

THE SPIRITS THAT WERE CALLED
THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY AND THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND

by
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The Spirits That Were Called

The Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the Reconciliation Process in Northern Ireland

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Abstract

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The Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland

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Bloody Sunday Inquiry – Historical Truth Commission – Reconciliation – Northern
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This thesis focuses on the research question whether the Bloody Sunday Inquiry has promoted reconciliation in Northern Ireland. The Inquiry examines the events of Bloody Sunday, January, the 30th 1972, when the British Army shot fourteen Catholic civilians during a civil rights march. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry is of significance for two reasons: firstly, if a historical truth commission, as a mechanism, can promote reconciliation. Secondly, the work of this thesis assesses Tony Blair's announcement of the Inquiry as a means to reconciliation. This research's further value lies in the novelty as the first scientific analysis of the Inquiry.

Witness statements provided the latent content analysis which focused on the process since the final report of the Inquiry has not yet been published. In addition, five interviews, with concerned parties during a research stay in Northern Ireland in January/February 2006, provided insight into the perception of the inquiry as well as helped in the analysis of the findings from the content analysis.

The content analysis reveals that the process of the inquiry holds only very few indicators for reconciliation. Rather, the indicators for Null-reconciliation – a term developed to qualify the indicators that state the opposite of reconciliation – exceeded those for reconciliation. Consequently, the content analysis suggests that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry does not promote reconciliation in Northern Ireland. This finding has been confirmed by all interviewees who underlined that Northern Ireland lacks a generic mechanism of dealing with the past.

ÖZET

Çağırılan Ruhlar

Kanlı Pazar Soruşturması ve Kuzey İrlanda'da uzlaşma süreci

Katharina Ploss

Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2006

Dr. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak

Kanlı Pazar Soruşturması – Tarihsel Hakikat Komisyonu – Uzlaşma – Kuzey İrlanda

Bu tez, Kanlı Pazar Soruşturması'nın Kuzey İrlanda'daki uzlaşma sürecine katkı sağlayıp sağlamadığı araştırma sorusu üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Soruşturma, 30 Ocak 1972'de Britanya Ordusu'nun, sivil haklar için düzenlenen bir yürüyüş sırasında, on dört Katolik sivili vurduğu Kanlı Pazar olaylarını incelemektedir. Kanlı Pazar Soruşturması iki nedenle önemlidir: öncelikle, tarihsel hakikat komisyonunun, bir mekanizma olarak uzlaşmayı teşvik edip edemeyeceği sorusu açısından kritiktir. İkinci olarak, bu tez çalışması, Tony Blair'ın Soruşturma'yı bir uzlaşma aracı olarak duyurmasını değerlendirmektedir. Bu araştırmanın bir diğer önemi, Soruşturma'ya dair bilimsel bir analizin ilk kez yapıyor olmasıdır.

Soruşturma'ya dair nihai rapor henüz yayınlanmadığı için, sürece odaklanan gizli içerik analizini tanıkların bildirimleri oluşturdu. Ayrıca, araştırma kapsamında Ocak/Şubat 2006'da Kuzey İrlanda'da ilgili partilerle yapılan beş mülakat, soruşturma algısına ilişkin bir kavrayış sağlamakla beraber, içerik analizinden edinilen bulguların analizinde de yardımcı oldu.

İçerik analizi, soruşturma sürecinin uzlaşma için çok az göstergeye sahip olduğunu açığa çıkarmaktadır. Aksine, sıfır-uzlaşma'ya (uzlaşmanın zıttını belirten göstergeleri belirtmek için kullanılan bir terim) ilişkin göstergeler, uzlaşmaya ilişkin olanlardan daha fazladır. Sonuç olarak, içerik analizi, Kanlı Pazar Soruşturması'nın Kuzey İrlanda'da uzlaşmayı teşvik etmediğini öne sürmektedir. Bu bulgu, yapılan mülakatlar sırasında Kuzey İrlanda'nın geçmişle ilgilenecek jenerik mekanizmadan yoksun olduğunun altını çizen herkes tarafından teyit edildi.

For my family and Nils

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Glossary

Bloody Sunday Bloody Sunday refers to Sunday, the 30th of January 1972 on which fourteen Catholic civilians were shot by the British Army during a Civil Rights March.

The Troubles The Troubles are a general description of the Northern Ireland conflict in the 20th century. The term focuses on the conflict that started in the 1960s and continued until the 1990s.

The Good Friday Agreement The Good Friday Agreement is the general and common name for the Belfast Agreement that was signed on Good Friday 1998 between all major political parties in Northern Ireland.

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

UUP Ulster Unionist Party

Sinn Féin Irish republican party. Sinn Féin means “ourselves”.

SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party

IRA Irish Republican Army

Provisional IRA The Provisional Irish Republican Army. The Provisional IRA is also known as PIRA, IRA, or Provos. It is a paramilitary organization that aimed at ending the British rule in Northern Ireland and having a United Ireland. PIRA was declared as a terrorist organization by the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and the United States. In July 2005, the PIRA Army Council announced the end of its armed campaign.

Parachute Regiment An elite unit of the British Army.

RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary. RUC was the name of the police force in Northern Ireland between 1922 and 2001. It was renamed “Police Service of Northern Ireland” in 2001.

Widery soldiers The term Widery soldiers refers to the group of British soldiers that gave a statement to the Widery Tribunal in 1972.

Non-Widery soldiers The term Non-Widery soldiers refers to the group of British soldiers that were on duty on Bloody Sunday but did not give any statements to the Widery Tribunal.

1

Introduction

...If you prick us, do we not bleed?

If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?

The Merchant of Venice, Act III, i, 8-11

When a society has suffered a protracted conflict, adversary parties do not easily reunite. Lives change tremendously when violence rules and horrible crimes are committed. What then shall be done when a society has undergone a severe and intractable conflict? Shall one side revenge or forgive? Furthermore, who should forgive whom and for what? What is apparently needed in this state of affair is a means to get to terms with the past and to enable the parties to the conflict to engage mechanisms that in some kind of a reconciliation process.

Northern Ireland, currently a province of the United Kingdom¹, has experienced these scenarios and now faces the challenge of dealing with the legacy of the conflict. A particular burden has been Bloody Sunday, the infamous Sunday the 30th 1972, where fourteen Catholic civilians were shot by the British Army. The tragedies of Bloody Sunday were dealt with in the immediate aftermath by the so – called Widgery Tribunal, but the families of the victims were highly disappointed by the Tribunal's findings which confirmed the British account of the story – the Tribunal is thus generally considered as a whitewash of what actually happened on that particular Sunday on the

¹ See Appendix Maps 1 and 2

streets of Derry. The opening of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry announced by Prime Minister Tony Blair on January, the 29th 1998 was the consequence of 26 years of campaigning by the families. The intention was to finally deal with one particular burden of the conflict. Though a generic reconciliation process has not yet been set up in Northern Ireland, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry certainly falls into the category of an officially sanctioned truth seeking mechanism (Hayner, 2002) with the aspired goal of contributing to the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland (Blair, 1998).

When I started this research, my perception of Bloody Sunday was that it, even if people are not directly affected by it, has a high symbolic value within the Northern Irish society. This assumption seemed obvious to me because Bloody Sunday is usually referred to as a turning point for the Troubles. In addition, Bloody Sunday is a case that has been widely reflected in the international media as well as comprehensively studied in the academic world. This major attention was a reason to believe that the Bloody Sunday has played a central role in the daily lives of people in Northern Ireland. Therefore, it appeared natural to me that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry would impact strongly on the society in Northern Ireland; it seemed self-explanatory that the Inquiry could promote reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

This Master's thesis aims to determine if the process of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry has promoted reconciliation in Northern Ireland. The underlying hypothesis concerns the question of the inquiry's contribution to the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland. At a later stage of the research, it became clear that an inquiry into one single event of the Northern Ireland conflict cannot achieve reconciliation for the entire society. To achieve this goal, further wide-ranging and in-depth means and mechanisms would be necessary. Still, the inquiry may be one part in the puzzle called 'reconciliation' in Northern Ireland. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry is a unique case not only for the Northern Ireland conflict but for the scholarly world, too. As a historical truth commission (Hayner, 2002), it belongs to the mechanisms which are supposed to contribute to the reconciliation process in a divided society. However, unlike other historical truth commissions – e.g. the United States' "Advisory committee on Human Radiation Experiments" held in 1994 until 1995 or Canada's "Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples" held between August 1991 until November 1996 (Ibid) – the Bloody Sunday Inquiry focuses on one particular event in the history of the Northern Ireland conflict and not on a long term abusive policy of one side against the other.

Since the final report of the Inquiry has not yet been published – it is expected to come out some time in Summer 2006 – it has not been possible to look at the findings. Rather, in order to obtain the necessary data to answer the question, a content analysis of the online accessible witness statements that were given to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was conducted. In addition, five interviews were carried out during a research stay in Northern Ireland in January/February 2006. The interviews, first of all, served the purpose of providing better insight into the perception of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry by those concerned. In addition, it was invaluable for acquiring a profound, though initial idea of the perception towards “the other” side as well as the assessment of the peace and reconciliation process in Northern Ireland by the interviewees. The information gathered in the interviews helped in analyzing the findings from the content analysis and provided fascinating ideas for further research on the issue of reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

This research is of particular interest for two reasons. First, at the policy level, the Inquiry was promoted as a contribution to the reconciliation process by Tony Blair. The research offers an initial assessment of this policy claim. Thus, the thesis is a policy evaluation. Second, as it was pointed out earlier, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is a unique case in the Northern Ireland conflict as well as for the academic audience. In addition, the research provides insights into the efficacy of historical truth commissions (Hayner, 2002) to promote reconciliation because the study focuses on a historical truth commission, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry². Thus, the study contributes to the theoretical literature on truth commissions and their role in reconciliation processes. Taking these points into consideration, the study helps to gain a first insight into one particular historical truth commission which has not been studied comprehensively by now.

The six chapters of the thesis offer a comprehensive understanding of reconciliation and the role of truth commissions in reconciliation processes in general. Furthermore, the chapters provide a thorough assessment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and thus suggest an evaluation of Tony Blair’s expectations that the Inquiry contributes to the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland.

² Further elaboration can be found in the literature review.

2

Historical Background

For centuries Northern Ireland has been characterized by conflict between Catholics and Protestants. British settlers arrived in Ireland as early as 1170 and the plantation of Ulster was established in 1608. The plantation of Ulster is unique among the Irish plantations because it attracted many colonists from England, Scotland, and Wales due to the offer of land (Darby, 1995). The aim was to build another society in Ireland with the result that the plantation of Ulster meant the introduction of a foreign community (Ibid). The plantation laid the cornerstone for the conflict: “The same territory was occupied by two hostile groups, one believing the land had been usurped and the other believing that their tenure was constantly under threat of rebellion. They often lived in separate quarters. They identified their differences as religious and cultural as well as territorial.” (Ibid) A few decades later, the first sparks of the Catholic-Protestant conflict can be witnessed with the emergence of a Catholic-Gaelic uprising against the plantation and the confiscation of land by English and Scottish settlers (Fitzduff et al. 2000). Northern Ireland was politically dominated by England when the Pope granted King Henry II legal control over the land.

July 12, 1690 is one of the most important dates in the Northern Ireland Conflict because it meant one of the first major acts of humiliation of Catholics by Protestant British Army. During the Battle of Boyne – July 12, 1690 – Protestant troops under King William III broke Catholic resistance, Catholicism and the Irish language were banned, and most Catholics had to work as ‘slaves’ for English landlords. In addition, the urban economy was dominated by Protestant immigrants who were sent to the island of Ireland from Scotland and England. The effects of such strife are still felt today in the annual Orange Parades.

The nineteenth century witnessed further milestones in the history of the conflict: the Act of Union in 1801, which was an attempt to secure more control over Ireland by abolishing the Irish parliament and government and submitting Ireland to direct control of the British government in Westminster, the potato famine in 1840, and the founding of Sinn Féin in 1890 by the journalist Arthur Griffith are further milestones in the history of the conflict in the 19th century.

Similarly, the early 20th century was also marked by many violent incidents. In 1912 the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant was signed by over 400,000 Protestants who wanted to remain in the union of the United Kingdom. During the Easter Rising in Dublin in 1916, Sinn Féin and other groups had a brutal encounter with British troops (Fitzduff et al. 2000). In 1921 Ireland was split: the 26 counties in the South became the Irish Free State and the 6 counties in the North (Ulster) remained part of the UK³. Ulster obtained its own provincial government in Stormont (Haus, 2001: 108-112).

Unfortunately, the Northern Ireland conflict in the late 20th century is still characterized by violence. A crucial point in the history of the Northern Irish conflict was the late 1960's. A Catholic Civil Rights movement was formed which was inspired by protests taking part in the rest of the Western world (Haus, 2001: 111). Issues of structural violence, for example fair housing, were on the agenda of the Civil Rights movement (The Bloody Sunday Trust, unknown). The situation became even more severe when in 1971 the British introduced a policy of internment. Haus points out that suspected terrorists could be arrested, held without trial and without the usual judicial provisions regarding the rights of the accused. He refers to hundreds of IRA activists who were imprisoned or interned without trial; however, no Protestants were (Haus, 2001: 111). The marchers on Bloody Sunday protested against this internment policy as well as the ban on protest. The march was organized by Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) (BBC History, unknown). The harsh reaction of the British government against the movement contributed to the emerging violence. The violence culminated in Bloody Sunday, on January the 30th 1972 in Derry. After Bloody Sunday, the military presence in Ulster grew dramatically even though the military had been deployed there before Bloody Sunday (Haus, 2001: 108-112).

³ See Appendix Map of the Republic of Ireland and Map of Northern Ireland for further information.

During the three decades between 1970 and 1990 atrocities, deaths, and injuries, therefore the growing bitterness and anger between Catholics and Protestants have been on the agenda of Ulster.

Signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 meant a change: for the first time Dublin had a formal and legitimate role in Northern Ireland's affairs although the agreement could not make any significant contributions to the peace and reconciliation process (Morton, unknown). The Downing Street Declaration in 1993 was a further positive development in Irish-British relations. The British as well as the Irish government made concessions: on the British side recognition of the rights of both traditions in Ireland and on the Irish side, disavowing the unification of the island. A cease – fire called by IRA and loyalists in 1994 denoted a short period of peace and progress (Dunn, 1999: 720-726).

In early 1995 the British government for the first time asked for outside help. Until that time the British saw the Northern Ireland conflict as an internal problem and thus refused any outside intervention. To involve chairmen from outside – the USA and especially George Mitchell (former US senator), Harri Holkeri (former Finnish prime minister), and retired Canadian general Jean de Chastelain were appointed as mediators in conflict (Haus, 2001: 113) – was “simply acknowledgment of the need once again to have neutral individuals oversee the talks involving the two governments and the parties.” (De Chastelain, 2003: 438). The so-called Mitchell Report in 1996 was followed by the Canary Wharf bombing in London conducted by the IRA. The bombing brought the cease fire to an end (Dunn, 1999: 724).

The election of Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1997 gave the process a new drive; the anew ceasefire declaration of the IRA on 19 July of 1997 meant a step forwards. The so called Good Friday Agreement which officially holds the name Belfast Agreement took place on 10th of April 1998. The agreement was widely accepted in both parts of the Irish Island (71% yes in Northern Ireland (turnout 81%), 94% in the Republic of Ireland (turnout 56%)). Even before the agreement was signed, the British Prime Minister announced the establishment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry on January the 29th 1998 to the House of Commons. The inquiry was opened by the appointed chairman, The Honourable Lord Saville of Newdigate on April 3rd 1998.

A couple of months after the signing of the GFA, Northern Ireland was faced with a horrific incident: the Omagh bombing (named after the place where it happened) that was conducted by the real Irish Republican Army (rIRA), a splinter group of the

Republicans, which later admitted responsibility for the act (Melaugh, 2005). 29 people died, and hundreds were injured.

