

COGNITIVE AND RELATIONAL OUTCOMES OF TRACK- TWO INITIATIVES
AND TRANSFER STRATEGIES USED: THE CASES OF THE GREEK- TURKISH
FORUM AND THE GREEK- TURKISH JOURNALISTS' CONFERENCE

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ABSTRACT

COGNITIVE AND RELATIONAL OUTCOMES OF TRACK- TWO INITIATIVES AND TRANSFER STRATEGIES USED: THE CASES OF THE GREEK- TURKISH FORUM AND THE GREEK- TURKISH JOURNALISTS' CONFERENCE

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The Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists' Conference are both track- two initiatives which work on the Greek- Turkish relations. The former was established in 1998 and the latter in 2000. These two initiatives have been working with the goal of influencing and improving the relations between the two states, each one focusing on different aspects of the problem. The Greek- Turkish Forum includes quasi-official participants and mainly has an advisory role to the politicians and the policy makers. On the other hand, the Greek- Turkish Journalists' Conference is a process which includes Turkish and Greek journalists and its efforts are primarily focused on creating a positive attitude in the media and thus have an impact on public opinion.

Primarily, the thesis examines the cognitive and relational outcomes of the two initiatives separately, while it also discusses the transfer strategies that were used by the two initiatives are discussed. Finally, a short comparison of the two initiatives illustrates

the main differences and the commonalities between the two. Data was compiled from a series of interviews held with most of the participants and a participant's observation was made in the case of the Greek- Turkish Forum.

The results of the research suggest that for both of the initiatives there were positive cognitive and relational outcomes. With regard to transfer strategies, the data indicate that the Greek- Turkish Forum targets mainly on upward transfer while the Journalists' Conference focuses more on downward transfer, meaning mainly the journalists who participate in the Conference' s processes, but public opinion as well.

ÖZET

TÜRK-YUNAN FORUMU VE TÜRK-YUNAN GAZETECİLER KONFERANSI VAKALARINDA KULLANILAN İKİNCİ YOL İNSİYATİFLERİ VE TRANSFER STRATEJİLERİNİN KAVRAMSAL VE İLİŞKİSEL SONUÇLARI

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Hem Türk-Yunan Forumu hem de Türk-Yunan Gazeteciler Konferansı Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ekseninde işleyen ikinci yol inisiyatifleridir. Bunlardan ilki 1998’de, diğeri ise 2000 yılında kurulmuştur. Söz konusu iki inisiyatif iki devlet arasındaki ilişkileri etkilemek ve geliştirmek amacıyla çalışmaktadır, ancak her biri sorunun farklı açalarına odaklanmaktadır. Türk-Yunan Forumu, yarı resmi katılımcıları kapsamakta ve temel olarak siyasetçi ve politika üreticilerine tavsiye verme rolünü üstlenmektedir. Diğeryandan, Türk-Yunan Gazeteciler Konferansı, Türk ve Yunan gazetecilerin katılımıyla gerçekleşen bir süreç olup temelde medyada olumlu bir tavır yaratmak suretiyle kamuoyunu etkilemeyi hedeflemektedir.

Bu tez öncelikle her iki inisiyatifin kavramsal ve ilişkisel sonuçlarını ayrı ayrı değerlendirirken, bu inisiyatifler tarafından kullanılan transfer stratejilerini de tartışacaktır. Son olarak, iki inisiyatifin kısa bir karşılaştırması yapılarak temel farklılıklar

ve ortak yanlar ortaya konacaktır. Gerekli kaynak katılımcıların büyük çoğunluğuyla gerçekleştirilen bir dizi görüşme ve Türk-Yunan Forumu'na katılımcı olarak yapılan gözlemler neticesinde toplanmıştır.

Araştırmanın sonuçları, her iki inisiyatifin de olumlu kavramsal ve ilişkisel etkilerine işaret etmektedir. Transfer stratejilerine yönelik olarak ise, mevcut kaynaklar Türk-Yunan Forumu'nun tavana doğru bir transferi hedeflediğini, Gazeteciler Konferansı'nın ise tabana doğru bir transfere yoğunlaştığını, yani sadece konferans sürecine katılan gazetecilerin değil kamuoyunun da hedeflendiğini göstermektedir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Unofficial initiatives which involve citizens from societies or groups in conflict have been a popular method of conflict resolution for the past decades. In many conflicts around the world, such as the Cyprus and Israeli- Palestinian conflicts, civil society undertakes initiatives which aim to bridge gaps and open the road to resolution. These initiatives include different kinds of people, ranging from quasi- officials to grassroots individuals.

This thesis examines two of these initiatives which act within the context of the Greek- Turkish conflict. The first one is the Greek- Turkish Forum which was established in 1998, in a period when Greek- Turkish relations had reached a nadir. The second is the Greek- Turkish Journalist's Conference which was realized for the first time in 2000, when a small group of Turkish and Greek journalists conceived the idea to organize a conference that would bring the journalists from the two countries together.

The goal of this research is to explore these two initiatives and try to examine their cognitive and relational outcomes. As a second step, the thesis will analyze the transfer strategies that these initiatives used in order to transfer these outcomes to the policy making or the societal level.

The thesis begins with a literature review which will define and elaborate on the main concepts that are used in the current research. For the needs of this paper three main concepts are being discussed. Firstly, a brief literature review is given for second track diplomacy including its origins, definitions and practice. The discussion continues with

the intergroup contact theory and the conflict resolution theories which explain how intergroup contact in an unofficial setting might have positive outcomes. Finally, the chapter focuses on transfer strategies as an aspect of track- II literature.

Chapter three analyzes the research question and poses propositions based on the literature review. Furthermore, in this chapter the methodology that has been used for the collection of data and also the research strategy for the data analysis is discussed, so that it is clear to the reader how the outcomes of the research are reached.

Chapters four and five, descriptive in nature, firstly inform the reader on the two initiatives, by introducing the processes the participants and the issues discussed in both the GTJC and the GTF and secondly, discuss the main areas of conflict between the Turkish and the Greek State.

In the sixth and seventh chapters, the analysis of the data is conducted accompanied by a discussion on the findings. In the conclusion part where the results from the two initiatives are compared and further comments are made.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 General Remarks

This chapter shall to present the existing literature on the main concepts that this research uses. The purpose of a comprehensive literature review is twofold. Firstly, it familiarized the reader with concepts. Secondly, it provides a framework in which the propositions and the assumptions of the research can be based.

For this paper, there are three different concepts that should be analyzed and reviewed, since these are the concepts that shape the backbone of the thesis. The first one is the notion of track- II diplomacy, which is a part of the conflict resolution literature. The second part of this chapter focuses on the Contact Hypothesis, and gives a brief summary of how, according to the literature, changes can occur through contact, and what these changes are. Finally, the review deals with the concept of transfer, meaning the transfer of the track- II initiative level to the macro level. Although examined separately, it should be mentioned that transfer is also part of the track- II literature.

2.2 Track- II

The idea of track- II diplomacy exists in the Conflict Resolution theory, though not by this term, from the 1960s. According to Wallensteen (2002), the roots of track- II can be traced back to the mid- 1960's when a problem- solving workshop was organized in order to discuss the tensions between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, with representatives of these three countries participating in the meetings. However, Burton (1969, 1979, 1984) was the first one who understood the power of this fresh approach and its ability to contribute decisively to conflict resolution, through unofficial communication among high- level representatives of the parties, and always under the guidance of a third party actor (Kelman, 2000). The first term used by John Burton was “controlled communication”, emphasizing mostly the prevalent role of the third party in influencing and guiding the parties to mutual understanding and joint generation of ideas that could lead to conflict resolution (Fisher, 2004).

The initial idea of the first “controlled- communication” workshops became very popular mainly because they served two quite important purposes. To begin with, the new approach offered an alternative to traditional and conventional methods of third- party interventions which were based on legal and diplomatic frameworks, and had proven inadequate for successful conflict resolution. In addition, the new set- up gave the researchers the opportunity to get an inside look to the dynamics of ongoing conflict, something that it is almost impossible to be done in an “uncontrolled” environment (Hill, 1982).

The ideas of Burton had considerable influence in the field and soon other scholars of conflict resolution, based on the first design of “controlled communication” workshops started to develop the model further. Herbert Kelman was one of the scholars who, starting with the standards Burton created, developed the model both theoretically and practically, becoming one of the best- known scholar practitioners in the world (Mitchell, no date). The work of Kelman was very similar to the work of John Burton;

However, Kelman, as a social psychologist, paid more attention to the psychological perspective (Kelman, 1999). Moreover, Kelman used the term *interactive problem-solving* in order to describe the new approach to conflict resolution (Kelman 1972, 1986, 1991).

Ronald Fisher (1972, 1976) built his own generic model of interactive conflict resolution by emphasizing the role of the third- party in the process. His model was finalized in 1983 when he published his article on “third- party consultation” proposing it as a method to deal with intergroup conflicts. The main intention of the article was to provide a statement of the major components of third- party consultation, and it also demonstrates how interactive conflict resolution is a form of consultation that goes through the usual phases of consultation, and carries the professional and ethical requirements of intervening in someone else’s system (Fisher, 1983: 320; Fisher, 2002: 68).

The term *track- two* was coined much later than the initiation of problem solving workshops by Joseph Montville (1987 and 1995), a Foreign Service officer. Track- II, as opposed to track- I which is official diplomacy, suggests problem- solving workshops to facilitate breakthroughs and promote self- sustaining structural development. It thus involves, as a necessary supplement to official diplomacy, the non- official, sub- national and analytical problem- solving orientations which constitute track- two diplomacy (Azar, 2002: 22). Although initially track- II diplomats were viewed with mistrust and contempt by the official diplomats, and vice versa, track- II quickly grew in practice and reputation so that became to be considered necessary (Chataway, 1998: 271).

2.2.1 Terminology

As it can be clearly seen from above, there are a number of different terms used in order to describe this approach to conflict resolution: problem- solving workshops,

interactive conflict resolution, and track- two diplomacy are just some of the terms which are currently used. The truth is that in the literature, usually there is no distinction between these terms and they are used interchangeably by scholars. However, as Chataway (1998) says, track- II diplomacy is a much broader term including a variety of unofficial interactions, while interactive problem solving includes a much more restrained range of initiatives. In this sense, ICR includes only projects where a third-party facilitator moderates dialogues between significant people belonging to the parties in conflict, while track- II may include a broader spectrum of people and actions.

This is exactly the reason why for the term track- II, was chosen for this research and later on I shall examine if this is an appropriate term for the current research. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, there is no distinction made between the different terms, and they maybe used interchangeably.

2.2.2 Definitions

In the literature many different definitions of track- II diplomacy exist. For instance, Kelman defines interactive problem solving as:

“an unofficial, academically based third- party approach to the resolution of international and inter-communal conflicts, especially suited to protracted conflicts between identity groups. Derived from the pioneering work of John Burton, the approach is anchored in social psychology principles, and the central tool for the approach is the problem- solving workshop” (Kelman, 2004: 7)

The above definition emphasizes on the third- party character, the types of conflicts which are suitable for this kind of approach and method. However, in this particular definition there is no information about the participants, that is the people who should participate in these types of workshops.

Ronald Fisher, in his effort to indicate the main characteristics of track- II, agrees with the main points of Kelman, about the third- party and the workshop method, but he adds some important details. According to him, there is a small group of representatives for each side (usually up to five). These people are usually influential individuals in their communities and they are asked to participate in an open dialogue which takes place in an unofficial environment. The main role of the third party is to encourage the parties to express their views and listen to the views of the other side (Fisher, 2004).

Although, the above definitions cover much of track- II characteristics and are very similar there are also different and more generic approaches. Diamond and McDonald supported the idea that the contact can take place not only among influential individuals, but also among a variety of non- governmental actors, including, for example, doctors, lawyers, students, and so on. They chose to name this type of contact “multi- track diplomacy” in continuation of Montville’s track- II, because the old term did not cover the variety, scope and depth of citizen involvement (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 4).

Finally, since my decision was to use the term track- II for this paper, I would like to give a concrete idea of how exactly I understand the term and with exactly with what meaning I am using it. For the scope of this research, track- two may be defined as a process which involves interaction between individuals or groups belonging to parties in conflict, which act outside the official scene, under the possible facilitation of a third-party. This definition corresponds to the definitions given above and, most importantly, is able to cover both of the two initiatives that are under research in this work.

2.2.3 Why track- II?

At this point, it is important to explain why track- II became so popular during the last decades, or in other words why it is sometimes important to use track- II processes in

Conflict Resolution. First of all, track- II initiatives offer to the participants an environment suitable for fruitful discussion where exploratory talks about the underlying needs and interests of the two sides can take place, in a confrontational and safe setting (Azar, 2002). According to Kelman (2004), the unique strength of track- II workshops is their unofficial and non- binding character which finally leads to achievements, such as generation of exploratory ideas, which are more difficult to reach in official negotiations. With regard to this point, it seems that there is general concurrence in the field of conflict resolution that a non- official brainstorming process can make a contribution to conflict de- escalation, in a multi- track approach to protracted social conflicts (Chataway, 2002: 166).

Another issue that makes track- II initiatives important is the help they can offer during pre- negotiation. If we define pre- negotiation as a period beginning when parties start to consider negotiations as a policy option, and ending when the parties agree to engage in formal negotiations, or when a party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option (Zartman, 1989: 4), then track- II initiatives may prove to be quite helpful in this phase. They can help establish a framework within which the official negotiations may take place and also advise the official diplomats on how to assess the viability of formal negotiations (Fisher, 1989). Since track- II processes cannot lead to solutions by themselves they can provide a great assistance in pre- negotiation phase by setting the agenda for the official negotiations (Wallenstein, 2002: 42-43). Other scholars have also pointed to the importance of track- II in pre- negotiation (Kelman, 2000; Dupont and Faure, 2002), but, in addition, they clarify that the importance can also continue during the period of official negotiations.

Finally, track- II may be a very suitable choice for conflict resolution when the conflict includes very sensitive or taboo issues that are very difficult to be discussed during the official negotiations. In other words, track- II is accorded the task of focusing on issues too sensitive for official negotiations which, as consequence, have been bracketed by track one. The nonofficial, informal, and to a certain degree confidential format of these meetings gives participants the opportunity to discuss these issues frankly

and free from fears that any party might be embarrassed in the process (Runald, 2002: 84-96).

2.2.4 Practice

At a practical level, interactive conflict resolution and track- II processes have been used all around the world in many different cases of protracted conflict, including international and inter- communal disputes. Kelman, for example, has worked extensively on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, organizing many problem- solving workshops with Israeli and Palestinian participants. However, he has also worked in other disputes such as Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Cyprus (Kelman, 2002). Similar work has been done throughout the Middle East with Israeli, Arab and even Iranian elites coming together in different settings to discuss threat perceptions and common security concerns and to engage in a variety of unofficial “confidence building measures” (Kaye, 2001: 49). The Cyprus conflict has also been a context where many ICR processes were organized. One of Burton’s first “controlled communication” initiatives took place in London with Turkish- Cypriots and Greek- Cypriots participating. Fisher also later on organized a number of problem- solving workshops in Cyprus (Fisher, 2001 & 2002: 68). An indicative list of track- II initiatives organized in Cyprus is given by Benjamin Broome a Fulbright scholar who also worked on the Island, organizing workshops (Broome, 2005).

In the context of Greek- Turkish relations, a great number of track- II projects are in operation. Apart from the Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalist Conference which are subjects of this research, there are also many other initiatives such as the Greek- Turkish Business Council, the Greek- Turkish Information Society Forum as well as citizens initiatives like cultural exchanges, women initiatives, student exchanges and so on.

2.2.5 The micro and the macro-level

As it was made clear by the aforementioned definitions of track- II given above, these initiatives engage a limited number of people who can work together in a controlled environment. So, the primary goal of track- II is to cause changes at the micro- level, meaning the alteration of people who are part of the “microprocess” (Kelman, no date). These changes are important if an impact is to be made in the macro- meaning the official diplomacy or the society. In the following sections these possible outcomes of the microprocess will be defined, and ways to reach the macroprocess will be examined.

2.3 Cognitive and relational outcomes in the micro-level

As part of this research, potential outcomes when groups of people, like the ones under study, interact need to be examined. These outcomes need to be understood, their dynamics defined, their limitations perceived and their functionality rationalized, because the outcomes in the micro- level are directly connected with the transfer to the macro- level. If there are no outcomes in the micro- level then there is no meaning for transfer and if there are certain outcomes then the right paths for transfer should be followed.

2.3.1 Intergroup Contacts

A review of intergroup contact literature is vital to understand and map the possible outcomes that may result from track- II initiatives. Intergroup contact theory may be used to describe the dynamics that may rise in track- II meetings, as in these initiatives people who belong to different and conflicting groups, come together to discuss their problems.

Most of the literature which studies intergroup contact is focused mostly on the positive changes that the interaction of people from different groups can cause (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005; Tropp 2003; Hewstone and Brown, 1986). Concretely, most of the researchers are interested in how we can achieve a reduction of prejudice and improve relationships and attitudes among groups through intergroup contact. Social scientists have tried to create a theoretical framework on intergroup contact such as Watson (1947) and Williams (1947) (as cited into Dovidio, Gaertner and Kawakami, 2003), the most significant being Gordon Allport. In his contact hypothesis (cited in Brown, 2000; Pettigrew, 1998), he specified the conditions necessary for a contact group to be fruitful. The most important of these conditions are that in order to reach the positive outcomes mentioned, contact requires an active, goal oriented effort. His second suggestion was that there should be no intergroup competition towards the attainment of common goals. The third one was that the contact should involve people of equal status. Finally, the fourth condition states that there should be institutions and norms that support the contact.

Pettigrew based his Intergroup Contact Theory mainly on Allport's Contact Hypothesis, but he added a very important condition that Allport had missed. Pettigrew suggested that the duration of the contact and friendly environment can play a decisive role in the outcome. According to him

Optimal intergroup contact requires time for cross-group friendships to develop. Once we adopt a long-term perspective that allows cross- group friendship to develop and the full decategorization, salient categorization and recategorization sequence to unfold, we can expect striking results (Pettigrew, 1998: 76)

Adding to Pettigrew's point concerning the importance of duration in intergroup contact, Aberton, Shoemaker and Tomolillo examined the importance of friendship to the

reduction of implicit and explicit biases against African Americans and Latino by White Americans (Aberson, Shoemaker and Tomolillo, 2004).

2.3.2 Positive Effects and Limitations

As mentioned earlier, most of the literature focuses on the positive affects of intergroup contact. Linda Tropp specifically mentions the decades of research that have concluded that contact between members of different groups can lead to reductions in prejudice along with a variety of other positive outcomes (Tropp, 2003: 131), such as improvements in relationships. Most of the researchers who have intergroup contact agree to that (Miller, 2002; Brown, 2000; Hewstone and Cairns, 2001).

