

**THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION**

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EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

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The start of accession talks between Turkey and the EU on 3 October 2005 has forced Europeans to reconsider the European integration project. Debates over whether Turkey could ever be European have sharply increased in number. Prior to this stage, political, legal and economic aspects of the European integration project were more at the fore front. It is at this point, cultural considerations appear to underestimate the potential benefits of Turkey's membership to the EU. Theoretically, rational institutionalism and sociologic/constructivist institutionalism are found to be partially competing and partially complementary. In other words, Turkey's accession to the EU will be determined by its material costs/benefits; however, the perceptions of these costs will largely be determined by the willingness of the European public to accept Turkey. Culture and identity, therefore, will play an equal important role in this process.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ÜYELİĞİNE TEORİK YAKLAŞIMLAR

EVRİM TAŞKIN

Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2006

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği, rasyonel kurumculuk, Avrupa Birliği’nin Doğu genişlemesi, sosyolojik /yapısalcı kurumculuk

3 Ekim 2005’te Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği arasında katılım müzakerelerinin başlaması Avrupalıları, Avrupa entegrasyon projesini gözden geçirmeye zorladı. Türkiye bir gün Avrupalı olabilecek mi türünden tartışmalar sayıca hızla arttı. Bu aşamaya dek, Avrupa entegrasyon projesinin daha çok siyasal, yasal, ve ekonomik boyutları ön plandaydı. Tam bu bağlamda, kültürel etmenler Türkiye’nin AB’ye olası katkılarını gölgelemektedir. Teorik olarak, rasyonel kurumculuk ve sosyolojik/yapısalcı kurumculuk kısmen rekabetçi, kısmen tamamlayıcı bulundu. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği, Türkiye’nin materyal fayda/maliyet durumuna göre belirlenecektir. Bununla beraber, maliyetlerin algılanışı büyük çoğunlukta Avrupa kamuoyunun Türkiye’yi kabul etme arzusuna göre şekil alacaktır. Bundan dolayı, bu süreçte kültür ve kimlik eşit önemde rol oynayacaktır.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the very day of its commencement in 1957, the European Union has completed five rounds of enlargement. The most recent enlargement has taken place in May 2004. Precise implications of the latest EU expansion (i.e. the EU's Eastern enlargement) are not yet known. Therefore, the challenge of Eastern enlargement has paved the way for new theoretical explorations in the field of EU integration. Current literature revolves around the two main of institutionalism of different sort: (i) rational institutionalism, (ii) sociological/constructivist institutionalism. When framed as such, as also acknowledged by the most prominent scholars of the EU integration, the Eastern enlargement constitutes a theoretical puzzle. In view of the theoretical and empirical evidences as regards to the EU enlargement, it is thus possible to conceptualize the EU's Eastern enlargement as a theoretical puzzle. Drawing from this, two logics of integration are argued to work behind the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Inevitably, logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness are also the ones which operate behind the two branches of institutionalism. Logic of consequentiality reveals the basic idea at work behind the rational institutionalism. Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism is identified with the rational institutionalism. In other words, theorizing the EU's Eastern enlargement from the Moravcsik's point of view is tantamount to put 'utility-maximizing considerations' in context. Here material considerations (economic, security, and political levels) are argued to be the driving engine of the EU enlargement policy. In other words, size and allocation of enlargement costs are assumed to be fundamentally decisive in the rational institutionalist explanation of the EU's Eastern enlargement.

On the opposite side of the debate, in the sociological/constructivist institutionalism, EU's constitutive norms, principles and collective identity are considered to constitute the basics of the EU enlargement policy. Two complementary visions in the sociological/constructivist institutionalism are presented so as to provide insights into the logic of appropriateness: (i) Schimmelfennig proposes a novel

mechanism by means of which constitutive norms and principles have impacted on the social actors as regards to enlargement. This intervening variable is called ‘rhetorical action’. (ii) Helene Sjursen likewise emphasizes the importance of constitutive norms and principles of the EU in shaping the EU’s enlargement policy. However, Sjursen prefers to make use of ‘communicative action’ of Habermas as opposed to rhetorical action of Schimmelfennig. Drawing from the prioritizations done in the EU’s Eastern enlargement, Sjursen points out the salience of collective identity arguments in shaping the EU’s enlargement policy. Kinship-based arguments, according to Sjursen, have played a major role in the admittance of the CEECs in the latest enlargement round in May 2004.

Nonetheless, both approaches are found to be partially competing and partially complementary. While rational institutionalism is argued to have a stronger explanatory power in clarifying the EU’s signing of Association Agreements with the CEECs; it fails in explaining the EU’s decision to go beyond the association partnership. Taken together the EU’s shared identity, its constitutive norms and principles along with the material considerations; the Eastern enlargement of the EU has been explained. In other words, sociological/constructivist institutionalism is argued to complement the rational institutionalism.

When framed as such, what is significant and fruitful is to put Turkey’s EU membership into theoretical framework. While there is a bulk of literature as regards to the EU’s Eastern enlargement, there are a few academic works in which Turkey’s EU membership has been put into context. It is an interesting phenomenon in view of the fact that Turkey became an associate member to the EC/EU in 1963. There must have been a much more rigorous and systematic effort to theorize the Turkish case in relation to the EU. In December 2004, after 41 years of waiting at the doorstep of Europe, the EU decided to open accession talks with Turkey. Eventually, the accession talks started on 3 October 2005. This was a turning point in the history of Turkey-EU relations. For many Turks, this was a long-desired affirmation of Turkey’s European bid, a project whose roots date back to the beginning of the Turkish Republic. However, eventual membership in the EU is not yet assured.

In order to shed light on Turkey’s EU membership and discover possible implications of these theoretical approaches on the Turkish case, both the material and cultural/ideational factors are taken into consideration. However, institutional implications are not in the confines of the study. In addition, this thesis is not designed

so as to test all approaches against one another. Central aim is to highlight the need to let other visions to provide new insights into the theoretical exploration of the EU integration.

With this aim in mind, chapter one is designed so as to provide the theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter two provides the historical and empirical analysis of Turkey-EU relations. In chapter three, likely impacts of Turkey's EU membership are examined. This is done through the examination of utilitarian considerations: (i) geopolitical/ strategic considerations; (ii) economic considerations. For a number of reasons, Turkey's aspiration to become a member of the EU has not been perceived by the EU as in the same fashion as other applications. Instead, Turkish case has been viewed as being 'especially unique' and 'distinguishably problematical'. Therefore, cultural and ideational dimension of the debate over Turkey's EU membership are examined in chapter four. Respectively, (i) European identity; (ii) Turkey as Europe's other and the EU public opinion over the question of Turkey's EU membership are presented.

In sum, this thesis has concentrated on Turkey's EU membership through adopting a critical approach to the existing theories of EU enlargement. In light of these theories, Turkey's membership has been found to be qualitatively different and timely problematic when compared with the previous EU enlargements. In addition, it has also assessed Turkey's potential contribution to the EU. Meanwhile, it has adopted a critical approach to the existing theories of EU enlargement and highlighted the shortcomings of these theories in explaining the Turkish case.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EU ENLARGEMENT

Since the day of its foundation with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Economic Community has evolved in such a rapid fashion; now, it is rather hard to imagine what the future path will be for the European Union. In 1957, it started with the collaboration of a few group of countries which are later labeled as ‘the original Six’. Since then many successive rounds of enlargement have been observed in the history of the enlargement of the EU. The latest example of one of those enlargement rounds is the acceptance of ten new member states into the Union in May 2004. After the latest 2004 EU enlargement, the EU has grown from fifteen to twenty five members. Still other applicants are at the door of the EU and waiting for to get the ‘seemingly privileged honor’ of being a full member of the EU. In other words, the EU is still in the process of creating itself and the very mechanism to do so is the enlargement. Therefore, enlargement is still important for the EU itself and apparently it will continue to be as such for the following years. Put it simply, the process has not yet ended and we still do not know how the enlargement mechanisms work and how the impacts of the successive enlargements has impacted (i) the way EU functions, (ii) the EU itself and (iii) the once-called ‘applicant’ but now ‘the new member’ states *per se* as well. Though it is impossible to get the full understanding of the EU without a close investigation of each and every of the specific issue areas within the EU, it is still possible to get a rough but satisfactory understanding of the EU through a close examination of EU enlargement. But what is at stake here is that the studies held in the field of European integration theory in general and EU enlargement in particular seems to be concentrating in the specific peripheral locations.¹

¹ For a deeper understanding of these concerns associated with the study of European integration and its concentration in peripheral locations see Schmitter, P., and J.I.

Despite the existence of myriad complaints about the study of EU enlargement, “a thorough and systematic investigation of how the EU has handled “the question of enlargement (across time, across different countries or regions and with regard to different policy areas)” is still tempting in terms of “providing valuable insights into the EU’s self-understanding, goals and priorities.”²

In order to put the Turkish accession to the EU in theory and context, the latest Eastern enlargement of the EU is chosen to be as the basic theoretical reference point of this study. Despite the existence of various scholars of different minds, traditions, and perspectives within the field of European integration theory; for the sake of brevity, three approaches will be held in the theoretical analysis part of the study. In the first section, enlargement will be examined through the lenses of liberal intergovernmentalism which is assumed to be one of the most promising representatives of the rational account in the study of European integration. In the remaining sections of the study, two other complementary approaches, which heavily draw from the sociological and/or constructivist account, will be investigated with the aim of understanding the study of EU enlargement. Two logics of integration are examined in this study: the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness. Liberal intergovernmentalism in the study is represented with the logic of consequentiality whereas sociological and/or constructivist approaches of Schimmelfennig and Sjursen are represented with the logic of appropriateness.

To say the last but not the least, the structure of this part of the study is not designed so as to test all these approaches against one another but to emphasize the need to let other perspectives provide new insights into the theoretical exploration of European integration.

Torreblanca, “Eastern Enlargement and the Transformation of the European Union”, in W. Loth and W. Wessels (eds.), *Theorien Europaischer Integration*, (Opladen: Lekse-Budrich, 2001), pp. 219-46 and Wallace, H., “EU Enlargement: A Neglected Subject”, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds.), *The State of European Union*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 149-63.

² Sjursen, H., “Enlargement in Perspective”, ARENA Report: Proceedings from the CIDEL Workshop in Avila, Spain, on *Justifying Enlargement- Past and Present Experiences* (May 2004), p.2.

1.1. Utility-Maximizing Perspective: Liberal Intergovernmentalism

1.1.1. The logic of consequentiality

In order to understand the basic premises of the liberal intergovernmentalism, thorough understanding of the logic behind its premises is crucial. Having previously said that different metatheoretical approaches exist within the field; and, three approaches would be examined throughout the study so as to depict the dynamics of European integration in general and enlargement in particular; it is wise to remind that all three approaches held in this study eventually highlight the different aspects of the study of EU enlargement. In other words, multi-faces of the study of EU enlargement inescapably bring different logics of integration along. As Piedrafita and Torreblanca argue “each of them emphasizes a different logic as accounting for a certain political action or policy, a distinctive mode of social action and interaction, and a particular consideration of the nature and goals of the actors”.³ Hence, understanding of the different logics of integration (i.e. the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness) is necessary and highly important. Accordingly, this part of the study aims to examine the logic of consequentiality in order to explain the basics of the liberal intergovernmentalism of the rationalist account in the field of EU integration.

According to schools in rationalist camp such as neo-realism and liberalism, actors’ decisions are on prima facie led by logic of consequentiality.⁴ That is to say, states, which are the primary actors, first “define their preferences about the different options with reference to their particular interests, and act according to them in a

³ Piedrafita, S., and Torreblanca, J. I., “The Three Logics of EU Enlargement: Interests, Identities and Arguments”, *Politique Européenne*, No. 15 (Winter 2005), p. 32.

⁴ For further information see March, J., and Olsen, J., “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 943-69.

basically technical environment”⁵, in which “bargaining is the common procedure to resolve disputes.”⁶ Hence when actors act according to their particular interest and engage in interaction for the betterment of their current position, actors are assumed to be ‘rational’. Needless to say, distribution of power, individual preferences and negotiating capabilities of the engaging actors determine the final outcome of the interactions pursued by the rational players. As Piedrafita and Torreblanca point out

“[a]s far as the EU is concerned, the relevant actors are considered to be the member states’ governments, who base their respective positions on the expected consequences of a specific political action, defining their preferences before the decision-making process sets off and, thenceforward, acting in a strategic way in order to maximize their gains.”⁷

1.1.2. Incorporation of domestic politics into the analysis of European integration and two-level games

It is a well-known fact that neoliberals- when compared with realist school- tend to be more interested in the interaction of state preferences rather than in the distribution of capabilities among states.⁸ Hence neoliberals are both interested in the formation of state preferences and in the bargaining process occurring between the actors. Due to its special emphasis on formation of state preferences, liberal theory has to inescapably deal with the processes of domestic politics.

⁵ Scott, W.R., “Unpacking Institutional Arguments”, in W.W. Powel and P.J. DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organization Analysis*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), pp: 164-82 as quoted in Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005, p. 33.

⁶ Elster, J. “Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante”, in (eds.) R. Malnes and A. Underdal, *Rationality and Institutions*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992); and, Schimmelfennig, F., “Strategic Action in a Community Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1/2, 2003, pp.156-83, as quoted in Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005, p. 33.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Stone, A., “What is a Supranational Politics? An Essay in International Relations Theory”, *Review of Politics*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (1994), p. 460.

In one of the earliest efforts of putting domestic forces into the analysis of the EC policy making, Simon Bulmer argued that the key players were the national governments and; therefore, the dynamics of integration basically were brought forth from the interactions of national state preferences in the EC.⁹ He extended his analysis and further claimed that to grasp the dynamics of the bargaining process taking place between national governments at the Community level, the domestic roots of state preferences which were negotiated in those bargains had to be taken into account while making assessments associated with the integration process. In the final analysis reached by Bulmer, domestic factors were considered to be the sources of legitimacy for state actors.

Another work related with the incorporation of domestic factors into the exploration and study of the international relations is Putnam's prominent idea of two-level games. A 'two-level game' is a metaphor created to illustrate the linkages between domestic factors and international factors in studying international relations.¹⁰ Putnam basically claims that national executives (i.e. the heads of national governments which represent state preferences in the international arena) play games in two spheres almost simultaneously. At the domestic level, power-maximizer office holders' endeavor to construct coalitions of support among domestic groups. At the international arena, the same players seek to find the best possible outcome in the bargaining process that would satisfy their domestic audiences. By acting as such, they would have the opportunity to enhance their positions at the domestic level. When viewed from a wider perspective, it is wise to claim that Putnam's analysis has close resemblance to that of Bulmer's. At this point, it is relevant and helpful to examine Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist analysis as the most recent example of theorizing European integration as a two-level game.

⁹ Bulmer, S. J., "Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1983).

¹⁰ Putnam, R. D., "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.

1.1.3. The logic of liberal intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism, which is almost always identified with Andrew Moravcsik, is an end result of a combination of two theories which are frequently regarded as being seemingly incompatible: liberal theory of International Relations and theory of intergovernmental institutionalism. By and large, liberal intergovernmentalism is simultaneously uttered with the task of theorizing of EU integration. According to Moravcsik

“[f]rom the signing of the Treaty of Rome to the making of Maastricht, the EC has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation. The most fundamental task facing a theoretical account of European integration is to explain these bargains.”¹¹

Throughout his analysis of the EC in his seminal article in 1993 he claims that “the EC can be analyzed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination”.¹² As already mentioned, his work can be regarded as an effort to incorporate domestic factors in examination of the international relations. In his work, there is a sharp emphasis on the formation of state preferences which are represented in the Community level as mere reflections of the domestic demands. Therefore, theorizing EU integration necessitates special emphasis on the formation of state preferences as well as the intergovernmental bargains taking place between the states at the international level. Accordingly, he arrives at this generalization about the state of the integration.

“such theories rest on the assumption that state behavior reflects that rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment. An understanding of the preferences and power of its member states is a logical point for analysis”.¹³

¹¹ Moravcsik, A., “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No.4 (December 1993), p. 473.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 474.

¹³ *Ibid*.

By doing so, he basically attempts to reach the conclusion that “although the EC is a unique institution, it does not require a sui generis theory”.¹⁴ To construct such a framework which he prefers to label as ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’, he utilizes his earlier work associated with the analysis of the origins of the SEA.¹⁵ According to Moravcsik, “Liberal intergovernmentalism builds on an earlier approach, ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’, by refining its theory of interstate bargaining and institutional compliance, and by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence”.¹⁶ Moravcsik proposes three elements which stand at the center of his analysis. These three elements are:

“The assumption of rational state behavior, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. The assumption of rational state behavior provides a general framework of analysis, within which the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences, while the relative intensity of national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the opportunity for issue linkages provide the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of the resolution of distributional conflicts among governments”.¹⁷

Drawing from the liberal theories of IR, which basically concentrate on state-society relations; the foreign policy choice of states can be perceived as varying in line with the changing domestic preferences which are aggregated through political institutions in the international arena. Following the same logic, Moravcsik comes to a point in which he reminds the reader the salience of the national interests and the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ See Moravcsik, A., “Negotiating Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community”, *International Organization*, Vol. 45, (Winter 1991), pp. 173-205. In his article he claims that the SEA arose because of the converging preferences of the most important members of the EC; that is to say, France, Britain and Germany. Furthermore, domestic circumstances of the time were in favor of a more liberal European economy.

¹⁶ Moravcsik, 1993, p. 480.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 480-1.

processes in which they are bargained. To recapitulate what Moravcsik has in mind, it is relevant to take a look at the following lines given below:

“National interests are, therefore, neither invariant nor unimportant, but emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments. An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among states”.¹⁸

Thus liberal intergovernmentalism combines two types of general international relations theory which are usually perceived as contradictory to some extent: a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and institutional creation. Hence, at this juncture, Moravcsik argues that “[u]nicausal explanations of European integration, which seek to isolate either demand or supply, are at best incomplete and at worst misleading”.¹⁹ According to Moravcsik, what distinguishes Moravcsik from the rest is that he does not favor one or another side (i.e. demand or supply side) throughout his analysis of the European integration. Following lines are reflections of what Moravcsik intends to mean when he refers to two-sided reductionism in the study of European integration:

“the demand-side reductionism- the narrow attention to variation in domestic preferences while ignoring the strategic context in which states interact- or supply-side reductionism- exclusive emphasis on interstate bargaining or international institutions without considering the underlying distribution and variation in preferences- risk omitting essential variables and encouraging misleading inferences about those that remain”.²⁰

The demand side of the process refers to the formation of national preferences and underlines the advantages of cooperative activity and the coordination of policy among the states in bargaining for their national interests; and the supply side refers to the domain of interstate bargaining.