Although the Good Friday Agreement marked an enormous progress in the Northern Ireland conflict – the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to both John Hume (SDLP) and David Trimble (UUP) in October 1998 for their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Northern Ireland conflict (Wikipedia, 2005) can be seen as an outer sign of the development in the peace process – the implementation has still been extremely problematic. The problem of decommissioning almost led to a failure of the agreement. However, in November 1999 Mitchell was able to “sell” a deal to the opposing parties: the IRA would begin decommissioning the day a government was formed. The IRA committed itself to decommissioning by May 2000. Hauss writes that on December 3rd, 2000 the new cabinet was formed for the first time (Hauss, 2001: 123). Dunne indicates that “The two major obstacles still remaining are the annual summer Orange parades and the decommissioning of weapons.” (Dunn, 1999: 727-728). The weapons had not been surrendered as demanded in the Good Friday Agreement.

The situation changed in May 2000 when the IRA announced that they would surrender the weapons. A couple of months later in December 2000, the Northern Irish Cabinet formed for the first time. Nearly one year later, the IRA issued its first apology to the families of the 650 civilians killed by the IRA since the late 1960s. This can be seen as a tremendous gesture; however, it is not clear if and how the affected families accepted the apology and if they have come to other terms with the IRA. Still all political institutions in Northern Ireland have been suspended since October 2002 because the IRA was accused of espionage at the Northern Ireland Office. The political process in Northern Ireland nevertheless progressed, even though with a little delay: more than one year later, in November 2003, elections were held in Northern Ireland: Sinn Féin and DUP became the largest parties; however, they could not reach agreement about how to form a power-sharing executive. Therefore, Northern Ireland continued to be under direct rule by the British government (BBC News, 12/11/04). The DUP under Reverend Ian Paisley refuses to talk to Sinn Féin as long as IRA does not surrender its weapons with a photo proof (BBC News, 12/11/04). In August 2004 the British and Irish governments issued the “Proposals by the British and Irish governments for a comprehensive agreement” which aimed at ending the suspension of the Northern Irish political institutions though Northern Ireland has remained under direct rule of the British government. Recently, Peter Hain, Secretary of State for

Northern Ireland, urged the concerned parties especially the DUP, to arrange the power sharing and finally get the assembly running. Even though the DUP does not show willingness to come to terms with Sinn Féin, Hain put the deadline to find an agreement for power sharing for November 24th 2006 (BBC News, 04/29/06).

In November 2004, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was closed. It was reconvened in December 2004 to hear the evidence from a man known only as “Witness X”. The inquiry was finally closed in August 2005. A firm date for the issuing of the final report has not been made public.

2.1 Bloody Sunday

Bloody Sunday took place at a time of already existing hostilities between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. Internment without trial and fair housing were among of the major concerns of the Catholic community at that time (The Bloody Sunday Trust, unknown). Fitzduff (2002) points out that civil rights marches against discrimination against Catholics were met with suspicion, anger, and in some cases violence by the Protestant community. She traces this attitude to the Protestant community’s consciousness of minority status and the long-held fear of Catholic subversion who would force Protestants to enter a united Ireland (Ibid: 7).

Bloody Sunday refers to the nature of the events that took place in Derry on the afternoon of Sunday, January 30, 1972. A Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march had been organized to protest against the continuation of Internment without trial in Northern Ireland. Approximately 20,000 men, women, and children took part in the march in a frolic atmosphere. The march was prevented from entering the city centre by members of the British Army (CAIN 2005). As it is further outline on CAIN’s website, the main body of the march then moved to Free Derry Corner⁴ to attend a rally, but some young men began throwing stones at soldiers in William Street. Soldiers of the Parachute Regiment, an elite regiment of the British Army, moved into the Bogside in an arrest operation. 30 minutes later these British soldiers shot dead 13 men (and shot and injured another 13 people) mainly by single shots to the head and

⁴ See Appendix “Street map of the Bogside/Derry”

trunk. (CAIN, 2005). The most controversial topic concerning Bloody Sunday is if the Parachute regiment shot the victims deliberately and with a prior plan at hand to shoot people during the march or if the military was attacked prior to the shootings and reacted in self defense. The soldiers that day who shot and caused the deaths and injuries insisted that they had “come under sustained gun and bomb attack by members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and only fired at people in possession of weapons.” (Ibid). Against Sinn Féin MP Marin McGuinness’ account, in 2000, Christopher Clarke, Queen’s Council (QC) revealed information of an informer who claimed that Martin McGuinness admitted that he had fired a single shot from the Rossville Flats on the day of Bloody Sunday (Mullin, 2000). McGuinness “labeled the informer's allegations ‘a pathetic fabrication’”. (Ibid)

Those involved in the march and witnessed the events evolving provided evidence which contradicted the army’s account of the events (Ibid). The forensic evidence regarding the handling of weapons and nail bombs which was given to Saville cast doubt on the correctness of the conclusions that Lord Chief Widgery drew from the earlier forensic report and the evidence given by the soldiers (Mullin, 1999). One particular concern, for example, was whether Gerald Donaghy carried nail bombs with him or if the nail bombs that were later found in his pockets had been planted there by after he was shot. The forensic findings of Dr. Lloyd lead to the assumption that at least one of the nail bombs would have been very likely to explode when Donaghy was shot because of its location and its highly impact sensitive explosive (Lloyd, 1999).

2.2 The Widgery Tribunal

In the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday, the British government established the “Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day”. The so called Widgery Tribunal was named after its head Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery. The appointment of Lord Widgery, a British judge, was controversial: many people in Derry were angry and some even called for a boycott of the inquiry. However, the majority chose to attend it (Bloody Sunday Trust). The final report of the events of what happened on Bloody Sunday was produced very quickly – and confirmed the army’s account. The army’s account has been that they were shot by people before they

opened fire against the demonstrators. The Widgery report claimed to have based its conclusion on scientific evidence (Wikipedia 2005). However, those who cooperated with the inquiry were amazed by the results (Bloody Sunday Trust). The Widgery Tribunal did not take evidence from the wounded marchers still in hospital and did not consider individually the many eye-witness reports submitted by civilians (Eaglesham, 2000). The Widgery report has thus been perceived as a whitewash of the actual truth, never accepted by either victims or by the broad majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland (Wikipedia, 2005). The Londonderry coroner Major Hubert O'Neill said, for example, that Bloody Sunday was "sheer unadulterated murder" (BBC History). Don Mullan (2002) points out that the Widgery report suffers numerous shortcomings: internal inconsistencies, failure to resolve the conflicting evidence, to give the evidence its due and proper weight, recognize the complete unreliability of the forensic evidence, incorrect application of the law on lethal force, and reach conclusions justified by facts (Mullan, 2002: XXXVIII).

2.3 The Bloody Sunday Inquiry

The Bloody Sunday Inquiry which is often called the Saville inquiry – after its chairman, The Honorable Lord Saville of Newdigate – was established 26 years after the events of Bloody Sunday. It is the biggest public legal inquiry ever held in British legal history (Wright, 2004). On January the 29th 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the inquiry to the House of Commons. According to Prime Minister Blair, the aim of the inquiry is to contribute to the way to the "necessary reconciliation that will be such an important part of building a secure future for the people of Northern Ireland." (Blair, 1998). This research is concerned with to what extent this policy goal was realized.

The opening of a new inquiry meant a big success for the families of the victims because they achieved what they had campaigned for, for so many years (Ploss, 2006a). The establishment of the inquiry in light of the Good Friday Agreement may lead to the assumption that international actors such as George Mitchell, the chair of the talks that led to the GFA, have influenced the decision-making process that led to the set-up of the inquiry. One of the interviewees who works for a political party in Northern Ireland suggests that the international dimension played a crucial role in the set-up of the

inquiry. Another interviewee who is also involved in a political party in Northern Ireland adds that Cherie Blair, the wife of Prime Minister Tony Blair, may have affected and encouraged Tony Blair to decide in favor of the campaign of the Bloody Sunday families. The set up of the inquiry by the British government and, not for example, by an international institution was considered and confirmed to be the only option by all interviewees. Since Bloody Sunday happened on British territory, it fell under British jurisdiction. Due to this conception it was unlikely that anyone apart from the British government could have set up an inquiry.

Even though the Bloody Sunday families were successful in campaigning for an inquiry into the event, they were not successful with their request for international staff (Personal interview 1, 2006). The Bloody Sunday Inquiry is chaired by an English Law Lord and two Commonwealth judges, The Honorable William L. Hoyt from Canada and The Honorable John L. Toohey from Australia. The tribunal members are not exclusively from England – the decision to bring judges from other countries apart from England may be considered an attempt to live up to the expectations of the families without totally giving in – but as Commonwealth judges Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Toohey are still responsible to the British government.

The status of the inquiry is determined by the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. This implies that the Tribunal has the same legal powers as the High Court to require individuals to attend it and provide documents (The Bloody Sunday Inquiry). However, the inquiry is not a trial. Consequently, it is inquisitorial but not adversarial, i.e. the inquiry tries to ascertain the truth but does not see its task as deciding in favor of one party or another: “from the point of view of the Tribunal, there are no parties or sides.” (Ibid). Therefore, it is supposed to be all about the truth of what happened on Bloody Sunday. Eventually, the inquiry may pay respect to previously unrecognized victims or their descendants as Hayner (2002) argues but it does not take sides, it does not accuse one side of being guilty while the process is running. This maxim of the inquiry can be seen as a mechanism to insure impartiality and consequently to gain trust on both sides of the communities. Apparently, this can play an important role for the overall acceptance of the inquiry by the people in Northern Ireland. If it is perceived as inherently biased from the very beginning, one side of the community may reject the outcome anyway. However, in a personal talk, Hamber (2006) points out that one of the main shortcomings in the set up of the inquiry has been that it was not established through a joint political process in which all political parties had a say. Rather, he says

that the opening of a new inquiry was perceived as a win by the one side, which meant at the same time a loss to the other side. The degree of acceptance within the entire Northern Irish society thus remains arguable.

The actual hearings started on the 27th of March 2000 in the Guildhall in Derry. The majority of witnesses were heard until the 13th of February 2004. The inquiry did not stay during the entire time in Derry but moved to Central London for approximately one year. The inquiry closed on November 2004 but reconvened one month later to hear the evidence of a man only known as “Witness X” who was granted anonymity as was available to other witnesses. The inquiry closed again after the hearings of Witness X. The Court of Appeal ruled in December 2001 that “the evidence of the soldier witnesses should not be taken in Londonderry on the grounds that they have reasonable fears for their safety.” (Ibid). After the year of hearings in Central Hall in Westminster, the inquiry eventually moved back to Derry to continue its remaining work in the Guildhall. The move of the inquiry meant a major disappointment to the families of Bloody Sunday as it was outlined by one of the interviewees who was directly affected by Bloody Sunday: “Well certainly we weren’t happy with it. We did not want it to move to London.” (Ploss, 2006a). The final report has not yet been published. It is expected to be launched in summer 2006.

One of the major criticisms especially from Unionist/ Loyalist side has been the enormous costs brought from the inquiry. According to the official website of the inquiry, it has cost around £155 million (approximately € 223 million). A Unionist contact claimed that the money that was put into the inquiry should have been used for the National Health Service or schools (Personal email, 2006). However, the issue about the costs and its legitimacy is highly controversial. Many felt that the big (financial) attention given to one single event as Bloody Sunday may be perceived as neglect of other victims and incidences (Ploss (c), 2006 and personal email, 2006).

Bloody Sunday appears to be a relatively unique case in the Northern Ireland conflict not only because of what happened on that particular day – actually Bloody Sunday was not the only case of state violence against civilians in Northern Ireland as one of the interviewees, a person from a governmental institution pointed out – but due to the fact that a second inquiry was set up to bring about the truth. After the history of the conflict with a particular focus on Bloody Sunday and its inquiries was outlined, the following section focuses on the theoretical background for this research: reconciliation and truth commissions.

3

Literature Review

In the years immediately following the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the conflict in Northern Ireland seemed to have ended or at least on a straight way to termination. Less violence, less dead, and a growing economy indicated a positive turn in this protracted conflict.

The establishment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry on 29 January 1998, 26 years after Bloody Sunday, occurred even before the Good Friday Agreement was signed in April. It was not just a part of this agreement but an initiative on its own. Of course, a connection between both might be seen however no apparent proof exists. Tony Blair's statement to the House of Commons (Blair, 1998) has led to the assumption that the Northern Ireland conflict and the reconciliation of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland should play a role in his election period. It apparently points out that the peace process itself has made some progress (less violence, growing economy, etc); however reconciliation between the people in Northern Ireland still has been only a desired goal. The literature review will shed light on four points of major importance to answer the research question. The review departs from the broad concept of reconciliation and then focuses on one aspect of reconciliation, the truth commission and its scope. The order of the literature review will be threefold: First, how reconciliation is discussed in the relevant research literature. Second, the focus will be on truth commissions, one particular method to achieve reconciliation, and the question if the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is such a truth commission. And last, the attention will be on the scope of a truth commission.

3.1 The Concept of Reconciliation in the Literature

When asking people in Northern Ireland what they consider reconciliation to be Hamber et al. (2005) discovered even though people were willing to talk about the concept of reconciliation most of the interviews were “fairly vague on the details of the process” (Hamber et al. 2005: 43). Yet, this study of Hamber et al. (2005) is not inclusive since only a certain number of people were asked in a relatively narrow area, Northern Ireland. Elsewhere, people might have a clearer picture in mind of what is reconciliation. However, reconciliation remains an advanced concept to know about. What kind of dimensions does it have? Is it a process, an actual state, or both? Therefore, to clarify the concept of reconciliation the literature review shall give a comprehensive overview of the relevant literature on the topic at stake.

First of all, reconciliation belongs to the broader category of peace building (Lederach, 1997 and Hamber et al. 2004) or conflict transformation (Sandole, unknown: 6). The interest in peace building in general and reconciliation in particular is a more recent development. Jacobsson Hatay (2005) points out that reconciliation received increasingly more political attention from the early 1990s onwards. Before that, the discussion was predominantly dominated by theologians, political philosophers, and trauma counselors (Jacobsson Hatay, 2005: 51). She highlights that reconciliation was then considered as “a key element of the post-conflict reconstruction process, part of a wider process of social and political change aiming at the transformation of conflictual social relationships (‘social reconstruction’) and the promotion of a ‘culture of peace and non-violence’ as well as the development of institutions and norms for the peaceful regulation of conflict.” (Ibid).

Looking at the literature on reconciliation shows that the major concepts concerning reconciliation show numerous similarities. Lederach, Kriesberg, Galtung, Assefa, and Hamber et al. describe reconciliation as a process consisting of several steps. The steps themselves resemble one another even though they may be named differently; the description closely parallels. Reconciliation is viewed as both a process and a goal (Lederach, 1997: 30-31). In the following section I will point out the above mentioned fundamental concepts concerning reconciliation.

Lederach sees reconciliation as a concept composed of four social energies (Lederach, 2001: 847). These energies are: Truth, Mercy, Justice and Peace (2001: 849-853). Elsewhere Lederach describes reconciliation as simultaneously locus and focus:

As a perspective, it is built on and oriented toward the relational aspects of a conflict. As a social phenomenon, reconciliation represents a space, a place or location of encounter, where parties to a conflict meet. [...] Reconciliation promotes an encounter between the open expression of the painful past, in the one hand, and the search for articulation of a long-term, interdependent future, on the other hand. Second, reconciliation provides a place for truth and mercy to meet, where concerns for exposing what has happened *and* for letting go in favor of a renewed relationships are validated and embraced. Third, reconciliation recognizes the need to give time and place to both justice and peace, where readdressing the wrong is held together with the envisioning of a common, connected future. (Lederach, 1997: 30-31).

Lederach points out that reconciliation has to be understood as a dynamic process, where the social energies, Truth, Mercy, Justice, and Peace are interdependent. Thus, reconciliation has to be a broad approach. The approach to reconciliation has to account for a multiplicity of needed activities, simultaneity of action, and interdependence of the energies (Lederach, 2001: 854).

