbihat üzerine asakir-i şahane müheyya olarak ferdası yani şehri mezkurun yigirmi dördüncü Cuma günü tahsis olunan mahallere saf-beste-i tecemmü olup saat üçte Arpaçayı geçilerek asakir-i muvazzafa sergerdelerinden Hacı Temür Ağa zikir olunan Baş Şüregel karyesinde terk ve tevkif birle orduy-ı hümayun ile cümleten Aküzüm nam karyeye muvasalat olunmuştur.

Bu dahi tasdik olunmuştur.

Orduy-ı hümayun ile beraber yanımızda bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafa sergerdelerinden mevcut maiyetleriyle her kağısı tensib (?) bilür ve ne mahalde ikameleri irade buyurulur ise hududa karib birkaç karyede ikadı hususu taraf-ı aciziden müşarünileyh hazretlerine ifade olunmuş ise de ilerüde icabına bakılır deyu cevap verdiler.

Abdi Paşa hazretleri “bu askerin cümlesi yerleştirildi” dedikten sonra Ahmed Paşa “bunda olan mazarrat askerin dağılması maddesi olup çünkü sergerdelere bir mahal irae olunmadığından dağıldılar” demesine cevaben Abdi Paşa “Aküzüm’e gelmek üzere tertip eyledik. Sergerdeler geldiler, neferatı gelmediler. Bunlar nasıl olsa dağılacak idi” cevabı üzerine Ahmed Paşa bazı mertebe itiraz ederek bu maddenin istilam olunmasına iki taraftan dahi muvafakat olunmuştur.

Ve bir de cenahlarda bulunan fırka-i askeri kumandanlarına yani Revan canibinde Üç Kilisa’nın karşusunda Aras suyunun kenarında bulunan Hakkâri valisi devletlu Mehmed Paşa ve Ahışa’da olan müşarünileyh Ferik Ali Paşa hazeratına orduy-ı hümayunun gerüye alınıp sizler dahi ona göre hareket etmek ve olmadığı halde ne vechile tedabire teşebbüs eylemek lazım geleceği keyfiyetlerine dair orduy-ı hümayun mezkur Bayındır karyesinden hareket etmezden çend gün evvel müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri taraflarından ba tahrirat malumat verilmek iktiza-i halden iken bu dahi kat’a vuku’ bulmamıştır.

Bunlara beyan-ı keyfiyet olunamaması neden iktiza eylediği Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta “Bu madde onlara bildirilmek lazım gelmez. Benim bunları yazmamaklığımdan ne zarar oldu?” demeleri üzerine Ahmed Paşa, “Ali Paşa gerü gelür idi” demesiyle Abdi Paşa, “Ali Paşa’ya yazdım” demiş ise de Ali Paşa kendüsüne öyle kağıt gelmediğini ifade eyledikte Abdi Paşa, “Ben yazdım lakin size vasıl olmamış. Bunun müsveddesi mahallinde mevcuttur. Ona müracaat olunsun fakat evvelce yazılmağa lüzum olmadığından Hakkâri valisine yazılmış idi ve böyle yazılmış bile olsa bizim kalktığımız gün Ali Paşa bozuldu” demesine cevaben Ahmed Paşa, “Hakkâri valisine Salı günü ben yazdım. Vasıl olduğu gibi hareket eyledi. Bunu da Abdi Paşa’nın tenbihi üzere yazdım” demiştir.

[page 5]

Yevm-i mezkurda Şam-ı Şerif canibinden azimet etmiş olan Sergerde Hasan Yazıcı Ağa gelip “Esnay-i rahda müşir paşa hazretlerini gördüm. Bizleri bir münasip mahalle yerleştirmek üzere size gönderdiler” diyerek ifade ettiklerinde ne kadar atlunuz var deyu sual ettim. İki bin kadar atlunuz vardır deyu ifade etmelerine mebni li-ecl-i müşahade binip mumaiyleh ile atlunun içlerine varıldıkta nisfından ziyadesi çoluk çocuk olarak cümleten sekiz yüz kadar atlusu ancak olduğu görülmüş ve yem verecek ziyade bulunması cihetle mumaiyleh mevcudatıyla beraber mezkur Aküzüm karyesine memur-ı mahsus ile gönderilmiştir.

Bu madde dahi Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta, “Demincek dediğim gibi yolda rast geldim ve Ahmed Paşa kumandasına gönderdim” demiştir.

Mumaiyleh Hasan Yazıcı Ağa karye-i mezkura varıp oturur oturmaz üst tarafındaki [sic] bulunan tepeden Rusya taburları yüz gösterdikte ağa-i mumaiyleh karyeden dışarı

çıkıp burada ben kalamam deyip derakıb haber göndermiş olduğundan keyfiyetin tahkik ve tedkiki zımnında Kolağası mumaileyh Şerif Ağa gönderilerek sahihen ordunun [sic] mahall-i mezkurda görüp haber getürmüş ve ağa-i mumaileyh ol gece mezkur Gedikler'e yarım saat mesafede vaki Kilisa karyesinde beytutet ettirilmiş ve keyfiyet-i vakia Salı gecesi ba tahrirat müşarünileyh hazretleri taraflarına bildirilmiştir.

Hikayeden ibaret olmağla hükmü olmadığı

Ve ferdası Salı günü Rusyalu'nun dört tabur piyade ve dört kıta top ve bir alay süvari ve bir miktar Karapapak atlısı yine Kars suyunu geçerek Aküzüm karyesinin alt tarafında neferat-ı muvazzafa ile harbe mücaseret edip hatta top endaht ettikleri dahi mezkur Gedikler karyesinde istima olunmuştur.

Bu dahi

Bunun üzerine yine asakir-i nizamiye ile mezkur Gedikler karyesinin haricine çıkılıp hat tertip olundukta birkaç atlı ile ilerüye gitmiş ve harb olunduğunu görmüş olduğundan ve sonra tarafeynden birkaç telefata vukua gelerek düşman mezkur Kars çayını öteye geçip ordusu canibine gittiklerinden yine gerüye avdet kılınmıştır.

Bu bendin meali Abdi Paşa tarafından tasdik olunmuştur.

Ve Pazar günü saat yedide vuku-ı hal ile asakir-i şahanenin tayinatından dolayı zaruret-i hallerinden bahisle keyfiyet ba tahrirat müşarünileyh taraflarına işar kılınmıştır.

Gedikler karyesinden Salı gecesi yazılan tahriratımıza cevaben Salı günü müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden alınan tahriratta Pencşenbe gününe kadar iktiza-i hal bitteemmül yine sureti karar işar olunacağından ona göre iktiza-i hale bakılması münderic olup tahrirat-ı mezkur yedlerinde mevcut bulunduğundan iktiza eylediği halde irad edeceğini Ahmed Paşa hazretleri ifade eylemiştir.

Ferdası Çeharşenbe günü karakollar birbirleriyle muhabere etmek sırasında (?) iken müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafından mersul tahrirat-ı aciziye cevabname vürud etti ve meali şu oluyor ki asakir-i şahanenin tayinatı şimdiye kadar çamur ve yağmurun kesreti cihetle gönderilemediği ve kendü katarıyla bir miktar neferat-ı muvazzafa cephanesi gönderildiği ve yavaş yavaş Subatı karyesine gelirse Rusyalu Kars çayını geçtiği anda haber alınarak alel gafle basdırılsa bir iş görülür deyu tahririden ibaret olup bunun üzerine Mirliva izzetli Veli ve Hafız ve Mustafa Paşalar celb olunarak tahrirat-ı mezkur meydana konulup kıraat olunduktan sonra yarın Pencşenbe günü kalkılacağı ifade olunmuş ise de paşa-i mumaileyhima [sic] tarafından bazı mahzurlar mütalaasıyla ifadede bulunmuşlardır. Yani şöyle ki "Bizler buradan kalkarsak düşman peşimizde ve çoluk çocuk ve emval ve eşya ve ırz ve ıyal bilcümle bilcümle [sic] ayak altında kalur ve bizlerce dahi bir fenalık melhuzdur ve değirmanlarda cem ve iddihar olunmuş olan hintalar değirmanlar ile düşman elinde kalur ve Kars'dan tayinat gelmiyor ve Subatı karyesinde değirman yok. Zaruret-i hale giriftar olmak ve düşman peşimizde iken kalkup gitmek lazım gelmez. Bir iki gün sabr edelim. Düşman gelür ise gavga eyliyelim. Eğer gelmez de Gümrü'ye çekilür gider ise başluca buradan kalkup Subatı ve Kars'a kadar gideriz" deyu bu yolca ifadede bulunmuş olduklarından ben dahi inşallahu teala yarın sabahleyin gidelim deyu müzakerede iken müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerinden yaver-i harb Binbaşı Arif Efendi geldi. Müşir paşa hazretlerinin selamı var yarın kalkılsa yavaş yavaş Subatı karyesine doğru çekilirse yine siz bilürsünüz deyu bu vechile ifade etmiştir.

Bu madde Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden سوال olundukta "Olunan müzakere vechile muradım asakir-i şahaneyi Subatan karyesine çekip ve Rusyalu'yu Kars çayından berü alıp orada sıkıştırarak bir muharebe etmek maksadına mebni idi. Zira bu manevranın icrası için asakir-i şahaneyi berü almaklıkla olur ve yazdığım tahrirat bunu müeyyiddir" demesiyle

tahrirat kıraat olunup vakıa bu bendde muharrer olduđu vechile olup fakat zahire gönderilip yağmur ve çamur münasebetiyle henüz vasıl olmuş olacağı muharrer olmađla bunun üzerine Abdi Paşa Kars'a avdet olunduđu vakit her günde dört kere vukuat yazılması tenbih olundu ve kendüleri orduyu Subatan'da bildiđi cihetle yaveri Subatan'a gönderip orada bulamadıđından ilerüde bulup Kars'a avdet olunmasını ifade eyledi ve hatta Kerim Paşa'yı bile Kars'dan çıkarıp ordu için mahaller bile hazırlattı dedikten sonra "Ben yaveri gönderdiđim vakit Ahmed Paşa'ya ne söylemiş ve onlar dahi yavere ne cevap etmiş yaverden sual olunsun ve yazdıđım kağıdı okuyan liva paşalardan dahi keyfiyet istilam kılmsın" demişlerdir. Ve Ahmed Paşa hazretleri dahi buna muvafakiyet etmiş ise de Zarif Paşa'nın bizlere husumetleri cihetle kendülerinden ve kumandasında bulunan zabitan ve saireden sual olursa hakikat-i hal beyan etmeyecekleri maznun olduđundan istilama gelecek cevaba asla itimad edemeyeceđini müşarünileyh hazretleri ifade eylemişlerdir.

Ve biz dahi bu keyfiyeti paşalar ile müzakere etmekteyiz diyerek müşarünileyh hazretlerine böylece haber gönderilmişdir.

Hükmü olmadığı

Bunun üzerine mumaileyh Meded Bey ve biraderi Miralay İsmail Bey gelip istima'mıza göre yarın buradan hareket edecek imişsiniz. Sizler gittiđiniz halde bu kazada bulunan çoluk ve çocuk ve ırz ve ıyal perişan olup ayak altında kalur. Hiç olmaz ise bari bir iki gün tevkif ediniz bu havalide bulunan kura ahalilerini Kars canibinde kain münasip karyelere gönderelim deyu ifade etmelerinde onlara dahi bakalım deyu cevap verilmiştir.

Bu dahi

Şehr-i mezkurun yigirmi beşinci Cuma ertesi günü [27.11.1853] mezkur Aküzüm karyesinden dahi kalkılıp salif-üz zikr Subatı karyesine birbuçuk iki saat mesafede kain Gedikler karyesine muvasalat olunmuş ve altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ile bir batarya top esnay-i rahda mumaileyh Veli Paşa'nın kumandasıyla Subatı karyesine ve müşarünileyh Kerim Paşa dahi Kars'a gönderilmiş ve müşarünileyh Raşid Paşa hazretleri dahi gitmiştir.

Bu bendin mealini Abdi Paşa hazretleri tasdik eder.

Bu aralık Baş Şüregel'de birađılmış olan mumaileyh Hacı Timur Ađa'nın katibi Hasan Efendi gündüz saat on raddelerinde gelip Rusyalı kuvve-i mecmuasıyla saat yedi kararlarında Arpaçayı'nı berü tarafa geçip Baş Şüregel karyesine geldiđini ve mumaileyh Hacı Timur Ađa dahi karye-i mezkurdan kalkıp buraya gelmek üzere esnay-i rahda bulunduđu müşarünileyh hazretlerine ifade ve beyan etmiş ve ben dahi ol vakit asakir-i şahaneyi birleştirmek üzere bulunduđum halde nöbetçi çavuş Mustafa'yı li-ecl-il icab arkamızdan göndermeleri cihetle yanlarına geldim ve katib-i mumaileyhin ifadesini ber tafsil nakil buyurdular ve bunun üzerine asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafadan münasip mahallere karakol ve top konulması tensip gördüler.

Hükmü olmadığı

Ve bunun üzerine bendeleri esb-süvar olup mirliva paşaları celb ederek karakol ve top ikadı iktiza edecek mahaller müşahade olunmak üzere keyfiyeti paşa-i mumaileyhimaya ba'd et-tenbih Rusyalı'nun geleceđi tarik üzerinde vaki Ermeni köyüne kadar giderek neferat-ı muvazzafanın yanlarına ve karye-i mezkurun kenarına vardım. Yigirmi otuz atlu ile Kiđı kazası müdiri Mehmed Bey'in mahdumu İsmail Bey ile Malatya kazası hanedanından Hacı Mehmed Ađa'yı kırk elli kadar atlu ile orada bulup küsur neferat-ı muvazzafayı sual ettikte Kars'a dođru savuşup gitmiş olduklarını ifade eylediler.

Bu bendin mealini dahi müşarünileyh tasdik edip fakat kaçtı denilen asakir evvelce tertib ve tesrib olunmuş idi. Sonra kendüliklerinden firara karar vermişler deyu ifade eder.

Ve ol ahşam saat on bir buçuk raddelerinde mumaileyh Hacı Timur Ağa mevcut maiyeti bulunan üç yüz kadar atlı ile gelerek Rusyalu'nun Kars çayının öte tarafına gelip nasb-ı hıyamla ikamet ettiklerini beyan etti ve bunların cümlesi ol gece Hamza Gelik [?] nam karyede ikamet etmelerini ve ilerüye dikkatli karakol çıkarmalarını ve geçen düşman tarafından bir hareket vukua gelür ise arkalarında bulunan nizamiye karakollarına haber vermelerini bunlara dikkatli (?) tenbihat icra olunarak ve çıkarılan karakol mahalleri dolaşarak ol gece saat ikide orduya geldim ve benim oturacağım odada müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretlerini hazır bulup keyfiyet-i vakıayı kendüsine bit-tafsil ifade eyledim.

Hükmü olmadığı

Ve işbu ifadenin üzerine Subatı karyesinden mumaileyh Veli Paşa'nın celbi zımında taraflarından tahrirat gönderilip gece yarusu paşa-i mumaileyh mevcut maiyetiyle gelerek asakir-i merkume Yukarı Gedikler karyesine yerleştirildi ve berf-i baran yağarak ol gece sabah olmuştur.

Hükmü olmadığı

Yevm-i Pazar [28.11.1853] ilerüde bulunan karakollardan Rusyalu geliyor deyu alınan habere binaen müşarünileyh hazretleriyle birlikte olduğumuz halde karye-i mezkurun karşusuna çıkıp iki hat üzere asakir-i şahane tertib eyleyerek ve sağ ve sol cenahlara süvari konularak ve bizler dahi işbu hatlardan kırk elli hatve ilerüye giderek saat dörtten sekize kadar durulup düşman askerinin süvarisi Kars çayını bu tarafa geçti ve muahharen yine dönüp gerüye gittiler deyu bizim karakollar haber getürdiler. Bunların ne tarafa gittiklerine muttali olup ifade etmek üzere müteaddid ademler gönderilip asakir-i şahane gerüye mahallerine alınmıştır.

Bu bendin mealini Abdi Paşa hazretleri tasdik eder.

Ve şehir-i mezkurun yigirmi yedinci Pazar ertesi günü [29.11.1853] Yaver-i Harb Yüzbaşı Hasan Ağa ile müşarünileyhin gönderdiği habere binaen kalkup odada yanlarına vardıkta yanında üç kağıt olup "Ahışa'da bir fenalık zuhura gelmiş ve bu fenalığın vukuu orduy-ı hümayunun Bayındır karyesinden gerüye alınmasından neşet etmiş deyu atufetli müsteşar efendi yazmış olduğundan ve Kars'dan layıkıyla tayinat gelmemekte bulunduğundan ben Kars'a gideceğim" deyu ifade buyurmuşlardır.

Bu madde Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden سوال olundukta "Vakıa ben de gitmek efkârında idim. Ahmed Paşa efkârımı tasdik ettiğinden Kars'a gittim. Bu vukuat bizim çıktığımız günden bir gün sonra oldu. Buna bu çıkış nasıl sebeb olabilir?" demiştir.

"Her çend düşman peşimizde dolaştığı halde sizin gitmekliğiniz kat'a caiz değil" deyu vaki olan ifade-i acizaneme mebni "Düşman firar ederek Gümrü kalesinden içerüye girdi ve bana sahih haberi geldi" deyu ifade buyurmuşlardır.

Bu maddenin kat'a aslı olmadığını ve Rusyalu Gümrü kalesine geçmiş diyerek ifadat ve ihbarat vaki olduğundan onun üzerine keyfiyet buraya dahi yazıldığını Abdi Paşa ifade eyledikte "Rusyalu Gümrü kalesine gitmeyip olduğu yerde bulunmuş iken hilaf ifadeye mebni çarçabuk keyfiyet buraya yazıldığı ve bu keyfiyeti yazmak üzere kendüsüne ifade etmiş ise de dinlemediğini Ahmed Paşa beyan ettikte Abdi Paşa tasdik edip lakin bu bir vukuat demek olmadığından yazılmasında beis olmadığını ifade etmiştir.

Halbuki mezkur düşman zikir olunan Şüregel karyesinin önüne ordu kurup oturmakta oldukları güneş gibi zahir iken bu guna ifadede bulduklarına binaen "siz bilürsünüz

irade sizindir” deyu hatm-i kalam olunmuştur. Sonra mirliya paşaları çağırıp “Size tayinat göndereyim ben Kars’a gideceğim. Siz Ahmed Paşa ile burada çadırlar ve çamur kuruyunca [sic] kadar ikamet edip birkaç gün sonra geleceksiniz” deyip binip gitmişlerdir.

Bu madde Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta öyle oturmak için tenbihat vaki olmayıp fakat Hasan Yazıcı yolda olduğundan o geldiği gibi hareket olunması ve badehu Ahmed Paşa kumandasında bulunması tenbih olunarak avdet olundukta yarım saat berüde Hasan Yazıcı dahi gelmekte olduğu görülmüştür deyu ifade eylemiştir.

Ve Pencşenbe günü nöbetçi miralay gelip değirmanlarda iki bin kıyye dakik teraküm ettiğini ve beş on tabur iki üç günden berü bir şey almadıklarını ifade etmekten naşi çarçabuk dakik-i mezkuru müsavat üzere taksim ederek ve yakın karyelerden bir miktar tezek getürdülerek ve hemen etmek yapsunlar kalkılacak deyu ifade ve tenbih ettim. Bundan bir saat sonra Rusyalu Kars çayını geçip geldiğini karakollar gelip haber verdiler. Derakıb mirliya paşalara haber gönderdim. Askeri silah başına alıp geçen Pazar günü çıkılan mahalle doğru asker çekünüz deyu tenbihat-ı lazıme icrasıyla beraber üç tabur piyade ve altı kıta top Mirliya Hafız Paşa’nın kumandasıyla köyde ihtiyat bırağılarak esbe rakiben köyün kenarına çıkıp bakdım ki düşman gelmekte ve asakir-i şahane dahi çıkmaktadır.

Bu dahi

İşbu asakir-i şahanedan beş tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve altı kıta top ve beş yüz kadar neferat-ı muvazzafa mumaileyh Veli Paşa’nın kumandasına verilerek bizim sol cenahımızdaki köyün sol tarafına doğru gönderilmiş ve baki yanımızda bulunan on üç taburdan dört beş taburu Mirliya Hüseyin Paşa’nın kumandasıyla sağ cenahda ve bir alay süvari ve Hasan Yazıcı dahi sağında ve beş taburu dahi Mustafa Paşa kumandasıyla onun solunda ve bu taburların altısı birinci hat ve dördü ikinci hat ve üç taburu dahi gerüde ihtiyat konulmuştur ve heman otuz iki kıta top ile çıkılmıştır.

Askerin bir hat üzerine tertip olduğuna dair mahallinin bazı tahkikat ve işaretleri var ise de bu hale göre asakir-i mevcude iki hat olarak ihtiyatı dahi tertib olunmuş olduğu anlaşılmuştur denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri eğerçi ben gavgada bulunmadım ancak ibtidai tertibi bu vechile olduğunu tasdik ederim fakat suret-i icraati meçhulümdür demiştir.

İşbu toplardan altı adedi mumaileyh Veli Paşa ile sol müfrezede ve yigirmi altısı mumaileyhima Hüseyin ve Mustafa Paşa kumandalarında kalıp bir hat üzere taburlardan elli altmış hatve ilerüsünde olup fakat üçe münkasım olmuştur. Yani sekizi sağ ve solunda ve on adedi ortada çift kolların ilerü hareketinde hat açacak mahallerin arası açık bırağılmıştır.

Hasbel mevki topların vaz ve tertibi Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin bu bendde ifadesi vechile fenn-i harbe muvafık gibi anlaşılır ise de bu misillü şeylerin tahkikatına mukaddema memur-ı mahsus gitmiş olmasıyla bu maddenin tahkikine tevfiik olunması münasip olacağını Abdi Paşa hazretleri ifade eyledikten sonra ihtiyat kıtasında top bulundurulmamış gibi anlaşıldığı dermiyan olundukta hatt-ı harbin gerüsünde olarak yakın bir köyde dahi altı kıta top olduğunu Ahmed Paşa hazretleri ifade eylemiştir.

Erkân-ı harb zabitanı cümleten Kars canibine gidip mevcut olmadıklarından ve düşman dahi karşuda pek takarrüb ettiğinden aceleten bu kadarca tertib ve tesviye olunmuştur.

Bu madde Abdi Paşa’dan sual olundukta “Zaten orduca böyle işlerin erbabı erkân-ı harb zabitanı bulunmayıp fakat Faik Bey var idi. O dahi bilmem o aralık nerede idi demesine cevaben mumaileyhin Çürüksu’dan geldikten sonra Kars’a gittiğini Ahmed Paşa beyan etmiştir.

İki nefer mirlivalarda altı bölük avcı olup bunların dahi üç bölüğü ilerü ve üç bölüğü ihtiyat olarak gerüye konulmuştur ve iki bölük dahi mumaileyh Veli Paşa tarafına gönderilmiştir.

Tertibi beyandan ibaret olmağla hüküm getürür şey olmadığı

Bu hengamda mumaileyhima mirliva paşalar ve topçu miralayı Abdullah Bey çağırılıp tenbih ettim ki düşman karşumuzda top ve tüfenk attığı gibi benim kumandama bakmayıp icabına göre kumandanızda bulunanlara tenbih ediniz ve düşmanın gelişine göre hareket ve gayret etsünler deyu tenbih olunmuştur. Zira bir mevkide çok aram edemem sağ ve sol tarafa giderim iktizasına göre sizlere yaverler gönderirim ona göre hemen siz işinize bakasız deyu tekiden tenbihat-ı lazıme icra olundukta mahallerine gitmişlerdir.

Hareket-i harbiyeyi beyan demek olmağla hükmü yoktur

Rusyalu'nun karşumuzda yigirmi dört tabur piyade ve altı alay süvari ve üç bin kadar başıbozuk atlasu ve altmış kıta topu olup bunların on sekiz taburu ile beş alay süvarisi ve iki bin kadar başıbozuk atlasıyla elli altı kıta top bizim karşumuzda ve altı taburu gerüde arabaların yanında ve bir alay süvari ile dört kıta top mumaileyh Veli Paşa'nın karşusunda olduğu halde ibtida Rusyalu tarafından top endahtına mücaseret ve tarafeynden kezalik saat yedide harbe mübaşeret olunmuştur.

Bu askerin miktarı Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta “On iki tabur olduğunu işittim” demiştir.

Bu halde Veli Paşa'nın karşusundaki süvari alayı ilerü vararak iki top ahz etmiş ve muahharen dahi beri tarafda bulunan topların birkaç kobuz kapaklusuna gülle tesadüf ederek ateş alıp yanında bulunan asker ve hayvanata ziyade sakatluk vermiştir ve sağ cenaha bir alay süvari hücum etmiş ise de bizim taraf ihtiyat avcıları kuvvetiyle yine gerüye avdet ettirilmiştir.

Hükmü olmadığı

Ve bunu müteakip piyadesini ilerüye sevk ederek bizim taraftan dahi taburlar hareket edip hat açarak tüfenk gavgasına mübaşeret olunmuştur.

“Bu bendin mealine nazaran hatlar açılmamış demek oluyor. Bu halde asker açılmak lazım gelür idi” denildikte “Evet, işte düşman askeri açıldığı gibi bizimki de açıldı” deyu Ahmed Paşa'nın vaki olan ifadesi üzerine “Kavaid-i harbiyeye göre gavgaya başlama şöyle dursun tüfenk atılmaksızın bile saff-ı harb tertib olunmak lazım gelür idi” suali cevabsız kalmıştır.

Ve ol aralık Mirliva Mustafa Paşa'nın sol ve ilerüsünde bulunan tepe tutulması münasip mütalaasıyla ihtiyat birağılanlardan iki taburunu alarak mahall-i mezkura varıldıkta üç tabur düşman askeri bize karşı gelip muharebeye ibtidar olunmuş ve onlar gerüye çevrilmiş olduğu halde muharebe her taraftan müstedd olarak sonra Rusyalu tarafından bizim sağ tarafa üç alay süvari ve taburların mukabelesinde tabur sevk etmiş ve topları dahi ziyadece bulunmuş olduğundan bizim taraftan her ne kadar ikdam ve gayret ve süngü süngüye gelinmiş ise de sağında bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafa ve süvari alaylarını kaldırmış olduklarından kalkan süvari alayı ikinci hattın sağ başından gerüsüne doğru firar ederken ikinci hattın sağında bulunan redif taburuna da perişanlık tari olmuş olduğundan Rusyalu dahi birinci hatta ziyade yüklenerek birinci hattı dahi gerüye dönderdi ve ikinci hattın sağ başında bulunan redif taburu uygunsuz hareketde bulduklarından baki kalan üç tabur birinci hatta yerleştirilmiş ise de onlar dahi tâb-âver olamayıp sol tarafa doğru geldiler ve topkeşan bargirlerinin ekserisi telef

olduğundan ve birazı dahi gerüde köyde ihtiyat olarak Hafız Paşa'nın kumandasıyla birağılmış olan topçular topları koşup Kars canibine firar eylemelerini muharebede bulunan topçular gördüklerinden bunlar dahi biraz topkeşan bargirlerini alarakdan savuşmuşlar ve yigirmi altı pare toptan on dört top ma kapak güç ile kaçırılmış ve asakir-i şahane tarafına Rusyalu tarafından ziyadesiyle pişrev ve kurşun endaht olunmakta olduğundan min tarafillah [?] sağ tarafdan bu vechile hal-i mükeddire vukua gelmiş olduğu.

“Bu dağılan askeri toplatmak mümkün olamadı mı?” sualine **“Pek çok çalışıldı lakin düşmanın kuvveti ziyade olduğundan çaresi bulunamadı”** deyu Ahmed Paşa tarafından cevap verilmiştir.

İşbu asakir-i şahaneden bir takımı savuşup firar ve bir takımı doğruca bizim olduğumuz tarafda tepeye gelerek orada bir miktar harp ziyadelendi ve birkaç defa biz onları ve onlar bizi dönderdiler ve hatta ol vakit esbden inip asakir-i şahanenin arkasından kılınc ile binbaşı makamında kumanda dahi ettim ise de kader-i ilahi böyle imiş perişaniyet vukua gelerek etrafımı Rusyalu kuşatıp yanımda iki tabur ancak kalıp yüzbaşı ve mülazimden başka bir büyük zabıt bulunmadığından ve esbimi dahi seyis alıp bir tarafa gitmiş olduğundan yayan kaldım ve bizim esb gelinceye kadar asakir-i şahane tepeden ve etraftan güzelce gayret ettiler ve esb geldiği anda süvari olup muharebe ederek ve yaverler ve uşaklar hayvanlarına mecruh yükleyüp gerüye alarak öylece içlerinden çıkılmış ve iki defa Rusya taburları gelüp çatdı ise de yine asakir-i şahane gerüye çevirüp yaraluları ve zayıfları toplamak için gerüye dönüp gavgaya ederek mecruhlar selamete çıkartırılmış ve ol halde Hafız Paşa birağılmış olan karyeye geldikte paşa-i mumailiyh nerelerdedir ve taburlar ne mahaldedir sual olundukta toplar Kars'a gitti ve Hafız Paşa dahi burada yok deyu taburlar bu vechile ifadede bulunmakta iken Mirliya Hüseyin ve Mustafa Paşalar oraya geldiler ve düşman yine karşudan on pare top ile gelüp ateş etmeğe başlayup obüs danelerini ziyadesiyle atmakta iken tabur-ı mezbur ile saat on bir buçukta Subatı karyesine doğru çekildik ve orada Hafız Paşa'yı görüp asakir-i şahaneyi niçün bıraktınız ve topları niçün gönderdiniz deyu sual olundukta toplardan haberim yok lakin giden askeri çevirmek üzere buraya geldim deyu ifade ettiler ve ol anda keyfiyet-i hal müşir paşa hazretlerine ifade olunmak üzere Miralay İsmail Bey ve muahharen mirliya-i mumailiyhima Hüseyin ve Mustafa Paşalar gönderilmiştir ve ol aralık mumailiyh Veli Paşa mevcut maiyetiyle geldi ve mukaddem Subatı karyesine birağılmış olan çanta eşya-i sairelerini götürebildikleri kadar askere aldırılarak gece saat iki raddelerini geçerek Kars çayına azimet ve saat dokuzda muvasalatla müşir paşa hazretleriyle mülakat ve keyfiyet-i vakıanın ifadesine mübaderet olunmuş ve müşir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri dahi takdir-i ilahi olup noksan tedabirden olmadı diyerek teselli-i hatırdan bulunmuştur.

Hükmü olmadığı

Ve işbu muharebede bizim tarafdand beş yüzden ziyade şehid ve yedi yüzden ziyade mecruh ve yaralı olup meydan-ı muharebede şehid zannıyla kalmış olan bir nefer binbaşı ve bir nefer mülazım ve bir çavuş ve bir nefer ve köyde samanlık damına girmiş olan üç nefer ki ceman yedi nefer esirimiz vukua gelmiş ve düşman tarafından meydan-ı muharebede üç bine yakın mürd ve telef olanlardan yüz yigirmi mülazım ve miralay ve general ve kusura tüfenk-endaz, topçu ve süvari olduğu ve dört binden ziyade mecruhları bulunduğu sahihen tahkik olunmuş ve beş nefer zabitan ile bir nefer tranpete neferi ki ceman altı nefer dahi esir alınmış olup işte keyfiyet-i muharebe bu vechile olmuştur ve bu muharebede mevcut bulunan ümera ve zabitan ve asakir-i şahane ve cümleten uğur-ı şahanede elden geldiği mertebe çabaladık ise de muzafferiyete muvafık olamamış olduğu beyanıyla takrir-i hale ibtidar kılındı.

Bu dahi

Gümrü'den esnay-i avdetde zuhura gelen bozğunluğun sebeplerine dair komisyondan vaki olan sualler üzerine taraflarımızdan irad ve beyan olunan cevablar maddeleri balalarına surh ile işaret kılınmış olduğundan temhirine dahi ibtidar kılınmıştır.

[Seals from right to left] Ali Rıza, Ahmed, Abdülkerim Nadir

Appendix 82. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6, undated. Answers and comments of former commanders of the Anatolian army Müşir Abdi Pasha and Müşir Ahmed Pasha and of Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha to questions of the military commission in Istanbul on the situation of the Anatolian army.

Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunun bazı vukuatına dair derdest bulunan tahrirat üzerine orduy-ı hümayun-ı mezkur müşiri esbak ve sabık devletlu paşalar hazeratıyla Ferik saadetlu Ali Paşa hazretlerine komisyonda vaki olan es'ile ve müşarünileyhim hazeratı taraflarından verilen ecvibedir ki ber vech-i ati zikir ve beyan olunur.

Devletlu Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin fi 14 S sene 70 [16.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh tahriratu kıraat olunup mevadd-ı mundericesinden gönderilmediği beyan olunan iki tabur asker ile çend kıta topun suret-i tehiri ve böyle maddeler için yazdığı şeylere cevap tahrir kılınmaması sual olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Rusya'lunun Gümrü'ye imdad gönderecek mahalli olup zabtı mümkün denilen Kaygulu ve Kazancı boğazları teshir olunmak şöyle bir vakit ile mümkünatdan olamadığından başka bunlar için o civara asker göndermek muhataralu olduğundan bu sureti tecviz etmediğim cihetle askeri göndermedim. Fakat bu tahrirata ve bunun gibi her yazdığı mevadda derakıb cevap gönderdim” cevabını vermiştir.

Atufetlu müsteşar efendi hazretlerinin fi 25 S sene 70 [27.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh tahriratu aynen kıraat olunup, netice-i hükmünde Abdi Paşa'nın emr-i muharebede olan tereddüdüne ve gevşekliğine dair olan sözlere Abdi Paşa, “Haşa, ben böyle bir umur-ı cesimede gevşeklik isnadını kabul etmem. Mukaddemce dahi beyan eylediğim vechile hasb-el mevsim muharebeyi evvel bahara talik etmiş idim. Kendilerinin vürudıyla herkesin efkarını suret-i ahire meyelan ettirerek tekevvün eden kil u kal ve muahharen zuhura gelen vukuat-ı müteellime doğrusu bana da dağ-i derddendir. Kendüleri gelip de bu suretle davranmamış olsalar bunların biri vücuda gelmez idi” dedikten sonra Gümrü muharebesinde fırsat elde iken düşman askerine hücum olunmayıp ihtiyat durulması Raşid Paşa'ya tenbih olunduğu beyan olduğundan sebebi soruldukte “Düşmana hücum etmek mümkün değil idi çünkü ben süvari ile gavgaya yetişdim lakin piyade ahşam ezanıyla beraber ve belki daha sonra geldi. Raşid Paşa'nın ifadesi sahih değildir ve bil-farz yetişse bile öyle hücum kolay şey değildir. Kendüsünün böyle şeylere malumatı olmamak cihetle her kim ne söyler ise onu yapar ve yazar. Mamafih böyle yazmasından anladığıma göre bana nefsaniyeti var imiş demek oluyor. Bilmem nedendir” demesiyle Ahmed Paşa, Raşid Paşa ile Miralay İsmail Bey bana dediler ki “Piyade saat on buçuk raddelerinde Baş Şüregel tarafına geldi. İlerü gitmek için her ne kadar ibram etmiş isek de Abdi Paşa ruhsat vermedi” deyu rivayet etmesine cevaben Abdi Paşa, “Hayır ezan vakti geldiler ve mumaiylehima bunun için bana bir şey söylemediler. Söylese bile bilmiyorum” demesiyle Ahmed Paşa “Saat dokuzda gavgaya başlanıp yaver gönderildi. Hesabca piyade yetişebilir idi ve yetişdi” demiş ise de Abdi Paşa yetişmedi dediğinden bu maddede ihtilaf vaki olmuştur.