Looking at the domestic side, though the state rationality both exists in realist IR and in Moravcsik’s analysis, Moravcsik departs from the realist IR by stating that

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 481.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 482.

²⁰ *Ibid*.

rational state behavior emerges from dynamic political processes in the domestic sphere. He argues that “the interests of societal groups are not always sharply defined”.²¹ This variation in domestic preferences may lead heads of national governments to support or oppose European integration. Moravcsik verbalizes his perception on the importance of the domestic factors and their impacts on the integration process as follows:

“[t]he primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in democratic societies, this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation. Through this process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations”.²²

At the domestic level, three things are assumed to be working behind the support or opposition of national governments towards the ongoing European integration process. These motivations could be summarized as federalist (or nationalist) beliefs, national security concerns and economic interests. For Moravcsik

“The *federalist* motivation views European integration as a cosmopolitan ideal, justified by a sense of a common European identity and purpose. (Ideological opponents of integration may be motivated by an equally ideological commitment to a conception of the nation that places value on the preservation of sovereignty.) The liberal *national security* motivation is premised on the view of economic interdependence and common institutions as mean of reinforcing peaceful accommodation among democratic states with an historical legacy of conflict ... or guaranteeing political support for specific, democratically legitimate national projects... The *economic interdependence* motivation views the EC as a means of co-ordinating policy to manage flows of goods, services, factors of production, and economic externalities more effectively than unilateral policies”.²³

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 484.

²² *Ibid*, p. 483.

²³ *Ibid*.

Drawing from these arguments Moravcsik himself prefers to draw conclusion from the economic interdependence argument and the ways in which it limits member states' preferences in international bargaining.²⁴

Another side of the process is the supply side. It is the domain of interstate bargaining. Moravcsik makes three assumptions associated with the specific bargaining nature of the EC. First, intergovernmental co-operation in the EC is voluntary; that is to say, non-coercive. Second, the environment in which EC governments bargain is relatively information-rich. Third, the transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining are low.²⁵

It is thus possible to observe that Moravcsik attaches a significant role to international institutions. They are the means to reach 'positive sum bargaining'. That is to say, "international institutions may promote greater co-operation by providing information and reducing uncertainty. Greater information and predictability reduce the costs of bargaining and risk of unilateral non-compliance".²⁶ Institutions not only play a key role as facilitators in the intergovernmental bargaining process that takes place among the participants states; but also they

"strengthen the autonomy of national political leaders vis-à-vis particularistic social groups within their domestic polity. By augmenting the legitimacy and credibility of common policies, and by strengthening domestic agenda-setting power, the EC structures a 'two-level game' that enhances the autonomy and initiative of national political leaders"²⁷

At the ultimate level, according to Moravcsik, the particular structure of the EC could be advantageous in various ways. Heads of national governments can enhance their position against their domestic polity through the achievement of the domestic legitimation and the pursuit of preferences.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 485.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 498-9.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 509.

²⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 507.

1.2. Eastern Enlargement in Sociological/Constructivist Perspective

1.2.1. Review of theoretical approaches to enlargement: rationalist vs. constructivist /sociological institutionalism

As of today, the EU has completed five rounds of enlargement. Though the precise effects of all these rounds have not been observed in its entirety—due to the fact that the process is still going on—, there are some discernible implications accruing from the incorporation of the new members into the Union. To recapitulate, the EU enlargement has not only affected the political and economic shape of Europe, but it has also changed the institutional set up of the EU, as well as the course of direction that the European integration leads to. However, it has to be remembered that since the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the importance and priority attached to enlargement by the academic circles and the key political practitioners has started to increase in an unimaginable fashion. Herewith, the EU's decision to enlarge eastwards has played a key role in attracting the attentions of the scholars and the practitioners of the politics.

The purpose of this section is to review the debate between rationalist and sociological/constructivist approaches with regard to Eastern enlargement. This debate is two-folded: one is the theoretical side and the other is the empirical side. At the theoretical side, the key question is whether EU enlargement policies either fit to rationalist or sociological/constructivist theories of institutions. At the empirical side, amount of the questions seem to be somewhat excessive than the amount of questions posed in the theoretical side. These questions might be summarized as follows: When, how and why the decision to enlarge was taken? Which criteria was chosen and used during the selection of the candidate countries? When the Union decided to open accession negotiations with the candidate countries; Was there any talk of budgetary or institutional reform inside the EU? Or were the reforms— if necessary— already done by the EU before embracing the candidate countries? What were the basic components of the calculations of the cost of the enlargement? Were these components of an economic, security or institutional nature?

Having represented the fundamental questions investigated by the scholars both at the theoretical level and the empirical level, it is no surprise to guess that ‘Eastern enlargement of the EU is a challenging theoretical puzzle.’

As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have already argued “rationalism and constructivism do not provide us with fully elaborated and internally consistent competing hypotheses on enlargement that we could rigorously test against each other.”²⁸ Therefore it is wise to perceive rationalist and sociological/constructivist theories of institutions “as partially competing and partially complementary sources of theoretical inspiration for the study of enlargement.”²⁹

Through the rigorous efforts of various scholars in the field, the enlargement process in general and the Eastern enlargement in particular has turned out to be a significant area to test, elaborate or falsify contending theories of rationalist and constructivist/ sociological institutionalism.³⁰

When looked into the fundamentals of these two institutionalisms, it is possible to observe that they are based on different social ontologies (individualism and materialism in rationalism and ideational ontology in constructivism) and assume different logics of action—a rationalist logic of consequentiality opposed to constructivist logic of appropriateness.³¹ These two contending visions about the status and purposes

²⁸ Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U., “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.9, No.4 (August 2002), p.508.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ In order to see some of the examples in theorizing of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, see Fierke, K. M. and Wiener, A., “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.5 (1999), pp.721-42; Friis, L. and Murphy, A., “The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 37, No.2, pp.211-32; Schimmelfennig, F., “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, *International Organization*, Vol.55, No.1 (Winter 2001), pp.47-80.; Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U., “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.9, No.4 (August 2002), pp.500-28 and Sjursen, H., “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40, No.3 (2002), pp.491-513.

³¹ March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 160.

of institutions inevitably influence the theorizing enlargement in its entirety. Hence, the conditions, assumptions and mechanisms of enlargement have to differ according to the chosen logic at work. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier clearly demonstrate the basic differences between these two approaches as follows:

“In rationalist institutionalism, the causal *status of institutions* generally remains secondary to that of individual, material interests. Institutions are treated as intervening variables between the material interests and the material environment of the actors, on the one hand, and the collective outcomes, on the other. They mainly provide constraints and incentives, not reasons, for action; they alter cost/benefit calculations, not identities and interests. By contrast, in the constructivist perspective, institutions shape actors’ identities and interests. Actors do not simply confront institutions as external constraints and incentives towards which they behave expediently. Rather, institutions provide meaning to the rights and obligations entailed in their social roles. Actors conform with institutionally prescribes behavior out of normative commitment or habit.”³²

Accordingly, different status of institutions conceptualized in these two approaches also reflects itself in the importance attached to international organizations. “Rationalist institutionalism emphasizes the instrumental, regulatory, and efficiency-enhancing functions of international organizations.”³³ Hence, it is fair to say in this context rational account views institutions as a significant constraint upon self-interested action.

On the other hand, sociological institutionalism views “institutions as autonomous and powerful actors with constitutive and legitimacy-providing function.”³⁴ In line with this logic, it is possible to arrive at this conclusion:

“international organizations are ‘community representatives’³⁵ as well as community-building agencies. The origins, goals, and procedures of international organizations are more strongly determined by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international community they represent (which constitute their

³² Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 509.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Abbott, K. and Snidal, D., “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1998), p. 24 as cited in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, p.509.

cultural and institutional environment) than by the utilitarian demand for efficient problem-solving.”³⁶

In other words, institutions -which are defined in a rather broad term in sociological institutionalism in comparison with the rational account-, turn out to be the instrument through which the world is made meaningful to actors. For sociological institutionalists, “interests and identities are *endogenous* to (emanate from within) the processes of interaction that institutions represent. Interests as well as “the contexts of action are socially constructed- given meaning to actors- by institutional norms and conventions.”³⁷ To sum up, this view clearly represents the belief in “capacity of cultural and organizational practices (institutions) to mould the preferences, interests and identities of actors in the social world (hence sociological institutionalism).”³⁸

1.2.2. The logic of appropriateness

Simply , the logic of appropriateness means players while making up their minds, do not only take into account what is good for them but also what they are expected to do, that is to say, the roles and norms to be applied.³⁹ It might suggest both rule-following due to habitual practices or particular identity and rule-following based on a rational assessment of morally valid arguments.⁴⁰ Here the causal mechanisms suggested in clarifying-how norms and principles can have an impact on negotiation or bargaining process- may alter depending on the theoretical frameworks. As already discussed, sociological institutionalism emphasizes the constitutive and forming effects of principles and norms on social actors. But these aspects of principles and norms

³⁶ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, pp.509-10.

³⁷ Rosamond, B., *Theories of European Integration*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 119.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.114.

³⁹ For further information see March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, (New York: Free Press, 1989).

⁴⁰ Eriksen, E. O., “Towards a Logic of Justification: On the Possibility of Post-National Solidarity”, in Egeberg, M. and Laegreid, P. (eds.) *Organizing Political Institutions: Essay for Johan P. Olsen* (Oslo: Scandinavian Press), pp. 215-44 as cited in Sjørusen, 2002, p. 494.

become such powerful on social actors; from here those norms and conventions of the institutional setting become embedded in the minds of the members of the institution. Thenceforwards, preferences of the social players are set so as to comply with those norms and principles. And eventual outcome of this interaction is that decisions are inevitably taken in line with those ‘constructed’ preferences.⁴¹ “Within this approach, the rationality of the actors is considered contextual, rather than instrumental, and deriving from the identity of the community they belong to.”⁴² As March and Olsen points out “human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations”.⁴³ In a similar vein,

“the criteria for social action justification rely on values stemming from a particular cultural context and salient concerns of the decision-making process have to do with the search for collective self-understanding and the building of a common identity, which can serve as the basis for developing stable goals and visions. Collective decisions are a matter of identity, rather than efficiency, seeking to develop and protect the sense of ‘we-ness’ and to establish bonds of solidarity.”⁴⁴

1.2.3. Schimmelfennig: expansion of the international community, rhetorical action, and norm-based arguments

The starting point for Frank Schimmelfennig is to clarify the reasons behind the decision of the EU to expand to Central and Eastern Europe?⁴⁵ Throughout his whole work his main is to explain the theoretical puzzle which is an end result of the Eastern

⁴¹ For a deeper analysis see Parsons, W., “Theories of the Policy Process”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2000), pp. 126-130 and Johnston, A., “Treating International Institutions”, *International Studies*, Vol. 45, pp.487-515.

⁴² Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005, p. 34.

⁴³ March and Olsen, 1989, p. 951.

⁴⁴ Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005, p. 34.

⁴⁵ Throughout the section on Schimmelfennig, his seminal article Schimmelfennig, F., “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, *International Organization*, Vol.55, No.1 (Winter 2001), pp.47-80 will be used as the basic reference point to demonstrate his contribution to the field of EU integration..

enlargement of the EU. With this aim in mind, Schimmelfennig makes use of two current mainstream accounts on European integration: rationalist and sociological/constructivist institutionalism. While mentioning the merits of liberal intergovernmentalism in explaining most of the enlargement preferences of the member states and the formulation of the association agreements with the Central and Eastern European countries accruing from the bargaining process among them; he does not hesitate to claim that liberal intergovernmentalism fails to account for the Community's decision to go beyond association and offer full membership to those Central and Eastern European countries. In other words, Schimmelfennig both demonstrates the merits and shortcomings of the rationalism (i.e., in this context, represented as liberal intergovernmentalism) with regard to its inability to explain enlargement outcomes. However, he also criticizes sociological perspective in its inability of explaining through which mechanisms that this enlargement has taken place. According to Schimmelfennig “[a]lthough rationalism can explain most actor preferences and much of their bargaining behavior; it fails to account for the collective decision for enlargement. Sociological institutionalism, in turn, can explain the outcome but not the input.”⁴⁶ Subsequently he comes to a conclusion that neither isolates nor embraces the liberal intergovernmentalism in its entirety as a proper means to explain the whole Eastern enlargement process. See the following lines in which Schimmelfennig openly demonstrates what he has in his mind:

“[t]his puzzle is solved through a sociological perspective in which enlargement is understood as the expansion of international community. If the EU is conceived of as the organization of the European liberal community of states, its decision to open accession negotiations with five Central and Eastern European countries can be explained as the inclusion of those countries that have come to share its liberal values and norms.”⁴⁷

In other words, Schimmelfennig proposes a novel approach, rule/norm-based explanation of the Eastern enlargement, in which the Eastern enlargement is considered as the expansion of the liberal community. To explain why Eastern enlargement has taken place, he asks four critical questions: Why did the EU decide to expand to Central and Eastern Europe? Why did the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)

⁴⁶ Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 73.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 47-8.

want to become EU members? How did the member states of the Community agree upon to enlarge eastwards? And ultimately how did the members of the EU choose the new members from among the CEECs?

As Schimmelfennig has argued “[s]ince its beginnings, European integration has been legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-democratic states.”⁴⁸ Hence, he claims that these liberal establishing principles and/or rules of the Western international community are the key explanatory variables in understanding the Eastern enlargement. In other words, it was not the constellation of material, economic or security, interests and power that explain the normative outcome (i.e., enlargement).⁴⁹ At this juncture, it is relevant and wise to remember the analysis of Moravcsik on integration decisions. As previously demonstrated, three factors are important in Moravcsik’s analysis: the formation of member states’ preferences, the end results of the interstate bargaining among the member states, and the choice of international institutions. Schimmelfennig summarizes the fundamentals of the liberal intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik as such:

“His central claim [that of Moravcsik] is that state preferences and international outcomes emerge from distributional conflict and reflect patterns of bargaining power at the domestic and the international level: Whereas the state preferences in European integration are chiefly determined by international interdependence, opportunities for international economic exchange, and the dominant economic interests in national society, substantive integration outcomes result from hard bargaining among states.”⁵⁰

By contrast, he seeks to show that, “whereas the enlargement preferences of EU member states and the initial bargaining process largely conform to rationalist expectations, the decision to enlarge the EU to Central and Eastern Europe- cannot be

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 48.

⁴⁹ Here the argument is aimed to refute the liberal intergovernmentalism of Andrew Moravcsik.

⁵⁰ Moravcsik, A., *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (Ithaca: New York, Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 3-9, 26 as quoted in Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 49.

explained as the result of egoistic cost-benefit calculations and patterns of state preferences and power.”⁵¹

However, Schimmelfennig is not content to remain at what he has proposed. Rather, after forming this hypothesis, he bolsters his hypothesis with a brand new mechanism which he prefers to label as ‘rhetorical action’. He proposes “*rhetorical action*- the strategic use of norm-based arguments- as the intervening mechanism”⁵² in explaining the Eastern enlargement of the EU.

It is through rhetorical action that the norms and/or rules, drawing from the ideology of pan-European community of Western liberal states, have had an impact on Eastern enlargement. The strategic use of rule-based arguments by the candidate countries is claimed to be different from the logic of appropriateness operationalized by the sociological/constructivist institutionalism. As already mentioned in the prior parts of the study, sociological institutionalists and constructivists argue that action of the social players are motivated and even further led by the rules of appropriate behavior. These rules of appropriate behavior are later adapted into institutional setting in which norms/rules are ensued, due to the sheer following fact, that they are perceived to be natural, expected and the right thing to do.

However, what is not to be forgotten at this point is that the expansion of the liberal community on the basis of constitutive Pan-European rules takes its roots from sociological institutionalism in which social actors act not only according to exogenously determined utility functions of their own but also according to the values and norms that are endogenously part of the process of social interaction in which those actors act. On the other hand, rhetorical action which stands between rationalism and constructivism as an intervening variable can be regarded as somewhat pointing to rational institutionalism with its associated individualistic assumptions and its state-centeredness.

Having said that the rhetorical action is the mechanism through which these constitutive liberal values of the Community have demonstrated its power on the members of the Community, it is important to clarify how this rhetorical action played its role during the Eastern enlargement. Schimmelfennig explains this process as follows:

“[i]n an institutional environment like the EU, political actors are concerned about their reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their preferences and behavior. Actors who can justify

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

their interests on the grounds of the community's standard of legitimacy are therefore able to shame their opponents into norm-conforming behavior and to modify the collective outcome that would have resulted from constellations of interests and power alone."⁵³

Having clarified how did the rhetorical action get into the enlargement process; it is relevant at this point to remind that

“[s]ince the Central and Eastern European countries and their supporters in the Community did not possess sufficient material bargaining power to attain enlargement, they based their claims on the constitutive values and norms of the EU and exposed inconsistencies between, on the one hand, the EU's standard of legitimacy, its past rhetoric, and its past treatment of applicant states and, on the other hand, its policy toward Central and Eastern Europe.”⁵⁴

Looking back at the enlargement of the CEECs, it is possible to claim that those countries not only explored the salience of rhetorical action but they also counted on it in order to it achieve their goals. They achieved their goals through -what Schimmelfennig prefers to call as- rhetorical argumentation and manipulating European identity. In acting as such,

“they have managed to ‘mobilize’ the institutionalized identity and to make enlargement an issue of credibility. Finally, in order to advance their individual interests in accession, they have sought to show not only that they share the community's values and adhere to its norms, but also that they stand out from other candidates in this respect.”⁵⁵

Consequently, as Schimmelfennig has also reminded “the opponents of a firm commitment to Eastern enlargement found themselves rhetorically entrapped. They could neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without damaging their credibility as community members”⁵⁶ To understand the actual reason behind the preferred reticence of the opponents of the enlargement is not that hard:

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 68.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.48.