Kriesberg refers to Lederach's work when discussing reconciliation (Kriesberg, 1999: 107). He has developed a similar model to Lederach's four social energies approach. Kriesberg considers reconciliation to be a process that aims at the development of a mutual conciliatory accommodation between formerly antagonistic groups (Kriesberg, 1998: 351). He underlines that reconciliation has more than just one meaning and includes contradictory elements. (Kriesberg, 1998: 351-352). Elsewhere, Kriesberg talks about four dimensions of beliefs and moral interpretations. The degree of reconciliation varies along these dimensions (Kriesberg, 1999: 107). The dimensions are:

1. acknowledge the terrible aspects of what happened between them [the adversary parties];
2. accept with compassion those who committed injurious conduct as well as acknowledge each other's suffering;
3. believe that injustices are being redressed; and
4. anticipate peaceful mutual security and well being (Ibid).

Kriesberg's four dimensions are similar to Lederach's four social energies' concept. (1) resembles Lederach's concept of truth; (2), Lederach's concept of Mercy; (3) Lederach's concept of Justice, and (4) Lederach's concept of Peace.

Johan Galtung uses a comparable approach to reconciliation. He considers reconciliation to be a combination of closure and healing – Reconciliation = Closure +

Healing (Galtung, 2001: 4). “Closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities, healing in the sense of being rehabilitated. Reconciliation is a theme with deep psychological, sociological, theological, philosophical and profoundly human roots – and nobody really knows how to successfully achieve it.” (Ibid). Galtung refers to twelve approaches to reconciliation⁵ in which “The Historical/ Truth Commission Approach” is only one (Galtung, 2001: 12). The “Historical/ Truth Commission Approach” suggests that it is vital to get the truth about the past into the public, no matter how ugly this truth might be (Ibid). Galtung claims that this approach bears a few problems: revealing the truth “does not by itself produce the catharsis of the offered and received apology, the hoped and offered forgiveness.” (Ibid). In addition, the approach falls short in generating ideas for how crimes of the past can be prevented in the future. Moreover, the lead of the process should not be limited to a group of professionals, such as lawyers and judges, but expanded to a broad circle including local communities and NGOs. (Ibid). Hunt (2004) seems to confirm the last point: he argues that the truth commission’s search for a new national memory bears some shortcomings because the outcome of the commission, due to naivety and some degree of arrogance, is considered to be the “official” history of the past (Hunt, 2004: 193). This problem might not occur, if finding out about the truth of a conflict is not only limited to an exclusive circle of people.

Like Lederach and Kriesberg, Galtung says that reconciliation can only be achieved if there is an adequate combination of the twelve approaches (Ibid). Consequently, he sees the approaches as interdependent.

In line with the researchers mentioned above, Assefa argues: “This approach [reconciliation] not only tries to find solutions to the issues underlying the conflict but also works to alter the adversaries’ relationships from that of resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony. Of course, for this to happen, both parties must be equally invested and participate intensively in the resolution process.” (Assefa, 2001: 337). He sees reconciliation as a conflict handling mechanism which consists of numerous core

⁵ Galtung points out twelve approaches to reconciliation: exculpatory nature-structure-culture, reparation/restitution, apology/forgiveness, theological/penitence, juridical/punishment, codependent origination/karma, historical/truth commission, theatrical/reliving, joint sorrow/healing, joint reconstruction, joint conflict resolution, and the ho’o ponopono approach.

elements (Assefa, 2001: 336) bearing a likeness to Lederach's and Kriesberg's social energies, respectively four dimensions. However, Assefa refers to more than just four elements in his approach. Still, as stated the core elements show commonalities. Assefa also mentions Truth ("Honest acknowledgment of the harm/ injury each party has inflicted on the other"), Mercy ("Readiness of the conflicting parties to let go of the anger and bitterness caused by the conflict and the injury"), Justice ("Sincere effort to redress past grievances that caused the conflict and compensate damage caused to the extent possible"), and Peace ("Entering into a new, mutually enriching relationship") (Ibid: 340).

Hamber et al. have developed a comparable approach to reconciliation. However, in contrast to the concepts of reconciliation developed by Lederach, Kriesberg, and others, Hamber et al. have not developed their reconciliation concept formally in research (Hamber et al. 2004: 3-4). For them, reconciliation is a process that "generally involves five interwoven and related strands: 1. Developing a shared vision of an interdependent society; 2. Acknowledging and dealing with the past; 3. Building positive relationships; 4. Significant cultural and attitudinal change; 5. Substantial social, economic and political change." (Ibid.). In a personal talk, Hamber (2006) underlined that the lack of a joint political vision as it was the case in South Africa is the major obstacle for reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Thus, the first point of the working definition of reconciliation provided by Hamber et al. (2004) may be attributed foremost importance when looking at the particular case of Northern Ireland.

To see reconciliation as a process that consists of several steps as it was outlined with variations by the above mentioned scholars seems highly convincing because reconciliation does not happen when only the truth was told but no forgiveness was given or no judicial consequences followed. Rather, it is a highly complex process that does not happen overnight but needs time. Lederach's (1997) idea that reconciliation is at the same time locus and focus may sound a bit confusing at the beginning. However, visualizing this approach may help to understand it and thus show its virtue. Take the simple picture of cooking and apply it on the reconciliation model. In the cooking pot called reconciliation the four ingredients Truth, Mercy, Justice, and Peace go into it. They "meet" within the pot and are mixed with each other. In order to get a proper meal all of the ingredients must go into the pot, leaving one out or putting too less into the mix, means to spoil the meal. The cooking process (the process of reconciliation) would not work out properly because the ingredients are interdependent as the social energies.

Though, the theory of reconciliation as, simultaneously, process and focus appears to be compelling, one has to take into consideration what reconciliation actually means to the people in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the study of Hamber et al. (2004) is of high value because they tried to figure out what this abstract concept called reconciliation implies to the people in Northern Ireland. This approach turns out to be particularly persuasive because people in different societies may have a different account of what reconciliation means to them. In a personal talk, Hamber (2006) indicated that people in Northern Ireland tend to have a sense of fear of reconciliation. He argues that for them reconciliation is closely related with some kind of threat to their own identity: since their identities are defined in relation to the other, giving up the existing imagine of the other – e.g. the other being the scapegoat – would mean that the own identity has to be re-defined. Therefore, reconciliation might not be as desired as it is for people who do not face this dilemma such as scholars or people who are standing outside the Northern Irish society.

With regard to international conflicts, William Long and Peter Brecke (2003) provide a significantly different view on reconciliation. It has to be underlined that the apparent difference refers to international conflicts, not to intra-state ones. Thus, this particular approach to interstate reconciliation can be neglected, however, for the sake of completeness it shall be briefly mentioned. Generally, Long et al. assume that reconciliation events correlate with successful conflict resolution; that is to say, with the restoration of civil and international order. The assumption is based on a survey of civil and international conflicts conducted by the authors. The survey has shown that often after a reconciliation event, the violent conflict was terminated. A reconciliation event includes:

direct physical contact or proximity between opponents, usually senior representatives of the respective factions; a public ceremony accompanied by substantial publicity or media attention that relays the event to the wider national society; and ritualistic or symbolic behavior that indicates the parties consider the dispute resolved and that more amicable relations are expected to follow. (Long et al. 2003: 6).

Long et al.'s study indicates that unlike in civil war situations, reconciliation events following the rational choice model⁶ were more likely to happen and to restore

⁶ According to Long et al. (2003) the rational choice model of reconciliation is derived from game theoretic approaches to explain cooperative outcomes. The model implies

social order than reconciliation events in the forgiveness model⁷ (Ibid: 110-111). The finding is ascribed to “insufficient motivation, inadequate mechanisms, or insurmountable obstacles for a sustained and constructive exploration of the truth, redefinition of the actors’ identities, and resolution of guilt and the application of limited justice.” (Ibid: 113). Since actors in international conflicts don’t have to share a country (Ibid: 114) and due to the lack of intimacy and inescapability in the relationship as well as the dearth of international legal and institutional means that could motivate and provide mechanisms for forgiveness (Ibid: 118) reconciliation events following the rational choice mode are more successful. The analysis of the data, however, shows that reconciliation events in international conflicts were only successful when they were “characterized by signals that are costly, voluntary, and irrevocable” (Ibid: 157). When looking at the civil war cases, reconciliation events following the forgiveness model were more successful than reconciliation events in the rational choice model (Ibid: 73). Recognition of harm and truth telling, redefining of self and the other, and justice short of revenge (Ibid: 67-72) – all of these are indicators for the forgiveness model as it has been defined by the authors– played a major role in achieving restored social order and peace (Ibid: 66). Long et al. point out that the rational choice model cannot explain why the social order has been restored within these countries (Ibid). The findings are of particular value for this study. They underline that truth telling and recognition of harm, redefining the relationship and restorative justice are vital factors for at least restored social order in a conflict torn society.

that the best tactic to break a vicious circle of hostile behavior towards the other side is to send obvious and costly signals that show the willingness to improve the relationships with the other side. A signal is costly because they are politically costly, they have an “audience effect” and “are more reliable determinants of a leader’s true intentions for improved relations.” (Ibid: 18). Long et al.’s (2003) assumption is that a reconciliation event in the rational choice model is perceived as costly by the other side and thus anticipated as a sincere offer to improve relations. Consequently, the parties may overcome the deadlock in their relationship.

⁷ Long et al. (2003) argue that forgiveness and reconciliation are an inherent human capability of problem-solving. The forgiveness model according to Long et al. (2003) involves that reconciliation is “part of a process of forgiveness, transforming certain emotions (moving from anger to affinity) and transcending certain beliefs about oneself and the other that opens the possibility of new, beneficial relations.” (Ibid: 23).

Hayner (2002) points out another aspect of reconciliation, which is important for this research: the distinction between individual reconciliation and national or political reconciliation. She suggests that speaking openly and in public about past events like the actions in truth commissions can ease the pressure these events otherwise might have on political bodies. Individual reconciliation can be more complex and more difficult to achieve through a truth commission because “forgiveness, healing, and reconciliation are deeply personal processes, and each person’s needs and reactions to peacemaking and truth-telling might be different.” (Ibid: 155). According to Hayner (Ibid) the strength of truth commissions lays in national and political reconciliation rather than individual reconciliation. This argument is persuasive due to two reasons: first of all, it is doubtful if it takes only a single truth commission to bring reconciliation in a society. Hayner (Ibid) underlines that it needs other factors, too, such as the individual and societal readiness to change. Hamber’s (2006) account of the situation in Northern Ireland confirms this view. Second, it may be difficult to measure if the truth commission was the determining factor that led to individual reconciliation. Moreover, how many people should be asked to find out about if a society is also individually reconciled? By virtue of this argumentation, this study focuses on the question if the Bloody Sunday Inquiry promotes national reconciliation rather than individual reconciliation.

Truth commissions, as it was just stated by Hayner (2002) are one particular mechanism that are supposed to contribute to reconciliation. Since the Bloody Sunday Inquiry falls into this category, the following two sections will focus on that topic.

3.2 The Bloody Sunday Inquiry – a Truth Commission?

Officially sanctioned truth seeking mechanisms to look into the past of a particular conflict ridden country, in other words, truth commissions are a phenomenon that occurred in the second half of the 20th century. The most famous truth commission is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa which was set up in 1995 until 2000. The TRC managed it to shed major international attention on the topic of reconciliation in general and truth commissions in particular. Even though other truth

commissions were set up before the TRC, such as the “National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons”⁸ in Argentina from 1983 until 1984, the TRC meant a turning point (Hayner, 2002). Hayner (Ibid) identified 21 major truth commissions even though she alludes that these 21 ones are not an exhaustive list. Hayner’s works on truth commission are of special value because she provides knowledge that is unique due to its comprehensiveness and extensiveness.

The success of each truth commissions has varied widely. Generally, none of the truth commissions that is highlighted by Hayner can be considered the perfect truth commission. All bear the one or other shortcoming. However, the Guatemalan “Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan People to Suffer”⁹, for example, was ideal in most of the circumstances, such as budget, size of staff, length of commission, and breadth of investigation (Hayner, 2002: 335-6). Nevertheless, as it was outlined in the previous chapter, reconciliation depends on more than just a truth commission not matter how ideal it is. Thus, to give a judgment on whether one particular truth commission was successful or not, means to skate on thin ice.

The investigation of a past period of human rights abuses is “often done through temporary, government-sponsored commissions to look into past abuses – now generically referred to as truth commissions.” (Hayner, 1996: 19). In his statement to the House of Commons, Tony Blair points out one of the hoped for results of the Inquiry: truth about the events on Bloody Sunday (Blair, 1998). Following Hayner’s definition of truth commissions, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry falls into this category:

“a fairly specific type of body different from the most nongovernmental efforts at documenting the truth, and different from government human rights commissions set up to a report on or guard current abuses. [...] First, a truth commission is focused on the past. Second, it does not focus on just one event, but on the record of abuses over a period of time (often highlighting a few cases to demonstrate described patterns or large numbers of abuses). Third, a truth commission is a temporary body, generally concluding with the submission of a report. Finally, a truth commission is somehow officially sanctioned by the government (or by the opposition, where relevant) to investigate the past.” (Hayner, 1996: 20-21).

Hayner (2002) elaborates further the concept of a truth commission. She offers a subcategory to the generic truth commissions as the South African Truth and

⁸ Original title: “Comisión Nacional para la Desaparición de Personas“ (CONADEP)

⁹ Original title: “Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico”

Reconciliation Commission: Hayner points out that there exist some kinds of present-day government-sponsored inquiries which look at past abuses by the state. Historical truth commissions are “not established as part of a political transition, and indeed may not pertain to today’s political leadership or practice given the time that has passed.” (Ibid: 17). These historical truth commissions serve the purpose “to clarify historical truths and pay respect to previously unrecognized victims or their descendants” (Hayner, 2002: 17). The Bloody Sunday Inquiry seems to better fit this category. The Inquiry looks at a historical event and it is government-sponsored. Though it was initiated at a time of political transitions – the Good Friday Agreement was signed in April 1998 – the Inquiry is not a body such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was designed for the political transition process. Since the Bloody Sunday Inquiry does not look at other abuses of the Troubles, triggering political transition through the Inquiry cannot be expected of it. Nevertheless, even though the Bloody Sunday Inquiry looks at a singular past event, the report can still have a powerful impact because it may urge the British military and the British government to accept and commit that a major wrong has been done in their name without having thoroughly addressed the issue 26 years before the second inquiry was opened. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry is within the group of historical truth commissions such as the United States’ “Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments”, or Canada’s “Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples”, a relatively unique case. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry looks at one particular event unlike the two mentioned historical truth commissions that were concerned about a long term, abusive political practice. The United States’ “Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments” (ACHRE), for example, was announced in 1994 by then president Bill Clinton. The purpose of the committee, which was formed out of fourteen US citizens – one representative of the general public and thirteen experts in bioethics, radiation oncology and biology, nuclear medicine, epidemiology and biostatistics, public health, history of science and medicine, and law – was to uncover the history of human radiation experiments in the United States from 1944 until 1974 (Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, unknown). Similar to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, the ACHRE was set up by the leading political figure of the country: Prime Minister Tony Blair in the case of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and then President Bill Clinton. In both cases, issues of state violence against citizens were investigated. However, similarities do not seem to exceed these two points: the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is led by three judges,

while the ACHRE consisted of a group of fourteen US citizens who would conduct the investigation. Moreover, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is exclusively concerned about Bloody Sunday, whereas the ACHRE investigated a long term political practice of the state against certain groups of citizens. Furthermore, the time frame is different (the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is still running since its set up in 1998, while the ACHRE took only one year), the topic of investigation seems less controversial in the United States than it is in Great Britain, and the political circumstances at the time when the issues of investigation occurred were highly different: Northern Ireland was characterized by a highly violent conflict between its two communities, whereas the United States did not face political circumstances as such. One may also have a brief look at the “Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples” that was held in Canada between 1991 and 1996. The commission consisted of four aboriginal and three non-aboriginal commissioners who were expected to investigate the issue at stake and to provide the Canadian government with recommendations (The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 2004). The purpose of the commission was to investigate the evolution of the relationship between the aboriginal peoples, the Canadian government, as well as the Canadian society (The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 2006). The commission finished its work with the publication of a 4000 pages final report in which numerous findings from the investigation as well as plentiful recommendations to the Canadian government were outlined. Similar to the ACHRE and unlike the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples investigated a long term abusive and discriminatory political practice of the state against certain groups within its borders. However, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples had to look at a 500 years long practice and not “only” at 30 years of controversial political actions by the state as it was the case in the United States. The political circumstances when the Canadian commission started its work, bear a few similarities to the ones in Northern Ireland when the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was announced. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples came into being when the Canadian federation was highly debated (The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 2006), that is to say, at a time of political transition in Canada. Similar to that, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was proclaimed only three months before the Good Friday Agreement was signed in April 1998. Like in the case of Canada, political shift was on the Northern Irish agenda. However, the general mood was different: crisis in the case of Canada, atmosphere of departure into a positive future in Northern Ireland. The time and effort spent on the

Canadian commission gets close to the level of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. However, it took the Bloody Sunday Inquiry more than the five years to look at a singular event, whereas the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples needed for a 500 years history the same amount of time. Certainly, these brief comparisons between the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the ACHRE and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples are no comprehensive. The comparison rather serves the purpose, to underline the distinctiveness of the case of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. The uniqueness of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is therefore another incentive to conduct research on it because this gap in the scholarly literature has not yet been filled.