However, both the Contact Hypothesis of Allport and the Intergroup Contact Theory of Pettigrew have been criticized. Most of the critics focus on the limitation of the generalization of the positive outcomes of intergroup contact, but the critics claim that even when all the conditions posed by Pettigrew and Allport are fulfilled, the positive outcomes are not certain.

While Miller accepts the fact that there are positive outcomes from intergroup contact, he points out that the generalization of these effects to the “outgroup” as a whole is still under discussion and there are contradicting studies on this issue (Miller, 2002). These kinds of generalization effects have been described by Hewstone and Brown in their Contact Model (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). According to their model, the type of contact is divided into two: interpersonal and intergroup. Their findings were that while interpersonal contact may lead to improve an attitude towards the individual, it is unlikely to lead to a generalization to other group members. Hewstone and Cairns make the above statement clearer:

One of the most serious limitations is that participants in cooperative contact programs , even if they do come to view one or a small number of individuals from the other group more

positively, do not necessarily generalize these positive attitudes and perceptions. Recent work on intergroup contact is aimed in overcoming precisely this limitation (Hewstone and Cairns, 2001: 328)

Another limitation that they point out is that the process of bringing positive attitudes to the macro-level is harder when it involves adult participants. However, it should be clarified that the two initiatives under research are more outcome-oriented than process-oriented. This actually means that relational outcomes (and their generalization to the outgroup) is not their main goal. The primary aim both of the GTF and the GTJC is to find solutions to the problems.

2.3.3 Contact in an unofficial setting and Conflict Resolution

Having seen the positive and the negative outcomes of contact between people belonging to adversary groups, and the criteria which the Contact Hypothesis poses for successful contact, I would like to return to conflict resolution literature and consider how track- II contacts are explained.

Firstly, it should be pointed out that there is an understanding among conflict resolution scholars that track- II initiatives have, or should have, a positive impact on cognitive outcomes and relations among people who participate in them.

“The participants speak only for themselves- not under instruction from government and other political authority. They are free to explore a broad range of ideas that they come to believe- as a result of listening to each other- are important. Often these are ideas that underlie or reach beyond present relationships. As participants exchange ideas the talk is increasingly characterized by its interactive quality- they learn to talk, to think, to work together on problems and relationships of importance to all the group rather than only exchanging formal positions on agreed agenda items” (Saunders et al, 2000: 291)

Since, the participants are “free to explore a broad range of ideas” they may acquire new learning and this may have a direct impact on the relationships. There is confidence that the ways the interactive conflict resolution workshops are designed, the participants have the chance to acquire new learning in many different levels. Moreover, these cognitive changes are not just an outcome of the workshops, but as Kelman says it is the actual goal of these workshops to promote change in the participants through face-to-face interaction in small groups (Kelman, 2000).

A very serious effort to operationalize the new learning in track- II processes has been made by Nadim Rouhana (2000). Rouhana gives examples of different types of learning such as changing societal beliefs about the other party, the examination and learning of the other’s political needs, learning about political concerns and constraints etc. These types of changes can be referred to as cognitive outcomes, since they are strongly associated with new learning that takes place on many levels. However, in Rouhana’s work we can distinguish a different type of change that might take place in track- II processes. These are changes which are not connected with learning but with the relations between the participants. For instance, changing the enemy image, which is considered by Rouhana one of the micro- objectives of the problem solving workshop, can go under the relational outcomes of track- II processes. The differentiation of cognitive and relational outcomes is further emphasized by d’Estree et. al. (2001). In their effort to create a sufficient evaluation model for track two they created a chart with four different dimensions of evaluation. The first two refer to cognitive and relational outcomes respectively. Concretely, in the first category, which is called ‘changes in representation’, there are issues like new learning and integrative framing. In the second which is titled ‘changes in relation’ there are issues such as improvement in relational climate and empathy.

Another relational change that Kelman gives a lot importance to, is the generation of trust among the participants of problem- solving workshops. Beginning with the argument that since the parties are in conflict, mistrust among the participants is the most likely situation that a facilitator will encounter in a track- II initiative, he continues by

outlining methods according to which distrust can substitute trust, and how important is this replacement for the success of the initiative (Kelman, 2004).

2.4. Transfer Strategies

The above discussion has summarized, the nature of track- II processes, how they work and the possible cognitive and relational outcomes that people can acquire through participation in these types of initiatives. However, one of the realities that track- II initiatives have to face is that, in the end, the number of people participating, or who are willing to participate, in interactive conflict resolution processes is quite limited. Therefore, in order for the influence of a track- II initiative to be increased, the changes generated in the micro- level should be transmitted to a larger number of people, reaching the macro- level. According to Kelman (2000: 279), transfer is the actual goal of interactive problem solving and the changes on individuals should be seen as a vehicle for change in larger social systems, the national policy and the conflict system at large. Thus, a big part of the recent literature (e.g. Fisher 2005; Cuhadar, 2004; d'Estree et al 2001) does not focus on the ways fruitful dialogues should be conducted, but how to move ideas from the track- II initiative into practice over a wider field (Saunders et al, 2000: 292).

According to Kelman, the micro- process is connected to the macro- process in two different ways (Kelman, 2000). The first connection is between track- II and the official diplomacy track. This part concerns the transfer which is delivered to the politicians or the policy makers through different ways that will be examined below. This kind of transfer can be referred to as 'upward transfer' (Cuhadar, 2004). The second connection is between the track- II level and the society level, and it engages the problem of how changes and learning from the small groups that participate in interactive conflict resolution initiatives can be transferred to the grassroots level. This kind of transfer can be referred to as 'downward transfer'. Later on, Cuhadar added another connection to the macro- level, *lateral transfer* (Cuhadar, 2004).

2.4.1 Upward transfer

The question of transfer that aims to connect track- II with track- I has been posed since the very beginning of Burton's "controlled communication" workshops. Burton believed that the results of problem solving workshops may contribute to the official negotiations process. However, this impact will only be connected to relational outcomes without having impact on the negotiating positions and the bargaining process. Based on the human needs theory approach, Burton dismissed any change in this area, since basic human needs are not negotiable and hence they cannot be satisfied through compromise (cited in Fisher, 2005: 3).

Nevertheless, later on, the idea that track- II can influence the process of official negotiation through upward transfer of relational and cognitive outcomes from unofficial diplomacy level was accepted. As Azar says for example:

Track- II refers to processes that parallel and eventually link up with track- I (official) diplomacy. The participation of individuals in their personal capacities, and yet with access and potential to influence decision makers, is a useful supplement to the work of professional diplomats and political leadership, while also facilitating discussion at the grassroots level. Ultimately, all non-official processes are aimed (at least in part) at influencing official opinion although at first the link may be very remote (Azar, 2002: 23)

In other words, according to Azar, the upward transfer is embedded in the nature of track- II initiatives. Kelman (1992) also stressed the importance of transfer from participants to the policy makers, and the help that this transfer might contribute to overcome barriers to entering negotiations phase, to reaching agreement and to changing their relationship in the post agreement phase (as cited in Fisher, 2005: 4).

2.4.2 Downward transfer

Transfer aiming towards the grassroots level as equally important as the upward transfer, since its goal is to include a greater number of people from the communities in conflict and, thus make conflict resolution more likely. Joseph Montville, responsible for coining the term track- II, suggests that influencing public opinion is one of the two or three main processes of second track initiatives (Montville, 1987: 7-8). The transfer of knowledge from the micro- process to the societal level is very important because the initiative becomes a broader effort and thus learning stops being a matter of selected individuals and becomes embedded in the society.

Downward transfer becomes a clearer issue in the case of multi- track diplomacy, as multi- track mainly concerns people- to- people activities from every component of a society (professionals, students, NGOs etc). Ambassador John McDonald and Louise Diamond (1996), emphasize the role that the media initiatives can play in downward transfer. Because media shapes public opinion and they are the main sources of information for people, the transfer of learning can be extremely direct when journalists' initiatives are concerned. This is a very relevant fact, since one of the two initiatives under research is the Greek- Turkish Journalists' Conference.

2.4.3 Lateral transfer

It is a usual phenomenon in a conflict that more than one track- II initiatives are working simultaneously. Cuhadar (2004) suggested that transfer can also take place among different types of track- II initiatives other NGO and organizations, and further elaborated on the different types of directions lateral transfer can take. According to her proposition, lateral transfer can be divided into transfer to local/regional track-II initiatives and transfer to international track- II initiatives. The overall directions that

outcomes of the microprocess are portrayed in the following figure (Fig. 2.1) which was developed by Cuhadar (2004)

The different directions of transfer analyzed above are not totally independent from each other but rather are connected quite closely. Fisher has created a model where transfer effects and their connections are comprehensively portrayed (Fisher, 2005: 6). By adopting a bottom – up approach, Fisher starts from public opinion and the learning and changes transferred at the grassroots level, by participants of track- II initiatives who have the means to reach the mass of society. Following there might be a chance to the politicians and the policy makers; this might happen for two reasons. Firstly, the politicians may follow public opinion and, secondly, there also might be direct transfer from the initiative to the politicians. Finally, at the top of his model, Fisher places the diplomats acting within the first track. They are influenced by the politicians, but they might also be influenced by the track- II initiative in the case of some participants becoming members (or advisors to members) of the official negotiating process.

Figure 2.1: Upward, downward and lateral transfer (Cuhadar, 2004)





Figure 2.2: Possible directions of transfer (Fisher)



2.4.4. Transfer strategies

Having defined the meaning of transfer and examined the directions that transfer can take place, the next step would be to look into the tactics that a track- II initiative might use in order to maximize the transfer effects. As I will explain below, there are different transfer strategies that should be followed depending on where a track- II initiative aiming at the macro- level. To clarify this further, there are different ways to increase upward transfer to the policy making level and different paths to follow if the process is aimed at the society level.

Upward transfer requires a good relationship with the politicians. Thus, selecting the participants who are influential at that level is a very important step for a track- II initiative, in order to create a direct link, and this is pointed out by many scholars (Azar,

2002; Kelman, 2000; Chataway, 1998: 270 & 2002, Fisher, 2001: 319). Through their position, these participants have the chance to influence the policy makers in different ways, such as advising, communicating new ideas or political activities (Kelman, 2000: 280). Rouhana, offers additional tactics for upward transfer such as involving potential future leaders in interactive conflict resolution processes, or trying to influence decision makers (Rouhana, 2000: 297).

The selection of appropriate participants is again very important when the initiative tries to maximize downward transfer as well. The difference is that in this case the participants should be people who are closely connected with the society, such as religious leaders, grassroots leaders or people who have the means to influence directly public opinion such as journalists. In addition, Nadim Rouhana (2000) says that the groups can produce joint concept papers or try to disseminate new ideas to the public. Fisher, being more concrete, says that the participants might disseminate ideas generated through the process to think tanks, research institutes study groups and so on (Fisher, 2005: 6). Moreover, extracting from his experience on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict Kelman claims that some participants, in particular journalists, columnists, or academic analysts, managed to convey some of the learning they acquired in the micro- process to the public, by taking advantage of their affiliations (Kelman, 2000: 280).

2.5. Conclusion

In the current chapter there was an effort to analyze the main concepts that will be used in the rest of the research. Firstly, the nature of track- II initiatives has been examined and a definition for track- II has been selected. Secondly, the literature's propositions on what the possible cognitive and relational outcomes of track- II initiatives may be have been analyzed. Finally, there was a look into the different directions of transfer in order to transmit these outcomes from the micro- level to the macro-level. As

it is made clear in the following chapter the review of the literature will provide valuable assistance to the design of the methodology.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

One of the most important issues in a research is that the researcher will choose to use those methods that are more suitable to help answer the questions posed. Methodological gaps can be one of the reasons that may mislead a researcher to incorrect outcomes. Different types of questions desire different types of methodologies. Once, the methods to be applied have been chosen they should be followed to the end as they are the ones that define the design of the research. In the following chapter I will describe the methodologies used in order to answer the questions posed, and also the design of the current research. Before the discussion of methodology I will state the research question and examine any propositions that can be made based on the literature.

3.1 Research question

The research question could be stated as:

“What were the cognitive and relational outcomes of the Greek-Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists’ Conference? Which transfer strategies were used by these initiatives and how were they implemented?”

There is more than one question to be explored in this paper. Even though the research question is analyzed in detail below, one thing I would like to clarify is that essentially there are two different issues addressed; the changes, meaning the cognitive

outcomes and outcomes in the relationships, and the transfer strategies. Based on these guidelines, but most importantly on the theoretical background analyzed in the previous chapter, a proposition can be posed. The proposition applies only to the part of the research which deals with outcomes. Since, the part concerning the transfer strategies is totally exploratory the decision was to be left without any propositions. As Yin (2003) explains if the research topic is a matter of “exploration” it gives the researcher a legitimate reason not to have a proposition.

P1: there should be positive cognitive outcomes and relational outcomes for both of the initiatives under research

Both the GTF and the GTJC have been meeting for a long time, and the participation concerns people of similar status who have common goals. Moreover, both initiatives require active participation for their participants. Thus, it seems that all the preconditions that Pettigrew sets in his Contact Hypothesis, the way it was explained in the literature review chapter, are fulfilled. Therefore, the results should suggest that indeed should be positive cognitive and the relational outcomes.

3.2 Scope of the research

The current work is related, as it has been mentioned before, to track-II initiatives. Concretely, my goal was to examine the relational outcomes and learning outcomes that participants in these initiatives experienced or in other words what can be the gain in terms of knowledge and change from participation in track-II/ citizens’ diplomacy initiatives. The second issue that is being examined by the current work is what kind of transfer strategies may be used from a track-II project, so that it can convey the knowledge earned from the project to the macro-level, meaning the policy making level or the society level.

The results of the current research can be used in the future in many ways. First of all, they provide original data which explain the way the participants in the two initiatives under study learn or at least the learning they perceived they have gained through their participation in these initiatives. Moreover, the data acquired, through the methods that will be elaborated below, can also provide with interesting information about the way relationships among participants have changed, positively or negatively. All these data can be used in a future effort to create a bigger paradigm trying to explain the role of track- II initiatives in learning processes and relationship building among the participants.

The transfer strategies part of the research is without doubt of equal importance. At the end of this research there will be a list of strategies that each of the two initiatives has been using until now. Each of these strategies will be backed up with qualitative data which will further explain the way these strategies were applied. Thus, researchers in the future will be able to use these data in order to aggregate them in a greater model, which will use data from many examples of track- II initiatives in many conflicts and identify conditions under which transfer strategies function better. The results of this part of the research also can offer ideas to people who organize these types of initiatives and they lack the knowledge on how they can reach the macro- level.

3.3 Research strategy

I believe that the best approach to explore my research questions is a comparative case study. First of all, the nature of the questions posed indicates that case study is the appropriate strategy to be used. In this research the question asked is actually a ‘how’ question in the sense that I intend to find out the different ways (strategies) that track-two initiatives used in the case of Turkish-Greek relations. The second question that comes out of the research question is a ‘what’ question and that concerns the possible cognitive outcomes that these track-two initiatives generated. According to Kaarbo and Beasley, the type of questions more appropriate for case studies are ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions-

that is questions focusing on the underlying process, on the causal nexus between the independent variables and the phenomena to be explained (Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999: 378).

The next issue that should be made clear is what type of case study this piece of work will be. To answer this question first the unit of analysis should be mentioned. As Druckman (2005) states, it is sometimes difficult to identify the unit of analysis from the research question itself and in this case the task of pointing it out falls to the research itself. In the case of this paper the 'case' is not the Greek- Turkish relations but the two initiatives themselves, namely the Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists' Conference. The research will eventually be a comparison of the two initiatives and it will base its assumptions on the commonalities and differences that the results from the study of these initiatives might have. Thus, since there are two different cases being studied, this is considered a comparative case study.

The selection of the cases was not random. The small number of cases suggests that the current research is a comparison study and as such the cases to be compared should come from the same class or universe of cases (Druckman, 2005: 211). Thus, both the GTF and the GTJC are initiatives that work on the Greek- Turkish conflict, they have been going on for many years, they have shown the willingness to go further than just the micro- level process and they both include participants who are well known individuals in their respected countries.

The last question that should be answered concerning the research strategy is under which category of case studies the current research falls. Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) suggest five different types of case studies (or comparative case studies), and they make this categorization based on how the case introduced is linked to the theory. Following their track, I would say that my work constitutes a disciplined- configurative comparative case study, in the sense that it uses an already existing theoretical framework to explore new cases. The theoretical framework I am using for my research is based on

the framework developed by Cuhadar (2004) for the researching on cases concerning the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.

3.4 Methodology and data collection

In order to conclude a research like the one described in detail above there is a very specific pool of data a researcher has to look into. The data collected and used are all primary data, and the means to collect them were personal interviews with the participants of the Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists Conference. In the case of the GTF I also had the chance to make two participant observations, the first in the meeting held in Ankara in June 2005, and the second in Istanbul in March 2006. Following I will explain exactly in what way these methodologies were applied during the data collection phase.

3.4.1 Interviews

The interviews were the most important tool I used during the research since they helped me gather a lot valuable information about the two initiatives. The interview protocol that was used (APPENTIX I) was adopted and modified from Cuhadar (2004). As the original protocol has only been used once for a specific conflict, the Israeli- Palestinian case, there were some modifications to be done. The interview is a series of questions which aim to collect qualitative data on how the participants in the two initiatives perceive cognitive outcomes they experienced as a result of their participation, relational outcomes, and finally, data concerning transfer strategies that the initiative or the interviewee personally used.

In the case of the GTF there were a total of ten participants interviewed, including four people from the Turkish team and six people from the Greek team. The selection of the people who were interviewed was not a very easy task, baring in mind that there are some people who left and there are newer members and on top of that there are visiting members who do not participate regularly but are invited from time to time. Finally, the ten people, selected and interviewed, represent the 93% of the core group of the Forum, at least in its current form. The GTJC was very similar in the sense that it was again difficult to decide who should be the people to be interviewed. The final decision also in this case was to interview the people from the Contact Group, which includes three Greek journalists and three Turkish journalists. These are 100% of the people who initiated and have been organizing the Conference. The panelists and the participants were excluded from the sampling, because most of them had attended only one or two from the series of Conferences, and keeping in mind that the second Conference followed up almost five years before the first one, there would be methodological gaps in asking these people about the Conference. However, this restriction does not apply to the Contact Group because even when the organization of the Conference had been paused these people were still cooperating and were in close collaboration. An analytical list with the people who were interviewed is given by Table 1.