“...because this would have meant rejecting the very values and norms on which their membership in the Community rested and admitting the hypocrisy of their former public pronouncements. They could and did, however, base their reticence on other, potentially competing values and norms of the Community’s standard of legitimacy.”⁵⁷

1.2.4. Sjursen: EU’s collective identity, communicative action, and kinship-based arguments

As observed in Schimmelfennig, Sjursen has also admitted that norms have played a part in the decision of the EU to enlarge eastwards. She has likewise investigated through which mechanism these norms have had an impact on the decision to enlarge in particular and the enlargement process as a whole. She reminds the reader that “actors not only used norms instrumentally in the decision to enlarge. Norms constitute the identity of the actors: they not only constrain their behavior, but also constitute their world-views and preferences. It is on this basis that enlargement must be understood.”⁵⁸

In order to solidify her analysis she starts with the question of “[w]hy does the EU enlarge and why does it make certain prioritizations among applicants in the enlargement process?”⁵⁹ Given the high price of the enlargement, she seems apparently

“impressed by the generosity showed by the EU in welcoming ten new members despite their negative contribution to the EU’s per capita GDP, their acute financial needs in terms of structural funds of agricultural subsidies, their more than weak political cultures and their heavy impact on the efficiency of the EU’S institutional system.”⁶⁰

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 73.

⁵⁸ Sjursen, H., “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40, No.3 (2002), p.491. It has to be noted that throughout the section in of this study, aforementioned article of Sjursen is employed as a basic reference point for theoretical investigation.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*.

⁶⁰ Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005, pp. 30-1.

Having taken into consideration of all those factors mentioned above, Sjursen arrives at a conclusion that ethical-political reasons which basically refer to a feeling of shared identity, common history, political values, and sense of we-ness are the main driving forces behind the Eastern enlargement. In other words, sense of kinship-based duty has played a key role in mobilizing the member states for enlargement. At this point, she refers to the impact of two different forms of norm guided justifications: rights-based and value-based. She further argues that the distinction between rights-based and value-based norms is relevant and necessary in order to get a better understanding of the prioritizations that have taken place throughout the EU's Eastern enlargement.⁶¹

The approach employed by Sjursen is based on two points: "first, Max Weber's observation that all rulers need legitimacy in order to remain in authority; and, second, Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action."⁶² However, what is critical is to answer the question of how rules, principles, norms become embedded in the minds of social actors? Thomas Risse points out the role of communicative action: "the processes by which norms are internalized and ideas become consensual...communicative processes are a necessary condition for ideas to become consensual (or fall by the wayside for that matter)."⁶³ Hence, it is possible to argue that theories of communicative action which heavily draws from the work of Jürgen Habermas⁶⁴ concentrate on processes of deliberation and argumentation, which are in turn, perceived as manufacturing the basic epistemic 'glue' that, binds actors together.⁶⁵

Last but not the least Sjursen also argues that in "Habermas' theory of communicative action, actors are rational when they are able to justify and explain their

⁶¹ Sjursen, 2002, p.491.

⁶² *Ibid*, p.492.

⁶³ Risse-Kappen, Thomas, "Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1996), p. 69.

⁶⁴ See Habermas, J., "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason", in *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 1-17.

⁶⁵ Rosamond, 2000, p. 121.

actions, and not only when they seek to maximize their own interests.”⁶⁶ Thus by making reference to Habermas, Sjursen basically tries to explain that “[t]he arguments and reasons provided in favor of enlargement have to be of a type that others can support: they must be considered legitimate.”⁶⁷ In addition, she prefers to follow the Weberian tradition by claiming that she does not aim to “predict the final outcome of the enlargement process, but to analyze the reasons why we have come to where we are now in the enlargement process.”⁶⁸ That is to say, she explicitly states that she is a part of the Weberian tradition in which social science ‘is a science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.’⁶⁹

While attempting to demonstrate the ethical-political justification argument Sjursen “rel[ies] on a particular conception of the collective ‘us’ and a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community. In this context, she seeks to justify enlargement by referring to duties and responsibilities emerging as a result of belonging to a particular community.”⁷⁰ As already discussed, this is very much in line with the logic of appropriateness as opposed to the logic of consequentiality. But it is wise to remember that Sjursen does not attempt to undermine the importance of utility considerations throughout the whole enlargement process; instead, she tries to provide new insights into the puzzle of Eastern enlargement of the EU by introducing two further dimensions: a ‘value’ dimension and a ‘rights’ dimension.⁷¹ Hence, utility-dimension which is firmly advocated by Moravcsik can only be the one way of understanding the decision to behind the Eastern enlargement of the EU.

To put it simply, Sjursen agrees with the belief in the capability of norms in shaping the social actors’ preferences and decisions. Sjursen verbalizes her point of

⁶⁶ Sjursen, 2002, p.493.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Weber, M., *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, (eds.) Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 4 as quoted in Sjursen, 2002, p. 493.

⁷⁰ Sjursen, p. 494.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 495-6.

view regarding the salience and impact of norms in shaping the actions of the social actors as follows:

“...from the perspective adopted here, norms do not only constrain actors’ behavior, as the sociological-institutionalist perspectives on enlargement suggest. Norms constitute the preferences and world-views of actors. This perspective is particularly useful for analyzing enlargement because it is not simply a pragmatic issue. It raises questions not only of a technical or economic nature and empirical knowledge may not be enough to resolve the issue of enlargement. The perennial issues of ‘what is Europe’ and ‘who can the EU legitimately claim to represent’ inevitably arise with enlargement.”⁷²

Accordingly, Sjursen also points out the difficulty in finding an exact definition and way of determination to concretize the norms, constitutive principles, and rules of the Union. It is still problématique to give a precise answer to the question of where Europe starts and ends and what is the EU’s collective identity and vice versa.

In this critical juncture, Sjursen proposes the utilization of ethical-political arguments and moral approach in understanding the justification that might have led actors to support enlargement. See the following lines below in which Sjursen depicts the way she follows in dealing and explaining the salience of the constitutive values of the Community:

“ethical-political arguments are revealed through references to values and traditions that are seen as constitutive of European identity. One would thus use arguments and statements that explicitly include or exclude people from a European ‘community’ and perhaps also make efforts to describe people as part of a common cultural entity (or not). Indicators of a feeling of a community of values can also be references to ‘duty’ and solidarity with those that are seen as ‘one of us’, as opposed to references to justice and rights that would have a broader address. This last dimension is thus what has been labeled a moral approach to justification.”⁷³

Accordingly, main arguments presented by Sjursen can be boiled down as such: enlargement should not only be perceived as a process of extension of international community based on the norms of pan-European liberal ideology but rather enlargement should be read as a process in which norms based on a common institutional-identity, sense of we-ness. Therefore, for Sjursen, the decision of the EU to enlarge eastwards

⁷² *Ibid*, p. 501.

⁷³ *Ibid*.

necessitates a deeper understanding of who the Europeans are and what it means to be European.⁷⁴

1.3. Review of the Two Logics of Integration

Whole discussion about the theories of EU enlargement has thus far revolved around the two competing logics of integration: logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness. These two different logics of integration have made themselves visible in two different types of institutionalism: rational institutionalism and sociological/constructivist institutionalism. In the rational institutionalist camp, Liberal Intergovernmentalism of Andrew Moravcsik has been chosen to be a representative of the logic of consequentiality. Here material considerations (economic, security, and political levels) have been regarded as the forces which have impacted the enlargement policies of the EU. On the opposite side of the debate, in the sociological/constructivist institutionalism, EU's constitutive norms, principles and collective identity have been demonstrated as being the primary driving forces of the EU enlargement. Two complementary visions have been selected to depict the sociological/constructivist institutionalism: (i) Schimmelfennig has proposed a novel mechanism by means of which those norms and principles have made their impacts on the social actors visible. He called this mechanism as rhetorical action. (ii) Helene Sjursen has likewise emphasized the importance of constitutive norms and principles of the EU's Eastern enlargement. However, she has also highlighted the salience of communicative action of Habermas as opposed to rhetorical action of Schimmelfennig as regards to the EU's enlargement policy. Further, she has also demonstrated that prioritizations in the EU's enlargement policy have occurred and created some advantageous outcomes for some candidate countries. She has reminded that collective identity arguments have impacted the EU's Eastern enlargement. Kinship-based arguments, according to Sjursen, have played a significant role in the admittance of the CEECs in the latest EU enlargement in May 2004.

In light of the discussion above it is no surprise that this chapter is an attempt to reconcile arguments based on the strategic considerations of costs with those based on

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 508.

bargaining and following institutionalizations of norms, rules and principles. According to Torreblanca, throughout the whole Eastern enlargement a middle-ground has been found to accommodate interests and principles in the EU.⁷⁵ In other words, EU enlargement policy has found a middle ground to move in a normative direction (hence meeting the EU’s constitutive norms and principles) and, in the mean time, let member states to protect and maximize their material interests.⁷⁶ To put the theoretical findings in context, and demonstrate how the big picture looks like from the outside when two contending visions of enlargement are positioned one against another; it is inevitably necessary to summarize all the findings of the chapter through an illustrative table.

Table 1: Summary of the Contending Visions about Enlargement Policy

	Rational Institutionalism	Sociological/Constructivist Institutionalism
Principal Logic	Interest-driven bargaining and negotiation (i.e. logic of consequentiality)	Principle, norm, and shared-identity-driven consideration (i.e. logic of appropriateness)
Principal Actors	Players with decision-making and institutional power (coalition-building agenda setting, and veto)	Norm and principle entrepreneurs (the European Commission, etc.).
Adjustment Mechanism	Bargaining and strategic negotiation about the costs of the enlargement	Social learning and preference changes

Source: created from the concepts developed by Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998; Rosamond, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Sjursen, 2002; Torreblanca, 2002; Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005.

In light of the summary given in Table 1, it is possible to see a group of utility-driven actors in the rational institutionalism, bargaining for their own national interests in the issues concerning the enlargement policy. The primary consideration is the relative weight of costs vis-à-vis the benefits for each individual country in matters of enlargement. Since the social players act as utility-maximizers (i.e. doing what is most beneficial for their own national interests) these players are expected to make use of

⁷⁵ Torreblanca, J.I., “Accommodating Interests and Principles in the European Union: The Case of the Eastern Enlargement”, ARENA Report, No. 7, 2002, p.18 available at http://selene.uab.es/_cs_iuee/english/obs/working_occasionals_ang_archivos/beyond%20the%20enlargement/d_Torreblanca.pdf.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

strategic bargaining and negotiations among them. In other words, logic of consequentiality is the driving force behind the entire enlargement process.

As for sociological/constructivist institutionalism, social players are supposed to follow the logic of appropriateness through the guidance of norm/principle entrepreneurs like the European Commission. Decisions on enlargement policy thus are supposed to be taken in accordance with the constitutive norms, principles and the shared identity of the Union. In other words, logic of appropriateness governs the entire enlargement policy and the subsequent process. From the entire discussion presented in Table 1, it is thus possible to reach the following arguments given in Table 2:

Table 2: Arguments about Enlargement Policy

	Rational Institutionalism	Sociological/Constructivist Institutionalism
Explanatory Variable	Relative weight and allocation of enlargement costs on individual member states	Constitutive norms/principles, and shared identity
Opinion on Enlargement	Polemical, unwilling and retarded	Collective and communal, willing and without delay
Enlargement Criteria	Biased and cost- driven	Unbiased and principle/norm-driven
Timing	Allocation of costs lead enlargement; thus, enlargement takes place slowly and/or in stages	Consideration on principles, and norms lead enlargement; thus, enlargement progresses fast
Allocation of Costs	Costs are transferred or passed on individual member states	Individual member states consent to stand the cost among them
Outcome of the Enlargement Policy	Individual member states' interests govern the enlargement process.	Constitutive rules, principles and norms govern the enlargement process.

Source: created from the concepts developed by Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998; Rosamond, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Sjursen, 2002; Torreblanca, 2002; Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005.

As shown in Table 2, two different logics of integration- which make themselves visible in two different types of institutionalism- cause enlargement policy outcomes to differ from each other. In the rational institutionalism, size and allocation of costs are the primary concerns of the actors and those concerns reflect themselves in the

bargaining and negotiation process. In the final analysis, national interests vis-à-vis the communal interests govern the enlargement policy.

In the context of the sociological/constructivist institutionalism, decisions taken throughout the enlargement process are forced to be in line with the constitutive principles, norms and collective identity of the Community. Thus, communal principles and norms dominate the entire enlargement process.

Having demonstrated all layers of the debate, it is therefore relevant to display how the two logics of integration fit into enlargement policy. In order to do so, see the following table, Table 3, in which logics of integration are applied into enlargement policy.

Table 3: Applying the Two Logics of Integration into Enlargement Policy

	Logic of Consequentiality	Logic of Appropriateness
Deliberation	A strategic bargaining and negotiation process with vested interests and preferences where social players foresee outcomes and act accordingly without taking into consideration of the prosperity of the rest.	A process of social learning in which social players act in line with what their identities or roles assign them to do.
Aim	To enhance the material position of the member states (interests and preferences of the member states are primary and must be elevated to an upper level in comparison with the prior situation).	To create or empower a shared identity and to construct a union of interest or purpose with the candidate.
End Result	An interest-driven decision which manifests the allocation of the costs with respect to power relations of actors throughout the bargaining and negotiation process.	An opinion implying consensual determination with respect to a set of principles, values and norms.

Source: created from the concepts developed by Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998; Rosamond, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Sjursen, 2002; Torreblanca, 2002; Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005.

When two logics of integration are applied into enlargement policy as in Table 3, it is obvious that rational institutionalists act as utility maximizers and results from this perspective are in tendency to mirror the relative distribution of power among the players. At that point it is vitally important and timely necessary to recollect what

Piedrafita and Torreblanca once wrote about the enlargement policy with respect to rationalist institutionalism:

“At the aggregate level, enlargement could then be modeled as a power game in which the EU seeks to maximize the benefits of an expanding membership in terms of economic, political and security gains and, at the same time, minimize the costs of accepting new members (in terms of budgetary, economic and political impact of the new members on the EU’s economy, budget and institutions).”⁷⁷

Thus, collective decisions are matter of material considerations in the rational institutionalism. At the extreme side, in the sociological/constructivist institutionalism, “[c]ollective decisions are a matter of identity, rather than efficiency... and to do with the search for collective self-understanding and the building of a common identity, which can serve as the basis for developing stable goals and visions.”⁷⁸

1.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter is an attempt to analyze Eastern enlargement of the EU from the two competing versions of new institutionalism. That is to say, enlargement is examined from the lenses of rational institutionalism on the one hand and the sociological/constructivist institutionalism on the other hand. Although these two visions might seem to be contending, it is the aim of the study in general and the chapter in particular that these two visions should not be taken as totally competing against each other; rather, they should be perceived partially competing as well as partially complementary with regard to their explanatory power in explaining the EU politics of enlargement.

With regard to enlargement, rational institutionalists claim that players live in a world in which they seek to maximize their utility which is represented in the form of economic or security preferences. In case of a conflict of interests, players make use of negotiations with the aim of distributing the benefits or accommodating the costs among themselves. Correspondingly, outcome of the negotiations is akin to manifest the distribution and asymmetries of power among the players. In a nutshell, both at the

⁷⁷ Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005, p.30.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 34.

member state level and the applicant state level, enlargement preferences are shaped by the calculation of expected cost-benefit of each individual state. Accordingly, each actor seeks to maximize the net benefits of its own. Nonetheless, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have already argued

“it is not necessary that enlargement *as such* is beneficial to *each* member. Enlargement can also result from unequal *bargaining power* among the incumbents. Member states that expect net losses from enlargement will agree to enlargement if their bargaining power is sufficient to obtain full compensation through side-payments by the winners (which, in turn, requires that the necessary concessions do not exceed the winners’ gains from enlargement). Otherwise, the losers will consent to enlargement if the winners are able to threaten them credibly with exclusion (and if the losses of exclusion for the loser exceed the losses of enlargement).”⁷⁹

As opposed to rationalist account, sociological/constructivist institutionalism sees enlargement as shaped by the ideational, cultural factors. Therefore analysis of enlargement is tantamount to the analysis of social identities, norms, values, rules.⁸⁰ Accordingly, enlargement politics inevitably focus on the “collective identity, the constitutive beliefs and practices of the community, and norms and rules of the organization.”⁸¹

⁷⁹ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, pp. 512-3.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

Since the start of accession negotiations on October 3, 2005, Turkey-EU relations have entered a new phase. Turkey as an aspiring country aiming to enter into the EU, with the longest history of waiting at the doors of European Union, is now an official candidate country bargaining to be a full member of the EU. Nevertheless, in order to understand the nature of the relationship between the EU and Turkey one ought to look back at Turkey's EU bid from the lenses of history. The reason is quite simple. Turkey's European vocation is not a new phenomenon. It dates back almost to last two hundred years of the Ottoman Empire. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans, for the first time, felt the urgent necessity to turn their faces towards Europe in various spheres. They were aware that they were lacking behind Europe; therefore, through enforcement coming from outside of the Ottoman territory, the Ottomans consented to the idea of catching up with Europe. 1839 Reformation (Tanzimat) Movement was the first example of this trend in the Ottomans. The process of emulating and competing with the West in general and Europe in particular continued till the last days of the Empire. As already known the New Republic of Turkey was founded by the Young educated Ottoman elites, on the lands which were once the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it is no coincidence that Turkey's relationship with Europe has to some extent displayed similarities with that of the Ottomans'. The Ottomans had always had difficulty in putting their relations with Europe in a steady state. Their relations with Europe were full of ups and downs. The same pattern can also be somehow observed in case of the newly established Republic of Turkey of 1920s and in the over-80years-existent today's Turkey. Thus, before going deep down of the current state of affairs between Turkey and the EU, it is timely and wise to revisit the dusty shelves of the history of Turkey-EU relations, with the aim of shedding light on the present situation. It has to be reminded that concurrent problems between Turkey

and the EU can not be fully explained without taking into consideration the past structuring of the Turkish Republic due to the fact that the Republican rhetoric is still alive in the present Turkish political life and culture. To get a better understanding of the current framework of Turkey-EU relations, a superficial look⁸² at the Ottoman Legacy and the principle of Westernization is inescapably essential.

2.1 Adherence to Principle of Westernization

“...There is only one way to escape these dangers... in other words to equal them in civilization. And the only way to do this is to enter European civilization completely.”⁸³

(Ziya Gokalp 1876-1924)

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, after the First World War, Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal and his friends. The Kemalist elites followed an inward-looking nationalism while trying to adopt western-oriented development policies for the new-born Republic. Since its establishment, Turkey has chosen to follow the path which was once pursued by the contemporary Western nations. The West, which basically meant Europe both for the Ottoman Empire and the young Republic of Turkey, was the last destination that needed to be reached. The Ottomans once desired to be a part of the Western influence sphere. They did want to reach the same level of development as their European counterparts did. To be regarded as Western, in particular, European was tantamount to be civilized, developed, and privileged. The founding elites of the Republic were no different than their Ottoman peers when it came to deal with the matters like the West, Westernization and Europe. Thus, it is wise to recall that Turkey’s aspiration to become a part of the Western world, especially the world of the Europeans which has always symbolized the West, is not something new and unknown. This chapter is opened with a statement of Ziya Gokalp,

⁸² It is a ‘superficial look’ in the sense that in the fourth chapter while explaining the Turkish identity the section will inevitably be touching upon fundamental legacies inherited from the late Ottoman era and the Empire itself.