Hayner (2002) argues that the efficacy of the report of a historical truth commission can still be high even if the actual event happened long time ago. The publication of the report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry has been expected in summer 2005. Due to the sudden appearance of a witness who was considered to be of special value for the Inquiry, it restarted its work after the actual closure in November 2004 (BBC News, 2004). However, the final report is now in preparation and expected to be published some time in summer 2006.

3.3 The Truth Commission and its Scope

Can a truth commission actually promote reconciliation? What can truth commissions achieve? I will now examine the relevant literature regarding this point. The expectations for a truth commission are generally higher than what they reasonably can accomplish. Consequently, a certain degree of disappointment on the work of the truth commission is not uncommon (Hayner, 2002: 8). Indeed, truth commissions have a lot to offer when it comes to the question of dealing with the past. The potential positive effects are numerous: truth commissions can “promote reconciliation, outline needed reforms, allow victims a cathartic airing of their pains, and represent an important, official acknowledgment of a long-silenced past.” (Hayner, 1996: 19). The aims of a truth commission are: to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to

promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past (Hayner, 2002: 24). However, Hayner limits this purely optimistic view when she points out that truth commissions do not necessarily bring peace, reconciliation, and/or reform (1996: 19). Elsewhere she points out that some truth commissions have been significantly limited “from a full and fair accounting of the past.” (Hayner, 2000: 347). Furthermore, Hayner (2002) asks if it is necessary to know the truth in order to achieve reconciliation. She underlines that in some cases true reconciliation might be dependent on other factors than the truth, such as a clear end to the threat of further violence, a reparations program for those injured, attention to structural inequalities and basic material needs of victimized communities, the existence of natural linkages in society that bring the formerly opposing parties together, or just the passage of time (2002: 6).

Mendeloff and Minow argue similarly. Minow shows that “when it comes to national healing, it is simply unclear whether theories and evidence of individual recovery from violence have much bearing.” (Minow quoted in Mendeloff, 2004: 364). Mendeloff pushes the question even further by asking if hearing the truth promotes individual healing after psychological trauma (Mendeloff, 2004: 364). He considers the negative effects truth telling might have: “In some cases, hearing the truth is beneficial and ultimately helps individuals heal; in other cases, the truth can retraumatize victims and make their suffering worse. [...] Clinical psychologists generally concur that cathartic experiences should be avoided except under highly controlled conditions because the dangers of retraumatization could be much greater than the potential benefits.” (Mendeloff, 2004: 365). Psychiatrist Judith Herman (1997) underlines that it is a vital prerequisite for victims to remember and tell the truth in order to achieve the restoration of social order and to heal individual victims (Ibid: 1). Allowedly, retraumatization may take place; however, the chief mental health specialist at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) argues that it is not necessarily the case that retraumatization is harmful. Rather, “you have to get worse before you get better, in order to heal. It’s horrible, but that makes it a real transformation.” (Grenville-Grey cited in Hayner, 2002: 144).

As stated above, Hayner (2002) alludes to the distinction between individual reconciliation on the one hand, and national or political reconciliation on the other. In her opinion, a truth commission is more successful in promoting reconciliation at the national or political level rather than at the individual level because individual

reconciliation is far more difficult to achieve. On the individual level, reconciliation is a deep personal process (Ibid: 155).

In this regard, it is important to mention that a truth commission is only one approach to reconciliation. As it was outlined earlier, Galtung sees limitations for the achievement of reconciliation in this approach: “Although ‘getting the facts straight’ – however ugly – is important, there are serious problems.” He says that “this [the approach] does not by itself produce the catharsis of the offered and received apology, the hoped for and offered forgiveness. Truth alone is merely descriptive, not spiritual.” (Ibid). Montville seems to approve this approach. However, he sees a joint analysis of the history as the point of departure for a reconciliation process (Montville, 1993: 115). Though, in addition to joint history, the recognition of injustices and resulting historic wounds, and acceptance of moral responsibility are vital for the reconciliation process (Montville, 1993: 112). Elsewhere, Montville points out that the situation becomes more complicated when both parties have a sense of victimhood (Montville, 1997: 10). This phenomenon takes place in Northern Ireland: “Each side, Catholic and Protestant, pointed to times when it was victimized, disregarding those times when it was an aggressor.” (Curran et al. 2003: 118). Thus, the problem of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the question of whether it promotes peace might be that it is perceived as a unilateral gesture that is solely addressing the need of the Catholic community for dealing with the past in the form of a truth commission without taking into consideration that Protestants might also have the need for a similar body (e.g. victims of IRA attacks).

3.4 Conceptualization of Reconciliation

The conceptualization of reconciliation in this thesis is based on Lederach’s (1997, 2001) and Kriesberg’s (1999) definitions of the term. In Lederach’s terms (1997), reconciliation is simultaneously locus and focus. On the one hand reconciliation is considered to be a process built up of several elements; on the other hand, reconciliation is perceived as a state of affairs. Kriesberg holds a similar approach to reconciliation as pointed out in the literature review. Like Lederach, Kriesberg considers reconciliation to be a process to transform the relationships of the formerly antagonistic parties to a positive state (1998). He also assumes that this process consists

of contradictory though interdependent social energies (1999). In this research, reconciliation is conceptualized as a long term process entailing the four elements truth, mercy, justice, and peace. The aim of this process is to restore or transform the relationships between the former adversaries to a good mode or at least to a state of peaceful coexistence. The aim can only be achieved if the process the relationships experience includes all four elements because each element serves a certain function in the process.

The content analysis of the witness statements aims at detecting if in the process of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry any indicators for reconciliation exist; consequently by analyzing these indicators, drawing a conclusion if the process of the Inquiry does contribute to the overall reconciliation process in Northern Ireland.

4

Methodology

4.1 The Methodological Tracks

This research aims to determine if the Bloody Sunday Inquiry promotes reconciliation in Northern Ireland. The data for the thesis is derived from a latent content analysis of the witness statements which were given to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. Together with numerous other evidence such as photos, diaries, and (confidential) governmental documents, the statements are all publicly available from the web site of the Inquiry, www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.

The larger numbers of statements were statements given to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry or as it is usually called the Saville Inquiry. However a few other statements date back to 1972 when people were no longer accessible for a statement to the Saville Inquiry. Not all statements were oral ones: approximately 921 of the 2500 total statements were given orally; the others were written statements (The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 2005). The format of the statement – oral or written – does not make a substantial difference, they are taken into consideration on equal terms (Dickinson, personal communication, 10/25/2005). Individuals providing the statements are allocated in nine groups:

1. Civilians
2. Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
3. Widgery soldiers
4. Non-Widgery soldiers
5. Media
6. Politicians
7. Priests

8. Experts (forensic)
9. Medical witnesses

The content analysis was conducted for the statements of the Civilians, RUC officers, the Widgery soldiers, the Non-Widgery soldiers, the Media, the Politicians and the Priests. The group of Experts and the Medical witnesses were not taken into consideration for the content analysis. The witness statements of these two groups are not relevant for answering the research question because the statements deal exclusively with medical and forensic issues. For the sake of comprehensiveness, the statements of Experts and Medical witnesses were reviewed in an additional chapter of the thesis.

4.2 The Sampling

The witness statements were sampled with a simple random sample with a confidence level of 95%. Before the sample could be drawn, the witness files had to be reviewed initially because each witness file which is available from the Inquiry's web site does not only entail the actual statement, but also previous statements from 1972, cross examination transcripts from the Widgery Tribunal, hand written documents, drawings, photos, maps and numerous other evidence. With the initial review of the file, the actual witness statements could be extracted from the whole file. The separation of the witness statement from other evidence saved in the file was necessary because the content analysis was solely focused on witness statements and not on other types of documents such as photos.

As stated above, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry claims to have received approximately 2500 witness statements during the Inquiry. 921 persons were called for oral questioning in the process. 2438 statements were available for examination in this project that is to say these statements were downloadable from the website of the Inquiry. Some of the documents were erroneous. During contacts with the Bloody Sunday Inquiry staff, it was made clear that the website is the only source for documents (Stephenson, personal communication, 10/05/2005). As a result, 2349 documents from all inquired groups were accessible for this project (see table 1).

	Total number of documents downloaded and examined	Erroneous documents	Zero page documents	Total number of documents available for analysis
Media Witnesses	118	0	6	112
Politicians	64	0	11	53
RUC Officers	245	0	3	242
Priests	13	0	0	13
Non-Widgery Soldiers	605	3	5	597
Widgery Soldiers	187	4	19	164
Civilian Witnesses	1206	10	39	1157
Experts	3	0	0	3
Medical Witnesses	8	0	0	8
Total:	2449	17	83	2349

Table 1: Material available for analysis

As stated earlier, after examination of all experts and medical witness statements, it became clear that the information contained is not relevant to this project. Therefore, the statements were summarized in one section but are not considered for sampling. Consequently, 2338 out of 2438 documents which were in total available for downloading form the basis for the sampling and analyzing process (see Table 2).

	Total number of documents downloaded and examined	Erroneous documents	Zero page documents	Total number of documents available for analysis
Media Witnesses	118	0	6	112
Politicians	64	0	11	53
RUC Officers	245	0	3	242
Priests	13	0	0	13
Non-Widgery Soldiers	605	3	5	597
Widgery Soldiers	187	4	19	164
Civilian Witnesses	1206	10	39	1157
Total:	2438	17	83	2338

Table 2: Relevant material available for analysis

From here on, as the sampling and analysis starts, statements from Experts and Medical Witnesses are omitted.

Examined groups include Media Witnesses, Politicians, RUC, Priests, Non-Widgery Soldiers, Widgery Soldiers, Civilian Witnesses. Statements from Civilian Witnesses and Non-Widgery Soldiers make up for 75% of the statements, while the next biggest groups RUC and Widgery Soldiers account for 17% whereas Media Witnesses, Politicians and Priest contributed 8% of the statements (see Figure 2). Figure 1 shows the actual number of documents for each group in accordance with Figure 2.




Figure 1: Contribution (in #) of relevant material by groups




Figure 2: Contribution (in %) of relevant material by groups

The overall number of documents to be taken into account for the analysis was calculated using Formula 1.

Formula	$n = \frac{Z_{\alpha}^2 * [p(1-p)] * N}{Z_{\alpha}^2 * [p(1-p)] + (N-1) * C_p^2}$ <p><i>*Formula derived from Rea et al. 1997</i></p>		C_p = confidence interval Z_{α} = Z score for various levels of confidence n = Specific sample size N = Population size																							
Parameters	Z_{α} 1,96	p 0,5	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">N</th> <th rowspan="2" style="text-align: center;">C_p</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">Number of documents taken</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">Media Witnesses</td> <td style="text-align: right;">112</td> <td rowspan="7" style="text-align: center;">0,05</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">Politicians</td> <td style="text-align: right;">53</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">RUC Officers</td> <td style="text-align: right;">242</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">Priests</td> <td style="text-align: right;">13</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">Non-Widgery Soldiers</td> <td style="text-align: right;">597</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">Widgery Soldiers</td> <td style="text-align: right;">164</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">Civilian Witnesses</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1157</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: right;">Total:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2338</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	N		C_p	Number of documents taken		Media Witnesses	112	0,05	Politicians	53	RUC Officers	242	Priests	13	Non-Widgery Soldiers	597	Widgery Soldiers	164	Civilian Witnesses	1157	Total:	2338	
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Number of documents to be sampled	$n = \frac{1,96^2 * [0,5(1-0,5)] * 2338}{1,96^2 * [0,5(1-0,5)] + (2338-1) * 0,05^2} = 330$																									

Figure 3: Calculation of overall number of documents to be taken for analysis

Z score for various levels of confidence is one set to the common value of 1,96, for the 95 percent level of confidence while the confidence interval is set to a 5 percent range.

The representative sample contained a proportionate number of documents from each group. The proportion was given by the percentage of documents available per group in relation to the overall number of statements to be sampled. In this case the overall 330 documents that were taken, are allocated to the distinct groups as illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 4: Number of documents taken from each group in relation to the overall group size

Selecting the number of documents from the respective groups required a calculation of the overall number of pages within each witness group (Figure 4). Only relevant pages of the documents were counted. If a file of a witness included a statement from the Widgery Tribunal as well as a statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, only the statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was taken into account for the cumulated number of pages. If only a statement given to the Widgery Tribunal was entailed in the file, this statement was taken.




Figure 5: Cumulated, relevant number of pages per group

By dividing the overall number of pages by the number of documents to be selected from each group, a sampling interval (Figure 5) is calculated.




Figure 6: Sampling interval of documents to be sampled (documents taken for sample set)




Figure 7: Summary of the sampling process

4.3 The Content Analysis

The content analysis was based on the witness statements selected through the above described Simple random sampling process. The Codebook as well as the Null-Codebook provided the parameters for the analysis. The analysis was conducted with a latent coding because manifest coding would not have grasped the implicit and subtle meanings in the statements. The major part of all statements that were analyzed usually constituted a chronological account of what happened and where the witness was at the time of the march – when and where did he or she join the march? where was the witness if he did not join the march? etc. – and what he observed regarding the shootings. The minor part of the statement, if there was any indicator at all, entailed indicators for reconciliation/ Null-reconciliation as they were set out in the Codebooks. The coding did not exclusively focus on statements about Bloody Sunday but rather all kinds of statements that would qualify for reconciliation or Null-reconciliation statements respectively. That meant that general statements about the other side, such as the willingness to forgive for example, were coded, too even if the statement was not directly linked to Bloody Sunday. If it was not explicitly said by the witness that he felt the feelings he described on the present day, the context had to allow for the coding to be made. If it was not clear or outright obvious that the feelings were not there anymore, the phrase was left blank without any code. This step was done to avoid over-interpretation. Sometimes, the differences between the codes within the each category are not substantial. Statements with, for example, the code “to reject” often could have been coded with “to deny” or “to decline”. Thus, the decision which code to apply depended highly on the general tone of the statement.

4.4 The Codebook

The codebook¹⁰ for the content analysis was developed in accordance with the conceptualization of the term reconciliation. This meant that the four elements of reconciliation, truth, mercy, peace and justice had to be taken into account while developing the codes because the conceptualization of the term reconciliation suggested that reconciliation is a process consisting of these four elements. The result was that the four categories were taken as the main categories – Truth, Mercy, Justice, and Peace. These categories had numerous codes such as ‘To forgive’ or ‘To let go resentment against the other side’ for the category Mercy. The codes again were derived and further developed from Lederach who provides a few suggestions in his book what the four elements of reconciliation entail (Lederach, 1997: 30).