Müsteşar-ı müşarünileyhin fi 9 Ra sene 70 [10.12.1853] tarihiyle müverreh tahrirat-ı mufassalasında beyan olunduğu üzere Ahmed Paşa'nın teferrüdü sual olundukta Abdi

Paşa “Nizam üzere her dediğim şeyleri icra edip fakat şu Gedikler muharebesi maddesinde verdiğim talimat-ı şifahiye vuku’ bulan muğayir hareketten başka her halde itaat ve inkiyad üzere bulunurdu” demesiyle, Ahmed Paşa dahi “Abdi Paşa büyük kumandan olduğu halde teferrüd etmek ve emrine itaat etmemek nasıl olabilir? Şu Gedikler muharebesi vukuatı dahi zaruri olduğu ve habere vakit bulamadığını evvelce beyan etmişim. Zann ederim ki bu şikayetler oranın efkarınca Abdi Paşa aleyhinde bulunduğumdan neşet etmiştir” dedikten sonra ordunun her umurunda işar kılınan teseyyüb ve sui idarenin esbab-ı mücbiresi ne olduğu sual olundukta Abdi Paşa “Sui idare ne demektir? Ben elimden geldiği ve vüs’üm yettiği merteye çalışıp çabaladım” deyip Ahmed Paşa dahi “Ben idaresizliğe dair bir şey göremedim” deyu tasdik etmiştir. Başibozuk askeri sergerdelerinin hareket-ı gayr-i layıkaya ictisarlari halinde men’ olunmamaklığının sebebi sual olundukta Abdi Paşa, “Başibozuk sergerdelerinden İnce Arab nam şahıs Şam’dan oraya gelinceye kadar yollarda haylice fenalık ettiği söylendi. Kadir değil idim ki Şam tarafında onu o yoldan men’ edeyim. Orduya geldi ve Bayezid tarafına memur edildi. Orada biraz fenalığı tahkik ve istima’ olduğundan gerü alınıp ve habs ü tevkif ettirilip tedibine bakıldı. Galiba buraya da gönderildi” demesi üzerine beyan olunan sirkat ve telefata nasıl şeydir deyu sual olundukta Abdi Paşa “Sirkat maddesini bilmem. Bunda dahi elden geldiği kadar sa’y ederdim. Bunu bilmiş olsam ve mennine bakmasam şerik-i sarik demek olacağından bunu bir vechile kabul etmem. Kendüleri dahi memur-ı müstakil olduğundan böyle şeyleri aramak ve mennine bakmak lazım gelür idi. Bu suret umur-ı mülkiyeye aid ise ol halde memurlarından sual olunmalıdır” dedikten sonra Ahmed Paşa, “Ben dahi bunları tasdik ederim” demesiyle Rusyalu Sivas’a kadar getürdükten sonra def’i çaresi istihsal olunacağına dair edilen tedabir nasıl şeydir denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri Rusyalu’yu Sivas’a kadar getürdürüm demek maazallah oralari ona teslim edilmek manasına olmayıp alel itlak hikaye ve beyan-ı efkar tarikiyle ve hasbihal yoluyla eğerçi düşman kuvvetli gelür ise bile ondan korkmak lazım gelmez ve kuvve-i mütesaviye bulunmadıkça gavgaya durulmak olmaz böyle bir hal vukuunda bu denilen mahaller tahliye ettirilip gerü çekilmeli yine takib eder ise bu usule riayet etmeli. Düşman tecavüz etdikçe tefrik-i kuvvet edeceğinden artuk ondan sonra üzerine hücum olunur ise pek kolay def ve perişan edilür diyerek kavaid-i harbiyeden ihtimal ki bazı şeyler beyan olunmuştur. Ancak bu lakırdı suret-i resmide olup da bu yolda memurlara talimat verilmemiş ve tahliye maddesine teşebbüs olunmamış ki bunu böyle yazmışlar. Her ne hal ise bunlar garazlı şeylerdir” denmesi üzerine Ahmed Paşa hazretleri “Abdülkerim Paşa bir gece Zarif Paşa hazretlerine gidip orada defterdar efendi ile beraber meclisde hazır oldukları halde Abdi Paşa hazretleri bu fıkrayı söylediklerini bana hikaye ve beyan eyledi” demiştir.

Yine müsteşar efendi hazretlerinin fi 25 S sene 70 [27.11.1853] tarihli bir tahriratında Gümrü kalesinden vuku’-ı avdetinde oralari ahalisinden Kars’a gelecekleri rivayet olunduğu beyan olunan kesian kimler olduğu sual olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Böyle şey vukuunun kat’a aslı yoktur” demesi üzerine tahrirat-ı merkumenin fıkrat-ı mündericesinden işe layıkıyla bakılmış olsa Ahışa ve Ahılkelek ve Revan kalelerinin ele geçmesiyle beraber şimdiye kadar Tiflis’in içinde bulunabileceğine dair sözler istifsar olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “Böyle sözleri söyleye söyleye herkesin zihnini tahrik ile akıbet şu iki vukuat-ı mükeddirenin zuhuruna sebep verildi. Hasb el mevki bu kalelerin alınması ol vaktin kuvve-i mevcudesine göre mümkün olamayacağı erbabı indinde malumdur. Bu mütalaa varid ise de noksanı olup şöyle ki evvela vaktin ilerüsi kış idi. Şeyh Şamil ile iltihak mümkün olmazdı. İkincisi asıl bunda faide ve kuvvet o civar ahalisinin teminatıyla hasıl olacağına ve bu ise nakden fedakârlık ihtiyarına menut olduğu halde mevcut akçe olmamasına binaen ihtiyar olunmadı. Bunlar hayal-i muhal kabilindedir. Kendüsi bunları düşünüp kendü işine

bakmadığından Gümrü'den Kars'a avdetde ibtida haylice dakik mevcut iken onu tekml edip de yerine tedarik etmediğinden dolayı beş on gün çekilen zahmetler cümlenin malumudur” dedikten sonra olunan suale cevap verilmemesinin ve bazı şeyler mektum tutulmasının sebebi sorulduktaki “İktizasına göre sualine cevap verirdim ve pek güzel katib olduğundan hatta mühim ve mektum şeyleri kendülerine rica ile yazdırır idim” deyu Abdi Paşa hazretleri ifade eylemiştir.

Yine müsteşar efendi hazretlerinin fi 26 S sene 70 [28.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh tahriratında yazdığı şeylerden Erzurum valisi müşarünileyhin Ahışa ve Ahılkelek üzerlerine vuku'-ı memuriyetinden sonra istenilip gönderilmeyen iki tabur asker ile iki topun ve Kürdlerden bazılarının eyledikleri çapulculuğun yazılmış iken men'ine bakılmamasının sebebi sorulduktaki Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “İstenilen iki tabur ile iki top Ahılkelek'e gönderilmeyip ihtiyat durmak ve maiyetinde bulunmak şartıyla gönderdim ve başıbozuk takımından öyle hareketde bulunanların men'i çaresine bakılırdı. Bundan anlaşıldığına göre civar köyler ahalisinden olan başıbozuk neferatı bazı umurlarını tesviye eylemek ve yem ve yiyeceklerini kendi köylerinden ve çarşudan almak için ruhsat isteyerek azimet ve avdetlerinde bu makule halat-ı nazarziyeye cesaret edebilmeleri ihtimalatdan olduğu misillü bunların bu yoldan men' olunmaları dahi mertebe-i imkanda olmadığı şübhesizdir” dedikten sonra asakir-i şahanenin Gümrü pişgahında çadırsız kaldıkları sebebi sorulduktaki Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Asakir-i mevcudenin birazı köylere ve bir takımı çadırlara yerleştirilmişti. Vakıa biz-zarur lüzumu derecesinde çadır getirilememesinden dolayı biraz asker açıkta idi. Bunlar da karakol demektir” demesiyle şu tahriratınızda ki fi 26 S sene 70 [28.11.1853] tarihiyle müverrehdir, soğuk ve çadırsızlık münasebetiyle avdet olunacağı beyan olduğundan bu kol tasdik olunuyor denildikte “On altı tabur için nısf tertib çadır getirilmiş idi. Askerin birazı şuraya buraya yerleştirildikten sonra birazı karakol heyetinde olarak açıkta idi” cevabı verilip “Çadır mahallinde mevcut değil mi idi?” sualine dahi “Mevcuddur lakin nakli güçtür” demeleriyle o civar ahalisinden dehalet edip de yedlerine bayrak ve buyruldu verilenlerin bazı şeyleri Kürd taraflarından yağma olunmasıyla tazallüm-i hal eylemeleri keyfiyeti sualine Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “Dehalet maddesi sahihdir lakin evvelce köyler tahliye ettirilmiş olduğundan bu suretle gelenler öyle külliyyet üzere olmayıp yalnız bir iki kocabaşından ibaretdir ve yağmanın aslı yokdur çünkü şimdi söylediğim gibi köyler her şeyden hali bırakılmış idi. Kürdler gidip de ne çalacak?” demesi üzerine Ahmed Paşa hazretleri “Fakat bir iki kişi gelip tazallüm ettiklerinde derakıb Meded Bey'e havale ile iktizası icra ettirildi. Bunlar cüziyattan ve men'-i vuku'-ı muhalatdan olan şeylerden olmasıyla şikayete şayan değildir” dedikten sonra gönderilen arabaların tevkifi beyan olduğundan sebebi nedir denildikte Ahmed Paşa cevabında “Cephanenin hayvanatı lüzumu derecesinde olmadığından belki lüzumu olur mütalaasına mebni alıkonulmuş ve zahire için bezden çuval yapıldığı dahi sahih bulunmuştur” demesiyle asakirin etmek hususunda zaruret çektikleri beyan olunmasıyla bu hususun menşei istizah olunduktaki Abdi Paşa hazretleri, “Müsteşar efendi hazretleri zahirenin memuru olmasıyla vaktiyle gönderilmesi lazım gelir idi” demeleriyle zabt ü yağma olduğu işar olunan zehair maddesi sualine dahi “Çünkü oralar ahali arpa ve buğdaylarını kuyulara vaz' eylediklerinde bazı Kürdler bunu bilip ve biraz şey çıkarıp sattıkları istihbar olunmasıyla derakıb bit-taharri buldurulup aldıkları arpa hayvanata verdirilmiştir” cevabını vermiş ve soru olunan tedabire cevap verilmediğinden şikayet edilme-siyle bunun sebebi nedir denildikte “Vakıa bazı şeyler sorulmuş idi lakin mevki icabınca beyan edeceğim şeyleri yar ve ağyarın istima' edebilmesi mümkünatdan olduğundan ve bu dahi caiz olmadığından söylememekten başka böyle lakırdı tefevvühünün bile bil-münasebe önü kestirilmiştir” dedikten sonra müsteşar efendinin Gümrü'ye gelişine hazz olunmaması sualine “Vakıa geldi, görüştük. O gece Ahmed Paşa'da kaldı. Ertesi oraları gezmiş ve gecesi bilmem

nerede kalıp daha ertesi gün kendü kendüye avdet etmiştir. Hazz olunmamasında bir sebep bulamam” cevabını vermiştir.

[page 4]

Müsteşar efendi hazretlerinin fi 27 S sene 70 [29.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh tahrirat-ı mevrudesi melfufatından Zarif Paşa'nın bir tahriratında Gümrü üzerinde düşmana mukabil kırk binden mütecaviz asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafa mevcut iken Ahışa taraflarıçün istenilen iki tabur asker ile çend kıta topun gönderilmediği gösterilmiş olduğundan bunların sebebi sual olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “Gümrü üzerinde olan asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafanın miktarı nihayet on yedi – on sekiz bin raddelerinde olmasıyla böyle sözler buranın zihnini dolaştırmak için yazılmış demektir. Çünkü benim sözüm şu babda müfari-ı sıhhat olmamak tarafına haml olunur ise asakir-i mevcudenin miktarını mübeyyin her zaman taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriye jurnalleri takdim olunur idi. Ona müracaatla keyfiyet ve miktarı anlaşılır. Bununla beraber biraz asker göndermek kabil idi. Lakin bunda olan sebep-i tehir Subatan vukuatıdır. Vakıa evvelce lüzumu yazılıp Kerim Paşa maiyetiyle Ardahan'a gitmek üzere biraz asker tertib ve ihrac olundu. Biraz mahal gidilmişken çarçabuk haber irsaliyle yolda tevkif ettirildi” demesiyle yine müşarünileyhin müsteşar efendi tarafına varid olup bir sureti melfuf bulunan tahriratında maiyetinde bulunan başıbozuk askerinin bil-münasabe cüziyattan bahs olunmuş olmasıyla Ahmed Paşa hazretleri bu maddeye tarizen “Müşarünileyh valiliğinde mevcut olan dört bin nefer başıbozuk askeriyile Ahışa taraflarına gideceğini Dersaadet'e yazmış idi. Vukuattan evvel oraya gidip imdad etmek ve ordunun etrafına karakollar koymak mümkünatdan idi. Lakin o kadar başıbozuk askerinin aslı olmayıp öyle yazılmaktan murad kendüsünün orduya azimetine lüzum ve ehemmiyet göstermekten ve ordunun sui halini beyan eylemekten garaz buranın efkarını teşvik etmek maksadına mebni olduğunda şüphem olmadığı misillü müsteşar efendi ile mükatebeleri ve suretlerinin buraya irsalleri muvazaa suretiyle olmak dahi ihtimalatdandır. İşte bunlar ve bunun emsalince fenalıklar vukua gelmiştir. Ezcümle Gedikler gavgasından beş altı gün evvel ordu basıldı. Müslümanlar meydana çıksun diyerek Kars'da münadiler dağıldığından herkes kemal-i telaş ve ızdırab ile dükkanlarını kapayıp bir fena hal kesb eylediğinden ne hal ise Kerim Paşa bu eracifin önünü almış idi. Buna yakın fenalıkların nihayeti yoktur” demesi üzerine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Evet bu eracife ve sair fenalıklara bunların ikisi sebep-i müstakill oldular” demiştir.

Müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin fi 22 Receb sene 70 [20.4.1854] tarihiyle müverreh tahrirat-ı varidesinde Gümrü'nün öte tarafında vaki Tuhaber [Tukaber? Tuhayr?] nam mahalden Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin reyiyile emval ve mevaşi ve esir alınıp satıldığı gösterildiğinden keyfiyet sual olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “Orada Rusya askeri ve iki top olduğu haber alınarak bin kadar başıbozuk askeri Meded Bey maiyetiyle gönderilip urdurulmuş olduğundan biraz pilaçka almışlar ve yedi sekiz Kazak askeriyile ahalisinden çend nefer adem esir diyerek getürmüşler idi. Ufak tefek olan şeyler biz-zarur asker yedinde kaldı ve Kazak askeri tevkif ettirildi. Kûsur ahalden aldıkları ademler iade kılındı. Muahharen dahi şunun bunun yedinde ora ahalisinden çocuklar zuhur etmesiyle mahalline gönderilmiş idi. Zannederim ki şimdi bulundu denilen ademler dahi ol vakitden kalanlardan olmalıdır. Ol vakit ben bu babda tahrirat-ı lazımede kusur etmedim. Lakin bu hale nazaran saklanmış demek oluyor. Başıbozuk askerinin girdiği yerden boş çıkmayacağı umur-ı müsellemedendir” demiştir.

Yine müsteşar-ı müşarünileyhin fi 19 Ra sene 70 [20.12.1853] tarihli tahriratında beyan olduğu üzere Subatan muharebesinden Kars'a avdet olunduktan sonra Rusyalu hayli

zahire ve saire almış olduğundan bu babda tegafül olduğu zımnen şikayet olunmasıyla bunların esbab-ı sahihesi ve Gümrü ve Ahışa ve Ahılkelek ve Ardahan taraflarında külliyet üzere zahireye destres olunmuş iken göz göre ve bila mucib elden çıkarıldığı beyan olduğundan sebepleri nedir denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında muharebenin sabahı Subatan'a biraz asker gönderilip oranın ahvali teftiş ettirilmiş idi. Hatta bu askerin şimdi irsali düşmanın teşciini muceb olur diyerek müsteşar efendinin hayli telaş eylediği halde böyle yazması doğrusu cay-i istiğabdır ve elden çıkarılan zahire nasıl şeydir bilmem şu kadar ki öte tecavüz olduğu halde ahali-i meskunesi mal ve canından temin olunmakta ve oraları emval-i miriyeden hali olup mevcut olan zahire cümleten ahalinin malı olarak kuyularda bulunmakta olduğundan bu hale göre zahireyi zabt etmek nasıl olur? Fakat lüzumuna mebni biraz arpa alınıp hayvanata verilmiş olduğundan bunun iktiza eden defter ve mazbatası müsteşar efendiye verilmiştir” dmesiyle etmeççi Kozma'nın ve tayinat-ı lahmiye müteahhidi Keşişoğlu'nun bu maddelere suret-i taahhüdleri nasıldır ve Rusya casusu oldukları rivayet olduğundan sahih midir?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri evvel emirde beş bin somar hinta verilmek ve etmeğin beher kıyyesi yigirmişer paraya olmak üzere Kozma ile ve etin beher kıyyesi yaz ve kış kırk yedişer paraya verilmek şartıyla Keşişoğlu'yla konturato olunmuş idi. Bunların casusluğuna dair bir guna tahkikatım olmadığı halde cihet-i mezhebiyeden dolayı bunların her ne kadar konturato olunmuş ise de def'leri çaresine bakılmasına müsteşar efendi ile Raşid Paşa'nın Erzurum'dan Kars'a geldiklerinde resmen ve alenen söylemiş idim. Eğerçi filhakika öyle casus olsalar derakıb ruhsat verilürdi. Bundan sonra ben dahi tahkikat-ı kafiyyeye ibtidar eylediğimde ona dair bir şey anlayamadım. Mamafih münasebet-i mezhebiye cihetle gönül rahatsızlığı mevcut iken bu maddeyi ondan başka hüsn-i idareye muktedir oralarca kimesne bulunamaz zann ederim. Çünkü kendüsi eshab-ı iktidardan olduğu cihetle oralarda pek çok furunlar inşa ettirmiş ve zaten dahi oranın ahalisinden gibi bulunmuş olduğundan böyle şeylerde yed-i tulası [?] olduğu derkârdır” demesi üzerine “Bu Kozma hakkında bazı taraftan sahabet olduğu beyan olduğundan bu ne taraftan olmak iktiza eder?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri müteahhidi olduğu maslahatın mercii meclis olduğuna ve reisi ise Ahmed Paşa bulunduğuna mebni olsa olsa sahabet o taraftan olmuş demek olur. Bununla beraber bunu da beyan ederim ki konturato Erzurum'da yapıldı ve Ahmed Paşa ol vakit Harput'da bulundu. Hatta mersumun aleyhinde bulunduğunu teferrüs etmiş idim” dedikte Ahmed Paşa “Haşa bu tesahüb maddesini kabul etmem. Zira etmek bozuk gibi göründüğünden Kozma'nın habsini Abdi Paşa'dan niyaz ve rica eyledim. Himayet ve sahabet etmiş olsam bu yolda mı bulunurdum?” demesi üzerine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Vakıa öyle şikayetleri üzerine iktizasına bakılmış idi” dedikten sonra Ahmed Paşa hazretleri “Bunların ikisiyle olunan konturato gadr ü himayeden aridir ve haklarında kimesne tarafından tesahüb vuku' bulmadı ve casus olduklarını işitmedim. Bunların adem-i sıhhatine hala istihdam olundukları delalet eder. Müsteşar efendi hazretleri bu Kozma ile Keşişoğlu'nun uygunsuzluklarından bahisle hesap-larının rüyetiyle iktizasına bakılmasını inha eylemelerine mebni buna dair taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriden emirname geldiğini Erzurum'da iken bana yazmışlar idi. Ben dahi ber muceb-i emirname iktizasına himmet buyurmalarını cevaben yazmışdım. Sonra müsteşar-ı müşarün-ileyh hazretleriyle Zarifi Paşa hazretleri infisalimiz vukuunda mersumunu beraberce Kars'a getirmiş ve bilahare kendüleriyle tecdid-i konturato olunarak tayinat-ı askeriyede istihdam olundukları devletlu Hayreddin Paşa hazretlerinin tahkikat mazbatasında muharrer bulunmuş” olduğunu ifade ederler.

“Ferik Hurşid Paşa'nın fi 26 Ra sene 70 [27.12.1853] tarihli suret-i tahriratında evvel emirde Gümrü'ye gidilmeyip Tiflis'e gidilmek lazım geleceğini beyan edeyor. Burası nasıl olmak iktiza eder idi?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri Tiflis denilen mahal Gümrü

ve Ahılkelek ve Ahısha kaleleri mevkillerinin arkasında olmak ve asıl kesdirme yolu Kars'dan on iki saatde Gümrü'ye ve Gümrü'den dahi otuz altı saatde Tiflis'e gidileceğinden ve orduy-ı hümayun ise Gümrü ve Ahısha ve Ahılkelek pişgahında bulunduğundan o halde Tiflis'e gitmek nasıl olur? Bundan murad hiç Tiflis'e gidilmez ve orası teshir olunmaz manasına olmayıp ol vaktin kuvveti oraya gitmek için derece-i kifayede değil idi" demesi üzerine Ahmed Paşa ve Ali Paşa "Biz de bu sureti tasdik ve bunun kailini tahmik ederiz" dedikten sonra "Karakilise'de vuku' bulan gavga bütün top ateşinden ibaret imiş. Bunda düşmanın ziyadece telefâtı vukua getürmek ve kalesine avdet edememek için yolunu kesdirmek mümkünatdan olduğu beyan olunduğundan bunlar nasıl şeylerdir?" denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri "Gece olduğundan vakıa öyle top gavgası edildi ve iki taraf birbirinden bihaber idi. Lakin bu ibtidaki gavga demek olduğundan nusret bizim tarafda idi. Buranın haritası mahallinde mevcut olmağla celb ile bil-mütalaa keyfiyeti layıkıyla anlaşılır ki öyle düşmana hücum etmek ve kalesine girememek için yolu kesdirmek mümkün olur mu?" demiş ve bunun üzerine Ahısha tarafına sevk olunan kuvve-i askeriyenin taburları birbirinden uzak mahallere konulduğu beyan olunduğundan "Bunun sebebi nedir?" denildikte Ali Paşa mevcut olan askerinin birazı bir köye ve bir miktarı dahi bir çaryek saat mesafede olan diğer karyeye ikamet ettirildi ve arasına dahi süvari yerleştirildi. Bu hale göre bunların mevkilleri birbirine dörder beşer dakika demek olur dedikten sonra Ali Paşa gavgadan ibtida kendüsi kaçmış olduğu rivayet olunduğundan sıhhati led-es-sual yine Ali Paşa "Takdim eylediğim layihada tafsilen beyan eylediğim vechile dokuz saat top ve tüfenk gavgası olup ben piyade olduğum halde durdum. Gavganın şiddeti ve duman basması cihetle Harput redifinden birazı firar eylediğinden onları gerü çevirmek ve Liva Ali Paşa yaralanmış olduğundan kendüsünü gerü çekdirmek için oralarda gezinmekte iken düşman şiddetlenip bizim asker bütün bütün firara başladı. Bir taraftan onların çevrilmesine ve bir taraftan pişrev atılmasına dikkat ve itina olunmuş ise de kârger olamadığının üzerine ben dahi askerle beraber avdet eyledim. Elhasıl muharebenin nihayetine kadar orada bulunduğum mahallince meşhur ve müsellemler olmağla buna itimad olunmaz ise mahallinden sorulsun" demesi üzerine Abdi Paşa ve Ahmed Paşa hazeratı "Bunda firar maddesini biz dahi işitmedik" dedikten sonra Gümrü muharebesinde Ahmed Paşa imdad istese pek menfaatli olacağı beyan olunduğundan bu madde sual olundukta Ahmed Paşa "Bunda olan mevani takdim eylediğim layihada tafsilen beyan etmişim" demiştir.

Müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin fi 9 Ş sene 70 [7.5.1853] ve fi 23 C sene [70? 23.3.1854?] tarihiyle müverreh iki kıta tahriratında beyan olunduğu üzere Ahmed Paşa ve sairenin kendü malları olarak ordu hizmetinde kullandırılan hayvanatın ücreti alınmış olduğundan "Bunun suret-i istihdamları nasıldır?" denildikte Ahmed Paşa "Vakıa bu madde sahihdir. Hayvanatın orada killeti cihetle kendü hayvanlarımı orduya yazdırdım ve bundan benim maksadım hitam-ı maslahatda bunların ücretleri her kaç kuruşa baliğ olur ise saye-i hazret-i şahanede orduy-ı hümayun hazinesine teberrü etmek idi. İnfisalimiz vuku' bularak buna muvafık olunamadı ve hayvanları bu tarafa gelür iken Trabzon'da bırakmışım. Oradan hazine yükletilip orduy-ı hümayuna gönderilmiş. Bunlar oradan avdetle el haleti hazihi Bayburt kazasında mevcuttur zannederim. Çünkü müşarünileyh Zarif Paşa hazretleri kan ben bu hayvanların ücretini almışım gibi beyan ederek ücretine mahsuben onları orduy-ı hümayun hizmetine rabt ü tahsis etmişler. Halbuki benim orduy-ı hümayun hazinesinden aldığım akçe müşirlik maaşından ve sair cihetden dolayı ba senedat üç yük bu kadar bin kuruşa mahsuben olmağla daha küsur alacağım var iken müşarünileyh hazretlerinin işbu matlubat-ı çakeranemden dolayı alel hesab olarak aldığım akçeyi hayvanat-ı mezkure ücreti-dır diyerek inha etmiş ve zikr olunan hayvanları ol suretle zabt etmiş olmalarıyla burasını madelet-i seniyyeye havale ederim" deyu ifade ettikten sonra mekkari hayvanatından

birazı etmekçi Kozma'nın umurun-da işlemiş ve bir takımı dahi ordan nakl eylemiş olduğundan bunun sebep ve hikmeti Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta Bayezid vukuatından sonra dakikin telefatından dolayı azracık olan degirmanlara zahire irsali lazım geldiğine ve Kozma'nın mevcut hayvanatı kifayet etmemesiyle beraber mekkari hayvanatının o aralık başka hizmetleri olmadığından birazı beş on gün Kozma'nın o işinde kullandırılmış idi. Bu müddetin ücretinin merkurundan merkurundan ahz u istihsali lazım gelür. Hatab maddesi bahsine gelince çünkü hayvanat aralıkta boş kaldıkça gerek Kars'ca ve gerek Erzurum'ca civardan kat' ve nakl ettirilmiş idi. Erzurum'ca kat' ettirilen hatabın mesarif-i katiyesi bil-hesab onun eshabına itasıyla ücret-ı nakliyenin irad ve masrafı icra ettirildiği misillü Kars'ca dahi bu vechile muavenet-i lazimesi bil-icra iktiza eden mazbatası memurine birağılmış olduğundan bu dahi resmen ve usulen buyrulmuş olacağı derkardır deyu ifade eylemişlerdir.

Erzurum canibinden İngiltere sefaretine vürud eden mektubun bir bendi tercümesi mealinden müsteban olduğu üzere Mühendis Faik Bey marifetiyle yapılan tabyalar fena halde olduğundan hedm ile tekrar yapılması neden iktiza eylediği Abdi Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta “Gerek Kars'ca ve gerek Ardahan'ca yapılan tabyaların mahallerini bizzat irae ve tarif ile yaptırıttım. Sonradan öyle yıkılıp tekrar yapıldığına malumatım yoktur” demeleri üzerine “Firik Ali Paşa'ya taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriden geldiği beyan olunan tahrirat nasıl şeydir?” denildikte Ahmed Paşa hazretleri cevabında “Müşirliğimiz o anda sair ümera-i askeriye tamimden geldiği gibi ona dahi bir tahrirat-ı seraskeri geldi ve meali dahi bazı mertebe tenbihatı şamildir” demişlerdir.

Devletlu Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin fi 14 ve 16 S sene 70 [16-18.11.1853] tarihleriyle müverreh makam-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i seraskeriye ve fi 13 S sene 70 [15.11.1853] tarihiyle orduy-ı hümayun müsteşarı sabık atufetlu efendi hazretleri tarafına mebus üç kıta tahriratları led-el kırae hulasa-i mealleri Gümrü pişgahında Rusyalu ile Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin vuku bulan muharebesine ve kendülerinin ne suretle imdada gelerek muzafferiyet-i seniyyeye mazhar olduklarına ve müşarünileyh hazretleri her bir hususda gayurane ve şeciane hareket edip sair ümera ve zabitanın dahi bu yolda gayret ve besaletleri meşhud-ı mesbuk idüğünü tavsiye ve beyandan ibaret bulunmuş olmağla müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri, “Madamki müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri hakkında böyle hüsn-i şahadet eylemişlerdir, layihalarında güya Arpaçayı'nı öteye geçme deyu tenbih buyurmaları üzerine hilaf-ı hareket etmiş olduğumun muharrer olması şu tahriratlarının mealine münafı oluyor” demeleri üzerine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “İşbu tahriratların muharebe vukuundan üç dört gün sonradır. Müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa'ya verdiğim talimat-ı şifahiye muharebeye hin-i sevkindedir. Vakia ol vakit beynimizde bazı müzakerat vuku' bulmuş idi. Yani ba'd-el muharebe müşarünileyh hazretleriyle mülakat ettiğimizde emr-i muharebede vuku' bulan kusurları kendülerine yegan yegan ifade olundukta bazılarını sebep beyan ederek bazılarını dahi itiraf etmişler idi ve tarafımızdan dahi şu muharebede muzafferiyet vukuuna mebni bundan sonra vuku' bulacak muharebelerde yoluyla hareket edecekleri memuliyle kusurlarından sarf-ı nazar etmiştim” dediklerinde Ahmed Paşa hazretleri cevabında müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleriyle bu misillü şey müzakere etmedim ve bir guna kusurum vuku' bulup da itiraf eylemedim” deyu cevap vermişlerdir.

Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunun bazı vukuatına dair derdest bulunan tahrirat üzerine bu defa komisyondan vakı olan es'ileye taraflarımızdan verilen ecviye dahi derc ü ilan kılınmış olduğundan temhir olunmuştur.

[Seals from right to left] Ali Rıza, Ahmed, Abdülkerim Nadir

Appendix 83. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, undated, probably January 1854 or December 1854. Answers from the meclis of the Anatolian army in Erzurum to the questions of Inspector Hayreddin Pasha in Erzurum and answers from Abdi Pasha, Ahmed Pasha and Ferik Ali Pasha to questions at the MV in Istanbul.

Zabıta müşiri devletlu Hayreddin Paşa hazretlerinin Erzurum canibine muvasalatlarında teşkil olunan komisyonda ibraz eyledikleri bir kıta layihalarında Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununun ahvaline dair vaki olan suallerine verilen cevablar üzerine orduy-ı mezkur müşiri esbak ve sabık devletlu Abdi Paşa ve Ahmed Paşa hazeratıyla Ferik saadetlu Ali Paşa hazretlerinden istizahı icab eden maddeler başka başka sual olunarak ahz olunan cevabların suretidir ki ber vech-i ati zikr u beyan olunur.

[Question 1] Orduy-ı hümayun el haleti hazihi ne heyettedir ve ne kadar piyade ve süvari ve topçu cunud-ı nizamiye ve ne mikdar asair-i muvazzafa mevcuttur ve maaş ve tayinatları ne merkezde ve ne mahalden verilmektedir? Yoluyla ve vakit ve zamanıyla verilür mü? Giyecek ve örtecek şeyleri ve muhafazalu yatacak yerleri var mıdır? Tafsilen beyanı.

Mahalli meclisinin istintak cevabı

Piyade ve süvari ve topçu asakir-i nizamiye ve redife-i şahanenin mikdar-ı mevcuduyla güzeşte maaşlarının ne kadar olduğu takdim kılınan hulasa jurnalı ile defterden malum-ı ali-i müşirileri buyurulacağı ve tayinat maddesi hasbel icab beşinci maddede tasrih ve ifade olunduğundan tekrardan sarf-ı nazar olunmuşdur ve neferat-ı muvazzafa İsmail Paşa nezaret ve marifetiyle yoklama ettirilerek onların dahi mikdar-ı mevcudu zikr olunan jurnal ile idhal ettirilmiştir ve asakir-i şahanenin mevcuduna göre Kars'ın vüsati kafi olamadığından ve kışla gibi bir mahall-i mahsus dahi bulunmadığından mukaddemleri asakir-i şahane yatacak ve oturacak yerlerce zaruri müzayaka ve sefalet çekmişler ise de icabına göre bazı süvari alaylarıyla piyade taburları civar münasip kuraya çıkarılarak esbab-ı istirahatlarına itina olunmakta ve bu suretin hastagan ve vefeyatca fark ve faidesi anlaşılmakta bulunmuşdur ve mevcut olan cunud-ı cenab-ı mülukaneden Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa mensub olanların bu sene-i mübarekede elbise-i şitaiyeleri Dersaadet'den tamamen vürud etmemesi cihetle noksanları bulunmuş ise de saye-i hazret-i şahanede bir uçtan gelmekte olup bunlar dahi ikmale reside olmakta olduğu gibi yağmurlukları dahi Gedikler muharebesinde vuku bulan dağınlıktan dolayı neferat-ı askeriye alamamış olduklarından noksantari olmuş ve saye-i zilliyetvaye-i cenab-ı mülukanede peyderpey gelmekte ise de henüz ikmal olunamadığından mikdar-ı mevcut ve noksanı üçüncü maddede beyan olunan elbise mazbatasına idhal ve imla kılınmıştır.

Bu taraftaki komisyonda verilen cevablar

Kars'ın vüsatsızlığı cihetle asakir-i şahane civar münasip köylere yerleştirilerek refah ve rahatları istihsal kılındığı beyan olduğundan bu hususun daha evvelce yapılmaması neden icab eylediği ve asakir-i şahane elbisesinde beyan olunan noksaniyete sebep ne idüğü ve Gedikler muharebesinde asakirin dağınlılığı cihetle yağmurluk alamadıkları beyan olduğundan yağmurluğun mikdar ve keyfiyeti dahi sual olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında burada beyan olduğu üzere asakirin civar mahallere yerleştirilmesi maddesi benim zamanımda yani azlimden yigirmi otuz gün evvel icra olundu ve ordunun elbise-i şitaiyelerinde müşirliğimiz evanında hiçbir şey gelmemiş idi ve gerek gavgada ve gerek dağınlılık zuhurunda yağmurluk telef edilmeyip fakat ol vakit köylere yerleştirilmiş olan asakirin biraz yağmurluğu telef olduğu misillü Subatan'dan asker gece gelmek cihetle bunların dahi zayıtı vuku bulduğundan keyfiyet ol vakit makam-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i seraskeriye yazıldı demiştir.

[Question 2] Böyle kesret üzere asakir-i nizamiyeden vefeyat vukuu tabiblerin vech-i layıkında hastalara bakmamalarından mıdır, yohsa yiyecek şeylerine ve yatacak yerlerine kemaliyle dikkat ve nezaret olunmamasından mıdır? Tafsilten beyanı.

Bu dahi

Asakir-i şahane Kars'dan çıkararak Bayındır'a sevk olunduıkları esnada mevcut olan hıyamdan mikdar-ı kifaye çadır istishab olunmamış ve orada dahi heyet-i harb üzere bulunduğundan cunud-ı nizamiye kuraya tevzi ve ikame olunamamış olduğundan ve Gedikleri karyesi civarında gelindiği esnada dahi karyenin adem-i istiâbı cihetle açıkta kalındığından asakir-i şahane bu suretle zedelenip Kars'dan nan-ı aziz ve dakik irsaline her ne kadar gayret olunmuş ise de adem-i kifayeti ve oralarda tedarik olunamaması cihetleriyle bu suretle dahi zaruret ve meşakkate duçar ve bozgunluk vukuunda elbise ve yağmurlukları dahi za'y olarak Kars'a gelip gayet ziyk ve sıkındı mahallere ittiad olunup sıklet-i mekan ve zaruret-i elbise ve örtünüp yatacakları olmaması cihetle adem-i refah ve huzurlarıyla bazı meyusiyetlerinden neşet etmişdir ve ol babda Sertabib Miralay izzetlu Salih Bey bendeleri canibinden tanzim olunan çend bendi şamil bir kıta takrir-i mufassala dahi manzur-ı meali-neşur-ı asafaneleri buyurulmak üzere takdim kılınmıştır.