⁸³ As quoted in Junk, D., “Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?” *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute* (Copenhagen: 2001), p.4.

which has to be reminded at this point; that he was one of the most nationalist thinkers of the Late Ottoman Empire; and, his ideology to a great extent impacted the minds of the founding elites of Turkey. As Gokalp put it rather clearly, there was only destiny set forth for the people of Turkey: the West. To enter into the world of European civilization was set to be the primary goal. To do as such, principle of Westernization (i.e. catching up with Europeans in spheres of technology, economy and etc and emulating and even importing their styles except the matters of culture) was utilized. When framed as such Gokalp's aforementioned statement clearly displays the underlying reason behind Turkey's aspiration to be regarded as member of the contemporary world, that is to say, Europe. The principle of Westernization was chosen by the Turkish elites to be the mechanism which would facilitate the transition from a theocratic Ottoman Empire to a secular young Turkish Republic. This was to be done by imitating the West which consisted of a group of countries which were regarded as secular, civilized and democratic. Actually, westernization was an end result of this newly-established country's desire to survive in its own and provide the continuity of the nineteenth century reform movements of the late Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴ In this context, the principle of Westernization can be considered as a legacy inherited from the Late Ottomans by means of which the entry into the civilized world was assumed to be made possible.

The principle of Westernization was not the only fundamental legacy that the Turkish elites inherited from the Ottomans. The Ottomans also bequeathed a highly diversified demographic structuring: under the territory of the Ottomans lived many groups (i.e. Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, and Jews) which were ethnically, linguistically, and culturally rather different from each other. The way that the Ottomans interpreted Islam, practice of tolerance and respect towards non-Muslim groups hold these vastly divided communities together. Besides, those non-Muslim groups were granted citizenship and the right to practice religion as they wished.⁸⁵ Eventually, the infamous 'Sevres Syndrome'⁸⁶ (referring to the 1920 Peace Treaty

⁸⁴ Oran, B., *Türk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar*, (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2003), p.50.

⁸⁵ Khosla, I. P., "Search for a Role", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 25, No.3, 2002, p.346.

⁸⁶ Despite the fact that the Treaty of Sevres (1920) was never put into practice, essentially it was the culmination of the desire of achieving the territorial partition of

between the World War One victors and the Ottoman Empire) cast doubts as to the goodwill of Western powers towards the Turks.⁸⁷ From time to time, this perception nevertheless became apparent in the context of Turkey-EU relations. The most obvious example of the revival of this syndrome in the collective memory of some Turkish circles was the very days following the Luxembourg Council of 1997 in which Turkey's elevation to the candidate status was denied.

In light of these arguments, Kemalism (i.e. the founding ideology of the Turkish state) can be considered to have “[b]ecome a kind of loose state ideology, one that was grounded in state paternalism and corporatism, a pronounced role for the military, economic modernization, and steadfast secularism.”⁸⁸

Despite the difficulties faced during the consolidation of the fledgling Turkey between 1923 and 1945, and the very existence of nationalistic, inward-looking domestic policies; plus, neutral foreign policy, Turkey gave up its neutral position and moved towards cooperation with western organizations. Turkey's march to the West became apparent in the early 1950s. First, Turkey joined the OECD in 1948; this was followed by membership of the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952. Becoming part of those western organizations could in a way be interpreted as the rejuvenation of Turkey's European vocation and effort to enter into the Western orbit. Hence The Cold War provided a golden opportunity for Turkey to be acknowledged as a European power. Turkey's strategic importance and military capacity rendered it a perfect and powerful partner for the western alliance against the Soviet threat.⁸⁹

Through its membership to various Western institutions, Turkey was able to get into a close contact with the Western Community. Nonetheless, by rejecting to attend the Asian Conference in 1949, speaking on behalf of the West at the Bandung

Turkey. It was both the symbol of the Ottoman defeat and the Turkish national resistance. This event is generally uttered with the Kurdish question and is still existent under the name of 'Sevres Syndrome', which implies that there is an international conspiracy aiming to weaken and to divide Turkey.

⁸⁷ Junk, 2001, p.5.

⁸⁸ Kubicek, P., “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities”, *World Affairs*, Vol. 168, No.2, (Fall 2005), p. 68.

⁸⁹ Aybet, G., “Turkey and European Institutions”, *International Spectator*, Vol.34, No.1, (January-March 1999), p.103.

Conference of Asian and African Nations in 1955, and siding with the colonialist powers against Algerian and other independence movements in the late 1950s Turkey explicitly demonstrated that it was willingly committed to all initiatives of Europe and siding with Europe almost in every possible sphere.⁹⁰ The next step for Turkey to follow was not to confine itself only with its political and diplomatic ties with the West but also to find a way to establish certain economic ties with the Western Community. With this aim in mind, Turkey finally applied to the European Economic Community in 1959.

2.2. The Association ‘Ankara’ Agreement

Turkey formally applied for associate membership of the newly founded EEC in July 1959 sixteen days after the Greek application. The underlying reasons behind Turkey’s application could be summed up as follows: “the culmination of Turkish orientation to the West; gaining free access for Turkish exports to the European market; and providing stimulus for economic growth; and on top of that Greece’s application to the EEC.”⁹¹

An association agreement between Turkey and the EEC was signed on September 12, 1963, two years after the ending of a similar association agreement with Greece; and it came into effect on December 1, 1964. “From the Community’s point of view, both countries were important NATO partners, critical for western security interests in the Cold War context.”⁹² In addition, Turkish association “was a way of drawing a strategic ally into its ranks as well as preserving the balance between Greece and Turkey; however, [a]s for Turkey, it was the door to Europe.”⁹³

⁹⁰ Oran, 2003, p.813.

⁹¹ Muftuler-Bac, M., *Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.54. See also for Hale, W., *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, (London Frank Cass Publishers Co. 2000), pp.174-5.

⁹² Onis, Z., “An Awkward Partnership: Turkey’s Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective”, *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, 2001, p.108.

⁹³ Muftuler-Bac, 1997, p. 56.

As Kubicek has argued “[m]embership , for a variety of reasons-most obviously Turkey’s level of economic development-was not on the table, but, very significantly, the EEC then agreed that Turkey was eligible for membership on geographic grounds.”⁹⁴

In other words, “[t]he Ankara Agreement was opening the door to Customs Union and full membership by envisaging a stage by stage integration process following the successful completion of preparatory and the transitional stages.”⁹⁵ The preparatory stage was completed on January 1, 1970. The Additional Protocol was signed on November 23, 1970; thenceforth came into effect on January 1, 1973 with “the ultimate aim of establishing a customs union between Turkey and the EU by December 31, 1995.”⁹⁶

2.3. 1970s: the period of Crisis

Throughout this period a number of factors contributed to the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the Community. “[T]hese were the enlargement of the Community from six to nine in 1972, the 1973 oil crisis and the 1974 crisis over Cyprus.”⁹⁷

Starting from the last one, the 1974 crisis over Cyprus marked a turning point in Turkey’s relation with the Community as well as Greece. Turkish military intervention to Cyprus in 1974 was eventually followed by the overthrow of the military junta in Greece. “The new government of Constantine Karamanlis applied for full membership in 1975. Greece saw the full membership card as a golden opportunity to consolidate its newly born fragile democratic regime with the aim of containing the security threat from Turkey.”⁹⁸ Furthermore, the way that the Community handled with the conflict

⁹⁴ Kubicek, 2005, p. 68.

⁹⁵ Onis, 2001, p. 108.

⁹⁶ Muftuler-Bac, 1997, pp. 58-9.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 61.

⁹⁸ Onis, 2001, p. 110.

dismantled the delicate balance in favor of Greece. The Turkish side felt isolated from Europe and this event increased the Turks' mistrust of the Europeans.⁹⁹

In September 1978, Turkey froze its relation with the Community resorting to the Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the Self-Protection Clause. Turkey was to a great extent dissatisfied with the credibility and commitment of the Community with regard to the Association Agreement. In the meantime, the Community was undecided to classify Turkey's position in Europe. Was Turkey a part of the Community's Mediterranean Policy or an associate member of the Community?

While all these were happening between the Community and Turkey, Spain and Portugal applied for full membership with the courage they took from the Greek example. Eventually, in 1979, Greece signed an Accession Treaty with the EC and the ultimate outcome of this relatively short time period of transition culminated with the full membership of Greece to the EC as the new tenth member of the Community.

Despite the efforts coming from the Turkish side to catch up the Greek example, with the aim of making a formal application to the EC by the autumn of 1980, Turkish military took over the regime on September 12, 1980. This resulted with the freezing of Turkey's relations with the Community.

2.4. 1980s and 1990s

One can easily argue that the 1980s were the years of rapid and radical transformation for Turkey as well as the EC. At the beginning of the 1980s Turkey shifted its economic policies and started implementing neo-liberal, market oriented economic policies. Though the process of liberalization of the financial markets and the privatization of the state enterprises were not an easy task to deal with, the steady transformation process began to flourish after the holding of multiparty (i.e., democratic) elections in 1983. Under the initiative of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, Turkey applied for full membership on April 14, 1987 on the basis of the Rome Treaty, which gave right to any European country to apply for full membership.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

“Although the European Commission noted Turkey’s eligibility, its Opinion of December 18, 1989 which detailed serious economic and political difficulties about Turkey, rendered Turkish accession unlikely, such as the expansion of political pluralism, the state of democracy, the persistence of disputes with a Member State (namely Greece), the lack of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative economic backwardness, especially in macroeconomic terms, the Kurdish question, and problems related to human rights.”¹⁰⁰

It was also mentioned that another wave of enlargement was not yet seen possible at least till 1993. Subsequently, the continuation of the Customs Union with Turkey was recommended. Meanwhile Europe was performing a great deal of transformation in both the realm of politics and economics. The aim to complete the single market in the realm of economics and the emphasis on the quality and sustainability of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law within the political context were two apparently crucial parameters for Europe. And eventually this Europe (i.e., the European Community) was transformed into the European Union with the signing of Maastricht Treaty in 1992. This paved the way for ‘further integration’ movement which was to flourish within Europe. Hence the former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe applied for the EU membership. Those former Communist states eventually “concluded association agreements, received large amounts of EU aid (far more than Turkey), and awaited a decision on their membership application.”¹⁰¹ Besides, in 1993, through the introduction of Copenhagen Criteria in the Copenhagen Council, minimum prerequisites for the candidate countries were eventually set forth. The criteria for membership were set as follows: “(i) stable institutions, democracy, respect for human rights, and rule of law (ii) a functioning market economy and a capacity to cope with competitive pressure, and (iii) an ability to take on the obligations of membership such as the adherence to aims and policies of the Union.”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰Muftuler-Bac, M., “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No.1 (Spring 2000), p.22-3.

¹⁰¹ Kubicek, 2005, p. 69.

¹⁰²*Ibid*, p.33.

In light of the developments taking place in the EU, Turkey-EU relations were revitalized in the early 1990s.¹⁰³ Hence, on March 6, 1995, Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement with the EU.

“As the Customs Union became a reality by the end of 1995, Europeans tended to place much more emphasis on political factors and the limitations of Turkish democracy, as opposed to earlier periods where the primacy emphasis was always the development gap and the relative underdevelopment of the Turkish economy.”¹⁰⁴

As seen above, European political elites were no longer satisfied with “[t]he mere existence of representative democracy...as a qualification for full-membership...on the political front.”¹⁰⁵ When framed as such, it is no surprise that the logic of consequentiality had started to pave the way for the logic of appropriateness. In the EU, merely interest-driven and instrumental -oriented logic were not any more the only engine of the integration. That is to say, “*deep integration* in Europe by the beginning of the 1990s had a fundamentally different meaning attached to it compared to Turkey’s first encounter with the Community back in the early 1960s.”¹⁰⁶ Despite the poor human rights record of Turkey; plus, the European Parliaments adamant policy regarding this issue, the likelihood of the EP’s possible assent on the Customs Union was seen rather low. Nonetheless, in contrast to expectations, on March 1995, the EP gave its consent on the Customs Union. The Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1996.

2.5. The Luxembourg European Council (December 1997)

At the Luxembourg European Council of December 12, 1997, “the EU agreed that several post [C]ommunist states were ready to begin membership negotiations, having

¹⁰³Birand, M. A., *Turkiye’nin Gumruk Birliđi Macerasi*, (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap Yayinlari, 2000), p.480.

¹⁰⁴Onis, 2001, p. 114.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*

sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria.”¹⁰⁷ That is to say, the EU set the time table for the accession negotiations with six candidate countries, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus for the next year. “Turkey, however, was pointedly excluded.”¹⁰⁸ As Muftuler-Bac and McLaren have pointed out “Turkey’s application... was apparently ignored despite the hopes raised by the experience of the Customs Union with the EU.”¹⁰⁹ The EU explained this rationalized this outcome by stating that “Turkey failed to meet the economic and political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria for membership and thus could not join the EU.”¹¹⁰ Not surprisingly, “[t]his outcome provoked extreme hostile reactions from within Turkey, and led to even further doubt about whether the EU was serious about ever including Turkey.”¹¹¹ For example, Tufan Turenc of Hurriyet (i.e. one of the most circulated newspapers of Turkey) wrote “Europe, Go to Hell” in response to the ignorance of the Turkish application by the EU in the Luxembourg European Council Summit.¹¹²

In addition, some European leaders’ rather straightforward declarations about Turkey made the matters worse. For example, Luxembourg’s Jean Claude Juncker, the EU president of the time, proclaimed that “the EU should not negotiate with a country where there is torture”.¹¹³ Likewise, the Belgian Christian Democratic Party Leader Wilifried Martens declared that Turkey’s culture rendered it ‘unacceptable’ for the EU membership.¹¹⁴ “In response to the Luxembourg decision, Turkey froze all political

¹⁰⁷ Kubicek, 2005, p. 69.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Muftuler-Bac, M. and McLaren, M. L. “Enlargement Preferences and Policy Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey”, *European Integration*, 2003, Vol.25, p.21.

¹¹⁰ Kubicek, 2005, p. 69.

¹¹¹ Muftuler-Bac, M. and McLaren, 2003, p.21.

¹¹² Turenc, T., “Europe, Go to Hell!” Hurriyet, 13 December 1997.

¹¹³ Kubicek, P., “The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2002, Vol.5, No.2, p.40.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

dialogue with the EU and declined to participate in the European Conference convened in March 1998 for candidate countries.”¹¹⁵

As seen from the above statements of European leaders of the time, majority of the objections to the Turkish application were associated with the matters of political concerns. By and large, they were giving emphasis on political and human rights records of Turkey. This is not to suggest, however, that the logic of consequentiality lost its importance in leading the EU integration project in those times. Rather, with the start of the 1990s, the ‘deep integration’ process of the EU made political concerns visible and; thus, opened the way for the political integration while strengthening the economic integration. this is As for Turkey, The Ankara Agreement of 1963 had already sealed Turkey’s indisputable Europeanness; therefore, there should not have been any confusion so as to render Turkey to be given full membership or not. As a matter of fact, the Association Agreement had only been signed for the purpose of full membership. There was no alternative but the full membership for the Turkish side with regard to the EU. Europeans’ emphasis on structural problems and their constant efforts to remind Turkey about its political and cultural constraints in its EU bid made Turkey feel like as it was the victim of double standard. Hence, “Turkey’s feeling of isolation and exclusion has been compounded” once again.¹¹⁶

2.6. The Helsinki European Council (December 1999)

In the Helsinki European Council, “the EU agreed to treat Turkey as it had the post [C]ommunist states although it continued to recognize that Turkey fell short on the Copenhagen Criteria and, thus, was not eligible (as other states were) for immediate accession negotiations.”¹¹⁷ In other words, the EU changed its policy towards Turkey and granted “an officially explicit candidate status to Turkey which produced

¹¹⁵Muftuler-Bac and McLaren, 2003, p. 21.

¹¹⁶Onis, 2001, p. 115.

¹¹⁷ Kubicek, 2005b, p. 69.

considerable optimism on Turkey's part."¹¹⁸ As Kubicek has argued "the Helsinki decision was hailed by Turks as a major victory and an affirmation of their European aspirations."¹¹⁹ Several reasons could be summarized in order to understand the logic behind the elevation of Turkey to the candidate country status: (i) crucial decisions were taken to consolidate European security and defense in Helsinki; and in the light of Turkey's strategic importance in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Eurasia it was no coincidence that Europeans attitude changed sharply.¹²⁰ ; (ii) The changing approach of Greece towards Turkey-EU relations¹²¹; (iii) replacement of Helmut Kohl by Gerhard Schroeder as German Chancellor and hence the policy change towards Turkey.¹²² Despite the apparent differences lying for Turkey on its road to the EU, the start of accession process turned into a powerful catalyst and paved the way for Turkey's firmly anchoring itself to its European bid. As seen from the Helsinki European Council of 1999 in which Turkey has given the official candidate status, logic of appropriateness for this time worked in favor of Turkey. Logic of appropriateness previously revealed itself in the rejection of Turkey's application in 1987 by the Commission and the denial of Turkey's expectation to be elevated to the official candidate status in 1997 in Luxembourg European Council Summit.

¹¹⁸ Onis, 2001, p.117.

¹¹⁹ Kubicek, 2005, p. 69.

¹²⁰ Eralp, A., "Turkey and the European Union in the Post- Cold War Era", in Makovsky, A. & Sayari, S. (eds.), *Turkey's New World*, (Washington: Washington Institute, 2000), p.185.

¹²¹ For further information about the change in the Greco-Turkish relations in the same time period see, Onis, 2001, p.117 and Avci, G. "Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.7, 2002, p.97 in which both writers suggest that a European Turkey was in Greece's own national interest.

¹²² Avci, G., 2002, p.98 in which Avci suggests that prior to the Summit Schroeder and his Foreign Minister Fischer already knew the difficulty of having Turkey in the EU as full member. Nonetheless, with the aim of demonstrating the EU as a secular entity which would embrace all the European cultures regardless of religion, they played their cards in favor of Turkey.