Table 1: Participants who were interviewed

	Participants	
	GTF	GTJF
Turkish	4	3
Greeks	6	3
Sum	10¹	6

¹ In the GTF there is no equality between the Greek and the Turkish participants; it includes six Greeks and five Turks

3.4.2 Questionnaires

Nevertheless, while conducting interviews with open ended questions there is always the possibility that the interviewees will not give all the information they have, mainly because they tend to forget and also because they tend to provide information that is salient to them. This type of error is described by Willis (2005) as “non-response error” and can lead to biased data. In the effort to avoid this error, two other questionnaires including close ended questions were designed which would supplement the first one. The first questionnaire includes a list of possible cognitive outcomes and relational outcomes based on the theoretical background given in the literature review chapter, but also based of Cuhadar (2004), d’ Estree et. al (2001), Rouhana (2000) and Kelman (2004) (APPENDIX 2). The second questionnaire includes a list of possible transfer strategies or tactics which are also based on the literature (Cuhadar, 2004; d’ Estree et. al. 2001; Rouhana, 2000) (APPENDIX 3).

3.4.3 Participant observation

From the two initiatives that are examined in this paper, the researcher had the chance to do a participant observation in one of them, the GTF. The type of observation done can be described as passive observation, meaning that the observer was present in the scene of action but he did not participate or interact with other people to any great extend (Spradley, 1980: 59). In total participant observation was done in two of the meetings of the GTF, one in June 2005, when the research was still in its first stages and one in March 2006 when the research was getting closer to its final stage.

The observation offered valuable help in many levels. First of all, it gave a very concrete idea of what the Forum is, how it works and what are the processes taking place within its context. Secondly, it was a chance for the researcher to meet the participants

and talk with them in an unofficial environment, something that had a direct impact on the interviews which were made later. Most important however, was the fact, that the observer was able to collect information which was directly connected to the questions posed by the research question. In that sense, the observer was in position to take notes about the behavior of the participants to one another, and also about the atmosphere that prevails in the meetings.

3.5 Data analysis

The data gathered as a result of the research are both qualitative and quantitative. The interview was the main source of the qualitative data giving a very concrete idea of what the participants think about the initiatives they participate in, what are the transfer tactics used by each participant and the initiative as a whole, and equally important how they perceive the learning process they have been through and the changes in relations with the rest of the participants. The participant observation in the GTF was also a quite important source for qualitative data as well.

For the analysis of the qualitative data there was a need of a codebook which would indicate the parts of the interviews that can be used in the research. The codebook (APPENDIX 4) includes codes for the cognitive outcomes and relational outcomes as well as for the transfer strategies. The cognitive outcomes are coded as *learning about the conflict*, *learning about the other*, *learning about in- group*, *learning about track- II*, and *leaning new skills*. The relational outcomes are coded as *trust*, *friendship*, and *other relational outcomes*. Finally, the transfer strategies include *upward*, *downward* and *lateral transfers*. After all the interviews were subscribed they were coded with the assistance of a computer software called Nvivo.

The quantitative data is the outcome of the close constructed questionnaires. The data provided by these questionnaires for the cognitive outcomes helped filling in two charts (one for each initiative). Each entry from the questionnaires was added to the chart followed by numerical representation of the participants' answers and also the percentage that this number represented as a division of all the answers. The charts are designed in this way that the answers from the Turks and the Greeks can be distinguished so that comparison is possible. As for the questionnaires which deal with the transfer strategies it helped filling in a chart including the strategies that each initiative use and also when or how they did it.

As a final step of the analysis part, all the quantitative figures will be given in detail followed by comments and explanations. Afterwards they will be supported with qualitative data provided by the coding of the interviews. The results of the analysis will hopefully offer a solid base for the assumptions of the current research to be based on.

3.6 Shortcomings

The research strategy described above has created a comprehensive framework which led to data that are very interesting for the understanding of track-II initiatives. However, there are some methodological concerns that should be discussed. Unfortunately, the researcher had no pretest data available. This means that there is no data which can show the cognitive or relational standards for the participants before they start being members of the GTF or the GTJC. Thus, there is nothing to compare the data which is outcome of the current research which can be considered as a posttest. Consecutively, as long as the cognitive and relational part of the research is concerned, the data provides us with perceived outcomes, meaning that the participants talk about changes they saw in their selves in retrospect and therefore, they actually speak about

how they perceive these changes at the specific time that the interview was given. This is why the word 'outcomes' is far more suitable from the word 'changes' and the term changes is used most of the times conventionally.

Nevertheless, the data reached from this research is still valuable, because even if for example a participant perceives that he has gained new knowledge through participation in a track- II initiative, this means a great deal for the initiative itself. Before examining what are these perceived outcomes for the cases of the GTF and the GTJC a short description of the two initiatives will be given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

DESCRIPTION OF THE INITIATIVES

This chapter includes a description of the two initiatives, exploring the ways or reasons that led to their formation, the processes that take place during these initiatives, the members of each initiative and the issue discussed. At the end of the chapter some of the commonalities and differences between the GTG and the GTJC will be also pointed out.

4.1 The Greek- Turkish Journalist Conference (GTJC)

The first initiative to be discussed is the GTJC. Following I will briefly describe the Conference, trying to portray its general characteristics, the people who are involved in the initiative and the nature of the issues addressed in it. I will also try to highlight the possible commonalities or differences between the GTJC and the GTF which was analyzed above. The data for this part are also derived from the interviews with the organizers of the Conference, but also some interesting information were kindly provided to me by one of the organizers in the form of a memo.

4.1.1 Formations and members

The GTJC was realized for the first time in 2000, in a time when even though the relations between the two countries had begun to become smoother, the media in both Turkey and Greece had adopted a quite nationalistic approach while broadcasting issues relevant to the relations of the two countries. Before the decision for the formation of the GTJC was taken, Dr. Oktay Eksi in coordination with the Turkish journalist Nur Batur decided to invite some Greek journalists to Istanbul in order to discuss about the situation in the media of the two countries. In this first meeting there were about 15 Greek journalists, all from Athens besides one from Thessaloniki and one from Western Thrace, Mr. Dede. The idea for the formation of the Conference was taken in this meeting. As one of the interviewees reveals:

“After we discussed we decided to make an organizing committee of rapprochement with the goal each side to try to remove the influences applied from governments or other organizations and influence the Greek Turkish relations in order to serve political games, and to give the opportunity to the journalists of each side to explain to the other side’s journalists what happens in their country and how they approach different events because indeed there were many things that each side didn’t know about the other”

The organizing committee, which is officially called “the contact group”, comprises of six very well- known journalists, three from each side. This small group of people is indeed the heart of GTJC, as they are responsible for its organization, the issues discussed, the formation of the panels and in general the realization of the Conference.

The members of the Conference are by definition Turkish and Greek journalists. To explain this part further, I believe it is essential to distinguish three different groups of participants. The first group is the Contact Group which as mentioned includes the same six people from the beginning of the Conference. The second group includes people who participate as panelists, analyzing a specific issue that is under their specialty or that the

Contact Group has asked them to present. People in this group are predominantly journalists and people of the Media, but there have also been academics. The third group, which concerns the big mass of the Conference, includes journalists who have been invited by the Contact Group for participation. The number of participants is not standard. For instance, in the first Conference, which took place in Greece in February 2000, the list of participants included 71 journalists. In the second Conference in Istanbul, later the same year, the participation grew including 77 Greek journalists and around the same number of Turks. For the third Conference although there are no exact data available to me, it is certain that the participation from the Greek side was rather poor, something which actually had a negative impact on the Turkish side.

4.1.2 Process

Until now there have been three Conferences held, with the first one taking place in Athens in the year 2000. Although, the initial plan was to hold two Conferences per year, financial and logistical problems prevented the realization of the Conference for five years. However, the GTJC was organized again in 2005, for its third meeting and it is scheduled to take place in June 2006 in Istanbul. The duration of the Conference is one and a half days, although the second Conference lasted only for one day. All the Conferences took place during weekends, and this shows the effort of the organizers to attract more participants.

For each Conference, there are specific topics which have been decided by the Contact Group, that are subject to discussion. For each topic there is a panel, comprising of three or four panelists. The coordinator of each panel is a member of the contact group. After each panel, there is time for open dialogue and clarification questions from the audience. Data from the interviews with the members of the Contact Group show that the discussion part is very interesting, and also it is the session of GTJC that helps the people involved understand the other side. It was also obvious, from the same data, that the

discussions were some times intense. The following example as described by one of the interviewees is indicative:

“... when the last conference at Athens took place there were some people from the Turkish group who were expressing some opinions which were a little bit stretched. For example for the issue of the accession of Turkey to the European Union they were saying things that were unrealistic, that Turkey is a big country and for this the EU should accept it. This caused tension in the discussion but this was also positive. So there were some discussions, which are useful because through personal opinions we made that people understand some issues.”

Beside the panels and discussion sections in the Conference, the organizers of the initiative seem to pay much attention to leisurely activities as well. In every meeting there are quite a lot activities planned including, opening ceremonies, dinners, talks given by officials and politicians.

4.1.3 Issues

In each Conference the issues discussed are decided by the Contact Group in advance. The issues analyzed and discussed concern the role of the media in the Greek-Turkish relations and in general issues concerning media in the two countries. For example, an issue discussed in the first Conference was “Assessment of positive and negative influences of the Media on the Greek-Turkish relations”. Another example from the second Conference in Istanbul is “Organizational and other forms of cooperation in multiple levels, of journalists and media executives of Greece and Turkey”. However, occasionally there are topics not directly connected with the Media, topics for example that concern the European perspective of Turkey. Moreover, there are open discussions which are related with the future of the initiative and also discussions which are meant to evaluate the work done in the Conference so far.

An important piece of information that should be taken under consideration is that there is the will from the Contact Group to expand the issues covered in the initiative, so that it also include issues which are not directly attached to the media. A Turkish member of the Group answering a question on how the GTJC could be improved mentions among others:

“...we should not only discuss the problems of the media, or not to discuss mainly political issues. We can talk about social matters, low politics, cultural exchanges, music; all these things. And plus the TV series which have been very influential lately. In the coming conference we have invited some, not officials, but some other colleagues lets say who are influential on the other field, like culture.”

4.2 The Greek- Turkish Forum (GTF)

The GTF is probably the most important track-II initiative working on the Greek Turkish relations, and also it is the only group that has been going on for such a long time. Since 1998 approximately 35 meetings have taken place in different countries and there are a number of different issues addressed in these meetings. The meetings take place in a closed environment where only the members and people invited from both the Turkish and the Greek teams, can attend. Following I will describe in detail the GTF as it has been introduced to me by its members through the interviews and also by using the knowledge from my observation in two of its meetings.

4.2.1 Formation and members

The GTF was established in 1998, following two conferences in Wilton Park in England where 15 Greeks and 15 Turks participated. After the conferences some of the participants received an invitation asking them to be participants in a smaller group. Until now it is not clear who put the list of the participants together but most of the members of

the GTF that were interviewed believe it was someone from the British side. It was also the British side that handled the funding at the beginning through the Robert's Foundation and RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) which is dependent on the English Ministry of Defense. However, in the very early stages the PRIO (Peace Research Institute of Oslo) became involved by offering further funding.

The first meeting took place in London and the initial group included 7 Greeks and 7 Turks. Although the first couple of meetings took place in other European countries, the rest of the meetings took place in either Turkey or Greece. At the beginning there were 4 meetings per year, 2 in each of the two countries but during the last years the number of meetings was reduced to two. There were also two coordinators assigned for the Greek and Turkish group. Christos Rozakis, a well known Professor of International Law, was the initial coordinator for the Greek team and Admiral Guven Erkaya, who was also Admiral of the Turkish Army during the Imia/Kardak crisis, was the coordinator of the Turkish group. Currently, both of the coordinators have changed. After the death of Admiral Erkaya, Ambassador Iltur Turkmen took the coordination of the Turkish side and he is still the coordinator. From the Greek side Dr. Rozakis was appointed as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and he had to withdraw his participation to the GTF since he was an official member of the Greek Government. Later on he became a Judge in the International Court of Justice. Since his withdrawal the coordination of the Greek team was appointed to Costa Karras.

The members of the GTF are all prominent figures in their societies. The two groups include former ambassadors, well-known professors, philanthropists, advisors to politicians, politicians and high-ranked military officers². Indeed a remark we should make at this point is that the people selected for participation in the GTF are very important people who have excellent knowledge of the issues addressed in the meetings. However, membership is not everlasting. Currently, there are 11 members representing Turkey and Greece in the GTF and only some of them were in the initial group when started in 1998. These people constitute the core group of the GTF or the Policy Analysis

² Not in the current formation

Group of the GTF as it is sometimes called. The explanation for this is simple. Old members may stop participating because of lack of time, personal issues, or even because they occupy a new position that does not allow their participation (as the example of Dr. Rozakis mentioned above). New members are invited to cover the empty spot of an old member, or if the core group decides that their knowledge could help in the meetings (for example when the forum started the discussion on Cyprus Dr. Hadjivasileiou was asked to become a member of the GTF because of his rich knowledge on the issue).

In addition, there are many other people who have participated in some of the meetings but in any case they do not belong to the core group of the GTF. It is not unusual that people with various affiliations (journalists, researchers) are invited to participate if they can help the process with their knowledge. For example Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish journalist, has often been invited in order to explain the current trends in the media or to give information about latest events.

4.2.2 Process

The GTF group meets twice a year, with one meeting taking place in Greece and one in Turkey. However, there is no strict rule on this and if the members think that there are issues to be discussed the GTF can be organized more often than that. For instance, in the meeting taking place in Istanbul in March 2006 the members decided that they want to meet again in June 2006, and this would make the Forum's third meeting in less than 9 months.

Each meeting lasts approximately for one and a half days. I believe, according to my observation that this time- frame can be divided into two different parts. The first one includes a general discussion where the members have the opportunity to exchange views about the developments which have taken place in the two countries since the last meeting. This part of the Forum is a great chance for the members to see how people

from the other team see and understand their problems. To explain this further, what is happening in this part is that every team explains the developments in their own country and then accepts questions from the other side. For some of the members of the GTF this part is the most important one since it helps them form a view of what the other side is thinking and hence can understand it better. As one of the Greek members says during the interview:

“I must say that I find this part of the session extremely interesting because this is how you understand how the other side thinks how the other side feels and what are its immediate concerns, which is very important in a process like this. I also had the opportunity to follow different lines of thinking in the Greek side; it is a very nice reflection in the Greek side as well.”

The second session mainly consists of presentations usually from visiting members concerning a specific issue within the context of the Greek- Turkish relations. For example, in the meeting that took place in Ankara in June 2005, Dr. Thanos Dokos from ELIAMEP, who was for the first time invited to the Forum gave a very interesting presentation on how Turkey and Greece can relieve tensions over the Aegean Sea. In the same meeting a Greek-Cypriot, Alexandros Lordos, gave a presentation on a survey he had made on Cyprus on what changes the people from both communities on the Island would like to see in the Annan plan. After the presentations a discussion follows and questions are being asked back and forth.

Although the participants are people with high image and rich background, the atmosphere prevailing in the discussions is quite relaxed and warm. Personally, as an outsider, I could actually feel the personal connection among the members, mainly those belonging to the core group. The participants were feeling free to ask some times hard questions in an informal way without worrying being misunderstood from the other party. There are situations when voices become higher but everything seems to move within the limits of decent and fruitful dialogue. Humor is also present in the discussion with members from both sides exchanging humorous comments occasionally.

The sessions described above are moderated by a third party who in the case of the GTF for many years has been Dan Smith, a scholar affiliated with PRIO. In action Dan Smith would almost let the group find its own way through the discussion and would only intervene if there was the need to get the dialogue in the correct track. However, in the last meeting, March 2006, Dan Smith could not make it to Istanbul and the moderation of the session was appointed to Dr. Ustun Erguder and Ms. Polina Lampsas jointly. Since, the meeting was one of the best the Forum had for a long time, at the end there was a discussion among the core group, if there was the need for a third party anymore. Although there were no decisions made on the table, it seems that from that point on the Forum would work without a third party and the meetings would be moderated from the members.

4.2.3 Issues

As the Forum has been taking place for many years now, there are a lot of issues that have been discussed and different approaches to various issues have been examined. During the first years of the Forum, the group had focused on the Aegean issue and this led finally to a common paper which was signed by the members of the GTF in 2001. The importance of this joint statement can be seen in the words of all the members of the Forum. For instance a member from the Greek team says:

“We came up in the year 2000, which is a breakthrough in my view, with a document recommending a process for eventually leading the question of the continental shelf and its relating issues to the International Court of Justice. It’s a very clear view, we gave it to the two foreign ministers signed by the members of the GTF, as we told them ten days later we made it public. And I consider it the golden mean; when you see it you will see how it is possible to get Greeks and Turks to agree to a common procedure toward eventual settlement of this particular issue by the ICJ”

However, after this paper was signed by the GTF it was obvious that there were not many things left to do on the Aegean issue. The Forum dealt with other less important issues concerning Greek- Turkish relations like the minorities' rights, or confidence building measures. It would not be far from the truth to say that although the GTF offered a very good line of communication between the two countries, it was also facing a stalemate. As one of the members revealed to me just after the meeting in Ankara in 2005, *“if the GTF does not start dealing with hot issues, we will end up as a bunch of friends getting together twice per year having a good time”*. Finally, the group decided to open the Cyprus issue, an issue that the Greeks almost denied to discuss in absence of Greek-Cypriots. In the meeting which took place in March 2006, a number of prominent personalities from Cyprus were invited and after some discussion the group reached a very important decision which in my opinion gives a different value to the GTF, although this was not the first meeting that Cypriots participated. The decision was that there should be a Cypriot group which would meet some times per year and would report to the GTF. It is, so to say, the beginning of the Cyprus branch of the GTF.

4.3 Commonalities and differences

Both the GTF and the GTJC are track- II initiatives functioning in the context of the Greek- Turkish conflict. However, the way each initiative is being organized and the role they try to play are very different. Following I will try to point out to the main differences, but also to some of the commonalities that can be found between the two initiatives. The main differences can also be seen in Table 2.

One of the main differences between the two initiatives is that while the GTF is being held in a closed environment, the GTJC is an open process where the number of participants can vary and under some circumstances it is also open to the public. In that sense, the GTF is a Forum with a primary target to include only the members and thus, create a decent and fruitful dialogue. This way it can be assured that each of the members

Table 2: Main differences between the GTF and the GTJC

Differences between the GTF and the GTJC	
GTF	GTJC
outcome-oriented	process- oriented
close format	open format
Third- party (until recently)	No third party involved
People with different affiliations involved	Journalists only
Started earlier when the relation between Greece and Turkey had reached a nadir	Started after the rapprochement
Policy advising group	Decision making initiative ³

of the Forum will be able to say his/her opinion without the fear of the public. In other words secrecy is a very vital issue for the GTF to work properly. On the other hand, the decision of the organizers of the GTJC is to keep this initiative open to every one who is interested. In this case we can actually assume that the number of the participants as well as their affiliation would not allow making this initiative a closed one.