Bu dahi

Asakir-i şahaneden külliyyet üzere vefeyat vukuuna sebep Bayındır'da iken çadırsız kalmak ve kuraya tevzi olunamamak ve bozgunluktan sonra Kars'a avdette ziyk yerlerde ikamet ettirmek maddeleri beyan olduğundan bunların mümkün mertebe esbab-ı maniası istihsal olunmak lazım gelir idi denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında asakirin soğuk alması ve çadırsız kalması gibi fenalıkların zuhuru kış münasebetiyle umur-ı tabiiyeden olup fakat Kars'da mahallerinin beyan olunan ziyıklığı cihetle demincek beyan olduğu cihetle şuraya buraya dağıtılıp mahalleri tefrik ve tevsi olunmuş idi. Böyle şeyler imkan buldukça yapılmamak nasıl olur ve bununla beraber asakirin Kars'da ikamet ettiği mahaller öyle pek de şayan-ı teşekki şeyler değildir. Bunlara asıl sebep sonradan Arabistan tarafından asker gelmesi ve hilaf-ı memul cümleten asakirin Kars'a bozulup gelmesi maddeleridir ve hasb el mevsim terk-i harb ihtiyarı bunların vukua gelmemesi havfindan ibaret idi. Ne çare ki nasıl ise o babda sebat edemediğime teessüf ederim. Mukaddemce Kars'da yigirmi dört zeminlikler yapılmasına karar verilerek inşasına mübaşeret ettirilmiş olduğu halde Kars'dan çıkılıp vakte ki avdetimde oraca teseyyüb olunup bakılmadığından dolayı natamam olarak tatil edilmiş bulduk. Bu yapılmış olsa oldukça barınacak şey idi. Asakirin ziyade hastalanmasına sebep şeylerden ez cümle hamam hususu ki nefis-i Kars'da dört hamam olup ikisi işe yaramaz asker yıkanamaz surette fena şey olduğundan diğer ikisiyle oranın adetince ve hamamcılık icabınca suyu gayet sıcak olduğundan askerin hücum ile girip çıkmasında soğuk aldıklarından ve oturdukları yerler ahur gibi şeyler olup tecdid-i havaya mahal olmadığından ben orada iken pencere ve baca gibi mahaller açılmasını tenbih etmiş idim. Bilmem nasıl oldu. Bir de abdesthane olmadığından gece soğukta taşra çıkıldığından ekser hastalıklar bundan neşet etmektedir [zan?] ederim” demiştir.

[page 2]

[Question 3] Cunud-ı nizamiyenin ne mikdarının elbiseleri vardır ve ne mikdarının yokdur? Eslihaları tekmil midir değil midir? Elbise ve eslihadan noksanı olduğu halde sebep ve hikmeti nedir ve bundan böyle noksan kalmış mıdır ve mikdarı nedir? Tafsilten beyanı.

Bu dahi

Piyade ve süvari ve topçu cunud-ı nizamiye ve redife-i şahanenin elbise ve eslihalarının mikdar-ı mevcut ve sebab-i noksanietini mübeyyin tanzim olunan bir kıta defteri takdim kılınmıştır.

Bu dahi

Hükmü olmadığı

[Question 4] Edevat-ı harbiyeden elyevm mevcut nedir ve ne mikdar ve ne cinsdir ve derece-i kifayede midir değil midir? Olmadığı halde noksanının cins ve mikdarını mübeyyin tafsil beyanı.

Bu dahi

Edevat-ı harbiyeden mevcut olan ve noksan bulunanların cins ve mikdarını mübeyyin erkan-ı harbiye meclisi tarafından terkim ve takdim kılınan defter mütalaasından müsteban buyurulacağından tekrarından sarf-ı nazar olunmuştur.

Bu dahi

Bunun dahi hükmü olmadığı

[Question 5] Orduy-ı hümayunun idaresinde kifayet ve vefa edecek zehair ve erzak var mıdır? Olduğu halde ne mikdar ve ne cinsdir ve ne kadar müddet idare-i tayinat-ı askeriye kifayet edecektir? Eğer kifayet edecek zehair ve erzak yoğise şimdiye kadar adem-i tertib ve iddihariyenin sebab ve hikmeti nedir? Tafsil beyanı.

Bu dahi

Orduy-ı hümayun için lüzum görünecek zehair-i külliyyenin bidayet-i meselede tertib ve tedariki ve icabet-i umurdan ve sinin-i sabıkada olan feyz ve bereket cihetle bunun vaktiyle çaresine bakılmış olsa bu maddede bir guna zaruret çekilmeyeceği vazıhadan ve bu dahi orduy-ı hümayun meclisine aid mevaddan olduğu gibi şu iddihar-ı zehair-i vafiye ve erzak-ı mütenevvia-i kafiye ve levazımat-ı saire keyfiyeti bazı erkan ve ümera tarafından dahi ol vakit lazım gelen mahalle ifade ve ihtar kılınmış ise de başlıca tertibine bakılmamış ve nan-ı aziz tayinatı dahi yedi sekiz seneden berü orada olageldiği misillü bu sene-i mübarekede dahi ba-marifet-i meclis orduy-ı hümayun şehri Temmuz ibtidasından itibaren bir seneliği yalnız Erzurum somarıyla beş bin somar hinta verilmek ve bunun beher somarı yüz yigirmi kuruşa ita olunup kendüsi dahi nan-ı azizin kıyyesini yigirmişer para hesabıyla vermek üzere orduy-ı hümayunun kadim etmekçibaşısı bulunan Kozma ile konturatoya rabt olunmuş ve buna bakılmayarak Erzurum ve Çıldır ve Kars sancakları mahsulatından otuz bin somardan ziyade zahire teslim ettirilmiş ve tayinat-ı lahmiye dahi Erzurum'da ala koyun etinin kıyyesi otuz ikişer ve Kars'da yigirmi sekiz paraya olduğu halde sayf ü şitada bahaya çıkar ise bulup vermek üzere merkum Kozma'nın kefaletiyle beher kıyyesi ellişer paraya Keşiş oğlu Artin ile yine bir seneliği kezalik meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun marifetiyle konturato edilmiş ve lahmin bahası mikdar-ı mezkur üzere olduğu halde mersum verdiği lahmin bazılarını dükkanlarda sürülemyen etlerden ucuz baha ile alıp vermiş ve bozgunluk akabinde kendüsi Kars'da izhar-ı acz ederek Erzurum'da bulunan şeriki dahi adem-i iktidar sureti gösterip orada yine meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun marifetiyle mersumun mukavelesinden bir para noksan olarak Kasap Abdi Ağa ile yeniden konturato olunup idare ettirilmekte ise de Kars'da aşair ve saireden koyun celb ve mübayaa olunarak alaylar marifetiyle tarh ü ita ettirilmekte bulunmuş ve nan-ı aziz hususunda hayliden hayli sıkıntı çekilerk ol suretle sekiz mah idare olunup müddet-i bakıyede yoluyla idare edeceğini ve edemediği halde matlubatından orduy-ı hümayun hazinesine iki yüz bin

kuruş terk edeceğini mersum Kozma Erzurum'da orduy-ı hümayun ve memleket (?) meclisleri birlikte olduğu halde iddia ve ifade ile konturatosu tekid ve el haleti hazihi icra buyurulan ikdamatı (?) semeresiyle temizce nan-ı aziz çıkarılmakta ve erzak-ı saire dahi meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun tarafından idare olunmakta olduğundan bu dahi nan-ı aziz gibi bulunmuştur.

Bu dahi

Zahire maddesine evvel emirde başlıca teşebbüs olunmadığı beyan olunduğundan bunun sebebi nedir denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “evvelce dahi beyan eylediğim vechile nan-ı aziz tayinatı için etmekçi Kozma ile konturato edilmiş ve zahire hususu Vali Paşa'ya muhavvel olduğu halde buna bakılmayarak orduca iktiza eden mahallere mahsusen mektub yazılıp celb ü cem' ettirilmekte idi. Fakat bazı mahaller memurları biraz rehavet gösterdiler. Mamafih oradan çıktığım vakit orduy-ı hümayunu bir sene idare edecek zahire var idi. Beyana hacet olmadığı vechile bu zahire maddesinin lüzumu derecesi malum şey olduğu misillü emr-i tedarik ve iddiharı hususunda dahi elden geldiği sa'y ve ikdamda kusur olunmadığı ve olunmayacağı bedihidir. Eğerçi bunlara itimad olunmaz ise yazdığım mektub-ların müsvedatı ve mahallerinden gelen mazbatalar orduca mevcut olmak lazım geleceğinden onlara müracaatla hakikat-i hal malum olur” dedikten sonra Ahmed Paşa hazretleri “vakıa tertib olundu lakin celbine teşebbüs kılınmadı” demesi üzerine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “tertib olduğu misillü celbine dahi teşebbüs kılınmış idi. Fakat öyle birden bire celbine kafi hayvan olmadığından refte refte gelir idi. Hatta Muş ve Erzurum taraflarında olan zehairin celbi bittabii tehir edeceğinden bazılarından yani oraların sayf ü şita ahvalini bilenlerden Muş ve Erzurum tariklerinin kış münasebetiyle kapanıp kapanmadığı sual olundukta kapanmaz cevabını vermişler iken bi-hikmeti teala şiddet-i şita zuhuruyla bunlar kapanıp zahire celbine muvafık olamadım. Fakat mahall-i saire-i malumeden lüzumundan ziyade tertib ile celb olundu” dedikten sonra Ahmed Paşa hazretleri “vakıa zahire maddesi Vali Paşa'ya havale buyurulmuş idi. Lakin lüzumu kadar celbine teşebbüs olunmayıp hatta bir gün Vali Paşa defterdar efendi ile led-el mülakat bu zahire sohbeti açıldıkta lüzumu kadar zahire mevcut olmadığından biraz şey tedariki lazım geleceğini irad etmekliğime cevaben Vali Paşa tarafından gavga edilmeyecek olmağla ziyade zahire tedariki çürütülmesini ve bu dahi mesuliyetimizi mucib olacağı söylenmiş idi. Ne hal ise şu beyan olunan zaruret hasb el icab askerinin Kars'a toplanmasından neşet etmiştir” demesi üzerine “burada lahmin beher kıyyesi ellişer paraya ve müsteşar efendinin yazışı (?) kırk yedişer paraya demek olur. Bunda olan ihtilafatın sebebi nedir?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “lahmin beher kıyyesi evvelce dahi beyan eylediğim vechile kırk sekiz parayadır. Bilmem bu yazışlar (?) nasıl şeydir” demesini Ahmed Paşa hazretleri dahi tasdik etmiş ve “bu Kozma nasıl ademdir ve idaresi ne suretledir?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri “bu herif gayet işgüzar ve sahib-i yesar olmağla etmek hususunu pek güzel ve yolunda idare edip bir aralık hakkında bazı güftegu tekevvün ettiğine binaen istifa etmiş idi. Haylice taharri olundu ise de yerine başka bir muktedir adem bulunamadığından yine ne hal ise etmek maddesi ona ihale kılındı” deyu ifade eyledikten ve bu keyfiyeti Ahmed Paşa ve Ali Paşa hazeratı dahi tasdik eyledikten sonra “Gedikler'den Kars'a avdet olundukta dakik olmaması cihetle beş on gün biraz meşakkat çekildi. Lakin sonraları pek yolunda idare olunur idi. Ancak bir livaya un verilip kendileri etmek pişirirler idi” deyu Ahmed Paşa hazretleri söylemiştir.

[Question 6] Elyevm kaç kıta top mevcuddur ve çap ve cinsleri nedir ve top-keşan bargirleri kaç danedir? Derece-i kifayetde midir değil midir ve esnay-i muharebede top bargirlerinden telef olan kaç danedir ve şimdi mevcut ve telefâtı nedir ve top

koşumlarıyla levazımat-ı sairesi tekmlil midir değil midir? Olmadığı halde noksan olan ve lüzum görünen nedir? Tafsilen beyanı.

Bu dahi

Top ve mühimmat-ı harbiye ve edevat-ı saire ve hayvanatın cinsi ve mikdarıyla noksan ve mevcudu ve telef olanları tanzim ve takdim kılınan hulasa defterinden tebeyyün edeceğinden tafsil ve tekrarından ihtiraz olunmuştur.

Bu dahi

“Erzurum’da ve Kars’da ne mikdar var idi?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri cevabında “oralarda altmış kadar top olup mikdarını mübeyyin defteri bundan evvel gönderilmiş idi” demesi üzerine sonradan etraftan gelenler ile beraber doksan kıtaya balığ olduğunu Ahmed Paşa hazretleri ifade etmiştir.

[Question 7] Temür baş olarak mevcud olan mekkare bargirleri ne mikdar ...

....

....

[Question 8] Ahışa hadisesinde asakir-i şahaneden şehid olan ve yaralanan ve düşmanın eline geçip esir kalan ne kadardır ve mecruh olanlara şimdiye kadar bakılmış mıdır ve elyevm dikkat üzere bakılıyor mu ve yaralılardan vefat etmiş ve ifâkat bulmuş ve henüz kesb-i ifâkat edemeyip yatakda bulunmuş olan kaç danedir? Tafsilen beyanı.

Zikr olunan hadisede bulunan taburlar Erzurum’da olduğundan asakir-i şahaneden şehid olan ve yaralanan ve düşmanın eline geçip esir kalan ne mikdardır ve yaralulara layıkıyla bakılıp bakılmadığı ve bunlardan vefat etmiş ve ifâkat bulmuş ve henüz kesb-i sıhhat edememiş bulunan ne kadardır buraca mechul bulunmuş ve eğerci taburha-i merkumeden altıncı alayın iki taburu burada ise de onların yaraluları dahi Ardahan’da kalarak Erzurum’a gelmemiş olduğundan buraca hakikat-i madde meydana çıkarılamayıp Erzurum’dan istilamı lazım geleceği.

Bu dahi

“Ahışa muharebesinde mecruh olanların mikdarı nedir?” denildikte Ali Paşa hazretleri “iki tabur nizamiyeden yetmiş bir ve altı tabur redifden kırk bir ve süvari topçusundan yigirmi otuz kadar ki mecmuan yüz kırk nefer mikdarı yaralı bulunup Erzurum’a gidinceye kadar yedi neferi vefat etmiş idi. Küsuru dahi hastahane de pek güzel bakılmakta olduğunu hastahaneye gittiğimde gördüm” demiştir.

[Question 9] Ahışa’da mühimmat-ı harbiyeden zayıat ve telef var mıdır? Olduğu halde cinsi ve mikdarı nedir? Ahışa muharebesinde düşmanın eline top geçmiş midir? Geçtiği halde ne cins topdur ve çapları nedir ve asakirin yağmurluk ve silah ve çanta ve palaska ve çadırları za’y olmuş mudur? Olduğu halde cins ve mikdarı nedir? Tafsilen beyanı.

Bu dahi

Mühimmat-ı harbiye ve yağmurluk ve çanta ve palaskadan hayli şey ve bir taburluk çadır telef ve za’y olmuş ise de sair alay ve taburlar burada mevcud olmadığı cihetle cinsi ve mikdarı bilinemeyip Erzurum’dan tahkiki lazım gelmiş ve altıncı alayın üçüncü ve dördüncü taburlarıyla topçu bölükleri burada bulunmuş olduğundan salif üz zikr iki taburdan vuku’ bulan zayıatın mikdarını mübeyyin ziri mazbatalu tanzim ettirilen bir kıta defteri takdim kılınmıştır ve mezkur topçu bölüklerinden zay’ olan top ve mühimmat-ı harbiye ve sairenin cinsi ve mikdarı dahi Gedikler muharebesiyün topçu

alayı tarafından tanzim ve takdim kılınan balası defterlu bir kıta mazbataya idhal olunmuştur.

Bu dahi

“Bu Ahışa muharebesinde olan telefatin mikdarı nedir?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri “bundan evvel defteri tanzim ve takdim kılınmış idi. Ona müracaat olunması icab eder” demiştir.

[page 3]

[Question 10] Ahışa’da vuku bulan uygunsuzluk ve perişaniyet-i hale kimler sebep olmuştur? Erkan ve ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriyeden kanğısı ibraz-ı hizmet ve sadakat ve kanğısı izhar-ı cebanet ve hıyanet eylemiştir ve düşman ile mukabele ve mukatele etmeksizin ve ağız önü bakmaksızın başlarını alıp gerüye avdet eden kimlerdir ve kanğı alay ve kanğı taburdur ve kumandanının isim ve şöhretleri nedir? Tafsilen beyanı.

Bu dahi

Ahışa üzerine memur asakir-i şahane kumandarı Ferik saadetlu Ali Rıza Paşa hazretleri tarafından yigirmi iki gün zarfında mevcut olan top ve asakir-i şahane birbirine yarımşar saat ve üçer çaryek mesafede vaki karyelere taksim ve ik’ad olunmuş ve mikdar-ı kifayede ve muhavver (?) layıkında lazım gelen ve mutena (?) bulunan mahallere karakol konulmamış ve müddet-i mezkur zarfında birinci redif alayının birinci ve ikinci ve Dersaadet orduy-ı hümayununun piyade dördüncü ve redif alayının ikinci taburları ve yedi kıta top ile düşmana en yakın olan Aşağı Süflis karyesinde oturtulmuş olduğundan düşman askeri sabah vakti bağıteten mezkur Süflis karyesi üzerine gelip evvela top muharebesine mübaşeret etmiş ve üç saat kadar top muharebesi imtidad bulup muahharen dahi mezkur taburlar hat açarak düşmanın piyadesiyle ve nevbet ateşiyle cenk ve harbe başlamış ise de bu müddet içinde sair karyelerde olan ve nihayet uzaklığı üç çaryek mesafede bulunan taburlar kumandarlarına düşmanın Ahışa içinde hareketi istima’ olunduğundan bu gece besaret üzere bulunulmasını ferik-i müşarünileyh Mirliya Mustafa Paşa ve Ali Paşa’ya birer kıta tezkire ile bildirmiş ise de düşmanın bir mahalle bağıteten geldiği halde şu suretle ve bu vechile hareket ve yekdiğere muavenet eylemelerine dair bir guna emr ü tenbih verilmemiş olmaktan naşi zikr olunan mesafede bulunan taburlar vaktiyle gelip yetişememiş olduğundan düşman bunları galebe ederek mezkur taburları dağıtmış ve yedi kıta top dahi zabt eylemiş olduktan sonra zikr olunan birinci alayın üçüncü taburuyla nizamiye altıncı alayın üçüncü ve dördüncü taburları birbirini müteakıben gelmiş ise de mezkur taburlar neferatı dağılmış olup celb ve cem’ olunamadıklarından düşman askeri dahi ziyadece bulunup kol açamadıkları halde harbe şüru’ etmişler ise de tâb-âver-i mukavemet olamayarak bunlar dahi dağılmış ve badehu düşman askeri yürüyerek kumandar-ı müşarünileyhin oturduğu karye üzerine gelmiş olmaktan naşi orada bulunan iki kıta top ile topçular ateş etmiş ve bu sırada mezkur dördüncü redif alayının üçüncü ve dördüncü taburları oldukları karyeden oraya gelmek münasebetiyle bunlar dahi bir mikdar harb eylemiş ise de her nasılsa bunlar dahi mukavemet edemeyip kol ve tabur heyeti bozmayarak gerüye çekildikleri halde bu perişaniyeti netice vermiş ve bunun vukuu kumandar-ı müşarünileyhin sui tedbir ve karakollara adem-i dikkatle alay ve taburların bir mahalde topluca bulundurmamasından neşet eylediği hin-i istintaklarında Mirliya Mustafa Paşa ile Kaimmakam Hacı Eyüp Bey ve Topçu Binbaşısı Mustafa Ağa ve erkan-ı harb zabitanından Osman Efendi’nin ifadelerinden tebeyyün etmiştir.

Bu dahi

Ahışha vukuatına sebep askerin layığıyla tertib olunamaması maddesi olduğundan “bu ne surette olmuştur?” denildikte Ali Paşa hazretleri “evvelce tarif eylediğim vechile asakir mabeynleri birer çaryek olarak iki kol üzerine üç karyeye yerleştirilmiş ve düşmanın gelecek iki tariki olup onlar dahi tutulmuş idi. Hasb el mevki bundan başka bir tertib olunmak mümkünatdan [değildi?] ve karakollar dahi yoluyla konuldu ve ihtiyat mevkiinde iki top olduğu gösterilmiş ise de beş kıta top var idi” demiştir.

[Question 11] Ahışha üzerine memur olan kıta-i müfreze kumandanının asakir-i nizamiye-i şahaneden bir çavuş ile sekiz neferi idam ve telef eylediği sahih ve vaki midir? Olduğu halde kaçınıcı alaydan ve kaçınıcı tabur ve bölük ve onbaşındandır ve memleketleri neresidir ve isimleri nedir ve katl ü idam olunmalarına istihkakları neden ve kanğı töhmet ve kabahatten vaki olmuştur ve buna dair kumandanın yedinde Divan-ı Harb mazbatası var mıdır ve iradesini istihsal eylemiş midir veyahud ordu müşiri tarafından kendüsüne mezuniyet verilmiş midir? Tafsil beyanı.

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[Question 12] Ahışha üzerine memur olan kumandar esir olarak bir takım köle ve cariyeyi alıp furiht etmek üzere öteye berüye taksim eylediğinden başka el haleti hazihi birkaç danesi dahi yanında bulunduğu rivayet olunmuş olmağla rivayet-i mezkure sahih midir değil midir? Olduğu halde buna ne taraftan mezuniyet almıştır ve yedinde bir guna sened var mıdır? Olduğu surette kimindir ve getirdiği köle ve cariyeye ne cins ve ne mikdardır ve nerelidir? Tafsil beyanı.

Bu dahi

Ahışha canibinde kimesne tarafından köle ve cariyeye alındığı işidilmeyip fakat Ferik saadetlu Ali Rıza Paşa muharebe-i merkumeden birbuçuk iki ay evvelce ve akçesiyle Şavşit kazası müdiri Selim Bey ile karındaşı Şakir Bey marifetiyle iki cariyeye ile bir nefer köle almış ve bunların dahi Gürcü bulunduğu ala rivayetinin mesmu’ olmuş olduğu Mirliya Mustafa Paşa bendelerinin istintak-ı vakiasından tebeyyün etmiştir.

Bu dahi

Ahışha’da alındığı rivayet olunan köle ve cariyenin keyfiyet-i bey’ ve şırası nasıldır denildikte Ali Paşa hazretleri “Şavşit [Şavişet?] müdiri Selim Bey ile biraderi Şakir Bey’in küçükten alıp büyüttükleri bir re’s Çerkes köleyi ve babalarının kezalik evvelce alıp beslediği bir re’s Çerkes cariyeyi baha-i layıkla Ardahan’da iken aldım ve bunların alınıp verilmesi gavgadan üç mah evvelce idi” demiştir.

[Question 13] Gedikler muharebesinde asakir-i şahaneden şehid olan ve yaralanan ve yaralılardan şimdiye kadar vefat eden ve ifakat bulan ne kadardır ve muharebede düşmanın eline kaç dane ve ne cins top geçmiştir ve mühimmat ve edevat-ı harbiyeden zayiat ve telef var mıdır? Olduğu halde cins ve mikdarı nedir ve asakirin yağmurluk ve silah ve çanta ve palaska ve çadırları za’y olmuş mudur ve bunda erkan ve ümera ve zabitanın hüsn-i hizmet ve şecaat ibraz eden ve sui hareket ve ve cebanet ve hıyanet izhar eyliyen kimlerdir ve isim ve şöretleri nedir? Tafsil beyanı.

Bu dahi

İşbu muharebede şehid olan ve yaralanan ve şimdiye kadar yaralulardan vefat eden ve ifakat bulan zabitan ve neferatın mikdarını mübeyyin alayları canibinden ziri mazbatalu tanzim ve takdim kılınan defterden müsteban olacağı misillü düşman eline geçmiş olan topların cins ve çap ve mikdarı ve bunların mühimmat-ı harbiye ve edevat-ı sairesinin zayiat ve telef defteri dahi topçu alayı tarafından ziri mazbatalu defteri tanzim ve takdim olunmuş ve asakir-i şahanenin yağmurluk ve silah ve çanta ve çadırlarının

mikdar-ı zayıtı dahi kezalik piyade ve süvari ve topçu alayı ve taburları tarafından tanzim ve takdim olunan hulasa defterlerinden tebeyyün edecektir ve bu vukua gelen perişaniyet ve uygunsuzluk erkan ve ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriye'nin hiç birisine muharebe mahallinde şu vechile ve bu suretle hareket olunacağına veyahud filan mahalle veya muharebeye şu vechile bed ve mübaşeret kılınmasına ve şayed düşman galebe ederek gerüye çekilmek lazım geldiği halde bir mahalde toplanmasına en büyük kumandar bulunan devletlu Ahmed Paşa hazretleri tarafından bir guna emr ü tenbihat vuku' bulmamasından ve yigirmi dört kıta topun hattın sağ başına ve bir mahalle vaz ettirmesinden ve sağ baş kumandarı bulunan Mirliva Hüseyin Paşa bendeleri dahi her nasılsa muhafaza edemeyip zikr olunan topları düşman almak ve oranın kuvve-i askeriyesi dağılmak cihetinden bu hal-i mükeddireyi vermiştir ve böyle sui ahval ve tedbire göre Bayındır ve Gedikler muharebelerinde topçular hudud-efzun-ı gayret ve şecaat etmiş oldukları gibi mezkur Gedikler muharebesinde cümle zabitan ve neferat-ı askeriye tarafından dahi gayret ve sebat olunmuş ise de taburlar neferatının haylicesi arpa ve saman ve tezek celbiyle ve cameşuy yıkamak misillü hizmetler ile müteferrik ve meşgul olup tabur mevcud-ı tammeleriyle harbe çıkamamasından ve on dokuz piyade ve on bölük süvariden mürekkeb çıkan asker dahi bir hatt üzerine ve hatt-ı sani ve ihtiyat bulunmamasından ve müşarünileyh hazretlerinin esna-i muharebede taşın arkasında bulunup taburların suret-i hareketlerine dair kumanda vermemesi misillü vukua gelen teseyyüb-i ahval ve sui tedbiratından neşet etmiştir.

Bu dahi

“Gedikler muharebesinde ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriye'ye hiçbir guna talimat ve tedbir-i mukteziye ve mevadd-ı saire-i icabiye için kat'a ifadat vuku bulmadığı ve düşmanın galebe edip gerü çekilmek lazım geldiği halde asker toplanmak için bir mahal tayin olunmadığı ve mevcut olan yigirmi dört kıta top hattın sağ başında olarak bir mahalle konulduğu beyan ve ima kılındığından bunlar sahih midir ve bu topların çoğu düşmanın eline geçmesi adem-i muhafazadan neşet eylediği işar kılınmasıyla niçün bu kayıtsızlık vuku bulmuştur ve asakir-i şahanenin ekserisi saman ve tezek celbiyle ve ve cameşuy yıkamakla meşgul olduğundan taburlar mevcud-ı tammeleriyle harbe çıkamadıkları ve bir hatt üzerine tertib olunup hatt-ı sani ve ihtiyat bulundurulmadığı ve esna-i muharebede Ahmed Paşa'nın taş arkasında bulunduğu beyan kılınmağla vaki midir?” deyu sual olunduktan müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa cevabına ibtidar ile “Cümleten mahall-i muharebe[de?] bulunduğumuzdan öyle talimat ve tebliğat-ı resmiye vuku bulmayıp ancak bir kumanda olmak üzere mezuniyet-i kamile verilerek Veli Paşa sol tarafa tayin olunduktan sonra Mustafa Paşa ve Hüseyin Paşa ve topçu mirlivası nezd-i acizaneme celb ile “İşte düşman askeri karşuda duruyor. Din ve millete hizmet etmeklik maddesi tamam bu vakittir. İcabı vechile hareket edip herkes kendü hizmet ve kumandasına dikkat eylesün” diyerek bazı mertebe icra-i tebliğat olunduktan sonra bizzat taburlar üzerlerine varılıp onlara dahi teşvikat zımında münasip lisan kullanılmakta iken düşman tarafından tüfenk atılmasıyla muharebeye şüru olunmuş idi. İhtiyat taburları köylerde olduğundan asakirin avdeti halinde oralara yerleştirileceği umur-ı bedihiden olduğu misillü eğer bozgunluk olur ise mahal tayiniyle toplanılması maddesi alel infirad ilan olunmak düşmanın kuvvetini bir nevi tazyif ve asakir-i şahane tehvif edilmesi demek olacağından burası abes gibi görünür ve zikr olunan top yigirmi dört kıta olmayıp yigirmi altı kıta idi. Evvelki meclislerde dahi söylediğim gibi yigirmi altı kıta topun bir hatt üzerine olarak sekiz kıtası sağda ve sekiz kıtası dahi solda ve on kıtası dahi ortada olmak ve askerin önünde olduğu halde silah işlettirilecek surette olmak açık bulmak üzere tertib olunmuş idi ve düşman yedine top geçürülmemesi için pek çok çalışıldı lakin düşmanın kuvveti ziyade olduğundan çaresi bulunamadı ve askere arpa ve saman ve tezek taşıttırıldığına aslı olmamak gerekdir ve benim buna dair bir guna ruhsat ve emrim vaki olmadı. İhtimal ki üç beş adem cameşuy yıkamak için kalmıştır.

Böyle olduğu halde tabur mevcut-ı tamıyla çıkamadı denilemez cümleten çıkarılmışdır ve asakirin ne suretle tertib ve tesvik olunduğunu evvelce beyan etmişdim. Bunların dediğim gibi tertib olunduğuna mahallinde pek çok ademin malumatı olduğu misillü öyle taş arkasında bulunmadığım dahi meşhud ve müsellemdir ve topçular suret-i tertibi ve muharebe keyfiyeti verdiğim layihada musarrahdır” deyu ifade etmiştir.

[Question 14] Ahışha ve Gümrü muharebesinden avdet edenler ne halde ve ne suretle gelmiştir ve bunlar tabur heyetine idhal ve rabita-i nizamiyeleri ikmal kılınmış mıdır? Tafsilen beyanı.

Bu dahi

Ahışha muharebesinden ricat edenlerden fakat Dersaadet orduy-ı hümayununun piyade dördüncü redif alayının üçüncü ve dördüncü taburları kol ve nizam heyetiyle avdet edip küsur kalan taburlar perakende olarak Ardahan’a geldiği tahakkuk etmiştir ve Gümrü’den edenler Gedikler karyesine kadar kol ve nizam heyetiyle gelmiş ise de Gedikler’de vuku bulan muharebede piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının ikinci ve üçüncü ve dördüncü ve üçüncü alayın ikinci ve Dersaadet orduy-ı hümayununun piyade dördüncü redif alayının birinci taburları ve Hassa orduy-ı hümayununun şeyhaneci taburlarının iki ve süvari birinci alayının dört bölüğü ve dört kıta top ile ve neferat-ı muvazzafa sergerdelerinden mevcut refakatiyle Hacı Temür Ağa bendeleri Ferik saadetli Veli Paşa hazretleri kumandasıyla kol nizamında ve topluca avdet ve sairleri perakende olarak Subatı karyesine kadar gelmiş ve orada sair taburlar dahi meh-ma emken toplanarak Kars’a muvasalat etmiştir.

Bu dahi

“Ahışha ve Gümrü muharebelerinden sonra asakir-i mevcude ne halde avdet eyledi?” denildikte Abdi Paşa ve Ahmed Paşa hazeratı zabıta müşiri müşarünileyh hazretlerine komisyondan verilen cevap vechile avdet olunduğu sahihdir ve topların cümlesi otuz sekiz kıtadan ibaretdir ve gavgadan gerü geldiği beyan olunan top dört kıta olmayıp on dört kıtadır. Bunlardan maadası düşman yedine geçmiş demektir” deyu ifade eylemişlerdir.

[Question 15] Muharebe vukuunda baş ve kulak kesmek memnu olduğu halde Bayındır muharebesinde muğayir-i irade-i seniyye baş ve kulak kesilmiş midir ve kesildiği halde ne mikdardır ve kanğı askerden olmuştur? Tafsilen beyanı.

Bu dahi

Müşir-i sabık devletlu Ahmed Paşa hazretleri zaman-ı riyasetlerinde ve devletlu Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin hengam-ı müşirliğinde evvelce orduy-ı hümayun ile Kars’dan hareket ve Bayındır’a muvasalatımızda vuku bulan başıbozuk muharebesinde aşair ve nefer-i amm askeri tarafından yüz kadar kelle kesilip ve kesenlere defter tanzimiyle müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri tarafından ellışer kuruş verilip arabaya tahmil ve kendü yaverini dahi yanına terfik ederek Kars’a tesyil [sic] eylemiş olduğundan vusulünde derhal bir mahalle defin ettirilüp ondan sonra vukuu istima’ olmamıştır.

Bu dahi

“Kelle kesildiği ve getürenalere ikram olunduğu sahih midir?” denildikte Ahmed Paşa hazretleri “Filvaki başıbozuklardan bazıları yüz kadar kelle getürdiler. Biraz bahşış verilmişdi. Muahharen bunun mennine dair olan irade-i seniyyeden sonra keyfiyet ilan olunmağla vuku bulmamıştır” deyu ifade eylemiştir.

[Question 16] Asakir-i muvazzafa tarafından uğradıkları karyeler ahalisini rencide eylemek gibi hareketler vuku bulmuş ve bulmakta idüğü rivayet olunmağla bunların aslı var mıdır? Olduğu halde kanğı sergerdenin ademlerindendir? Vukua gelmekte ise meydana çıkarılarak icabının icra ve min ba'd bu makule şeyler vukua gelmemesi ne esbaba mütevakıf ise hemen iktizasına bakılarak icra ve kararının tafsilen beyanı.

Bu dahi

Bunun vukuu mertebe-i sübutta tevatür olarak bu habasete ictisar edenlerin en eşna ve akvası İnce Arab nam şaki ve buna mümasil eyalat ve elviyeden toplanıp gelerek avdet edenlerden zuhura gelmiş ve sairlerine ibret olmak üzere merkur İnce Arab Bayezid'den Kars'a celb olunarak zulm ü teaddisini gören ahali ve fukara ile Erzurum'da meclisce bil-muvacehe istintak ve muhakeme olunmak ve ona göre mücazâtı tertib ve tahdid kılınmak için memur-ı mahsus refakatiyle taraf-ı hazret-i müşiriden Erzurum'a irsal buyurulmuş ve bundan böyle bu misillü fezahat vukua gelmemesi için asakir-i merkume sergerde ve binbaşılılarıyla sair icab edenlere ekiden emr ü tenbih buyurularak tahlif olunmuş ve bu surette bunun dahi önü kesdirilmiş olup bir daha şahs-ı vahid bu makule halat-ı nahemvareye cesaret edemeyeceği ve edecek olduğu takdirde o makulelerin dahi derhal tedib ve terbiyelerinde taraf-ı bahr-eş şeref-i hazret-i müşiriden dakika-i vahide fevt ve tehir buyurulmayacağı ve bu keyfiyet bundan sonra gelenlere dahi alel infirad ilan olunacağı.

Bu dahi

“Başbozuk sergerdelerinden bazılarının ve bil-husus İnce Arab nam şahsın bazı uygunsuz hareketleri vuku bulduğu halde men' olunmaması ne sebebe mebnidir?” denildikte Ahmed Paşa hazretleri “İnce Arab'dan maada öyle halat-ı namarziyeye ibtidar eder kimesne bulunmayıp o dahi yaver gönderilerek Bayezid'den Kars'a celb olundu ve Erzurum'a irsal ile icra-i muhakemesi derdest iken tebdil vukuundan dolayı kalıp komisyonun cevabından anlaşıldığı cihetle şimdi icra-i muhakeme için Erzurum'a gelmiş demek oluyor” deyu ifade etmiştir.