2.7. The Copenhagen European Summit Council (December 2002) and Beyond

As Gamze Avci has argued after the 1999 Helsinki European Council Decision to give Turkey an official candidate status, a “political avalanche of democratization” happened in Turkey.¹²³ The Turkish government displayed considerable degree of commitment and enthusiasm with the aim of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. Subsequent efforts of the Turkish government can be summed up as follows:

“The government quickly passed a National Program for the Adoption of the EU Acquis that accompanied the Copenhagen Criteria and pushed through an impressive list of reforms: abolition of the death penalty, expanded freedom of expression, curtailment of the power of the military, release of political prisoners, dozens of constitutional amendments, and more freedom for the use and study of Kurdish, which previously had been prohibited.”¹²⁴

In light of these developments, it is possible to argue that the Helsinki decision encouraged Turks to improve their democratic and political credentials vis-à-vis the EU. Post-Helsinki reforms taking place in Turkey strengthened the cards in Turkey’s hands in its way to the Copenhagen Summit in 2002. In the meantime, Turkey was accelerating its reform process; however, this did not equal to mean that efforts to implement the reforms were sufficient enough to satisfy the meet the Copenhagen political criteria. The EU, thus, clearly stated that Turkey’s efforts were not sufficient enough to open the accession talks. Subsequently, the EU demanded to see a further progress in line with the practical implementation of all the previous reforms initiated by the Turkish government since 2001. At the Copenhagen Summit, Turkey was given an exact date, namely December 2004, with the prospect of opening accession talks on the condition of proper implementation of reform packages and meeting the

¹²³ Avci, G., Turkey’s EU Politics: What Justifies Reform?” in (ed.) Sjurssen, H., “Enlargement in Perspective”, ARENA Report: Proceedings from the CIDEL Workshop in Avila, Spain, as quoted in Kubicek, 2005b, p. 70.

¹²⁴ Kubicek, 2005b, p. 70.

Copenhagen political criteria. Through setting a certain date for the start of accession talks between Turkey and the EU, the Copenhagen European Summit paved the way for acceleration of the pace of Turkey's reform process, which had already been initiated in 2001.

Despite the existence of positive developments taking place between Turkey and the EU, “[c]ertain issues (for example, adoption of a new penal code, protection of religious minorities, recognition of Cyprus) would linger and complicate EU-Turkish relations through 2004.”¹²⁵ Eventually, in December 2004, the EU agreed that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria; thus, accession talks were to be open in October 2005 between Turkey and the EU, subject to certain conditions. The set of conditions were taken under tough and tense bargaining within the EU 25 leaders over how rigid the requirements on Turkey should be and also over Cyprus's perseverance that Turkey ought to give a full recognition to Cyprus. These conditions have to do with the guaranteeing of the continuation of Turkish reform program and enforcing Turkey to implicitly recognize Cyprus through signing of an updated Customs Union agreement with all twenty five EU states. As has already mentioned,

“[T]urkey's road to membership remains paved with a multitude of challenges if not obstacles. Some of these challenges actually stem from the "buts" and qualifications built into the decision to open accession talks; another set stems from Europe and Turkey itself. Yet these challenges or difficulties cannot hide the fact that the European Council is heralding a new era both for Europe as well as Turkey with potential repercussions for the regions beyond Turkey. These give the decision of opening accession talks on December 2004 a historic quality.”¹²⁶

When looked into the long history of Turkey-EU relations, for many Turks, the December 2004 decision was a long-awaited affirmation of Turkey's European vocation, a project whose roots date to the beginning of the Turkish Republic.¹²⁷ The opening of accession talks on 3 October 2005 was sealed the decision taken in

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Kirisci, K., “The December 2004 European Council: Decision on Turkey: Is It an Historic Turning Point?” *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.4, article 8 (December 2004).

¹²⁷ Kubicek, P., “The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.3, (September 2005a), p.361.

December 2004; and thus, Turkey-EU relations entered into a new phase in which the willingness of the both two sides were to determine the fate of the Turkish membership.

It is no hard to notice that “[m]uch of the debate over Turkey’s application until December 2004 revolved around whether Turkey had done enough to meet the political criteria of Copenhagen.”¹²⁸ Nonetheless, as the Turkish accession become a crude reality in the EU circles through the opening of accession talks on 3 October 2005, talks about the Turkish membership have gained a new direction and so do the arguments against the Turkish membership. As Karlsson has brilliantly pointed out

“[t]he arguments against a Turkish EU membership that have been used so far have lost much of their force in view of the rapid reform process launched by the Erdogan government and the result of the referendum in Cyprus. Consequently, those who are opposed to Turkey’s membership now talk less about the country’s ‘EU maturity’ and the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Instead they argue that EU cannot absorb a new member of the size of Turkey that a Turkish membership would cause serious geopolitical and strategic problems and, last but not the least that EU is a community based on Christian values.”¹²⁹

In sum, a new phase in Turkey-EU relations has started with the beginning of accession talks in October 2005. Obviously, eventual Turkish membership is not guaranteed. As has already been stated by Karlsson above, it is possible to see a shift in change of attitudes in the EU circles vis-à-vis the Turkish membership. Hence, the finalization of the Turkish accession is contingent on the willingness of the both two sides.

2.8. Concluding Remarks

When Turkey first signed the Association Agreement with the then the European Economic Community in 1959, nobody had ever dreamt about the possibility of the Community’s turning into a political union. In those times, “the EEC was an economic

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ Karlsson, I., “Turkey’s Cultural and Religious Heritage: An Asset to the European Union”, in Emerson, M. and Aydin, S. (eds), *Turkey in Europe Monitor*, CEPS, No.9, September 2004, p. 84.

organization and the political integration that we see today existed only in the dreams of the most ambitious architects of the European project.”¹³⁰ As has previously been stated, the logic of consequentiality (i.e. do A, in response, you will get B) was largely dominating the European project. As the Community expanded through inclusion of new member states, the logic of appropriateness (i.e. do A; in view of the fact that, it is the right thing to do) started to reveal itself as the new engine of the European project. Respectively, inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the Community throughout the 80s paved the way for political integration in which logic of appropriateness began to grow stronger vis-à-vis the logic of consequentiality. In particular, by means of the deep integration process which was commenced right after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, today’s European Union began to be shaped. Political aspects came to the fore front in the integration project together with the material considerations. This new structuring of the EU has inevitably impacted the course of Turkey-EU relations. In many occasions, ‘Turkey’s shortcomings in its democracy, and poor human right records’ were reiterated by European political elites. Until the December 2004, the main concern of the EU was about the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria by the Turkish government. “There was little need to refer to historical/cultural/religious arguments about whether Turkey could ever be ‘European’; it was enough to note that on strictly political grounds, Turkey was not yet ‘European’ enough.”¹³¹

Nonetheless, as the Turkish membership to the EU became apparently visible in both the elite and societal levels in Europe, process of reconsideration of the scope of European integration started. Post-October 2005 era is merely a representation of such attitudes among Europeans with respect to the Turkish membership. As a matter of fact, with the opening the accession talks, Europeans bitterly felt the necessity of “rethinking about the parameters of the European project or the identity or purpose of the European Union.”¹³²

¹³⁰ Kubicek, *Turkish Accession to the EU*, 2005, p. 68.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p. 69.

¹³² *Ibid*.

CHAPTER THREE

UTILITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS-LIKELY IMPACTS OF TURKEY'S

ACCESSION TO THE EU

To put the Turkish membership in the broadest possible context, after having presented the historical and empirical analysis of Turkey-EU relations, it is timely to discuss over the likely impacts of the Turkish accession to the EU. In other words, utilitarian considerations are aimed to be analyzed. These considerations can be summarized as follows: (i) geopolitical and strategic considerations; and, (ii) economic considerations.

3.1. Geopolitical and Strategic Considerations

*“It is not symbolic geography that creates politics, but rather the reverse... ‘Europe’ ends where politicians want it to end.”*¹³³

Maria Todorova

Since the commencement of accession talks with Turkey on 3 October 2005, discussions on the likely impact of Turkish membership to the EU have increased in numbers in both the EU circles and the individual member states. Beyond doubt, geopolitical and strategic considerations have always been one of the most conspicuous and significant assets of Turkey in those discussions. Therefore, one has to inevitably

¹³³ Todorova, M. N., *Imagining the Balkans*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 160, 139 as quoted in Liotta, P. H., “Imagining Europe: Symbolic Geography and the Future”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 67.

discuss the likely impacts of the prospective Turkish membership to the EU from the lenses of geopolitics and security. It has to be remembered that the operating assumption at the heart of the discussion is that ‘the EU is willing and aiming to be a global power’. The capability of the EU as an international actor on the global stage is out of the scope of the discussion.¹³⁴ In other words, the inclusion of Turkey into the EU is a means to strengthen the EU’s aim to be a global power on condition that Turkey and the EU are both able and willing to find a common denominator in shaping their needs and preferences while walking towards a common and consistent future. Drawing from the same line of reasoning, it is relevant to discuss the likely impacts of Turkish membership to the EU on the issue areas such as foreign policy, defense and security.

3.1.2. Foreign policy and security dimension

Turkey’s geopolitical significance has always been a substantial asset in the positioning of Turkey in the international arena. It has always been important for the Americans. The Cold War is the best possible international phenomenon in which Turkey’s geostrategic importance reached its apex. It is worth to remind that Turkey has been a reliable member of the NATO throughout the Cold War. With regard to Turkey’s place in Western security circle; and, especially its position in the NATO, subsequent arguments over Turkey are worth considering:

“First, [Turkey] may be seen as a forward position for Western security interests, extending NATO power into the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In this mode, Turkey’s eastern military bases and borders reaches form a strategic frontier for its allies to project military presence well into the Russian sphere of influence and the strategic energy zone around the Persian Gulf states.”¹³⁵

¹³⁴ For a fruitful discussion on the EU’s international actorness see Allen, D. and Smith, M., “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1(1990) and Smith, M., “The European Union as an International Actor” in Richardson, J. (ed.) *European Union: Power and Policy-Making* (London: Routledge, 1996).

¹³⁵ Dahlman, C., “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Geopolitics of Enlargement”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 45, No. 8 (2004), p. 563.

Second, through “[a]n emphasis on energy transport and new geostrategic interests among” the US and the EU, “Turkey serves as a bridge into that same region”.¹³⁶ Drawing from the same ‘bridge’ metaphor in reference to issues of foreign policy, it is contextually apt to state that “[T]urkey provides a diplomatic bridge between European and US interests, at one end, and the Muslims states of the Persian Gulf and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, on the other.”¹³⁷

The foregoing discussion fairly represents the geopolitical significance of Turkey. Precisely like their American counterparts, Europeans are also aware of the uniqueness and peculiarity of Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic positioning in its region. As the likelihood of Turkish membership turn into a reality, the EU’s awareness and attention to the significance of Turkish geopolitical location have increased. An American type of awareness in matters of security and geopolitics regarding Turkey can also be found in the EU circles. See, for example, the following sentences extracted from the Commission’s Staff Working Document on Turkey, in which Turkey’s geopolitical significance for the EU is clearly highlighted:

“Turkey is situated at a regional crossroads of strategic importance for Europe: the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; its territory is a transit route for land and air transport with Asia, and for sea transport with Russia and Ukraine. Its neighbors provide key energy supplies for Europe, and it has substantial water resources.”¹³⁸

As the aforementioned lines demonstrate, Turkey is positioned in a strategically important region. The prospective Turkish membership to the EU implies the direct extension of the EU borders to the regions like the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Balkans and the Central Asia. Though those areas are not the safest, securest and most stable regions of the world (both economically and politically), there are a lot to be gained for the EU by making use of Turkey’s past historical experiences with the states in those regions. In other words, if the EU wants to construct a better relationship

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ Commission of the European Communities, “Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective”, *Commission Staff Working Document*, {COM (2004) 656 Final}, (Brussels: 6 October 2004), p. 6.

framework with the non-EU states in those regions, the Union should be aware of the potential that is carried along through the entrance of new comers into the EU. That is to say, the EU should “[m]ake use of the commonalities that exist between some member states and some neighboring countries...this is especially true in the case of Turkey and its neighbors.”¹³⁹

When framed as such, it is possible to argue that Turkish membership poses a set of challenges and opportunities. So long as the two sides insist on a common and consistent future, at the overall, plusses arising from the Turkish membership surmount the negatives. In view of the fact that ‘Turkey is an asset -rather than a liability- for the future of EU’s foreign policy’, one framework created by Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci from CEPS, in which the arguments advocated by Prime Minister Erdogan are put into context, is chosen to be the most relevant framework, which have the capability of being in harmony of the scope of this section.¹⁴⁰

Table 4: Objective Factors Demonstrating Turkish Potential Contribution to the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy:

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Turkey’s accession would lead to an <i>extended reach of the European Neighborhood Policy</i>.¹⁴¹ Turkey’s neighbors would become direct neighbors of the EU.2. Turkey has the role of a geographical hub for regional cooperation.3. Turkey is a <i>secure energy-transport hub</i> for Caspian, Middle Eastern and Russian oil and gas.4. Turkey is well situated to become a <i>forward base for the EU’s security and defense policy</i>, for military logistics and the credibility of the EU’s presence in the region.5. Turkey has <i>valuable</i> human resources to complement those of the EU for cooperation programs, ranging from business know-how to language skills. |
|--|

Source: Emerson and Tocci, 2004, p. 9.

¹³⁹ Emerson, M., and Tocci, N., “Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy”, CEPS, *EU-Turkey Working Papers*, No. 1 (August 2004), p. 6.

¹⁴⁰ The framework presented by Emerson and Tocci draws heavily from the speeches of Mr. Erdogan during the course of January 2004. It also incorporates his speeches on 26 January 2004 to the Council for Foreign Relations in New York and on 30 January 2004 to JFK School of Government at Harvard University. (Emerson and Tocci, 2004, footnote 14, p. 9)

¹⁴¹ For further information on European Neighborhood Policy, see European Commission, *European Neighborhood Policy- Strategy Paper*, (Brussels: May 2004).

Nonetheless, though there are deep cleavages among the individual member states of the EU on the common foreign and security policy due to the events of 9/11 and the War on Iraq, the extension of the EU borders via Turkish membership to the regions like Syria, Iran, Iraq will inevitably push member states to better cooperate on foreign policy.¹⁴² In other words, in the next decade -though still depending on how much the EU is willing to demonstrate itself as a foreign actor in its neighborhood- it is possible to see a “[r]ebalancing of the Union’s focus towards its southern and south-eastern neighborhood.”¹⁴³ Therefore, both for the EU’s internal security and its credibility as a foreign policy actor in its neighborhood, Turkey’s accession is an appropriate means to accelerate the construction of the EU’s foreign policy.

Another dimension of the debate is the security. In this context, Turkey as an experienced NATO member and having significant military assets, subsequent to its cultural and technical links with the Middle East and Southern Caucasus, may well contribute the security and defense of the EU provided that these assets are incorporated with that of the EU.¹⁴⁴ Also, Turkey may also contribute the EU in the issue areas associated with the soft threats to the EU like illegal trafficking of drugs and humans, fundamental terrorism.¹⁴⁵ There are clear evidences backing up this argument. In order to illustrate what has been stated, see the following data

“Turkey spends 2.4% of its GDP on military expenditure, compared with an average of 2% for the rest of NATO’s European members. Turkey’s military forces are by far the largest in NATO’s European contingent by number of personnel, accounting for a quarter of the total, with 514,000 enrolled (but with a large number of conscripts-391,000)...Turkey has also a substantial gendarmerie of 150,000, some of whom are effectively elite military troops. More specifically, Turkey has a significant cadre of career NCOs, with considerable combat experience in difficult terrains.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴² Hughes, K., “Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession”, *Friends of Europe*, Working Paper (June 2004), p. 27.

¹⁴³ Emerson and Tocci, 2004, p. 8.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 28-9.

¹⁴⁵ Tekin, 2004, p. 14; Emerson and Tocci, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 32.

Having discussed the potential benefits/opportunities arising from the Turkish accession; however, there are also some challenging and somewhat controversial issues with regard to the Turkish case. According to some critics, no matter how convergent may be the Turkish and EU foreign policy interests in the previously mentioned regions, there is still a possibility that Turkey may “[f]ollow the footsteps of the American policies” due the fact that Turkey and the US have a strong bilateral relationship for more than fifty years.¹⁴⁷ However, “rejection of the temporary deployment of 62000 US troops in Turkish soil by the parliament on 1 March 2003” in the War on Iraq, changed Turkish-American relations directions and surprised many Europeans, Americans and as well as Turks themselves.¹⁴⁸ Plus, “[i]t has also brought Turkey’s foreign policy closer to the underlying ideology of European foreign policy, even is the EU has itself been so deeply split over Iraq.”¹⁴⁹ In other words, labeling Turkey as the ‘Trojan Horse of the US in the EU’ is bit of an overstatement. Besides, the CEECs are also known with their pro-American stance especially with regard to the issue areas in the security field.

In addition, some observers have pointed out that Turkey might be a strong bridge between the EU and the Middle East. But it has to be noted that though Turkey will serve as a bridge in many aspects, waiting Turkey to be a stronger player in the political realm between these two worlds is somewhat naïve. Rather than a strong bridge, it is better to see Turkey “as an interpreter or translator for the EU with the Middle East but to an extent that should not be exaggerated and that will vary by country.”¹⁵⁰

One final point is associated with the traditional security discourse of Turkey. In order for Turkey to adopt itself the changing security discourse imposed by globalization

¹⁴⁷ Tekin, A., “Turkey’s Place in Europe’s Future”, Paper No. 173, presented at the Second Pan-European Conference, (Bologna: June 24-26, 2004), p.13.

¹⁴⁸ Emerson and Tocci, 2004, p. 27.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 28. For a good discussion of Turkey, EU and the US relations with regards to the War on Iraq, see Onis, Z. and Yilmaz, S., “Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2005). For a similar critical perspective on the War on Iraq, and Turkey’s stance on that specific issue, see also Bagci, H. and Calis, S., “Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited”, prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, (Brussels: 12 May 2003).

¹⁵⁰ Hughes, 2004, p. 29.

in general and the EU in particular, Turkish should transform its traditional Republican rhetoric with a new one. “The traditional discourse on security in Turkey has been that of the civilian-military bureaucratic elite since the foundation of the Republic.”¹⁵¹ In other words, “[f]ear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory”, plus the “assumption of geographical determinism has characterized the Republican era.”¹⁵² This is however not to suggest that *this* traditional discourse throughout all those years remained unchanged.