The goals of each initiative are also quite different, meaning mainly that the GTF and the GTJC have almost completely different reasons of existence. The GTF is not a decision making initiative. Its role is strictly advisory and also some times, if needed, it can also function as a communication line between the two parties. Also its character is exclusively political. As one of the members says:

“...I am not familiar with any other initiatives which moved among these lines. There were other civil society initiatives but this is a purely political one. So it is not like Greek Turkish economic cooperation board or anything of this sort, it is probably the most prominent political group. I participated in some of the foreign economic relation board, sub-committee of the Greek Turkish

³ At least to the extend that the decisions concern the journalists or the Media

economic council. But these are economic ones, there are not like GTF, they are to promote business among Greece and Turkey. They are decision making ones.”

On the contrary, the GTJC is an initiative that can make decisions at least to the level these decisions concern the journalists and the world of the media in the two countries. The primary goal of the Conference is not to influence the conflict or to make recommendations to the policy makers, but instead to create a cooperative environment for the journalists from Turkey and Greece. According to the Contact Group the way to achieve this is through dialogue and mutual understanding. Through this way there may also have been some indirect influences to the conflict.

Another important difference is that the GTF and the GTJC have different orientations. The GTF is solution oriented, in the sense that in the meetings the members are trying to find ways that would make the resolution of the Greek- Turkish conflict easier. On the other hand the GTJC is more relationship oriented as its main goal is to bring the journalists of the two countries together.

Despite the differences we can still find some common ground, some commonalities between the two initiatives. Both the GTF and the GTJC are formed by people who wanted to see rapprochement realizing, and who at some point they understood that there should be efforts beyond the official level for this to happen. Thus, we can say that the way of thinking of the people involved in both initiatives is quite similar at least concerning the ways the civil society can back up the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey.

Another commonality is that both initiatives engage people who are quite well-known in their societies and also quite influential so much for the politicians and policy makers, whom with most of them have very close relations, but also for the society at least for those of the participants who have the means to communicate with the society. I have already talked about the affiliations of the participants in the GTF, but also in the GTJC the level of the journalists involved in the Contact Group is very high. There are

head columnists and chiefs of editing in top- rated newspapers, directors of big radio stations and so on.

In the current chapter the GTJC and the GTF were described and some of the main issues concerning these two initiatives were discussed. Moreover, some of the common points between the initiatives were clarified and their main differences were portrayed. In the next chapter follows a brief analysis of the main issues of the Greek-Turkish conflict.

CHAPTER 5

CONFLICT CONTEXT

This chapter includes a short mapping of the conflict and it gives valuable data to the reader which can help him/her understand better the negotiations, the actions or the non- actions of the Track-II initiatives under study. I also found it important to add a small piece which would describe the developments of diplomatic contacts at the official level which happen within the time-frame examined.

5.1 Issues

It is quite challenging to explain the issues in the Greek-Turkish conflict and the main reason is that traditionally in this conflict it is very hard to find the two parties agreeing on what are the issues that should be discussed. For the needs of this paper we will consider an 'issue' any issue that is being posed by any of the two sides. Generally, we could say that all the issues can fit under three umbrellas: the Aegean issues, Cyprus Question, and problems concerning minorities.

5.2 The Aegean Issues

The confrontation over the Aegean Sea is probably one of the most complicated issues between the two sides as it is comprised of several problems. Even though these problems are connected to each other in a higher or lower degree, they should be discussed separately since the two sides have developed a different argumentation for each one of the problems. The problems concerning the Aegean Sea that will be discussed here are the delimitation of the continental shelf, width of territorial waters, the Greek air space and the Flight Information Area (F.I.R.) over the Aegean, the demilitarization of the islands of the East Aegean, and finally the operational control of NATO in the Aegean Sea.

5.2.1 The Continental Shelf

According to the definition given by the third UN Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 the continental shelf is defined on article 76 paragraph 1 as:

The seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas of a coastal state that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.⁴

At this point there should be some things cleared out. The first one is that both Greece and Turkey as states with a coast on the Aegean are entitled to continental shelf and the second is that the continental shelf does not in any way imply sovereign rights but it grants exclusive rights of exploitation and exploration of the wealth of the territorial

⁴ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

shelf. Moreover, the notion of the continental shelf was not known before the WWII and therefore there is no reference to it in the Lausanne treaty.

5.2.1.1 Positions of the Turkish and the Greek side

The problems with the continental shelf between the two countries started in the 1970's when the parties started the efforts for exploration of the Aegean continental shelf in order to find oil. Greece had already granted licenses for petroleum explorations from 1963 but only to areas within the territorial zones of the islands or its coasts. According to Bolukbasi, Greece was the first to grant license for exploitation outside the limits of its territorial sea, near the island of Limnos (Bolukbasi, 2004). The same event is seen by the Greek side from a totally different point of view. According to it Turkey unilaterally decided to grant licenses for exploitation of the Aegean continental shelf in 1973 which included areas that Greece had already granted to foreign companies for exploration (Rozakis, no date).

According to the Greek side, the islands are entitled to their own continental shelf based on the Geneva Convention. Thus, most of the continental shelf should be considered to be Greek and moreover Turkey shall not have any rights to the west of the Greek Islands because this is a threat to its sovereignty (Aydin, 2004). The issue of sovereignty is probably the main concern of the Greek state which in any case cannot accept Greek territory to be within Turkish continental shelf. To understand better this concern, one should also keep in mind that the Greeks fear that Turkey does not only have economic reasons to claim half of the Aegean's continental shelf. The fact that throughout the years of exploration there are no major exploitable oil reserves found (Theodoropoulos, 1995; Aydin, 2004) backs up this fear.

Turkey's point of view on the continental shelf issue is completely different from the one Greece stands for. The first and most important argument of Turkey is that the

area she claims constitutes the *natural prolongation*⁵ of the Turkish territory and that, in a geomorphological sense, the continental shelf upon which the eastern Aegean Islands rest forms the prolongation of her mainland (Rozakis, 1997: 101). In that sense the Greek islands lying very close to the Turkish mainland do not possess a continental shelf of their own (Bolukbasi, 2004). As a solution to the problem, Turkey proposes the delimitation of the continental shelf on the basis of equitability. However, according to Turkey's position in order for the equitability method to apply on the Aegean case, the bases should be the Greek mainland and the Turkish Anatolian coasts, rather than the islands.

5.2.2 Territorial Sea

According to the current situation in the Aegean Sea, Turkey and Greece apply the six-mile limit for their coasts, meaning both their mainland and islands. Since, the territorial sea implies sovereign rights it is very important to understand that the territorial sea is part of a state's territory. Thus, under the current status quo Greece owns 43.5% of the Aegean Sea, Turkey owns approximately 7.5% and the international waters comprise 49% (Evin, 2005).

5.2.2.1 Positions of the Turkish and the Greek side

The current status in the Aegean Sea concerning the territorial waters does not cause any problems and it is acceptable from each side vis-à-vis the other. The problem begins with Greece's claims that she holds the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles when the time is convenient. The right of Greece to a 12 n.m. territorial sea is a direct outcome of the United Nations Convention of the Law of Sea (UNCLOS III)

⁵ Highlighted in the original

which Greece signed in 1982, and was ratified by the Greek State in 1995. According to the ratification act:

Greece has the inalienable right, in application of Article 3 of the convention which is being ratified, to extend at any time the breadth of its territorial sea up to a distance of 12 nautical miles (Ioannou, 1997).

According to the Greek arguments, the fact that the Aegean Sea is a semi-closed sea does not deny the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles because although the status of the semi-closed seas is acknowledged in UNCLOS III, it is not implied anywhere in the convention that the 12 n.m regime is differentiated depending on the case. Finally, to answer Turkey's claims that the possible extended Greek territorial waters will cover Turkish continental shelf, the Greek side brings the argument that the right for territorial sea, as a right of sovereignty, precedes the right to continental shelf (Rozakis, no date).

The governments of Turkey have repeatedly declared that if Greece attempts unilaterally to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, it will constitute a *casus belli* for Turkey (Aydin, 2004). To understand Turkey's hard position on the issue it is important to point out that in the case of extension its vital interests in the Aegean are being offended. Concretely, Turkey's free access to high seas will almost disappear as the ships will have to go through Greek waters. Moreover, automatically Turkey will also lose rights to a big part of the Aegean continental shelf (scientific researches, exploitation rights, cable laying etc), rights provided by the use of waters (fishing and navigation), and rights in the airspace of the Aegean (military maneuvers, overflight etc) (Gunduz, 2001). To back up its case legally, Turkey refers to the equity and equitability principles provided by international law, the rule of the 'persistent objector' and the status quo set by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. In addition, Turkey points out that the character of the 12 nautical mile rule in UNCLOS III is opposite to the one Greece tries to implement, in the sense that this rule tried to favor the freedom of the seas by

preventing some states from extending their territorial waters to a limit greater than the 12 nautical miles (Bolukbasi, 2004).

In order to give a concrete image of what the Aegean Sea will look like in the case that Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, it is worth mentioning that Greece will extent its sovereign rights to 71.5% of the Aegean, Turkey would merely increase her share to 8.8% and the international waters will decrease to 19.7% (Evin, 2005). The current status quo and the situation that will arise in the case of extension of the territorial waters to 12 nautical miles can be seen at the maps provided at the end of this chapter.

5.2.3 Problems concerning the airspace above the Aegean

There are two different problems between Greece and Turkey which concern the airspace over the Aegean Sea. The first one refers to the width of the Greek national airspace; it is a question of sovereignty and it is also connected to the territorial waters issue. Concretely, the question rises from the denial of Ankara (and most of the international community) to recognize a different width limit than the limit of the territorial waters for the Greek national airspace. The second issue concerns the status of the Flight Information Area (FIR), which is not a question of sovereignty, but only jurisdiction over a particular area which aims to ensure safety in flights.

5.2.3.1 Positions of Greece and Turkey

In June 1931 with a presidential decree Greece fixed its national airspace to ten nautical miles. Until the present day Greece retains this length for its national airspace

while its territorial waters limit is, as mentioned before, fixed at 6 nautical miles. There are three different arguments from the Greek side which justify this, moderately unusual, practice of the Greek state as explained by Rozakis (no date). The first one advocates that Greece has two maritime zones, one of six miles and a second one which extends 4 miles beyond the first one and it aims to serve only for the control of the air traffic. The second one suggests that the different width limits for territorial waters and national airspace is in accordance with the international law since the width of the national airspace width is within the maximum allowed by the international law width of the territorial zone, which is as mentioned before set to 12 nautical miles. The third one proposes that the status of unequal zones has existed for more than 40 years with no objections by a third party (including Turkey) and therefore it can be considered as a local custom (also in Ioannou, 1997). However, it should be noted that there are voices that question the usefulness of the 10 mile air space and support the idea of a homogeneous width limit for the territorial sea and the national airspace (Theodoropoulos, 1995).

Concerning the FIR, Greece recalls the right granted to it by the Third Regional Meeting of the European Civil Aviation Conference in 1952. According to the decisions taken there the limits of the Athens FIR were fixed at a point bordering the outer edge of the Turkish territorial waters, leaving Greece in control of both international and Greek national airspace over the Aegean (Syrigos, 1998). Greece, based on these rights, and in order to ensure safety in air traffic, asks from every military aircraft entering the Athens FIR to submit flight plans.

Turkey does not recognize the 10 nautical miles airspace which Greece claims for itself and frequently Turkish military planes fly in the international airspace of the Aegean within the 10 mile limit (Aydin, 2004). Turkey claims that Greece's arguments have no validity under international law, mainly because under international law the limits of national airspace should coincide in length with the limits of the territory, in this case the 6 miles. Moreover, domestic legislation, like the Greek presidential decree which established the 10 mile national airspace limit, is meant to implement international law and not create it. Finally, to answer the Greek claim that the unquestionable use of the 10

mile airspace for 43 years has created a local custom, Turks answer that simply they were not aware of it until 1974 (Bolukbasi, 2004).

As far as the FIR is concerned, Turkey accuses Greece of using its authority given to it over the FIR in order to extend its sovereign rights to the whole Aegean airspace, meaning including the air over high seas. Bolukbasi (2004) gives examples of corridors, with extreme lower and higher flying limits, which were aligned by the Greek state and which were moving very close to the Turkish coast. As for the flights of military planes, which Greece considers as violations since they do not submit flight plans before their entrance to the Athens FIR, Turkey claims that the Chicago Convention only covers flights being carried out only by civil aircrafts (Evin, 2005). Therefore Turkey has no responsibility to inform the Greek services for the flights of their military planes over international air space.

5.2.4 Militarization/Demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands

To understand better the arguments of the two parties, and especially those coming from the Greek side, it is vital to divide the islands of the Eastern Aegean into three different groups. The first group includes the islands of Mitilini (Lesvos), Chios, Samos and Ikaria which fall under Article 13 of the Lausanne Treaty. The second group includes the islands of Samothrace and Lemnos which are situated north, close to the Dardanellia entrance and fall under article 4 of the above treaty. The third and final group is the Dodecanese islands which were granted to Greece by Italy in 1947 with the Paris Peace Treaty.

5.2.4.1 Positions of Greece and Turkey

In the case of militarization of the islands of the Eastern Aegean, Greece does not deny her obligations that has undertaken under the Lausanne Treaty. However, she argues that there are special circumstances that led to the militarization of the islands. For the first group of islands Greece bases her arguments on Article 51 of the UN Charter which backs up the right of each nation to defense (Theodoropoulos, 1995). Actually, this argument can also stand for the other groups. Even though this Article states that the right of defense is granted to a nation only after an attack has already been made against it⁶, Greece argues that the common practice in international community has shown that states can go on with preventive actions concerning their defense. For the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace Greece argues that article 4 of Lausanne Treaty has been replaced by the Montreux Convention in 1936, which gave full sovereignty to Turkey over Dardanelles and the Islands Imvros and Tenedos. After that Turkey militarized these islands and Greece did the same for Lemnos and Samothrace (Rozakis, no date). Concerning the Dodecanese islands, their demilitarization status is an outcome of the Paris Peace Treaty between Greece and Italy. The treaty directly states in Article 14 that the Dodecanese islands should be demilitarized⁷. Since Turkey is not a part of the specific treaty, she cannot, according to Greece claim a clause from the treaty. As long as Italy has never protested for the militarization of the Dodecanese islands, Turkey also has no right to do so (Rozakis, no date).

5.3 Minorities

The status of the minorities in Greece and Turkey is set again by the Lausanne's Treaty. The obligations of the two sides (rights to education, religion, security and civil

⁶ <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>

⁷ http://www.mfa.gr/greek/the_ministry/eny/1947_italy_treaty.doc

and political rights) are described in section three Articles 37-45 of the above Treaty. Moreover, Article 14 specifically refers to the status of autonomy that the islands of Imvros and Tenedos should have⁸.

The issue of the minorities shall not be discussed here in detail, since there is no conflict concerning the interpretation of treaties or of international law. It actually has to do with complains from both sides concerning the rights of the minorities. From the Greek side the main complains concern the reduction of the Greek minority population and the weakness or the unwillingness of the Turkish state to answer its obligations deriving from the Treaty of Lausanne. Also for the Greek government the issue of those who were deported in 1964 is open (Theodoropoulos, 1995).

The Turkish complains according to Rozakis (no date) focus on religious rights being trampled by the Greek governments, barriers to members of the minorities for investments, hindrances to freedom of speech and expression.

5.4 Images

Despite all the real problems existing between Greece and Turkey, it would still be difficult to understand the conflict if we did not also take under consideration the feelings that Turkish population has for the Greek and visa-versa. I believe that explaining the images the one party has created towards the other is very indicative of the dynamics of the conflict and also it will give a more comprehensive understanding of the dispute.

One of the first accounts of the images each side has for the other is given by Millas who explains the way school textbooks in both countries picture the other. So, in the Greek textbooks the Turks are described as barbaric, the enemy, invaders and so on,

⁸ <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html>

while there is a very positive view for the Greeks and their achievements. The same image exists in the Turkish textbooks, but from the opposite perspective. In this case the Turks are those who were ideal and the Greeks are pictured as unfaithful, unreliable, macerators of the Turks and so on (Millas, 2004). Moreover, under the same study Millas comes to the conclusion that these images described above are maintained in the Greek and Turkish literature and the historiography as well.

Furthermore, Carkoglu and Kirisci (2005) give some very interesting data which reveal Turks' perceptions of Greeks. According to their findings, Turks see the Greeks very negatively, ranking them only one position above the last in the friendliness perceptions. In the question of which country would be Turkey's best friend in the international arena only 1.1% of the interviewees answered Greece while 36.1% considered Greece to be the worst friend (both open ended questions). Another very interesting finding is that Turks consider Greece to be their number one threat, since they believe that in the case Turkey is attacked this would be by Greece (29%).

The same survey was also made in Greece with the reverse questions⁹, exploring the Greeks' perceptions of the Turks. The data reveal that Greeks perceive Turkey as the main enemy in the international arena with a percentage of 72%. On the other hand, only 0,5% considers Turkey as the closer ally of Greece. Moreover, on a scale ranging from one to ten, with one representing totally hostile and ten being totally friendly, 59,7% of the people questioned answered for one.

5.5 A new era in the Greek-Turkish relations?

The Greek- Turkish relations have undoubtedly entered a period of détente and rapprochement after 1999. In 1999 there are two major facts that certainly helped a lot in order for a turn in the relations between the two states to realize. The first one was the

⁹ The survey has not been published yet but the data was kindly provided by Dr. Dokos from ELIAMEP

earthquakes that happened in Istanbul and in Athens approximately a month following the first one. The humanitarian help provided by each party to the other created the view that the earthquakes created a positive atmosphere in the Greek-Turkish relations:

If this popular view is an accurate depiction of reality, then we are faced with the phenomenon of public opinion swaying reluctant governments. This is not uncommon in the Greek-Turkish relations but with a major difference: it has swayed them in the very positive direction, towards conflict and animosity rather than reconciliation and peace (Heraclides, 2004: 74).

However, most scholars would agree that the positive turn in the Greek-Turkish relations had started even earlier. Earlier that year in May 1999, the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs had met in New York to set a group of common targets which concerned lower politics cooperation (Evin, 2005). This type of contact between Ismail Cem and Yorgos Papandreou, two ministers who were open to dialogue and communication, is referred to as ‘earthquake diplomacy’ (Couloumbis, 1999).

No matter what exactly the turning point was, the positive atmosphere that existed at the end of September 1999 led to the change of the Greek policy line during the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, where Greece gave the green light to the beginning of negotiations between EU and Turkey which would lead to accession. Nevertheless, this change in Greek policy should not only be attributed to this positive atmosphere described above. In fact the Greek policy makers took the chance to engage Turkey in a process (democratization, detention of the military’s role etc) which would at the end have a positive effect on the conflict. Moreover, Greece also got immediate concessions from Turkey. Firstly, the two countries would submit the issues of delimitation of the continental shelf and gray zones to the International Court of Justice, if all the other means would fail. Secondly, Turkey accepted that the resolution of the Cyprus problem was not a condition for Cyprus accession (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2004).