An initial screening of some witness statements revealed that it was necessary to further develop the codebook because the statements that were screened did not show any codes for reconciliation but rather codes for what should later be called Null-reconciliation. Null-reconciliation means the exact opposite of reconciliation: instead of having codes such as ‘To forgive’ or ‘To let go resentment against the other side’ for Mercy one would have codes as ‘To not forgive’, ‘To keep resentment against the other side’ or ‘To perceive the other as negative or malevolent’ for 0-Mercy. Consequently, to meet these conditions an additional codebook, the Null-Codebook¹¹, was developed which took these facts into consideration. As in the Codebook, there were four categories in the Null-Codebook which are called 0-Truth, 0-Mercy, 0-Justice, and 0-Peace. All of these categories held numerous codes as stated above in the example on 0-Mercy.

¹⁰ For detailed information on the Codebook see the Appendix.

¹¹ For detailed information on the Null-Codebook see the Appendix.

4.5 The Interviews

In addition to the content analysis, interviews were conducted with several concerned parties in Northern Ireland. The aim of the interviews was to draw an initial conclusion about how the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is perceived by people who have been affected by it as well as the set up of the Inquiry and the current situation of the peace process including how the relationships with the other side is seen by the interviewee and his/her constituencies. The selection of the interview partners is not based on a representative sampling; however, the interview partners were purposefully selected according to their affiliation and accessibility. The aim was to try to cover a broad range of representatives without having a scientific sample. Due to this, the interviews can be considered as complimentary to the content analysis but they are not the main basis for this work. The interviews should give a first impression of the reading of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry by particular groups and help in interpreting the findings from the content analysis by exploring the context. In the end, five interviews with people from different positions and backgrounds were conducted. The interviewees had the following profile (listed in the chronological order of the interview dates)¹²:

1. A man who was directly affected by Bloody Sunday.
2. A man from Sinn Féin.
3. A man from a governmental institution.
4. A man from the SDLP.
5. A woman from a local NGO.

Unfortunately, there was no interview partner from the Unionist/ Loyalist side available. However, even though a face-to-face interview was never accomplished, email contacts could give a broad idea how the Unionist/Loyalist – in the case of the interview request, a Unionist political party – side perceived the Inquiry. In addition to these interviews, Brandon Hamber was kindly providing insight into the issue of reconciliation in Northern Ireland in general, and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in particular, in a personal conversation by phone.

¹² Further information on the identities of the interviewees will be kept undisclosed and are not available to the public.

Two slightly different questionnaires¹³ were developed in order to appropriately cover the various interviewees. The first questionnaire was for victims and their representatives. The other questionnaire was for policy makers and NGOs. The questionnaire for victims was designed to address the special situation of the victims, that is to say, to obtain information about the victims' attitudes and feelings towards the Inquiry and towards the other side. In the questionnaire for policy makers and NGOs, these questions were omitted. Four out of the five interviews were conducted with the second questionnaire because of the population sample. Most of the questions in both questionnaires were open ended questions. Though two questions – “Did you follow the hearings regularly?” and “Do you think that such an inquiry should be repeated?” – had a closed ended character. A pilot test of the questionnaires was not conducted due to the small number of interviewees and its narrow role in the overall analysis of the research question.

¹³ For further detailed information on the questionnaires see the Appendix.

5

Findings

5.1 Findings from the Content Analysis

Can a single truth seeking inquiry bring reconciliation to Northern Ireland? Probably not. Reconciliation is first of all a long – term process as it was outlined in the literature review. The Inquiry concentrates on a particular event of the Troubles without taking into account other occasions such as the bomb in Omagh or Enniskillen¹⁴. Consequently, Saville addresses a particular group of people namely people who were some how involved in Bloody Sunday (e.g. civilians who marched on that day or the British military). Others might be less concerned about Bloody Sunday than with personal loss they suffered due to the conflict. How much Saville impacts these people in that they stop resenting against their offenders is questionable and it is not answered in this research. Unlike the people who were called to give evidence, many others did not have the chance to speak about their loss in public. Considering Galtung (2001), if only one approach to reconciliation like a truth seeking inquiry is used, it necessarily falls short because in order to achieve reconciliation, numerous different approaches to

¹⁴ The city of Enniskillen was battered by a Provisional IRA bombing on November, the 8th 1987. The bombing, which is also known as the Remembrance Day Bombing because it happened on the annual Remembrance Sunday for those killed during the First and Second World War, led to the death of eleven and the injury of another 69. The IRA claimed later that its leadership did not authorize the bombing (Wikipedia, 2006).

it have to be applied.¹⁵ Even though, the Inquiry's grasp should thus not be overestimated, it nevertheless can be one piece in the puzzle called reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

Cassandra aside: can it contribute to the overall reconciliation process? It may. The content analysis investigated if indicators for reconciliation entailed in the process of the Inquiry exist. Should it be the case that an overwhelming number of indicators for reconciliation were found, it would be possible to draw the conclusion that the Inquiry impacts positively on the reconciliation process. Tony Blair's (1998) claim that the told truth would bring Northern Irish society forward on the way to necessary reconciliation was an optimistic signal when the Inquiry was created. Did the Inquiry live up to these expectations? The content analysis of the witness statements provided a first assessment of Blair's claim. It is important to underline that the content analysis focused exclusively on the process of the Inquiry and not the outcome of it. The content analysis thus was a process analysis.

Departing from the positive hypothesis that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry promotes reconciliation in Northern Ireland, the initial screening of some witness statements dampened optimism. The witness statements would not only entail positive and encouraging answers but to some degree negative and antagonistic replies became clear, as well. Consequently, as mentioned above, to accommodate this problem, the Null-Codebook was developed.

Surprisingly as it can be seen in the graphics, the overall amount of indicators in either direction (reconciliation or Null-reconciliation) is relatively low. This phenomenon might be due to the fact that the Northern Irish society has not yet undergone some kind of reconciliation process but rather, that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is one of the first mechanisms aiming at dealing with the past. In addition, Hamber (2006) argued that Northern Ireland lacks a shared vision of a reconciled future which may explain the low number of indicators for reconciliation and the disproportionate high number for Null-reconciliation. Despite the optimism at the political level, the victims and other civilians seem to not share this optimism but rather hold on to their negative feelings. As it can be seen in the graphic below, the vast

¹⁵ Galtung (2001) refers to twelve approaches to reconciliation in which the so called "Historical/ Truth commission" approach is only one.

majority of paragraphs that were marked with codes from the Null-Codebook. This finding is stunning due to two reasons: first, high expectations were raised by Tony Blair that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry would contribute to the reconciliation process. Second, the Inquiry is a rather comprehensive means to look into Bloody Sunday as it is confirmed by one of the interviewees who has been affected directly by Bloody Sunday: “So this was certainly a fairly intense, extensive inquiry into the happenings of Bloody Sunday.” (Ploss, 2006a).




Figure 8: Total number of paragraphs coded with the Codebook and the Null-Codebook out of 330 documents

The finding is interesting because it refutes the initial hypothesis that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry promotes reconciliation. More than 80% of all indicators found in the entire sample were indicators that showed the opposite signs of reconciliation (Null-reconciliation), that is to say statements that, say, refute the other side’s story. One of the soldiers, for example, stated: “There has been publicity adverse to my regiment in relation to ‘Bloody Sunday’ over a long period of time. Much of it is, I believe, inaccurate and makes me angry.” (INQ005, unknown). Again, one has to be aware of the fact that the focus of this research is on the process of the Inquiry. However, it shall not be neglected, that the process determines the outcome: the way the process is

conducted, influences the outcome. If the process offers few reconciliatory gestures and statements, it is less likely that the outcome will promote reconciliation. Hamber (2006) provides a crucial insight that validates this assumption: he argues that the Inquiry has suffered on a substantial problem from the very beginning because it was not set up in a joint political process in which every party to the conflict participated. Rather, it was set up by Tony Blair due to campaigning of the Bloody Sunday families. Thus, the set up of the Inquiry was perceived as a unilateral win for the Catholic/Republican side by the Protestant/Unionist community (Ibid). A statement from the interview with the person who was directly affected by Bloody Sunday backs this argument up:

I'm not saying everybody is thinking the same way but there are certainly some individuals politicians on the Unionist side, they hated the Inquiry, they hated it. And politicians within the British government as well to be honest did not like the Inquiry. They did not want it to be there. But this is their problem, not our problem, you know. We fought hard, we campaigned harsh to get the case re-opened and we won that. We produced evidence to show that Widgery was not the correct outcome of the Inquiry. So therefore... Tony Blair at the end had not option. Okay, he could have refused it but he had no option at the end but to open a new inquiry into Bloody Sunday. And there was people, you know, even politicians at that time totally condemned Tony Blair, Tony Blair's announcement of a new inquiry into Bloody Sunday. But we expected that in a way. You are not going to win everybody's heart in relation to this Inquiry. (Ploss, 2006a).

If the perception of the Inquiry was a win/lose one from the beginning, the promotion of reconciliation by the Inquiry is relatively doubtful.

5.2 Findings from the Codebook

In this section, I will first examine the indicators for reconciliation. Take a closer look at the chunk about “indicators for reconciliation” reveals that the majority of indicators are indicators about Truth. This finding is not surprising if it is taken into consideration that the aim of the Inquiry is to find out the truth about what happened on Bloody Sunday.




Figure 9: Distribution of codes within Codebook

The fact that the substantial majority of indicators within the statements are about Truth rather than, say Mercy, leads to the conclusion that the willingness to forgive on the side of the victims is not high. As it was outlined above, this may be due to the fact that so far Bloody Sunday was not dealt with in an acceptable way for the victims and thus, they would be not willing to forgive the perpetrators.




Figure 10: Distribution of codes for the category Truth

Figure 9 shows which codes were used for the category Truth. Taken together, statements concerning the acceptance of a painful loss or the acceptance of a wrong

committed, constituted the biggest group ('to recognize a wrong and unacceptable action', 'to validate a painful loss and experience', and 'to acknowledge'). These statements were usually powerful. One of the soldiers stated as follows:

It is tragic for the families who lost their loved ones on Bloody Sunday. I cannot say whether any of those who were killed or injured were armed but in my own mind, I do believe that a lot of these people were not armed. That is just my own personal view of the matter. (Soldier 202, 2000)

Elsewhere in his statement, the same soldier said, that

I stand by what I said in this passage-of the interview, I am sorry that the day was handled badly. That is the context in which I said that I was sorry. I regret the deaths of the men on Bloody Sunday, as well as regretting the deaths resulting after Bloody Sunday, including the deaths of friends in my Regiment (Ibid).

The statement of this soldier reveals an apology for what happened on Bloody Sunday. The apology left room for a potential forgiveness on the other side. Another soldier argued similarly:

We later found out that 13 people had been shot and killed, which we took to be a success for the Parachute Regiment as we assumed that everyone they killed were terrorists. However, as it turned out, that may not have been the case. (INQ906, unknown)

The fact that this type of statements compromises the biggest group within Truth is interesting. Figure 10 shows that most statements with codes from the category Truth were allocated to statements of soldiers.




Figure 11: Distribution of codes for the category Truth among the witness groups

Indeed, acknowledging a wrong committed, is a courageous step to take since the witnesses are affiliated with the British Army. Though, it cannot be proven scientifically here, but standing up against such a powerful organization, may be perceived as a betrayal of this organization by the witnesses. However, one also should not forget that first of all, soldiers are human and thus have an own perception of what is right and what is wrong that can be different from the official account of the British Army. In addition to this view, it has to be taken into account that the events of Bloody Sunday were already 26 years passed when the Inquiry was announced. Due to this passed time, the soldiers who gave witness had time to think and reflect on the actions of Bloody Sunday and may thus have come up with statements like those given to the Inquiry.

Probably one of the biggest challenges in a reconciliation process is to achieve that the victims grant mercy to the perpetrators. This challenge seems to stay unmet in the Bloody Sunday Inquiry according to the content analysis of the Inquiry’s witness statements. Figure 11 shows how the codes are distributed within the category of

Mercy. As it can be seen, the codes are evenly allocated, though very low in absolute numbers.




Figure 12: Distribution codes within category Mercy

Louis McKinney, the brother of Gerry McKinney who was shot on Bloody Sunday, gave an impressive statement to the Inquiry. Amazingly, his statement is in contradiction with the just mentioned challenge of reconciliation processes, namely that it is hard to have the victims granting mercy to the perpetrators:

I still pray every day for my brother and for the soldiers who killed him, so that they can be reconciled with themselves. If I met the soldier who shot Gerry McKinney I would shake him by the hand and say, "You're forgiven". I do not feel any bitterness or hatred towards him. I want him to reconcile what he did with himself, with God and with me. (McKinney, 1999).

Elsewhere in his statement, Louis McKinney provided another indicator for ‘Mercy’. He argues that “It is not just Catholics who have been killed. The families of RUC officers have had the same pain. I have thought to myself in the past that I am glad I don't have any sons, because I couldn't live with my son killing someone.” (Ibid). He further said in his statement:

I am anti-partitionist. I would love to see people come together and for there to be a united Ireland with a better relationship with Britain, but I want to be equal. I would love Ireland to be happy, to see no more marches in the streets. I would like to be reconciled and to retire with all this off the slate. I hear politicians talk about releasing prisoners now. I would like to put some of the politicians inside because they were the guys who antagonised the situation but couldn't talk. (Ibid)

It is interesting that Louis McKinney's statement made four out of the five codes that were used in Mercy. Two ideas come to mind: the fact that it is nearly exclusively Louis McKinney who is providing statements indicating his willingness to show mercy towards the other side, implicates that the remaining other witnesses of the sample do not share this feeling. Moreover, Louis McKinney may have undergone special personal circumstances that helped him to come to terms with the perpetrators of his brother's violent death. The statements of Louis McKinney seem to indicate that he has reached individual reconciliation: he appears to have come to terms with the past successfully. However, Louis McKinney's case is complicated: as it will be outlined later, Louis McKinney was also coded for 0-Peace because even though, it seems as if he forgave the soldiers for what they done, he did not forgive himself. Rather, he is blaming himself for what happened. It might be that McKinney created a picture for the public, showing that he could close the book of Bloody Sunday, whereas in personal spheres, he reveals that Bloody Sunday is still an issue of major importance for him.

The fact that the allocation of who made what kind of statement follows the textbook – Widgery and Non-Widgery soldiers who presumably shot the fourteen Catholic marchers on Bloody Sunday are making statements with regard to Truth, whereas Civilians are giving statements that include indicators for Mercy – this apparent 'clarity' should not blur the fact that the willingness to forgive appears low. Figure 12 shows how the statements are distributed among the witness groups. Generally, the overall number of indicators for both Truth and Mercy that were found in the witness statements is quite small. As aforementioned, the statements indicating Mercy were nearly exclusively made by Louis McKinney. Thus, the readiness to show mercy to the other side appears not only tremendously little with regard to the number of indicators for the category Mercy but also – or even more – regarding the fact that one single witness gives 80% of all mercy-indicating statements.




Figure 13: Distribution of codes for the category Mercy among the witness groups

Figure 12 illustrates that all statements pointing to Mercy were found within the group of Civilian Witnesses. Louis McKinney’s statements covered all applied codes apart from “to accept”. As aforesaid, the intensity of McKinney’s testimonial leads to the conclusion that he managed to come to terms with Bloody Sunday. Apparently, he has reached some degree of individual reconciliation which is hard to achieve (Hayner, 2002). Patricia Anne Jarvis, the witness who ‘accepted’ what happened on Bloody Sunday states as follows:

I think I made my statement a few days later (I am sure it was not the next day). Statements were taken at a local primary school. I wanted to put on paper what was clear on my mind. I could then go on with my life, although I have never forgotten what happened. (Jarvis, 2001).