In line with the requirements of the circumstances in both the domestic and foreign policy, the national security understanding in Turkey has gone under severe scrutiny since the 1999 EU Helsinki decision to give Turkey an official candidate status. “The constitutional reforms and ensuing harmonization packages since October 2001 constitute indisputable evidence of change in Turkey.”¹⁵³ Though Euro-skeptics still firmly stick to the traditional discourse of national security, pro-EU actors are aware of the fact that some sort of a brand new approach (without necessarily ignoring the old one in its entirety) in national security understanding is necessary in order for Turkey to mould its national preferences into a common future with the EU.

To recapitulate, as Bilgin has argued “[t]he pro-EU actors have made a beginning by opening up Turkey’s definition of Turkey’s ‘national security’ for debate and sowing the seeds of an alternative discourse on security.”¹⁵⁴ Despite the recent developments such as the increase in the numbers of the civilian in the National Security Council, and the decrease in the centrality of military in the Turkish politics, there are still much to be done. That is to say, “[f]or Turkey’s security discourse to change further, civil societal actors and politicians would need to develop an interest in, and knowledge of, issues to do with security.”¹⁵⁵ By doing as such, it is possible to find a better ground for cooperation with the EU in foreign and security policy areas.

¹⁵¹ Bilgin, P., “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 44 (2005), p. 183.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p.187.

¹⁵³ Emerson and Tocci, 2004, p. 7.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.195.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 97.

3.2. Economic Considerations

Many Europeans fear that Turkey's accession will be too costly for the EU because they think that Turkey is 'too poor' and 'too big'. They also believe that the volatile and backward nature of the Turkish economy will worsen the already bitterly struggling economies of Europe. In addition, there is also a possibility for Europeans to lose their jobs since they believe that the Turkish membership will presumably cause huge waves of immigration from Turkey to the core EU member states. In order to contemplate over these considerations, it is timely to look at the Table 5 in which main features of Turkey and the EU are given in a comparative perspective:

Table 5: Some Facts about Turkey and the EU in a Comparative Perspective

	TURKEY	EUROPEAN UNION
Population	70,413,958	456,953,258
Age Structure	0-14 years: 25.5%, 15-64 years: 67.7 % 65 years and over: 6.8%	0-14 years: 16.03%, 15-64 years: 67.17 % 65 years and over: 16.81%
Population Growth Rate	1.06%	0.15%
Life Expectancy at birth	72.62 years	78.3 years
GDP (PPP)	\$572 billion (2005 est.)	\$12.18 trillion (2005 est.)
GDP-real growth rate	5.6% (2005 est.)	1.7% (2005 est.)
GDP-per capita (PPP)	\$8,200 (2005 est.)	\$28,100 (2005 est.)
GDP- composition by sector	Agriculture: 11.7% Industry: 29.8% (2005 est.) Services: 58.5%	Agriculture: 2.2% Industry: 27.3% Services: 70.5% (2005 est.)
Labor Force	24.7 million <i>Note:</i> about 1.2 million Turks work abroad (2005 est.)	218.5 million (2005 est.)
Labor Force Occupation	Agriculture: 35.9% Industry: 22.8% Services: 41.2% (3 rd qtr. 2004)	Agriculture: 4.4% Industry: 27.2% Services: 67.2% (2005 est.)
Unemployment Rate	10.2 plus Underemployment of 4% (2005 est.)	9.4% (2005 est.)

Source: Data compiled from the CIA, The World Factbook 2006.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ If not otherwise stated, the estimations are for 2006 and available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

As seen from the figures above Turkey can be regarded as a middle income country. In terms of demographics, it is nearly 15.5% of the EU-25. Drawing from these two facts, “opponents to Turkish accession suggest that Turkey will be both too powerful and too costly in budget terms to join the EU”.¹⁵⁷

Nonetheless, it has to be remembered that “size per se is not a criteria for EU accession but potential impact of size on the Union is an important and relevant factor in managing accession”.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, “with a population of 70 million, Turkey, would in terms of today’s population figures, become the second largest member of the EU. However, the population of Turkey is relatively young, and it is likely to exceed Germany’s 82 million by 2020, if not earlier”.¹⁵⁹ However, the earliest date for accession is 2015 if everything goes on the right track between the EU and Turkey. Also, “at a political level, the fact that Turkey is a small economic player will reduce its political clout on economic policy issues.”¹⁶⁰ Not surprisingly, the most powerful economic players in the EU are also the most powerful political players in the EU: Germany, France, UK and Italy are in this category. Simply, “political and economic dominance go together. This is not the case for Turkey”.¹⁶¹

As is evidenced from the statistical data given at the beginning of the discussion, possible implications of the Turkish membership on the EU should be evaluated by its size, GDP per head, and its dependence on agriculture. These factors are all reflected in the huge income disparities across Turkey. Since Turkey is a lower middle income country,

“[a]ccession of Turkey...would increase regional economic disparities in the enlarged EU in a similar way to the most recent enlargement, and would represent a major challenge for cohesion

¹⁵⁷ Hughes, 2004, p.8.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ Flam, H., “Economic Effects of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union”, in (eds.) Hoekman, B. M. and Togan, S., *Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union*, (co-publication of the World Bank and the Centre for Economic Policy Research: 2005), p. 341.

¹⁶⁰ Hughes, 2004, p. 8.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

policy. Turkey would qualify for significant support from the structural and cohesion funds over a long period of time.”¹⁶²

Furthermore, “Turkey’s relatively low level of development is [also] evident in the share of the labor force in agriculture”.¹⁶³ For the EU, if all these factors are combined together; if immigration is let free there is a high possibility of large-scale migration to the core countries of Europe. “The prospect of large-scale immigration is a source of considerable concern among the EU15; they fear immigrants will depress wages, boost unemployment, and cause social frictions and political upheavals”.¹⁶⁴ Nonetheless, drawing from the previous enlargements experiences in the 1980s and the latest one in 2004 it has to be reminded that “old member countries were allowed to restrict immigration for a period of seven years. It can therefore be safely assumed that immigration from Turkey will be subject to restrictions for several years.”¹⁶⁵

As for trade, the prospect of Turkey’s accession is not assumed to alter the pattern of trade between the EU and Turkey in view of the fact that Turkey has already been in the Customs Union since the late 1990s. Nonetheless, “the volume of trade could increase considerably” among the two parties.¹⁶⁶ By the by, the Customs Union is one of the most interesting aspects of the Turkey-EU relations. Turkey is the first country in the history of the Union which entered into the Customs Union without being a full member of the EU. Therefore, it is fair to say that “some integration effects are already visible in the context of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Accession itself can provide a further boost to economic growth and prosperity in Turkey, as well as a positive, but much smaller, impact on the present EU Member States.”¹⁶⁷ One possible scenario with regard to Turkey’s growth potential might be framed as following. If the annual growth rate of Turkey and EU-25 can be stabilized at an average rate of 5% and 2% respectively, “the

¹⁶² Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, p.5.

¹⁶³ Flam, 2005, p. 341.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 342.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 349.

¹⁶⁷ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, p. 13.

Turkish economy by 2015 would only be 2.9% of EU-25 GDP.”¹⁶⁸ As mentioned previously, this scenario is again a reflection of the projection that “Turkey’s impact on the Union and the internal market is likely to be marginal for the Union, though it could be highly positive for Turkey itself.”¹⁶⁹

Despite this positive outlook, some commentators argue that Turkey is still lacking behind the ten new members of the EU. This is true that Turkey’s population is more than the sum of the ten members’ population and Turkey is still growing in concrete numbers as opposed to the current situation in the EU-25. Apart from that, Turkey is not that much different from the previous candidates.

“The average GDP per head is less than 30 percent of the EU-25 average while that in the new members in Central and East Europe is closer to 50 percent. But it is unfair to compare Turkey, which is at the start of the journey, with the new members that have already arrived. Ten years before accession, Poland’s GDP per head stood at 35 percent of the EU average, and that of the Romania was much lower still.”¹⁷⁰

As for the issue of foreign direct investments, Turkey is far behind the ten new members. Considerable degree of FDI have entered into those countries “as a result of large investments by firms from Western Europe and elsewhere, which combine their technical, managerial, and marketing assets with a generally well-educated and skilled labor force at low wages”¹⁷¹ and “the privatization of state-owned companies.”¹⁷² Looking at Turkey from here, “Turkey has a long way to go before it can hope to attract the same level of foreign direct investment as some of the more successful countries in Central and Eastern Europe.”¹⁷³ Nonetheless, it is fair to say that “the perspective of EU membership triggers substantial FDI by EU companies due to the simple fact that the

¹⁶⁸ Hughes, 2004, p. 10.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Barysch, K., *The Economics of Turkish Accession*, Center for European Reform, p. 2, available at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_economics_turkey_july_05.pdf

¹⁷¹ Flam, 2005, p. 349.

¹⁷² Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, p. 15.

¹⁷³ Flam, 2005, p.349.

implementation of the *acquis* and of the institutional framework of the EU boosts investors' confidence to explore new market opportunities."¹⁷⁴

Another characteristic of the Turkish economy is its growing population of working age, i.e. demographic dynamism.¹⁷⁵ In contrast to the situation in many CEECs, "labor force will continue to increase in the long-run and this huge discrepancy gives Turkey potentially much more dynamism and leeway for growth."¹⁷⁶ In other words, "the share of young people will remain quite high when compared to the EU and candidate countries. This demographic structure presents both a window of opportunity for the Turkish economy, but also a heavy burden, especially on the educational and training system."¹⁷⁷

With regard to likely migration flows from Turkey to the EU, it is not yet possible to predict the outcome. It will be shaped *ceteris paribus* by the level of income and unemployment and existing employment opportunities at the two sides.¹⁷⁸ As has already been stated, Turkey will not receive a different treatment from the 2004 entrants. There will also be a transition period for the case of Turkey.¹⁷⁹ In other words, "[a]ppropriate transitional provisions and a permanent safeguard clause could be considered to avoid serious disturbances on the EU labor market."¹⁸⁰ At this stage, Ansgar Belke offers a highly optimistic scenario regarding the Turkish case. See the following words of Belke;

“[A]t that time a new scenario will prevail. First, due to population ageing, not only the EU-15 [the ones who pushed the button for

¹⁷⁴ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, p. 15.

¹⁷⁵ Belke, A., "Turkey and the EU: On the Costs and Benefits of Integrating a Small but Dynamic Country", *Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre*: Stuttgart, Nr. 247/2004, p. 3 available at www.uni-hohenheim.de/RePEc/hoh/papers/247.pdf and also see Hughes, 2004, p. 15.

¹⁷⁶ Belke, 2004, p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ Taymaz, E. and Ozler, S., "Labor Market Policies and EU Accession: Problems and Prospects for Turkey", *ERC Working Paper in Economics*, (METU: March 2004), p. 23.

¹⁷⁸ Hughes, 2004, p. 17.

¹⁷⁹ The EU-15 countries set a transition period for the 2004 entrants lasting up to seven years (i.e., 2+3+2) with a limitation on the free movement of labor.

¹⁸⁰ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, p. 5.

restriction on the free movement of labor] will suffer shortages instead of unemployment. Second, due to income convergence, emigration will not appear as worthwhile as before to Turkish workers. Seen on the whole, the current public debate on how large Turkish emigration flows will actually be, seem to be exaggerated and misplaced.”¹⁸¹

The final issue regarding the implications of the Turkish accession to the EU is the cost of the enlargement, that is to say the budgetary effects of Turkey’s membership to the Union. First of all, it is impossible to give a precise number as to how much Turkey’s membership will cost the EU budget in view of the fact that both the Turkish and European economies are subject to constant change. First, Turkey’s membership will not take place before 2015. Second, the context and guiding rules of the financial perspective of 2014 onwards are not yet known. Third, it is almost impossible to predict what direction the EU budget and major policies like CAP or regional policy will take by the year 2015 and beyond.¹⁸² In light of these uncertainties, making long term forecasts about the cost of Turkish membership to the EU is thus highly speculative. Incidentally, it is worth to remind that the determinants of the cost of Turkey’s membership are the ‘structural funds and CAP receipts’ that Turkey will get when full membership is assured.¹⁸³ To give a rough approximation as to how much Turkish membership will cost the EU budget; the following forecast done by Dervis, Gros, Oztrak, and Isik, with the collaboration of Bayar will be presented. In this forecast, Turkey’s membership is not assumed to take place before 2015. In other words, the forecast takes the year 2015 as the earliest date for the Turkish entrance into the EU. In view of the fact that Turkey is a lower middle income country and contains huge income disparities among its regions, components of the possible cost of the Turkish membership are assumed to be consisting of structural funds (arising from the cohesion policy of the EU) and the CAP receipts

¹⁸¹ Belke, 2004, p. 6.

¹⁸² Torreblanca, J., “Europe’s Reasons and Turkey’s Accession”, *Real Instituto Elcano*, No. 199 (AREA: Europe-ARI, 2004), p. 5; and Chislett, W. “Turkey’s EU Membership: The Moment of Truth”, *Real Instituto Elcano*, Working Paper, No. 17 (AREA: Europe-ARI, 2004), p. 24.

¹⁸³ Due to huge income disparity and low level of development among the different regions of Turkey; plus, the agricultural dependency of Turkish economy all put Turkey in a position of net beneficiary of structural funds and the CAP.

(arising from the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU). To see the overall picture, see the Table 6 given below:¹⁸⁴

Table 6: Possible Cost of Turkish Membership to the EU Budget

	Turkey in Today's EU (in billions of current euros)	Turkey 2015 in enlarged EU (as a % of EU GDP)
Structural Funds	8	0.16
CAP receipts	9	0.08
Total Receipts	16	0.25
Contributions to EU budget	2	0.05
(Max) Net receipts For Turkey	16 (0.16% of EU GDP)	0.20

Source: K. Dervis, D. Gros, F. Oztrak, and Y. Isik in cooperation with F. Bayar.

Although elaborated numbers may as well change during the course of time, this sort of estimation is appropriate - at least to some extent- to give an overall idea (albeit an approximation) as to how much Turkey's membership will cost the EU? Under the assumption that current rules for contributions and receipts are still valid; plus, the CAP it self, "the *ceiling* for the net cost should thus be around 0.20 % of EU GDP (equivalent to about €20 billion given today's EU GDP of around €10.000 billion."¹⁸⁵

To sum up, although estimated numbers may seem to constitute a considerable amount; on the other hand, when compared with the national economies of Europe or the whole EU economy, these sums constitute important but manageable amount for the EU budget.¹⁸⁶ Above all, one condition will always have to exist for the sake of the Turkish economy itself and the likelihood of accession process to proceed: continuity in the

¹⁸⁴ Dervis, K. and Gros, D., Oztrak, F., Isik, Y. and Bayar, F., "Turkey and the European Budget: Prospects and Issues", in Emerson, M. and Aydin, S. (eds.), *Turkey in Europe Monitor*, CEPS, No. 9 (September 2004), p.79.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 80.

democratic and economic reform processes which have already engendered significant improvements and stability in both the political and economic realms.

3.4. Concluding Remarks

Throughout the entire chapter, likely impacts of Turkish membership to the EU have been analyzed. Two points have been central in the context of Turkey's membership to the EU: (i) geopolitical and strategic considerations; (ii) economic considerations. These two points are assumed to represent the utilitarian considerations. Inevitably, logic of consequentiality has been the principal logic behind the entire chapter. Throughout the chapter, Turkey's potential contribution to the EU has been explained. As has already been stated, "[f]ollowing the logic of consequentiality implies to treat possible rules and interpretations as alternatives in a rational choice problem."¹⁸⁷ If it is the case, acting on the basis of logic of consequentiality resembles something like this:

"To act on the basis of logic of consequentiality or anticipatory action includes the following steps: a. What are my alternatives? b. What are my values? c. What are the consequences of my alternatives for my values? d. Choose the alternative that has the best expected consequences. To act in conformity with rules that constrain conduct is then based on rational calculation and contracts, and is motivated by incentives and personal advantage."¹⁸⁸

When applied to the institutional perspective; logic of consequentiality, in context of the Turkish membership to the EU, produces the results that are presented throughout this chapter. With the aim of getting the broadest possible overall picture as regards to the potential contribution of Turkey's accession to the EU's foreign and security policy, main findings of this chapter have to be revisited. This is to be done through reminding of the Commission's point of view in this issue, which also coincides with the overall argument of the section on geopolitical and strategic considerations in this chapter. See

¹⁸⁷ March, J. and Olsen, P., "The Logic of Appropriateness" ARENA Working Papers (Centre for European Studies: University of Oslo, September 2004), p. 5.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

the following lines which are extracted from the Commission's Staff Working Document of 2004:

“Turkey is a strategically important country whose EU membership would have implications for foreign policy in a number of potentially unstable neighboring regions such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia... If Turkey pursues its economic modernization, socio-economic development and regional integration, it would be able to play an important stabilizing role in its neighborhood. As an EU member Turkey would have importance for a number of trans-national issues (energy, water resources, transport, border management, counter-terrorism). With its large military expenditure and manpower, Turkey has the material capacity to make a significant contribution to EU security and defense policy. On international issues, Turkey generally aligns its positions to the EU's common foreign and security policy; but on some sensitive issues (human rights, the Middle East) this is not yet the case... However, in the future development of Turkish foreign policy, much will depend on internal developments within Turkey, especially as regards the future role of the military, religion, and civil society.”¹⁸⁹

From the findings of this chapter as regards to geopolitical and strategic considerations, it is possible to claim that Turkey's accession “could give a synergetic boost to the EU's capability and credibility as a foreign policy actor across the EU's southern and eastern neighborhoods.”¹⁹⁰

As for the economic dimension of the debate, the section on economic considerations aims to present a qualitative and to a certain extent quantitative assessment on how Turkey's accession would impact the EU. In order to review the general findings of the section, see the following lines extracted from the Commission Staff Working Document of 2004:

“Overall, EU Member States' economies would benefit from the accession of Turkey, albeit only slightly. An acceleration of growth in Turkey should give a positive impulse to EU-25 exports...A possible increase in labor supply, stemming from migration from Turkey, could contribute to some additional growth. Taking into account the low income levels of Turkish regions as compared to the EU average, Turkey's accession would statistically increase regional disparities in the EU. Turkey would benefit substantially from its accession to the EU. Accession should boost Turkey's growth essentially via increased trade, higher investment due to higher FDI inflows, and higher productivity growth to a shift in the sectoral composition of output and

¹⁸⁹ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, pp. 11-2.