5.5.1 The Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish conflict

After the Helsinki summit a new chapter in the Greek- Turkish relations has begun. Firstly, the conflict internationalized or to be more specific Europeanized. All the distinctive issues described above became a matter of importance not only for Greece and Turkey, but also for the European Community, and the actions of these two parties as well as their strategies should now be re-examined in order to fit the European context. Apart from being ‘allies’ (which the two countries were since 1952 when they entered the NATO), they would also have to be partners.

In that context, as we have seen from 1999 to the present days, we are no longer in the era of the big crises (Imia/ Kardak, Ocalan, S-300) but in an era that could be described as the time of communication, understanding and dialogue.

5.6 Conclusion

As a conclusion to this chapter a chronology of the main developments in the Greek- Turkish relation over the past ten years will be given. This will also help in positioning the GTF and the GTJC, and some of their acts in the conflict context. The main incidents that had an impact on the Greek- Turkish relations can be seen in the following table:

Table 3: Main Developments in the Greek-Turkish Relations

Main developments in the Greek- Turkish relations 1996- 2006	
Date:	Incident:
January 1996	Imia/ Kardak crisis. The two countries reach at the brick of war, but the situation de-

	escalates before it becomes an armed conflict
1997	S300 Crisis
1998	Kick- off of the GTF
February 1999	Ocalan crisis. The Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan is abducted by the Greek Embassy in Kenya and transported to Turkey. The GTF is held in Athens where only one Turkish member chooses to attend. Other track- II initiatives are postponed.
May 1999	The two foreign ministers, Cem and Papandreou meet in New York and agree on low politics cooperation
August 1999	Earthquake in Turkey. Greece sends search and rescue teams
September 1999	Earthquake in Athens. Turkey responds by sending search and rescue teams.
December 1999	Helsinki Summit. Greece changes a long lasting policy and gives the green line to Turkey for starting of accession negotiations with the EU
2000	Kick- off of the GTJC. Two conferences are held in this year
2001	GTF generates the Aegean paper
2002	Secret exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey start
November 2002	Elections in Turkey. The AKP wins the elections and becomes the governing party
December 2002	Copenhagen Summit
April 2004	Elections in Greece. The New Democracy party wins the elections and becomes the governing party

Map 1: Aegean sea with 10 n.m. Greek Territorial sea



Map 2: Aegean Sea with 6 n.m. Greek Territorial sea



CHAPTER 6

THE CASE OF GTJC

With this chapter the data analysis part of this thesis begins. The first initiative to be reviewed is the GTJC; the results from the questionnaires will be introduced and quotations from the interviews will provide qualitative data to support them. Firstly, the cognitive and relational outcomes are being examined and then the transfer strategies the GTJC used will be presented. A table which includes the results of the questionnaires is added at the end of this chapter.

6.1 Cognitive outcomes in GTJC

6.1.1 Learning about the other

The kinds of knowledge concerning the other side that a person can gain in a track-II initiative can take many forms. In the close constructed questionnaire there are six different questions which try the whole spectrum of the cognitive outcomes which are in any way connected with the other side. The results suggest that the participants of the GTJC as a whole believe that interaction through the Conference helped them considerably to learn about the other side. Following, I will present findings from the questionnaires and from the interviews.

One type of learning is concerned with perspectives of the other, meaning if the members of the Contact Group think that their participation helped them understand the point of view of the other side. The answers in the interviews and the questionnaires suggest that the interviewees agree that they have seen a great deal of change in their learning in that respect.

All the participants from both the Greek and the Turkish teams agreed that their participation has helped them understand the perspective of the other. Moreover, in all the cases there was almost no hesitation for them to answer positively to this question, in contrast with some other questions, where sometimes they needed clarifications or they wanted to think about their answer. The results, however, can be considered normal because this question is quite general and it can cover a lot of things from the spectrum of knowledge about the other side.

Data from the interviews also illustrate about how participants understands and how they express this type of knowledge that they have acquired. For example a participant explains:

“First of all, it gave us the possibility to realize the way the journalists from the other side operate. Meaning, which were the perceptions they had shaped all these years and so on. We approached and I think the same stands for the other side, the mentality and the way the journalists function”

Through these lines we can understand that the Conference helped the participants understand the line of thinking of the other side, but also the interviewee goes one step further, and based on what he has experienced, he also believes that the rest of the people involved in the Conference should have seen a change like that in themselves.

A second type of learning regards the political dynamics of the other side. Alternatively, this question could be framed as understanding the ways that political powers on the other side are distributed. The overall results for this answer are not as homogenous as in the first question. However, in this case as well the majority of the

group answered positively, meaning that they have learned more on this issue and two of them answered no, indicating no change.

In the interviews there are no direct expressions that might reveal that a participant learned more about the other side's political dynamics. Nevertheless, there are a few indirect statements that suggest it. For instance a Greek journalist from the Contact Group says:

“There is a completely different mentality between the Greek and the Turkish journalists. In the Turkish side you have the ones who are Kemalists, who are feared that the lack of the secular state will lead to the collapse of the state, and they hate everything that is Islamic. There is nothing like this in Greece”

The above statement can also be correlated with the next type of learning which is somewhat similar to the political dynamics question.

The next type of learning regards if participants had any new knowledge about the political needs of the other party or not. This means that participants should say if the Conference helped understand more the desires of the other party in the policy making level. Thus, in that case the above statement implies that some of the Greek interviewees understood the political need of the Turkish side for safety, in terms of territorial integrity.

To support this assumption, another Greek member of the GTJC commenting on the new knowledge says:

“In correlation of the way the Turkish state acts towards Greece it was that the Turks had the same perception like as, let's say of victimhood...What exists to the Turks is fear. They fear that, better of feared because this has also changed, Greece is a small but extremely dangerous state concerning the being of the Turkish state”

In this case, as before, it seems a significant cognitive outcome for the Greeks has been the understanding of the importance that the Turkish side gives to safety and security.

The resemblance between the second and third questions in the questionnaire can also be seen in the answers, as again most people from the group answered that they indeed have learned more about the other's political needs. Again two interviewees, one from each side said that they have not learned anything new on this specific topic.

The people who comprise the contact group were also asked if they have any new knowledge concerning the diversity on the other side. In plain words, this could be explained as an observation that the other group is not homogeneous and does not have only one opinion but there is more than one point of view within it. The results from this question are quite encouraging. All the Turkish members of the Contact Group and all its Greek members answered that they have enriched their knowledge on this topic. Once again this outcome makes much sense, especially if we consider the large number of people who participate in the conference. It would be really difficult for all these people, even if they belong to the same group, to share the same ideas.

Interview data is also rich with respect to the diversity issue. For instance, in the quote above it is obvious that a Greek participant separates the Turkish team into Kemalists and Islamists. Even though this is a typical example of new learning about the other's diversity, it can also be considered as a new type of stereotyping or "sub-typing". Moreover, there are also other direct statements from participants on this issue as well. A Turkish participant clearly states:

"After some time we discovered that the Greeks had differences on their opinion and they were people with whom we could do business with"

The next type of learning covered in the questionnaire deals with political and social constraints. In this case what we are looking for is if there is any cognitive outcome

for the members of the Contact Group concerning this issue. The answers to this question from the questionnaire are all positive so much from the Turkish members and for the Greeks as well, a fact that indicates that all the journalists who are affiliated with the GTJC greatly appreciate the knowledge they gained from the Conference on the political and social constraints.

On the other hand, the interviews are not indicative on this issue, and none of them includes a direct statement. An example of an indirect statement is:

“I think we have learned the views of each other more, and this gave us the opportunity to understand the other side better. Understand the fears, understand the prejudices of the Greek media and understand the prejudices of the Turkish media. They understood us more and we understood them more”

This quote from an interview with a Turkish member of the GTJC talks about fears and prejudices which can fall under the category of social and political constraints, in the sense that fears and prejudices can be considered as an obstacle for political and social rapprochement.

A final type of learning is concerned with whether or not the interviewees realized that the other side is more sophisticated than they might have initially thought. This question aims to explore to what degree the members of the Contact Group began to see the other part as more complex than before. This type of learning is different than the learning about the diversity. What is meant by sophistication is that the ideas of one side are more complex, include a well-organized argumentation and they are not just arbitrary claims.

In this case the results are interesting because although there is an agreement on the Turkish side that indeed they understood that the Greek side is more complex than they thought before, in the Greek side two of the Contact Group members said that there was no new learning concerning the sophistication levels of the Turkish side. However,

they also added that this does not necessarily mean that they believe the Turkish side is not sophisticated or monolithic.

Concerning the issue of complexity of the other side out of six interviewees it was only mentioned directly only by one Turkish member. As he mentioned:

“as a result I made three or four trips to Greece. And I met many Greek journalists as a result of the Conferences and I saw that the Greek press was not as monolithic as it appeared from the outside that there were different kinds of people, there was a variety of outlooks, and I am sure the same thing stands for the Greeks”.

After having finished with the questions covered in the close questionnaire which deal with cognitive outcomes about the other, I have to mention that there are also many statements that came up in the interviews and suggest knowledge about the other side but do not fit under the categories mentioned. For instance statements like:

“I think the most important thing I learned is that Turks and Greeks can live together and that Turks and Greeks are very similar in many respects”

or

“we understood that as long as we know each other better then we were closer to understand each other mental language”.

The statements above are actually a direct reference to what is called “empowerment” and it is also one of the possible cognitive outcomes of track- II initiatives mentioned in d’Estree et. al. (2001). In this case it seems that the Conference helped the participants to create a positive and optimistic approach towards the future and empowers them.

Another issue that worth commending on is that two out of six people in the interviews stated that the Conference did not change the way they have been thinking for the other side. Nevertheless, the same people seem to have given some positive answers in the questionnaire which has filled in after the interview.

6.1.2 Learning about 'in- group'

This type of learning is concerned with learning about one's self or the in-group. The results suggest that members of the GTJC recognize that they have learned more about their own side, but nevertheless less than they learned about the other side. Another observation is that the Turks tend to be more positive about this type of cognitive outcomes while the Greeks tend to say 'no' more often, and they are more reluctant to accept that they have also learned about their self. It seems that the Greek interviewees had a strong belief that they were very well informed about their "in group" even from before the Conference.

The first question on this topic is if the participants have understood more the political needs of their side. The results show that half of the interviewees answered negatively, and one of the Greeks answered that even if there is a change, this is negative in the sense that he was confused more about the political needs of the Greek side. The second question is whether or not the members through the processes of the Conference have understood more the political and social constraints of their side. In this case even though the answers from the Turks are all positive, one Greek said no and two answered 'yes' but one of them said that the change has been rather negative than positive. The third question is about the diversity on 'our side'. Once again all of the Turks answered positively while the Greeks were again more skeptical, with the majority of them saying that they feel more confused about the diversity on the Greek side and only one of them answering for positive change. A comment that should be made here is that although the interviewees perceive confusion as negative, it actually shows that their thinking is challenged.

Unfortunately there are not many statements in the interviews which can offer qualitative examples of the changes that the members of the Contact Group have experienced on this issue. There are two reasons for that, first of all, people were more willing to talk about their new knowledge about the other side, and not their own.

Secondly, as the negative answers are many, the change of people mentioning a change in the interviews is also reduced. However, even in the quotes that have been given already we can find sentences that imply knowledge about the people's own side.

6.1.3 Learning about the conflict

This category of cognitive outcome concerns new knowledge about the conflict itself, in this case the Greek- Turkish conflict. There are two questions in the questionnaire that deal with learning about the conflict.

In the first question the interviewees had to answer if they have understood that a solution to the conflict is possible or not. At this point the participants must think about the things they heard during the Conferences, and also the things they learned about themselves and the other side and judge if all that have made them believe that resolution of the conflict is more probable than they thought.

In this question the answers are quite positive with the majority participants saying that they have changed their mind about the tractability of the conflict. Moreover, one member who answered negatively also added that he always thought that the problems between Greece and Turkey could be resolved so there was no further space for the Conference to convince him otherwise.

The references of new learning about the tractability of the conflict are not very frequent in the interview data but still some direct expressions can be found. For example a Turkish member of the contact group says:

“I also felt that my theory about resolving conflicts between Turkey and Greece was collaborated by this experience. In one of the early meetings before the earthquakes and the rapprochement started, I had reached the point where I was beginning to think

that Greek Turkish problems was irresolvable, that they could only been transcended. One of the point I was trying to make is that I believe that one format of transcendence would occur if Greece and Turkey were both members of the European Union. Not one down here and the one up there. That would be a format because when Turkey and Greece become members of the same political institution which aims for greater integration many of the problems that we have would become meaningless; such as Cyprus and the use of the Aegean. And so on and so forth. So I think my theory was proven”

Another member, also from the Turkish group, says that this experience was helpful for everyone who participated in order to understand how steps forward can be accomplished:

“Yes, I learned about the conflict, because in any conflict, the basic thing is to compromise. You cannot solve any conflict if you do not compromise. So I think the basic idea started having a base, you know that we should compromise. We cannot get everything we cannot give everything we should compromise”

The second type of learning concerned with the conflict itself asks the participants if the Conference has helped them understand or acquire concepts that are useful to better analyze the conflict. For example, as we have seen in the chapter where the Greek-Turkish conflict context is described there are many details especially regarding legal issues attached to the International Law.

The members of the Contact Group were very positive to this question and all of them answered positively with no restrictions or comments. Unfortunately, in the interviews no one mentioned anything that can be coded under this category. This may not be so strange though, if we take into consideration that the question is very specific, and in case this type of learning is not among the first things an interviewee would think of in an open ended interview. However, there are some things that the interviewees said and can be put under the new learning about the conflict. A Greek member suggests that there was an assumption reached in the Conference which concerned knowledge about the conflict and the role of the media:

“What came out was the assumption that there is a vicious circle of mutual feedback from the media to the public opinion and visa versa. When for example the media were sensing that the public was moving towards extreme positions they repeated it, and then the extreme positions influenced the public opinion”

It is also interesting that two of the people in the interviews directly denied any new learning about the conflict. One of them, a Greek, states clearly:

“The perception that existed about the conflict continues to exist, there is nothing changed”

while the other, a Turk, also challenges the whole idea that the Conference dealt with the conflict itself:

“We are not interested in conflicts. Each side has so many people to deal with the conflict. We are not even discussing an issue like Aegean issue or FIR line or...we have never discussed these kinds of things”.

6.1.4 Learning about track-II

Moving on to more concrete types of new learning there is a paradox starting to appear. There is an inconsistency between the answers given in the close- constructed questionnaire and the ones given in the interview. For example all the members of the GTJC said that they have learned more about track-II initiatives and the way these initiatives can contribute to conflict resolution. On the other hand there is no direct or indirect expression about this type of learning in the interviews. The lack of statements that mention new learning about the track- II processes in the open ended interviews can be interpreted again that this is not one of the most salient pieces of learning for participants even though they reported learning of it.

6.1.5 Learning new skills

The same paradox as above can be also observed in this case. However, in this case also in the questionnaire it is only half of the participants who say that they have learned new skills, including two Turks and one Greek, while the other half says that there is no new learning that concerns skill building. These skills mainly concern policy analysis skills, negotiation skills, or communication skills etc.

The above data covered the cognitive outcomes from the Journalists' Conference. The outcomes seem to have been positive especially in specific types of learning, such as learning for the other side. The analysis will continue with the relational outcomes of the GTJC.

6.2 Relational outcomes of the GTJC

For the relational outcomes what is more important is the changes in relations that the participants of the GTJC and especially the members of the Contact Group have experienced since the time that the Conference has been organized. During the coding of the interviews there were three parameters kept in mind. The first one is whether or not there were friendships developed among the members of the Contact Group or between the six members of the GTJC and other journalists that participated in the Conference. The second one involves the building of trust, and how the process of trust building moved forward through the processes of the Conference. Finally, other relational outcomes, such as empathy, were also coded if they were mentioned in the interviews.

On the first question which concerns friendship, all of the interviewees answered positive, meaning that they indeed have made friends with some people from the other side. Moreover, some of them pointed out while completing the questionnaire that although they have come closer with many of the people, there are one or two people that

they really developed friendship with, and these people are not necessarily also members of the Contact Group.

Friendship seems to be an issue that is often mentioned in the interviews as well. There direct and indirect statements that show that people from the two sides have improved the relations among them considerably. A very characteristic statement comes from a Greek which says about the Conference:

“It contributed much from the Turkish side; For the Greek side it contributed that some Greek journalists met with some Turkish journalists”

and he continues later on

“the Conference had a very big impact in the sense that it created an atmosphere of rapprochement and smoothing and friendship between the two parties”.

There are some indirect statements which are indicating the good relations that have been constructed as an outcome of the Conference. A Turkish member says:

“I think there has been great improvement, there is constant contact, and personally I have constant contact with quite a lot of colleagues in Greek media”.

Another Turks says:

“I know now that if I go to Greece I have an address in my mind in my pocket, I know I am in an easy position there, so it really helps a lot”.

In both these statement we can understand that friendship is a reality between members and participants of the GTJC, but also that this friendship is highly appreciated by the members of the Contact Group.

On the second question which deals with trust among the two sides, the answers have been quite positive as well. All of the Contact Group members accepted that there has been a change in terms of trust towards the other side, and as time goes by they feel like they can trust the other side more. In the interviews there are no direct statements which express trust. However, there are a couple of indirect expressions which imply that people have engaged in a trust building process. For instance, Turk says in the interviews:

“in the 1st conference we had, I noticed that the Greeks were not accusing the Turks and the Turks were not accusing the Greeks, instead the two sides were very self- critical with a spirit of self criticism which is very helpful and that has been the case ever since. I think this is a direct result of the conference due to the good will it created between the two sides. Because when you get to know your colleague you know that he is not a spy or whatever, and therefore instead of accusing him of being all these things, you say ok maybe I should look at what I am doing”

This indirect statement actually generalizes to all the journalist who participate and not only the members of the Contact Group, and constitutes an example of how better relations can lead to trust building, and also how trust helps the Conference processes to move forward more smoothly.

Finally, concerning relational outcome of the GTJC there are no statements on behalf of the interviewees that suggest that there were other types of outcomes such as the ones mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.

6.3 Transfer strategies

As it has been mentioned in the methodology chapter, this part of the research is completely exploratory. The goal of the data analysis is to find what kind of methods did the initiatives use, if used at all, in order to transfer the learning acquired from the track-II process to the macro- level. Following the directives given in the literature review, the

overall transfer has been divided in three parts including upward, downward and lateral transfer strategies.

The GTJC is a special case when we are looking at transfer strategies because of the nature of the initiative, which aims to create better relations and understanding among the journalists of the two sides. Influencing the participants is the primary if not the only target for the workshop. Therefore, there is no planned strategy for influencing people outside of the Conference. However, there are some interesting data on transfer about the GTJC that I still want to discuss.