[Question 17] Şimdi kanğı mahalle istihkam verilmek lazımdır ve istihkam verilecek yerler neresidir ve şimdiye kadar ne kadarı yapılmış ve ne mikdarı yapılmamıştır ve yapılmış olanlara kaçar kıta ve ne cins top kullanmak lazımdır ve topların ne mikdarı mevcut ve ne mikdarı mevcut değildir ve bunların vakt ü zamanıyla hazır ve amade olmamasının sebebi nedir ve neden böyle kalmıştır? Tafsilen beyanı.

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[Question 18] Ve bu hale göre orduy-ı hümayunun ilerüye sevki ne mikdar kuvve-i askeriye muhtaçdır ve ne suretle tecavüzi hareket lazım gelür ve düşmanın kuvveti ve hal ve hareketi ne merkezdedir? Bu babda olan tahkikat ve mesmuatınızın tafsilen beyanı.

Bu dahi

Orduy-ı hümayunun sevki takdirinde ne miktar kuvve-i askeriye muhtaç olacağı ve ne suretle tecavüzi hareket lazım geleceği ve düşmanın kuvveti ve hal ve hareketi ne merkezde bulunduğu erkan-ı harbiye meclisi tarafından verilen karar ile takdim kılınan memhur mazbatalardan muhat-ilm-i alem-araları buyurulacağı.

Bu dahi

Ordunun hareket etmesi tedabirine dair olmağla hükmü olmadığı

[Question 19] Elli altmış haneyi havi Tuhber (?) denilen mahal ile kırk haneden yetmiş haneye kadar cevamlı (?) bulunan Bağdaşen ve Paşalu ve Mudaniş (?) ve Kara Galata ve Akması (?) ve Hocabey ve Kervansaray ve Pervan Köle (?) namun karyeler urulup on bin iki yüz re's sığır ve bargir ve yigirmi dokuz bin sekiz yüz otuz dokuz re's koyun ve iki bin yedi yüz altmış somar şair ve üç bin iki yüz seksen somar hintaları yağma ve garat olunduğu gibi mezkur Tuhir ahalisinden ve taife-i nisa ve zükurdan haylice nüfus esir kılındığı istihbar olunmuş ve bu ise bil-vücut madelet-i seniyyenin hilafı bulunmaktan naşı tahkiki lazım gelmiş olmağla husus-ı mezkur sahih ve vaki midir ve olduğu halde buna cesaret eden kimlerdir ve kanğı zat tarafından mezuniyet verilmiştir ve salif üz zikr üsera ile mevaşi ve zehair kimlerin yed ve zimmetlerinde kalmıştır? Tafsilin beyanı.

Bu dahi

Zikr olunan Tuhir [Tuhaber? Tevhir?] nam mahal müşir-i sabık devletlu Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin zaman-ı riyaset ve ibtida Gümrü üzerine memuriyetleri hengamında Şuregel kazası müdiri Meded Bey başında bulunan Karapapağlı ile ve Zilanlı aşireti müdiri Kasım Ağa ve Kaskan (?) aşireti beyleri Beto (Tebo?) ve Hasan Beyler ve Cemedanlı (?) aşireti müdiri Serhenk (?) Ağa ve buna mümasil kimesneler refakatlerinde bulunan aşair atlasuyla müşarünileyh hazretleri tarafından tertib ve Subatı karyesinden izam ve tesrib olunarak marr ül beyan Tuhir? nam mahal urdurulup emval ve eşya ve mevaşisi yağma ve garat ettirildiği ve birtakım ademleri dahi esir aldirmiş ve hatta üsera-i merkumeden kendisine odalık cariyesi olmak üzere bir nefer esir dahi müşarünileyh hazretleri tevkif etmiş ise de devletlu Abdi Paşa hazretleri yedinden aldırıp iade ettirmiş ve küsur kalan esirler ile emval ü eşya ve saire dahi zikr olunan müdir ve ümera ve ağavat ile başlarında bulunan Karapapağ ve aşair atlasu yedlerinde kaldığı işidilmiş ise de getürdikleri salif ül beyan üsera ile emval ve eşya ve mevaşi ve zehair ne mikdardır ve alel infirad kimlerin yed ve sahibliğinde kalmıştır buraları mechul olup fakat zikr olunan esirlerden birkaç neferi anif-üz zikr eşhas-ı mersule yedlerinde olduğu taraf-ı eşref-i müşiriden haber alınarak bunların celbi zımında tahrirat-ı samiye-i mahsusaları tastir ve müstakil memurlar dahi tayin ve tesyir buyurulmuşdur ve bu maddede asakir-i nizamiye-i cenab-ı şahane ve neferat-ı muvazzafadan bir zabıt ve bir nefer gönderilmeyip yalnız aşair-i merkume ve müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin inzımam-ı rey ve marifetiyle olduğu gibi birtakım kura-i sairenin dahi emval ve eşya ve mevaşi ve zahireleri akıb-ı yağma olduğu haber alınmış ise de isim ve şöreti ve cinsi mikdarı nedir ve kimlerin zimmetlerinde kalmıştır buraları bilinemediğinden ve aşair-i merkumenin yağma ve garat etmesi cihetle bunlara dahi müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri malumatları bulunacağı memul-i kavi idüğünden kendüsinden istilam ve istişarı lazım geleceği.

Bu dahi

“Böyle esir alındığı ve köyler urulduğu sahih midir?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Bu yazılan dereceyi bilmem. Mukaddemce dahi beyan eylediğim vechile birkaç karıdan ve çoluk çocuktan ibaret olarak alınmış olan çend nefer adem yine iade olundu. Ahmed Paşa odalık aldığına aslı yokdur ve şu Tuhaber (?) denilen mahal Rusya kıtasında olmak ve ahali Kazak taifesinden olup Rusyalunun iki kıta topu ile üç dört yüz Kazak atlasu dahi bulunduğu haber alınmak cihetle mukaddemce dahi ifade eylediğim vechile oraya biraz başıbozuk asker gönderilip urdurulmuşdu. Lakin küsur-ı beyan olunan sekiz on kıta karyeler urulduğu ve zehair alındığını bilmiyorum. Orada iken Rusyalunun bazı karyelerini Revan aşireti yağma ve garat edip bu tarafa geçdiği rivayet olunmuş idi. İhtimal ki bu havadis muahharen bu rengi kabul etmiş” demiştir.

Zabıta müşiri devletlu Hayreddin Paşa hazretlerinin Erzurum canibine muvasalatlarında tertib olunan komisyonda ibraz eyledikleri bir kıta layihalarında Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununun ahvaline dair vaki olan suallerine orduy-ı hümayun-ı mezkur meclisi tarafından verilen cevaplar üzerine bu tarafda teşkil buyurulan komisyonda olunan suallere taraflarımızdan verilen cevaplardır ki yanlarına siyah mürekkebe ile işaret kılınmış olduğundan işbu mahalle dahi temhirlerine ibtidar kılınmıştır.

[Seals from left to right] Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, Ahmed Pasha, Ali Rıza Pasha.

Appendix 84. HR. MKT. 96/99, dated 5 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (26 December 1854). From Grand Vizier Reşid Pasha to the commanders of the Batum and Anatolian armies and the governors of Trabzon, Erzurum and Lazistan on the ban on slave trade.

Batum ve Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunları kumandanlarıyla Trabzon ve Erzurum valileri-ne ve Lazistan mutasarrıfına üsera keyfiyetine dair bazı tenbihat.

Geçen sene Ahışa ve Şekvetil taraflarında vuku bulan muharebelerde re's-i hududda Gürcistan kurası ahalisinden olup berü taraftan alınmış olan bazı çoluk çocuklar ve meşmul-i cihan olan ma'delet-i celile-i hazret-i padişahiye mazhar olmak emeliyle kendiliklerinden taraf-ı eşref-i saltanat-ı seniyyeye dehalet eden bir takım genç ademler ve çocuklar muahharen her nasılsa esir sıfatına konularak bunların ekseri bazı ümera ve zabitan yedlerine geçtiği ve sonraları dahi şuna buna satılıp el haleti hazihi bu muamele-i nabeca ol havalide cari olduğu bu kere bazı ihbarat-ı mevsukadan anlaşılmıştır. Beyan ve tekrara hacet olmadığı vechile bu makule insaniyet ve cemiyete muhalif olan muamelat-ı merdude'nin tamamen kaldırılması emel olunmakta olduğu halde oralarda bu madde-i na-revaya iki baştan revac verilerek memurin ve zabitan taraflarından alınıp satılmakta olması bil-küllüye niyat ve tenbihat-ı devlet-i aliyeye mugayir olduğundan başka hürriyet-i tabiiye-i beşeriyeye mugayir olan bu misillu muamelat-ı baridenin cereyanı Rusyalu'ya bilahare bir büyük sermaye imtisar olarak taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeye mütemayil olan ahaliyi bu sebeple bis-suhule tebrid ve tenfir edeceğinden ve bu hususu enzar-ı ecnebiyede dahi pek çirkin görünerek nice muamelat-ı gayr-ı layıkanın hudusüne sebep vereceğinden şu hareket-ı na-marziyenin bir an evvel önü kestirilmesi pek ziyade ihtimam ve ikdam olunacak mevadd-ı mühimme-i mülkiyeden olmasıyla bad-ez-in böyle uygunsuz şeylerin vukuuna kat'a meydan verilmemesi ve şimdiye kadar oralara gelmiş olan bu misillu mülteciyandan her kimin yedinde üsera bulunur ise bahaları müteselsilen istirdad ettirilmesi ve devlet-i aliyenin adalet ve merhametine sığınmak emeliyle gelmiş olan bu kadar biçareganın bu suretle kayd-ı rıkk ve esarete (?) giriftar olmaları bütün milletimize ait bir sui şayiayı müstelzem olarak birkaç kendüyi bilmez ve devlet ve milletinin şan ve namusunu gözetmez eşhas-ı cahile için şu mehazir bir vechile ihtiyar olunamayacağından ve zükurdan kabul-i İslam eyleyenlerden elverişli olan ve istek edenlerin silk-i celil-i askeriye idhaliyle henüz hitanları icra olunmayıp memleketlerine avdet emelinde bulunanlarının dahi mümkün olabilir ise vilayetleri canibine izam olunması ve çocuk ve gayr-ı müdrük bulunanlar ve inasdan şeref-i İslam ile müşerrefe olanlarının dahi münasip miktar nafaka tahsisıyla geçindirilmesi ve kız ve erkek çocukların familyasından aranılanları ve tebdil-i din etmeyip de gitmek arzusunda bulunanları olur ise ba'd-es-sübut teslim olunması ve inasın kebirleri dahi tezevvücüne talep zuhurunda icabı icra kılınmak üzere ba marifet-i şer'-i şerif şimdilik birer emin mahallere yerleştirilmesi ve bu maddede cüzice müsamaha bilahare pek büyük mesuliyeti davet edeceğinden ber vech-i meşruh serian icrai icabıyla keyfiyetin bu tarafa beyan ve iş'ar kılınması hususlarına imtina ve himmet buyurmaları siyakında mahremane olarak işbu şukka.

Appendix 85. İ. MMS. 5/170 İef 9. February 1855. Zarif Mustafa Pasha's answers to questions in the MVL.

1) *Orduy-ı hümayun müşirliğine hin-i memuriyet-i devletlerinde mahsusen talimat verilmiş midir?*

Mahsusen talimat olmayıp eskilerini devr etmişler idi ve bazı tahrirat dahi şerefvurud etmekte idi. Öyle mahsusca talimat verilmediğinden yalnız kavaid-i harbiyeye ittibayla Kars'dan altı saat ilerüye Kars Çayı ile kalenin vasatı olan Subatan mevkiine avangard yani talia çıkarılıp sonradan Rusyalu'ya orada terekküp olundu.

2) *Orduy-ı hümayuna vürud-ı devletlerinde merkez kanğı mahal idi? Kuvve-i askeriye ve idare-i maliye ve tedarikat-ı mühimmat ve malzeme hususlarında vaz'-ı mevcudu ne suretde buldular ve asakirin taayyüş ve seknesi ve hastahane tertibatı ne raddelerde idi?*

Merkez-i ordu bit-tabii Kars olup Hayreddin Paşa'nın verdiği jurnale göre her nevi asakir-i muntazama olarak mevcut olan on yedi bin neferden on bir bini hasta idi. Süvarisinin hemen hayvanatı hiç kalmamış idi. Top ve mühimmat ve levazımatı noksan bulunup fakat mevcut olan yetmiş topun ikişer yüz ellişer atım cephanesi yokdu. Mevcud-ı anbar olan zahire üçyüz kıyye yağdan ve altmış kıyye pirinç ile bin somar yani on iki bin kıyl hintadan ibaret olarak hayvanata iki iki buçuk kıyye yem ve asakire dahi kavurma verilmekte olduğundan işbu kavurmadan beş altı günlük şey mevcut idi ve erzak gelememesinden dolayı mevcut-ı sanduk olan akçe on üç bin kuruşdan ibaret bulundu. Havanın bürüdeti cihetle neferat-ı askeriye ahali hanelerinde ve bazı zıyk mahallerde tahammülünden ziyade ikamet ettirildiğinden ve hastahaneler kesb-i taaffün eylediğinden ziyade hastalık vuku bulmuş idi.

3) *Bu keyfiyatın ıslahı zımnında ne tedbire müracaat buyurdular?*

Bir Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Muvakkat yapılip ve nezareti müsteşar efendiye havale kılınıp reisi Raşid Paşa ve azası süvari livası Şükrü Paşa ve ordu mümeyyizi Emin Efendi ve ordu kadısı efendi ve kaimmakam tabip bey ve Arabistan ordusundan kaimmakam Emin Bey ve Anadolu ordusundan kaimmakam Selim Bey olup katibi dahi Dâr-ı Şûra ketebesinden olup müsteşar efendi maiyetinde olan Hurşid Efendi idi. Ordunun askerce ve hayvanca ve her dürlü erzakça [?] olan noksanı ikmal kılındı ta Sivas'dan bile redif askeri getirildi.

4) *Kars'tan ilerüye ilk hareket ne memuriyete ve ne sebab-i mahsusa mebni vuku buldu ve hangi talimata tatbik kılındı ve nereye varıldı ve düşmanın bundan evvel ve sonra hareketi ne oldu?*

Sekiz tabur piyade ve iki alay süvari ve iki batarya top talia olarak Subatan'a gönderildi. Rusyalu Arpaçayı'nı tecavüz ile köyleri tahribe ve karakollar üzerine hücum ile def'e mübaderet eylediğinden avangarda bir kuvve-i zahiriye olmak üzere Vezin köyüne iki alay süvari daha götürüldü. Bunun üzerine Rusyalu Kars Çayını geçerek İncedere'ye kadar gelip avangardın basılacağı casuslar tarafından haber verilmesiyle erkan-ı harbiye meclisi cem olup artık müdafaaya bütün bütün hacet gelerek meclisin kararı üzerine mukabele olunmak üzere hareket olundu. Elde başka talimat bulunmayıp fakat evrak-ı müdevvereden bazılarının netice-i emri Avrupalu zabitanın reyinden istifade ile ana göre hareket olunması lüzumunu beyandan ibaret olmağın bir meclis akd olunup karar-ı

müzakerat hükmünce çünkü Rusyalu'nun şu tecavüzi hareketine mukabele olunmaz ise ta Kars'a kadar gelecek ve ol halde ahalinin çok zedelenecek ve bilahare tedarik ve nakl-i zehair maddesi müşkilata düşecek olduğundan ve evamir-i mevcude ise def'-i mazarrat için olacak hareketi mani olmadığından hareket olunmasında ittifak hasıl oldu. Ol vechile Kars'tan iki fırka olmak üzere hareketle fırka-i evveli Kerim Paşa maiyetiyle Subatan'a ve fırka-i sanisi kendi maiyetimle Hacı köyüne varılıp kırk sekiz gün orada düşman ile beynimiz iki saat mesafe olmak üzere ikamet olundu.

5) *Bu meseleye dair meclis resmi olup müzakere-i adiyeden başka mazbatalı karar bulunur mu ve kimlere bildirildi?*

Heyet-i meclis erkan-ı harbiye zabitanı namına olarak bizden ve ecnebi takımından Hurşid Paşa maiyetinde ne kadar erkan zabitanı var ise anlardan ibaret idi. Rusyalunun yetmiş altı topu var iken bizim seksen dört topumuz mevcut olduğu gibi asker mikdarınca dahi bizde ziyadelik var idi. Hatta peyderpey gönüllü askeri gelip gavga etmek isterler ve efkârı bozacak şeyler söylerler idi. Birçok meşayih ve dervişan cihad ve iğtinam için başımıza toplanıp nizam çadırları arasında bile ne duruyoruz gibi lakırdılar işitişdim. Batum vukuatı dahi oraya aksederek biz de bir şey yapmıyacak mıyız yollu bazı mekalat tekevvün etti. Hal böyle iken Bayezid'in bozgunluğu haberi gelmekle daha kimesne duymaksızın Sırrı Paşa ve mevcut olan ferikan ile birleşilip tedabir-i seriası hakkında cereyan eden mütalaatda Bayezid tarafına bir kol asker gönderilmesi karar bulup fakat Hurşid Paşa buraya mümaşat etmeyip orduyu iki kola bölmeyerek belki Rusyalu Bayezid'den asker celbiyle kuvvetleşmeye vakit bulmazdan hemen müctemi' olan askerimizle burada derhal hücum birle düşman muzmahill oldukta artık Bayezid'e dahi bildiğimiz vechile gitmek icab eder yollu burada gavga etmeliği tercih eylediğinden her ne kadar buna bakılmıyarak bir kuvve-i askeriye tefrikiyle irsale hazırlanmış ise de asakirin böyle tefrikası halinde Karsca nasıl hareket olunmak lazım geleceği bilinmek için Sırrı Paşa ve ferikan ve bilcümle erkan-ı harb zabitanı takımından ibaret olarak bir meclis yapılıp burası dermiyan olundukta ekseriyet-i ara burada bulunan asakirin gösterdiği hahişine ve Rusyalunun Bayezid kuvvetini buraya getirebilmesi ihtimaline göre burada gavga edilmesi tarafında bulunup fakat Raşid Paşa bir fenalık olur vahimesine binaen pek mümaşat etmedi ve başka rey dahi veremedi. Bunun üzerine tahaffüzi harekete dair Serasker Paşa hazretlerinin bir tahriratı zuhur ile birkaç saat sonra yine meclis birikdirilip ve emirname meydana konulup huzzar-ı meclis "şu karar tamam meal-i tahrirata muvafıktır çünkü biz Rusya memaliki tarafına gitmeyip anı memalik-i Osmaniye'den def' edeceğiz. Hareket-i tahaffüzi ve tedafüi bu demektir. Eğer düşman Kars çayının öte yakasına olsun def' olunmaz ise artık ordu Kars'ta taayyüş edemeyip askerimizi beslemekte olan Zaruşad ve Şuregil kazaları elden gider. Hatta Kars çayından öte gidilip düşman ta serhadde Arpaçayı'nın öte yakasına sürülmelidir" demeleriyle Hurşid Paşa tasmim-i harekata mübaderetle bir tertip yaptı. Verilen karar vechile gece saat beşde olan mehtabla hareket kılındı. Hatta Hurşid Paşa reis-i erkan olup bana talimat verdiği misillü bilcümle ümeraya dahi verip tarafımızdan dahi üzerlerine mucébince hareket olunması işar kılındı. Tarafımıza verilen talimatın bir kıta sureti dahi buraya takdim kılınmış idi.

6) *Harekat-ı vakta be-tıbk-ı karar ve tasmim ve vakt-i muayyene imtisalen icra kılındı mı, olunmadı ise sebebi nedir?*

Cümlesi icra kılındı. Fakat ikinci fırka yolların fenalığı misillü bazı mevaniin suubetiyle vakt-i muayyenden bir saat kadar tehir etti. Gurub-ı kamerden sonra kalktı. Bu fıkrayı Hurşid Paşa kendisi sevk ederdi ve karanlık diyerek kendülüğünden önu sıra kenar

çekdirmiş ve aleyhinde bulunanlar bu hareketini tezyif etmişler fakat bundan bir fenalık olmadı.

7) *Muharebeye mübaşeret olunduğu anda icra kılınan usul ne idi?*

Kerim Paşa sağ cenaha kol nizamıyla hareket edip ilerüye giderek mevki-i muayyeni zabt ve cenge şüru eyledi. Fırka-i saniye dahi sol tarafa müteveccihen izam kılındı. Birinci fırkanın ihtiyatı Vanlı Mehmed Paşa livası ikincisinin mersum Hasan Paşa livası idi. Sağ cenahın sağ yanına tesadüf eden Karadağ'a dahi biri şeşhaneci olarak beş tabur piyade ve süvari ve üç bin başıbozuk ile Abdurrahman Paşa anda olan istihkamata zabt eylemek üzere bit-tayin icra-i fiiliyatı [?] görüldü.

8) *Bu usul ve nizam ne vakit müzakere ve ittihaz kılındı?*

Bunlar yukarıda beyan olunan meclisde vech-i meşruh üzere karar verildi ve tamamen icra kılındı.

9) *Muharebenin hareket-i mutena [?] ve kat'isi ne oldu?*

Esnay-i muharebede birinci fırkanın sağ tarafı biraz zedelenip ihtiyatı uzak düşerek gelememesinden fenalık zuhur etti. Bu perişanlığı Karadağ'da olan Abdurrahman Paşa bin adım mesafeden gördüğü halde gelmediğinden eğerçi gelmiş ve imdad etmiş olsa bil-hal tamamı galebe hasıl olacak idi. Bu halde askerın ziyade fenalaşdığını gördüğü anda nakl-i mevki edip biraz toplamak üzere iken Rusyalu bütün bütün sol tarafa verip ve bizim taraftan asker eyü dayanıp ve üç saat gavga mümted olup birinci fırka hal-i telaşla gerü çekilmekte iken artık ikinci fırka dahi asla nizamını bozmayarak avdete mecbur olmasıyla yerlü yerimize gerilere gelindi. Asker çadırına girip bir iki saat ikamet ettirildi ve başıbozuk külliye Kars'a firar ettiler. Andan sonra çadırlar kaldırılmağa başlandı.

10) *Bundan sonra kanğı mevki bulunup ne tedbir icra kılındı?*

O gün Kars'a gelindi. Eski mahalline asker yerleştirildi. Hasta ve mecruhları Erzurum hasta-hanesine gönderildi. Kars kalesine mukaddema yapılmış olan istihkamata üç tabya ilave kılındı. Rusyalunun şayed gelmek ihtimalini men' için asakir-i mevcude talim ve taallüm-leriyle meşgul oldular. Muharebeye avdet hahişi beyn el asakir mevcud idi. Nizamiye olarak piyade ve süvari tahminen otuz bin kadar mevcud olmalı idi. Başıbozğun cümlesi firar edip muvazzafa dahi izin verilmiş idi. Fakat bin beş yüz kadarı kaldı. Hayvan ve levazımatıyla doksan beş top olup hatta neferatın hengam-ı muharebede Rusyalu'dan aldıkları sekiz yüz kadar hayvanatdan yüz elli bargir toplar için mübayaa olunmuş idi.

11) *Hasılı bu netice-i müteellimenin esbab-ı asliyesi nedir?*

Netice-i müteellime nedir? Zannıma göre bu harbden zarar görülmedi ve bais-i şan oldu. Şu layihamda tafsil munderic bulunduğu vechile ricat susuzluktan ve asakirin imtidad-ı muharebe cihetle takatsizliğinden neşet edip sair esbab-ı maniadan bir şey yoğidi. Yedi yüz şehid ile bin bu kadar mecruh bulunup avdetinde rediften bin kadarı firar etti. Bargirsizlik cihetiyle ve üç topun ağzı çatlamış bulunmağla on beş top ve on sekiz kapaklu birağılmış idi. Rusyalunun asıl darb-ı destiyle aldığı dört topdur. Mesmuata göre Rusyalu'nun sekiz bin nefer telefata olup üçbin bargir naaşı meydan-ı muharebede görüldü.

12) *Bu suretde talimat-ı seniyye icra olunmuş mudur? Acaba harbce veyahud icray-i karar-ı evvelde müsamaha ve bir nevi tereddüd ve tehir zuhur etmiş midir?*

Bize mahsus talimat verilmeyip evrak-ı müdevvere var idi. Sonraki emirnamenin hükmü dahi tecavüzi hareket etmediğimiz cihetle tamamen icra kılındı. Demincek beyan eylediğim cihetle hareket-i lazıme vuku bulacak karara muallak olduğundan müzakerat-ı icabiyeye tamamıyla tevfiğ-i hareket olunup hiçbir şeyde kusur olunmadı ve ordunun sonraki hali evvelkiden eyüce idi.

13) *Orduy-ı hümayunun idaresinde irtikab vaki olmuş bu madde kimlerden ve kanğı maddelerde sadır oldu? Bu babda tahkikat-ı devletleri nedir? Emr-i idare kaide-i mer'ıye tahtında değil miydi? Usul-i mevzua-i devlet niçün tağyir etti? Kim sebep oldu? Mazarrat nasıl men' buyuruldu? Bazıları niçün men' buyurulmadı?*

Hiçbir maddede bizden böyle şey vaki olmadı. Her dürlü tahkikat icra olundu. Umur-ı maliye müsteşarlığa ait olduğu halde mesarifat-ı fevkaladeye bakılmak ve mücerred mazbutiyet [?] olmak için orduy-ı hümayun mahallinden başka Erzurum ve Kars'ta yine nezaret-i müsteşari tahtında birer idare meclis-i muvakkatı teşkil olunup muamelat-ı mukteziyenin icrasını mahsus emr-i idarenin perakendelikten sıyaneti zımında oraya havale eyledim.

Asakir Erzurum'dan ilerüye çekildiğinde Erzurum'daki meclis-i muvakkat bittabii lağv olundu. Artık her işe bunlarla müsteşar efendi baktılar. Hiçbir karışıklık olmadı. Men' olacak bir şey olsa müsteşar efendi bakardı. Ama men' edecek bir şey olmadı ki ana dahi bakılsun.

14) *Eşyanın bahası kimlerin muvafakatiyle kat' olunurdu? Kim kayd ederdi? Kimin işaretiyle sarf ve muvafakatiyle tevzi olunurdu? Cümlesinde ordu müsteşarının rey-i veyahud *ilmi [?] açık mı idi?*

Yukarıda yazılan meclis mübayaa fiyatını kat' eder, anbar memurları ile binbaşı ve yüzbaşılardan ve müsteşar efendinin ağalarından olurlardı. Onlar eşyayı kayd edip alay emini tarafından usulî üzere getirdikleri işaretsiz sened-i mahsusları mucebince verirler müteahhiren meclis tarafından vuku bulan istidalar üzerine mazbatası yapıp yürüdüldür idi. Müsteşar efendi bu meclisin reisi gibi olup zat-ı maslahat ise memuriyeti dairesinde olduğundan her muamelata vakıf olur idi ve ahirinde alaylarla hesap görülüp mahsubunu icra ederdi. Bir de bu meclisin mübayaatı yağ ve pirinçten ibaret olup sair şeyleri sancak meclisleri tertib ve fiyatını kat' edip mazbatasıyla beraber canib-i orduya irsal ederler. Bu meclisin malumatı olmaksızın münferiden ve mahsusen kimesne bir şey mübayaa edemezdi ve mübayaat hususunda bizim ordumuzun işleri pek yolunda idi.

15) *Kozma kimdir ve nasıl ademdir? Etmekçilikten maada kasaplığa dahi karışması neden icab eyledi? Bunun istihdam kılınması babında emir yok muydu? Daha mübayaatda münferiden kimler kullanıldı? Meclise emir verilmez miydi?*

Demincek beyan eylediğim gibi levazımat mübayaa olunur idi. Bu Kozma etmekçi olup her eşya memuriyetine teslim olduğuna misillü zahire dahi ona teslim kılınırdı. İbtida orduy-ı hümayuna vürudumda rivayet olunan uygunsuzluğunun bazı eseri görülmekle darb ve tedip olunmuş idi. Pek güzel hizmet etmeğe başladı. Kasaplığa sonra girişmiş olduğundan buna malumatım yoktur. Bunun tardı babında bana hitaben bir emir gelmeyip müsteşar efendiye gelmiş ise anı bilmem. Döğdördüğüm vakit ihrac etmek

üzere Erzurum'dan etmekçiler celb ettim. Bunun yaptığı gibi anlar yapamayıp hayli şey ziyade istedikleri cihetle herif zengin imiş çaresiz meclis azası ittifakla ba mazbata ona ısmarlandı. Sairlerinin Kozma gibi etmek verememesi eser-i sahabet olmayıp kendüsünün külliye sermayesi ve çok vakitten berü oralarda asakir-i şahane etmekçiliği işinde bulunup müteaddid furunları ve birçok işgüzar ademleri bulunmasından icab ediyor. Kozma hakkında tashilat ve sairleri için tasibat irae etmedim. Çünkü bunlar umur-ı müsteşariye aid şeyler olduğundan andan sorulmak lazım gelir. Bu babda tarafımıza bir şey azv eyler ise bihakkın redd eyler ve bil-muvacehe dahi söylerim. Artık ne derlerse desinler ben hak teala hazretlerine havale edip şimdi cibilliyetimi icra ederim. Kimesne hakkında bir şey demem.

16) *Memur bildiğini söylemek ikdam-ı faraizdendir. Şimdi kimesneye bir şey azv olunmayıp yalnız zat-ı devletlerinden eyü fena ne oldu ise sual kılınur. Bunda bais-i teessür bir şey yokdur ve elbette herkes bildiğini söyler. Muvakkat meclis orada kimlerden ibaret idi? Kars'ta ne vakit teşkil kılındı? Daha eskiden var mıydı? Azası tebdil olundu mu?*

Ben şimdi bir şey bilemem. Davacı var ise çıksın ol vakit söylerim. Ben canen ve malen fedakarlıkla hizmet ettim. Saye-i şahanede istihkamat için işlettiğim neferata yüz bin kuruşu müteceviz bahşiş verdiğim ve bir an ve dakika ikdamı bırakmadığım bütün ordunun müsellemidir. Hatta ümeradan buraya gelmiş olanlar taht-ı kumandamda bulunup tehdidimi görmüş ademler olmasıyla anlar ve Avrupa zabitanından kezalik burada bulunanlar dahi bunu böyle söyleyecekleri derkar olmağla sorulsun. Meclis Kars'ta Reis Raşid Paşa azası ordu kadısı ve maiyet-i [?] müsteşaride olan Mümeyyiz Emin Efendi ve Şükrü Paşa ve Kaimmakam Tabib Bey ve Kaimmakam Emin Bey ve Kaimmakam Selim Bey'den ibaret olup Erzurum'daki miralayı Selim Bey ile birkaç binbaşidan mürekkep olmak üzere teşkil olunup Erzurum'dan Kars'a asker gelmedikten sonra bit-tabii lağv ile idarenin işine asıl ordunun meclisi nezaret ederdi. Kars'a vürudumda teşkil olunup ibtida reisi Şükrü Paşa iken Raşid Paşa sonradan gelmekle reis tayin kılındı. Bunun tertibinden murad çünkü Erzurum valiliğinde ve Abdi Paşa'nın müşirliğinde beş bin somar zahire tertib olunup tedarik ve irsali bana havale olundukta eğerçi bunun cüziyattan olduğu beyanıyla ziyade alınmasını ihtar etmiş isem de kabul olunmadığından ve sair levazimat dahi buna mikyas olduğunu bildiğimden zaruret ve müzayaka çekmemeleri için her şeyin böyle ve vaktiyle tedarik ve celb olunması maksadına mebnidir. Bunlardan sonra asakire ne suretle *imla?* et ve etmek ve sair mekulat verildiği mahallinden istilam buyurulsa anlaşılır. Azanın tebdili maddesi sebab-i tahtında olmayıp umur-ı tabiiyeden idi. Mesela bir alay memuriyetle gider ise miralayı dahi gidip yerine meclis azalığına bir diğeri tayin kılınırdı.

17) *Raşid Paşa ve Şükrü Paşa haklarında ihtar ve şikayat vaki oldukta taraf-ı devletlerinden araştırıldı mı?*

Hiç öyle ihtar vuku bulmadı. Cümlesi eylediğim tahkikata göre işlerinde gayret ederlerdi. Ben dahi arar idim.

18) *Et ve etmek tayinatı ne suretle ve ne miktar olarak idare olunmuştur? Müteahhidleri etmeği ve eti numunesine muvafık olarak veremediklerinin sebebi nedir? Yem keyfiyeti ne halde idi? Ne miktar kestiriliyordu? Çoğalış artmadı mı?*

Ordunun tayinatı meclis-i muvakkat muvafakatıyla bil-mübayaa verilip avangard dahi olduğu yerlerde alayı canibinde idare olunurdu. Asakire tam tayin verilip piriç az bulunduğundan pilav her hafta kamilen verilemez ise de çorbaları adeti vechile yolunda

veriliyordu. Et ve etmek konturato olunmuş idi. Bunları müteahhidleri numunesine muvafık olarak vermedikleri anda darb olunurlardı. Amma pek ala verdiler arpa ve saman usulü vechile anbarlardan tam veriliyor ve kestiriliyordu. Fakat çayır [?] vakitte arpa az bulunursa binek hayvanatına birer kıyye verilip yine top bargirlerine dair [?] tam veriliyordu.

19) *Asakir-i muvazzafanın maaşları ne suretle veriliyordu? Yoklama ve sergi defterlerini kimler tutardı? Kanğularına rütbe verildi? Mekkari hayvanatı kullanıldı mı? Ne kadarı için konturato yapıldı? Ne suretle yapıldı ve kimlerle pazarlık olundu? Ücretleri nasıl kat' ve tediye kılındı? Nerelerden bulduruluyordu? O [?] ordunun esteri ne mikdar var idi?*

Müsteşar efendi tarafından sergerdelerine verilür, bu madde hem müsteşar efendinin ve hem de meclisin nezareti tahtında olup ayda bir kere onlar tarafından ve bazen dahi meclisten birini tayin ederek ordu canibinden yoklamaları icra olunur idi. Başibozuk takımının iki reislerinden biri Hacı Timur Ağa olup zararsız adem olmağla ve hayli işte bulunmağla ona kapucıbaşılık rütbesi verdiğim misillü Latif Paşa'nın oğluyla vücuhdan başka birine hocalık ruusları verildi. Küsür kalan ruuslar devir kılındı. Diğer Hasan Yazıcı olarak zaten fena bir adem olduğundan başka vukua getirdiği uygunsuzluklar üzerine mevcut maiyetim diyerek neferat için istediği maaşların itasını Hayreddin Paşa hükm ettiği halde müteahhiren şu istenilen akçeden ba'del muharebe Sırrı Paşa'nın konağında heyet-i meclis hazır olduğu halde iki bin kesesini tenzil ettim. Bunlar müsteşar efendinin işi iken ben tesviye eyledim. Doğrusu herkesin işini ben arar ve sorardım. Müsteşarın da meşgalesiyle ben uğraşdım. Mukaddema ellışer kuruş yevmiye ücret kat'ıyla iki bin beş yüz kadar hayvanat istikra olunduğundan onlar ol vechile kullanılıyordu ve ziyade iktiza eder ise meclisce kazalardan buldurulup eshabı isimleri defterine kayd ile ücretleri vuku bulan istidaları üzerine yine ellışer kuruş yevmiye hesabıyla taraf-ı müsteşariden veriliyordu. Eshab-ı hayvanat haklarını almamış ve alamamış olsalar elbette sızlanacaklarından böyle bir iştika vukuunu bilmiyorum. Piyadenin saka bargirlerinden başka süvari ve topçunun katırları var idi. İşe yaramazdı. Orduya mahsus olan evrak-ı nakdiyeyi akçe ile tebdil edip baş almak gibi şeyler vuku bulduğu işidilmiş ise de kimler yaptığını bilmezlenürüm. Hakkımda azv olunan irtikabat maddesi mahallinde ferikandan ta neferine kadar memur irsaliyle tahkik olunup eğerçi bir şey tebeyyün ettirilebilir ise hane ve eşyamı satarak zâmin olacağımdan başka her dürlü cezaya dahi razıyım. Bu azviyata sebep olanları cenab-ı hakka havale ederim. Zira tahammülüm kalmadı.