¹⁹⁰ Emerson and Tocci, 2004, p. 1.

the implementation of structural reforms in line with the competitive EU internal market...In order for Turkey to fully benefit from accession, macroeconomic and financial stability must be ensured and its productive capacity enhanced by appropriate increases in physical and human capital.”¹⁹¹

In sum, though Turkey is a populous and economically poor country, “the economic outlook for Turkey is rather promising and...the accession negotiations might be self-enforcing.”¹⁹² In addition, Turkey is a young and dynamic economy. Main obstacle in front of the Turkish economy is to make its latest macroeconomic stabilization sustainable.¹⁹³ Nonetheless, the sustainability of democratic reforms is also crucial for the negotiations with the EU. “The EU monitoring will help Turkey to spot problems and set priorities...But the main responsibility for sorting out the Turkish economy lies with Turkey itself.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, pp.16-7

¹⁹² Belke, 2004, p. 8.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ Barysch, 2005, p. 8.

CHAPTER FOUR

CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Since the 2004 Brussels European Council Meeting, in which the decision on the formal opening of negotiations between Turkey and the EU was taken, “opponents to enlargement have invoked a supposed historical and cultural identity, especially with regard to Turkey.”¹⁹⁵ Turkish accession to the EU has thus become quite apparent in both the political elite level and the societal level in Europe. It is at this stage in which cultural, ideational, and religious factors come into the scene. Prior to this stage, objections to the Turkish membership were primarily based on economic and political considerations. Debates as regards to Turkey’s Europeanness were not yet on the table of the EU. As has been clearly stated by Ziya Onis,

“European approach to Turkish-EU relations was that Turkey was economically backward and, at the same time, had failed to satisfy the criteria in relation to democratization and human rights necessary to qualify for full membership in the foreseeable future.”¹⁹⁶

However, when the EU decided to open the accession talks with Turkey in view of the fact that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, debates “concerning the various dimensions of European identity and the boundaries of and the ambiguities

¹⁹⁵ Mayer, F. C. and Palmowski, J., “European Identities and the EU-The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2004 p. 593.

¹⁹⁶ Onis, Z., “Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 10 (March 1999), p. 107.

surrounding the European project” has sharply increased in number.¹⁹⁷ “Turkish accession to the EU has [thus far] become one of the most politically contentious issues in Europe”.¹⁹⁸ Almost every political party in Europe has a stance on this issue. Nonetheless, it is worth to point out the fact that debates over Turkey, “and the broader issues surrounding membership, reveal much about what Europeans hope the ‘New Europe’ will become”.¹⁹⁹

4.1. European Identity

It is a universally acknowledged truth that being European does not only refer to living in a particular region of the world- i.e. Europe- but also refers to sharing and practicing of a common history, norms, traditions and values. By the same token, it is no surprise that current twenty-five members of the EU are key players in creating the concept of Europeanness. Those states share a common understanding of the past along with a common heritage. For so many times in history, economic and social practices made them closer; but, at the same time cultural and historical specificities made them foes and rivals. In this common heritage, Europeans have witnessed several important events such as the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the industrialization, the birth of nation-state and democracy. Aforementioned events were not only ‘essential’ and ‘revolutionary’ *per se* in the history of Europe but also crucial and constitutive in the world history.

To begin with, Europe is a geographical region which gave birth to construction of a particular civilization. In the formation and construction of *this* civilization, the Roman Empire and Christianity played constitutive and unifying roles in binding the peoples of Europe together. Despite the fact that the Reformation might have broken the seemingly harmonious state of unity in religion; however, Christianity has never ceased to serve for the greater good of the European intellect.²⁰⁰ Subsequently, Enlightenment

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 109.

¹⁹⁸ Kubicek, 2005b, p. 71.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*.

²⁰⁰ As regards to Christianity, it has to be reminded the reader that both Judaism and Islam have been crucial in shaping the European civilization.

with its emphasis on rationality and individualism engendered an unprecedented process of development in Europe in science and technology. In other words, the Enlightenment and modernization went hand in hand. As time went by, the peoples of Europe-albeit experiencing the Enlightenment and modernization in different times- witnessed “the transformation of rural, subsistence economies and feudal patriarchal political systems into industrialized democratic systems.”²⁰¹ In a very broader sense, at the risk of oversimplification, the European Union as we know it today can be viewed as the latest product of the peoples of Europe.

While all those revolutionary events were taking place in the heart of Europe, European way of thinking and doing things started to affect the non-European world. Modernization, which is oft-identified with Europe, thus started to spill over to the rest of the world. That is to say, “historical points of convergence, common experiences and the development of a particular appraisal of the world, humanity and life itself went beyond underlying cultural and ethnic differences”.²⁰² While mentioning the convergence of particular experiences, values and traditions, it is also worthwhile to remember the simple fact that differences, rivalries, enmities throughout all European history have to a certain degree been instrumental in shaping the political and cultural map of Europe. At this point, Jewish, Arabic and Ottoman influences are worth mentioning in Europe’s search for the ‘other’. Following the same line of reasoning, it is thus reasonable to interpret European history and Europe as an end result of the interplay of the commonalities and differences engendered by Europeans themselves as well as non-Europeans. These diverging and converging points gave birth to the genesis and continuity of European thought and culture. At this stage, it is wise to acknowledge that Europe has performed remarkably well in changing the circumstance in its favor. As regards to Europe’s success in transforming the circumstances in its favor, Agnes Heller points out the fact that “Europe takes the other, transforms it and makes it own.”²⁰³ In accordance with the idea of a ‘unified and integrated Europe’, it is possible

²⁰¹ Nas, C. “Turkey-EU Relations and the Question of Identity”, in *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey* (eds.) Muzaffer Dardan, Cigdem Nas, (Publication of Marmara University European Community Institute, 2002), p. 219.

²⁰² *Ibid*, p. 220.

²⁰³ Heller, A., “Europe: An Epilogue”, in Brian Nelson, D. Roberts and W. Viet (eds), *The Idea of Europe*, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992), pp. 12-25.

to argue that the very existence of external threat and the urgent need to defend themselves against the threat compelled Europeans to think and act in harmony.²⁰⁴ For most of the time, the source of the threat was the East: (i) Arabic invasions to the Iberian Peninsula; (ii) Ottomans march to the doors of the Central Europe; (iii) the hegemony of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Europe.²⁰⁵ Europe's other has always been subject to change according to evolving nature of the European circumstances. In other words, "[t]he importance of external recognition varies, but at its most extreme it is a crucial determining factor in the creation of identities."²⁰⁶ As David McCrone points out "nor are national cultures and identities fixed and immutable. They are subject to processes of translation and change."²⁰⁷ The same point of view has also been advocated by Mayer and Palmowski. In a similar fashion, they argue that "[i]dentities are constructed and mediated constantly, and they require acceptance both within and from without."²⁰⁸ Accordingly, the same logic can also be applied to the formation of the European identity. As mentioned earlier, it is still under construction and subject to constant change. Thus the particular conception of Europe should not only be constructed on the basis of a common reading of the past and homogeneous culture. Despite the fact that, 'others of the Europe' have played a significant role in construction of the self-definition of Europe, it is better to remind that being European is also defined through "forgetting as much as remembering".²⁰⁹

As of today, European identity does not seem to be prevailing over the national identities. That is to say, national identities are still at the fore front and do not appear to be eroding in favor of the newly emerging European one. In this context, European identity is a new layer of self-identification, added on top of national identities without necessarily challenging them. The latest debates indicate that there is no actual trade-off between the national and European identities. In this sense, as Hooghe and Marks point

²⁰⁴ Nas, 2002, p. 220.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ Mayer and Palmowski, 2004, p. 577.

²⁰⁷ McCrone, D., *The Sociology of Nationalism*, (NY: Routledge, 1998), p.30.

²⁰⁸ Mayer and Palmowski, 2004, p. 577.

²⁰⁹ Nas, 2002, p. 221.

out, there is a positive correlation between attachment to one's own country and support for European integration.²¹⁰ By the same token, Bruter claims that the more an individual defines oneself with his/her nationality, the more he/she associates himself/herself with Europeanness.²¹¹

One final point still demands an urgent attention. It is a well-known fact that “[i]dentification with the European continent has always been linked to the continent’s history, geography and culture. However, the current, particular ...meanings of a European identity have been reshaped, expressed and amplified through the process of European integration since the 1950s.”²¹² It is actually the case because the supra-level European identity revolves around the EU. Therefore, the roots of the European identity, as we know it today, can be traced in the political and legal aspects of the EU. “[T]he EU can at most be characterized by an attempt to build civility codes of identities by reutilizing new practices and rituals in a European sphere of communication and identification with key values and institutions.”²¹³ In accordance with Bartolini’s point that only the acquired rights and traits can be the base of Europeanness; and, thus, the fundamental elements of European identity are declared in the Document on the European Identity is to be a society which measures up to the needs of the individual representative democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights.²¹⁴ In other words, European identity should be inclusive in the sense that “[t]he factors that make the difference between being European and not-on the margins of Europe- involve sharing a particular set of values, socio-economic development and societal organization.”²¹⁵ Therefore, “[c]ommon understandings,

²¹⁰ Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” *PS-Political Science and Politics*, Vo. 37, No. 3, (July 2004), p. 417.

²¹¹ Bruter, M., “Institutions, Media & The Emergence of European Identity” (Istanbul: Sabanci University, 29 January 2005).

²¹² Mayer and Palmowski, 2004, p. 592.

²¹³ Bartolini, S., *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.215.

²¹⁴ Article I-I of the Document on the European Identity.

²¹⁵ Nas, 2002, p.221.

values, norms and interests will constitute the basis of liberal community” in which the peoples of Europe live.²¹⁶

Having touched upon the European identity, it is relevant to discuss the identity debate with regard to enlargement. As already stated, becoming a member of the EU implies being a part of the European integration process through the sharing of burdens and benefits emanating from the membership. Accordingly, while deciding on decision to expand, the EU sets its own agenda and more than that its own priorities. Thus countries excluded from the successive enlargement rounds will be the ones whose Europeaness is not acknowledged or in question. What is significant and clear is that “the European collective identity *promoted* by the EU is hybrid in terms of embodying both inclusive and exclusive aspects.”²¹⁷ Therefore the newly-emerging- political map of Europe will set the demarcation line between the Europeans (i.e. insiders) and non-Europeans (i.e. outsiders).

In this critical juncture, Turkish membership to the EU has to be analyzed through the lenses of identity and culture so as to shed light onto the ongoing debate on Turkey’s Europeaness and Europeans willingness to embrace Turkey as a new member in the EU.

4.2. Turkey as Europe’s Other

For a very long time Turkey has been in a close relationship with Europe. Nonetheless, despite the existence of long years of relationship with Europe, Turkey’s Europeaness has always been a controversial issue. Needless to say, Turkey’s own internal ambiguities regarding its identity and Europe’s own confusion in shaping its newly emerging identity have made the things worse. Regarding the Turkish case, it is possible to argue that the past still casts shadows over the present tense. That is to say, the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim identity as opposed to Christian Europe have been crucial in shaping the minds of Europeans in conjunction with the Turkish membership to the EU. In particular, when one starts considering the civilizational dimension of the

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ Rumelili, B., “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, 2004, p. 44.

European integration project, ideational and religious factors inevitably come to the fore front. Not surprisingly, the demarcation lines between the insiders and outsiders start growing bolder. In the context of contemporary Europe's self definition and the other; according to Ziya Onis, "Christianity is a key component of European identity, even though it may not be its principal or overriding constituent."²¹⁸ He goes further and argues that "[i]n the EU's relations with Turkey, this dimension of the European identity comes to the surface and plays a major determinant role."²¹⁹

Having said that "Christian-Muslim divide is ...a central line of demarcation between Turkey and contemporary Europe", it is relevant to go back in history to find the traces of this demarcation.²²⁰ As has also been stated by Mayer and Palmowski, it is worth to look back at history in the sense that "[w]ith the current wave of enlargement, a European identity has largely been constructed on historic grounds."²²¹ In this context, it is possible to argue that "for more than 500 years Europe defined itself partially in opposition to the Ottoman Empire, asserting an historic identity for Europe would have profound implications for the question of Turkish accession."²²² The first meeting of Europeans with Muslim civilization can be assumed to take place in battles at Tours/Poitiers in the eight century. Some two hundred years later -through the crusades- confrontation of Christians with the Muslims started growing tense and violent. Finally, with the second siege of Vienna in 1683, this confrontation reached its climax. Therefore, these historical experiences of Europeans with the Muslim world still have contemporary influence in the minds and hearts of the peoples of Europe.²²³ In this sense, the Ottoman Empire was obviously a critical player in European politics; however, for most of the time, the Ottomans' confrontations with Europe were always almost hostile and violent. In addition, the Ottomans did not exert themselves too much

²¹⁸ Onis, 1999, p. 113.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 107.

²²¹ Mayer and Palmowski, 2004, p. 574.

²²² *Ibid*, p. 575.

²²³ Dombey, D. "Turkey's Legacy Casts Long Shadow over Talks with EU", Financial Times, (6 September 2004), p. 14.

to develop more substantial and closer ties with Europeans in the areas like culture, economics or even in diplomacy.²²⁴ According to Mayer and Palmowski,

“[i]t is through interaction with each other and with outsiders that individual and group identities are constructed. Certain base coordinates such as geographic and familial origin are given, but they obtain their individual meanings through the emotional content gained in interaction with others.”²²⁵

The emotional content in the EU-Turkey relations were already existent in conjunction with the Ottoman past of the Turks. As already mentioned “[e]vents such as two Ottoman sieges of Vienna did much to imprint a view of the Turks on Europeans, so that in Said’s terms, Turks (and Muslims more generally) were defined as ‘the other’ by Europeans and imbued with a host of negative traits (for example, ‘uncivilized’, ‘barbaric’, ‘heathen’).”²²⁶

As of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans became the ‘sick man of Europe’ and World War One brought the collapse of the Empire. Nonetheless, hostile confrontations of the Ottomans with the Christian community in the Balkan Wars and the massacre of Armenians in World War One did nothing but to make the Ottomans’ image worse in the eyes of the Europeans and to a great extent strengthened the prejudices against the Ottomans with regard to their ‘savagery’. When one follows the traces of the past, it is no hard for him to find ‘hostile sentiments’ against the Ottomans among the Europeans. Here is a simple manifestation of one of those ‘hostile’ sentiments against the Ottomans:

“The primary and most essential factor in the situation is the presence, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, of an alien substance. That substance is the Ottoman Turk. Akin to the European family neither in creed, in race, in language, in social customs, nor in political aptitudes and traditions, the Ottomans have for more than five hundred years presented to the European powers a problem, now

²²⁴ For the falling short and/or omission of the Ottomans in establishing close engagements with Europeans, see Lewis, B., *What Went Wrong?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a critical discussion of Turkish history, see Zurcher, E., *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).

²²⁵ Mayer and Palmowski, 2004, p. 577.

²²⁶ Kubicek, 2005b, p. 68. For further information on Europe’s definition of its other and critique of Euro-centric view, see Said, E., *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage, 1979).

tragic, now comic, now bordering almost on burlesque, but always baffling and paradoxical.”²²⁷

Having said that the First World War brought the end of the Ottoman Empire, it is worthwhile to mention that a new nation-state was come into being after the demise of the Empire. This process of nation-building was accomplished through the War of Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal against the Allied Forces. The ultimate result of this war was the establishment of a new state, i.e. the Republic of Turkey, in 1923. After having discussed that the Ottoman past of Turkey still casts shadows over its present day relations with Europe, it is timely to discuss the contemporary Turkey’s journey with the EU from the angles of identity and culture.

As mentioned earlier, Turkey first demonstrated its will to become a member of the EEC (i.e. now the EU) through a signing of an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1959. Since this day, “Turkey’s status as a potential member has continuously evoked heated debate within the EU and remained at best ambiguous.”²²⁸ Drawing from the above discussion about Turkey’s being Europe’s other, “an important asymmetry seems to be evident concerning its [i.e. Europe] approach to and treatment of insiders and outsiders.”²²⁹ If one considers the recent enlargement of the CEECs, this reality comes to the surface and becomes much more visible. Infact, “it would not be possible to explain the differential treatment of the CEECs and Turkey, countries broadly at the same level of economic and political development, without reference to this factor.”²³⁰

As already known, the EU did not display the same eagerness and goodwill towards Turkey as it did towards the CEECs. At this point, Ziya Onis prefers to point out the ambivalent nature of the EU integration process. According to him, European project evolves at an ambivalent nature: the EU is a project,

“that is sensitive and inclusionary in terms of economic and political development to individuals, groups, or nations within what appears to be its natural borders defined on civilizational grounds and yet much

²²⁷ Marriot, J. A. R., *The Eastern Question*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1919), p.3 as quoted in Kubicek, 2005b, p. 68.

²²⁸ Rumelili, 2004, p. 44.

²²⁹ Onis, 1999, p. 112.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

less sensitive and, indeed, exclusionary in its approach to individuals or societies perceived as lying beyond its natural frontiers.”²³¹

What has just been called as ‘ambivalence’ in the rhetoric of Ziya Onis with an implicit reference to the EU’s treatment to Turkey is called as hybridity in Bahar Rumelili’s terminology. She goes further and argues that “[t]his hybridity produces competing discourses on Turkey’s identity in relation to Europe.”²³² These competing discourses can be summarized as follows:

“The discourses that emphasize the exclusive aspect of European identity based on geography and culture construct Turkey as inherently different. On the other hand, the discourses that emphasize the inclusive aspects of European identity construct Turkey as different from Europe solely in terms of acquired characteristics.”²³³

Drawing from her analysis, Rumelili arrives at this conclusion: All these discourses highlight that “while exclusion of Turkey is racist and hence incompatible with European identity, Turkey is significantly different from Europe because it is economically underdeveloped, has an unstable political system marked by pervasive military involvement, and a bad human rights.”²³⁴

As these considerations make clear, all debates about Turkish membership to the EU are related with Europe’s own confusion and hesitancy about its own identity. Debates over Turkish membership are merely the asymmetrical reflections of ongoing debates on European identity, in which ‘mess’ and ‘confusion’ about the shared identity among Europeans is no longer possible to hide.