Apparently, Patricia Anne Jarvis was also able to build the event into her life since she says that she was able to continue with her life after she gave her statement in 1972. The action of statement giving might had some kind of cathartic effect on her. However, her statement is less intense than Louis McKinney’s.




Figure 14: Codebook Justice (left), Peace (right)

Figure 13 presents the codes used for the categories Justice and Peace. Obviously, both, Justice and Peace are hardly perceived by the witnesses of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. The category Justice as well as the category Peace were only coded once each. Due to the infrequency of codes, the graphics for the distribution of the codes for Justice and Peace can be found in the Appendix.

The interviews underline the positive perception of the Inquiry. One of the interviewees, who was directly affected by Bloody Sunday, stated in the interview: “This was a fairly intense extensive inquiry into the happenings of Bloody Sunday. And, there was a lot of work put into it [...] So it was a massive, massive inquiry.” (Ploss, 2006a). Another interviewee, who is involved in a political party in Northern Ireland outlined his perception of Lord Saville as the chair of the process when discussions about the move of the Inquiry from Derry to London was about to take place:

In fairness to Saville, he was tied by the decisions of the court, but Saville gave a pledge at the beginning that he would like to see all evidence given in Derry [...] I think Saville himself, privately may feel that this [the move of the Inquiry from Derry to London due to ruling of the Court of Appeal] was an unwanted interference into the Inquiry. (Ploss, 2006b).

Further, the interviewee outlined that

I suppose that now the Inquiry is done at its best, perhaps [we have to wait] until we see what the findings are [...]. Saville, on the surface, has done a very thorough job. I don’t think that any person believed that when it started it would last that long, that some of the documents which have come to the floor, there might have been attempts in the past for them to be withheld or suppressed. (Ibid).

Another interviewee, who is also involved in a political party in Northern Ireland, argued similarly:

I think that Saville, whatever people may think of the Saville report when it comes out, the Saville Inquiry was thorough. It did work hard to get as many people as possible who were here on Bloody Sunday. It faced difficulties, it faced big challenges and other sorts of problems but its integrity at this stage, I don't think that you can question the integrity of the Saville Inquiry at this stage. (Ploss, 2006d).

However, even if there has been a positive perception of the Inquiry process, there was by no means a statement that would lead to the assumption that after a few commitments, that is to say Truth – statements were made, the other side, namely the Bloody Sunday families or others who feel affiliated with them, would forgive. Indeed, Louis McKinney's statements are striking and contradict that the point that the families would not forgive – obviously, a member of one family was able to do so – but as it was outlined earlier, he is an exception. No other witness gave a comparable account as he did. In addition, there was no evidence observable within the interviews that the publication of the final report would necessarily lead to some degree of forgiveness. None of the interviewees made a statement about how the relationship towards the other side could change if Saville was eventually publishing a final report that would then possibly be accepted by the victims. An exclusively positive account to the question if any change in relationship could be observed due to the set up of the Inquiry was not given by any of the interviewees. The next best fitting account was that an acceptable final report would bring closure to the families of the victims as it was argued by the person who was directly affected by Bloody Sunday:

At the same time I think that Saville will deliver that. I think he will declare the total innocence of all those died in the events of Bloody Sunday as definite. But we are waiting for the report and we don't know what the future holds; and if Saville delivers is, a truthful report, we can move on, we can put closures to this issue and that's what we are trying to do. People were talking that we were opening old wounds; the wounds have never healed as far as the families are concerned. And the sooner we are able to deliver this to the families, the sooner the people are able to move on with their lives and that's important to us and to me, you know, I'm coming to retirement soon and I want to enjoy the rest of the life I have which is important to me, you know. (Ploss, 2006a).

However, even this was challenged by one of the interviewees, a person working for a governmental institution, who pointed out that one would need to be aware that

especially the families have been dealing with the issue of Bloody Sunday since 36 years, and thus, the conflict naturally became a substantial part of their lives since their relatives died on the 30th of January 1972. The interviewee emphasized that first of all, maybe not every family would accept the final report by Saville, and secondly the interviewee stressed the ‘what then?’ problem: after 36 years of dealing with Bloody Sunday would the families so easily be able to close the chapter and move on? The interviewee outlines as follows:

The concern to me would be, you know, the peoples’ concern, the families’ concern, such a huge portion of their lives have been built around this Inquiry and the incidence itself, you probably know it exactly, is very early 1970s we are talking about, we are talking about 30, 35 going on nearly 40 years of pain and grief rising out this thing, but also picking the Inquiry itself and what the expectation is what the Inquiry will produce and assuming that the Inquiry for an individual said everything that they felt and what they agreed with and what they felt to be their possession, then what? What is going to happen then? (Ploss, 2006c).

Further research on how the final report is eventually perceived and how the families then will go on with their lives may explain that question if they have a closure or not. Potentially, the Inquiry may have a positive impact on the Catholic community since the British government decided to investigate comprehensively in a case that heavily affected their community. The Inquiry might be perceived as a conciliatory gesture from the British government by the Catholic community to deal with the violent past of Northern Ireland. However, the Inquiry might also lead to some degree of competing victimhood not only between Protestants and Catholics but also within the Catholic community. As a high profile case, Bloody Sunday has received major political and media attention whereas other cases, that are no less tragic for the victims, are neglected.

5.3 Findings from the Null-Codebook

In the following section the focus is on the findings from the Null-Codebook, that is to say the findings that indicated the exact opposite of reconciliation. As it can be seen in Figure 7, the number of codes from the Null-Codebook greatly exceeds those from the Codebook. The distribution within the big chunk of codes from the Null-Codebook is, on the other hand, more even but of course not equal to each other.




Figure 15: Distribution of occurrences of 0-Justice, 0-Peace, 0-Truth and 0-Mercy for Null-Codebook

The findings from the Null-Codebook show that the perception of the Inquiry and of what happened on Bloody Sunday depended highly on who was asked. As it can be seen in Figure 14, the largest group is the 0-Mercy followed by 0-Justice and 0-Peace at equal terms as well as in fourth place followed by 0-Truth. In the subsequent paragraphs, the distribution of the codes within the respective 0-categories is outlined.




Figure 16: Null-Codebook 0-Truth

The finding that 0-Truth is the smallest category in the Null-Codebook is interesting because it may indicate that revealing the truth about what happened on Bloody Sunday is still the major achievement of the Inquiry. Figure 15 shows which codes were applied for the category 0-Truth. Truth is the category that was coded the most, whereas 0-Truth is the category that was coded the least in the Null-Codebook.




Figure 17: Distribution of codes for the category 0-Truth among the witness groups

Figure 16 outlines how the codes were distributed among the witness groups. The witness groups of soldiers claim the highest number of statements coded with 0-Truth. The code that was used most frequently in this category was “to decline”. Most of the statements with this code declined the view that the British military particularly the Parachute regiment, had prior plans to ‘teach the Catholics a lesson’ on what was later called Bloody Sunday. Sir Grabham Shillington, a former Chief Constable at RUC, stated:

I have been asked to comment on the suggestion that the Commander of Land Forces, General Robert Ford suggested in a memo to the GOC that in order to control the rising level of domestic unrest in Londonderry it may become necessary to shoot a few of the ringleaders, as he called them, "young Derry hooligans". I do not remember hearing or reading anything along these lines and would have been horrified if this had been suggested in any meeting I attended. (Shillington, 1999).

The Right Honorable Sir Edward Heath, Conservative Prime Minister between 1970 and 1974, argued similarly to Sir Grabham Shillington. Sir Edward Heath’s statement, however, was coded with “to reject” due to the overall tone of his statement:

I have also been asked by this inquiry whether I was aware of a proposal, supposedly emanating from General Ford, that some of the young hooligans in Londonderry should be shot, after due warning, as a possible means of restoring law and order in Londonderry. If such a proposal had been approved by General Ford's superiors in the army, it would have reached the Secretary of State for Defence, who would have reported it to me. This did not happen, and I was not aware of any such suggestion.(Heath, 2000).

Sir Robert Ford himself, the Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland, claims that “the suggestion therefore made to shoot a few leaders was not a suggestion to kill them; ‘shoot’ and ‘kill’ are obviously different words.” (Ford, 2000). Apparently, Sir Robert Ford did not deny that shootings were planned, however to kill some one was denied by him. This statement appears as a distinction without difference. Of course, the Parachute regiment has been a military elite unit with high shooting skills, however, in a tumult as it happened on Bloody Sunday, giving this kind of order seems risky and naïve. To shoot could have easily meant to kill. A soldier, who was granted anonymity, nevertheless confirmed Sir Robert Ford’s view: “I want to emphasize, however, that the mood had not changed to ‘we’re going in to shoot this lot’ and indeed this attitude was never there at any time.” (Sergeant O, unknown).

A slightly ‘stronger’ code than the ones mentioned, for example, was “to refute” which was only used one time. The witness, a soldier of the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment who was granted anonymity, stated that “There has been publicity adverse to my regiment in relation to ‘Bloody Sunday’ over a long period of time. Much of it is, I believe, inaccurate and makes me angry.” (INQ005). The reaction of the soldier might be due to the fact that the Parachute Regiment has been under harsh critique since Bloody Sunday happened because presumably, soldiers from that Regiment shot the victims of Bloody Sunday. Since the soldier might have a totally different account of what happened, the fact that again, he and his regiment are put in the (negative) spotlight, may lead to his angry statement to the Inquiry.

The following section takes a closer look at the findings from the category 0-Mercy. 0-Mercy is the biggest group within the Null-Codebook. Again, if the analysis of the category Mercy is taken into consideration, the findings from 0-Mercy are not surprising. As it was outlined above, there were hardly any statements coded within the category Mercy. In total, there were two witnesses who made statements indicating a merciful attitude, that is to say a low number of witnesses are willing to forgive or to show mercy at that point in time. The relatively high number of 0-Mercy confirms this account. The high number shows that the Inquiry was not very successful in generating mercy. Figure 17 shows which codes were applied for the category 0-Mercy.




Figure 18: Null-Codebook 0-Mercy

The distribution of the statements among the witness groups within the category 0-Mercy can be seen in Figure 18.




Figure 19: Distribution of codes for the category 0-Mercy among the witness groups

As stated earlier, the fact that Civilian witnesses are the ones who claim most of the codes of the category 0-Mercy confirms the finding from the analysis of the category Mercy. ‘To perceive the other side negatively and malevolent’ is the code that was used the most for the category 0-Mercy. Most of the statements with this code concerned the issue if the Parachute Regiment had prior plans to shoot people on that day. Thomas Barr, a civilian witness, for example, argued that “my lasting impression was that the soldiers were intent on killing and didn't care who they killed.” (Barr, 2003). Like him, Sean Barr claimed that “from my point of view, there were two tragedies that day; the first was the killing of innocent people.” (Barr, S. 2000). Another witness, Ann Hope, a then member of the Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), also stated “I believe that what happened in Deny on Bloody Sunday was the result of deliberate army policy to fire on a peaceful crowd. Although I have no proof, I believe that the soldiers had orders to shoot on that day.”

(Hope, 2001). Reg Tester, who was a Command Staff Quartermaster for the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA), provided an alike view: “My personal view was that Paras should have never been used in that situation. Paras have no other option other than to shoot to kill. We were part time amateurs, but the Paras were cold blooded killers. If they had kept on their own side of the line, nothing would have happened.” (Tester, 2003). Both the Civilian witnesses as well as Reg Tester – for him it is more obvious because he was a member of the IRA – seem to belong to the Catholic community due to their highly critical attitude towards the British Army. Consequently, the fact that the statements are unfavorable for the British Army comes not with a surprise.

Statements that were coded with ‘To not forgive’ were powerful. Figure 18 shows that nearly all statements with this code belonged to Civilian witnesses. Only one of the Priests who gave witness made a statement that could be coded with ‘To not forgive’. Helen Doherty, the sister of John Young who was shot on Bloody Sunday, made a compelling statement that showed what tremendous role Bloody Sunday took in her life:

I pray that something comes out of this Inquiry. A lot of people like myself have blocked out the events of Bloody Sunday because it is too painful to talk about. I still cannot believe that the army opened fire. Even after I had seen the soldiers that day I did not think they would open fire. I cannot believe that the soldiers shot John dead, he would not have been doing anything wrong. When John died, for me, civil rights died as well. (Doherty, 1998)

Leo Friel is another witness, whose statement was coded with ‘To not forgive’. Like Helen Doherty’s statement, Friel underlined the impact of Bloody Sunday on his life:

I have never been able to come to terms with the savagery of what happened that day. I still believe today that the Paras were sent in to teach us a lesson. The British Army were having a very bad time of it back then and I believe that they were sent in to murder people to try and bring an end to the Troubles. It certainly didn't do that. (Friel, 2001)

When reading statements like the above quoted, it is hard to imagine a successful reconciliation process. Unlike Louis McKinney, who seems to have reached a degree of individual reconciliation, others as Helen Doherty have not yet come to terms with the past. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry may bring a change. As the interviewee, who has been affected directly by Bloody Sunday argued: “But we are waiting for the report and we don’t know what the future holds; and if Saville delivers is, a truthful report, we can

move on, we can put closures to this issue and that’s what we are trying to do.” (Ploss, 2006a). Possibly, Helen Doherty’s attitude towards Bloody Sunday and towards the other side changes, if the report is acceptable to her and other Bloody Sunday families. Thus, the report may help her and others to close the chapter of Bloody Sunday.

The perception of Justice, plays a crucial role for the reconciliation process. As it was outlined above, only one document could be coded for the category ‘Justice’ and was thus omitted. 0-Justice together with 0-Peace were coded the second most. The fact that both categories 0-Justice as well as 0-Peace were coded relatively frequently confirm the finding about the categories Justice and Peace. The perception of Justice as well as Peace appears low among the witnesses of the Inquiry. This finding, again, provides hint that the promotion of reconciliation by the Inquiry is rather unlikely. The code with the highest number within the category 0-Justice was ‘To be not hold accountable for crimes committed’ as it can be seen in Figure 19.




Figure 20: Distribution of codes within the category 0-Justice

As Figure 20 shows, all statements that were coded with ‘To be not hold accountable for crimes committed’ were statements of Civilian witnesses. This finding confirms the view that Bloody Sunday was not yet dealt with in an acceptable manner for the families of the victims. Generally, the fact that Justice was only coded once within the

Codebook (Figure 13), backs up the findings about the negative perception of the British jurisdiction.




Figure 21: Distribution of codes for the category 0-Justice among the witness groups

The perception that no one was held responsible so far for what happened on Bloody Sunday certainly contributes to the unwillingness to reconcile with the other side. Maura Duffy, the sister of John Young, underlined in her statement that

This Inquiry has to find out the truth. As far as I was concerned my brother was murdered. He was just starting to live his life. Someone has to put their hands up and say they were responsible. Someone has to be responsible for the actions on that day. (Duffy, 1999).