20) *Hayvan kirası veyahud sair hesaplar için akçe isteyenler haklarını tamam alur mıydı? Böyle şeyler taraf-ı devletlerinden tahkik olundu mu? Bu babda karışıklık olmaz mı idi? Kabahat kimde idi? Maliyece kimlerin taksiri bulundu ve davacı olacaklar kimdir?*

Akçeleri verilememesinden dolayı bazıları şikayet edip müsteşarlık işi olarak esas-ı madde mechulüm olduğundan ve sebep olanların tahkik ve ta'zirine dair bir emir bulunmadığından sükun eder idim. Buraları ordudan istilam buyurulmak lazım gelür. Zabitan ve neferat-ı askeriyeden kabahatlı bulunmayıp mülkiye memurlarından Kars kaimmakamı Latif Paşa'nın azlinde ise medhalim yokdur. Maliye işine karışmazdım, bilmem. Müsteşar efendi ve mevcut maiyeti işlerinde kat'a takayyüd ve ihtimam etmemeleriyle umur-ı maliye müşevveş ve muattal olup hatta orduya gelen akçeyi eshab-ı matlubeden ibtida kim gelür ise o alıp sonra gelenler tehice avdet ederler bu cihetle ihtiyat için hiçbir akçe bulunmazdı. Sonraları tarafımdan işaret olunmadıkça verilememesini tenbih ile tesir ettirdiğimden biraz akçe teraküm ederlerdi.

21) *Bu idare hususunda hatırgüzar-ı devletleri nedir? Islahı neye mütevakkıf idi?*

Ordunun meclisi ve umur-ı maliyenin memurları olduğundan bu babda bir diyecek bulamam. İnfisal ile buraya avdetimde ordunun üç aylık zahiresi mevcut idi. Orduy-ı hümayun tarafına vürud ile ta infisal-i acizaneme kadar olan hareket-ı askeriyeyi ve bis-sual söylediğim şeyleri tafsilen şu kağıda yazdığımdan kıraat ve mütalaa olunur ise malumat-ı zaide alınmış olur.

Appendix 86. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 9, 3 February 1855. From Stratford de Redcliffe on the Turkish Contingent.

The present memorandum is intended to declare that the British Government, in leaving to the Turkish Authorities the appointment of Subaltern Officers in the Body of Troops to be taken into its Service according to the Convention signed today, reserves only the nomination among them of a few British drill Serjeants, and that in case of difficulty or delay in making up the complete number of privates agreed upon by the terms of the Convention, the British Commanding Officer shall be at liberty to recruit, and make up the deficiency from among the subjects of the Sublime Porte indiscriminately without reference to their being already either Regulars or Rediffs.

February 3rd, 1855.

[signed] Stratford de Redcliffe

Appendix 87. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 10, 3 February 1855. Ottoman Irregular Cavalry. Pera of Constantinople. February 3rd, 1855.

The means of raising within the Sultan's dominions a separate Corps of four thousand Ottoman Irregular Cavalry [*başıbozuk süvari askeri*], to be paid by the British Government and commanded principally by British officers having been determined in pursuance of a proposal emanating from the British Government and accepted by the Sublime Porte the undersigned requests that proper steps may be taken and the necessary orders issued to the Provincial Authorities for giving every facility and assistance to the officers and agents charged with superintending the enrolment of the troops in question and directing them with suitable appliances to the several places of rendezvous.

The success of this important experiment depends so much upon the manner and spirit in which it is begun that the undersigned in addressing Aali Pasha on the subject cannot too strongly impress His Highness with the necessity of having the Vizirial letters, which he solicits, drawn up in the clearest and most stringent terms. It is, in particular, desirable that the men to be enrolled should know from the outset that in point of military service, pay, and rations they are to stand in direct connection with British officers and the Queen's Government. It is also essential that strict precautions should be taken to secure the peaceable inhabitants from any acts of plunder or violence in which the volunteers, if left entirely to themselves, might be tempted to indulge, while passing from their respective homes to the place of their destination.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the assurances of his high consideration.

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe. [Words in brackets from the official translation]

Appendix 88. HR. TO. 221/6, dated 6 February 1855. Extract. Erzurum. Slave trade.

The buying and selling of slaves by the officers of the Kars army is as notorious as any other malpractices on their part. Boys [*“oğlan köle”*] are preferred by these brutes, and the girls [*“cariye”*] are sent as bribes to Constantinople; and until the allied consuls are authorized to demand the restitution of these victims to Turkish Sensuality [*“bu biçare köle ve cariyeleri Osmanlunun sui hırsından kurtarmak”*], and are provided with funds to send them back to their families in Georgia; and until the Porte is bound by treaty to send the culprits so detected to the galleys for a certain specified time, this infamous traffic will flourish, and all which has been said or may be written about abolitionary firmans simply adds mockery to crime and woe. [Words in brackets from the official translation]

Appendix 89. HR. TO. 221/13 lef 4. Clarendon to Stratford on slave trade, not dated, translated on 26 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (16 March 1855).

The Turkish authorities in the Porte of the Black Sea have shewn no willingness to give effect to the Sultans's Firman prohibiting the traffic in Circassian and Georgian slaves; and that when two boats laden with Circassian slaves arrived at Trebizond about the 26 of December last, the Pasha's excuse for not detaining them was that he could not define whether they were slaves or not.

I have to instruct Your Excellency to communicate the enclosed extract to the Ottoman Govt and to request that clear and stringent Instructions may be sent to the proper authorities in the Ports of the Black Sea, pointing out to them that there can be no difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the Circassians and Georgians brought to those ports are intended for sale; and that the Pashas must be held strictly responsible for the punctual execution of the Sultan's order declaring that this traffic is to cease.

Appendix 90. HR. TO. 221/13 lef 2. Copy. Extract of a dispatch from Lord John Hay to Sir Edmund Lyons inclosed in a letter from Admiralty dated January 29th 1855.

Tribune at Karatch
January 8th 1855

On the 28 December 1854 I visited the Mushir at Choorooksou: having expressed my surprise that the Pacha at Soukoumkale had not received orders relative to the suppression of the Slave Trade the Mushir informed me that he was most anxious to give effect to the Sultan's Firman, but although he had received the Firman 6 weeks previously, no opportunity had as yet presented itself of communicating with Soukoumkale. Indeed the country boats passing were liable to capture by the enemy's gun boats out of the rivers at Poti and Anakria, and the only steamer at his disposal was merely sufficient to bring provisions from Trebisonde for the use of the army. Proceeded to and arrived at Trebisonde on 29th Dec. 1854. The Pacha was absent when I visited him. I however learnt from Mr. Stevens, Vice Consul, that Two Boats laden with Circassian slaves had arrived at this Port a few days previous. The Pacha did not clearly see how he could give effect to the Firman of the Sultan not knowing how to define whether the people were slaves or not.

I recommended that Mr Stevens' advice should be acted on and that the Boats and people should be detained on suspicion.

Alltogether I think there does not appear to exist among the Turkish officials any excessive anxiety to put a stop to the Circassian and Georgian Slave Trade.

Appendix 91. HR. SYS. 81/2, dated 15 February 1855. From British consulate in Diyarbekir to British embassy on Yezdanşer.

İngiltere sefaretine bin sekiz yüz elli beş senesi Şubat'ının on beşi tarihiyle Diyarbekir canibinden varid olan tahriratın suret-i tercümesidir.

İzzeddin Şir Bey muahharen Midye kazasını basıp yağma ve külliye harap etmiştir. Abdullah Bey namında birinin kumandasıyla yalnız başıbozuktan ibaret olan bir miktar asakir pek cüzi bir mukavemet [2] etmiş ise de bunların bir miktarı Mardin'e avdet ederek Abdullah Bey dahi bakiye-i neferatıyla Mardin ile Midye beyninde kâin olup kendü maskat-ı re'si olan Sur karyesine çekilmiş ve esna-yı [3] rahda rast geldiği kurayı kâmilene nehb ve garet eylemiştir. Mir-i merkum muahharen istifa etmekle Mardin kaimmakamı Osman Paşa dahi bunun harekât-ı vakiasından kat'a sual etmeksizin vaki olan [4] istifasını kabul etmiştir. Mardin civarında bulunan kâffe-i kura ahali kendü nefislerini tahlis zımında Mardin'e iltica etmiştir. Tahminen üç bin nefer-i nizam ile dört bin nefer-i başıbozuk asakiri [5] Bağdad'dan Musul'a çıkarılıp rivayet olunduğuna göre Cizre'ye doğru azimet etmektedir. İşbu hareket-i askeriye İzzeddin Şir Bey Midye'den Cizre'ye doğru çekilmesini davet ile Mardin üzerine [6] hücum etmesini men' etmiştir. Geçen iki mah zarfında pek çok rahmet yağdığı cihetle yollardan mürur ve ubur mümteni olmuş olduğundan Halep'ten çıkan asakir henüz vürud etmemiştir. Sivas ve Erzurum'dan [7] gönderilecek asakire dair hiçbir şey işitilmemektedir. Rivayet-i vakıaya nazaran İzzeddin Şir Bey Mardin semtlerinde bulunan Araplara zikıymet hediyeler irsal ettiği cihetle bunlar ile pek eyü [8] dost olmuş ve muzafferiyet-i vakiası kendüsüne kemal-i cesaret vermiş olduğundan zan olduğuna göre merkum şimdiki halde Cizre'ye doğru sevk olunan asakir-i şahaneyi dağıtmağa muktedir olduğu [9] takdirde Musul canibini hücum ile yağma etmek üzere Araplar kendisiyle birleşecektir. İşbu Kürd isyanından tertip eden fakr ü harabiyet günden güne tezaid etmekte ve bu tarafların bu vechile [10] asakir-i muntazamadan hali bırakıldığından dolayı derkar olan gaflet kemal-i esef ve keder ile zahire çıkmaktadır. Asakir-i nizamiyenin birkaç yüz neferini cem' etmekte derkar olan müşkülât [11] ve te'hirat Midye'de eşkiya takımına derece-i gayede muceb cüret ve cesaret olmuş ve bu maddenin zuhurundan beri takriben üç mah mürur etmiş iken Diyarbekir'e henüz bir nefer asker yetiştirilmemiştir.

Appendix 92. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 34. Raglan to Redcliffe, 20 February 1855. Before Sevastopol.

My Lord,

I have the honor to lay before Your Excellency the copy of a dispatch which I have today addressed to the Duke of Newcastle and I request Your Lordship will be so good as to communicate it to the Imperial Exc. and to offer them my warmest congratulations on the successful resistance of the Ottoman Army to the powerful attack which was made upon Eupatoria on the morning of the 17 instant.

I have, etc.

Raglan

Appendix 93. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 35. From Lord Raglan to His Grace the Duke of Newcastle on the battle of Eupatoria. [copy]. Before Sevastopol. Feb. 20. 1855

My Lord Duke,

Your Grace will have learnt by my telegraphic dispatch of the 18th inst. that the Enemy had on the previous morning at daylight attacked Eupatoria with a very large force, and a powerful body of Artillery, and had been repulsed after an engagement which terminated with their retirement at 10. a.m.

I have now the honor to lay before Your Grace copies of two letters which I have received from Colonel Simmons, who is attached to the Headquarters of Omer Pasha, containing the details of the action, and whilst Your Grace will rejoice to see that the Turkish Troops which have been landed at Eupatoria have availed themselves of the earliest opportunity to shew that the character they acquired on the Danube was well merited, and remained unimpaired, you will join in the regret which I feel that they have suffered so considerable a loss, and that among the killed is numbered the General of Division Selim Pasha [an Egyptian], and among the wounded a General of Brigade, also an Egyptian. This loss however, and particularly that sustained by a Battery of Artillery, afford ample proof of the gallant and determined conduct of the Troops, and of the serious nature of the attack which was made upon them, as well as of their being worthy of their illustrious chief.

I have great satisfaction in drawing Your Grace's attention to that part of Lt. Colonel Simmons' dispatch in which he bears testimony to the efficient assistance rendered to the Ottoman Army by Her Majesty's Ships in the Bay under the command of the Hon. Captain Hastings of the *Curaçoa*.

I have, etc.

[Signed] Raglan

Appendix 94. İ. MMS. 4/135 lef 75, dated 21 February 1855. Report of the grand vizier on Yezdanşer.

Atufetlu efendim hazretleri

Kürdistan'da izhar-ı bağı ü isyan eden İzzeddin Şir Bey'in nezdine Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu tarafından gönderilmiş olan kaimmakam Salih Zeki Bey'in avdetiyle takrir ve ifadesinden mir-i merkumun [2] istifham olunan niyat-ı müfside-i gayatını ve gaile-i muzırının indifai saye-i şevketvaye-i hazret-i şahanede birkaç tabur asakir-i nizamiye ile hasıl olacağından mahall-i malumeden gelmekte bulunan [3] ve talep ve tertip kılınan asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafa ile üzerine varılarak ba avn-i Hak tenkil ve istisaline bakılacağı ifadesini ve tebliğat-ı saireyi mutazammın Kürdistan ve Musul taraflarından bu defa [4] dahi alınan tahrirat ve Kürdistan valisi devletlu İzzet Paşa hazretlerinin bu maddeye müteallik terkim ve ita eylediği on dört bend bir kıta layiha geçen Pencşenbe günü akd olunan Meclis-i Mahsus'da [5] led-el kıraat tahrirat-ı mezkure meallerinden müstefad olduğu vechile merkumun revş ü hareketi müfsidane ve akavil ve işaratı dahi hilekarane şeyler olmasıyla ve güya arz-ı dehalet ve itaat [6] için teminat talebinde bulunması dahi mücerred vakit kazanmak da'yesinden ibaret bulunmasıyla bunlara bakılarak tedabir-i lazimenin gevşetilmesi caiz olmayacağından ve müşarünileyh İzzet Paşa [7] hazretlerinin layihasında munderic olan mevadd şü gailenin indifai ve bunu zuhura getirdiği istima' olunan sebeplerin ıslahı hakkında lazımlı şeyler olduğundan iktizaları [8] led-el mülahaza eğerçi tahrirat-ı merkumenin birinde beyan olunduğu üzere mir-i merkum birtakım haşarat ile Garzan kazasına gelerek hareket-ı tecavüziyeye cesaret eylemesine mebni [9] mukabele-i bil-mislin icrasıyla münhezim olduğu misillu merkumun Midyat koluna sevk eylediği iki binden mütecaviz eşkıya-yı ekradın dahi saye-i satvet-vaye-i cenab-ı cihanbanide orada [10] bulunan kuvve-i askeriye tarafından üzerlerine hücum ile yüzden ziyadesi cerh u itlaf olunarak eşkıyadan malum-ül esami rüesa ile iki yüz kırk bu kadar nefer dahi [11] hayyen ahz olunmuş ve bunların da küsuru münhezim ve perişan olarak sairlerine

vahşet-ariz olduğu halde mir-i merkurum bakaya-i eşkıya ile Cizre nehrini geçip firar eylemiş ise de [12] bununla maslahata bitmiş nazarıyla bakılamaya-cağından def'-i gaileye kafi kuvvet içtimarıyla merkurumun bütün bütün kahr u tenkiline bakılması feraiz-i mülkiyeden görünerek bu madde için [13] geçende bil-müzakere hakpay-ı aliden istizan olunduğu vechile bu taraftan ve Halep ve Sivas'tan üç tabur piyade ve mükemmel bir alay süvari asakir-i nizamiye-i şahane tertip ve kezalik [14] piyade ve süvari olarak üç bin nefer kadar asakir-i muvazzafa tedarikiyçün dahi vali-i müşarünileyhe mezuniyet ita olunup bu miktar asker eşkıya-i merkurumenin tedmir ve istisaline [15] kafi görünebileceği mülhaza kılınmış ve maslahatça hüsn-i tesiri muceb olmak üzere Bağdad tarafından dahi bir miktar asakir-i nizamiyenin tehiyesiyle tedib-i eşkıya için gönderileceğinin [16] neşr ü ilanıyla iktifa olunmuş iken şimdi ol taraftan bir alay süvari ve üç tabur piyade asakir-i nizamiye-i şahane dahi sevk ve izam kılındığı ve mahallince de sair sunuf-ı asakir [17] tedarik ve cem' edilmekte bulunduğu mezaya-i iş'ardan anlaşıldığından bu kuvve-i müctemia mahallince istenilen kuvve-i nizamiyenin iki katı demek olduğuna ve evvelki karar mucebince [18] bu taraftan gidecek iki tabur piyade asakir-i nizamiye dahi müheyya olunup heman ihraç ve izam kılınmak üzere bulunduğu binaen bu maslahat için yeniden asker tertibine hacet görünmemesiyle [19] tahrirat-ı merkurumeye icabı vechile cevabnameler yazılması ve zikr olunan layihada münderic mevad üzerine cereyan eden müzakerat dahi bendleri balalarına surhla işaret kılınmış [20] olduğundan ana göre icray-ı iktizalarına bakılması tensip olunmuş ise de ol babda her ne vechile irade-i isabet-ade-i hazret-i mülkdari-i keramet-efzay-ı suver buyurulur ise mantuk-ı münifi [21] icra kılınacağı ve evrak-ı mezbure manzur-ı şevket-mevfur-ı cenab-ı padişahi buyurulmak için arz ve takdim olunduğu beyanıyla tezkire-i senaveri terkim kılındı efendim. (mim)

Fi 2 C 71

[Sultan's aproval on 3 C 71]

Appendix 95. HR. SYS. 1336/40, dated 13 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (3 March 1855). Mustafa Pasha, the commander of Batum army on Georgian slaves.

Maruz-ı çaker-i keminelidir ki

Geçen sene Ahışa ve Şekvetil taraflarında vuku bulan muharebelerde re's-i hududda bulunan Gürcistan kurası ahalisinden olup berü taraftan alınmış olan [2] bazı çoluk çocuklar ve meşmul-i cihan olan ma'delet-i celile-i hazret-i padişahiye mazhar olmak emeliyle kendiliklerinden taraf-ı eşref-i saltanat-ı [3] seniyyeye dehalet eden birtakım genç ademler muahharen her nasılsa esir sıfatına konularak bunların ekseri bazı ümera ve zabitan yedlerine [4] geçtiği ve sonraları dahi şuna buna satılıp el haleti hazihi bu muamele-i nabeca cari olduğu bu kere bazı ihbarat-ı mevsukadan [5] anlaşılmış ve şu hareket-ı namarziyenin bir an evvel önü kestirilmesi pek ziyade ihtimam ve ikdam olunacak mevadd-ı mühimme-i mülkiyeden bulunmuş olduğu [6] beyan-ı alisiyle ba'd ez in böyle uygunsuz şeylerin vukuuna kat'a meydan verilmemesi ve şimdiye kadar buralara gelmiş olan o misillü mülteciyandan [7] her kimin yedinde üsera bulunur ise bahaları müteselsilen istirdad ettirilmesi ve zükurundan kabul-i İslam eyleyenlerden elverişli olan [8] ve istek edenlerinin silk-i celil-i askeriye idhaliyle henüz hitanları icra olunmayıp memleketlerine avdet emelinde bulunanlarının mümkün [9] olabilir ise vilayetleri canibine izam olunması ve çocuk ve gayr-ı müdrik bulunanlar ve inasdan şeref-i İslam ile müşerrefe olanlarının dahi [10] münasip miktar nafaka tahsisıyla geçindirilmesi ve kız ve erkek çocukların familyasından ayrılanları ve tebdil-i din etmeyip de gitmek [11] arzusunda bulunanları olur ise ba'd-es-sübut teslim olunması ve inasin kebireleri dahi tezevvücüne talep zuhurunda icabı icra kılınmak üzere [12] ba marifet-i şer'-i şerif şimdilik birer emin mahallere yerleştirilmesi ve bu maddede cüzice

müsamaha bilahare pek büyük mesuliyeti [13] davet edeceğinden ber vech-i meşruh serian icraı icabıyla keyfiyetin beyan ve iş'ar kılınması talimat ve iradat-ı dekayık-ayat-ı celilesini şamil [14] fi 6 R 71 tarihiyle müverrehan mahremane olarak reside-i dest-i tazim ve tefhim olan fermanname-i sami-i vekaletpenahileri ahkam-ı celilesi sarf-ı harf be harf-ı [15] müdrike-ârâ-i çakeri olmuştur. Bu tarafa hin-i muvasalat-ı bendeganemden berü kendiliklerinden zükur olarak şeref-i İslam ile müşerref [16] olmak emeliyle birer ikişer sekiz nefer Gürcü gelerek bit-tevfik bunlar haklarında ne vechile muamele olunmak lazım geleceği istizanına dair [17] fi 27 Ra 71 tarihinde makam-ı Vâlâ-yı hazret-i seraskeriye bir kıta ariza-i bendeganem takdim ve irsal olunmuş ve fi 7 C 71 tarihiyle [18] müverrahan takdim hakpay-i ali-i vekaletpenahileri kılınan ariza-i bendeganem muhatilm-i ali-i sadaretpenahileri buyurulacağı vechile [19] bu madde-i mühimmece ikdamat ve takidat-ı kamilenin icrasında kat'a tecviz-i kusur ve tesamüh olunmayarak ve bazı kimesne yedinde [20] gizlü Gürcü çocukları olduğu bit-tahkik meydana çıkarılarak meyamin-i tevcihat-ı celile-i vekaletpenahileriyle buralarca önü kestirilmiş olduğundan [21] şimdiye değin gerek kendiliklerinden gelen ve gerek şunun yedinde sıfat-ı esarete kalıp buldurulabilenler [22] bil-istintak haklarında tıbk-ı talimat-ı aliye-i vekaletpenahileri ahkam-ı celilesi üzere muamele olunarak keyfiyetleri arz ve inha [23] olunacağı ve bundan böyle dahi an be an takayyüd ve taharri olunmakta olduğundan ele geçdikçe icabı icra kılınarak hakpay-ı sami-i sadaretpenahilerine [24] bildirileceği muhat-ilm-i alem-ârâ-i vekaletpenahileri buyruldukta ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman veliyyül emrindir. Fi 13 C 71. An Çürüksu.

Bende

Müşir kumandan-ı orduy-i hümayun-ı Batum

[Sealed] Mustafa

Appendix 96. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 2, dated 23 Receb 1271 / 11 April 1855. Mazbata of the Meclis-i Vâlâ on the trial of Zarif Pasha and Hurşid Pasha.

[1] Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu müşiri devletlu Zarif Mustafa Paşa hazretlerinin ber mucceb-i emr ü ferman-ı ali icray-ı istintakıyçün bab-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i seraskeride [2] münakıd olan komisyonun hulasa-i tahkikatını mutazammın sual ve cevab suretinde yazmış olduğu müzekkeresiyle mazbata-i mahsusa ve ol babda bazı ifadatı [3] havi müşarünileyh tarafından verilen bir kıta varaka-i mufassala Meclis-i Vâlâ'ya havale buyurulmuş ve meallerine göre müşarünileyhin emr-i istintakı icra ve ikmal olunarak [4] şimdi lazım gelenlerle muvacehe ve muhakemesi sırası gelmiş olduğundan müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulan irade-i aliye-i vekaletpenahileri muccebince müşarünileyh hazretleriyle orduy-ı [5] mezkurun erkan-ı harb reisi olup bu husus için Dersaadet'e celb olunan Ferik saadetlu Hurşid Paşa ve keزالik orduy-ı mezkur ümerasından bu tarafda [6] bulunan saadetlu Raşid Paşa ve Hacı Rıza Paşa hazeratı münferiden ve müctemian defaatle Meclis-i Vâlâ'ya celb olunarak icra olunan muhakemelerinin keyfiyetlerini ber vech-i ati [7] beyan olunur.

[8] Malum-ı ali-i asafaneleri buyurulduğu üzere şu tahkikat ve muhakematın lüzumu iki nevi vukuat üzerine tertib edip birisi Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin müşirliği [9] esnada İncedere nam mahalde vukua gelen muharebenin netice-i mükeddiresi ve diğeri idare-i tayinat-ı askeriye ve mesarifat-ı sairede zuhur eden sirkat ve irtikabat maddeleri [10] olarak komisyonca şu iki cihet üzerine cereyan eden sual ve cevablar müzekkere-i merkumede ber tafsil yazılmış olmağla ibtidaki meclisde yalnız Zarif Paşa ile [11] Raşid Paşa hazır ve mevcut olduğu halde zikr olunan müzekkere kıraatle emr-i muhakemeye orduy-i mezkurun hareket-i harbiyesi bahsinden başlanılıp evvela ordunun [12] kuvve-i mevcude ve ahval-i mevkiyesine dair sözlerden sonra Kars'tan ilerüye hareket ve ictisar olunan harbin sebepleri ve keyfiyet-i icraatı ve neticesi hakkındaki

[13] iktiza eden sualler bir bir irad olunduğunun üzerine Zarif Paşa hazretleri mukaddemce komisyonda irad eylediği cevablarını tekraren dermiyan eylediği ifadatında [14] orduy-ı hümayundan avangard namıyla talia olarak altı saat mesafede kain Subatan nam mevkie evvelce sekiz tabur piyade ve iki alay süvari ve ona kuvve-i zeyliye (?) [15] olmak üzere muahharen Vezin köyüne dahi iki alay süvari irsal olunduğunu müteakıb Rusyalu Kars çayını geçerek ve bazı karyeleri yağma ve ihrak ederek [16] İncedere'ye kadar gelmesiyle li-ecl-il müdafaa Kars'tan iki fırka olmak üzere hareket olunup bir fırkasının Kerim Paşa kumandasıyla Subatan'da ve diğerinin [17] kendi maiyetinde Hacı köyünde ikamet-i esnasında gönüllü askeri ve cihad için gelmiş olan meşayih ve dervişan güruhu taraflarından gavga etmek emeliyle [18] asakir-i nizamiye çadırları arasında bazı mekalat ihdas olunarak o aralık Batum'un ve muahharen Bayezid'in vukuat-ı müteallimesi haberleri dahi gelmiş olduğundan [19] Bayezid için bir kol asker gönderilmesi tasavvur olunup fakat Hurşid Paşa buna muvafakat etmeyerek kuvve-i mevcude ile düşman üzerine hücum olunmasını tercih [20] etmiş ve akd olunan meclisde ekseriyet-i ara Hurşid Paşa'nın rey-i tarafında bulunmuş olduğuna binaen Hurşid Paşa'nın yaptığı tertibe ve verdiği talimata tatbikan [21] gece hareketle alessabah mevki-i muharebeye varılıp tevcihle harb olunduğunu ve ne suretle ricat vuku bulduğunu uzun uzun hikaye ile neticesine göre [22] kaffe-i hareket ve icraatın usul ve nizamına ve meclisce ümera-i askeriye ittifakıyla icab-ı maslahata tevfikkan yapıldığı davasında bulunup fil-hakika hareket-ı vakıa [23] bu tarafın talimat ve işaretine tevfik olunarak yolunda davranılmış olsa diyecek olmaz ise de orduy-ı mezkur karar-ı ahir vechile tahaffuzi hareketle memur [24] olduğu halde ibtida-i emrde altı saat mesafede kain mahalle külliyetli asker çıkarılmasıyla beraber düşmanın vüruduna tereküb olunması ve onun üzerine Kars'ın [25] istihkamata ve ordunun kuvve-i mevcudesi henüz kafi ve mükemmel değil iken Kars'a ilerü hareket edilmesi ve başıbozuk takımının asakir-i nizamiye arasına duhul ile [26] neşr-i havadis eylemelerine fırsat verilip sonra bu mekalatın önü alınmak için ihtiyar-ı harb olduğu denilmesi ve Zarif Paşa'nın komisyonda vaki olan [27] ifadesi iktizasınca kaffe-i icraatını ümera-i askeriye ittifakıyla yaptığı misillü Bayezid'e sevk-i asker olunmak veyahud Rusyalu üzerine gidilmek tasavvurata üzerine [28] Hacı Köyü'nde akd olunan meclisde dahi ekseriyet-i ara ile muharebeye karar verildikten sonra tahaffuzi harekete dair taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriden tahrirat zuhur ederek tekrar [29] meclis akdiyle tahrirat-ı mezkure ol vakit meydana konuldu demiş iken şimdi meclisdeki takririne göre tahrirat-ı mezkure meclis akdinden on gün mukaddem [30] gelmiş olduğu halde mucebince hareket olunmaması ve bu kadar asker ve mühimmatın leylek gurub-ı kamerden sonra kaldırılıp karanlıkta beş saat mesafe mahalle gidildikten sonra [31] yorgun askerin muharebeye sevk olunması ve badelmevde (?) hiçbir yerde durulmayarak on bir saat mesafesi olan Kars'a kadar gelmesi keyfiyeti cay-i bahs ve itiraz [32] olmağla keyfiyetleri başka başka istizah olundukta Zarif Paşa hulasa-i ifadatında orduy-ı hümayundan avangard olarak ol mikdar asker çıkarılmasının [33] kaide-i harbce lüzumunu ve Kars'dan ilerüye hareket dahi ümeranın rey ve ittifakıyla olduğunu ve başıbozuk takımının asakir-i nizamiye çadırları arasına [34] duhule mezun olmayıp neferat-ı askeriye beyninden ihdas eyledikleri mekalat-ı müfside çarşı ve pazarda neşr olunmuş şeyler idüğünü beyan edip hareket-ı [35] tahaffuziye hakkında olan tahrirat-ı hazret-i seraskerinin vürud ve vusulü hususunda dahi tahrirat-ı mezkure meclis-i mezkurun akdinden hayli vakit evvel [36] gelmiş ve kendüsi mealini bazı zabitan ve ümeraya dahi bildirmiş olduğu halde bu hareketin meal-i tahrirata muvafık olacağı rey olunmasına mebni icra olunduğunu irad ile [37] tahrirat-ı mezkurenin sonradan vürud ve zuhuruna dair komisyonda vuku bulan ifadesinde sehv ü hata olduğunu ve ordunun Hacı Köyü'nden leylek [38] hareketi müşarünileyh Hurşid Paşa'nın rey ve talimatıyla yapıldığını ve avdetinde doğruca Kars'a kadar gelmesi ise düşman askerinden bir mikdarının Kars üzerine [39] geçtiği haber alınmasından ve

esna-i rahda düşmanın takibi mülahazasıyla tahaffuz ve tedafüü kabil istihkamat olmadığından bil-mecburiye ihtiyar olduğunu söyleyip [40] Raşid Paşa dahi şu denilen şeylerden bir takımını tasdik ile beraber Zarif Paşa'nın memuriyetinden sonra hakk el insaf orduy-i hümayunun usul-i idaresi [41] sabıklarına nazaran yoluna girmeğe başladığını dahi ilaveten mekal edip fakat kendüsünün reyi Bayezid'e asker gönderilmek tarafında olduğundan bu muharebenin [42] suret-i tertib ve tedbirine izhar-ı malumat etmemek istemiş ise de ferik-i müşarünileyhin ekser vukuat ve icraatına elbette vukuf-ı malumatı olmak lazım gelmesiyle [43] ikinci meclis Raşid Paşa yalnız celb olunarak maddenin aherine kadar söylettirilerek fezleke-i cevabında yine Zarif Paşa'nın gayret ve hizmetine dair [44] beyan-ı mukaddemat ile beraber usul-i mer'iyeye ve nizamiye üzere mahsus meclisler akdiyle müzakere-i maslahat olunmak ve jurnal tutulmak gibi bazı şeylerde ve tedbir-i lazımede [45] mutasavver olduğunu dahi irad edip hareket-i harbiye hakkında olan ifadatının hulasasında dahi kendüsünün reyi vechile ibtida-i emrde Bayezid tarafına asker [46] gönderilmek tasavvur olduğu halde sonradan Zarif Paşa ve Hurşid Paşa ve sair bazı ümeranın reyiyle harbe karar verilip Hurşid Paşa'nın [47] yaptığı tertib ve verdiği talimat iktizasınca saat birde hareketle üç saat ilerüdeki mahall-i muayyende aram olunarak oradan dahi sabahleyin kalkmak [48] lazım iken saat beş ve altı raddelerine kadar kalınıp Hurşid Paşa Zarif Paşa'ya "Kalkıp gidelim" dedikçe "Ordunun müşiri benim. Kalkacak vakti [49] bilürüm" diyerek itâb eylemesiyle nihayet beynlerinde muaraza vukuuyla bu kadar kuvve-i cesimenin gurub-ı kamerden sonra karanlıkta yola çıkarılması ve ibtida [50] yarım saat gerüde bulunan ikinci fırka hareket etmek iktiza eder iken sonraya bırakılıp birinci fırkanın muharebeye şuruundan haylice vakit sonra [51] yetmiş olması ve esna-i muharebede birinci fırkanın ihtiyatı uzak düşmesiyle vaktinde yetişemediği gibi Zarif Paşa'nın takriri vechile beş tabur [52] asakir-i nizamiye ve üç bin neferat-ı muvazzafa ve altı kıta top ile Karadağ'da memur Liva Abdurrahman Paşa mevki-i harbe bin hatve mesafede olduğu halde [53] birinci fırkanın kumandanı Kerim Paşa'nın iki defada gönderdiği habere itaatle imdad etmiş olsa düşmanın mağlup ve perişan olacağı meczum iken [54] onun dahi mütabaat edip gitmemesi ve mahall-i harbe karib olan nehir düşman tarafında kalarak askerinin susuzluktan bitap olması şu netice-i müteallimeyi davet eden [55] esbab-ı mahsusadan olduğunu irad ederek bu cümle ile beraber başıbozuk güruhunun asakir-i nizamiye arasına duhulden men' olduğuna ve hitam-ı [56] muharebede ikinci fırkanın asla nizamı bozulmayarak geri alındığına ve düşman askerinden sekiz bin nüfus ile üç bin kadar hayvan naaşının meydan-ı [57] muharebede kaldığına ve sekiz yüz kadar bargir ve hayvan alındığına dair Zarif Paşa'nın sıbkat eden ifadatını dahi Raşid Paşa tamamıyla teslim ve tasdik [58] etmeyip filhakika Zarif Paşa evvelki takririnde başıbozuk takımının tefevvühat ve mekalatını nizam çadırları arasında bizzat işitmiş olduğunu [59] söylemiş iken muahharen bunlar asker içine giremez demesi mesmuu olamayacağı misillü bozgun askerinin nizamı üzere gerü alınması dahi akıl kabul edişi (?) [60] olmadığı ve düşman telefâtı ise berü tarafın bozgunluğu cihetiyle tadad olunamayacağı malum olup fakat bu babda olunan rivayat ve ifadat-ı [61] mukteziyesine nazaran cunud-ı nizamiye-i cenab-ı padişahinin hareket-ı şecianesi eseri olmak üzere düşmanın telefâtı berü taraftan ziyade olduğu muhakkaktır.