In sum, almost every scholar-mentioned in this section- has emphasized the legal and political aspects of the European identity. The cultural, religious, and civilizational dimensions of the debate are assumed to be of secondary importance when the last forty years of the EU integration are taken into consideration. This is not to suggest, however, that cultural, historical and religious factors have not impacted the construction of the EU’s shared identity. Instead, this section is aimed to demonstrate that there are different types of European identity; however, as Mayer and Palmowski have argued,

²³¹ Onis, 1999, 112-3.

²³² Rumelili, 2004, p. 44.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

“Europe’s most significant political, legal and institutional manifestation...is the European Union.”²³⁵ In the context of interplay of multitude of identities in the EU, from the ideational and cultural perspective, Turkish accession can thus be interpreted as such:

“[s]ince a European identity is not based on a common historical memory, it is difficult to argue that Turkey should be excluded on these grounds. As long as Turkey can fulfill the institutional, economic and legal requirements for membership, all of which are necessary to meet other conditions such as human rights, Turkey is not principally excluded from a European identity which has been shaped so decisively by the institutions and the law of the EU.”²³⁶

Because the question of shared identity of Europe heavily reveals itself in the polls made at the societal level; it is thus relevant to discuss the opinion of the EU citizens as regards to the prospective Turkish membership to the EU.

4.3. Public Opinion: Support for Turkish Accession

It is a well-known fact that since the latest enlargement round in May 2004, the public opinion in the EU towards further enlargement has changed in a negative direction “While 49% of the citizens of the EU are in favor of further enlargement of the EU in future years, 39% of the respondents oppose this.”²³⁷ Several events have contributed to this decline in the popular will vis-à-vis the European integration: (i) rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch citizens in 2005; (ii) increasing rate of unemployment in several core EU member states; (iii) low rates of economic growth in the EU-25.

When framed as such, economic considerations might seem to affect the public attitude towards the accelerated integration. Beyond doubt, “[t]he main thrust of European integration has been to sweep away barriers to economic exchange, facilitate

²³⁵ Mayer and Palmowski, 2004, pp. 579-80.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 593.

²³⁷ Standard Eurobarometer 64, 2006, p. 134.

mobility of capital and labor, and create a single European monetary authority.”²³⁸ Therefore, it is no coincidence that economic factors play a major role in shaping the public opinion of the EU citizens. Looking back at the 2004 enlargement provides the simple fact that there were already clear reservations of the EU citizens as regards to the entrance of ten new members. The low level of economic development, concentration on agricultural sector, and the prospect of immigration to the core EU countries have been the characteristics of the state of nature of those states. Summation of all those factors has triggered an anxiety among the European public which were already suffering from the decline in economic performance in the European economies. All these arguments and concerns also hold true for Turkish membership. What is significant and determinant in the Turkish case is that fears and concerns of the EU citizens over Turkish membership are heavily impacted by the ideational, cultural and religious factors. It is thus at this stage that the aforementioned factors seem to underestimate the potential contributions of Turkey to the EU. Therefore, examination of public opinion in the EU towards Turkish accession- through the aid of the latest Eurobarometer polls- is timely and appropriate.

In both the Special Eurobarometer and Standard Eurobarometer 64 of July 2006, there are several questions on Turkey aiming to demonstrate the EU public opinion on Turkish membership in depth.

When the citizens of the EU are asked as regards to their choice of future members of the EU; the lowest level of support has been observed for Turkish membership to the EU. The question is as follows: “For each of the following countries, would you be in favor of against becoming part of the European Union in the future”.²³⁹ Results can be summarized as follows: “The 77 percent of the EU citizens would like to see most Switzerland and Norway as future members of the EU. In other words, with 77 percent of support level coming from the EU citizens, Switzerland and Norway are at top of the list of the countries that are most wanted to be seen as future members of the EU.”²⁴⁰ On the other hand, with the 31 percent of support level, Turkey has been found

²³⁸ Hooghe and Marks, 2004, p. 415.

²³⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 64, Public Opinion in the European Union, Publication June 2006, p. 137.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

to be the least desired country in the list of the EU citizens as to which country they would like to see as future member of the EU.²⁴¹ Having considered the general European public attitude towards further enlargement, it is relevant to contemplate over questions specific to the question of Turkish membership. To do so, the most recent Special Eurobarometer survey results are assumed to provide the most relevant data.

Here is the most critical question of the latest Special Eurobarometer survey. It is critical in the sense that it measures whether or not the citizens of the EU are willing to see Turkey as a future member even if Turkey complies all the condition set by the EU. The question is as follows: “Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be... to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?”²⁴² Results of the question are compiled in Table 7 given below:

Table 7: Turkey’s Accession Generates Approval or Disapproval?

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. 39% of the respondents are in favor of the Turkish accession while 48% oppose this.2. The strongest opposition comes from countries like Austria (81%), Germany (69%) and Luxembourg (69%) in which public opinion is already less in favor of enlargement.3. On the other hand, Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%) are also in disfavor of Turkey’s accession although they are generally in favor of accession of other countries.4. The strongest support comes from the Turkish Cypriot Community (67%). Conspicuously, 54% of the Turkish citizens are in favor of their country’s accession and 22% of them oppose it. |
|---|

Source: Special Eurobarometer 255, pp.70-1.

In this critical juncture, it is worthwhile to mention the positions of some EU member states vis-à-vis Turkish membership. However, before going deep down of the debate, there are some central points that still demand overall review. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks point out the fact that

“opposition to European integration is often couched as defense of the nation against control from Brussels. Radical right-wing parties in France, Denmark, Italy, and Austria tap nationalism to reject further

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² Special Eurobarometer 255, Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement, Publication June 2006, p. 70.

integration, and since 1996 such parties have formed the largest reservoir of Euroskepticism in the EU as a whole.”²⁴³

This analysis is especially true for the case of Turkey’s EU membership. As has already been stated, countries which are less in favor of further integration are also less in favor of Turkey’s EU membership. For example, “[T]he German Christian Democrats (i.e. Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union) oppose Turkish accession together with Austria and several politicians in France, since it would ‘overstretch’ the EU.”²⁴⁴ Namely, material considerations which are driven by logic of consequentiality (e.g. overstretching of the EU) might appear to work in opposition to Turkey’s EU memberships. The same logic lead those parties to offer a ‘privileged partnership’ to Turkey as opposed to the alternative of full membership. In other words, albeit in an implicit manner, historical and cultural differences seem to deteriorate the Turkish case. According to Francois Heisbourg of the French Foundation for Strategic Research, “[i]t is more or less spoken or more or less hidden, but the major component in popular rejection of Turkey’s admission is Islam.”²⁴⁵ Nonetheless, it has also to be noted that arguments about Turkey’s cultural fit to Europe does not all come from the far-right political parties of Europe. For example, when former French Prime Minister Jean Marie Raffarin was asked in 2004 so as to comment about Turkish membership, he made the following remarks: “We are not doubting the good faith of Mr. Erdogan, but to what extent can today or tomorrow’s government make Turkish society embrace Europe’s human rights values? Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?”²⁴⁶

Although the overall picture might appear to give negative signals about the issue of Turkey’s cultural fit to Europe; there are however some positive arguments which prove that Turkish accession is still an attainable goal. Former German Prime Minister Joscka Fischer, once claiming himself to carry doubts about Turkish membership; has given the following statements after the ‘War on Terrorism’:

²⁴³ Hooghe and Marks, 2004, p. 416.

²⁴⁴ Kubicek, 2005b, p. 73.

²⁴⁵ Ford, P., “Wariness over Turkey’s EU Bid”, *Christian Science Monitor*, (October 6 2004) as quoted in Kubicek, 2005b, p. 73.

²⁴⁶ “Turkey’s Francophiles Wounded by French EU Doubts” *Turkish Daily News*, 12 September 2004, as quoted in Kubicek, 2005b, p. 73.

“to modernize an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would almost be a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror, [because it] would provide real proof that Islam and modernity, Islam and the rule of law...[and] this great cultural tradition and human rights are after all compatible.”²⁴⁷

To end the discussion on the public opinion about Turkish accession, nine statements, in which the EU public opinion as regards to Turkish membership are crystallized, are assumed to give valuable insights in this matter. Nine statements are produced from the answers given the subsequent question: “For each of the following please tell me you agree-% EU”²⁴⁸. Results are compiled in Table 8 given below:

Table 8: Turkish Membership in the Eyes of the EU Citizens

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. “To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights”: 83 % agree and 7% disagree. 2. “To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy”: 76 % agree and 10% disagree. 3. “Turkey’s joining could risk favoring immigration to more developed countries in the EU”: 63 % agree and 23% disagree. 4. “The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession”: 55 % agree and 31% disagree. 5. “Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography”: 54% agree and 35% disagree. 6. “Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history”: 40% agree and 45% disagree. 7. “Turkey’s accession to the EU would favor the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values”: 38 % agree and 47 % disagree. 8. “Turkey’s accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region”: 35% agree and 48% disagree. 9. “Turkey’s accession would favor the rejuvenation of an ageing European population”: 29% agree and 50% disagree.

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 64, p. 139.

In view of the nine statements presented above, it is possible to argue that in the eyes of the EU public ‘Turkey’s accession should be contingent on the fulfillment of certain conditions’: the systematic respect for human rights (83%) and the significant improvement in the state of Turkish economy (76%). In other words, as Hooghe and Marks have previously pointed out both the identity (in the form of cultural traits, and

²⁴⁷ Kagan, R., “Embraceable EU”, *Washington Post*, 5 December 2004, as quoted in Kubicek, 2005b, p. 71.

²⁴⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 64, p. 139.

religion) and economic rationality impact the public opinion on further EU enlargement.²⁴⁹ Regarding the Turkish case, as the numbers clearly reveal, both the logic of consequentiality (implying to economic rationality) and the logic of appropriateness (referring to the shared identity, norms, values of the EU) appear to go hand in hand.

With respect to country profiles, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg are the countries in which there is already a tacit agreement on the view that Turkey will have to respect Human Rights in the following ten years. More than 9 out of ten respondents in those countries apparently adhere to this view. As for the case of Turkey itself, 69% of the Turkish respondents are in agreement that Turkey will have to demonstrate a systematic respect for human rights.²⁵⁰

As for the issue of economic improvement, there is almost unanimity among the respondents, 76% are in agreement with the view that Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy. It is worth to remind that varying degrees of agreement among the countries seem to be arising from the ‘don’t know’ responses which are tantamount to 14%. The highest level of agreement in this matter can be observed in Greece (92%), Finland (91%) and Belgium (90%).²⁵¹

In reference to the discussion on further enlargement and the prospect of Turkish membership, the citizens of the Union in the final analysis are found to be displaying certain characteristics. See the following lines at the end of the Special Eurobarometer 2006;

“Europeans surveyed recognize that EU enlargement will have positive consequences on mobility for Europe, the enrichment of cultural diversity, peace and stability, democracy, as well as the reinforcement of the EU’s role on the international scene. In contrast, with regard to the economic and social consequences of the process, EU citizens worry most about employment. They fear an increase in labor transfer to countries where labor is cheaper, as well as expecting workers from future member states of the Union to settle in other EU countries...for future enlargement processes; apart from the low level

²⁴⁹ Hooghe and Marks, 2004, p. 415.

²⁵⁰ Standard Eurobarometer 64, p. 140.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

of knowledge about the topic in general, benefits for the EU are less known compared to benefits for potential future member states.”²⁵²

4.4. Concluding Remarks

Obviously, Turkey’s membership is not guaranteed. Turkey still has a lot to do on its way to the EU. Turkey’s poor economic and political credentials are the main obstacles in front of Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey still needs further democratization in the political realm and the state of sustainable growth pattern in the economic realm. Stability and sustainability in both realms are assumed to help Turkey find its place in the international arena. It is no surprise that Turkish state needs to get into a profound and radical process of transformation in order to meet the EU demands throughout the entire accession process. Nonetheless, many commentators do not give up pointing out the ‘differences’ of Turkey in every occasion without taking into consideration the final stage arrived in Turkey-EU relations. Discussions on Turkey’s not belonging to the European family or hints on its Islamism are not essential barriers in front of the Turkish membership. “To assert that Turkey cannot be a member of the EU because of its culture and, especially, because it is Muslim, would be ...an intrinsic and insurmountable incompatibility with democratic values and respect for human rights”.²⁵³ Such claims on Turkish membership are mere reflections of Europe’s own confusion, disorientation about its own identity.²⁵⁴ In other words, challenge is two-sided: one lies at the heart of the EU’s itself. That it is to say, prospect of Turkish membership will not only determine the future of Turkey but also that of the Europe’s. Turkish identity and European identity are subject to change in accordance with the circumstances dictated by the nature of the relationship. The second challenge stands at the core of Turkish state in view of the fact that Turkey still needs to better its economic, societal and political conditions. Namely, , “the realization of the EU dream

²⁵² Special Eurobarometer 255, p. 74.

²⁵³ Torreblanca, J., “Europe’s Reasons and Turkey’s Accession”, *Real Instituto Elcano* ARI No. 199, 2004, p. 3.

²⁵⁴ Ballin, E. H., “*Europe’s Borders and Basics: Where to Situate Turkey?*”, Lecture for the Center for European Studies, Bogazici University, and the Foreign Policy Forum, (Istanbul, 17 December 2004), p. 2.

and, in part at least, its pursuit, require a process of transvaluation whereby the normative core of political activity and institutions in Turkey faces the need not simply to adapt but radically change.”²⁵⁵

²⁵⁵ Glyptis, 2005, p. 402.

CONCLUSION

Eastern enlargement of the European Union should both be discussed through the lenses of the rational institutionalism and the sociological/constructivist institutionalism. However, what is at stake here is that “rationalism and constructivism do not provide us with fully elaborated and internally consistent competing hypotheses on enlargement that we could rigorously test against each other.”²⁵⁶ Therefore it is wise to perceive rationalist and sociological/constructivist theories of institutions “as partially competing and partially complementary sources of theoretical inspiration for the study of enlargement.”²⁵⁷

When looked into the fundamentals of these two institutionalisms, it is possible to observe that they are based on different social ontologies (individualism and materialism in rationalism and ideational ontology in constructivism) and assume different logics of action—a rationalist logic of consequentiality opposed to constructivist logic of appropriateness.²⁵⁸

It is possible to see a group of utility-driven actors in the rational institutionalism, bargaining for their own national interests in the issues concerning the enlargement policy. The primary consideration is the relative weight of costs vis-à-vis the benefits for each individual country in matters of enlargement. Since the social players act as utility-maximizers (i.e. doing what is most beneficial for their own national interests) these players are expected to make use of strategic bargaining and negotiations among them. In other words, logic of consequentiality is the driving force behind the entire enlargement process.

As for sociological/constructivist institutionalism, social players are supposed to follow the logic of appropriateness through the guidance of norm/principle entrepreneurs like the European Commission. Decisions on enlargement policy thus are supposed to be taken in accordance with the constitutive norms, principles and the

²⁵⁶ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, p.508.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 160.

shared identity of the Union. In other words, logic of appropriateness governs the entire enlargement policy and the subsequent process.

What is striking for the confines of this thesis is that the possibility of reconciliation of these approaches. As Torreblanca has pointed out very clearly, throughout the whole Eastern enlargement a middle-ground has been found to accommodate interests and principles in the EU.²⁵⁹ In other words, EU enlargement policy has found a middle ground to move in a normative direction (hence meeting the EU's constitutive norms and principles) and, in the mean time, let member states to protect and maximize their material interests.

Having discussed all the aspects of theorizing EU enlargement with respect to the Eastern expansion, it is relevant to extend the debate into Turkey's accession to the EU. When Turkey first signed the Association Agreement with the then the European Economic Community in 1959, "the EEC was an economic organization and the political integration that we see today existed only in the dreams of the most ambitious architects of the European project."²⁶⁰ In those times, the logic of consequentiality was largely dominating the European project.

As the Community itself started growing in number, the logic of appropriateness started to reveal itself as the new 'driving engine' of the European project. Respectively, inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the Community throughout the 80s paved the way for the prospect of political integration in which, thus, logic of appropriateness began to grow stronger vis-à-vis the logic of consequentiality. In particular, by means of deep integration process which was commenced right after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, today's European Union began to be shaped. Political and legal aspects came to the fore front in the integration project together with the material considerations. This new structuring of the EU has inevitably impacted the course of Turkey-EU relations.

In many occasions, 'Turkey's shortcomings in its democracy, and poor human right records' were reiterated by European political elites. Prior to the December 2004, the main concern of the EU was about the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria by the Turkish government. "There was little need to refer to historical/cultural/religious

²⁵⁹Torreblanca, 2002, p. 18.

²⁶⁰ Kubicek, 2005b, p. 68.

arguments about whether Turkey could ever be ‘European’; it was enough to note that on strictly political grounds, Turkey was not yet ‘European’ enough.”²⁶¹

As a matter of fact, with the opening the accession talks, Europeans bitterly felt the necessity of “rethinking about the parameters of the European project or the identity or purpose of the European Union.”²⁶². It is at this stage historical, religious and ideational arguments in front of the Turkish accession to the EU undermine the material benefits with regard to the Turkish case. Put differently, both the logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness have explanatory power in elucidating the Turkish case. That is to say, both the rational institutionalism and sociological/constructivist institutionalism have their say in conjunction with Turkey’s accession.

For such a long time, Turkey has been (and for some others.. *is still*) viewed as Europe’s other. Historical, religious and cultural traits are the ones which make the Turkish case worse in the eyes of European public. When framed as such, constructivist claims such as sharing the common understanding of the past, traits, constitutive values and principles of the Community appear to have proven futile in the Turkish case. Since Turkey is not completely assumed to share the civilizational dimension of European project; sociological/constructivist institutionalism fails short of in giving a full answer to the question of Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, kin-ship based (i.e. referring to Sjursen’s view) and norm-based (i.e. referring to Schimmelfennig’s view) arguments are hard to find for Turkish membership.

When one considers the worsening impacts of the cultural and ideational factors in case of Turkey, the already existent potential benefits of Turkish membership appear to be underestimated. In other words, it is not the instrumental logic that leads the integration project. Since, impacts of the cultural and ideational factors for the case of Turkey heavily reveal themselves at the societal level; the pace of Turkish accession to the EU might badly be affected from this situation. Drawing from the arguments above, it is thus possible to argue that rational institutionalism has shortcomings of its own in explaining the Turkish case.

In sum, Turkey’s accession to the EU are to be determined by its material costs and benefits; however, the perceptions of these costs and benefits will largely be

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 69.

²⁶² *Ibid*.

determined by the willingness of the European public to accept Turkey. Culture and identity, therefore, will play an equally important role in this matter.

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