Other witnesses stated similarly like this formerly active member of the Official IRA: “Everybody needs to put their hands up and be honest about what happened. Soldiers should be accountable for every round they fire.” (Member of the Official IRA, 2004). Andrew John Stevenson is another Civilian witness who claimed that the respective people were not hold accountable for their actions on Bloody Sunday: “I do not know how the army was not held responsible for the events of Bloody Sunday. It was a massacre.” (Stevenson, 1999). It seems quite obvious that the likelihood for

reconciliation is restricted when there is a sense of injustice by one side of the community. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, there are numerous statements that could be coded with ‘To perceive Saville as inappropriate’ as well as ‘To perceive Saville as biased’. It was relatively striking, that one of the witnesses, who presumably belonged to the Provisional IRA and still has strong affiliation to the Republican movement, stated that “I do not wish to express any disrespect to the gentlemen on the panel as I am sure they are all honourable, but I continue to have suspicions as to the level of political involvement which may be applied to the final outcome.” (Member of the Provisional IRA, 2004). As a Republican and being most likely a Catholic, too, one would expect him to side with the Bloody Sunday families. If the families who lost one of their beloveds consent to the Inquiry and its chair – as it was outlined earlier, Lord Saville and the process is generally perceived positively by the families – others should be fine with the process and its chair, too. Similarly critical, but from the opposite political faction, The Right Honorable The Lord Kilklooney of Armagh argued that “I suspect that this Inquiry will not now get sufficiently accurate information to reach accurate conclusions, and regrettably I think that this Inquiry could be influenced by Irish Nationalist propaganda.” (The Right Honorable The Lord Kilklooney of Armagh, 2002). Both witnesses are suspicious that the Inquiry is biased and influenced by the respective opposing political faction. Unionist politicians like The Right Honorable The Lord Kilklooney of Armagh were generally skeptical of the Inquiry as it is confirmed by the interviews and a personal contact with a major Unionist party. However, the criticism of the Unionist side usually aimed at the costs of the Inquiry. In a personal email from a major Unionist party, the official policy was stated as follows:

So far the Inquiry has cost the state £52million, 2/3 of this amount are the fees charged by the lawyers, we feel this is an exorbitant sum of money which would be much better employed in the national health service or in our schools. We also feel the amount of time and money that has been spent on this Inquiry singles out Bloody Sunday from every other atrocity in terms of fairness and recognition of the victims. We fear the Inquiry is not uncovering the whole truth and that it has become one sided.

Both statements, the statement of the Irish Republican as well as the statement of The Right Honorable The Lord Kilklooney of Armagh, indicate that the extreme political positions within Republicanism and Unionism are critical and anxious of the Inquiry. Potentially, both sides fear losses – the Republican when the final report states that there were Provisional IRA gunmen at the scene on Bloody Sunday and the Unionist when

the final report concludes that the British Army committed murder and has to be held accountable for it.

The remaining category of the Null-Codebook is 0-Peace. The codes within the category are allocated clearly: Figure 21 shows that ‘To be unwell’ is the code that was used the most for the category 0-Peace. A closer look at the types of codes that were used, reveals that four out of six codes addressed emotional issues (‘To be threatened/pressured by danger, care, anxiety, apprehension or doubt’, ‘to be unwell’, ‘To feel separated’, and ‘To disharmonize’). As for the category 0-Justice, the fact that Peace was only coded once for the Codebook (Figure 13) confirms that findings about 0-Peace. The perception of peace is obviously very negative.




Figure 22: Null-Codebook 0-Peace

Figure 22 shows that most codes of the category 0-Peace could be applied on statements of Civilian witnesses, whereas Widgery soldiers as well as Non-Widgery soldiers share the remaining number of codes.




Figure 23: Distribution of codes for the category 0-Peace among the witness groups

Most of the Civilian statements that were coded with ‘To be unwell’ refer to an emotional status that was triggered by Bloody Sunday. The intensity of emotional involvement varied between the statements. Michael Dominic Clarke, for example, gave the following account:

I am guilt ridden by Bloody Sunday. I have lived with the thought that if I had not joined the movement Bloody Sunday may not have happened. This is because the IRA was the excuse which the British Army took to shoot 14 innocent people. I have lived with this for 35 years. Would people still be alive? I want closure for the families and hopefully, closure for me. I am a rebel with a conscience. (Clarke, 2003).

Louis McKinney, who was already cited numerously with regard to his statements that indicated mercy towards the perpetrators, stated:

I couldn't say the date or the year that my brother was shot. I don't say to people that my brother was murdered on Bloody Sunday. I just say that he was killed. For 30 years I have wrestled with my guilt. Gerry wanted to go home that day and I told him that nothing would happen and so he stayed. I have never spoken to Gerry's eldest boy, Kevin, and his other children about their father. I didn't realise how much I had blocked out. I have worked from 7.30am-10.00pm every night and even on Sundays to try to cope. My family, Frances and my two girls, called

me a workaholic, but I worked because I felt guilty about Gerry's death, because I was at Bloody Sunday and, as such, I must have contributed somehow by attending the march. Nearly every hour of every day I live with it. (McKinney, 1999).

As it was outlined earlier, Louis McKinney made powerful statements in which he showed that he forgave the perpetrators of his brother's death as it was discussed in a previous section. On the other hand, as it can be seen in this statement, he has not forgiven himself. McKinney seems to suffer "survivor guilt" (Lifton cited in Herman, 1997: 53) which is "especially severe when the survivor has been a witness to the suffering or death of other people. To be spared oneself, in the knowledge that others have met a worse fate, creates a severe burden of conscience." (Ibid: 54). He may show reconciliatory gestures towards the other side, but not to himself, because he blames himself for the death of his brother even though he could not have done anything for his brother. Even though, his mercy indicating statements imply that he got to terms with the past and forgave the other side, the case might not be as easy as it seems at first glance. Of course, he is expressing forgiveness in a public forum but inside him it looks differently. His self-blame should not be underestimated: it can be an indicator of Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD). If this is really the case, a treatment of PTSD may change his now positive attitude towards the other side, to a more negative one because he learns to accept that it was not his fault that his brother died but a crime committed by the other side.

Another interesting finding of the category 0-Peace was how the witnesses see the impact of Bloody Sunday on the Troubles. Figure 22 reveals that mostly Civilian witnesses gave account in this regard. Brendan Duddy, one of the Civilian witnesses, said:

My feeling is that the Bloody Sunday killings legitimised a more open fighting situation. Up until that point, the community exercised reasonable control, but that control was lost as a result of what happened and we headed into 30 years of conflict. (Duddy, unknown).

Similar to Brendan Duddy, Kathleen Marie Doherty argued that

They should have just listened to the people. Bloody Sunday has only made people more determined. I think that had the march just been allowed to go through, perhaps there would not have been the last 30 years of trouble. (Doherty, K. 1999).

A soldier of the Parachute Regiment, who stayed anonymous, gave an alike account: "What is really at stake is bigger than pursuing individuals and private

retribution. The whole incident served as a catalyst and spawned an escalation in violence, with the ensuing death and misery of thousands of people and the blight of many more lives.” (Soldier 027, 2000). Another soldier of the Parachute Regiment whose identity was also kept undisclosed, provided insight how his personal life has changed due to Bloody Sunday:

I lost a lot of friends in Northern Ireland and I think Bloody Sunday contributed to a lot of the incidents that took place later [...] I feel guilty about the subsequent effects of Bloody Sunday particularly when I think about the friends I lost in Northern Ireland. (Soldier 202, 2000).

Though the statement of this soldier is singular among the statements that were analyzed, the soldier becomes humanized though it: he is not any longer only a member of the Parachute Regiment that presumably shot the fourteen men but he becomes a person who lost friends due to Bloody Sunday and the subsequent Troubles. The statement shows how interchangeable the roles of victim and perpetrator are.

The diversification of the indicators within all 0-codes may be due to the higher overall number of the indicators in contrast to the number of indicators of all codes. It shows that the sample of witnesses of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry do not have a homogenous view on Bloody Sunday, the Troubles and the other side in general.

Eventually, the dominance of the civilians in all statements may be traced back to the fact that they constitute the biggest group of witnesses. Nearly half of the entire sample is composed of statements from civilians. This may be at least a technical explanation for their domination. Another potential explanation is that the civilians might be in general more willing to talk about Bloody Sunday than for example the soldiers who would even refuse to give their statement in the Guildhall in Derry. The Inquiry might be considered as platform by the big group of civilians where they are given the chance to speak out in public, in an officially sanctioned forum about what they saw on Bloody Sunday, what they think about Bloody Sunday, and how they perceive the other side. Unlike the army witnesses who presumably did not want a new Inquiry into Bloody Sunday, the civilians – at least the families and those who feel affiliated with them – had finally the chance to grasp the attention of the public concerning the issue of Bloody Sunday.

5.4 The Expert and Medical Witnesses

The Expert and Medical witness were intentionally left out of the content analysis. As stated in the above, an initial screening of the statements of these two groups indicated that they would not entail data relevant for this research. The Expert witnesses focus on forensic questions such as firearms, explosives, that is to say, the ballistic evidence and the types of wounds the victims had. The witnesses examined the findings of the Department of Industrial and Forensic Sciences (DIFS) from 1972. A particular focal point is the work of Dr. John Martin, a principal scientific officer at DIFS in 1972. For Lord Chief Justice Widgery, Dr. Martin's report together with the evidence given by the soldiers, meant proof enough that those who died on Bloody Sunday had fired or handled weapons, or were close to them (Mullin, 1999). The Experts witnesses cast doubt on Dr. Martin's findings from 1972 and even Dr. Martin himself in his statement to the Saville Inquiry confirmed that his findings from 1972 could be interpreted differently nowadays (Martin, 1999). The Medical witnesses concentrate on closely related issues: examination of the corpses, autopsy procedures, examination of clothes and nail bombs as well as general statements on the work at DIFS. Consequently, Expert as well as Medical witnesses deal with facts whereas the statements of all other witnesses reflect the perception of the respective witness.

Dr. Martin's statement to the Saville Inquiry, together with the findings by the Expert witnesses, appear to be of highest interest for the tribunal because they back up the claims made by the families of Bloody Sunday, namely that their family members did not carry any weapons nor nail bombs with them when they were shot by the army (Mullin, 1999).

The analysis of the findings showed how emotionally involved people still are by Bloody Sunday. This observation holds true for both large groups, Civilian witness as well as soldiers.

6

Conclusion

If one was to make a judgment whether the Bloody Sunday Inquiry promotes national reconciliation¹⁶ in Northern Ireland, yes or no, the answer would be most likely no. The findings from the content analysis as well as the interviews showed that indicators for reconciliation are rare. On the contrary, indicators for the opposite of reconciliation are frequent. Consequently, the contribution of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry to the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland seems low. How can this finding be linked to the existing literature?

Two major issues should be taken into consideration. Galtung (2001) points out that in order to achieve reconciliation, it is inevitable that an adequate combination of numerous approaches is used. Galtung in total refers to twelve approaches to reconciliation in which the “Historical/Truth commission” approach is only one among many (Galtung, 2001: 12). Galtung’s idea that a combination of approaches is needed in order to accomplish reconciliation is crucial for the interpretation of the findings. As was discussed in the literature review, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry belongs to the category of historical truth commissions (Hayner, 2002). When Galtung’s theory is applied, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry thus is only one particular approach to reconciliation. It may contribute to the reconciliation process, but does not achieve reconciliation. Indeed, the findings suggest that the process of the Inquiry does not even contribute to the reconciliation process because the indicators for reconciliation are too few for having a substantial impact. As pointed out earlier, the report may have another impact, but the process itself did not endorse reconciliation. Still, the launching of the

¹⁶ In the following section, the term reconciliation is equated to national reconciliation. Other cases will be indicated.

report might cause some difficulties as was outlined in the findings. First of all, it entails a challenge for the families themselves. One of the interviewees – a person from the governmental institution – suggested that the families may not so easily close the book of Bloody Sunday even if Saville publishes a report that is acceptable for them. To deal with a particular issue for 36 years implies that it has taken an enormous role in peoples' lives and it might be hard for them to actually leave the past behind when Saville launches the report. Another challenge might be, what happens when only a couple of families accept the report whereas other families are still not content with it. Would the group of families split and the one part continues campaigning whereas the other part turns the page? Furthermore, a positive reception of the report on the one side of the community does not necessarily mean an affirmative reception on the other side. Protestants – though it is simplistic to generalize – may feel threatened by the outcome of the Inquiry since it may confirm the account of the “other side”. In addition, the Protestant community may feel neglected because hardly any attention was paid to their sufferings. As it was outlined in the findings, the contact person from a major Unionist party claimed that the huge attention put on Bloody Sunday means a disregard of other victims of the conflict (Anonymous, personal communication, 01/05/2006). The interviewee who works for a governmental institution in Northern Ireland expounded the problem of perception of the major attention on Bloody Sunday, too:

So people trying to, you know, got to understand these things are personal and for people who have been very badly affected directly, personally themselves, they do tend to make these comparisons... and it is not necessarily based on a huge knowledge of why the Bloody Sunday Inquiry has taken all the shift that it has and the costs that it has and so on but it is just a human reaction, you know, that somebody else's problems receiving more attention than the one's that are closer to home for them. (Ploss, 2006c).

Taking this concern into account, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry may do harm rather than promoting the reconciliation process when there is no initiative for dealing with the past that includes all sides of the community.

Still, the Inquiry can generally be considered as a contribution because it aims at revealing the truth about Bloody Sunday. Even though, the Inquiry may not impact on the reconciliation process positively, the Inquiry contributes to the revelation of the truth about a particular event of the Northern Irish conflict. Still, it may have a symbolic value for others who can identify with the case but are not directly affected by it. The

fact that the British government took up its responsibility about Bloody Sunday can change the others' attitude towards the British side.

Generally, taking the question whether the Inquiry promotes reconciliation in Northern Ireland into consideration, the Inquiry's influence has to be thought through carefully since the overall effect is uncertain because none of the other approaches to reconciliation take place at the same time. As just stated, a generic process of dealing with the past in Northern Ireland is missing. Due to that, one can argue that the process of the Inquiry may be in vain eventually because it is not accompanied by any other approach to reconciliation. In addition, as it was laid out in the literature review, a truth commission in itself does not bring reconciliation. Other factors such as the societal and individual readiness to change, play a crucial role for the achievement of reconciliation (Hayner, 2002). To what degree this readiness exists in Northern Ireland is arguable, when Hamber's (2006) argument about the sense of fear towards the idea of reconciliation is taken into consideration. The interviewee from the governmental institution shares Hamber's skepticism:

The perception is that South Africa reached the political settlement at a certain point in time in which there was general agreement, if not universal agreement and therefore they can move on. The perception in Northern Ireland is that we haven't reached that agreement, yet so therefore, truth and reconciliation process operating in the middle of that there will be problems, there are perceived to be problems in actually doing that. So I think that's one of the basic differences but there may be other issues about that but as you know, at that moment in time there has not been any decision to do it, that's where we are. So in the sense Bloody Sunday is one offer for one particular incidence but there is no general approach to the whole subject because as I said, I don't think that people see a clear path. (Ploss, 2006c).

Hamber's as well as the interviewee's observation confirms simultaneously two arguments of Hayner: first, the just mentioned one that people have to be ready to change and secondly, Hayner's (Ibid) argument about the distinction between national and individual reconciliation. If, according to Hamber, reconciliation means to give up or change their identity to Northern Irish people, it is certainly more challenging to achieve individual reconciliation. Identity, as John Burton (1979) argues, is one of the basic human needs which's suppression or threat necessarily leads to some degree of aggression. Thus, individual reconciliation in Northern Ireland still has to tackle major challenges.

The literature review also showed that the scope of a truth commission is not necessarily as comprehensive as planned. Hayner (2002) underlines that generally the

expectations of what a truth commission can achieve are higher than what eventually is attained. Possibly, this phenomenon may take place with regard to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, too. In his opening statement, Tony Blair raised high expectations when he said that the Inquiry hopefully contributes to reconciliation, but the content analysis, as well the interviews showed that there are few indicators for reconciliation within the process of the Inquiry and in addition, that the process tends to be perceived negatively by the Unionist community as well as other victims who did not receive the same amount of attention as the Bloody Sunday families did. The rise of high expectations might be due to the fact that Blair indeed knows the necessity for reconciliation in Northern Ireland but it also reveals that he, as a top level politician, is not aware of the challenges to reconciliation processes and the fact that rising high expectations in the sensitive issue of reconciliation might do harm.