6.3.1 Upward transfer

Upward strategies include different methods that the initiative might use in order to influence politicians and policy makers. Since the participants in the Conference are journalists they have connections with the politicians at varying degrees, and as I am going to explain further on the GTJC has maintained a close connection with politicians from both Greece and Turkey. However, what is difficult to assess, is the will of the contact group to influence the politicians. This is because the goal of the Contact Group was to influence the journalists who participated and through them the public opinion, and not the politicians. Thus, as it can be seen from the interviews most of the members of the Contact Group do not want their initiative to be associated with politicians, in the sense that they like to think the GTJC as an independent initiative which concerns only the journalists of the two countries. As a Greek interviewee says:

“We did not seek to create a different policy; the policy is being planned by the governments of the two countries. We went beyond that to see how these results of the policies applied are being managed by the media”.

Nevertheless, the organizers have invited politicians to all the Conferences that have taken place until now. In the first Conference in Athens the two Foreign Ministers, Mr. Yorgos Papandreou and Mr. Ismail Cem, attended the meetings welcomed the participants and gave a brief talk, pointing out the importance of such initiatives for the rapprochement. In the second Conference in Istanbul the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Mr. Bulent Ecevit threw a cocktail party for the participants. Finally, in the third meeting which was also held in Athens, the spokesman of the Greek government and his Turkish counterpart attended some of the meetings. For the fourth Conference which is scheduled for June 2006, there is an effort from the Contact Group to bring both the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece.

The presence of high ranking politicians in some of the Conference's meetings, however, should not lead automatically to the assumption that there is upward transfer, since happens only when there is transfer of cognitive outcomes from the micro-process. Actually, a closer look shows that the participation of politicians has been quite typical, and their role was limited to giving opening speeches, throwing welcoming parties for the journalists and meeting with the journalists. So, as it seems the aim for inviting politicians is not to influence them, but on the contrary as some of the Contact Group members say the presence of politicians aims to give more momentum to the initiative. For example a Turkish member says:

“The first conference was really successful, the two foreign ministers came Ismail Cem and Papandreou, I think they were the ones who took the initiative to have a new start in the Greek Turkish relations and they gave support to the Turkish Greek media conference as well, and after that it was a big success the first one”

Another Turkish interviewee said:

“we have off course good contacts as journalists with the politicians which gives us the opportunity to push forward in this Conference and to take the initiative...to get their support as well. The ministers' participation for example is important; it gives a momentum to our initiative. And the other side, they are influential

journalists also, and that helps. But nobody has a real political connection I would say”.

From the above statements it is quite clear that the Contact Group sees the presence of the politicians, not as a chance to for the Conference to influence the politicians through upward transfer, but on the contrary, as a chance for the Conference to gain more momentum and become more successful. So, the assumption that could be made for the case of the GTJC is that the direction of transfer is opposite that the one the upward transfer implies.

The connection with the policy makers exists also in another level. Some of the interviewees believe that the Conference has helped (or can help) the work of the politicians because it diminishes nationalism in the media and therefore it reduces the possible political cost in the case of rapprochement. One interviewee says:

“I think we can make it easier for the politicians. If we minimize the nationalistic language they will have a better ground to discuss the matters to have the possibility to compromise, to have to give and take on the table because everybody is under the political pressure, and psychological and social pressure so the more we minimize the nationalistic way of approaching I think the political atmosphere will ease more and more every day”

However, also this interaction cannot be considered as transfer. What can be argued is that there is a complementarity or coordination between the Conference and the official track, in the sense that these seems to be a two-way assistance between the two.

To sum up, it seems that there is no intended or planned upward transfer from the Conference to the policy- making and the decision- making levels. The connection with the politicians seems to be typical, and the politicians are used by the organizers in order to help increase the momentum of the initiative. Since, there is even a limited interaction upward transfer cannot be excluded. Actually it is likely that while the politicians are present in the Conference they have the chance to talk to the participants and exchange

views about the initiative. However, even if this type of upward transfer happens, it is not planned by the organizing group and also it is very limited.

6.3.2 Downward transfer

The second group of transfer strategies includes those methods that may have been used by the initiative in order to influence the society, or more simply the big mass of people. Before I discuss the qualitative data from the interviews there are two important points I would like to mention. Firstly, as already mentioned above the GTJC did not intend to influence anybody but the participants only. However, and this brings me to my second point, since this initiative concerns journalists and media, we can assume that what the designers of the Conference had in mind from the beginning was to have an impact on the public opinion via the journalists by diminishing the nationalistic language in the media of the two countries. So, even if the primary goal is to influence the journalists who have participated, through them we can also assume that there is the underlying goal of influencing the public opinion. Based on this assumption it can be argued that the macro-level that the downward transfer aims can be divided in two. First comes the journalists who participate in the Conference's processes and their number is quite big and secondly is the influence on the public opinion.

The above assumption is clear among the members of the Contact Group who seem to believe that the changes that the journalists went through, will influence decisively the way news are broadcasted on the media and had an impact on the public opinion as well. this perception of the Contact Group is well emphasized in one of the interviews; A Greek member says:

“Laicism and nationalism had invaded the media etc. characteristics which we understood they had affected both the newspapers and radio or television of Greece and Turkey. So, since we accept the media have an essential role in the shaping of

public opinion, the question was how the media with more responsibility, moderation and understanding would intervene in this process of shaping the public opinion”

Another statement, from a Turkish member this time also shows how the GTJC managed, according to him, to create positive atmosphere among the journalists and through them to the news coverage:

“it has worked much better than we had expected from the beginning, the whole tone of media coverage in both countries changed partly as a result of what we were doing, I am not going to take credit for the whole change, obviously that change was taking place at many levels and journalists of course are not isolated from the rest of society and they are affected by other changes in society. But the media component was especially important because as I said before media is an amplifier of feelings, feelings of sympathy and feelings of hatred, and the coverage on both sides is toned down considerable, the old acrimonious nationalistic rhetoric is no longer visible”

So, the members of the Contact Group believe quite strongly that, although indirectly the initiative addressed the public opinion’s change.

Nevertheless, there is an obvious lack of planned downward transfer strategies that could further contribute to a more direct downward transfer. The Contact Group has not discussed how the Conference can influence the public opinion or the media attitude at large. For example there is no official website of the initiative or joint press conferences that could make the work of the Conference known to a broader group of people. What do exist are some individual efforts from some of the members. For instance Nur Batur said she has given some speeches in Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara and also in Sakarya University about the Conference. Haluk Sahin also told me that sometimes in his lectures he mentions examples from the GTJC and some of the results of the meetings. Last but not least, all of the six members of the Group said that in interactions they have with friends and colleagues they share some of the new learning they have acquired in the Conference.

6.3.3 Lateral transfer

All of the six people interviewed admitted that there has been no interaction with regional or international organizations with the aim of sharing knowledge or make recommendations. This fact is further proved by the lack of statements in the interviews that might suggest this type of interaction. However, there is a project going on that if realized could be described as lateral transfer. As an interviewee reveals:

“So now on the fourth conference our aim is, if we can possibly make it, to create an association between two sides and combined by the journalists of two sides. Then it will be an institutionalized relationship. Then we will withdraw, the next generation of the profession will take over hopefully”

Hence, there is this goal of creating a bi- national Journalist’s Association which could work as a regulatory instrument.

Finally, there was one occasion when a women’s NGO was invited to the Conference in order to offer their own views about the Conflict and the problems the two societies face. However, a member of the Contact Group confessed that this has not been a very useful contribution to the works of the GTJC because the people from the NGO started talking about their own issues with the result of confusing further more than help the works of the conference.

6.3.4 Evaluation of transfer

As it has been made clear by the research question the current work is not an evaluation research, and in any way it is not aiming to evaluate the transfer effects or impact either in the policy making level or the societal level. However, it is still important to describe the perception of the organizers on what the effect of their efforts

might have been. In general there is an optimistic view among the Contact Group that the initiative had a direct and indirect impact on the conflict. This is obvious in some statements that have already been quoted above. However, the general tendency in such initiatives is that the organizers themselves usually overemphasize and generalize their achievements. The overall impact cannot be measured with the current methodology and it is difficult to isolate the work of the Conference from the rest of the events in the Greek- Turkish relations.

CHAPTER 7

THE CASE OF THE GTF

Having examined the case of the GTJC in the previous chapter, this chapter deals with the GTF initiative and explores the cognitive and relational outcomes of the Forum, as well as the transfer strategies that it used. A table at the end of the chapter summarizes the results from the questionnaires.

7.1 Cognitive outcomes of the GTF

In this case the division of each learning group is the same as the one used in the case of the GTJC as the questionnaire remains the same. Thus, the questions focus on the learning for the other side, learning for the “in-group”, learning about the conflict, learning about track- II initiatives and learning new skills.

7.1.1 Learning about the other

In the case of the learning which concerns the other, there again six different indicators which are taken from questionnaire number one. Following I will analyze the answers that the participants of the GTF gave to these questions, concerning learning from the initiatives.

As far as the learning and understanding of the other side's perspectives is concerned, the responses have been very positive, just as in the case of the GTJC. All of the participants of the Forum said that the GTF helped them understand the others' perspective. Once again this was probably one of the easiest questions for the interviewees to answer, since there was no hesitation and no clarifying questions while answering.

The appreciation of the participants of the GTF to the understanding of the perspective of the other side is also clear in the interviews. One of the newer members of the initiative says:

"I am not sure this process concerns itself with understanding the Greek and Turkish people. The process concerns with understanding Greek and Turkish ways of thinking perhaps in a more refine basis, politicians and high level academics. Yes. Let me put it like this...it did not change my views but it certainly provided a dramatic enrichment. I feel that I have been missing things for many years that I was not in the GTF. Changing perhaps no, but certainly enrichment to a point that it is really dramatic. This is I think and I can speak as a younger member of the Forum; I think that this has much to do with the exceptionally high quality of representation from both sides"

There is also another quote from the interviews which I distinguished because it comes from a former Ambassador. As he mentioned:

"I must say I learned a lot. I learned a lot about Greek view and perception of the problems. Although I had many discussions with Greek diplomats in the past, it was never on such a sustained basis"

The above statement is important because it actually shows how the GTF works and in general how a track- II environment can be more beneficial in terms of learning than official track.

The next learning is concerned with the political dynamics of the other side and how people who participated in the GTF managed to understand them better. This question carries special weight because the GTF is a political initiative, and therefore learning about the political dynamics of the other side is a very important part of the knowledge that the participants look for.

As in the previous question the participants seem to perceive that the GTF has helped them learn how the political dynamics are set on the other side. So, in this question as well, all the participants, Turks and Greeks, answered that there was a positive impact. The high ratio of positive answers should be expected. After all most of the talks taking place within the context of the GTF concern political issues, and there is a lot of space for the participants to express their political beliefs.

However, the impact of GTF in helping the participants understand the other party's political dynamics is not reflected in the interviews as there are not many statements, direct or indirect, supporting this claim. It seems that the participants prefer to make more general comments about the understanding of the other without specifically mentioning the understanding of the political dynamics. However, there are still some statements that can support the results from the questionnaire. For instance a member of the Greek group, who is also a close advisor to a high ranked politician, says:

“one of the most important things was that we started to understand the complexity of each society, the different schools of thought, the different way of thinking of different categories of elites and this was particularly useful”

In this case “different schools of thought” and “different categories of elites” can be translated into political dynamics, in the sense that different elites can be attributed to different political parties or distinguished political approaches. Another quite direct statement made from a Turkish participant says:

“For someone that worked in Turkish diplomacy for 40 years has to come across with the Greek position many times. So, I know

what the Greek position is. So I tried to figure out what its details were; what is the percentage of others behind a certain position”

The next type of learning is also important for the GTF because it is, once again, dealing with the political level, meaning with knowledge that concerns details about the others political situation. Concretely, this question asks the participants how they evaluate the knowledge that they have gained from the GTF about the political needs of the other side.

In this question the majority of the interviewees answered positively and only one member of the Greek team answered negatively. What might be important to mention in this case is that the participant who did not answer positively is one of the younger members of the Forum, in terms of participation in the meetings, having been a member since 2003.

A very concrete example I would like to give is from a Greek participant. In his interview while talking about Turkey’s accession to the European Union he says:

“I also learned that the Turks are very slow in understanding what this whole accession process actually means and what impact it has on their foreign policy especially vis-à-vis Greece. I think they are very slow in understanding that this means fundamental changes that have to come about and this is something that has emerged in every one of these meetings”

The above statement, although it is in an indirect way, constitutes a fine example of understanding about the other side’s political needs, since the political need of Turkey may shape its foreign policy vis-à-vis Greece.

The next type of learning is concerned if participation in the Forum has helped participants to learn or understand the diversities of the other side. The question was very interesting to the interviewees and many of them made comments about how within the context of the GTF there are no strict lines between the two groups, but also within the teams. Some of them while filling in the questionnaire said that some times there was

even “tri-versity” within the same group, while a couple noted that, although there was diversity in both groups probably the Greek team had more diversity than the Turkish group.

Therefore, the results from the questionnaire do not come as a surprise. All the participants showed no reluctance to accept that through the GTF they managed to learn more about the diversity on the other side. The participants also mentioned learning about the diversity in the interviews. For example consider the following from a senior member of the Turkish group:

“The interesting thing about the GTF is that sometimes you get what we call in Political Sciences “cross cutting cleavages”, that is sometimes you find your self not as talking as Greeks or Turks but you see some Greeks and Turks together and some Greeks and Turks on the other side. So you get this complicated matrix”

The above statement is very important not only because it gives valuable information on how the discussion are held but also because it says that the diversity sometimes becomes so obvious that people agree more with a participant from the other group and disagree on the same issue with someone from their own group.

The next type of learning is about if participants have learned new things about the other side’s political and social constrains or not. The answers from the questionnaires suggest that there was important learning in this area, with most of the participants answering positively to the question. Nevertheless, there were no statements in the interviews suggesting that this type of learning was a part of the learning and understanding that took place through the GTF process. What should be pointed out though, is that a couple of interviewees clarified that even though they answered in a positive way, they meant that it was more like an exposure to others constrains that rather really learning more about it. As a Greek participant said while filling in the questionnaire:

“we were familiar with the Turkish political and social constrains, but it was the first time we were exposed to it”.

The final type of learning which concerns the other side is about the complexity of one side, and to what degree the participants think that they have understood that the other side is more sophisticated than they thought before their participation in the GTF. The ratio of positive answers to this question is not as high as in the rest of the answers, but still it quite high. The majority of the members answered yes, while some of the participants said that they do not think they learned anything new in their regard. Some of them also added some comments like for example that they never thought the other party was not sophisticated and so on.

One of the members made a quite interesting remark which is also a direct statement on this issue. She said:

“of course also we found out that finally each side, and this was discovered from both sides, is not so lets say as monolithic as we tend to believe before”

Although this participant expresses only her opinion, she seems to think that this change has also happened to other participants as well from both the Turkish and the Greek teams.

Finally, a general comment regarding new knowledge about the other side is that all of the participants seem to agree that they have learned a lot. However, during the interviews some of the interviewees made general comments and avoided being very specific. So, for instance there are a lot of statements like

“The meetings are about understanding one another. From that point of view the GTF has been successful and has been a notable beneficial influence in both countries”

Or

“Well, the orientation of the forum is first of all to understand each others thinking”

made almost by every participant of the Forum. Another interesting issue is that although some people started with statements such as “*It didn’t necessarily change my views about Greeks because I knew more about Greeks than just that group*”, later on when they were elaborating on the issue they admitted having learned new things about the other side.

7.1.2 Learning about ‘in-group’

Following the pattern set in the discussion about cognitive outcomes for the GTJC case, learning about our side will be the next issue to touch upon. The results from the questionnaires suggest that this type of learning is not as frequent as learning about the other side. In all of the interviews there are only a couple of direct statements which show that people think they have acquired new knowledge about their in-group party as well. Some of the indirect statements have already been quoted above.

Concretely, in the question which asks about the political needs of the in-group, eight out of ten people answered positively. However, it should also be mentioned that both of the people who answered ‘no’ were Greek participants of the GTF. In that sense, the results can be compared with those of the GTJC where again the Greeks were more reluctant to answer this question positively. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain the reasons for this variation between the Greeks and the Turks. The second question which deals with the understanding of the political and social constraints of one’s side has very similar results as the previous question. There are seven participants (4 Greeks and 3 Turks) who answered positively and three who said no. On the third question about diversity in the in-group, all the Greeks answered that they have learned more, which up to a degree proves the point mentioned above that the Greeks were more diversified, while one of the Turkish participants answered negatively.

From the interviews there were only two direct statements which mention in general how learning for the in-group was one of the cognitive outcomes. The first one

comes from a Greek participant who is a member of the group from the beginning of the initiative. She says:

“I would also say that we learn the details of the position of our own side, because in such a process we don’t learn only about the other side, you learn also about your own side and you can see your side with the eyes of the other. This is particularly useful”

The above statement is quite interesting because once again the answer seems to engage all the members of the GTF; the interviewee prefers to use the form of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ as she tries to explain that according to her beliefs this learning applies to the rest of the participants as well. The other statement comes again from a Greek member. During his interview he said:

“I have learned a lot of things about the evolution and the ways of expression of Greeks as well. On such high level discussion people present, I think, their best self. And it is very interesting to see this happening not only from the Turkish side but also from the Greek side which I know better”

Once again this is a direct statement about new learning about the in-group.

7.1.3 Learning about the conflict

As we have already seen in the case of the GTJC the cognitive outcomes which concern the conflict itself can be divided by two types. The first one is learning about the tractability of the conflict and the second concerns learning about new concepts which can be used to understand the context of the conflict better.

On the first type of learning participants of the GTF showed a quite positive attitude, with most of them answering that their participation helped them understand that a solution to the Greek- Turkish conflict is more feasible than they thought before. Only in one case an interviewee answered negatively to this question.

From the interviews we can extract a lot of qualitative data which support the results of the questionnaire, since at least half of the people stated something that can directly or remotely be connected with this issue. A very representative example is what a Greek member of the GTF says about his participation in the Forum:

“It made me believe that we can find solutions to all our main problems because the way we are brought up and what we hear mostly from the media makes us believe that these problems will never be solved without very painful concessions from one or the other side. Or a solution would never be accepted from the Greek or the Turkish society but through these discussions and through these different ideas that are being discussed I believe now that if there is enough political will from both sides then we can really find solutions on our main problems”

Within the same spirit a Turkish participant, although he seems quite reluctant and uncertain he mentions:

“If it changed it changed in a positive direction. Let’s say that I became more convinced that these are not unresolved differences”

As it can be seen by both these direct statements not only there is a belief among the participants that they have learned that the conflict can be solved but this change has been positive in the sense that they started to believe that the conflict is indeed solvable. So, there is a more optimistic approach concerning the tractability of the conflict compared to before.