[62] Bu harbin suret-i tertib ve icrasında Hurşid Paşa'nın ber minval-i muharrer beyan olunan rey ve malumatına ve Ferik saadetli Hacı Rıza Paşa dahi [63] muharebede birlikte bulunmuş olmasına nazaran onların diyecekleri dahi anlaşılacak üzere meclise çağırılıp ifadeleri zabt ü tahrir olunduktan sonra [64] ertesi defaya Zarif Paşa ve Raşid Paşa ile Hurşid Paşa ve Hacı Rıza Paşa birlikde olarak celb olunup bil-muvacehe ibtida Hurşid Paşa'nın [65] takrir ve ifadâtı dermiyan olunarak onun söyleyişine göre orduy-ı hümayunun ahval-i mevcudesi icabınca kendüsünün reyi Kars'ın ve Hacı köyünün [66] ikmal-i istihkamatıyla ilerüye tecavüz olunmaması tarafında bulunduğu halde bundan

dolayı Zarif Paşa ile beyinlerinde bazı mertebe muâraza ve bürudet [67] vukuuna mebni ince karakol memuriyetiyle harice gidip avdetinde ordunun Vezin köyüne doğru hareket eylediğini görmesiyle sebebini Zarif Paşa'dan [68] sual eyledikte “müşir benim” tabiriyle cevap verip muahharen Subatan karyesinde yine Zarif Paşa muharebe için kendüden rey talep etmekle eğerçi bu suret [69] evvel ve ahir reyine muğayir ise de madem ki böyle niyet olunarak oraya kadar gelinmiş ve oranın yarısı ince karakol memuriyetiyle ilerüye [70] çıkarılmış ve Rusyalu'nun azlığı dahi tahkik kılınmış olduğundan meram harb ise tamam sırası olduğunu beyan ile beraber vakit geçmezden ve düşmanın [71] haline kuvvet gelmezden mukaddem (?) hareket olunmasını dahi söylemiş iken Zarif Paşa o günlerde kamer burc-ı akrebde olduğundan itizar edip bu hal ile [72] orada beyhude birçok günler geçerek ve bu sırada birtakım yolsuz ve nizamsız şeyler dahi vukua gelerek nihayet olunan tertibin rengi ve hükmü [73] değişmiş olduğu halde hareket olunmuş olup Hurşid Paşa ise ordunun erkan-ı harb reisi olarak cümleden evvel onun reyi alınmak [74] lazım olduğu halde rey ve malumatı olmayarak Kars'dan hareketin sebebi Zarif Paşa'dan led-es-sual sebeb ve lüzumu hakkında tahriren ve şifahen [75] bast ü irad eylediği mukaddematı (?) tekrar ile beraber bunda Hurşid Paşa'nın dahi reyi munzam olduğunu teyid için pek çok sözler söylemiş [76] ve harekât-ı harbiye hakkında beyan-ı mütalaat ve muhsenatı mutazammın Hurşid Paşa'nın bazı zabitan ile müştereken vermiş oldukları varaka tercümesini [77] isbat-ı müddeaya mevadd olmak üzere ibraz etmiş ise de varaka-i merkumede Kars'dan harekete sened ittihaz olunur sarahat olmayıp Hurşid Paşa ise [78] bu hareketde kat'a reyi olmadığı davasında bulunduğu ve diğer paşalar canibinden dahi tarafeynin ifadatını red ve kabule medar-ı hüküm olur malumat [79] beyan olunmadığından Hurşid Paşa'nın bunda sahihen reyi olup olmadığı anlaşılamayarak ancak bu bahsin asıl maslahatça aranılacak mahalli Kars'dan [80] ilerüye hareketin sebeb ve lüzumu kaziyesi olarak Hurşid Paşa'nın dediği gibi Kars'da Hacı köyünde ikmal-i istihkâmat ile [81] hal-i tahaffuzide durulmasının halen ve mahallen eslemiyet ve recmaniyeti (?) inkar olunamaz ise de Zarif Paşa'nın ifadesi vechile Rusyalu bir tarafa tecavüz ederek etraf [82] ve civarda bulunan köyleri yakıp yıkmağa ve orduy-ı hümayunun ekser zad ve zehairi tedarik olunan ve hayvanatı otlatılan mahalleri zabt [83] ve istila etmeğe başlamış olduğu halde orduy-ı hümayun her ne kadar istihkam altında bulunsa da ol halde idare-i asker hususunda sıkıntı [84] çekilmesi ve belki bir hal-i hatar ve müzayakada bulunulması düşmanın dahi oraları istediği gibi tahririne fırsat verilmesi mülahazalarına nazaran orduy-ı hümayunun [85] Kars'dan hareketi şu mecburiyet üzerine ihtiyar olunur demek olur ise de ilerüsünde “niçün usul ve kaidece davranılmadı ve tahaffuzi harekete dair [86] tahrirata gitmiş iken ne sebebe mebni ketm olundu ve resmen meclis akd olunup müzakere-i maslahat olunmaması neden neşet eyledi?” denildiğine cevaben yine [87] Zarif Paşa irad eylediği ifadatında harekat ve icraatını usul-i nizama tatbik ve tahrirat-ı varidenin hükmü ise kaffe-i ümeraya tebliğ eylediğini [88] ve mesalih-i vakıayı dahi daima meclis akdiyle müzakere edip fakat yapılan meclislerde cereyan eden müzakerat şayi ve münteşir olmamak için [89] ferikandan maada zabitan dahil olmadığını bil-beyan hatta harbin lüzumuna dahi bir günde iki defa meclis akdiyle karar verildiğini beyan [90] ve tekrar etmekle karar-ı meclise dair mevcut olmak lazım gelen mazbata sorulduktan mazbata yapıp fakat Hurşid Paşa'nın talimat verdiğini [91] söylemesine binaen Hurşid Paşa'nın o mecliste bulunup bulunmadığı ve tahaffuza dair tahrirat hazret-i seraskerinin meydana çıkıp çıkmadığı kendüden sual olunarak verdiği cevabda vakta muharebe için yalnız ferikandan mürekkeb öyle bir meclis yapılmış ise de kendüsi davet olunmamış [93] olduğu halde bit-tesadüf meclise uğramış olmasıyla reyi sorulup kendüsi dahi usul ve kaide-i harb üzere talimatını yazıp [94] vermiş ve Raşid Paşa'nın ifadesi vechile asakirin saat birde kaldırılması tertib olunmuş iken Zarif Paşa saat beş ve altıya kadar [95] tevkif edip ve aralıkta “vakit geldi, hareket olunsun” deyu ihtar olundukça orası kendü bileceği şey olduğunu söyleyip [96] nihayet bivakit

karanlıkta hareketle hatta askerin ve top ve mühimmatın tertibi dahi karışık olduğu halde azimet eylediğini beyan etmesi üzerine [97] bu tevakkufun sebebi dahi Zarif Paşa'dan sorulduğunda Hurşid Paşa'nın dediği vakitte hareket olursa ilerüde sabah oluncaya kadar askerin [98] birkaç saat ayak üzerinde ve hal-i hatarda kalması lazım geleceğini söyledi ise de bu mütalaası nabeca görünmüştür. Komisyon müzekkeresinde [99] muharrer olduğu vechile Hurşid Paşa'nın leylen fenar çektiği olmasından bir mazarrat görülmemiş ise de sebebi anlaşılacak için bu keyfiyet dahi [100] sorulduğunda Hurşid Paşa ortalığın karanlığı ve geçilecek yollar ise taşlık ve dere ve tepe olması cihetiyle iktiza eden yerlerde [101] top arabaları geçirilmek ve hayvanlar kapanmamak üzere öyle fenar çektiği ise de bunun bir guna mahzur ve mazarratı olmayıp [102] bilakis yolca münkatı olduğunu cevaben ityan ederek sairleri dahi Hurşid Paşa'nın bu ifadesini tasdik eyledikleri gibi muharebenin [103] suret-i vukuunda ve bozgunluğun esbabı hakkında dahi Hurşid Paşa'nın ifadesi Zarif Paşa ve Raşid Paşa ve Hacı Rıza Paşa'nın [104] ifadatı merkezinde olduğu anlaşılıp fakat Hurşid Paşa muharebeden avdetinde bir başı Kars'a kadar gidilmesinden ve bozgun askerin [105] o kadar mesafeyi bir günde kat' ettirilerek perişan edilmesinden ise Vezin köyünde kalınıp muahharen avdet olunmasının imkanı [106] üzerine zahib olarak hatta bu sureti Zarif Paşa'ya teklif etmiş ve hiç olmaz ise orada kalan çadır ve mühimmatı toplamak için [107] kendüsünün yanına bir miktar süvari birağılmasını istemiş olduğu halde Zarif Paşa kabul etmeyerek gittiğini söylemekte ise de oranın istihkamatı [108] olmayıp Rusyaludan ise bir fırka askerin Kars üzerine geçtiği haber verilmesiyle mahall-i mezkurda kalınması hatadan salim olmayacağı diğer [109] paşalar tarafından irad olunmuş ve vakıa şu halde orada tevakkuf ve ikamet mahzuru meydana gelmişle Hurşid Paşa'nın bu rey ve ifadesi [110] muvafık-ı mevki ve maslahat olmadığı derkar bulunmuştur. Zarif Paşa'nın şu davadaki zehabına göre muharebe-i mezkure düşmanın berü tarafa tecavüziyle [111] hudud-ı Devlet-i Aliyye dahilinde vukua gelmiş olduğundan bu hareketin tahaffuz manasına haml ile meal-i tahrirata tevfiği itikadında olmasıyla [112] buna usul ve kaidece nasıl nazar ve itibar bakmak lazım geleceği Hurşid Paşa'dan sorulduğunda filhakika bu harbin arazi-i Devlet-i Aliyye'de [113] vukuuna nazaran buna halkça hareket-ı tahaffuzi ve tedafüi nazarıyla bakılabilir ise de düşman üzerine gidilip bozularak avdet olunması ve düşmanın [114] takib etmemesi cihetiyle hareket-ı tecavüziye add ve itibar olunacağını söylemiş ve Raşid Paşa ile Hacı Rıza Paşa dahi bu hareket tecavüzi değil ise de [115] tahaffuzi dahi olmadığını mütereddidane beyan etmiş olup ancak burası funun ve kaide-i harbiyece hall ve temyiz olunacak mevadd-ı mahsusadan [116] olmağıla meclisce bir şey denilememiştir.

[116] Şu tahkikat ve muhakematdan zahir olan neticeye göre orduy-ı hümayunun evvel emirde Kars'dan hareketi Rusyalu'nun berü tarafa tecavüziyle [117] vuku bulan mazarratın menni zımında icra ve ihtiyar olunmuş ve muahharen muharebeye dahi düşmanın azlığına ve vakit ve zamanın müsaadesine [118] istinaden ekseriyet-i ârâ ile karar verilmiş olduğundan Zarif Paşa'nın ifadesi vechile şu icraat hareket-ı tahaffuziye ve tedafüiyeden [119] sayıldığı halde yolsuz ve muğayir-i usul görünmeyip fakat böyle bir emr-i azimin kaffe-i hareket ve icraatı tedabir-i kaviye ile yapılmak [120] ve hususuyla cem'i hareket-ı harbiyede erkan-ı harb reisi bulunan zatın rey ve malumatı munzam olmak lazım iken ibtida Kars'dan [121] ilerü hareketde ve bazı maddelerin icrasında Reşid [sic, Hurşid?] Paşa'nın işe karıştırılmaması ve ifadatına ber minval-i muharrer naseza cevablar [122] verilmesi ve hususat-ı mühimmenin resmen meclis akdiyle müzakere olunmaması ve başibozuk takımının asakir-i nizamiye arasına duhul ile [123] neşr-i mekalat etmelerine fırsat gösterilmesi yolsuz olduğu misillü Hurşid Paşa'nın tertibine muğayir olarak mülhaza-i mukarrere ile [124] bu kadar asker ve mühimmatın leylen gurub-ı kamerden sonra kaldırılıp harbe sevk olunması ve fırka-i saniyenin gerü birağılması ve Abdurrahman Paşa'nın [125] imdad etmemesi ve top

bargirleri ve topçu neferatı mikdar-ı nizamiyesinden dun olduğu halde noksanı ikmal olunmayarak gidilmesi ve Hurşid Paşa'nın dahi [126] vukufuyla beraber susuz mahalli mevki-i harb tayin eylemesi keyfiyatı dahi mhsn (?) mütalaa-i kasire (?) ve malumat-ı nakisiyesi olacağını ve saye-i muavenet-vaye-i [127] hazret-i şahanede şu vukuatın esbab ve keyfiyatı ber minval-i meşruh meydana çıkmış ise de hareket-i harbiyenin tahaffuzi veyahud tecavüzi olup [128] olmadığı kesdirilemediği gibi zat-ı madde dahi umur-ı askeriye ve fünün-ı harbiyeye müteallik olmasıyla tertib edecek hükmünün ekabir-i kumandan-ı askeriye [129] rey ve ittifakıyla tayin ve tertibi mukteza-i maslahatdan idüğüne binaen ol vechile iktiza edenler hazır olduğu halde keyfiyetin huzur-ı ali-i vekalet-penahilerinde [130] mütalaasıyla verilecek karar üzerine tesviye-i icabatı ve balada beyan olunduğu vechile Karadağ'da bulunan Liva Abdurrahman Paşa'nın [131] birinci fırkaya imdad etmesi zımnında kendüye birkaç defa haber gönderilmiş iken gelmemesi ve kendüsinden büyük kumandarana itaat etmemesi askerce [132] azim kabahat olduğundan onun dahi Dersaadet'e celbiyle badel muhakeme töhmetine göre hakkında muamele-i mukteziyenin icrası suretleri müzakerat-ı [133] vakıa iktizasından bulunmuşdur.

[134] Orduy-ı mezkurun idare-i tayinat-ı askeriye ve mesarifat-ı sairesi hususunda vuku bulan ahval-i irtikabiyeye dair komisyonda [135] vuku bulan sual ve cevablara nazaran Zarif Paşa kendü müddet ve idaresinde o makule irtikabatın vukuuna bir guna malumatı olmayıp [136] bu keyfiyetlerin memur-ı idaresi bulunan ordu müsteşarı ve defterdarıyla memurin-i sairesinden suali lazım geleceğini beyan ile neraber nukudun [137] kavaim-i nakdiyeye tebdili gibi bazı vukuat hakkında dahi bilmezlenürüm tabiriyle tecahül edeceğini söylemiş olmağla bu hususlar dahi meclisde [138] birer birer kendüden sual olundukta ifadatı komisyonda sıbkat eden ecviyesi mealinde olup tecahül edeceğini beyan eylediği kaime tebdili [139] maddesinin keyfiyeti sorulduktaki bu işe hazine-i celileden memuren orduy-ı hümayunda olan veznedarın mücazeret eylediği [140] tahakkuk eylemesiyle habsi ve tedibiyçün müsteşar-ı sabık atufetli Rıza Efendi hazretlerine göndermiş ise de nasıl ise bir cüzi müddet habs ile [141] salıverilmiş olduğunu irad edip bu keyfiyetler hakkında Raşid Paşa ve Rıza Paşa ve Hurşid Paşa'nın vukuf ve malumatı onlardan [142] dahi sırasıyla led-es-sual Hacı Rıza Paşa ekser vakitte ahir mahalde bulunduğundan bu hususlara kat'a vukufu olmadığını beyan ederek Raşid Paşa ve Hurşid Paşa dahi süvari hayvanatının yemleri eksik verilmek ve ziyade fiyat ile zehair almak gibi bazı yolsuz şeylerin [144] rivayet olunduğunu beyan ile beraber keyfiyetlerini isbata muktedir olamayacaklarını söylemeleriyle bu husus hakkında paşaların vaki olan [145] ifadat-ı mukteziyesi hükmünce Zarif Paşa'nın memuriyetinden sonra mübayaat ve mesarifat maddelerinde sabıkları kadar uygunsuzluk [146] vuku bulmayıp asakir-i hazret-i şahaneye verilen tayinatın dahi bil-nisbe yerinde ve yolunda olduğu anlaşılmiş ise de mahalince bazı memurlar taraflarından [147] hiyl ü irtikabat vukuu münker olmayıp fakat keyfiyetlerinin ve muhti ve mürtekiplerinin buraca zahire ihracı kabil olamayarak meclisce [148] tahkike mütevakıf olduğundan bunların icray-ı tahkikatıyla keyfiyat-ı mütebeyyinesinin bu tarafa bildirilmesi hususu orduy-ı mezkur kumandanı [149] devletlu Vasıf Paşa hazretleriyle defterdarı saadetlu Vehab Efendi hazretlerine havale olunarak vuku bulacak tahkikat ve işaret üzerine [150] tertib edecek hükmün başkaca icabına bakılması ve merkum veznedarın keyfiyeti dahi tahkik olunarak ve icab edenlerle muhakemesi görülerek [151] tebeyyün edecek töhmetine göre mücazati icra olunmak üzere keyfiyetin bu tarafa yazılması hususunun dahi defterdar-ı müşarünileyhe işarı tezkir kılınmıştır. [152] Mütalaat ve ifadat-ı meşruha hakkında her ne vechile irade-i aliye-i vekalet-penahileri müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulur ise ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 23 Receb sene [12]71.

[Sealed by 13 seals]

Appendix 97. HR. SYS. 1352/49, dated Selh-i [29] Şaban 1271 (17 May 1855). Recruitment of irregular cavalry for the British army from the province of Damascus and the disorders caused by them.

İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi ordusunda istihdam olunmak üzere tertibi tansip buyurulmuş olan malum ül miktar asakir-i muvazzafanın lazım gelen mahallerden celb ve tertibi suretlerine [2] teşebbüs olunduğu misillü Şam-ı Şerif eyaleti dahilinde kain mahallerden dahi tedariki mümkün olan neferat ve zabitanın celb ve tertibi zımnında devlet-i müşarünileyha [3] zabitanından tayin kılınmış olan memur-ı mahsus marifetiyle yazılacak neferat ve zabitan emsali müşahade olunan başıbozuk takımı gibi uygunsuz [4] ve mechul-ül ahval makuleden olmayarak hanedan ve hüsn-i hal ashabından olmak üzere tahriri hususunda memur-ı mumaileyh hakkında muavenat-ı kamilenin icrası [5] iradesini şamil fi 29 Ca 71 [17.2.1855] tarihiyle müverreh ve fi 19 B 71 [7.4.1855] tarihinde hame-piray-ı tazim olarak meclisce kıraat olunan emirname-i sami-i vekaletpenahi [6] mantuk-ı alisince neferat-ı merkumenin ol suretle tahririne muavenetle infaz-ı irade-i seniyye damen-der-meyan-ı gayret olduğumuz halde memur-ı mumaileyh [7] bu sıralara atf-ı negah-ı dikkatten ve hükümet ve meclise müracaattan sarf-ı nazarla Şam-ı Şerif'in süfeha ve erazil takımından ibaret olan Şağor ve Meydan [8] mahallerinin uygunsuz ve pek fena tezkiyeli makulelerinden hod be hod tahrir ve tertib etmiş olduğu beş yüz nefere karib süvari ve piyade asakiri denilen [9] ecnas-ı muhtelif bir takım haşerat memur-ı mumaileyhin verdiği serbestiyete istinaden tek durmayarak gunagun sefahat-ı aleniye ve ehl-i ırz [10] nisvana tasallut ve kadimen husumetleri olan ehl-i memleketi darb ve cerhle muhill-i nizam-ı memleket ve hetk-i namus-ı hükümet olacak ve nihayet [11] ehl-i memleketi ayaklandıracak halat-ı namarziyye mübaderetlerinden naşi bu babda zuhuru mesbuk ve mücerreb olan ihtilal ve teşviş-i memleketin [12] kabl-el vuku önü aldırılmak üzere niyazmendan olarak lazım gelen tebliğat nasihane ve dostane suretle kendisine iblağ ve tefhim olunmuş ise de [13] bir suretle tarafından kabul olunmayarak nihayet asakir-i merkume uygunsuzluğu çoğaltmış olmalarıyla esliha keşidesiyle şunu bunu darb ve cerh edenlerden [14] nizamı mucebince li-ecl-it-te'dib habse ilka olunmuşken memur-ı mumaileyh bab-ı hükümete gelerek mahbusları istemiş olmasıyla çığırılıp eline verilmiş [15] ve anın üzerine memur-ı mumaileyh mekteb-i idadiye önünden geçer iken yol üzerinde vaki karavulhane kapusunda iki nefer asakir-i nizamiye [16] selam durmuş ve birisi dahi kapunun içerü tarafında kendi maslahatıyla meşgul iken bi-n-nefs kendi kavaslariyla karavulu tecavüz ederek [17] ve nefer-i merkum üzerine niçün sen de selam durmadın deyü at sürerek ve sürüderak ala mele-en nas alıp kendi konağına götürüp adeta darb etmiş ve nihayet bunların bu suretlerle hareket-ı indiyesinden ahalinin ekseri dehşete düşerek bir uygunsuzluk vukuu melhuz [19] bulunmuş olduğundan canib-i hükümetten tercüman Faris Efendi ve İngiltere devleti tercümanı Hoca Musa ve Mustafa Ağa havasla ve Hoca Şehade İstanbuli [20] memur-ı mumaileyhe gönderilerek asakir-i merkumenin şuradan ihracı nazikane beyan ve tefhim olundu ise de bir vehile müsmir olmayıp ve bunun üzerine [20] neferat-ı mezkure daha ziyade şımarıp fenalıkları tezaid-i kesb [sic!] eylediğinden bilcümle çarşu ve bazar halkı dükkanlarını sedd ü bend ile bunların [21] ellerinden canib-i hükümete işteka ettiklerine ve iştekalari müsmir olamayacağı surette bunlar da silah altına girerek mukavemete mütesaddi [22] ve nihayet iş müşkile düşeceği siyak-ı halden münfahem idüğüne mebni her ne suretle taraf be taraf vaad ve vaid suretleriyle ahali-i mezbure yatıştırılarak [23] derhal Arabistan orduy-ı hümayunu müşir vekili atufetli reis paşa ve übbebetli defterdar ve faziletli Molla Efendi hazeratıyla aza-yı meclis-i kebirden [24] İzzi[?]zade mekremetli Ömer Efendi ve izzetli Abdullah Bey ile Şam-ı Şerif'te mevcut bulunan Fransa ve Nemçe ve Sardinya ve İran devlet-i fahimeleri konsoloslarıyla İngiltere ve Prusya devletleri konsolosu

tercümanlarından mürekkep olarak tertib olunan meclis-i mahsusa müzakeratı kararı ve cümlesinin tasdiki [26] üzere neferat-ı mürettebe tekmil oluncaya kadar mevcut neferatın Hama tarafına ve böyle olmazsa Şam-ı Şerif civarında Kıbbe [Kıyye ?] karyesine çadır ve çerke [27] ve tayinatlarının isbaliyle neferat-ı mevcudenin Şam-ı Şeriften bil-ihraç orada ikametleri veya kaffesinin eslihası alınıp bila silah ırz ve edebleriyle [28] gezdirilmesi ve bu da kabul olunmazsa neferat-ı merkumenin haklarında lazım gelen ahkam-ı zabtiyenin icrasıyla ol suretle uygunsuzluklardan [29] men'i keyfiyetlerinin yirmi dört saate kadar imsalen ihtarıyla bununla neferat-ı merkumenin kabul-i surethalleri nümayan olmadığı halde [30] ol vakitte memleketin bundan vukuu ve tekevvünü melhuz olan fitne-i azimesi basdırılmasına medar olacak esbab-ı hükümetin icrasına hasıl olacak [31] mecburiyet keyfiyeti memur-ı mumaileyhe ba tezkire-i mahsusa-i resmiye bildirilmiş ise de yine bir faide hasıl olmamış ve işte neferat-ı merkumenin uygunsuzluklarından [32] naşi ahval-i memleket bu raddeleri bulmuş olduğundan bundan böyle neferat-ı merkumeden ol suretle tasallut ve taarruza cesaretleri vukuunda biz-zarur [33] canib-i hükümetten habsi ve terbiyeleri emri istihsalinden başkasıyla husul-i asayiş-i matlube-i ahali müyesser olamayacağı sibak-ı halden anlaşılmiş olduğundan [34] anların birisi olmadığı surette bu suretle namus-ı hükümet ve ahali ve reayanın emn ü istirahatlerinin vikayesi esbab-ı [35] vacibesinin istihsalinden gayri bir çare bulunamamış ve bununla her ne hal ise şimdilik memleket yatışmış ve salif-üz zikr yazılan Arabiyy-ül ibare [36] tezkire-i resmiyenin tercümesiyle beraber bir kıta sureti dahi merbuten takdim-i hakpay-i alileri kılınmış olduğundan beyan-ı hal maruzatında mazbata-i mahsusa-i kemteranemiz takdimine ibtidar olunmuştur. Ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi Selh-i Ş sene 71.

[Sealed by 19 members of the *meclis* of Damascus including governor Vamık Pasha, the Greek member's place [*an taife-i Rum*] is not sealed, the Jewish and Catholic members have also sealed]

Appendix 98. HR. SYS. 1352/55, dated 20 May 1855. Commander of Batum army Mustafa Pasha on slavery.

Maruz-ı çaker-i keminelidir ki

Rusyalu tarafından firaren bu canibe gelen eşhasın sıfat-ı esarete tutulması ve şuna buna satılması hakkında evvel ve ahir vukuu iştika ve istima olunan muamelat-ı gayr-ı layıkanın henüz önü alınmayarak daima bir suret-i serbestane ile [2] icra olunmakta olduğu ekser taraftan rü'yet olunarak hatta öte taraftan bu aralık firaren berüye gelmiş olan bir şahıstan kendisinin kân-ı kayd-ı esaretten tahlisi için Acara'da vaki Ardanuc kazası müdirinin üç yüz kuruş rüşvet dahi ahz etmiş olduğundan dolayı yine bir takım şikayat ve rivayat vuku bulmuş olup bu maddenin elan vukua gelmesi bu babda şerefsudur buyurulan talimat ve tenbihat-ı mahsusanın nazar-ı dikkat [3] ve ehemmiyetle görülmeyerek bir mevki-i adide tutulmasından icab eyleyeceği ve bu ise bilahare mesuliyet-i şedideyi istilzam edeceği beyan-ı dehşet-nişan-ı alisiyle bu hususta bid-defaat nezaret ve icab edenlere dahi tefhim-i ehemmiyet-i [5] maslahat ile talimat-ı mebusenin tamamen ifay-i ahkam ve de kayıkına ve müdir-i merkumun ber minval-i muharrer ahz-ı rüşvet fezahatına cesareti mütehakkık olduğu halde kavanin-i mahsusaya göre te'dib ve terbiyesine mübaderet-i abidanemi [6] amir fi 6 Receb 71 tarihiyle müverreh olup Fransa devlet-i fahimesinin Batum'da bulunan konsolosu vasıtasıyla fi 19 Ş 71 tarihinde mübahat efray-i hame-i tazim ve tefhim olan fermanname-i sami-i asafileri mefal?-i alisi sarf-ı taharrüf?-i [7] müdrike-aray-i çakeri olmuştur. Bu hususun ehemmiyeti her umur-ı mühimmeye müreccah tutularak şimdiye değin bu babda vu's-i bendeganemin nihayet mertebesine kadar çalışmakta olduğum ve imkanı olan

teşebbüsat ve tedabir ve ikdamatın [8] iltizam ve icrasından bir hatve ayrılmadığım buraca herkesin meşhudu olduğu misillu şimdiye değin vuku bulan ma'ruzat ve iş'arat-ı bendeganemden dahi muhat-ilm-i ali-i vekaletpenahileri buyurulmuş olacağı vechile ez cümle [9] geçende böyle üsera maddesiyeçün Erzurum ve Kars taraflarına mahsusen yaver ve Acara'ya zabıt gönderilerek hafiyen ve alenen ve cebren buldurulan esirler talimat-ı dekayık-ayat-ı asafanelerine itbaen isteyenler [10] ve sağır üs-sinn olanlar mümkün oldukça familyalarına teslim ve fail-i muhtar olup da burada kalmak isteyenler icabı vechile askerliğe ve hidemat-ı saire-i münasibeye tayin ve bu marziyetin hilafında bulunan görüldükçe [11] tedib kılınarak vuku-ı hal peyderpey hakpay-i sami-i vekaletpenahilerine arz ve tahrir olunmaktadır. Batum orduy-i hümayunu dairesinde bulunan ve hududa muttasıl olan mahaller ahalisinden ekseri öteden berü lisanen ve mişvaren [12] Gürcülerle ülfet ve ihtilat edegelmiş olup adet-i melufeleri ve mevkileri icabınca her hususta bunların daire-i efkar-ı adlide [?] istikrarı yenice teklifatla [?] suretnüma olabilecek keyfiyattan bulunmamış iken [13] mücerred destyari-i tevcihat-ı teshilat-ayat-ı vekalet-penahileriyle orduy-ı mezbur dairesinde şimdilerde esir maddesi-nin vukuu kat'a işitilmemektedir. Bundan mukaddem arz ve iş'ar olunduğu vechile bu maddenin Anadolu orduy-i [14] hümayunu dairesinde dahi külliye def'i orduy-i mezkur kumandanı devletlu paşa hazretleriyle memurin-i sairenin dahi ikdam ve himmetleriyle hasıl olacağı derkar bulunmuş ve Ardanuc kazası ise Anadolu orduy-i hümayunu dairesi [15] dahilinde bulunan Çıldır sancağına merbut ve mülhak olmasından başka ol taraf ahali dahi mesmu'-i bendeganeme göre hasb-el mevki tamamiyle mazbut ül ahval olduğu anlaşılmiş ise de mamafih tıbk-ı emr ü ferman-ı sami-i asafaneleri [16] mucibince kaza-i mezkur müdirinin fezahat-ı merviyesinin sıhhat ve hakikati zahire ihrac ile icabı icra olunmak üzere memur-ı mahsus tayin kılınmış olmağıla suret-i icraiyesi badehu hakpay-i sami-i vekaletpenahilerine arz ve iş'ar olunacağı ve şu madde-i mühimme hakkında ve her halde kemakan ikdam ve gayrette kat'a kusur olunmayarak emr ü ferman-ı seniye ve talimat-ı isabet-ayat-ı aliye-i sadaretpenahilerinin bi lutfihi teala fiilen ve mütemadiyen [18] tefyiz?-i ahkam-ı celilesine muvafakiyetten büyük emel ve vazifem olmadığı muhat-ilm-i ali-i vekaletpenahileri buyrulduktaki emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy ül emrindir. Fi 3 N 71. An Gelencik

Bende

Müşir kumandan-ı orduy-i Batum

[Sealed] Mustafa

Appendix 99. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 15-16, 19 April 1855. Redcliffe to His Excellency Saffet Effendi. The "Turkish Contingent".

The undersigned, impressed with the urgency of giving effect without delay to the provisions of the military convention which he had the honor of signing with their Highnesses the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd of February last, cannot entirely conceal the regret which he experiences in observing so very imperfect a preparation for that purpose at Constantinople notwithstanding the representations addressed repeatedly by him to the proper authorities, and the specific assurances received in reply.

The Porte is aware that Lieutenant General Vivian appointed by the British Government to command the regular force of twenty thousand Turkish soldiers to be paid and officered by them has been several days at Constantinople, and that his first inquiries have been submitted both to the Ottoman Secretary of State and to the Seraskier Pasha. Other officers destined to act under General Vivian are either arrived or expected from day to day.

Such are the circumstances under which the undersigned has requested that the Troops, which are to compose the Corps in question may be collected, and that such part of them as are at Constantinople, may be at once detached from the remainder of the Garrison, and reviewed in presence of the British General, to the amount of at least six thousand infantry, with two regiments of Cavalry and two or three batteries of Field Artillery. The season for operations in the field is rapidly coming on, and it is most desirable that the Turkish Corps in the Queen of England's pay should be prepared, with all practicable expedition and good effect, for taking part in them.

The Undersigned must remind the Ottoman Secretary of State that he is entitled to expect the number of troops agreed upon from the several places already designated by the Porte, namely, the Danube, Constantinople and Bosnia, or in failure of the required numbers in those quarters from other more convenient sources. He begs to observe at the same time, that according to his advices from the Crimea, there is no probability of any portion of the force in question being sent by Omer Pasha, since it appears beyond a doubt, that His Highness is not in a condition to weaken his army with any degree of prudence, and that he is employing the troops commanded by him, in strict agreement with the Commanders in Chief of the Allied Forces...

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe

Pera, British Embassy. 19th April. 1855.

Appendix 100. HR. SYS. 1030/4 lef 65. Lord Clarendon to the Earl of Westmoreland. "Urgent wants of the Christian subjects of the Sultan". Foreign Office. April 24, 1855. Copie. No. 164.

My Lord

The memorandum by Aali Pasha inclosed in Lord John Russell's dispatch No. 81 of the 18th Instant is dexterously drawn up and has been read with interest by Her Majesty's government but I have to observe that it passes over some of the urgent wants of the Christian Subjects of the Sultan.

It is true that Christian evidence is admissible in criminal Courts, though in many places it is not admitted but the Judges in such cases are still exclusively Mahometans.

The only mixed tribunals are commercial Courts whose functions are very limited – Christian Evidence is still inadmissible in civil cases and in as much as Robbery is a more frequent crime than murder, civil injuries are oftener perpetrated against Christians than personal injuries and the inadmissibility of Christian evidence in civil cases is a severe and daily felt grievance. There ought both in civil and criminal cases to be a court composed of an equal number of Christian and Mahomedan Judges.

All the local authorities in the Provinces are still Mahomedan and this leads to endless oppression and injustice committed and connived at towards Christians.

There ought to be some Christian officer of suitable rank attached of [sic] to each Musulman governor so that such Christian officer might be appealed to by injured Christians and he should have the right of appealing to Constantinople in the event of his not being able to obtain justice from the local governor.

Christians ought to be allowed to rise to any rank in the military and civil services and their advancement should not form an exception to the rule by which they are excluded from the higher ranks of their profession, the interests of the Sultan would unquestionably be promoted by enlarging [sic] the field of selection and taking into his service many able and intelligent men who have now no access to it.

The description given in the memorandum of the medical schools at Constantinople and of the kindly feelings which the youths of different creeds are taught to entertain towards each other should encourage [sic] the Porte to proceed in a system

which has been productive of such happy results and primary schools should be established in all the chief towns throughout the Turkish Empire in which Christian and Musulman children should receive elementary instruction together.

Her Majesty's government do full justice to the enlightened views and benevolent intentions of the Sultan and they are convinced that if it depended solely on the will of His Majesty justice would be impartially administered throughout his dominions and the state of his Christian subjects would be prosperous and contented, but unfortunately the men on whom devolves the duty of giving effect to the Sultan's will are not animated by his spirit and until rapacity, injustice and corruption are systematically discountenanced and punished, the social system of Turkey must continue to deteriorate and the reforms and improvements upon which the prosperity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire depend, will exist only in name.

Your Lordship will communicate this dispatch to Aali Pacha and furnish him with a copy if he should desire it.

I am etc etc

Signé Clarendon

Appendix 101. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 88. The Times, Monday, April 30, 1855. Parliamentary Intelligence. House of Commons, Monday, April 30. The Vienna Conferences.

...

Mr. BASS inquired what part Turkey had taken in the conferences? (A laugh.)

Lord J. RUSSELL. – I cannot go into details, but the Turkish plenipotentiaries were of the same mind as the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Austria. ("Hear, hear," and laughter.) [end of article]

Appendix 102. HR. SYS. 1353/68 lef 1, 12 September 1855. Instructions to Midhat Efendi on the prevention of the oppressions of the başıbozuk.

Meclis-i Vâlâ İkinci Katibi Saadetlu Midhat Efendi'ye talimat müsveddesidir

[1] Başıbozuk takımının buldukları ve geçtikleri mahallerde cümle sunuf-u tebaa haklarında icrasına mütecasir oldukları muamelat-ı [2] reddiye ve teaddiyatın had ve nihyeti olmadığı misillu bazı mahallerde dahi haydutlar zuhuru ile İslam ve Hıristiyan birçok [3] bigünah ademlerin zatlarına ve familyalarına dürlü eziyetler ve gadirler ettikleri umur-u malumeden olmasıyla ve tedibsiz [4] kaldıkça bu makule ef'al-i fecianın önü alınamayacağı bedihiyyattan bulunmasıyla bunun çare-i seriasına bakılmak lazım gelip [5] ordu-yu hümayunun gavail-i harbiyesi münasebetiyle böyle şeylere bakılmaklığa bit-tabia [?] vakit olamayarak vülat-ı [6] kiram dahi ziyadece meşgul bulduklarından ve küçük memurların bazıları tarafından dahi her ne sebebe mebni ise bu nevi [7] hususata ziyade takayyüd olunmadığından verilen memuriyet emr-i alisinde mestur olduğu vechile bu maddeye ruhsat-ı kamile ile [8] efendi-i mumaileyh ba irade-i seniyye memur buyurulmuş olduğuna ve zaman-ı ma'delet-nişan-ı hazret-i padişahide hiç kimse hakkında [9] teaddiyat ve barbarca muamelat vukuu tecviz olunamayacağına binaen zirde beyan olunan suret vechile efendi-i mumaileyhin ifa-ı memuriyete sa'y etmesi lazım gelecektir.