If the Saville Inquiry in its function as a truth seeking body disappoints or not is certainly closely related to first, by the final report and second, by which side of the community is asked. The first point cannot be answered in this research because the report has not yet been published. Some interviewees argued, however, that their judgment about the Saville Inquiry is highly related to the report. Thus, the report has to be awaited before Hayner's observation about truth commissions can be verified or falsified. If not the report but the process is reflected on, one may argue that it actually led to some disappointment. First of all, the findings from the content analysis suggest that there are hardly any indicators for reconciliation within the statements that were given to the Inquiry. Secondly, as it was outlined earlier, some of the interviews as well as a personal email from a major Unionist party suggest that the perception of the Inquiry is not positive. Rather, the general tone – one has to be aware that generalizations must be handled with care because representative data was not gathered through the interviews – indicates that the Inquiry is viewed negatively. Few reasons were given: the other victims who do not receive this huge attention and the enormous costs of the Inquiry. The question of the costs of the Inquiry is an argument that is usually deployed by the Unionist side. Though none of the interviewees was from an explicit Unionist faction, nearly all interviewees gave references to the argument of the costs of the Inquiry. The interviewee from the governmental institution stated as follows:

But the comments that are generally made about the Bloody Sunday Inquiry are the costs of it which I am sure you have heard about; and also that a comparison is

drawn between the amount of effort which is going in and again this is about the costs of it but the amount of effort which has going in the Bloody Sunday Inquiry as opposed to inquiries into the large number of other incidences. (Ploss, 2006c).

The interviewee who was directly affected by Bloody Sunday provides a similar insight into the argument about the costs. However, the interviewee is highly critical of the Unionist view:

I am talking about mostly from politicians, you know the DUP and UUP and so on. The main cry is about the costs of the Inquiry. They don't recognize the costs of Bloody Sunday in relation to pain over the years, you know. So the only they could grip about is the 165 million pounds as costs now for the Inquiry. Nothing else matters to them. (Ploss, 2006a).

One of the other interviewees, who is affiliated with a political party other than the Unionist parties, appeared unfavorable of the Unionist point of view, too:

An interesting point, a lot of Unionists have been very critical of the costs of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry as if it was the fault of the families of those who campaigned for it, as if it was they to be blamed for the fact that this Inquiry was very expensive [...]The families can't be blamed and it is very disingenuous, Unionist politicians who try to suggest that it is the families' fault that the costs have rolled up over the years in this Inquiry and of course this would [inaudible] Unionist politicians who would have supported legal challenges to the Inquiry over the years that it went on. They would have supported legal challenges that would have added to the costs of the Inquiry significantly and then they criticized the increased costs that the Inquiry would build up. So there is hypocrisy there and there is also disingenuity as the some of the Unionist are trying to suggest that this is the making of the families but it wasn't. They didn't choose the mechanism but the British government did and we hope that it delivers what the families need and what people would more broadly need as well. (Ploss, 2006d).

Indeed, the costs are a sensitive issue. Another interviewee, who is also affiliated with a major political party in Northern Ireland outlines the problem in the following way:

I have no doubt that the costs of the Inquiry had made it easy for people to undermine it. The costs are, in sheer monetary terms, are massive; that it has allowed people to say that lawyers were receiving a phenomenal amount of money and people are very cynical about that, so therefore that observation chops off and feed in to the sense that this Inquiry, you know, everybody knows what happened, so why did it take 200 million pounds, which is nearly 300 million Euro, why did it take that much to do this Inquiry. I think, in the mean that people out there are reasonably satisfied that the families were granted which they sought, in other words that was an Inquiry to address not only the wrongs of the killing of the people but the wrong that Widgery has trying to justify. (Ploss, 2006b).

It is interesting, that the interviewee who was cited as last, assumes that the other people apart from the Bloody Sunday families are satisfied that the Bloody Sunday families got what they sought for. This argument is contradictory to the one provided by the interviewee of the governmental institution who claimed that the major political and financial attention Bloody Sunday received, was perceived negatively by other victims. If the affiliation of both interviewees is taken into closer consideration, a possible explanation might be that the interviewee from the political party does not want to trigger a split within the community he is mainly representing. Thus, he claims that ‘people’ were satisfied that the Bloody Sunday families got what they campaigned for. The interviewee from the governmental institution may have due to his position that is kept undisclosed a different insight into the issue of competing victimhood. Consequently, looking at the process of the Inquiry and taking the account of the interviewees into consideration, confirms Hayner’s view that truth commissions do not necessarily bring about peace and reconciliation.

The other interesting finding that was made during the interviews and the stay in Northern Ireland is whether Bloody Sunday and its Inquiry generally have influenced the Northern Irish society and, if yes, up to what degree. Again, Hayner’s work provides the theoretical basis for the conclusion. Often, truth commissions have been significantly cut down “from a full and fair accounting of the past.” (Hayner, 2000: 347). The Bloody Sunday Inquiry itself faced numerous difficulties, such as the move from Derry to London to hear the evidence of the soldiers who claimed to fear for their lives if they were to go to Derry or the destruction or sale of rifles used by the soldiers on duty on Bloody Sunday (Mullin, 2000). These actions certainly constituted interferences into the process which might have restrained the Inquiry from taking a meticulous look into the past. Hence, these constraints could have influenced the Inquiry’s overall contribution to the reconciliation process. Hamber (2006) argues that the way how the Inquiry was set-up bore problems: unlike in the case of South Africa, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was not set up through a joint political process in which all parties had a say. Rather, it was passed by the Prime Minister. The difficulty in that action has been that one community perceived the Inquiry as a win, whereas the announcement of the Inquiry was seen as a loss by the other (Hamber, 2006). This proceeding has certainly limited the chances of the Inquiry to promote reconciliation since it already had a negative start. As a policy recommendation, it would be advisable to set up any future inquiry through a joint decision making process in which all

political parties would have a say. This joint decision making process can ensure that this future inquiry will be accepted on both sides of the community. Consequently, the inquiry's chances for promoting reconciliation might be higher.

One may also look at the Inquiry from another perspective: Inquiry's exclusive preoccupation with Bloody Sunday inherently limited its possibility to contribute to or to promote the reconciliation process because it focuses solely on one particular event. It may have some symbolic value for others who identify with the case but if this is actually taken place in Northern Ireland, where competing victimhood plays a role, is arguable. High expectations are therefore unreasonable since the Inquiry cannot live up to them. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry is not a broad truth commission that deals with the whole legacy of the conflict in Northern Ireland. This claim is supported by some of the interviews as well as personal conversations with people in Northern Ireland. Bloody Sunday and the Inquiry is predominantly an issue for the Bloody Sunday families and people who feel affiliated with them. It is open to discussion if Bloody Sunday has much meaning for other victims of the Troubles. Indeed, according to Derek Brown (2000), Bloody Sunday is a landmark in the Northern Ireland conflict not so much due to its bloodiness but rather due to the fact that "British commanders told British soldiers to fire on British citizens in a British city" (Ibid). As a result, Bloody Sunday cannot be neglected, it certainly has a symbolic value, but as some of the interviews suggest, it cannot be overestimated either. Other victims of the conflict were perhaps not influenced by the Inquiry at all – neither by the process nor by the report – because they are concerned about their personal losses rather than the suffering of the Bloody Sunday families as it was argued earlier by one of the interviewees. The Inquiry can, however, affect others in a way if these other victims develop a sense of competing victimhood as it was pointed out by Montville (1997). Competing victimhood most obviously may occur between the Catholic and the Protestant community – a phenomenon that actually takes place according to Curran et al. (2003) – but it may also take place within the Catholic community. The public attention has been heavily focused on the high profile case of Bloody Sunday and so did eventually the attention of the British government since it set up a new very costly Inquiry into the happenings of Bloody Sunday. Both may trigger a sense of competition among victims but this assumption cannot be validated with the data that was analyzed. Still, Hamber (2006) argues that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry even though it focused only at one particular event, does not create competing victimhood. The Inquiry may severe it but the sense of competing

victimhood did not begin in the Inquiry. Further research is necessary to present a satisfactory answer.

This research provided a first account of the impact of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry on the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland. The research outlined that the expectations of the Inquiry raised by Blair are excessive. Indeed, reconciliation is an easy and catchy term to use by politicians but politicians usually are usually not aware of the major challenges of reconciliation processes. Furthermore, as a historical truth commission that has not yet been analyzed comprehensively, it may be added as a newcomer to Hayner's (2002) list of other historical truth commissions.

Implications for Future Research

This Master's thesis offers numerous departure points for further research. First and foremost, it is of great interest what will happen when Saville eventually publishes the final report of the Inquiry. The question of how it will be perceived and if the report impacts on the relationships between the families of the victims of Bloody Sunday and other victims on the Catholic side or if the report influences the relationship to the Protestant side is certainly a topic worth investigating. The research and especially the interviews allude to another issue that deserves scholarly attention: how to deal with the sense of competing victimhood between the Catholic and Protestant side but also within the particular communities and how does this sense of competing victimhood impact on the reconciliation process?

The interviews as well as the research trip to Northern Ireland made clear that Northern Ireland needs a generic mechanism of dealing with the past. A generic mechanism should be something that takes the entire legacy of the Northern Ireland into consideration and aims at addressing this legacy comprehensively and satisfactorily. The idea of a generic mechanism for dealing with the past was suggested by most interviewees. First steps have already been conducted in this direction: the non-governmental organization Healing Through Remembering will publish an options report about potential mechanisms of how to deal with the past in the year of 2006.

Another interesting point for future research would be to conduct interviews with Louis McKinney who seems to have to come to terms with the past. It would be valuable to find out how he managed to forgive the other side and to find out how to relate the, on the one hand, forgiveness indicating statements, on the other hand, self-blame revealing statements can be linked. The results from such a study could offer a lot for the work with victims of violent conflicts.

When looking at the Northern Ireland conflict, one more general thought comes to mind. Can reconciliation or something like it in Northern Ireland exist at all? The word reconciliation refers to restoring the relationship of adversaries. This again implies that there must have been a point in time where the relationships between both parties were actually good or at least determined by peaceful coexistence (Jacobsson Hatay, 2005). However, what if the relationship was marked by unilateral dominance by one side and exploitation of the other? The historical overview has shown that the relationship between Irish and British, or Catholics and Protestants was constantly loaded with problems. Jacobsson Hatay (2005) states that reconciliation efforts have to aim at transforming the relationship of the adversaries and “thus to make them inherently less conflictual” (2005: 55). If this is not done, unhealed wounds of the society or of individual victims can continue to fester even if the fight is terminated (Hayner, 2002: 133). Unhealed wounds can brew subliminally and threaten an artificial or not fully accepted peace. Hamber (2006) states one of the most compelling arguments why reconciliation is so difficult to achieve in Northern Ireland: the lack of a shared political vision. Consequently, if this shared vision could be established somehow, reconciliation might be more likely to achieve. Research on how this shared vision could be established seems, therefore, compelling as well as urgent to conduct.

Appendix

8.1 Map of the Republic of Ireland



Figure 24: Map of the Republic of Ireland – Source: Map of Ireland, 2006

8.2 Map of Northern Ireland



Figure 25: Map of Northern Ireland - Source: Map of Ireland, 2006

8.3 Street Map of the Bogside/ Derry




Figure 26: Street Map of the Bogside/ Derry - Source: McClean, 1997

8.4 The Codebook

Truth	Mercy	Justice	Peace
To acknowledge	To accept	To have equal access to economical and political power.	To harmonize
To validate a painful loss and experience.	To validate the other side's (the offender's) story.	To be equal under the law.	To agree on feelings
To recognize a wrong and unacceptable (decent human standards) action.	To perceive the other positively/ favorably	To have equal moral worth of each person.	To feel united
To confess wrongs	To forgive	Even	To agree or be one

committed.			in feeling, opinion, purpose, or action.
To reveal information.	To let go resentment against the other side.	To be treated fairly	To be well
To make things transparent.	Less motivated to take revenge on the offender.	To be hold accountable for crimes committed.	To be safe
To be unambiguous about the past.	Less motivated to avoid the offender.	To compensate the victim/ victim's family financially	To be free from danger, care, anxiety, apprehension, or doubt.
To be authentic	To support the offender.	To perceive Widgery as appropriate.	To respect the other side.
To be honest	To act in ways that benefit the offender or the relationship with the offender.		To be respected.
To be accurate	To be compassionate.		To be esteemed or honored.
To be reliable	To acknowledge a suffering on the other side and/ or a shared suffering.		To accord
To be credible	To humanize the other side.		
	To perceive the other side positively		
	To restore the relationship to a sound condition.		
	Clement		
	Lenient toward the other side.		
	To seek for a positive relationship with the other side		

Table 3: The Codebook

8.5 The Null-Codebook

0 - Truth	0 - Mercy	0 - Justice	0 - Peace
To deny	To reject the other side's story	Unequal access to economical and political power.	To disharmonize
To refute	To not forgive.	To be unequal under the law.	To disagree on feelings
To reject	To perceive the other negatively and malevolent.	Unequal moral worth of each person.	To feel separated
To rebuff	To condemn the other side or the other side's story.	Uneven	To disagree on opinion, purpose, or action.
To contradict	To keep resentment against the other side.	To be treated unfairly	To be unwell.
To disagree with	(Highly) motivated to take revenge on the offender.	To be not hold accountable for crimes committed.	To be insecure
To refuse	(Highly) motivated to avoid the offender.	To not compensate the victim/ victim's family financially	To be threatened/ pressured by danger, care, anxiety, apprehension, or doubt.
To disallow	To oppose the offender.	To inhibit equal treatment	To disrespect the other side.
To decline	To act in ways that worsen the offender or the relationship with the offender.	To oppose rights of others.	To be de-evaluated.
To turn down	To be unfeeling.	To de-legitimize the rights/ positions of others.	To be dishonored
To repudiate	To de-evaluate/ deny a suffering on the other side and/ or a shared suffering.	To perceive the jurisdiction as biased.	To disaccord

To renounce	To dehumanize the other side.	To perceive Saville as biased.	Hostile
To disavow	Wintry towards the other side.	To perceive Widgery as biased.	To severe the Troubles.
To disown	Ruthless		
To ignore	Relentless		
To disregard			
To close the eyes to			
To take no notice of			
To pay no attention to			
To don't take into account			
To discount			
To overlook			
To turn your back to			
To flout			
To look right through			
To lie			
To deceit			
To cheat			

Table 4: The Null-Codebook

8.6 Graphics about the Findings from Content Analysis




Figure 27: Distribution of indicators within Justice




Figure 28: Distribution of indicators within Peace

8.7 The Questionnaires for the Interviews

Interview questions – victims/ representatives

1. What do you think about the Bloody Sunday Inquiry?
2. Did you follow the hearings regularly?
3. What do you think about the fact that the inquiry was set up by the British government?
 - a. Did this have an impact on the process of the inquiry in your opinion?
 - b. Would you change anything in the procedure of the inquiry?
 - c. How do you perceive the role of international actors (like the US through George Mitchell, or the EU) in the set-up of the inquiry? Do you think this influenced decision making process that led to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry?
4. Do you feel acknowledged as a victim?
 - a. By the British government.
 - b. By people (Protestants) at the community level.
5. How do you feel about the other side since the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was set up?
6. Do you think that such an inquiry should be repeated?
7. Do you think inquiries/ truth commissions like this are useful?
8. How do you perceive the current state of the peace process in Northern Ireland?
 - a. What do you consider the major obstacles for reconciliation/ relationship transformation in Northern Ireland?

Interview questions – policy makers, NGOs

1. What do you think about the Bloody Sunday Inquiry?

2. Did you follow the hearings regularly?

3. What do you think about the fact that the inquiry was set up by the British government?
 - a. Did this have an impact on the process of the inquiry?
 - b. Does it have any impact on the peace process in Northern Ireland (a British government acknowledges that the previous investigation through the Widgery Tribunal was no sufficient)?
 - c. Would you change anything in the procedure of the inquiry?
 - d. How do you perceive the role of international actors (like the US through George Mitchell, or the EU) in the set-up of the inquiry? Do you see any influence of them on that decision making process that led to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry?

4. Do you think that such an inquiry should be repeated?

5. Can you observe any change in relationships with the other side due to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry?
 - a. At the community level.
 - b. At the policy level

6. How do you perceive the current state of the peace process in Northern Ireland?
 - a. What do you consider to be the major obstacles for reconciliation/ relationship transformation in Northern Ireland?

9

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9.1 Maps

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