As far as the second question about new concepts is concerned the interviewees have not been as positive as in the first question but still the majority of them answered positively. Even though there are some statements in the interviews I would like to share what I have experienced in the meeting which was held in Istanbul in March 2006, which is closely connected with this question.

In this meeting the members of the GTF had decided to call prominent people from Cyprus in order to discuss the Cyprus problem. Among the people who were invited

were individuals who under their affiliation they had excellent knowledge on important issues, but most importantly they were able to explain all the details. During the discussions the members of the peer group had afterwards they were mentioning how helpful had this meeting been for them and how the visitors from Cyprus had managed to inform them on very specific yet very important issues. This was a moment where new learning about concepts that concern the conflict had been very obvious in the group.

7.1.4 Learning about Track- II

Learning about track- II, meaning new learning about the tractability of the conflict or new concepts that can help understand the conflict, has also been a cognitive outcome for the participants according to their answers in the questionnaires. Only one of the GTF members, a Turkish, answered negatively in this question. However, what should be pointed out is that three more people directly mentioned while filling in the questionnaire that although they learned more about the ability of track- II to contribute to conflict resolution, this also includes the limitations of track- II initiatives. In plain words, participants learned more for both the abilities and limitations of second track diplomacy.

Within the interviews there are some interesting statements on the issue, which show what people believe about track- II initiatives and specifically for the GTF. A Greek interviewee says:

“If we want to see resolution to any conflict situation it is important to give time to an initiative and it is important to create roots with the same people who can meet for a long period of time. And I am insisting on that because it doesn’t happen usually. And also I think that we should not neglect these 1 ½ kind of initiatives because they can really make the difference some times”

In this case the person who makes the statement is being very straight forward about her belief that track- II initiatives can help the resolution of conflicts. Another member from the Turkish team explained how the unofficial format of the group has helped the Forum's work:

“What makes the GTF interesting is that it is very informal. It is really difficult to understand who leads, what happens, what are the lines of responsibility, draw an organizational chart for example. I think it is the strength, the informality is the strength of the organization”.

7.1.5 Learning new skills

The answers from the questionnaire suggest that learning about new skills has been relatively low, at least for the Greek team, where only half of the participants answered positively. On the other hand, on the Turkish side all of the participants answered positively. The participants did not provide any other information on the type of skills that they have learned but in the questionnaires the examples of policy analysis skills and technical skills is given.

However, as in the case of the GTJC, as the questions are moving to more concrete types of cognitive outcomes, it is difficult to find direct or indirect statements in the interviews which can back up the data from the questionnaire. Thus, also in the case of the GTF there are no statements from the interviews that may suggest that some of the participants have learned new skills.

7.2 Relational outcomes of the GTF

As it was described in the section on the Journalists' Conference the relational outcomes have to do mainly with the development of friendships among the members of

the Forum and the development of trust. These are the two parameters that the interviewees were asked for in the questionnaire. However, while coding the interviews other relational outcomes were also taken into consideration.

According to the responses from the questionnaires there are significant relational outcomes in the GTF process. In the question that asks about trust building all the participants answered positively. However, what should be underlined here is that many of the participants were quite hesitant to answer to this question and they wanted to take some time before they filled in the questionnaire. What the participants were explaining later on is that although a certain amount of trust has been developed among the people in the two groups, there is still work to be done in this area. Also for some of them the issue of trust is very important and they wanted to be sure about their answer. Another interviewee said that trust keeps increasing as the time and meetings pass by.

This skepticism towards trust building is also obvious in the interviews where there is only one member of the GTF who makes a direct statement about the trust building process and the way trust has helped the group be more efficient. As she says:

“I think that what worked was to create trust, climate of confidence to give space to the other to express their arguments and to listen seriously to them”

So, in this statement the person who answers actually believes that trust is among the strength of the Forum, and this fact had positively influenced the process.

The results about development of friendships are not much different. Once again all the participants said that they have made new friends with people from the other side, and this time they were also more willing to answer positively. From the interviews some very indicative statements can be found. For instance a Turkish member of the Forum says:

“I think that the Greek team in GTF is an excellent team. We worked very well together. It is rare you can find such a group

which has meetings where there is real discussion but where the atmosphere is always friendly, and where the sense of humor prevails”

In this case it can also be seen how the element of friendship is also appreciated by the people who participate. Another participant says:

“I see the GTF as a place where friendly atmosphere prevails and participants say anything without restriction of binding other people; they bind only themselves. And this gives us background information of how Greek friends look at Turkey from Athens, from their side and our Greek friends learn how Turks look at the things that happen in Greece”

The above statement is another indicative example of how the unofficial status of the initiative has helped the development of a friendly atmosphere among the participants of the Forum.

In addition, I would like to add an incident which happened during my observation of the GTF. In the Istanbul meeting in 2006, after a certain point the visitors who had been invited from Cyprus were asked to leave the room so the core members of the Forum could have a discussion on their own. Up to that point the discussion had been quite formal. However, after the room was emptied by the visitors the atmosphere changed immediately and in a very obvious way to the observer. The discussion continued in a more unofficial format and the members took the chance to exchange friendly comments and criticize in a friendly environment what they had heard from the Cypriots in the previous sessions.

Finally, as in the case of the GTJC there are no expressions that state or imply that other relational changes have taken place; at least not as an immediate outcome of the Forum’s processes.

7.3 Transfer strategies

The GTF is, as mentioned above, a political initiative. As such its main purpose is to function as an advisory to the politicians and the policy makers in both Turkey and Greece. Thus, as the following analysis will suggest most of the efforts on behalf of the participants is targeted towards upward transfer as it was defined in the literature review chapter. However, there are also efforts of the initiative to influence people at the society level. In the following lines the main transfer strategies for all the transfer attempts that have been made by the Forum will be discussed.

7.3.1 Upward Transfer

Most of the participants of the GTF have strong connections to high ranked politicians. Some of them are former Ambassadors, MP's, or are currently serving as advisors to politicians. Thus, it does not really come as a surprise that all the GTF members in their interviews referred intensively to ways they try to influence policymakers and decision-makers and their overall connection with the politicians and the policy makers.

As an initiative the Forum was invited in many occasions by high ranked politicians and other officials to the meetings, so that they can share some of the knowledge the group has generated all these years. These politicians that the Forum tries to approach are mainly the current Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, but also other people who may play significant role in the political life of the two countries. For example one of the members says:

“the foreign ministers used to accept us in both capitals for meetings, in Ankara very often with very high level people. We met Mr. Erdogan before he became Prime Minister, Mr. Gul and other

ministers. In Athens too, but in Athens the government is very busy because EU takes a lot of time from the members of the government. But two times per year Papandreou was meeting with us or Mr Yannitsis at that time”

From the above statement it is made clear that high ranked politicians have been contacted by the GTF. In the meeting held in Athens in June 2006 also, Mrs. Dora Bakoyannis, the newly appointed Foreign Minister has been invited and it is highly likely that she will attend the meeting. Moreover, politicians from Cyprus are also invited to some of the meetings. For example in Istanbul 2006 meeting, Andros Kyprianou one of the higher members of the AKEL party participated, as well as, Oya Talat. Mehmet Ali Talat himself was in the meeting of the GTF which was held in Rome. In the same meeting the new UN envoy for Cyprus, Michael Muller, attended one of the sessions and met with the participants. So, to sum up the invitation and participation of high ranked politicians has been used as a method of transfer frequently by the GTF.

Another transfer strategy that has been used by the Forum is delivering ideas and recommendations to the policymakers. Actually, as an advisory initiative this is the strategy which is used in the most formal way by the Forum as a whole. I have already mentioned the policy paper that was the outcome of the participants work which came out in 2001. This paper was forwarded to the policy making level with the will (or hope), that it can offer a solid base for the beginning of the negotiations on the Aegean issues. Many of the participants mention about this paper and how it was leaked to the governments. For instance:

“at the end of certain meetings we produced a paper and this paper was forwarded by the coordinators of both sides to their respective authorities. Mr. Turkmen forwarded it to the Turkish minister of foreign affairs and Mr. Karras to Mr. Molyviatis. He used to from now on he will forward it to Mrs. Bakoyannis”.

So, this paper was sent to the two Foreign Ministers accompanied by a small letter from the participants. And this was not the only time something like that has happened. In one of the interviews a participant admits that this is a rather common practice:

“You know some times we make joint statements and these statements are sent to the governments. The recent one for example we decided to send a joint statement to the governments asking what happened to the Aegean why is not there any progress. Both sides have contacted the Foreign Offices”

Also many people while filling in the questionnaires said that this is a practice that has been used often.

Another strategy for upward transfer from a track-II initiative is the representation of one of the group members in the official negotiations. In the case of the GTF this happened as well. One of the members of the Forum, Argiris Fatouros, who had participated in the first years and he was part of the group when the ‘Aegean paper’ was edited, was later asked to be on the Greek team that participated in the official “exploratory talks” between the two governments. Professor Fatouros had to leave the group because of his new post and also the “exploratory talks” were being held in secrecy, so there was no available feedback about the ideas generated within the Forum have been used or not. However, some of the participants hope they are. As a Turkish participant says:

“Argiris Fatouros was a member of the team and he is now in the official negotiations. But they are very professional. He does not give us any information of what is going on in the exploratory talks. But I assume that since he signed that document he probably used those arguments. That he knows the Turkish problems better”

Almost the same idea is stated by a Greek participant:

“at that time among the members of the Greek group was the Professor Argiris Fatouros, who was later named from the Greek government as one of the two official representatives who participate in the exploratory talks with the Turks on the same issues. From their part absolute secrecy was kept, but some times while having light talks we were asking him if they had taken this paper under consideration and I believe without him saying it that this paper is in their files and they use it as a possible pattern of a process that could lead to resolution”

So, in both these statements there is the belief that the paper the group has edited might influence the official negotiations between the two countries.

As a final strategy for upward transfer the contacting and delivering ideas should be discussed. This case concerns interaction outside of the GTF framework and therefore it is a different transfer strategy than the invitation of politicians to the meetings discussed before. Actually, from the interviews it can be assumed that this is the strategy that most of the participants pay most attention to. Currently, there are three participants who are directly affiliated with the policy making level; Two Greeks, each belonging to the two major political parties in Greece and one Turkish MP in the governing party in Turkey. In the interviews they give a very concrete image of their connection to the policy making level. One of the Greeks said:

“I got involved when I was a special advisor to Yannis Valinakis, he is currently Greece’s deputy foreign minister, we were approached with the change of government to finance this project and it was within that framework that I was asked by Yannis Valinakis to participate in the Forum, in order more than anything to present the current political leaderships the use, and to be his person that would report whatever useful information comes out of it”

The second Greek who is strongly affiliated with the opposition party says:

“I myself was working with George Papandreou, ex-foreign minister and now the leader of the socialists’ party, who I have direct contact with”

Finally, the Turkish participant explain his connection with AKP:

“Actually, being served in the ministry of foreign affairs and having served in diplomacy for 40 years of course I have friends in the MFA and Gul is a very close person with whom I work so in any occasion I mention to him what we have achieved. So I am sure it is recorded somewhere in the back of his mind and it is also recorded to the mind of the foreign officials whom I see from time

to time, whom I talk from time to time about the outcome of the meetings”

So, from the above statements it is clear that some of the participants have direct link with high ranked politicians on both sides.

Nevertheless, besides the three participants mentioned above, almost all of the other participants have also good relations with politicians, with whom they usually exchange ideas about what they have learned in the Forum. The overall relation can be captured in the words of a Turkish member:

“I inform politicians yes. Sometimes they even call themselves to ask how it went. We communicate politicians after each meeting”.

7.3.2 Downward transfer

The GTF’s main concern is to influence the political and policy making level. However, there are efforts from the group for downward transfer as well, in an effort to influence and transmit the new knowledge to as many people as possible albeit of secondary importance. In order to achieve maximum downward transfer the Forum and the participants individually have used different types of strategies.

First of all, it is a quite often phenomenon that the Forum uses media in both countries. For example the ‘Aegean paper’ was also given to the press, and it was not kept secret. Also some top journalists such as, Mehmet Ali Birand, have been peripheral members of the wider group. A couple of the people in the core group also are regular columnists in newspapers or publish articles periodically. Television shows have also been used as a means to transfer especially with the help of the journalists. As a participant states:

“I also write articles in Hurriet. And there were frequent TV interviews, both here and in Athens Greek TV. I appeared several times on Greek TV and Karras and Greek colleagues appeared many times, Mehmet Ali Birant arranged these interviews organized these interviews on one of the most important programs, the Manset program...I write twice a week in Hurriet. When I write about the GTF sometimes I refer directly to the GTF but off course generally”

Thus, media is one of the main channels the GTF tries to transfer knowledge downwards.

Moreover, the initiative used to have a website through which anybody could access to the main ideas that were discussed. Even though the website is currently down, there is the will from the participants for it to operate again as it was admitted to the writer during private talks. The operation of a website shows the will from the participants to engage more people and to make public at least some of the issues that have been discussed behind the closed doors. This fact can further be proven by the statement of a participant. He says about the ideas that the Forum generated:

“We published them in forum’s web site; we also disseminate them to journalists and opinion leaders. We organized specific round tables with journalists, politicians, business people and we presented them the results of this paper. We did everything to inform as much as possible people who are interested in Greek Turkish relations”.

The participants also accepted that some of their speeches (for example to schools, communities etc) had been influenced by their participation in the Forum, in the sense that the new learning they gained in the process was also reflected in their speeches. The same thing happened for academic lectures for those who have the chance to offer them. Although there are not many concrete examples of these kinds of speeches, it is important to mention that the Forum’s participants due to their affiliations have the chance to address big groups of people often. However, a representative example could be a lecture given by Professor Ustun Erguder at Sabanci University in 2005, where he

explained some of the processes that take place in the GTF and compared it to the Turkish- Armenian Reconciliation Commission.

As an ending note on downward transfer, it is important to point out that some of the participants, and especially those who do not have direct contact at the policy making level, like to underlie the importance of the downward transfer and encourage the group for more action in this area. For instance, an academician who is member of the Forum says:

“Well, in all fairness I would want them to be more outgoing. Public opinion is not as much influenced as I would like to see. Publicize the work we do for example. There also arguments against it, like GTF is a backchannel. My approach is that we had gone too far on that side, we should go more public. Maybe we could go more public before the Cyprus referendum. It is an idea. The other thing is that we are not developing projects. One of the things I liked very much was to bring together youngsters”

7.3.3 Lateral transfer

As in the case of the GTJF lateral transfer is not among the priorities of the GTF. However, there have been cases that ideas or recommendations have been shared with both national or international organizations and other track- two initiatives. One of the first members says:

“We had organized events where we invited the other people belonging to other organizations or forums to participate. We also organized conferences where we invited all NGO’s that deal with Greek Turkish relations and we organized specialized workshop for the NGO’s dealing with environmental issues, with human security issues, women issues or with more media issues in order to help them create links among them and be more efficient in their future work”

Besides these regional organizations the GTF invites or meets with officials from international organizations like the UN, and the EU. The example of the new UN envoy in Cyprus who participated in a meeting has already been mentioned, but there are also examples from Chairmen of various Parliamentarian Committees who were either invited or approached by some of the members.

Finally, lateral transfer is happening through interaction with other grass-root organizations and other influential people who are close to the participants. In the first case, two think- tanks, the ELIAMEP in Greece and the IPC in Turkey seem to be closely affiliated with the initiative. The connection can actually be considered unavoidable since the heads of both these think- tanks are also part of the Forum. The second case refers to personal interaction the participants might have with friends, their colleagues or their communities. All of the participants said that they do try to transfer the new learning through this type of interaction as well.

7.3.4 Evaluation of transfer

Even though this research is not an evaluative one, some information brought up in the interviews should be mentioned in order to show how the participants perceive the results of the transfer strategies applied. The main argument here is that the participants themselves do not know how much the GTF have influenced the public opinion or the official negotiation processes; thus, some of them sound more optimistic than the others. Following two passages representing both approaches are provided. A rather pessimist participant says:

“I think no, no. I have no illusions. I don’t believe that civil society can offer a lot. Not because it has no capacity to do it but because after the Ocalan crisis there was this rapidly rapprochement between the two governments from the initiatives taken by the two ministers of foreign affairs Mr. Papandreou and Mr. Cem, who met in New York in the UN context and a correspondence started

between them, which very fast led to negotiations and to rapprochement and the signing of some bilateral agreements, and at some point I had the impression that the two governments are moving faster than us, the private sector. I don't want to have illusions"

On the other hand in another interview it is mentioned:

"It is tempting to say yes (meaning there was an impact) but if you ask if it is a seminal event... You know like we did this and that happened it is very difficult to say. It is something that is keep adding to the flavor a process that goes on, it is very difficult to isolate it. For example if the Aegean issue is resolved and then you pick up our paper and the way it is resolved has a lot of commonalities I would say we had some impacts. If you ask me does it worth the effort, yes it worth the effort"

In general the assumption would be that no one from inside the group can really know the effects the upward/downward/lateral transfer strategies had. Even the most pessimists leave an open window that there might have been some influence on a certain level, and the most optimists would always be reluctant to connect an action of the Forum with an outcome in the official process.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUTIONS

The aim of this work has been to research the cognitive and relational outcomes of track –II initiatives. Moreover, the strategies that these initiatives use in order to take these outcomes from the micro- level to the macro- level have also been examined. The units of analysis have been two different track- II initiatives running in the context of the Greek- Turkish relations and working on the Greek- Turkish conflict; the Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists Conference.

In order for the results of the research to be more concrete a certain path was followed. As a first step, the main concepts used were clarified and discussed in the literature review chapter so that they are made clear to the reader. Secondly, the methodology which led to the collection of data was analyzed. In chapter three the initiatives under research were described so that the reader can become familiar with the way they function, their organization, their approaches and the main issue they deal with. The next chapter was also descriptive, but it concerned the context of the conflict; what are the main problems between Turkey and Greece, what are their main arguments and so on. Finally, chapters six and seven analyze the data that have been gathered through the ways that are explained in the methodology. In the current chapter the results from the two initiatives are compared and further assumptions are made.

8.1 Cognitive outcomes

The final analysis of the data for the two initiatives offers interesting data on how the participants of the GTF perceive the learning process through participation and the relational products of such initiatives. The results from the questionnaires and the data provided by the open-ended questions interview can help reaching an assumption which will support or falsify the proposition posed in the beginning. This proposition suggested that widespread and positive outcomes should be expected for the participants of the GTF and the GTJC as a result of their participation in these initiatives. Indeed, as it can be seen from the data analysis both the Forum's and the Conference's members perceive that they have acquired a lot of new learning and that their relations with the other party have been improved.