[11] Efendi-i mumaileyhe teslim olunan evrak-ı mefahimden müsteban olunacağı vechile Varna havalisinde haydutlar tarafından [12] bazı biçare Bulgarlar hakkında insanı dilhun edecek surette vuku bulan muamelat-ı fecianın en büyük [13] davacısı Devlet-i Aliyye olduğundan ve bu misillu ef'al-i kerihye mütecasir olan eşhas-ı rezilenin mücazat-ı layıklarını [14] görmeleriyle beraber anlara müsaid ve böyle

şeylerin men'i maddesinde vazife-i zimmeti icrasına mütekasil olan memurinin [15] dahi derece-i cünhalarına göre tedibi hükümetçe pek elzem olduğundan efendi-i mumailiyh buradan bahren azimet ile Varna'ya [16] vasıl olduğu gibi ibtida doğruca zikr olunan vukuat-ı fecianın olduğu mahallere gidecek ve buna mütecasir [17] olan eşhası ele getirmekliğe ve müsaade ve müsamaha gösterenleri dahi mizana çıkarmaklığa sarf-ı mesai eyleyecektir [18] ve bir kere eshab-ı töhmet derdest olduğu gibi anları derhal mahallerinde gayet muhikkane ve müdekkikane muhakeme ile ceza-i [19] sezalarını mukaddemce neşr olunup birer sureti kendisine ita olunan emr-i ali ve talimat-ı umumiye ahkâmına tatbikan hemen icra etmez ise kendisi mesul olacaktır ve şayet fevkalade bir keyfiyet vuku bulur ise zikr olunan emr-i ali ve gerek talimat-ı umumiye ahkâmının haricine çıkmak icab eder ise fakat anı bu taraftan istida mecburiyet halinde bulunacaktır. Vaki olacak icraat peyapey bu tarafa bildirilecektir.

[23] Efendi-i mumailiyhin memuriyeti yalnız Varna havalisine münhasır olmayarak oradan bed ile Balkan'ın öte yönünde [24] bulunan mahalleri bütün dolaşacak olduğundan her nerede bu makule ef'al-i reddiye vaki olmuş ise anın [25] tahkik ve icrasına bakacak ve hiçbir yerde lüzumundan ziyade durmayacaktır.

[26] Efendi-i mumailiyhin maiyetinde lüzumu takdirinde mikdar-ı münasip kuvve-i askeriye bulundurulmak için iktiza edenlere tenbihat-ı [27] icabiye icrası taraf-ı vâlâ-yı serdar-ı ekremiye yazıldığı misillu işbu memuriyetinde kendisine her dürlü muavenat ile [28] ifası dahi hamil olduğu emr-i ali ile kaffe-i memurine bildirilmiş olduğundan artık ana göre makarimane [?] hareket ile [29] memuriyetini layıkıyla görmekliğe ve kendisinin memuriyetçe talep eylediği keyfiyatı icrada kusur edenler olur ise derhal [30] bu tarafa bildirmekliğe müsaraat olunmak iktiza-ı mesalih tendir.

[31] Varna havalisinde düvel-i müttefika asakir-i muavenesinin muhtaç oldukları erzak ve es'ar ve sair eşyanın tedarik [32] ve itası hususunda pek çok kusurlar vuku bulduğu kezalik yedine verilen evraktan efendi-i mumailiyh [33] bil-etraf anlayacağından ve düvel-i müttefikanın mücerred devlet-i aliyenin muhafaza-i hukuk-u seniyesi niyet-i halisesiyle [34] bunca fedakarlıklar ederek göndermiş oldukları asakirin kaffe-i umur-u vakıasına can ve başla çalışmak akdem [35] vezaifden iken bu misillu kayıtsızlıklar ve d*rb*ğ muamelat mücerred hamiyetsizlik ve gayretsizlikten neşat edeceği cihetle nezd-i saltanat-ı seniyede begayet mekruh olarak hatta Varna muhafızı sabık Hasan Paşa'nın azli dahi ancak [37] bu hususlarda zuhura gelen tekasülünden iktiza etmiş olduğundan bu misillu hareket-ı gayr-ı marziyeye mütecasir olanların dahi bit-tahkik tedipleriyle fi-ma-bad herkesin bu babda ziyadesiyle dikkat etmeleri ve asakir-i muaveneye zehair ve erzakı kat'a diriğ etmeyerek fiyat-ı mutedile ile ita eylemleri esbab-ı kaviyesinin istihsalı ve bu keyfiyetin cümle ahaliye ilanı dahi ehem ve mühimdir.

[39] Gezilen mahallerde vülat ve sair memurinin ahval-i idarelerini ve kaffe-i hareket ve muamelatlarını dahi hafî ve celfi [40] tahkik ile bu tarafa bildirmeklik cümle-i memuriyetinden olmağla ve hiç kimsenin uygunsuzluğu ketm olunmak caiz olmadığı [41] misillu azviyat ve müftereyata vücud verilmek dahi kaide-i insafa mugayir düşeceğinden gerek bu makule tahkikatta [42] ve gerek icra olunacak muhakematta bitarafâne ve mû-şikâfâne ve hakkaniyet-şiarâne olunmaklık farizadan bulunmağla [43] ana göre ifa-yı me'muriyete kemal-i dikkatle sa'y kılınacaktır.

[44] Bu memuriyette doğruca hareket etmek muceb-i mükafat olacağı misillu tarik-ı makusa gitmek dahi müstelzem-i itab [45] ve mesuliyet olacağından ana göre afifâne ve müstakimâne davranılması ve her varılan mahallerde derdi ve şikayeti olanların [46] Yenicuma'ya [?] gelüb ifade-i hal etmelerinin ilan kılınması pek elzemdendir.

HR. SYS. 1353/68 lef 2

[1] Rumeli'nin sol kolu ile Yanya taraflarına varınca vaki vülat-ı izamım iclaluhuma ve mühendishane-i hümayunum feriki olup [2] bu defa zikri ati hususa memur ve tayin kılınan Selim Paşa damet mealiye [3] ve elviye kaimmakamları dame mecidihum ve naib ve müftiler zide ilmihum ve kaza müdirleri ve aza-yı mecalis ve vücut-u memleket zide kadrihuma hüküm: [4] Memalik-i mahruse-i şahanemin bazı taraflarında başıbozuk asakirinin içlerinden bazı sebükmağaz ve cahil takımı esna-i rahda [5] gelip geçtikleri ve buldukları mahallerde ahali-i İslam ve Hıristiyan tebaa-i şahanemin mal ve can ve ırzlarına tasallut ile adab-ı [6] insaniyet ve hamiyete yakışksız bir takım hareket-ı kabihaya ibtidar ve bazı mahallerde dahi kutta-i tarik ve eşrar ve haydut makuleleri sunuf-u tebaa-i [7] şahaneme ve çoluk ve çocuklarına tasallut ile izac ve ızzar etmekte oldukları ve işbu hareketlerin zuhuru bazı memurinin tesamuhundan [8] neşet eylediğinden maada kendileri dahi bir takım teaddiyata ictisar ettikleri¹¹⁸⁶ bu kere bil-istihbar tahkik olunup beyana hacet [9] olmadığı üzere yed-i müebbed-i hilafetime vedia-ı cenab-ı Halık-ül beraya olan kaffe-i sunuf-u ahali ve tebaa-i devletimin her dürlü [10] mezalim ve teaddiyattan vikayet ve himayetleriyle idame-i huzur ve istirahatları nezd-i mealimevfur-u mülukanemde gayet matlub ve mültezem idüğünden¹¹⁸⁷ [11] o makule haklarında lazım gelen mücazat-ı şedidenin icra ve ifası zımnında mukaddemce bilcümle Memalik-i mahruse-i şahaneme mahsus evamir-i celile-i mülukanem tasdir ve tesyir olunmuş olduğu halde yine bu misillu hareket-ı fecia vukuu doğrusu pek çirkin şey olduğundan artık hem bu makule edepsizliğe cesaret edenlerin ve hem de öyle hilaf-ı emr ü nizam iğmaz ve hareket eyleyen memurların haklarında mücazat-ı şedidenin sürat-i icrası lazım gelerek Rumeli tarafının sol kolunda bulunan mahalleri Yanya tarafına varınca dolaşip ita olunan talimat mucebince gerek bunlardan ve gerek memur-ini mumaileyhimden o makule kabahati vuku bulanların icra-ı muhakemeleriyle zikr olunan evamir-i celile-i mülukanemde münderic ahkama tatbikan mücazat-ı layıklarınını hemen bila istizan icra eylemek ve kanunnameden hariç bir şey zuhurunda icabını derhal bu taraftan istizan etmek üzere ferik-i müşarünileyhin derkar olan dirayet ve istikameti cihetiyle ruhsat-ı kamile ile bu hususa memuriyeti tensip olunarak ol babda müteallik ve şerefsudur olan emr-ü irade-i seniye-i mülukanem mucebince hemen ol havalıye izam kılınmış ve bazı mahallerde erbab-ı töhmeti ele geçirmek için ferik müşarünileyhin kuvve-i askeriyeye muhtaç olması muhtemel olduğundan bu babda [20] tenbihat-ı mukteziye neşr olunması kaziyesi dahi Serdar-ı Ekrem canibine bildirilmiş olmağın müşarünileyhin memuriyet ve mezuniyetini havi Divan-ı [21] Hümayun'um-dan mahsusen işbu emr-i celil-ül kadirim ısdar ve ita olunmağla siz ki vülat-ı müşarünileyhimsiz keyfiyet malum-u dirayet-melzumunuz oldukda bu madde [22] mevadd-ı saireye bir vechile kıyas kabul etmeyip begayet dikkat ve itina olunacak şey olmasıyla bunların izame-i fırsat ve ikate-i vakt olunmayarak [23] hemen sürat-i icra-i cezalarına ikdam ve dikkat olunmadığı halde tesamuh edenler hakkında dahi netayic ve himayeyi mzdi [?] olacağından [24] ferik-i müşarünileyhin ber muceb-i talimat icra edeceği hususatda tarafınızdan dahi muavenet-i külliye ve takayyüdat-ı mukteza-i mütevaliyenin ifası [25] ve erbab-ı töhmetin derhal ele getirilerek muhakeme ve tedipleri icra olunmak üzere ferik-i müşarünileyhe teslimi hususuna bezl-i bari mekinet [?] [26] eyliyesiz ve sen ki ferik-i müşarünileyhsin sen

1186 (Yalnız Midhat Efendi'nin memuriyet emr-i alisine derc olunmak üzere) ve düvel-i müttefika asakir-i muavenesinin muhtaç oldukları zehair ve erzakın tedarik ve itası maddesinde tecviz-i kusur eyledikleri [marginal note in the original]

1187 (bu dahi) ve zikr olunan asakir-i muavenenin işlerini teshil etmek vazife-i zimmet olduğu halde hilafına hareket edenlerin tedibi tehîr olunamayacağından [marginal note in the original]

dahi mukteza-i memuriyetin üzere hemen bu taraftan hareket ve zikr olunan mahallere azimetle [27] geşt ü gûzar eylediğın yerlerde o misillu hareket-ı feciaya cesaret eden başıbozuk takımının ve gerek sair eşrar makulesinin [28] tarafına ita olunan talimat meal ve müeddasına ve zikr olunan emr-i alişanım ahkamına tatbikan muhakeme-i lazımleri bil-icra sahib-i töhmet [29] haklarında lazım gelen mücazat-ı şedidenin hemen bila istizan ve bila ikate-i vakit icrası ve memurlardan her kim iğmaz ve tesamuh [30] etmiş ve eder ise anların dahi tedibat-ı lazımleri icra olunmak üzere bil-etraf Dersaadet'ime beyan ve iş'arı hususuna ikdam [31] ve dikkat ve böyle şeylerde hatır ve gönüle ve büyük ve küçüklüğe bakılmayıp ihkak-ı hak ve icra-ı adalet olunması lazım geleceğı misillu [32] bicürüm olan ve ırz ve edebiyetle mkbd [?] bulunanlar haklarında bir guna teaddi vuku bulmaması emr-i ehemine dikkat velhasıl kemal-i bitarafi [33] ve hakkaniyetle icra-ı emr-i memuriyete bezl-i mahsul-u liyakat eyliyesin ve siz ki elviye kaimmakamları ve naib ve müftiler ve kaza müdirleri [34] ve aza-i mecalis ve sair mumaillehihsiz mazmun-u emr-ü ferman-ı mülukanem sizin dahi meczumunuz oldukda ferik-i müşarünileyhin ber minval-i muharrer [35] icra edeceğı kaffe-i hususatda tarafınıza vaki olacak ifadatı vechile hareketle o makule ashab-ı ceraimin ketm ve ihfa olunmayarak [36] meydana çıkarılıp ihkak-ı hak olunmasında emr-i hümayunumun hilafı hal ve hareket vuku bulur ise hakkınızda muceb-i eşedd-ü [37] mesuliyet ve vahamet olacağından ona göre ifa-yı lazıme-i kargüzari ve sadakatmendiye [?] sarf u sa'y u kudret edesiz. [38] Şöyle bilesiz alamet-i şerifeme itimad kılarsız.

[39] Mecidiye nişan-ı hümayunumun ikinci rütbesini haiz ve hamil halen Silistre ve Vidin valileri Vezir Mehmed Said Paşa ve Abdurrahman Sami [40] Paşa iclalehumaya ve rical-i devlet-i aliyemden Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye Katib-i Sanisi olup bu defa zikri ati hususa [41] memur ve tayin kılınan Ahmed Midhat dame uluvvuhuya ve elviye kaimmakamları dame mecidihum ve naib ve müftiler zide ilmihum ve kaza müdirleri [42] ve aza-yı mecalis ve vücuh-u memleket zide kadrihum Rumeli'nin sağ kolu ile Balkan'ın Tuna tarafına varınca aslı gibi.

Appendix 103. HR. SYS. 1354/60 lef 1. Letter to Sheikh “Shemuil” on the kidnapped Georgian women. [Also available at İ. HR. 114/5577 lef 2]

[On the envelope] Faziletlu zehadetlu fütüvvetlu daver-i ekrem Şeyh Şemuil efendi-i sütude şiyem hazretlerinin savb-ı şeriflerine

Faziletlu zehadetlu fütüvvetlu daver-i ekremim efendi-i sütude şiyem hazretleri

[1] Zat-ı fazilet-na't-ı kiramileri bihavlihi sübhan ve teala birçok zamanlardan beru savlet-i şeciane ve mekanet ve metanet-i hamiyetkarane ile def'-i sail-i düşmen ile vikaye-i hukuk ve namus ve muhafaza-i memleket ve millet iderek ve cibilliyet-i insaniyet ve [2] ketibe-i merdanegi ve besaletde meslek-i sedad ve sevab-ı ictihad buyurmuş oldukları ziver-i sahaif-i a'vâm ve her halde tevfik-i selamet ve muzafferiyet-i himemkârieleri efsayı mekasid ve meram olub ziver-i liva-yı nusret-i iltivalarında [?] cansiperane [3] sarf-ı mesai ve cuhud iden şucuanın [?] meslek-i şecaate ve kavaid-i merğube-i insaniyet ve nasfete riayetlerinden dolayı medayih-i müstahikkeleri dahi her tarafda işidildikçe muceb-i tahsin olmakda iken başıbozuk asakirinden bir takım haşarat [4] Gürcistan tarafında muteberan-ı ahaliden ve ashab-ı iktidardan bir ademin kendü halinde ve sayfiyesinde bulunan etfal ve ıyali üzerine hücum ve iktiham iderek mezkur sayfiyede bulunan iki genç kız ile bunların muallimesini idam eyledikleri ve şahs-ı [5] merkumun zevcesiyle diğeri nisvanı cibale nakl ettikleri ve işbu eşhas-ı ğasibe güya maiyet-i saadetlerinde bulunan asakirin bir şirzime-i müfrezesinden olduğı kemal-i teessüfle istihbar olunmuşdur. Zat-ı mekarim-semahatleri daima ahkam-ı münife-i [6]

şer'i şerifin ve fariza-yı adalet ve hakkaniyetin icrasına merai olduklarından bu misillu bigünah olan etfal ve nisvan haklarında ber-minval-i muharrer zulm u teaddi tarikine gidenlerin te'dibine ve terbiyelerine taraf-ı müstecmi'-üş şereflerinden himmet buyurmuş olacaklarında [7] şübhe yoğ ise de bu vukuat-ı facianın her tarafda şüyüü ve intişarı hemişe diyanet ve insaf ile zinetker-i [?] mesami' olan nam-ı fazilet ittisam-ı fazilanelerinin elsine-i enamda su-i iştiharını müstedi olacağından ve bu makule ef'al-i kabiha nezd-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'de cümle indinde menfur olarak böyle şeyler enva-i mehazir ve mazarratı müstelzem olacağından dahi şübhe olmadığından erbab-ı cünha haklarında lazım gelen te'dibatın sürat-i icrası ve ba'd ez in bu misillu hareket-ı zulmiye vukua gelememesi tedabir-i muktezasının istihsali hususunda ziyadesiyle tacil buyurulmak lazım geleceğine binaen kendüyi bilmez ve sunuf-u ibada şamil olan merhamet ve adalet-i behiyyenin [?] kadr-i celilini idrak itmez bazı cühela canibinden vukuu mervi olan o makule ef'al-i mezmume ve gayri meşrua hakkında icra-yı tahkikat buyurularak anların mücazat-ı layıklarının serian icrasıyla beraber o makule eyadi-i zulmiyeye geçmiş olan nisvan ve etfalın dahi hanelerine ve müteallik buldukları ademlere teslim ve itasına sarf-ı mekdaret ve bu vechile cebr-i mafate riayet buyurulması ve silah derdest olarak muharib bulunduğu halde maktul olanlardan maada bi gayri hakkın idam olunan mazlumanın ahkak-ı hukuku ve bi-lütf-i teala zabt olunan ve gerek bundan sonra teshir buyurulacak memleketlerde mutavattın olan ibad-ı ehlin her kanğı din ve mezhebde bulunur ise bulunsun cümlesinin adalet-i şamile-i şeriat-ı ğarraya mütesaviyen istihkakları bedihi [?] olduklarından bu kabilden olan ahalinin dahi temin ve iraha-i kulublarına ve her halde refah ve asayişlerine bakılması ve asıl Rusya askerinden hengam-ı muharebede esir edilenlerin dahi müddet-i esarete mesken ve makulat ve melbusatlarına kavaid-i mer'iyeye üzere güzelce baktırılması Devlet-i Aliyye nezdinde matlub ve mültezem olarak bu keyfiyetin savb-ı samilerine işarı hususu irade-i seniye-i hazret-i hilafetpenahi müteallik ve şerefsudur buyurulmuş ve bu babda şifahen dahi icray-ı tefhimat memuriyetiyle Dağıstani Enis Efendi mahsusen savb-ı alilerine gönderilmiş olmağla inşallahu teala led-el vusul surethal-i malum-ı fazilaneleri buyuruldukta ketibe-i İslamiyenin ittisaf ile iştiharına vesile olan esbab-ı menfurenin indifaıyla isbat-ı müddeaya ma'delet ve diyanete sarf-ı mesai ve taraf-ı halisanemiz dahi asar-ı mebrure ve tevcihat-ı samimiye-i mehasin-şi'arileriyle mübahi buyurulmak ve balada zikrolunan kesianın hamil-i tahrirat-ı senaveri olup şayan-ı itimad zat marifetiyle familyaları tarafına iade ve teslim olunmaları hususuna bezl-i cell ü meknet olunmak vabeste-i fazilet ve himmet-i rufi[?]leridir.

Appendix 104. HR. SYS. 1353/15 lef 2, dated 29 June 1855. From the governor of Baghdad. British consul in Musul is recruiting cavalry volunteers with 150 piastres of pay.

Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki

Anadolu ordu-yı hümayunu canibinden havale olunan güzeşte maaşın istihsali zımında Musul'a gelmiş olan Sergerde Laz Osman Ağa'ya ve maiyetinde bulunacak yüzbaşı ve zabıtana müstevfi ve neferat-ı saireye dahi [2] gayr ez tayinat ve masarifat şehriye yüz elli kuruş maaş tahsis olunarak beş yüz nefer süvarinin tahririne Musul'da mukim İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi konsolosu tarafından mübaşeret olunduğu keyfiyetine [3] dair Musul mutasarrıfı Saadetlu Hilmi Paşa hazretleri bendeleri tarafından bu kere su-i aciziye bir kıta tahrirat vürud etmiş ve tahrirat-ı mezkure mefadına nazaran konsolos-u mumaillehin maaş-ı zaid ile [4] oralarda asker terğib ve tahrir eylemekte olduğu misillu devlet-i müşarünileyha memurlarının Bağdad havalisinden dahi maaş-ı zaid ile asker tahrir edecekleri istima' olunmuş olup düvel-i müttefikanın [5] gerek işbu tahrir edecekleri asker hususunda ve gerek hususat-ı sairede murad ve niyetleri hayır ve

menfaatten ibaret olması meczum bulunmasıyla egerçi bu babda ez her cihet muavenat-ı lazıme [6] icrasına cümle tarafından sa'y ve ikdam olunmak vacibeden ise de beyandan müstağni olduğu ve malum-ı dakayık-mevsum-ı hıdivileri buyurulduğu veche üzere buralarda Anadolu ve Arabistan [7] ve Rumeli tarafları gibi mahalli ahali istihdam olunamayıp bu havalide müstahdem bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafanın cümlesi evvel ve ahir hezar meşakkatle Rum ve Anadolu canibinden celp olunmuş ve bunlara [8] şimdiye kadar şehriye maa masarif yetmişer kuruş maaş verilmekte bulunmuş olduğundan şu aralık ol suretle iki üç kat ziyade maaş verildiği ve memleketleri olan Rum tarafına sevk [9] olunacaklarını anladıkları gibi burada bir nefer Türk olarak asker kalmayıp cümleten asker yazılarak gidecekleri cihetle bu havalinin kuvve-i askeriyesine külliye hanel geleceğine ve Rusyalı'nun ise [10] sureta [sür ta?] Kars ve bağteten [?] Bayezid kolundan Kürdistan havalisine icra-i su-i kasd ile ahali olan ekradı tağlit birle Dersaadet ile Musul ve Bağdad beyninde olan tarik-i muhabere ve amedşüdi [11] kat' ile hitta-i Irakiyeyi istianeden mahrum eyledikten sonra İranlı'yu Süleymaniye ve Muhammere taraflarından Bağdad üzerine taslitle yeltenmek niyat-ı fasidesinde olduğu teferrüs ve istihbar olunması [12] üzerine buranın teksir-i kuvve-i askeriyesi hususuna gece ve gündüz çalışılmakta ve hariçten adem celp olunmakta iken konsolos-ı mumailiyhin mevcut olan askeri elden çıkarmaları hatır- [13] güzar-ı acizi olduğundan başka asakir-i merkume Anadolu'dan öte tarafa geçemeyecekleri ve bir iş göremeyerek beyhude yere buradan çıkmış olacakları ve bu havalinin istihsal-i esbab-ı [14] muhafazasıyla mehazir-i mezkurenin vukua gelmemesi dahi düvel-i müttelikanın cümleten mültezemleri olduğu meczum bulduktan naşi mehazir-i vakıa keyfiyetini bil-istizan ol babda irade-i seniye [15] zuhuruna değin asakir-i merkumeyi tahrirde bazı mertebe tenni eylemesi hususunun münasibi vechile konsolos-ı mumailiye ifade eylemesini cevaben mutasarrıf-ı müşarünileyh bendelerine iş'ar ve inha ve keyfiyet devlet-i [16] müşarünileyhanın Bağdad'da mukim konsolosu cenablarına dahi ifade ve ima kılınmış olduğuna mebni mücerred arıza ve hakikat-i hal maruzunda takdim-i arizaya ibtidar olunmuştur. Ol babda ve her halde [17] emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi 13 Şevval [?] [12]71.

Bende

Müşir-i orduy-i Irak ve mücavir ve Vali-i eyalet-i Bağdad

Mehmed Reşid [Sealed]

Appendix 105. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 55 ve 57, dated 10 November 1855. Stratford de Redcliffe to His Excellency Fuad Pasha. Grain exports.

The Undersigned has had the honor to receive the Porte's official note announcing its intention to prohibit the exportation of grain from the Turkish Dominions. Whatever it is proper for him to do with respect to so important a measure will have his immediate attention. He has already transmitted the necessary information to his Government. He holds it to be his duty at the same time to submit the following brief remarks to the serious consideration of His Excellency Fuad Pasha.

The right to export grain from the coasts and harbours of Turkey is secured by Treaty to British subjects as part of the produce of that Empire, and it is only as an indispensable object of subsistence that grain can be occasionally withheld from exportation without affording just cause of complaint. The occasion must be one of necessity, and the suspension of the right to export is to be limited in each case by the extent and duration of that necessity.

In the present instance there is no doubt information to warrant a belief that scarcity exists. But there is also reason to believe that the scarcity is partial. Measures, moreover, might be taken to facilitate the conveyance of grain from the interior to the

coast without resorting to the extremity of prohibition, or, at all events, without extending prohibition to the next harvest.

With respect to that period it may be observed that the term employed fixes no definite time. In this extensive empire the wheat harvest varies locally from April to July. The Porte, therefore, in extending its prohibition to the next harvest creates an uncertainty which is anything but favorable to commercial enterprise.

The Undersigned perceives with satisfaction that an exceptions is made in favor of the Allied Fleets and Armies and he hopes that the Porte will also in justice make exception for export contracts signed before the notification, especially as the term of notice is by no means long. This is the more desirable, as any disappointment in the fulfillment of contracts may be severely felt in those parts of Western Europe where the last crops are known to have been deficient.

The Undersigned has the honor to renew to His Excellency Fuad Pasha the assurances of his high considerations.

Stratford de Redcliffe

Therapia, November 10th, 1855.

Appendix 105. HR. TO. 424/37 lef 2, 20 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (30 December 1855). Translation of Muhammed Emin's Arabic letter to the Porte on Sefer Pasha's attack on him.

Hakpay-i mualla-i hazret-i sadaretpenahiye Mehmed Emin mühür ve imzasıyla memhur ve mumzi fi 20 R sene 72 tarihiyle müverrehan takdim olunmuş olan Arabiyy-ül ibare arizanın tercümesidir.

Şapsuğ nam beldede Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerinin emr ü iradeleri ve Sefer Paşa'nın rey-i mutazammım olarak bina eylediğim mahkemeye azimet-i bendeganemde mumailiyh Sefer Paşa bir takım kutta-i tarik ve casus makulesi asker göndererek [2] tarafıma gelecek ademlerin eslihalarını selb ve müttetikim bulunanların hanelerini garet ve nehb ve kulunuzla dahi muharebe ettiler ise de tâb-âver-i muka[ve]met olamayıp firar ve badehu paşa-i mumailiyh asakir-i nizamiye ile üç kıta top [3] ve bir takım haydukları dahi cem' edip Anapa'dan Abaza tarikleri üzerine azimet ve ulema ve salih zevatin ve ehl-i İslamın mal ve menâlini yağma ve garet ve kendilerini rabt ü bend edip tekrar kulunuzla muharebeye [4] ibtidar ve yine firar ettiler. Kendisiyle muhakeme olunmaklığı çendan istedim ise de muvafık olamadım ve süvari mirlivası Ali Paşa dahi erbab-ı fesad ile ittifak ederek Çerakise ile hafi meclisler tertib ve tahrikat-ı nefsanıyeye [5] mütebaıs [?] ederek bunları ifsad ve İslam meyanesine ilka-ı fitne ve şikak eylemiştir. Keyfiyat-ı vakıaya nazaran bu taraflarda din-i İslam munkarız olmasından havf olunaçağı malum-ı asafaneleri buyuruldukta ve her halde [6] emr ü irade efendimindir.

Appendix 106. HR. TO. 222/26, dated 15 January 1856. Extract from the report of the British consulate in Erzurum on the corruption of the governor [kaimmakam] of Muş Ömer Pasha and his bribes to the governor [vali] of Erzurum and the commander [müşir] of the Anatolian army.

Some time since a very large deputation came from Moosh to complain of the conduct of Omer Pasha who paid to Ismail Pasha the last Valy, 50,000 Piastres, to secure him the Post. As was natural, Omer Pasha indemnified himself amply for the sum his place cost him by plundering the people, who were so ill treated, that they came hither to solicit his recall, when Omer Pasha was called here to answer for his conduct. He has been long endeavouring to make interest with the Valy to get reappointed to

Moosh, but I warned His Excellency that I protested against Omer Pasha being sent back.

I now find that Omer Pasha is to return to Moosh. This has been related to me as the means he used. The Valy said he could not take the responsibility on himself, and referred him to the Mushir, who granted his request. There can be no doubt that a large direct bribe was given both to the Mushir and to the Valy. Omer Pasha, in the summer contracted to deliver Diarbekir rice for the troops, but the quality was so bad, that it was refused by the Medglis, and it was declared not worth P 10 per Batman. However lately it was taken by the same Mejlis for P 22 per Batman. The head of the Mejlis had been meantime changed, in the first instance, it was Tahir Pasha, and in the last, Etem Pasha, the creature of the Mushir. It is strongly suspected that the Mushir received a large portion of the difference between the real value of the Rice, and the exaggerated price paid. I have little doubt, fully as much was given to the Mushir by Omer Pasha for his confirmation, and something in proportion to the Valy Pasha.

Appendix 107. HR. TO. 222/30 lef 2, dated 25 January 1856. Stratford à Monsieur Etienne Pisani.

Copy.

Palais d'Angleterre
le 25 Janvier 1856

Monsieur

Sous le même pli avec cette instruction vous recevez un mémorandum en français relatif aux privilèges et reformes administratives dont la Porte s'accuse de concert avec les Allies, et une note officielle en Anglais, accompagnée d'une traduction turque, relative aux persécutions religieuses. Vous vous empressez de présenter ces pièces à Son Excellence Fuad Pasha après en avoir donné lecture à Son Altesse le Grand Visir. Celle qui concerne les privilèges, est confidentielle, mais les Ministres Ottomans peuvent en faire tel usage qu'ils jugent convenable, en la soumettant même à S. M. le Sultan et à leurs Collègues. C'est le même mémorandum dont il a été question dans notre seconde réunion chez le Grand Visir.

Il m'est revenu que je suis supposé d'attacher moins d'importance que les Représentants de France et d'Autriche à ce que la permission de posséder des biens fonds en Turquie soit accordée aux étrangers. J'ai à coeur de faire savoir que cette supposition est tout à fait erronée. Je suis convaincu, au contraire, que le rapprochement cordial de la Turquie à l'Europe est essentiel au bien-être et au maintien de l'Empire Ottoman, et que la mesure la plus efficace dans ce sens ne serait autre que la faculté assurée aux étrangers d'y posséder les immeubles de toute espèce.

Quant à la Note, elle est à peu près identique en substance avec ce que j'ai soumis au Ministère Ottoman il y a déjà plusieurs semaines par l'ordre exprès de mon Gouvernement, soit de bouche soit par écrit. Les hésitations qui se sont laissées apercevoir dans les réponses des Ministres en dernier lieu, m'imposent le devoir de présenter sans plus de retard cette pièce formelle, que j'avais déjà préparée il y a deux mois environs - ce dont la date porte témoignage et j'espère que la S. P. en prendra connaissance avec les sentimens [sic] que j'aime à lui attribuer.

Il ne me reste qu'à ajouter un mot en confirmation de mes opinions déjà plus d'une fois exprimées, relativement à l'admissibilité de toutes les classes aux conseils et aux emplois publics de l'Empire. Dans l'état actuel des choses c'est l'union seule des classes qui, à mon avis, peut rendre à l'Empire la force qui lui manque dans l'intérieur, et sans la mesure, que je viens de nommer, toute union réelle est une impossibilité.

Je suis etc.

[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe

[Marginal note in Turkish] Hıfz olunsun

HR. TO. 222/30 lef 1.

Le Gouvernement de S. M. le Sultan continuera à faciliter l'exploitation des ressources matérielles de l'Empire, en y appliquant d'une manière efficace les fonds nécessaires. Il formera des établissements convenables pour cet objet. Il veillera surtout à ce que de bonnes communications soient ouvertes par eau et par terre pour le transport des produits et l'encouragement de leur consommation. Tout ce qui opère comme obstruction au progrès de l'agriculture, de l'industrie, et du commerce sera au plutôt examiné de fond et reformé dans l'intérêt de leur développement complet, et de manière à leur assurer le concours et l'aide de la science, des capitaux et des bras de l'Europe.

Appendix 108. HR. SYS. 1355/28, dated 12 February 1856. Hassa müşiri Selim Pasha on the interference of British officers in internal affairs and his request to be appointed to somewhere else.

Devletlu atufetlu efendim hazretleri

Mukaddema dahi arz ve beyan kılındığı ve diğer ariza-i mütekaddime-i bendeganem ve melfuf tezkire mütalaasından keyfiyet bil etraf rehini-ilm-i sami-i cenab-ı cihan-aşına-i hıdivileri buyurulacağı vechile [2] Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu refakatine memur İngiltere devlet-i fahimesi zabitanının şimdiye kadar orduy-ı mezkurun umur-i dahiliyesiyle kumandanların umur ve rey-i mütalaarına müdahale ve tağlit ederek [3] önü kestirilmesi hasb el vakıa mümkün olamamış ve geçenlerde takdim kılınan maruzat-ı bendeganemin birinde keyfiyet müdahale-i vakıaları bir nebze beyan ve hikaye kılınması üzerine devlet-i müşarünileyha sefaretine [4] tebligat-ı lazimenin icrasına irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı mülukane müteallik buyurulmuş olmaktan naşi icabı icra buyurulduğu şerefvarid olan tahrirat-ı aliye-i hıdivileriyle beyan ve işar buyurulmuş idi. Şu hale göre [5] sefaret-i mezkure tarafından kendülere tayin ve işar vuku bulmasıyla zabitan-ı mumaileyhimin vezaif-i memuriyetleri dairesinden hariç bir maddeye açıktan müdahale etmemeleri memul ise de [6] bundan dolayı mumaileyhimin muğberr-ül-hatır olmalarıyla cüzi ve külli bir şey serrişte ederek sefaretler tarafına herbar iştika ve isnad-ı salim-i yeniden? hali olmayacakları ve bu cihetle evliya-i umur [7] hazeratının tasdi-i seralilerini mucib bazı makalat [?] tekevvün edeceği melhuz olub hatta görüşmek üzere tayin eyledikleri saatte gelmeyip üç saat mürurundan sonra gelmiş ve bu kadar [8] gelmelerine muntazır olmasına ve Avrupa kaidesinde bu babda taraflarından beyan-ı mazeret lazımeden bulunmuş iken bilakis çakerlerine azv u kabahata ibtidar ile keyfiyet iğrazını ve Bab-ı Ali ile sefaretleri tarafına [9] arz-ı iştika edeceklerini ala-mela-en-nas tahrir ve izbar eylemeleri mülahazat ve efali musaddık görünmüş ve hasb el vakıa bunun önü kestirilmesi mutaasır ve çakerleri burada kaldıkça daima böyle cüzi [10] şeye külli nazarıyla bakılarak bir takım sadai mucib olacağı emr-i bâhir olmasıyla rabbim göstermesin bunca senelerden beru çalışıp kazanmış olduğum tevcihat-ı ihsanat-ı aliye-i sipehsalarilerini şu yüzden [11] kaybedeceğim ve bunlar ile iştigal olunan tesviye-i mesalih orduda tekamül vukuu ile bilahare taht-ı mesuliyette kalacağım vahamesi doğrusu kullarını vadi-i hayrete düşürmüş ve bir de buraların [12] ab u havasıyla imtizaç edemeyerek bi hakk-ı Hüda bu tarafa geleli tedavi ve mualece ile vakit geçirmekte olduğum ve mukaddema takdimine mütecasir olduğum ariza-i mufassala-i bendeganemin bend-i ahirinde beyan olunduğu [13] üzere bu havalı umuru kesb-i cesame ve nezaket ederek tesviyesine çalışılması sıhhat-i vücud ile beraber bir taraftan müdahale vuku bulmasıyla husule geleceğine ve sıhhat-i vücud olmadığı misillü balada muharrer [14] olduğu vechile çakerleri burada oldukça müdahaleden hali

olmayacakları müstehakk ve meczum-i bendeganem bulunmuş olduğuna mebni lutfen ve ihsanen ve hakk-ı na-müstahakk-ı çakeranemde min el kadim meşhud olan ihsan [15] inayet-i aliye-i hıdivilerine alakaten ve sahihen [?] mesbuk olan ve istida ve niyaz-ı bendeganem vechile devletlu İsmail Paşa hazretlerinin veyahud münasib diğeri bir zatın buraya memuriyetleriyle kullarının şuradan [16] istihlasım her ne esbaba menut ise iktizasının icrası hususuna müsaade-i lutf-âde-i bendeperverileri şayan buyurulması niyaz-ı mahsusa-i çakeranem olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi 5 C sene [12]72.