If the two initiatives are compared to each other the results suggest that there is a certain similarity of the perceived relational and cognitive outcomes. Even though the limited number of participants does not allow direct comparison between the results of the questionnaires, since this could lead to false assumptions, there are some suppositions that can be made. To start with, for both the initiatives the learning outcomes concerning the other side seem to be very positive, and certainly more positive than all the other cognitive outcomes that have been discussed in this paper. The answers to the questions that dealt with this type of cognitive outcomes have the highest percentages of positive answers, while in three out of the six questions, all the sixteen interviewees have answered positively.

As it is made clear from the chart attached to the end of the chapter (chart 3), in the type of learning that concerns the other side the percentages of positive answers are all above 80% for the sum of the members of the GTF and the GTJC. The percentage reaches 100% for the learning about the perspective of the other side and also for the learning about the diversity on the other side. The number of positive answers is somewhat smaller for the learning about the political needs of the other, since three out of

the sixteen people who filled in the questionnaire answered negatively. However, the percentage (81%) even in this case can be considered high.

In the rest of the learning categories, as these are defined from the codebook, there are also similarities but they are not as obvious as the ones just described. It is clear however, that there is not so high consensus among the groups and the negative responses seem to be more frequent for both initiatives, although it should be pointed out that in these cases also the positive answers are more and the percentage of positive answers does not fall below 50%. Moreover, another similarity is that the question with the relatively lower amount of answers for both initiatives is the one which concerns the learning about new skills.

To be more concrete, in the type of learning that concerns the 'in-group' the percentages, for the members of both initiatives range, from 62.5% to 81%, with the less positive answers given to the question which concerned the political needs of the 'in-group'. In this case also it seems that the percentages for the GTF (70-90%) are higher than those of the GTJC (33-66%). This variation between the two initiatives can be considered expected, assuming that the journalists, because of their affiliation, are always well informed about the developments in their own countries.

The results about learning concerning the conflict are also quite high ranging from 81% to 87,5%. An interesting observation is that although all the members of the GTJC said that they have learned new concepts which are related to the conflict, in the case of the GTF almost the 20% answered positively. However in the question which asks about the tractability of the conflict the results are similar. The results can be explained if the affiliations of the GTF members are kept in mind. Most of them were former Ambassadors and others are academics so it can be assumed that they are in the position to have an in depth knowledge of the issues.

The learning about new skills has the lowest percentages from all other types of learning for both of the initiatives. The percentage reaches just 50% in the case of the

GTJC and it is somewhat higher for the GTF, reaching 70%. In this case a speculation that can be made is that all of the individuals who were interviewed have participated in many other conferences and forums, so maybe they have developed these types of skills from before.

The similarities described above are also clear in the interviews, so much those of the Contact Group members as of the Conference as those of the GTF members. Thus, the direct and indirect statements concerning cognitive outcomes related to the other are more frequent than the passages from the interviews that refer to other types of learning. It seems that learning of the other is the type of learning that the interviewees thought they should discuss about during the interviews.

Having compared the outcomes of the two initiatives it is also important to examine if there are similarities or differences within the groups, meaning mainly the responses of the Turks and those of the Greeks. As far as the GTF is concerned, there is no apparent differentiation between the responses of the Greek and the Turkish teams. In most of the questions about cognitive outcomes both the Turkish and the Greek participants showed a positive attitude, and even when there are negative responses these come from both groups. For the GTJC there is a similar situation. However, in this case a difference can be observed in the answers concerning the new learning about our own side. In these questions the Greek members of the Contact Group seemed more reluctant to answer positively than their Turkish colleagues.

8.2 Relational outcomes

As far as the relational outcomes are concerned, there are also great similarities between the two initiatives (chart 3). The responses on the questions which looked over the relational outcomes had been significantly encouraging, as for both the GTF and the GTJC all of the answers have been positive. The results leave no space for

misinterpretations; all the individuals that were interviewed and filled in the questionnaires perceive that there have gone through relational changes concerning the other party, they admitted that they have made new friends through the process and they have started to trust the other party more. Moreover, the lack of any negative responses makes any comparison between the answers of the Greeks and the Turks pointless, since there is an overall agreement between the Greeks and the Turks. In terms of numbers 100% of the interviewees said that the trust towards the other side has been increased and the same percentage said that through the track- II processes they have managed to make new friends with individuals from the other side.

The results are interesting for one more reason. As it has been mentioned earlier on, the GTJC is more process oriented while the GTF is more outcome oriented. However, this differentiation is not reflected on the relational outcomes. Since, the GTF is more outcome oriented the absolute positive relational outcomes can be considered as a surprise; Moreover, there should be some differentiation with the GTJC which aims to create good relations among the participants. The positive relational outcomes of the GTF could be explained, if we take under consideration the amount of time that the meetings have been held.

The results of this part of the research can provide information about the different types of cognitive and relational outcomes that track- II initiatives can have and as such it can contribute to the already existing literature (e.g. Cuhadar, 2004; Rouhana, 2000; d'Estree et al, 2001; Broome & Jakobsson-Hatay, 2006).

8.3 Transfer strategies

As it was made clear in chapter four, the GTF and GTJC have important structural differences. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that there are significant differences in

the ways the two initiatives try to influence the policy making level and the societal level, and also important disparities on the orientations of transfer that the two initiatives have.

Starting from the GTF, based on the data collected and introduced in chapter seven, the Forum is a political track- II initiative which mainly focuses on upward transfer, trying to influence the decision making level and offer proposals for resolution on the conflict that the policy makers can take under consideration. The GTF manages to do so mainly by delivering ideas to politicians and keeping close direct connections with the policy making level. Downward transfer also exists, mainly through media public interaction and internet, but it seems that the main orientation is to influence to policy makers and the politicians.

Concretely as it can be seen in the table at the end of this chapter (Table 4) the Forum has been using all of the transfer strategies that were included in the questionnaire. Moreover, the data show that these strategies have been used quite often with the goal of maximizing the possible influence at the policy making and the decision making level. As the GTF is an initiative which holds an advisory role for the policy makers, certainly the results can be considered expected. What is surprising, however, is that the GTF and its members have also used several of the transfer strategies that were included in the questionnaire but they concerned downward transfer.

On the other hand, the GTJC presents a different image. The main goal of the Conference is to have an impact on the public opinion through the change of the journalists' attitudes in both countries. As a journalist initiative this is the main orientation; diminish nationalistic ideas in the media coverage and have apposite impact on the public opinion. In addition, as it was discussed in the data analysis part it seems that the GTJC does not use any of the transfer strategies for upward transfer. The connection with the politicians exists but there is no upward transfer. This can also be seen in 3, where it is clear that the GTJC did not use any of the transfer strategies that for example the GTF used, for upward transfer.

The data on downward transfer for the Conference are also interesting. It seems that the GTJC was very reluctant to use some of the strategies that could address the big mass of people (e.g. websites, press conferences). The speculation that can be made is that the organizers were counting on the mainly participants for the downward transfer. In other words they probably believed that if they can create a positive atmosphere between the Greek and the Turkish journalists then they will have create a great asset for downward transfer. Therefore, other strategies have not been used.

The results of the part of the research offers examples of how track two initiatives can plan upward, downward and lateral transfer. The results can contribute to already existing literature which looks into specific track- II initiatives and examines the transfer strategies that were used in each case; for instance Irani's work on the Maryland problem solving Forums (2005), Bartoli's work on the Mozambique peace process (2005), Saunders' work on the Tajikistan case and Cuhadar's research on the Israeli-Palestinian case (2004).

8.4 Implications for future research

The current thesis offers valuable information on how people involved in two specific track- II initiatives perceive the changes that they have experienced as a result of their participation in these initiatives. The assumptions reached and discussed throughout the thesis, however, can not be generalized so as to cover other initiatives no matter how similar they might seem either to the Greek- Turkish Forum or the Greek- Turkish Journalists' Conference. In every track- II initiative there is a number of inputs. Each one of these inputs may or may not influence the process in a positive or negative way and have an impact on the cognitive and relational outcomes. Some of these inputs are for example, the number of participants, the third party, the goals that the third party sets at the beginning and so on.

Nevertheless, this research also gives some stimuli for further research. For example it would be interesting to see if the results would be the same if the rest of the journalists, meaning the ones who just participate, were also interviewed. This type of research could offer some information on the differences in outcomes between the people in the Contact Group, and the rest of the participants who were not so closely linked to the initiative. For the case of the GTF the same could happen if a future research includes the people who participate occasionally and not only the core group members.

Moreover, this thesis examines the cognitive and relational outcomes of the GTJC and the GTF, because looking into the actual changes requires a pretest. However, if a researcher has the time and resources it would be very interesting to examine the actual changes that the participants of the GTF and the members of the Contact Group of the Conference went through. This is possible if for example older articles, other writings and statements of all these people are compared with those which were written after the initiative had established.

Finally, as far as the transfer part is concerned, an evaluative research which would examine the impact of the transfer strategies, on the society or the policy making level, is the next step. This type of research could answer questions concerning, which transfer strategies are more suitable and to what context.

Table 4:

		GTF	GTJC
Upwards	Invite politicians or policy makers to the meetings	YES	NO (only for ceremonial purposes)
	Delivering ideas/ recommendations to policymakers	YES	NO
	Representation in official negotiations by one of the members	YES	NO
	Contacting and discussing the new knowledge/ideas with politicians	YES	NO
Downwards	Participants giving speeches (at schools, communities, media etc)	YES	YES
	Participants giving interviews (at schools, communities, media etc)	YES	YES
	Giving (joint) press-conferences	NO	NO
	Interaction with grassroots organizations (NGO's)	YES (rarely)	YES (once)
	Publishing (joint) articles in newspapers	YES (not joint)	YES
	Giving academic lectures (in universities, workshops etc)	YES	YES
	Publishing ideas/ initiative on the websites	YES (in the past)	NO (planned)
	Interaction with Colleagues/Friends/Community	YES	YES
Lateral	Sharing ideas/recommendations with national/regional organizations	YES	YES
	Sharing ideas/recommendations with international organizations	YES	NO
	Cooperation with other similar track-II initiatives	YES	NO

APPENDIX 1

Interview protocol:

1. Can you tell me about the second track project that you participated in with the Greeks/Turks on the Greek-Turkish conflict? (general information about the meetings)

This question can be followed up with these questions if necessary:

- a) What was the nature of the projects in terms of issues addressed?
 - b) What were you trying to accomplish in these meetings?
 - c) How did you go about this effort? What were the actions involved? (Meetings? When? What was the agenda? Who were the participants? Where? How were they facilitated?)
 - d) Who was involved in the project?
2. What did you know about the people at the meetings? How did you recognize them and their affiliations? Was everybody of equal/similar in status? (relationship/implementation)
 3. When you first came together in the meetings, did you have any past relations with any of the other participants? (changes in relation)
 4. Did the project change your views about the Greeks/Turks? Why? Why not? (changes in relation)
 5. Do you think there are Greeks/Turks that you can work with after this project? (changes in relations)
 6. What did you learn in these meetings/this project? (changes in representation)
 7. Do you think the project generated anything new about the Greek-Turkish conflict? If so, what? If not, why not? (changes in representation)
 8. Did the meetings/project change your views about the Greek-Turkish conflict? In what ways? (changes in representation)
 9. Were there any concrete results of these meetings? What were they? Did these results satisfy your initial goals? (Was this what you had in mind?) What did you do with these results? (foundations for transfer/implementation)

10. Did the group come up with a plan for the next step after the workshops?
(foundations for transfer/implementation)
 - a. Did you publicize the results?
 - b. To whom?
 - c. How?
 - d. What kind of strategies/ methods did you use to convey the results from the meetings?
 - e. Do you think that this method worked?
 - f. Who was interested in knowing about what happened in the meetings and/or the project?
11. Do you think your efforts had an impact on the Greek-Turkish conflict? Why? Why not? (foundations for transfer)
12. Do you think the project influenced the political process and official negotiations? If yes, why? How? What would you do differently to influence the political process and negotiations at that time? (foundations for transfer/implementation)
13. Did any of the participants in the meetings communicate directly with official policymakers and consult with them? Did the participants who made these contacts have relationships with the policymakers? If yes, can you tell me what kind of relationship was that? (foundations for transfer/implementation)
14. Did any of the people from the meetings take on an official/political position during the formal negotiations related to Greek-Turkish relations? (foundations for transfer/implementation)
15. Based on your experience, what do you think worked and did not work? What would you do differently to influence the political process and negotiations at that time? What would your advice be to others doing similar work?
16. Can you tell me briefly about other similar efforts on Greek-Turkish relations that you are aware of at the time you were involved with this project? Are there any similar efforts going on now? (coordination/information)
 - a. Do you think other similar efforts on the Greek-Turkish conflict have impacted your efforts? Positively or negatively? How?
 - b. Do you ever coordinate your efforts? In what way? With whom?
 - c. What kind of influence do you think other similar efforts had on the political process and negotiations?
17. Is there anything important that you would like to add?

APPENDIX 2

Questionnaire on relational and cognitive changes:

Learning/Change	Yes		No
	Positive	Negative	
Understanding the others perspective			
Understand the other's political dynamics			
Learn the political needs of the other			
Understand the other's political and social constraints			
Understand the diversity on the other side			
Learn more about Track-II processes and their ability to contribute to conflict resolution			
Understand the political needs of our side			
Understand the political/social constraints of our side			
Understand the diversity of our side			
Trust toward the other side			
Developed friendship with people from the other side			
That a solution to the conflict is possible			
Learning new skills (e.g. Policy analysis skills, technical skills)			
Understand and analyze new concepts that can be useful to understand the conflict			
Learning that the other side is more sophisticated than thought			

Yes (positive): contributed in a positive way
 Yes (negative): contributed in a negative way
 No: Did not contribute at all

APPENDIX 3

Questionnaire on transfer:

	Strategies Used in the Initiative	YES	NO	WHEN (if yes)
Upwards	Invite politicians or policy makers to the meetings			
	Delivering ideas/ recommendations to policymakers			
	Representation in official negotiations by one of the members			
	Contacting and discussing the new knowledge/ideas with politicians			
Downwards	Participants giving speeches (at schools, communities, media etc)			
	Participants giving interviews (at schools, communities, media etc)			
	Giving (joint) press-conferences			
	Interaction with grassroots organizations (NGO's)			
	Publishing (joint) articles in newspapers			
	Giving academic lectures (in universities, workshops etc)			
	Publishing ideas/ initiative on the websites			
	Interaction with Colleagues/Friends/Community			
Lateral	Sharing ideas/recommendations with national/regional organizations			
	Sharing ideas/recommendations with international organizations			
	Cooperation with other similar track-II initiatives			

Yes: means the tactic is used

No: means the tactic is no used

When: When the tactic was used (year, stage of the project etc)

APPENDIX 4

Codebook:

Cognitive Changes

1) New learning concerning the conflict

Description: participants learn about the details of the conflict and also learn to analyze concepts that can be useful for understanding the conflict better. It also includes any knowledge that concerns change in perceptions of tractability or solvability of the conflict.

Indicators for supportive qualitative data:

- Direct verbal expressions (e.g. I learned that the Greek- Turkish conflict can be solved) that suggest new learning about the conflict or better understanding of concepts related to the specific conflict
- Indirect verbal expressions by the participants implying they have learned more about the conflict through their participation in the initiative (e.g. I believe that participation has helped me see the problems between the Turks and the Greeks clearer)

2) New learning about the other side

Description: participants begin to understand the other side better and they are in the position to comprehend more different levels of the other's entity, like political level or social level

Indicators for supportive qualitative data:

- Interviewees state that their participation helped them understand the other's perspective
- Interviewees mention that they have learned more about the political needs of the other
- Interviewees mention that their participation has helped them understand the other's political and social constraints
- Interviewees state that they have distinguished diversities on the other side
- Interviewees mention better comprehension of the others political dynamics

3) New learning about our side

Description: participants begin to understand their own side better and they are in a position to comprehend more different levels of their own entity, like political level or social level.

Indicators for supportive qualitative data:

- Interviewees mention that they have learned more about the political needs of their side

- Interviewees mention that their participation has helped them understand the political and social constraints of their side
- Interviewees state that they have distinguished diversities on their side
- Interviewees talk about better understanding of the political dynamics of their side

4) *New learning about track- II initiatives*

Description: participants start to comprehend how exactly track- II processes work and what are their strengths and limitations in conflict resolution processes

Indicators for supportive qualitative data:

- Direct verbal expressions (e.g. I learned how track- II initiatives can contribute to conflict resolution) which indicate learning concerning track- II processes
- Indirect verbal expressions (e.g. my participation helped me realize how helpful these type of initiatives can be)

5) *Learning concerning new skills*

Description: participants through the process learn new skills, like policy analysis skills, or improve their skills in a specific area like negotiation skills

Indicators for supportive qualitative data:

- Direct verbal expressions (e.g. my participation helped me improve my active listening abilities) from the participants on how they acquired or improved skills through participation in track- II initiatives
- Indirect verbal expressions (e.g. these types of initiatives may be useful for someone in order to improve some skills) suggesting that this type of knowledge is possible to be gained through participation in track- II initiatives

Relational outcomes

1) *Trust*

Description: participants begin to understand the other participants within or outside the context of the meetings.

Indicators for supportive qualitative data:

- Direct verbal manifestations from a participant (e.g. I started to trust participant X) which reveal a feeling of trust being him/her and another participant
- Indirect verbal manifestations from a participant which may imply feelings of trust have been developed

2) *Friendship*

Description: feelings of friendship being created among the participants; participants making new friends in the meetings.

Indicators for supportive qualitative data

- Direct verbal manifestation from a participant (e.g. I have made good friends with participant X) which reveal friendship with other participants from the same initiative
- Indirect verbal manifestation (e.g. after all these years of cooperation me and X have become very close) from a participant which imply friendship being developed with other participants from the same initiatives

3) *Other relational outcomes*

Description: any outcome from the participation in the initiatives that can have relational prolongation, like empathy

Indicators for supportive qualitative data

- Direct verbal expression of a new feeling which is a direct outcome of the participation in the initiative (e.g. I started feeling empathy for the other group) and it is not covered above
- Indirect verbal expression concerning changes to the relations among the participants

Transfer Strategies

1) *Upward transfer*

Description: actions which show that there was transfer of learning to the policymaking level

Indicators for supportive quantitative data

- Direct or indirect expression which indicates sharing of ideas with politicians/ policy makers
- Direct or indirect expression explains interaction with politicians or policy makers
- Direct or indirect expression which reveal any other connection with the politicians or policymakers

2) *Downward transfer*

Description: actions which show that there was transfer of learning to the societal level or the public opinion

Indicators for supportive quantitative data

- Direct or indirect expression of actions aiming to influence the societal level or the public opinion, such as Conferences, websites, speeches etc

3) *Lateral transfer*

Description: actions which suggest transfer of learning and interaction with other track-two initiatives

- Direct or indirect expression which show interaction with other track- two initiatives
- Direct or indirect expression which show interaction with regional or international organizations

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