Bende

Müşir-i hassa [sealed] Mehmed Selim

An Erzurum

Appendix 109. HR. SYS. 1352/35, dated 9 Şaban 1272 / 15 April 1856. From the governor of Harput. Sabık Harput Müftüsü. “İngilterelülere iane eyleyen ve bunların hizmetlerinde bulunanlar din-i İslam’dan çıkmış olacağı..”

Maruz-u çakerleridir ki

Sabık Harput müftisi Hacı Efendizade Hacı Ömer Efendi daileri bundan akdem cami-i şerifte vaaz ve tedris esnasında İngilterelülere iane eyleyen ve bunların hizmetlerinde bulunanlar din-i İslam’dan çıkmış olacağını güya [2] söylemiş olduğu misillu sair hocalar dahi Hristiyanların gasb-ı emvalini tecviz eyledikleri ve halbuki halkın efkarını bozacak bu misillu rivayetler bu taraftan tedarik olunacak bargircilerin adem-i azimetlerine sebep [3] olarak umur-u nakliye memurlarının mesalihine sekte iras edeceği canib-i sefaretten ifade olunmuş olduğu beyan-ı alileriyle işbu rivayat neden neşet etmiştir ve ne mealde ve sebebe mebni söylenmiştir tahkikiyle keyfiyetin [4] iş’arı ve şayet hilaf-ı memul bazı ashab-ı garaz taraflarından o makule kelimat-ı gayr-ı layika neşr olunmakta ise derhal önü kestirilerek bunu neşr edenlerin ahval ve etvarlarının dahi bildirilmesi vasıl-ı hame tazim olan [5] emirname-i sami-i vekaletpenahilerinde emr ü ferman buyurulmuş olup efendi-i mumaileyh daileri meclise celp ile istintak olundukta egerçi bundan altı ay mukaddem cami-i şerifte vaaz ve tedris esnasında cümle İngiltere [6] devlet-i fahimesinin bargircilik hizmetine yazılanlar tarafından ve andan [?] mukaddem İngilterelilere hizmet etmekte diyanetçe bir bais var mıdır yollu kendisinden olunan suale cevaben medar-ı taayyüş için kanğı millete bir adem yazılsa [7] bais olunmaz ve dininden çıkmaz lakin beline zünnar takmaz ise kâfi olur mealinde söz söyleyip bundan başka bir şey tefevvüh etmediğini mecliste ifade ve tezkâr ederek bu sözü kaza-yı mezkur bargircilerinin bazı [8] anlayarak anlamayanlar dahi kalıb-ı ahire ifrağ ile tefevvüh etmeğe başlayıp efendi-i mumaileyh dailerinin efkar-ı adile-i saltanat-ı seniyye malumat-ı kafiyesi olarak zaten kendisi sair hocalar gibi mutaassıp olmadığından [9] böyle şeylere ilişik etmediği gibi bazılarını dahi kendisinden istifsar vukuunda İngilizlere hizmet etmek üzere teşvik eylediği cümle tarafından haber verilip mumaileyhin bu halini bazı mutaassıpların [10] çekemediklerinden hakkında böyle ifade ve iftiraya tasaddi eyledikleri ve esna-i vaazda vuku bulan ifadatını anlamayan bir takım bargirci makulesinin dahi zikr olunan hocalar bir mertebe daha efkarlarını bozacak [11] suretle Hacı Ömer Efendi böyle vaaz etti yollu sözler söylediği ve efendi-i mumaileyh dailerinin ifadatı suret-i aherde haber veren bargircilerden çend neferi dahi devlet-i müşarünileyhanın tesviye-i malzemesine [12] memur Sucu [?] Karabet hazır olduğu halde celb ile istintak oldukça Hacı Ömer Efendi öyle vaaz etmiş deyu çarşu ve bazarlarda ve kahvelerde şundan bundan haber aldık dediklerine nazaran rivayat-ı mezkurenin [13] li-garazin tekevvün ettirildiği tebeyyün edip merkurum Sucu [?] Karabet dahi bu yolda diyecek söz bulamayarak ve ol vakit kendisi Diyarbekir’de bulunmuş olduğundan efendi-i mumaileyhin bu makule vaazdan haberi olmayarak [14] fakat

bargircilerin kolbaşıı kendisine öyle yazmış olduğunu ifade eyleyip sair hocaların dahi Hıristiyanın gasb-ı emvalini tecviz eylediklerine dair asla ve kat'a kimsenin malumatı olmayarak hatta merhum Sucu [?] Karabet ile [15] mezkur bargirciler dahi böyle söz işitmediklerini ifade eylemiş oldukları ve saye-i muvaffakiyetvaye-i hazret-i şahane de şimdiki halde buraca o misillu bir guna rivayet olmayarak devlet-i müşarünileyhanın tedarik ve tesviye-i malzemesine [18] cümle tarafından sa'y ve gayret olunmakta bulunmuş olduğu maruzunda arıza-i çakeranem terkimine cüret kılınmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emr efendimizindir. Fi 9 Şaban 72

Bende

Vali-i eyalet-i Harput

Arif [Sealed]

Appendix 110. HR. SYS. 1928/2, dated 8 May 1856. Extract. Reports of a Muslim outbreak against Christians are exaggerated. Smyrna, May 8, 1856.

Suleiman Pasha proceeded to Magnesia to ascertain whether some reports of an intended outbreak on the part of the Mussulman population of that city against the Christian community which had been communicated to him by the Greek primates were well founded.

Suleiman Pasha having convinced himself that these reports were very much exaggerated, deemed it necessary to apprehend only three persons – two Turks and one Greek, who were forthwith claimed and sent here, and are now in custody at the Governor's palace.

The Prisoners are accused of having used exasperating language, the Turks towards the Christians of the place, and the Greek towards the Turks. These three individuals were informed by the pasha of the accusations preferred against them, but no explanation or defense was allowed them.

Their cases are to be referred to the Porte.

I cannot but regret, that H. E. should have proceeded in this matter in the sense of the arbitrary principle that has hitherto been the rule of the Turkish magistrates in similar cases, and which the Hatti Sheriff is intended to set aside, as it leaves the impression on the public mind that the Imperial Firman is an unsubstantial Reform which promises much, but effects nothing, and that no reliance can be placed on the hopes which were founded upon it.

Appendix 111. HR. TO. 223/30, 30 May 1856. Extract. British Vice Consulate. Mitylene. Slave trade.

Since the commencement of the present year, three vessels under the Turkish [Osmanlu] flag, carrying slaves have arrived at this port from Tripoli [Trablusgarp]. Their dates of arrival as follows:

January the 7th : The Brig "Beinet" [?] of 300 tons. Captain Abdallah, having on board 85 slaves [*"köle ve halayık"* in official translation].

January the 11th : The schooner "Eftichia" of 75 tons. Captain Omer, having on board 61 slaves.

May the 14th : The Brig "Eftichia" of 75 tons. Captain Mehmet, having on board 100 slaves.

None of the slaves on board of the first two mentioned vessels were landed at Mitylene, but were taken to Smyrna for sale. Of the slaves on board the Brig "Eftichia" only 8 were landed at Mitylene, the rest were taken to Smyrna.

**Appendix 112. İ. DH. 362/23964, dated 12 Safer 1273 (12 October 1856).
Interrogation of deserters from the Kars army who became prisoners of war to
Russia and who returned to Istanbul after the peace treaty.**

Anadolu ordu-i hümayununda piyade dördüncü nizamiye alayının üçüncü taburunun sekizinci bölüğü çavuşanından Muşlu Said Kars muhasarasında Rusya ordusuna firar etmiş ve geçende Dersaadet'e gelmiş olduğundan komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır.

S[ual]. Sen Kars hastahanesinde memur bulunduğun halde firar etmişsin ve bir kısraç dahi alıp savuşmuşsun. Nereye gidecek idin ve niçün firar etdin?

C[evap]. Ben alay-ı mezkurda çavuş idim. Taburum Bayezid tarafına gitti. Biz birkaç askerle perakende olarak Kars'ta kaldık. Beni hastahaneye memur ettiler. Orada hizmetime bakıyordum. Mülazımlık intihabnamesini tanzim eylediler. Lakin Kars'ta iki seneye karib hizmet ettim mülazımlık maaşı alamayıp çavuş aylığı alurdum. Bu cihetle borçlu düştüm. Vilayetimde çoluk çocuğum aç kaldı. Erzurum'a gitmek üzere oradan savuştum ve Tabip Ahmed Efendi'ye gideceğimi söyledim. O dahi eğer gidecek isen benim hayvanımı al beraber git dedi. Her ne kadar götüremem dedim ise de zor [?] etti. Ben de mezkur hayvanı alıp Kars'tan çıktım. Erzurum'a giderken yolda Rusyalu beni tuttu.

S. Rusyalu seni nerede tuttu?

C. Gece saat birde iken Kars suyu kenarıyla Kars'tan çıktım. Dört saat gittim orada beni tuttular.

S. Rusyalu'nun etrafda olan karakollarını cümleliz bilürdünüz ve hatta gerek askerden ve gerek ahaliden una [ona?] gidenleri bile Rusyalu tutardı. Bu hal ile kimsenin çıkıp kurtulamayacağını bilmedin mi ki kaçtın ve bahusus senin çıktığın yol doğruca Rusyalu'nun ordusunun önüne giderdi?

C. Rusyalunun eğerçi oralarda ve her yerde karakolu olduğunu bilmiş olsa idim öyle kaçar ve kendimi ateşe atar mıydım? Lakim bilmedim kurtulurum hülyasıyla kaçtım.

S. Rusya'dan esir alınarak hastahannede olan bir neferini niçün beraber götürdün?

C. Hayır ben götürmedim ve haberim yoktur. Vakıa Rusyalunun bir neferi hastahanneden benden evvel firar etti lakin nasıl gitti bilmem.

S. Bizim işidip bilmediğimiz hastahannede olan Rusyalu neferi beraber alıp Rusya ordusuna götürmüşsün. Ben bilmem haberim yokdur demek faide etmez. Doğrusu nasıl olmuş ise söyle. Hatta sen Rusya ordusuna gittiğinde seni karakol altına dahi koymayup hakkında ikram etmişler niçün saklarsın?

C. Eğerçi neferi beraber götürmüş olsam işte kendim götürdüm ve yine ayağımla geldim ne yaparsanız yapın derim lakin şu neferden asla haberim yokdur. Siz bilürsünüz. Rusyalu beni tuttuğunda bana ikram değil karakol altına koydu ve Tiflis'e gidinceye kadar hapsetti ve hatta beni hapsettiklerini topçudan bir çavuş vardır o dahi bilür ondan sual buyurun.

S. O çavuş nerededir ve ismi nedir?

C. İsmine Hasan Çavuş derler beraber esir idi lakin şimdi burada mıdır değil midir bilmem.

S. Sen nereye kadar habs idin?

C. Tutulduğundan Tiflis'e varıncaya kadar ve orada bulunduğum müddetçe mahbus idim ve eğerçi gezecek olduğumuz vakitte dahi yanıma karakol korlar idi.

S. Sen Kars'ta bulunduğun vakit ben mülazımım deyu daima davada bulunurdun ve memuriyetin hastahannede olup sair zabitan ve asker gibi tabyalarda bekleyüp istihkam imalinde çalışmadın. Mülazım demek küçük zabitdir. Zabit olan adem firar eder mi? Niçün kaçdın?

C. Kaçtığımin sebebi balada beyan eyledim. Gider ve borçtan ve açlıktan ziyade sıkıldım firar ettim.

S. Namus-ı askeriyeyi vikaye etmeyip kaçtığın şöyle dursun. Sen Kars'ta tehhül ettin ve diyorsun ki borçtan ve açlıktan sıkıldım kaçtım. Bir adem aç kalur da yalnız nefsinin kurtarmak için ıyalini öyle bakes birağup da firar eder mi? Bu nasıl insaniyettir?

C. Kars'ta vakıa tehhül ettim ve kayın pederim var idi ıyalimin idaresine bakardı.

S. Eğer öyle ise senin firarın idaresizlikten firar etmek olmayıp balada söylediğin şeyler dahi hilaf demek oluyor.

C. Efendim başım sıkılıp tahammül edemedim. Can cümleden akdem olduğundan kendimi kurtarırım hülyasıyla kaçtım.

S. Kars'ta olan asakir-i nizamiye ve redifeden gerek zabıt ve gerek nefer bütün gün bütün gece karakol bekler ve tabya yapar ve her dürlü sıkıntıyı çekerdi. Senin anlar gibi sıkıntın var mıydı ve anlara ziyade tayin ve mahiye verilip de sana noksanı verilir miydi ki kaçtın?

C. Bir diyeceğim yokdur siz bilürsünüz. Benim diyeceğim üç şeydir. Birisi şudur ki ben Rusya'ya kaçmadım. İkincisi Rusya neferinden haberim yokdur. Üçüncüsü Kars'ta borçtan pek fena sıkıldım. Evde ve odada duramaz oldum. Ya ölürüm veyahud kurtulurum, eğer habs ve ta*?* olunursam alayımdaya olayım deyu her şeyi gözüme aldırardım. Erzurum'a gitmek üzere savuştum.

S. Sen zabıt bulunduğun halde firar etmek sana töhmet değil midir ki firar ettin?

C. Töhmet olduğunu bilürdüm lakin borçdan fena suretde sıkıldım. Her ne olursa olur ve alayımdaya gideyim deyu kaçtım.

S. Firar eden Rusyalı'dan benim asla haberim yokdur ve bilmem deyu ifadede bulunur idin [?]. Yolda gelürken bindiğiniz vapur kapudanı "Sen utanmadın mı firar etmişsin ve Rusyalı'yu kaçırmış[sın]?" demesiyle "Hayır öyle değildir. Şu firar eden Rusyalı'yu taharri etmek üzere gittim sonra tutuldum" demişsin.

C. Öyle değildir. Vakıa kapudan bana sual etti ve "Niçün firar ettin?" dedi. Ben de o kadar asakir ve saire içinde halimi uzun uzadıya nasıl ifade edeyim benim kaçtığım uzun şeydir dedim.

S. Şimdi biz kapudanı çağırıp sual edersek o zaman ne dersin?

C. Kapudan gelür öyle söyler ise ne diyeyim.

Mukaddemce Ardahan tarafında kır serdarlığı ile müstahdem olup orada Rusyalı tarafından ahz ü gereft olunarak geçende esaretten Dersaadet'e gelmiş olan İsmail Ağa celb olunarak şunun sefinede olan ifadesi nasıldır deyu sual olundukta "Biz gemi ile beraber gelür idik. Gemi kapudanı kış üzerinde bu Said Ağa'yı celb ederek 'Sen Rusyalı'ya kaçmış ve bir Rusyalı'yu dahi kaçırmışsın. Sen utanmaz mısın?' dedi. Orada 'Ben kaçmadım fakat Rusyalı neferini aramak için gittim, tutuldum' dedi.

S. İsmail Ağa'nın ifadesine ne dersin?

C. Hayır efendim v'allah-ül azim şu Rusyalı'nun firarından asla haberim yokdur.

S. Çünkü haberin yokdur geçende kapudana niçün öyle söyledin ve şimdi niçün haberim yokdur diyorsun?

C. Kapudan Bey sual etti. Ben de hasb-el icab öyle söyledim.

Merkum komisyona celb olunarak suret ve esbab-ı firariyesi yegan yegan kendüsinden sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiş olduğu cevabı balada başka başka gösterilmiş ve suret-i hale nazaran icray-ı icabı irade-i aliye-i cenab-ı sipehsalarilerine menut bulunmuş olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 12 S sene 73.

[Seals from right to left] Binbaşı-i sol [?], an aza, Mehmed Selim, Binbaşı-i Süvari, an aza, Ahmed (?), Binbaşı-i yemin [?], an aza, Mustafa Vahdeti, Kaimmakam-ı yemin [?], an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top (?), an aza, İbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade (?), an aza, Abdülkadir Sadık, Mirliva, an aza, Süleyman Hilmi, Mirliva, an aza, Mustafa Alim, Ferik, reis-i komisyon, Hafız.

Anadolu ordu-yı hümayununda piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının birinci taburunun yedinci bölüğü çavuşanından Asitaneli Osman Kars muhasarası esnada [sic] firar etmiş ve Rusyalu tarafından ahz ü gereft olunarak geçende Dersaadet'e gelmiş olduğundan komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır.

S. Kars ordu-yı hümayununda bu kadar asakir-i İslamiye ile oranın muhafazasına bakılmak üzere bu kadar asker ve [sic] ölünceye kadar sebat olunmuş [sic] ve sen dahi çavuş olduğun cihetle küçük zabıtsin. Bölükte olan asakirin muhafazasına bakacak yerde zorun ne idi ki firar etdin?

C. Açlıktan dolayı. Erzurum'da ihtiyat ordusuna gidip orada yine padişahımıza hizmet edecek idim.

S. Nereye kadar gittin ve nerede Rusyalu seni tuttu?

C. Soğanlı dağına kadar gittim. Rusyalunun atlısı orada beni tuttu.

S. Rusyalu'nun karakollarını görmez miydin ve Kars'dan kimesne dışarı çıkamıyarak elbette tutulacağımı bilmedin mi?

C. Rusyalunun ordusunu daima görürdüm. Lakin gece haliyle ve belki kurtulurum hülyasıyla Rusyalunun birkaç karakolunu geçtim. Soğanlı dağında tutuldum.

S. Senden başka Kars'da aç adam ve asker yok muydu ve senin tayinatın diğerinden noksan mı veriliyordu ve cümle asakir-i şahane sabr ü tahammül etti. Sen niçün durmayup firar ettin?

C. Cümlemize bir sibak üzere tayin verilir idi. Lakin ben açlığa sabır ve tahammül edemedim ve biraz daha kalsam idi açlıktan telef olacak idim. Anın için kaçtım.

S. Tahmas muharebesinden evvel mi sonra mı kaçtın?

C. Muharebeden kırk beş gün sonra kaçtım. Ve benim kaçtığımdan yedi gün sonra Kars teslim oldu.

S. Kars'dan firar edüp de sonra tutulanlar olur ise hakkında şiddet üzere mücazat olunacak deyu her bar tenbihat olunurdu. Sen işitmedin mi?

C. Daima işidirdim ve lakin açlıktan zayıf düşdüm. Erzurum'a gider açlıktan kurtulurum hülyasıyla kaçdım.

S. Erzurum'a gidenler hakkında dahi öyle mücazat olunacak deyu tenbih olunurdu, bilmez misin?

C. Buna dair asla tenbihat işitmedim.

S. Kaçtığın vakit karakolda mıydın ve silah ve arkadaşın var mıydı ve ne vakit ve nasıl kaçtın?

C. Hafız Paşa tabyasının dışarısında karakolda idik. Karakol nöbetinde gittik (?). Çadırlara gelürken ben oradan gece saat altı raddelerinde kaçdım ve arkadaşım olmayıp silahım var idi.

S. Yüzbaşı İbrahim Ağa, bu çavuşun firarı karakolda olduğu halde mi vuku' bulmuştur yohsa takriri vechile karakoldan gelürken mi olmuştur?

C. Bunlar karakolda idiler. Nöbet beklerken gece saat üç buçuk sularında firar etmiş ve beş arkadaş idiler. Cümlesi ol gece firar eylemiştir.

S. Osman Çavuş, Yüzbaşı İbrahim Ağa diyor ki gece karakolda ve beş arkadaş olduğunuz halde firar etmişsiniz.

C. Yüzbaşı İbrahim Ağa ol gece bölüksüz [?] idi. Bölükten iki onbaşı alup ince karakola gidilmesini Mülazım Şaban Ağa bana emretti. Ben de iki onbaşı alıp karakola gittim. Fakat gece ince karakola gittiğimiz vakit yigirmi otuz adım daha ilerüye onbaşı

gönderilirdi. Ben de birinci onbaşıyı ilerü keşif noktasına gönderdim. Biraz arası uzadı, onbaşı gelmediğinden acaba nerede kaldı deyu olduğum noktadan ilerüye vardım, göremedim. Biraz daha ilerüye ve sağa sola doğru gittim. Bir de gördüm ki orada bir kalabalık var. Meğer Rusyalı'nun atlu karakolu imiş. Onbaşıyı orada tutmuşlar ben de gece haliyle üzerlerine varmış bulunduğumdan beni dahi tuttular. Benimle beş adam firar ettiğini binbaşım ile yüzbaşım söylüyor ise de karakola iki onbaşı ile gittim. Birisi benimle tutulup esir oldu, diğeri buradadır, ismine Halil derler, ondan dahi sual buyurun. Sair firar edenlerden haberim yoktur. Belki onları başka noktaya gönderdiler, zabitimin bileceği şeydir.

S. Halil Onbaşı, Osman Çavuş'un firar ettiğini nasıl bilürsün? Doğrusunu söyle.

C. Bir bölükte idik. Bölük mülazımı Şaban Ağa iki onbaşı alup ince karakola gidilmesini Osman Çavuş'a emretti. O dahi benimle Hasan Onbaşı'yı aldı. Karakola gittik ve usul üzere noktalara durup bekler idik. Aradan yarım saat kadar geçti. Osman Çavuş ile Hasan Onbaşı kayboldular. Fakat ol gece ortalık ziyadesiyle karanlık idi. Nasıl savuştuklarını görmedim. Nöbetden değiştik. Bunların savuştuğunu Şaban Ağa'ya söyledim. Bunlardan başka tabur malı olarak bir çavuş ve sınıf-ı taliden elhak [?] verilenlerden yine bir çavuş ve bir onbaşı daha kaçmış olduğunu işitdim. Bu kadar bilürüm.

S. Bu çavuş ile onbaşının onları [?] firar edeceklerine bölükte lakırdı [?] ettiklerini bilür misin ve işitdin mi?

C. Bunların kaçtığı gece karakola çıkılırken bana biz kaçacağız ister isen sen de beraber kaçalım dediler. Onlar firar etti ben kaçmadım.

S. Çünkü böyle ince karakolda bulunmuşsunuz sen sadakatin üzere kaçmamışsın ne güzel lakin bunların kaçacağını zabitlere niçün haber vermedin?

C. Karakola çıktığımızda yanımızda başka zabit yoğidi. Zabit yerine bu çavuşu yollattı. Noktadan ayrılıp haber veremedim ki noktadan ayrıldığı için kabahatli olmayayım.

S. Osman Çavuş senin anlattığın şeyler birbirine benzemiyor. Bunun doğrusunu söyle. İşte Halil Onbaşı'nın takririni sana okuduk.

C. Benim ifadem evvelki söylediğim gibidir. Lakin öyle kaçacağım lakırdısını söylemedim. Eğerçi Hasan Onbaşı söylemiş ise bilmem.

S. Onbaşı Hasan şimdi nerededir?

C. Benimle beraber tutuldu ve esir oldu. Tiflis'de hastalanup vefat etti.

S. Senin karakol nöbetinde durduğun nokta ile keşif noktasının arası nihayet doksan adım kadar olabilir bundan ilerüde daha piyade olarak süvari askeri karakolları vardır ve Rusyalı bu kadar yakın gelemes sen bu süvari karakollarını dahi ilerü geçmişsin. Demek oluyor ki firar edecek imişsin.

C. O kadar ilerü gitmedim. Hafız Paşa tabyasının ilerüsünde bizim karakol beklediğimiz mahallin önünde bir dere vardır. O kadar gittim.

S. İşte Halil Onbaşı yüzüne karşı keyfiyet böyle oldu diyor. Sen ne dersin? Bunun doğrusu nasıldır?

C. Eğer kaçacak olup da buna dahi söylemiş olaydık Onbaşı Halil'i de beraber götürürdük. Lakin ben öyle şey söylemedim.

S. Senin söylediğin şeyler birkaç dürlü ifadeyi cami olup bunun kanğısına itimad edelim?

C. Efendim ben firar değilim. Onbaşıyı karakolda ararken tutulduk. Açlıktan Erzurum'a gidecek idim deyu söylediğim şeyleri açlık sebebiyle kurtulurum hülyasıyla söyledim.

Çavuş-ı merkum bendeleri komisyona celb olunarak esbab ve keyfiyat-ı firarı kendüsinden ve sair lazım gelenlerden sual ile istintak olundukta vermiş oldukları cevabları balada başka başka gösterilmiş [?] ve icray-ı icabı rey ve irade-i aliyelerine menut bulunmuş olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 20 M sene 73.

[Seals from right to left] Kaimmakam-ı piyade, an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top, an aza, İbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade, an aza, Abdülkadir, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Süleyman Hilmi, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa, Ferik, reis-i komisyon, Hafız,
[Second line] Binbaşı-i süvari, an aza, Mehmed, Binbaşı-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa Vahdeti

Anadolu orduy-i hümayunu piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının şeyhaneci dördüncü taburunun yedinci bölümünün birinci onbaşı Karahisar-ı Şarkî'li Mehmed, Kars muhasarası esnada firar etmiş ve Rusyalu tarafından ahz ü greft olunarak muahharen Dersaadet'e gelmiş olduğundan komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır.

S. Kars'da orduy-i hümayun ile bunca müddet ol kadar zahmet çekildi ve cümle asakir-i şahane sebat eyledi ve sen de onbaşı bulunmuşsun. Senin takımında olan neferatın muhafazasına bakacak iken böyle firar etmeklik insaniyet ve İslamiyete ve askerlik şanına yakışur mu?

C. Ben kaçmadım. Bir gün bir emir geldi. Beher bölükten ikişer nefer aldık. Oduna gittik. Orada asker odun aldı. Ben arkadaşım ile silahlı idik. Asker ile beraber gittik. Orada biz taşda saklandık. Sonra savuştuk. Çalkadur'dan [?] dere içine aşdık [?]. Orada Rusyalu karakolları gelüp bizi gece saat üçde tuttu ve ordusuna götürdü.

S. Demek oluyor ki sen şu askerle karakol olarak silahın ile gitmişsin Bir adam diğer askerin muhafazası zımında karakol olduğu halde kaçarsa ne derler?

C. Firar derler.

S. Sen kaçmadım diyorsun şimdi buna ne diyelim?

C. Buna da firar derler.

S. Kars'dan firar edenler olur ise gerek Erzurum'da ve gerek sair mahalde tutulsun şiddet üzere mücazat olacak deyu daima tenbih verilürdü. Bunu sen işitmedin mi?

C. İşitdim ve şiddet üzere mücazat olduğunu gördüm lakin orada şu hal ile sağ kalacağımı aklım kesmedi. Kurtulurum hülyasıyla kaçdım fakat beni firar dediniz. Ben de firarım ancak bu firar iki dürlüdür biri açlıktan ve diğeri toklukdan firardır. Ben de aç olduğumdan bana firar demezler ve açlık vaktiyle tokluk vakitte firar size malumdur.

S. Din devlet ve millet uğurunda bir adam gavgaya gider ve bir kalenin muhafazasına memur olur ise bunda açlık ve kurşun ve sair şeyden olmak vardır ve bu halde arkadaşlarını birağup gitmek olur mu? Ve bir adam vakt-i hazırda veyahud böyle muhasara halinde firar eder ise bu firarın kanğısı eyü ve kanğısı fenadır ve mücazat olarak kanğısına ziyade mücazat olunmak lazım gelür?

C. Elbette bu halde firar eden fenadır ve bunun mücazatu şedid olur.

Merkum komisyona celb olunarak esbab ve keyfiyat-ı firarı kendüsinden yegan yegan sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiş olduğu cevabı balada başka başka gösterilmiş ve icray-ı icabı irade-i aliye-i cenab-ı sipehsalarilerine menut bulunmuş olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 13 S sene 73.

[Seals from right to left] Kaimmakam-ı piyade, an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top, an aza, İbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade, an aza, Abdülkadir, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Süleyman Hilmi, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa, Ferik, reis-i komisyon, Hafız,
[Second line, from right to left] Binbaşı-i süvari, an aza, Mehmed, Binbaşı-i top, an aza, Mehmed Selim, Binbaşı-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa Vahdeti

Anadolu orduy-i hümayunu piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının şeyhaneci dördüncü taburunun üçüncü bölümünde beşinci onbaşının üçüncü neferi Diyarbakirli Resul, Kars

muhasarası esnada firar ederek Rusyalu tarafından ahz ü gereft ile geçende Dersaadet'e gelmiş olan komisyonda icra olunan istintakını havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır.

S. Bilürsün ki Kars'da bu kadar asakir-i İslamiye ile düşmanın müdafaası zımında bunca sıkıntı ve ** çekildi ki ancak din ve devlet ve milletimize hizmet edelim. Sen de asker ve İslam olduğun cihetle sair arkadaşınla niçün orada sabr ü tahammül etmeyip de firar kâr-ı mekruhunu irtikab ettin ve askerlik ve İslamlığa yakışur şey midir?

C. Kars'da bu kadar vakit sabr ü tahammül ettim. At eti yedim ve daha giderek yigirmi otuz gün evvel ölmüş ve mezbele [?] içinde kalmış ve ne olduğu bilinmez hayvanın ciğerini ve fişkı içinden arpayı çıkardım ve yerden geven buldum yedim. Artık sabr ü tahammül edemedim. Erzurum'a giderim ve belki nefsimi kurtarırım deyu Kars'dan firar edip Kum derler bir karyeye vardım. Oranın muhtarı beni hanesine götürdü ve biraz yemek verdi yedim ve burada Rusyalu'nun karakolları vardır. Arpa için gelmişler dışarı çıkma seni tutarlar dedi. Ben de orada kaldım. Biraz sonra burada Osmanlu var imiş deyu Kazaklar ol hanenin kapusu önüne gelüp beni buldular ve kollarımı bağlayup Rusya ordusuna götürdüler. Siz bilürsünüz ne yaparsanız irade sizindir.

S. Kars'dan ne vakit kaçdın? Çadırda veyahud tabyada mı idin ve arkadaş ve silahın var mıydı ve saat kaçta idi?

C. Memur olduğumuz İngiliz tabyasında çadırda idik. Ahşam namazı vakti oldu. Çadırdan suya gittim. Orada bir taş ardında gizlendim. Bir saat sonra oradan çıkıp gittim ve arkadaş ve silahım yoğidi.

S. Senden başka at eti yiyen ve evvelki gavgalardan sonra yine orada sebat eden yok muydu ki sen firar ettin ve onlara senden ziyade tayinat mı verilürdi? Onlar da bu kadar aç kaldı.

C. Benden başka at eti yemiş ve gavgalarda bulunmuş daha asker var idi. Lakin onların kimisinin parası olup kendülerini idare ederler idi. Benim tayinatım dahi onlarla beraber idi ve ben dahi daha evvel olan olan gavgalarda bulundum ve hizmet ettim. Fakat bu defa açlığa tahammül edemeyip can cümleden akdem olduğundan şeytana uyup ve nefis galib gelüp kaçdım.

S. Başkalarının parası var idi onlar kendülerini idare eder idi diyorsun. Çarşuda bir şey bulunur muydu ki onlar idare etmiş ve sen aç kalmışsın?

C. Parası olanlar oldukça kendülerini idare ederler idi. Ben asker olduğum günden berü devletin gavgalarında bulundum. Sairleri kaçdılar ben kaçmadım. Lakin şu açlık herşeyi göze aldırdı. Onun için kaçdım.

S. Kars'dan kaçıp da nereye gidecek idin?

C. Erzurum'a gider ve belki kendümi açlıktan kurtarırım deyu kaçdım kader böyle imiş Rusyalu'ya tutuldum.

S. Kars'dan firar eden ve Erzurum'a gideyim deyu kaçan olur ise tutulduğunda şiddet üzere mücazat olunacağı size daima bildirir idik. Sen bunları işitmedin mi ve askere göre firar etmek töhmet değil midir?

C. İşittim lakin açlık cihetle aklımda kaldı. Ne olur ise olur deyu kaçdım.

S. Firar etmek töhmet değil midir?

C. Bana firar demezler ve ben firar değilim.

S. Zabitinden izin alup da mı gittin ki firar değilim diyorsun?

C. Hayır izin almadım lakin bana firar demezler açlık firarisi derler.

Merkum komisyona celb olunarak sebeb ve keyfiyet-i firarı yegan yegan kendüsinden sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiş olduğu cevabı balada başka başka gösterilmiş ve icray-ı icabı irade-i aliye-i cenab-ı sipehsalarilerine menut bulunmuş olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 13 S sene 73.

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Anadolu orduy-i hümayunu piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının şeyhaneci dördüncü taburunun beşinci bölüğünde sekizinci onbaşının ikinci neferi Kemahlı Hüseyin, Kars muhasarası esnada firar etmiş ve Rusyalu tarafından tutularak geçende Dersaadet'e gelmiş olduğundan komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havî Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır.

S. Kars'da bu kadar müddet ve bunca asakir-i şahane ile düşmanın müdafaasına bakılır ve pek çok meşakkatler çekilürdi. Sen de sair asakir ve arkadaşların gibi din ve devlete hizmet etmek üzere niçün sabır ve sebat etmeyip de firar ettin ve askere göre firar etmek töhmet değil midir?

C. Aç kaldım kaçtım ve askere göre firar etmek töhmettir.

S. Sair askere acaba ziyade tayin verilip de sana noksan mı verilürdi? Onlar ölünceye kadar sabr ettiler sen niçün tahammül ve sebat etmedin?

C. Cümlemizin tayinatı bir idi. Lakin ben tahammül edemedim. Nefse uydum kaçtım.

S. Kaçtığın vakit tabyada veyahud karakolda mıydın ve arkadaş ve silahın var mıydı ve ne vakit ve nerede tutuldun?

C. Kars'ta ihtiyatta çadırda idik. Karakolda değildim. Çadırda otururken gece saat iki sularında Tahmas tarafından kaçtım ve arkadaş ve silahım yoğidi ve Tahmas'tan aşağı indim. Orada tutuldum.

S. Kars'tan firar edersen nereye gidecek idin?

C. Erzurum'a gidecek idim.

S. Kars'tan kaçan olup da Erzurum'da ve sair yerde tutulur ise şiddet üzere mücazat olunacak deyu size daima tenbih olunurdu. Sen bunları işitmedin mi?

C. Tenbihatı işittim. Lakin açlığa tahammül edemedim. Lakin kurtulurum ve Erzurum'a giderim hayaliyle kaçtım sonra tutuldum.

S. Kars'ta iken Rusyalu'nun karakolları her tarafta çok idi ve cümlemiz görürdük. Öyle yalnız bir adamın çıkıp gidemeyeceğini bilmedin mi?

C. Kars'tan sair kaçanlar oldu onlar kurtuldu ben de kurtulurum zann ettim. Lakin sonra böyle tutuldum.

Merkum komisyona celb olunarak esbab ve keyfiyat-ı firariyesi yegan yegan kendüsinden sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiş olduğu cevabı balada başka başka gösterilmiş ve icray-ı icabı irade-i aliye-i hıdivilerine menut bulunmuş olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 13 S sene 73.

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